CHAPTER IV

TURKEY AND THE UN ACTION ON GULF-WAR

The ‘Gulf Crisis’ was regarded as a ‘make or break’ issue for the United Nations. The Kuwait issue demonstrated the limitations of the political expediency which had governed international relations in the cold war era. Certainly the United Nations figured prominently in the crisis, ostensibly one side of the crisis was being conducted by the United Nations or it was being conducted by the United States on behalf of the United Nations. In the conflict between East and West, the countries of the Third World were regarded as pawns in a game of super power chess, exploited by one or the other powers no matter what suffering was imposed on their people. The role of the United Nations was a complex one and there is a degree of misperception or misunderstanding regarding the nature of the United Nations, its purposes and functions, what it can and cannot do and perhaps, there are unrealistic popular expectations about what the United Nations can achieve. In the Middle East “every political convulsion in that region was seen as a plus or a minus in the great geo-political game, depending on weather it was viewed from Moscow or from Washington.”

1 John Bulloch and Harrey Morris: Saddam’s war the origin of the Kuwait conflict and the International Response; London: Faber and Faber; 1991; p.162.
The Iraqi "invasion and occupation of Kuwait was the first instance since the founding of the organisation in which one member State sought to completely overpower and annex another".\textsuperscript{2} The unique demands presented by this situation have summoned forth innovative measures which have given new practical expression to the charter's concepts of how international peace and security might be maintained. By the use of sanctions and other enforcement measures the UN has broken new ground as peace-maker, peace-keeper and peace-builder.

While Saddam Hussain's invasion of Kuwait surprised every government, the developed world was better prepared to face the consequences than the developing world. The latter have shown their total helplessness to resolve a Third World dispute. The US, not in the least reluctant, was called in and is unlikely to leave West Asia in a hurry. Meanwhile, most Third World countries are faced with bankruptcy and a penal fall in economic activity. The one bright feature in the international scenario is the more effective functioning of the UN. Though this will depend largely on the continuation of the entente between the US and the USSR. South Asia driven by domestic strife in many countries and harbouring half of the world's population of the poorest human beings, will clearly be the worst

\textsuperscript{2} The UN and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict 1990-1996; Department of Public Information, UN, New York; The UN Blue Book Series, Vol.IX; 1996; p.3.
hit. More than in other parts of the world, responsible leaders in every sphere of life in South Asia are called upon to think anew. The actual unfolding of events leading to the Iraqi conquest of Kuwait might have surprised the US but they had anticipated that Third World conflicts would continue to threaten their interests despite the end of the cold war.

On “2nd August 1990, Iraqi armed forces crossed into Kuwaiti territory and invaded that country”. The “Security Council met to demand Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait.” And the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam was a gamble which he felt obliged to take out of economic necessity but one which might have done better had he delayed it for several years until he had become militarily stronger in relation to outside powers. And the US and the European powers still had large standing armies equipped with the world’s most sophisticated weaponry and the relaxation of tension in Europe allowed them rapidly to switch forces to the new theatre of operations in the Gulf. No other “crisis in the history of the UN had elicited such attention and action from the council in such a short span of time”, than the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq. And for that matter, Saddam Hussain should not have been surprised

3 The Blue Helmets: A review of UNs Peace Keeping, Third Edition; Published by UNs Department of Public Information, New York; 1996; p.681.
4 The UN and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict 1990-1996, The UNs Blue Book Series - Vol. IX; Published by UNs department of Public Information; New York; 1996; p.3.
5 Ibid; p.3.
by the US response nor that of the NATO countries to his adventure or misadventure. So far as the NATO is concerned, he might have been deceived that the "NATO’s London declaration did not hold out any specific threat to Third World countries, he seems to have overlooked Secretary General Manfred Woerner’s reference to the NATO’s role outside Europe."

Another significant development by the UN Secretary General, Javier Perez de Cuellar that dropped a ‘bombshell’, the explosive power of which nearly matches that of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. He had said that the unanimous “UN resolution merely called for sanctions which meant that member countries had been directed not to have any trade relations with the offender.” Mounting a naval blockade or deploying ships to physically prevent import or export of commodities does not have UN approval and hence is illegal. Simply put, the USA and the UK were on their own in threatening to use force to commercially isolate Iraq. Thus the presence of the mighty US and British naval armada smacks of flexing of super-power military muscle. The violation of international law has embarrassed old and new friends of the USA, like France, Canada and Soviet Union who had not only distanced themselves from the blockade but had also bitterly complained about it.

7 Tribune; 16 August 1990; Chandigarh.
Since it moved with uncharacteristic speed to condemn Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and to impose legally binding sanctions, the UN has appeared to be acclaimed. Seemingly oblivious to the rising demands for UN action, the Secretary General had left ‘New York’ on a long planned tour of “Latin-America, while the Security Council had not met formally for nine days.”

There are two interpretations of the UN silence the first is that for the time being the UN had done all that was needed. The Security Council had called on Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait unconditionally and had imposed sanctions prohibiting trade with the aggressor. These are for individual states to observe. And the International community’s job is simply to monitor their compliance. To move to a UN blockade would inflame the situation unnecessarily. The second is that the US and UK had literally jumped on the gun by deciding to use “naval force if necessary to ensure compliance with the UN resolution. Where there was unity, they have created division, so reducing the chances of UN endorsement of military action.

The Security Council “resolution 661 passed on August 6 1991, cannot be fully effective unless backed by military force”, “imposed under Chapter VII of the Charter comprehensive and mandatory sanctions on Iraq and deciding not to recognize any regime set up in Kuwait by the occupying

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8 Times; 18 August 1990; London.
9 Ibid.
power.”

10 The UNs and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict - 1990-96; UN Blue Book Series; Vol.IX;
Published by UNs Department of Public Information; New York; 1996; p.15.

11 Deccan Herald; Bangalore, 1 September 1990.
always been to counter challenges to peace. The UN now has the opportunity to overcome the paralysis generally demonstrated when confronted by military conflicts in the past. The chief cause of such former conflict, the confrontation between the West and the Soviet Union, no longer exists. For the UN, the crisis resulting from Iraqi aggression against Kuwait become a touchstone for the international organisation's means of resolving conflicts.

The prevention of armed conflict is not only an important but also in the eyes of general public a particularly identifiable task of the UN.

The overriding task is always the joint action of states to attain common goals which each individual state is unable to attain alone. The Gulf-crisis is the most challenging test of this multilateralism so far. Never before has there been such an essential need for a multilateral solution. The way in which the Gulf-crisis was resolved will be highly significant for the assessment of how the UN will be able to find multilateral solutions to supranational problems in the future. The central features of the UN Charter are firstly its provisions regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes. That is for the resolution of disputes between member states before they reach the stage of 'overt military conflict'. And secondly its provisions regarding the notion of 'collective' security the collective commitment to go to the aid of a member state which is subject to aggression whether by a member or a non-member. A third feature which has become an important part of the actual
activity of the UN has been the mechanism it has developed for termination of conflicts and the policing of conditions of cease-fire pending the long term solution of disputes involving armed conflict. This “lia feature has arguably been the most successful feature of UNs activities throughout its existence.” But it is a feature for which there is no formal provision in the charter and the mechanisms for the initiation management of peacekeeping operations have been developed essentially by the General Assembly. However, the history of the UN in achieving resolution of disputes by peaceful means has been very unhappy. The high public expectations of the UN’s ability to resolve disputes and the high incidence of military conflict in the world consequent upon its failure to do. That there has been widespread disillusionment about the effectiveness of the UN and skepticism about whether it has any role at all to play in contemporary international system. And since the second world war, many wars have been fought in the Third World. And “since the 1960s, increasing extension of American-Soviet rivalries also weakened” the UN to act as impartial organization. Through the support of the Soviet Union and the US for the conflicting parties some of the Wars became proxy wars for the superpowers in the Third World was synonymous with safeguarding th...
own positions towards the other side. But the Gulf conflict, was a case in point where the Secretary General, 'Perez de-Cuellar', did not play a major role because essentially the major UN's actor was a member of the Security Council. Thus it was the US that was taking the leading role in the crisis, leaving little room for the Secretary General to play a part. During the crisis the "Security Council passed twelve resolutions beginning with Resolution 660 in the early hours of 2 August 1990, which condemned the Iraqi invasion and ending with Resolution 678 on 29 November 1990."14 Which authorized all necessary means to ensure the implementation of Resolution 660 "if it had not been complied with by 15th January 1991."15 The purpose of the first resolution (660) was essentially to define the invasion as a breach of international peace and security. And to place on record the demand of the Security Council that Iraq should withdraw from Kuwait and that the two parties should begin immediate attempts to resolve their dispute preferably within the context of the Arab League. This first resolution was a sort of holding operation which established the concern of the Security Council and signaled its intention to take some action. It had the effect of placing the issue on to the international agenda immediately without having to wait for an agreement or what should be done about it. In case the event was some four

15 Ibid., p.74.
days before the second Security Council Resolution (661) was passed, "imposing under Chapter VII of the charter comprehensive and mandatory sanctions on Iraq"\textsuperscript{16} and Kuwait covering all items except medical supplies and foodstuffs in humanitarian circumstances."\textsuperscript{17} It is worth emphasizing that nothing in the charter prohibits the Security Council from deploying peacekeeping forces without the consent of all the parties or from including troop contingents from the permanent members of the council. In such forces where the need for deterrence arises. The provision of troops by member states for deterrence operations would remain voluntary, as in other peacekeeping missions.

The 'ethos' of the UN is for 'peaceful settlement' of disputes and for the peaceful implementation of its resolutions. The idea that the imposition of sanctions is inherently a peaceful solution to the problem of aggression lies in the fact that sanctions are unlikely to be effective unless there is some mechanism to enforce compliance. This ultimately entails a willingness and an ability forcibly to prevent goods and materials from reaching and leaving the aggressor state. This implicit ethos of the UN very often puts the organization in the position of meeting the ends without providing the means

\textsuperscript{16} The UNs Blue Book Series : The Uns and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1991-1996. Published by UNs Department of Public Information; New York; 1996; p.15.

\textsuperscript{17} Ken Mathews : The Gulf Conflict and International Relations; Routledge, New York; 1993; p.74.
for the achievement of their policies. The tragic Gulf conflict between Saddam Hussain's army in Iraq and the coalition forces led by the US has not ended the moral ambiguities highlighted by it. Nor has it unraveled the complexities the ideological uncertainties and the intermeshing of old-fashioned national motivations with new global ideas. It is admitted by almost everyone today, including those most critical of the manner in which the Western world reacted to the conflict, that Saddam Hussain violated ordinary international law and especially in a world where there are many vulnerable small nation-states. It is also admitted that the historical justifications cited by Saddam Hussain for this invasion of Kuwait could be applied to many interstate borders in the post-colonial world in Asia and Africa. And there is very little left today of the romanticism about Iraq's crusade against the status quo in the Arab-Israel conflict. At the same time, the restoration of sovereignty to the people of Kuwait as a result of the military operation by the USA and the allied forces has left many doubts unresolved.

President 'George Bush' was waffling a lot about the new world order. He certainly was confused about whether the UN was useful or a nuisance. An explanation for the use of these "peacekeeping instruments is the fact that these measures of exercising military power envisaged in the UN Charter have been impossible upto now because of the general international political
situation. They also reflect the changed structure of the UN itself."\textsuperscript{18} The new states are almost exclusively small and very small Third World states. One of the indispensable key elements of the UN is the ‘one state, one vote’ resolution procedure. This means that there are two forms of developing a practical UN policy, through resolutions adopted by the majority or through a consensus. Due to the lack of an implementing executive the resolutions as such remain declaratory. The state urged to revise its conduct need to only declare the resolution invalid and the subject is deferred. A resolution can only be translated into action if it is based on the consensus of the states concerned. Another point is that, one can question “whether it will be logistically feasible for the UN to mount and maintain over a period of time, peacekeeping operations of sufficient size to provide a creditable deterrent. It can only be said that where the need for peacekeeping has been evident, as in Namibia, the magnitude of required support has not inhibited action.”\textsuperscript{19}

Consensus is the lifeblood of the UN. For peacekeeping it is generally and in particular of greater significance than was imaginable when the UN was founded immediately after the second world war. Against this background the possibility laid down in the UN Charter of also keeping the peace through

\textsuperscript{18} Hars Arnold: The Gulf Crisis and the UNs; Aussen Politik; Vol.42; 1991; p.71.
\textsuperscript{19} Bruce Russett and James S. Sutterlin: The UN in a New World Order; Foreign Affairs; Vol.70; No.2-3; 1991; p.72.
warfare does not represent an alternative to negotiated solutions. It is a last resort.

In the history of the last 40 years, the world has witnessed many wars in the West Asian region, this is for the first time that a great power rather than the sole superpower, the US has come from outside the area and is getting directly involved in the conflict. In the past, America had relied on what one may call the surrogates, the Shah of Iran and the Israelis in the fifties and sixties. They had built up the Shah in the Gulf region and Israel as a force in the eastern Mediterranean. The idea was that if any state ‘misbehaved’ it would be sanctioned by the surrogates. All that the Americans had to do was provide arms and give them the necessary backing so that they were of the American interests. But this situation changed after the fall and the rise of Khomeini which took Iran out of the American orbit. In fact Iran became a hostile force to America and that left its ally in the region. The other clients the Americans created in the oil rich states of the Gulf. Oil in essence represents the interests of America - the oil and nothing else. The war was certainly not a fight against dictatorship. All this is nonsense.

The thing to argue that sanctions can be an effective instrument of will achieve the desired objective of changing a state’s
behaviour. It is quite unrealistic to expect a sanctions policy that is not effectively enforced to achieve that objective. Thus the question arose as to whether ‘Resolution 661’ imposing mandatory sanctions was anything more than an exhortation upon members to refrain from trading with Iraq or Kuwait. In other words, yet another specific resolution authorising the use of force to effectively blockade Iraq was necessary. The US and Britain at least took the view throughout that in fact “Article 51 of the Charter conferred their right to furnish Kuwait with whatever assistance they jointly decided was appropriate independently of specific, and further Security Council authorisation.”\textsuperscript{20} Indeed “paragraph 9 of Resolution 661 declares that its provisions do not prohibit assistance to the legitimate government of Kuwait.”\textsuperscript{21} And it was on this basis that naval interceptions had taken place by US ships even some shots fired to deter sanctions breaking. Nevertheless the US for political reasons took the issue back to the Security Council after having to modify its previous reference to ‘minimum force’ to enforce sanctions to measures commensurate to the specific circumstances. The sanctions provision was further strengthened on “25 September with the

\textsuperscript{20} Ken Mathews : \textit{The Gulf Conflict and International Relations}; Routledge; New York, 1993; p.75.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
passing of Resolution 670 which extended the provision of Resolution 661 to include all means of transport including aircraft."

Pursuant to requests from Kuwait and the US, the Security Council convened within hours of the reports of Iraq’s invasion and adopted resolutions. The Security Council demanded that Iraq immediately and unconditionally withdraw all its forces from the soil of Kuwait. All the five permanent members of the Security Council voiced opposition to the invasion. the US called it a "heinous act", the Soviet Union expressed profound concern and alarm, France most firmly deplored Iraq's use of force, China stated that Iraqi troops should be withdrawn. And the United Kingdom said, this is an ugly moment in world affairs." Each also stressed the need for negotiation. Iraq's representative "stated that Iraqi troops had entered Kuwait solely in response to a request from the 'Free Provisional Government of Kuwait to assist it to establish security and order so that Kuwaitis would not have to suffer. And he declared that the Iraqi forces would withdraw as soon as order has been restored." Even the atmosphere outside the UNs was very volatile. On "3 August, the Gulf Cooperation Council condemned the brutal Iraqi aggression against the State of Kuwait and called upon Iraq to

22 Ibid.
23 The UNs Blue Book Series : The UNs and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict 1990-96; Published by UNs Department of Public Information; New York, 1996; p.14.
24 Ibid., p.15.
withdraw its forces immediately and unconditionally. The League of Arab states, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the European community”, 25 other regional groups and individual UN member states representing the breadth of world opinion also voiced their opposition. In all over the period between “2 August and 28 November 1990, the Council adopted 12 resolutions in connection with the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, culminating in resolution 678 (1990). The resolution was adopted on 29 November at a meeting where 13 members of the Security Council were represented by their Foreign Ministers, specified that if Iraq had not fully implemented by 15 January 1991 all of the Council’s resolutions relating to the occupation of Kuwait, Member states cooperating with Kuwait’s legitimate government were authorised to use all necessary means’ to compel Iraq to do so” 26 and restore international peace and security in the area. These several weeks before the deadline were seen as one final opportunity, a "pause of goodwill", for renewed diplomatic efforts to find a just and peaceful solution to the conflict. Despite the diplomatic initiatives of a number of Member States and efforts by the Secretary General, Iraq continued its occupation of Kuwait. Even the Secretary General issued an appeal in which he urged Iraq to comply with the relevant Security Council

25 Ibid.

26 The Blue Helmets : A review of UNs Peace Keeping; Published by UNs Department of Public Information; New York; 1996; p.681.
resolutions and thus to ‘turn the course of events away from catastrophe. The policy of the UN towards Iraq was one of condemning its behaviour and attempting to change that behaviour with the use of economic sanctions. But that was not the only source of coercion against Iraq. Parallel to the UN policy towards Iraq was the policy of the US whose military preparations were being conducted within the provisions of the UN's charter but without the specific authorization of the Security Council. “Article 51 of the Charter allows the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence which then takes place outside of the auspices of the United Nations. It was Resolution 678 which converted the US policy of military coercion against Iraq under Article 51 into a UN's policy of military coercion under Article 42, which allows such action as may be necessary to maintain and restore international peace and security.”27 However, such a UN's operation under Article 42 would not have been possible had not the US already taken action under article 51. This really highlights the implausibility of the UN itself being able to exert effective military coercion if left to the playing out of its own ethos and its own time-scale. If the military dimension of the response to the Iraqi invasion had not been brought into the picture until the end of November 1990, military action would effectively have been precluded and the Iraqis would have achieved their objective. It could be said that the one “act which

27 Ken Mathews: The Gulf Conflict and International Relations; Routledge; New York; 1993; p.76.
brought Iraq and the UNs inevitable in the conflict, not so much the invasion itself but Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait on 8 August 1990". This act entailed the elimination of Kuwait as a sovereign state and its incorporation as an integral part of Iraq. The implication for the UN if it acquiesced in that act was that it would no longer have a role in bringing about the 'peaceful settlement of a dispute between two sovereign members of the body. Any conflict going on there would be reinterpreted as being the internal affairs of Iraq and thus of no interest to the international body. Since this act was contrary to the fundamental principle of the acceptance of the sovereign independence of each member of the UN. Thus an immediate response from the Security Council was imperative. The implication was that if one member's sovereign independence could be snuffed out without response, so could that of any other member. Thus the resolution condemning the annexation and declaring it illegal was passed unanimously and attracted the support of even the pro-Iraqi states.

Turkey a long-standing U.S. ally and staunch member of NATO has played a pivotal role in the defence of Europe and the Middle East. Its value as a Western ally has hinged on its geographic reach, it spans two continents and threatens of cold war conflict with the Soviet Union. In the first years after World War II, as the only Islamic country with a secular democratic

28 Ibid.
government, Turkey along with Iran provided a massive land barrier to Moscow’s ambitions in the oil-rich Persian Gulf. Turkey’s main strategic role was increasingly seen in a European context, as potentially bottling up the Soviet navy in the Black Sea and serving as a staging ground for a counter thrust against the Soviet Union.

Today Turkey’s relations with its allies continue to be informed by the notion of reciprocity and designed by shifting security concerns. The only difference from recent years is that, with the Soviet threat sharply declined and Ankara having assumed an important role in US led coalition against Iraq. And following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Turkish government swiftly complied with UN proposals for economic sanctions against Iraq. Even the oil-pipelines of Iraq which passes through Turkey were cut off by Turkey. All these acts of Turkey provide enough sense that whatever the US led coalition will do against Iraq, Turkey will cooperate with them.

All Iraqi assets in Turkey were ‘frozen’ and Turkey’s border with Iraq were closed to the passage of all goods except on humanitarian grounds. Turkey’s strategic significance is once again being assessed chiefly in its Middle Eastern context. Turkey’s “Western-oriented leader, President Turgut Ozal moved with alacrity to commit the country as a staging ground for US and coalition air-forces against Iraq. Ozal is hoping for a substantial return on
his country's investment in the war effort, from both the U.S. and Europe.  

And further Turkey allowed the deployment of US and NATO aircraft in ‘south-east’ Turkey’s border with Iraq. In this way the US led coalition conducted their bombing missions into Iraq from ‘NATO’ bases in Turkey.

There are distinct perceptions that have emerged regarding the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent international response to it. The first one is that the Gulf-crisis was essentially a conflict between the civilised (Western) world and the barbaric personality of one man, Saddam Hussain. This group also perceived that popular response in the Arab world as being of a different order of validity from that of the Arab Governments. Therefore the response of the ordinary people to the crisis in the Arab world was often described as ‘ignorantly naive’. The official pro-west anti-Saddam stance of the Arab world regarded as the only valid response in that situation. Even though these same governments have long been criticised in the West for their lack of democratic representation. It was hard to escape the conclusion that their current respectability in the West was due only to their acquiescence in Western strategy over Iraq.

At another level it was also argued that to save the emerging new world order, the US and its allies prescribed remedies to the crisis to avoid its

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29 Bruce, R. Kuniholm: Turkey and the West; Foreign Affairs; Vol. 70, No. 2-3; 1991.
recurrence in the future. On the other hand the developments that took place between “August 1-2 in the Arab world were a complex phenomenon. It was not Saddam Hussain’s Iraq whom a section of the Arabs and others supported but what Iraq symbolised today, a steadfast resistance to western imperviousness.”30 The actual motive for taking all these steps Saddam Hussain might be knowing on what his personal characteristics or past history had been. He had in effect thrown down a gauntlet to the most powerful state on the earth. For a section of Arabs and others it was not the issue of Iraq’s invasion which is important but the sheer fact of Saddam’s apparently fearless stand against the might of the Western world. This to a people long humiliated, controlled and dictated by Western powers, was like balm on an open wound. Their support for Saddam Hussain was a measure not of their foolishness but of their perception of the West’s callousness and exploitation of the Arab world. But for Turkey, it was something different “Turkey’s apparent isolation from the Muslim world had its own consequences. For one thing its unconcern despite its cynicism and unkind ingratitude was not of its own making. It felt that it could stand on its own and withdraw into itself and followed its own distinct destiny. This marked a departure from Islam in universalism, a sort of pan-Islam which envisaged a common destiny for the Muslim world. It is interesting to note that Turkey viewed its revolution as a

part of intellectual regeneration or national reconstruction whereas the world of Islam took a different view of the institutions it had abolished.\textsuperscript{31}

And at another level, the Gulf crisis was not a conflict of International law or the need to stop a tyrant in his tracks. Western hypocrisy with regard to both these objectives from the West was well known. Can the “West which has condoned the invasion of Grenada and Panama, the occupation of the West Bank and supports Pol Pot and Pinochet, presume to moralise the rest of the world, especially Arabs over Saddam Hussain? A section of the Arab world took it instead as a flagrant example of imperialist arrogance in which the US intervened in the region to protect its own interests and to ensure the flow of cheap oil behind a smoke-screen of International moral indignation of Saddam Hussain. And in that sense Saddam was getting projected more as sinned against than sinning.\textsuperscript{32}

On the other hand Turkey allowed the US led forces to use their war techniques against Iraq from its soil. Indeed Turkey has never been “willing to commit itself wholeheartedly to a Western military endeavour without some form of quid pro quo. And ‘Ozal was hoping for a substantial return on

\textsuperscript{31} Mohammed Sadiq: The Turkish Revolution, A perspective on Ideological Change in Turkey; New Delhi, Macmillan India, 1997; p.12.

\textsuperscript{32} Sreedhar: n.30.
his country's investment in the war effort, from both the US\textsuperscript{33} and its partners in the Gulf-crisis.

The Gulf-crisis represents some of the vital questions about the security of small states. From time to time the world witnessed aggression against small countries by the bigger neighbours. And also in some cases big countries assisted smaller neighbours in overcoming their security predicaments. Even though the UN discussed the problem of security of small states every time, something concrete is yet to emerge. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait highlighted this problem, even though some of the small states spend enormous amounts of money on defence preparedness, it is no guarantee for the security of the small states.

With "40 per cent of the global crude oil reserves"\textsuperscript{34} located in the Persian Gulf and no substitute to crude oil as a primary energy source material in the near future, the US and its allies response to the Persian Gulf crisis created a host of new problems. The strategists might argue that the entire military build-up was a part of the US coercive diplomacy, but as the weeks passed on the prospects of war were increasing. In the 1990s the US might not be the dominant power but relative to the other major actors in the international arena it alone was positioned to shape the course of events in the

\textsuperscript{33} Bruce : n.29; pp.34-35.
\textsuperscript{34} Sreedhar : n.30; p.5.
Middle East for years to come. And behind the rhetoric of President Bush’s call for a ‘new world order’ lies the reality of an international system hurtling dangerously out of control. The old system and old ways are no longer adequate to the security needs of member states. Economic pressures, demographic upheavals, political instability exacerbated by ethnic and religions tensions and budding conflicts over scarce resources are taking place in a world of profound environmental and societal disruptions. If these challenges are to be tackled with any success, a period of stability is essential. ‘Pax Americana is not the answer, neither the US has the power, the wealth nor the urge to impose an imperial order. At the present crossroads, ideas and institutions to encourage development democratization and nation-building depend on first achieving a condition of security.

In the course of the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, majority of the Arab countries had reservations towards the USA’s deployment of aircraft and several thousand combat troops to Saudi Arabia. Many Arab states including “Saudi Arabia, Riyadh and other GCC states were obviously keen on a multinational armed force closely liaised with the UN. Providing military bases to non-Gulf powers and letting extremely large military units be deployed on its territory was a far-reaching step.”35 In the meantime USA

accounted by far the largest contingent of the multinational troops, including powerful naval and air force units. France and Britain sent soldiers respectively from different services but these contingents could also be increased. The Soviet Union, in this process had always declared that a “military solution must be avoided. In November 1990, however, it adopted a tougher line. As the fifth permanent member of the Security Council, China was initially even more decisively opposed to military action than the Soviet Union, but also had made it clear that it would not exercise a veto in the event of a corresponding UN resolution.”

Egypt, Syria and Morocco were Arab states which sent troops. If the crisis came to a military head, their presence as an Arab component would be politically important, even though their combat force must be rated as low.

Turkish involvement in such major regional crisis would inevitably help to determine its future relations with the people and states of the region. But direct Turkish involvement on any level would be viewed with great suspicion throughout the West Asian region. And the swift involvement of US and its allies in the crisis meant that Turkish actions in the context of the crisis would also help to mould its future relations with the West. But the major problem emerged from Turkey itself, “the Ozal governments commitment to the anti-Iraq coalition was not well received inside Turkey.

36 Ibid., p.64.
The decision and the manner in which it was reached, triggered the resignation of the chief of the Turkish army’s ways general staff on December 3, 1990. The Turkish media railed against the country’s involvement in the war. As would be expected, opposition parties clamored both for an end to what they perceived as the nation’s over enthusiastic role in support of the allied coalition. And a halt to what they characterize as Ozal’s ‘one-man-rule.’

Even Saddam Hussain was originally not trying to take over Kuwait, his motive was to remove the ‘Sabbahs’ the ruling family, and put in their place a new government. So in the beginning the attack was to overthrow the ruling family of Kuwait. But when Saddam Hussain saw the Americans moving in quickly with their weaponry then he changed the course and claimed that Kuwait was a part of Iraq. Many felt that earlier it was not his idea to annex Kuwait. This has happened, but unfortunately we go by mostly what appears in the Western media. We donot have any direct access to what has been going on in the minds of the people in the region. But “Saddam Hussain’s calculation was that once a government was established in Kuwait, which would not play into the hands of the Americans and it would place a very substantial portion, almost 30 per cent of world’s oil resources under Iraqi influence. And that would put Iraq in a position to be able to scare the

37 Bruce : n.29; pp.
Saudis.”  All these developments would have put Saddam in a respectable position in the oil market and he would have a major hold on the oil market. That was the name of the game and naturally the Americans did not like it, they believe that this would have effects on their vital interests. The Americans felt their interests were vital, but so do the Iraq’s and the Arabs. But many well meaning “radicals see in Bush’s New World Order, backed by the awesome power of American technology, shadows of a Pax Americana and a unipolar world.”

By the 1990s and in comparison with the rest of the Middle East, Turkey has become economically successful, democratic and stable. Hence, its position has sometime been compared to that of Japan - as a potentially powerful actor which prefers not to play a commensurate regional role and stays on the edge of a regional subsystem. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union have made it possible for Turkey to consider more flexible regional policies. On the other hand the Gulf crisis of 1990-91 demonstrated that, even if the super power conflict was ended, the Middle East is still a prime source of global instability. During the last two years Turkey has also emerged as an important actor in the politics of Central Asia,

38 M.S. Agwani: The Battle and Beyond; Mainstream; Vol.29; Oct-June 1990-91; pp.5-6.
the black Sea region and the Balkans. And with the Iraqi invasion of ‘Kuwait on 2 August 1990’, it was never likely that Turkey would issue anything other than a strong condemnation of the occupation of territory by force. However, at the outset it was not clear whether Turkey would take any effective action to reverse it. Immediately after the invasion, the Turkish government expected that the crisis would soon blow over or would be settled by diplomacy. A meeting of the national security council, which includes the President, Prime Minister, Cabinet Members and armed forces Chiefs was held. And on the following day, it was reported that Turkey would not close the pipelines or take other steps against Iraq. At this stage, the government appeared to have assumed that it would preserve its traditional neutral attitude (in what was seen as a purely inter-Arab dispute) without damaging its links with the Western powers. But this assumption was rapidly reversed by Saddam Hussian’s refusal to evacuate Kuwait and the unexpectedly strong and united reaction at the UN Security council “Resolution 661, passed on 6 August”\(^{40}\), which prescribed a complete economic embargo on Iraq, posed some tricky questions for Turkey, granted the political and economic constraints which have already been explained. In fact, “it was not until 8 August 1990, the government announced that the crucial ‘Kirkuk-Yurmutalik’ pipeline would be closed and all other commercial links with

Iraq and occupied Kuwait would be suspended. Moreover it appeared that this decision was taken unilaterally by President Ozal, without prior consultation with the cabinet.”41 The incident highlighted some serious divisions within the government. On one side, ‘Ozal’ was anxious to stress the important role which Turkey could play in the crisis and prepared to give full support to the coalition powers to demonstrate this. On the other side, the foreign ministry, parliament and public opinion were all anxious to preserve the traditional posture of neutrality and were not prepared to risks direct involvement in the Gulf for the sake of American favours or a higher international profile. In effect, Turkish policy-makers had to seek a compromise between these two viewpoints.

The closer of the pipeline and the ending of all regular trade with Iraq was undoubtedly a vital element in the economic campaign against Saddam. Without Turkish cooperation any effective embargo could have been quite impossible. On the other hand, it also created some severe economic costs for Turkey.

The first differences between the two superpowers became clear during the consultations on the US resolution on the enforcement of the trade embargo. “Mosco” backed all resolutions on the gulf-crisis but tried to

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41 William Hale : Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis; International Affairs, Vol 68; 1992; pp.683-684.
reintroduce its former plan for a Middle East Conference. The meeting between Presidents Bush and Gorvachev in Helsinki at the beginning of September 1990, clarified the situation. The USA rejected such a conference, which was only partly accepted by the USSR. Bush opposed any link between Kuwait and the Middle East. Gorvachev on the other hand stressed that there was a link. The previous failure to resolve the Middle East conflict had an influence on the intensity of the current conflict.\textsuperscript{42} Above all, Gorvachev wanted to retain a special role for the USSR, in the Middle East. ‘Mosco’, for example expressed criticism of the massive deployment of US troops in the Gulf.

Moreover the most remarkable thing was Bush’s determination to see the crisis through to the end and use force when all else had failed. With “patience and tact he skillfully forged the international coalition, rallied support at home, cultivated the Soviet Union’s cooperation and obtained strong UN security council resolutions that ultimately included the right to use force to ensure Iraqi compliance”\textsuperscript{43} And at the “government level, a common European front was demonstrated in agreement with the UN resolutions. At a European Community summit at the end of October 1990 it

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{43} Alvin Z. Rubinstein : New World Order or Hollow Victory, Foreign Affairs, Vol.70, No.4-5, 1991-92, p.55.
was again agreed that no isolated steps should be taken against Iraq".  

However, this unity is being questioned by visits to Baghdad by former members of government and prominent figures from individual European countries. Their aim was to secure the release of hostages and found out the possibilities of a political solution. Such visits give Saddam a welcome opportunity to demonstrate through the media to his own people and to the Arab would that he was by no means politically isolated but the host to a constant series of high-ranking visitors. He observed that hostage-taking leads to material gain, compels good conduct, breaks up fronts and thus weakens the enemy.

The UNs is not an arbiter but a seismograph. The Security Council translates power relations in legal terms, it does not abolish them. The time was favourable for Americans because the Soviet Union needed money and China needed a certificate of good conduct. The American superpower, now left alone in the arena, try to impose its will on the other permanent members. The United States after mocking the UN’s for so many years, did not subscribe to international law. It subscribed to the UNs because they are the one’s who decree the law by virtue of a startling and precarious coincidence of national interests.

And the Security Council resolution 687 (1991) represented one of the most complex and far-reaching sets of decisions even taken by the council. The longest text even adopted by the council, it sought to involve Iraq cooperatively in post-war measures to build lasting peace and stability in the region. The ‘resolution 687’ (1991) adopted, on “3 April after more than a month of extensive consultations, and setting specific terms for a former cease-fire to end the conflict. The council declared that a formal cease-fire between Iraq, Kuwait and the countries cooperating with Kuwait would come into effect after official notification by Iraq of its acceptance of the provisions of the resolution”.45 When ‘Resolution 687 was passed by the Security Council the policy of the UN towards Iraq was one of condemning its action and tried to change that action through the use of economic sanctions. But simultaneously the policy of the US, whose military preparations were being conducted within the provisions of the UN’s Charter but without the specific authorization of the Security Council. On “6 April, Iraq officially notified the Secretary General and the President of the Security Council that it had no choice but to accept the provisions of resolution 687”.46 The implementation of “resolution 687 (1991) sent the UNs into uncharted territory in many areas, among them the Organization’s work in demarcating

45 The Blue Helmets : A Review of UNs Peacekeeping; Published by UNs Department of Public Information; New York; 1996; pp.681-682.

46 Ibid, p.682.
the international boundary between Kuwait and Iraq, its collaboration with the IAEA in the nuclear area, its administration of a compensation fund and the use by the Security Council of subsidiary bodies such as the Special commission (UNSCOM) and the sanctions Committee”.47 In the Gulf-crisis, the “states united with Kuwait in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman, were obliged by the council’s statutes to afford military assistance”.48 Although they did not have powerful armaments but verbal commitment were given. The GCC only condemned the aggressor after a careful assessment of the regional and international reactions. If accepted an external intervention but only the form of collective measures by the UNs.

The US was obviously willing to orchestrate and lead UN’s ‘collective security’ measures in response to a crisis such as Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. The US was also willing to see and implement UN resolutions and economic sanctions in order to dismantle Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. Given Saddam Hussain’s genocide policies against Iraq’s Kurds in the north, this population needs continuing US and UN humanitarian assistance and military protection until its human rights and political autonomy can be guaranteed. While acknowledging Turkey’s role in facilitating this aid to Iraq’s Kurds, the

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47 The UN Blue Book Series: The UN and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict - 1990-96; Vol.IX; Published by Department of Public Information UN’s, New York, 1996.
US should also encourage Turkey to improve the economy of its own Kurds and offer them meaningful autonomy. And just as Iraqi Kurds need the US and the UN assistance and protection so also the Turkish Kurds.

As noted, the US is working through the UN to dismantle Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. Special agreement have been made by the ‘US, Russia, France, Britain and Germany to thwart any Iraqi effort to rebuild its nuclear, chemical and missile programmes. And the Bush administration undertook the largest deployment of military forces since World War II, forged an impressive anti-Iraqi coalition that included several Arab states. And secured the imprimatur of the UN Security Council for an economic embargo and for the use of all necessary means. Although the differences of opinion among fellow Arab states at the outset of the crisis were very real, the diverging attitudes at the official level masked the more widespread agreement which existed among the Arabs. That the Western military intervention against Iraq would have harmful consequences for the entire Arab world. Although many Arabs initially opposed Saddam Hussain’s aggression against Kuwait as a violence of Arab and Islamic norms. This opposition had become more muted in the wake of the US led military campaign against Iraq. The sympathy for Iraq is rooted in Arab perceptions of US military and political intervention against a fellow Arab state as an extension of ‘Western-imperialism’. It was also due to resentment against the
continued UN economic sanctions against Iraq, which were viewed as an unjust hardship on the Iraqi people. The activities of the UN with overseeing the distraction of Iraq's missile arsenal and biological weapons were viewed throughout the Arab world as an illegitimate attack against part of the Arab patrimony. And further evidence of US double standard in dealing with the Arab world and Israel, whose possession of the same types of weapons the US has declined to acknowledge.

What does seem more certain is that Iraq's defeat by the US-led coalition and the ongoing international efforts to dismantle Iraq's military capabilities will have a profoundly negative effect on Arab attitudes towards the US, Israel and the West for a long time to come. Such attitudes, would have no doubt played a crucial role in shaping Arab political and military strategies in the future, may likewise have important implications for the extension of other nuclear weapons control activities. A failure to address Arab security concerns vis-a-vis Israel's nuclear arsenal and the merging reality of an Arab nuclear option may undermine the US 'non-proliferation efforts as well as the prospects for long term peace in the West Asian region. And the crisis saw the "division of the Arab world into two rough coalitions, one staunchly anti-Saddam in which Egypt, Syria and the GCC were united in a common front and the other a grouping of states that chose to remain
outside the anti-Saddam coalition". While Turkish role in the economic embargo was certainly essential, it was clear before long that it would probably not be sufficient and that some military action would eventually have to be taken against Iraq. In contemplating this prospect, "There was occasional press speculation about the possible opening of a 'northern front' on land" against Saddam. On the other hand purely defensive measures caused the least political trouble for the government.

But for the Turks the main concern was if Iraq did decide to attack in the north, they would have insufficient planes and anti-aircraft defences to hold off the far superior Iraqi air force. In which "Turkey officially asked for the defensive deployment of NATO air-forces on 30 November 1992, and on 2 January 1991 it was announced that Germany, Italy and Belgium would be sending 40 air-craft as part of an allied mobile force."  

The sending of troops to the Gulf was none problematic for the government and for that it needed specific authorization from the Parliament. And the alleged adventurism of Ozal's for participating with the US -led coalition violently was opposed by the other political parties in general and

49 Barbara Gregory Ebent: The Gulf War and its Aftermath; Middle East Policy; Vol.1; 1992; p.80.
50 William Hale: Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis, International Affairs; Vol.62; 1992; p.684.
51 Ibid, p.685.
the people in particular. If Ozal had decided to send troops to the Gulf then he would have violated the principles of the constitution.

The unusual internal position of the Turkish government at the time of the crisis needs to be noted, since it had some important effects on Turkish reactions. ‘Turgut Ozal’ the founder leader of the ruling ‘Motherland Party’ had succeeded ex-General ‘Kenan Evren’, as President of the Republic. Constitutionally, his election was legal but it broke with political tradition, in that Ozal was the first president of Turkey since 1960 who was an important politician in his own right, rather than a retired military commander. It also threatened to produce a change in the constitutional balance, in which the President had normally played a figure head role. And the main political power was wielded by the Prime Minister. To conform to the constitution, Ozal was obliged to sever all his official links with the ‘Motherland Party’ on assuming the presidency. However, it was clear from the beginning that, in practice, he would have continued to exercise a predominant power over the government from behind the scenes. This situation set up tensions between the President on the one side and the cabinet, the government and backbenchers on the other.

A factor of more immediate importance in Turkey’s relations with Iraq regards the Kurdish issue. The policy of all Turkish governments was to deny the Turkish Kurds any separate cultural or political identity and try to
maintain an entente on the Kurdish question in which Turkey and Baghdad had a joint interest in opposing Kurdish nationalism. In particular, Turkish relations with Iraq were generally close-partly because of common opposition to 'Kurdish nationalism'. And Turks had long been intent on repressing their own Kurdish minority and one consequence of the Gulf war has been to give the Turks a free hand in repressing Kurdish culture villages and waging war-sometimes across the border into Iraq. Turkey in the “interest of dismembering a bellicose Iraq-had shown some support for Kurdish independence in Iraq but conservative Turkish factions reckoned that such a move would strengthen the dissident Kurds within Turkey.”

Turkey as a “compliant NATO member and a strategically well-placed country on the borders of Iraq, was very useful in the anti-Saddam crusade’. Ozal declared that the US had donated at least 8 billion-worth of military equipment to Turkey, including tanks, ships, helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft.” Even, President Bush agreed to sponsor Turkey’s application’ for membership of the European Community, despite Turkeys appalling human rights record including the prosecution of its own Kurds. Here, Turkey struggling to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the West, while maintaining a poor human-rights record and suffering from a substandard economy, the

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53 Ibid., pp.354-355.
assumption of a strategic role in the Gulf is a tight rope walk to security and prosperity. Ozal, perhaps recognising that the US-Turkish ties have tended to falter during periods of the US-Soviet détente, seized the opportunity to commit Turkey to the coalitions cause against a new and real threat. Recognizing that his country was at a crossroads, Ozal had made the first in a series of tough choices that would confront Turkey in the years ahead. But for the time-being his limited popularity at home was being put to a serious test. But it should be noted here that, President Ozal while granting NATO allies to use Turkish installations for operations against Iraq, he expressed he would not attack Iraq unless Turkey was attacked.

Turks were sensitive to the fact that NATO was considering a post crisis defence arrangement in the Persian gulf. Like Iran and Afghanistan, Turkey is cognizant of its vulnerability to both East and West, sensitive to the capricious character of its relations with them and aware of the necessity of walking a delicate line between power blocs. Surrounded by countries that are undergoing massive upheavals, and which are often antagonistic towards each other the Turks increasingly realize that cautious diplomacy leaves them out in the cold. And Turkey has earned the right to join the European Community. The strategic reason for its accession to NATO still hold, although they have undergone a substantial reorientation.
Turkey's importance in the aftermath of the Gulf war depends upon its being seen in a West Asian as well as a European context. But that vision will also depend on Turkey's being accepted as a full-fledged member of Europe. If it is so, Kemal Ataturk's legacy as a westernizer will be safeguarded and Turkey will be an important model to those Muslim nations in the West Asia that contemplate what means to be a secular, democratic republic.

In the Gulf-crisis, the involvement of Turkey in the US-led coalition highlighted strong debates inside Turkey which ultimately led to the 'passing of a bill in the Parliament and allowed the government to send troops abroad etc. The government thus "gained its war power but the Parliamentary battle had indicated the large scale of opposition to direct involvement in the Gulf and probably did more than anything to persuade Ozal to drop his more ambitious plans." And in the meantime the resignations of foreign ministers' and the Chief of the General Staff caused a major political storm and the resignation of a Chief of the General Staff was an almost unprecedented event in Turkey. And it was widely suspected that the Chief of the General Staff had "disagreed with the President about the Gulf Policy in particular, as to whether Turkey should allow the US air force to launch offensive raids against Iraq from Turkish bases, if a general attack became

54 William Hale: n.41; p.686.
necessary." In the meantime, the Bush administration in organising the international response, the US had been rather keen to achieve political isolation of Saddam Hussain. Even the US while initiating a series of measures, sought international approval and legitimacy and any lonely crusade would have been counter productive. Over the years, the US-UN relations were far from cordial and Washington frequently resorted to suspension of its contribution to various UN agencies. However, in the changed political situation, the UN appeared more useful to the US. Greater cooperation among the major powers is possible largely because of the 'US-Soviet detente' and the 'East-West' harmony. And the response of the European Community is crucial for the U.S. because of the former's dependence upon the Gulf oil. After a series of deliberations, the EC agreed to impose sanctions against Iraq. And the entry of Japan completed the western alliance against Iraq.

Among all the steps taken by the U.S., its military response has been most dramatic and controversial. The build-up by the US-led forces "took a new turn when Saudi-Arabia agreed to the US positions in its troops in the desert Kingdom." For Turkey as a precautionary measure President Turgut Ozal sought and obtained with the concurrence of the Turkish Parliament, the

55 Ibid., pp.687-688.
power to declare war and despatch, combat troops if needed. In addition, "Britain and France contributed to the multinational force in Saudi Arabia, while countries like Belgium and West Germany agreed to partially relieve the US commitments in the Mediterranean." Among the 'Arab powers, Egypt, Morocco and Syria' agreed to join the multinational force in Saudi Arabia. Bangladesh and Pakistan also joined the efforts. In almost all these cases, the influence of the U.S. or the desire to curry favour with it was apparent. While some were overtly pro-US, others wished to maintain and benefit from the East-West harmony. In the case of Pakistan, it has an additional responsibility of being greatful to the Saudis for their support on Kashmir at the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) meet in Cairo.

In the Persian Gulf crisis, the Security Council authorized a "comprehensive embargo in order to bring about Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and the restoration of its legitimate government." And in "Resolution 678 of November 29, 1990, the Security Council authorized member states cooperating with the government of Kuwait, to 'use all necessary means to uphold and implement Security Council Resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions, to restore international peace and security in the area." Here also other states were requested to provide the needful means in the

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57 Ibid., p.771.
58 Bruce Russett and James, S. Sutterlin: The UN in a New World Order; Foreign Affairs; Vol.70; No.2-3; 1991; p.75.
proper time to compel Iraq to evacuate Kuwait. This action and with specific reference to Chapter VII of the charter, constituted a new approach to the implementation of the collective security concept. The council turned to member states to act in its behalf through such measures as might be necessary. But this time no unified command was established and the use of the UN flag was not authorized. The Military staff committee, composed of the Chiefs of staff of the five permanent members of the Security Council designed to give effect to the provisions of the charter regarding the maintenance of International peace and security. The body was conceived as a mechanism for giving the UN its own military force. However, it has laid dormant since 1946 owing to the failure to agree the arrangements for the commitments of troops to such a body and how they would be deployed and controlled. The central problem for the idea of the UN having its own military force to carry out the resolutions of the Security Council was precisely the reluctance of members to commit their own troops to a force commanded perhaps by the nationals of another country and in circumstances over which they might have little control. That reluctance was not only a manifestation of the cold war, it was inherent in the idea itself. States are content to contribute troops to peacekeeping forces whose function is to act as a buffer between forces who have already agreed to stop fighting. However, few states would be willing to commit large scale military equipment and their own nationals
to fight a war in a force over which they may have little control. And where there might not be in complete confidence in the military competence of some commanders. Thus there is no reason to believe that the Military Staff Committee would be less dormant after the cold war than it was during it. It was extremely unlikely that a military operation on the scale of the Gulf War could ever be mounted under the auspices of the Military Staff Committee. The controversial "resolution 687 (1990) of November 30, 1990 provides acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN, One demanded that Iraq comply fully with resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and decides, while maintaining all its decisions, to allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of goodwill, to do so. Two, Authorises Member States cooperating with the government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before January 15, 1991 fully implements, the resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement Security Council resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area. Three, requests all states to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken in pursuance of Resolution 678 (1990)."59 And the Resolution of 687 has been interpreted by the U.S. in particular to mean an authorization to all Member States cooperating with the government of

59 Hari Swarup : Gulf Crisis : UN does not sanction War; Mainstream; Vol.29; Oct-June; 1991; p.7.
wait to use armed force against Iraq in order to compel it to withdraw from
wait and free all hostages.

This interpretation seems politically motivated and calculated only to
we colour of authority to the US move for using armed force in the Gulf
region. Such interpretation is contrary to the established norms of
interpretation. In the first place nothing can be read in a statement which is
t there. The Security Council would have used the term ‘armed force’ if it
intended. The absence of these words in the context of the Charter of the
N. and earlier resolutions of the Security Council means that the Security
council had sanctioned use of all measures other than armed force. Second,
precedents are always the best guide for interpreting a resolution of the
security Council. Whenever, the Security Council intended to permit the use
force in the past it had expressly said so. But the resolution 687, adopted
the Security Council neither determines that the use of armed force is
ecessary or called for, nor does it nominate a commander of forces or it
thorize the use of the UN’s flag.

The Security Council cannot be deemed to have even impliedly
actioned the use of military force by any Member State in the way it likes
the extent it likes, and to choose whatever weapon it likes. The Security
council in the circumstances can not be deemed to have sanctioned an
channelised war ‘free for all’. And where a procedure of action is laid
down by a charter nothing can be added to or subtracted from it by implication. 'Chapter VII of the UN Charter' lays down complete procedure in 'Article 42 to 49' for the use of 'armed force to restore international peace and security. And “Article 42 authorises the Security Council to take action by resorting to use of armed force provided the action under Article 41 fails to prove adequate.”  

* "Article 43 requires Members of the UN to make available to the Security Council their armed forces.

* Article 44 enables the council to call for arms aid from non-members states after it has decided to use force.

* Article 45 speaks about the process where it becomes necessary to take urgent military measures.

* Article 46 : 'Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

* Article 47 deals with the establishment required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council, for the maintenance of international

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60 Ibid., p. 10.
peace and security, shall be taken by all the members of the UN or by some of them as the Security Council may determine. 61

In examining all the resolutions, the Security Council has so far made no decision about the use of armed force against Iraq. It has not determined that the action to be taken to carry out decisions shall be military action. The charter of the UN nowhere permits the use of armed force by one member against another. Rather its whole tenor prohibits such use. Only the Security Council is permitted to use armed force against a member of the UN. It may of course take aid from members, but the action must be a Security Council’s action.

It would thus be a negation of the UN Charter to allow individual members to use armed force against any one or more under the pretext of doing a job which the Security Council alone has been assigned to under the UN Charter. The consequence of a war in the Gulf could be disastrous. It could mean negation of the right to life itself. The Security Council has been bestowed with the collective responsibility of preserving peace in the world. It cannot be deemed to have abdicated its obligation and transferred that obligation to the US or other powerful nations of the world.

61 Ibid.
It was terrifying to watch Iraq being readied for mass destruction. First, its leader was transformed into the personification of evil. Then Iraq's people and society were reduced to 'military assets'. Finally, after expiring some arbitrary deadline Iraqi society was declared a virtual nonentity, cities were smashed, agriculture and industry were torched, roads and bridges were reduced to rubble. The Gulf not merely an empty desert with a large pool of oil underneath and a whole bunch of sheikhs, terrorists or Hitlers on top. It is a place with actual peoples, traditions and societies whose aspirations and values have to be viewed as having merit independent of our needs. And “Western ignorance of Arab and Islamic culture becomes a useful mode of warfare, the enemy is easily dehumanised and readied for the kill.” Rarely does one find rational analysis, reliable statistics, concrete and undoctored descriptions of life in the Arab world today with its terrible inequities, its self-inflicted wounds; its crushing mediocrity in many fields. But, in addition to the above considerations, “cynics might suggest three additional points. First, some analysts suggested that the US exploited the Iraqi invasion as a means of establishing a permanent military presence in the region. Secondly, active military involvement in the Kuwaiti crisis provided justification for the continued build-up of an American military establishment under siege by Congressional budget cutters. Thirdly, involvement in the Kuwait crisis

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provided, the US President with the opportunity to sidestep domestic economic and social crisis by demonstrating foreign policy leadership on a global scale.” Collectively, the considerations outlined above provided compelling justification for the rapid deployment of the US forces to ‘Saudi Arabia’ and the Gulf region.

Now the question is whether the experience of the Gulf crisis marked a new departure in both principle and style for Turkish foreign policy on West Asia? The fact was that the style and substance of President Ozal’s intervention in the Gulf crisis was a controversial one within Turkey. The “primordial tenents of Kemalist foreign policy, Peace at home, peace abroad”, clearly was ignored by the President Turgut Ozal. The initial consensus over the dispute broke down as the positions became markedly more polarized. The ‘Kemalist traditionalist elite’, which took a more orthodox view of Turkish Foreign Policy in the region, balked at both the style and substance of Ozal’s brash partisan action. There was widespread feeling within the establishment that Turkey should have adopted a more neutralist approach, retaining the possibility of playing a mediatory role between Iraq and its immediate adversaries in the region. And, much of the

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kemalist establishment, whether at the political party, bureaucratic or military levels, were deeply discomforted by Ozal's policy with regard to the Gulf crisis. And it proved that, the foreign policy of Turkey has alternated between neutrality and alignment, depending on circumstances. It seems contemporary Turkey seeks to flow into European civilization without however altogether abandoning the Koran. Her endeavour is not only to adopt Western technology but also the civilization of the west, while retaining her own ethno-cultural identity. Though Turkey is not one of the great powers but she is the strongest among the countries of the West Asia. And, as history substantiates, her geo-political location and the character of her people have assigned her a potentially higher status than could be expressed in mere statistical figures.

The conclusion of the Gulf War did raise some serious doubts about the future status of the UN. It may be regarded that the Gulf War is regarded as a victory for the UN but whether that actually exaggerates its role or misrepresents what actually happened is perhaps a matter for investigation and debate. The most plausible conclusion is that it really is victory for United States diplomacy in the UN and a victory for US military power and efficiency which was put at the disposal, not of the UN but of the resolutions that it passed. In so far, as the UN acted in this crisis it could act as a result of the mobilisation of diplomatic activity and pressure by the US in the UN and
backed it up with its military power. Without the leadership of the US in the respect it is highly unlikely that there would have been such firm UN action. The UN as a body is not independent nor does it have an independent interest on capacity to act. Thus it is of course unrealistic to expect action by the UN but rather action through the UN. The natural tendency of the UN is indecision, prevarication and action in accordance with the lowest common denominator. The fact that the Gulf-crisis prompted uncharacteristic qualities of action and clear sightedness, was due to a particular constellation of forces at that time. Moreover, it took the most powerful nation in the world to lead the UN diplomacy and carryout the military mandate of the UN. Less clear-cut cases, or cases in which the major powers have more clearly conflicting interests, might not have produced such results. The point is that the responsibility for maintaining international security cannot just be given over to the UN. The role of the UN, as ever, is as the forum within which the diplomacy for the settlement and resolution of disputes can take place. Even in the 'new world order' it is very unlikely that the UN will itself have an independent military capability which it can use to serve its collective purposes, primarily because it rarely has collective purposes. It will still require powerful independent states to take such action on its behalf. And the Gulf military operation is an example of extremely well coordinated military coalition composed not of military equals, but under the professional military
leadership of the most powerful state in the world. And at last, the brief “survey indicated that idiosyncratic factors were more likely to explain Iraqi crisis decision making than that of the US. A single statement explanation as to why the crisis resulted in war rather than de-escalation and a non-violent resolution might be as follows. The Americans were locked into a set of structural imperatives which entailed an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait in the short term. The Iraqis were locked into a set of cognitive imperatives which operated to preserve the belief system of Saddam Hussain and which precluded a withdrawal short of actual war.”  

65 Ken Mathews: The Gulf Conflict and International Relations; London; 1993; p.125.