CHAPTER - 5

CONCLUSION
And nothing in itself, especially not what it can know of madness, assures the world that it is justified by such works of madness (P. 289).

From Madness and Civilization by Michel Foucault.

In the previous pages I have described what one may call the vicissitudes of the narrative impulse in Flaubert and Bankim. Without those strategies, narrator reaches an impasse: the conflict between the two opposing forces makes narration impossible. But since each strategy adopted engenders new problems, other strategies have to be devised. Moreover, since the strategies to overcome the conflicts are what make the narration possible, they are, in fact, part of one element of the conflict: they are "on the side" of the impulse to narrate. We cannot distinguish the impulse to narrate from the various strategies that make narration possible, just as we cannot distinguish the impulse toward non-narration from the various impasses that give rise to these strategies.

By talking about "strategies," we imply a distinction between means and end, we imply that there is an aim that precedes and determines the means, a certain intentionality that dictates a choice of means, and so on. Indeed, the word "strategies" implies many of the assumptions that underlie the notion of "representation," assumptions that the preceding analysis has shown to be highly problematic.
in Flaubert. "Strategies" is thus a highly inappropriate word. But its inappropriateness the necessary because the deconstruction of a concept, far from doing away with the concept, realizes for its articulation on that very concept.

A similar reservation is called for apropos of the term "desire"—and especially "the desire to narrate endlessly." Perhaps no other word indicates so strongly the priority of a subject over an object, of an intention over its realization, of an experience over its expression, as the word "desire". And yet, the desire to narrate endlessly, as well as the desire to move toward non-narration rather than in terms of something the narration expresses; it is a desire—a drive, an impulse, a tendency—in the narration. The desire to narrate endlessly is in fact the impossibility of achieving closure, an impossibility that results from a "framing" structure in which the outside cannot be separated from the inside; the desire to narrate endlessly—the impossibility of achieving closure—is in fact the impossibility of "going beyond". The impulse toward non-narration, on the other hand, arises in a certain precariousness in the discourse that makes it liable to stop at any moment if not propelled onward by a certain mechanical logic.

The words, "desire", "strategies" and "desire" (or "impulse") convey a dynamic view of the text rather than the static view implied by "conflict". The dynamics are those of the production of the text, but production here is not a process separated from its product is made: language that produces the text is also the text itself. But this same language does not enable us to talk about production except as a process that precedes and determines a static product. The opposition between static and dynamic, of text production, undertaken to avoid the pitfalls of an analysis that threatens the text as static (as an object full of meaning, a structure, an incarnation of intention, etc.), cannot be carried out without relying
on a static view of the text.

It seems, then, that at every turn we encounter terms like impasse, contradiction, split—an impossibility of going beyond. As Flaubert's oeuvre has already suggested, the result of these difficulties is not to make discourse impossible, but rather to make it endless. The applies not only to narrative, but also to critical discourse. I would like now to turn once again to the relation between narrative and critical discourse: to the role of the reader and the nature of reading.

In the preceding pages the two forces involved in the conflict were described in several—not synonymous but partially overlapping—terms. One way of describing the conflict which up to now has been only touched on, is in terms of the conflicting interests of the narrator and the character. I would like now to explore this formulation a bit further to see what insight it may offer about the status of reading (and of this reading).

When we talk about the separate interests of the character and the narrator, it is clear that we are not necessarily talking about a particular character or a particular narrator. Since in Flaubert characters can be narrators (like Marie in Novembre, for example), and narrators can be character (like the hero of Novembre), on a first level what we are talking about is something like Propp's "functions." The function of the narrator is to present the story; the function of the character is to act in the story. And since one can not act and narrate at the same time—an assumption that is at the root of the division of the autobiographical self into narrating-I and narrated-I—then it follows that these two functions are clearly separated: either spatially (two different selves) or temporally (two different stages of the "same" self). The notion of "interests" moves us to a different level, where the clear distinction implied
by the term "function" is undermined (in the way most clear distinctions and separations are, in the analyses presented in this book). The fact that a character (let us say Emma Bovary) functions at times as a narrator (she creates stories, fictions, her dreams are narratives, etc.) does not necessarily mean that her interests are those of a narrator.

The interests of a narrator are to narrate endlessly. The interests of a character are to establish a stable self that has a meaningful story—to fix attention on one image, to identify with one model, to choose one life, to recapture an image of the self. The character is a certain kind of narrator—one who creates closed, narcissistic stories. The narrator is a special kind of character—one who withdraws to the margin of the text and thereby allows another character to act. In every instance, a narrator or character manifests not so much an adherence to one or the other set of "interests" as a tension between their conflicting demands, an "immixture" of both interests. There is neither "pure" character nor "pure" narrator, but only mixed forms; rather than an opposition between two distinct entities, we have a mixture where, according to slight shifts in perspective, one is sometimes called narrator, sometimes character. The anxiety of alienation (which is the anxiety of self-representation) that the narrator of the *Memories* felt when he realized the difference between himself as narrator and himself as character is resolved not through a resort to a narcissistic illusion of unity, but rather through a realization that we are never entirely one thing or another, that past and present, self and other are pseudo-oppositions.

And what about the reader? In the same way that every character in Flaubert is potentially a narrator, and every narrator a character, so most of Flaubert's characters and narrators are readers. The narrator of the *Memories*, for example, is a reader of his own text besides being, as a character, a reader of his earlier
poems and of literature in general. But while the function of the reader surely plays an important role in Flaubert, we do not find the interests of the reader at work. The reader—both inside and outside the text—reads in keeping with the interests of the character or in keeping with the interests of the narrator, and in practice, usually in keeping with both.

It is true that traditional criticism saw the reader as doing something quite different from what a narrator or a character does: the reader was seen as subordinate to and dependent on the text (since he comes after it, derives all his knowledge from it, and is supposed merely to "serve" it), but at the same time as mastering the text (drawing from it a knowledge that is implicit or hidden, a knowledge that characters, and sometimes narrator and author, are not aware of—irony). Modern criticism that presented the reader as an issue for the first time redefined the reader as creator of the text, active participant in it, and so did away with the hierarchy and play of power between text and reader, with the temporalization of the relation between them, and with the spatial distinction between outside and inside. But by doing so, the criticism that has made such an issue of the reader is the very criticism that in fact has made the reader—and his reading—part of the text, that is, not something different or "distinct". If the reader is "in the text," then reading, and interpretation as a special kind of reading, is alongside the text. Reading is just another story.

Only what systematically happens is that reading emerges as not even another story, but rather as "the same story". One result of the "deconstruction" of the hierarchical relations between text and interpretation is that interpretation resembles the text it interprets. That means that the status of interpretation has changed. Interpretation still shows us certain things in the text, the reading
repeats the movement of the text. Or, put differently, interpretation is no longer ironic but dialogical—it constitutes one voice in a polyphony.

We can call this kind of interpretation an intervention. It produces knowledge not by saying something about the meaning of the text, but by showing, through repetition, the mechanism that generates the meaning of the text. Knowledge is produced, therefore, by the juxtaposition of two texts alongside each other rather than in hierarchical order; such interpretation always allows for the intervention of a third text showing how one text repeats the other. And the chain goes on, endlessly.

The basic structure of interpretation as intervention, its capacity to engender an endless series of texts, each a metonymical displacement of the previous one, shows this intervention to be very different from the narcissistic, dual specularity that, aiming at identification and mastery, desires and attains an absolute (even if illusory) end.

Freud, who as a structuralist *avant la lettre* conceived of reality in terms of a binary system of oppositions, was always concerned that any critique of that binary system would lead to an impossible monism, impossible especially since it would not be able to account for change and development, for life or for story. Deconstruction deconstructs binary oppositions and shows self/other, inside/outside, experience/representation, text/reader to be pseudo-oppositions: the self is other than itself, framing and self-referentiality show the outside to be part of the inside; experience shares with representation the doubling that is supposed to differentiate them, the reader is in the text, his reading is another text. And yet the product of this critique of binary oppositions is not static monism. In fact, as we see in the case of narcissism, which is
an example of binary structures, it is precisely this structure that implies a monistic existence—as an origin or an end—whereas the undermining of binary oppositions leads to a plurality without limit, without end.

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, especially after the 1860s, the educated, upper cast Hindu society of Bengal, displayed a growing attachment to history and to older forms of social life and culture. Up to a point this was only an extension of the Renaissance tradition which saw important breakthroughs in language, literature, scientific thought, historical or antiquarian research. During this time many significant questions pertaining to the quality of spiritual life and of a rational reconstruction of society had been raised and perhaps even resolved to an extent. However, within the next few decades, the ugly face of racialism and hardening bureaucratic attitudes gradually transformed what once represented the constructive rediscovery of one's history and tradition into cultural bigotry and chauvinism. The distinction that had once been ungrudgingly made between the undesirability of British rule and the pragmatic value of Western learning now fast began to lose its meaning. It is true that there still remained in the 1880s and 1890s, voices of restraint and sanity whose researches into Hindu religion or social norms did not take them to be irrational, acutely xenophobic sentiments but towards the closing years of the last century such voices were regrettably fewer in number and more feeble. In an environment where attempts at improving the social and moral fabric of a society came to be increasingly identified with Eurocentrism and the tragic severing of one's roots, the social reform campaign (and within it especially the efforts towards female emancipation) was unfortunately the biggest casualty. There seems to have been at one level a negative correlation between political reverses or rebuffs and the hardening of social attitudes leaving individuals and family relationships to be frozen in the attitudes of the past. Finally, and no less crucial, is the fact that the growth
at first of a conservative rhetoric and therefrom of a Hindu chauvinistic world-view was to leave an important mark on the future state of Indian politics. That is not to suggest that many political conceptions which evolved more towards the 1920s or 1930s can be easily located in the period under review. Nonetheless, it should be possible to suggest that from an overall perspective of political history, the period constituting the last three decades of the nineteenth century marks an important transitional stage wherein new inter-community and intra-community linkages were first established with noticeable effect.

Of late some controversy has rightly arisen over whether 'revivalism' is a valid description of the Hindu's growing attachment to the past or alternatively his attempt to locate in that past elements that were distinctly modern. In this context I have only tried to suggest that in our construction of terms like 'revivalism', 'nationalism', 'communalism' and many others one cannot afford to grossly underplay the perceptions that the actors in history had themselves brought to bear upon them. Bengali press and literature of this period it itself replete with the use of terms like 'revival' and 'revivalism' which in my opinion should be suggestive of the spirit in which the reigning public mood then understood this phenomenon. Every generation does write its own history but even here, one remains to an extent, tied to an older social consciousness or the language of self-expression. To the content that there has always existed underlying continuities in Indian life, 'revivalism' may not be a very appropriate term of reference. It begins to acquire greater meaning however, when without questioning the validity of such inner consistencies of social life, one tries to understand the disproportionate importance that certain elements with a tradition began to receive during our period. It is useful to remember here that traditions after all, can be both imbibed and invented. Seen from this perspective, terms like 'reform' and 'revival' have a specific historical context and derive their greatest legitimacy.
in terms of Nationalist usage and vocabulary. The continuities in Indian life notwithstanding, there emerged in the nineteenth century, different perceptions about self and society, different structures of power and a new language and tools of understanding to overcome problems that were themselves new. In a sense the writing of a work like Bankim's *Dharmatattwa* or the gradual forging together of an all-India unity of Hindus are developments that were possible only within the political and intellectual environment of the late nineteenth century colonial India.

Seeking reassurance in one's past or living with notions of greatness derived from it have been a characteristic feature of many Afro-Asian societies which have had to simultaneously face problems of overcoming political subordination and inbuilt impediments on the road to modernity. In some respects therefore, recourse to the past—whether historical or mythical, was not simply a journey backwards in time but a conscious attempt to locate within that past, issues of contemporary relevance. However, problems of historical formulation are bound to arise here because of conflicting perceptions about what constitutes the past and what relevance they might have for the present. Hindu revivalism was a fragmented body of thought partly because the contemporaneity of older ideas and institutions was understood and explained in diverse ways. While at one level there remained a broad consensus about the fact that the past per se could not be brought back to life, there was evidently no such agreement on what elements within that past could be reinvigorated and to what extent. Within the broad framework of defending Hinduism or Hindu society, Bhudeb rather than Bankim was far more concerned with questions of ritual conformity.

Differences could also sometimes arise over strategy. For one section within the orthodoxy, it was the pace at which reforms were carried out that mattered.
more than their social objectives. This for instance was one major issue dividing various sections of the Brahmo community from one another and a fact that also accounts for many Brahmos themselves leaning towards social orthodoxy. For people like Bankim it was very important that the reinvigoration of the Hindu tradition did not fall contingent on such bodies of thought that were quite insular and also positively dated. It was important because such men always entertained hopes of reconciling their pride in Hinduism with a positive and tolerant attitude towards other people and faiths and this as they saw, could be achieved only at the level of philosophy, not at the level of routine, day to day existence. For Ramakrishna, Bankim or any other man of that generation it was far easier to point towards the fundamental philosophical unity between Vedantic Monism, Christian Unitarianism and the monotheistic tenets of Islam than towards similarities in social or ritualistic practices within them. A similar problem related to the use of the Shastras could be cited in this context. In the 1850s Vidyasagar himself had relied greatly on these texts but in the context of the widow marriage campaign, their use had been largely polemical. In any case, Vidyasagar's argument that the Shastras did not categorically rule out such marriages, only confirms the point later explicitly made by Bankim that in the course of history, an original text not so conservative in its implications was deliberately made so through successive interpolations. Within the Hindu revivalist movement itself, there were men who were able to distance themselves from the more intransigent, ultra-orthodox groups largely on the basis of their belief that there ought to be constructive dialectics between social prescriptions made by an older generation and needs felt by a modern society. There were thus men who considered the Shastras to be an infallible, immutable guide to human conduct and others who did not totally disregard the Shastras but considered them amenable to progressive change. Both Bankim and Vivekananda by and large conformed to the traditional thinking on gender
relations but their sharp criticism of the opponents of the Consent Bill only proves that they ultimately preferred relying far more on modern medical opinion and common sense while determining a reasonable age of marriage and its consummation than on ancient scribes like Manu and Parashar.

Some important conclusions one hopes will also tend to emerge from this work. To reiterate an earlier point, the genesis of Hindu thought no doubt lies within a larger problematic in modern-standards on this issue, there is some validity in the arguments consistently made by the orthodoxy about the hollowness of reform perpetuated by a government and other agencies whose understanding of India and Indian problems was at best contrived and quite superficial. In this context I am entirely in agreement with Forbes who perceives revivalist ideology as 'some kind of protective blanket' under which many elements of traditional Hinduism were critically revalued and even attached but within boundaries of its own making. If it is some-how possible to overlook for a moment the excesses committed by the Roman Catholic Church there might appear to be some broad similarity between the restorative spirit within the Counter-Reformation in Europe and Hindu revivalism in late nineteenth century India. One is only too acutely aware of the very different social and intellectual environments in which these two movements were born but that apart, it is quite noticeable that there is within both a nagging concern for the 'enemy within', a fairly ambiguous relationship with the State and its instruments of power and the overriding desire to restrain movements of religious reform from broadening themselves into radical social upthrusts from below. Outside this analogy, the validity of which is surely a little uncertain, it could also be said that in almost every such country of the erstwhile colonial world where the transition to modernization and self-conscious nationalhood has had to follow the tortuous course of simultaneously countering an alien government and an alien way of life, the wedge between
xenophobia, chauvinism and cultural insularity has sometimes been exceedingly thin. In some cases of course, certain factors peculiar to a culture or region have conditioned these reflexes to an extent. In its confrontation with the West, whether in the realm of regional power politics or over broader confrontation of culture, Pan-Islamism has enjoyed a far larger geographical expanse and has been propelled by somewhat different factors than has been the case with Pan-Hinduism. Though they were both subjected to indignities and exploitation, the relative difference in the degree of political control has similarly produced important variations in the respective historical developments of India and China. Incidentally one of the examples often cited by Indian nationalists to prove precisely the same point was that of Meiji Japan which evidently had the freedom to evolve appropriate strategies on the road to modernization. In the case of India regrettably, the modernity—tradition dichotomy tends to become sharper for the important reason that here modernization however limited in scope or effect, also implied a degree of political tutelage.  

While Hindu thought cannot but be understood within a larger political context, one is not certain if, there is a direct correlation between revivalist moods and militancy in politics. Towards the late 1880s there did begin to build up some general dissatisfaction with the concurrent state of politics but this, one feels, ought to be distinguished from the fierce criticism of the Congress and its modus operandi that one finds in one section of the Bengali press. Bankim for instance would not have been as unhappy over the coming of local self-government institutions for in terms of his analysis, such concessions were crucial to the greater political enfranchisement of the educated middle classes. The more orthodox Bangabasi by comparison did not take such developments as kindly for in one sense this clearly meant the emergence of alternative avenues of power which clearly endangered those already in existence. Judged from this
perspective, every expansion of the elected component at the level of provincial councils, Municipality or District Boards appeared to make the induction of such groups more possible whose social power was not rooted in caste-ranking or in other traditional forms of power. This is the light in which the orthodox Bengali press saw the attempt made by certain members of the Congress to also involve themselves with social reform issues. Evidently these people perceived that recourse to the Shastras as the best guide to social and religious reform was intimately linked with the question of power for as long as this continued, social leadership could not completely pass from the hands of the more traditional gentry into the hands of the new professional middle class. The differences in perceptions between Bankima and Bangabasi writers should not however be overstated for they are essentially reflexes born in similar social environments and associated with people whose abiding quality was their great professional competence. Up to a point, detailed studies of patron—protagonist relationships may help in understanding better, the complex interpenetration of ideology personalities and factions—I consider this to be quite crucial in the context of developments in late nineteenth century Bengal for after the 1850s at least, the so-called divide between the Hindu and the Brahmo, liberal and the orthodox, reformer and revivalist very rarely coincides with meaningful differences in birth, education and upbringing or general life-style. It would be quite appropriate therefore to recall at this juncture the rather perceptive comment made by one scholar which sees both 'Brahmo Reformation' and 'Hindu Revival' as reflexes of the same social class, 'firstly of its false hopes at birth and then moratorium at its adolescence'.

It may be possible at one level to view Hindu revivalism as only one other form of 'false consciousness' but this is somewhat an oversimplification. The Hindu orthodoxy in Bengal was one of the earliest and most consistent champions
of economic self-help and barring a few exceptions, there was in each one of them, albeit in varying degrees, an innate faith in the universality of mankind as also of human problems. It is uncharitable to suggest that the distinctly apolitical slant sometimes obvious in some Bangabasi' writers took away from their patriotism. In one sense, this apathy towards politics grew not only from a lack of faith in political solutions—at least in the short run, but also from the lack of a larger societal vision. The 1890s, particularly in the case of Bengal, represents an age overshadowed by the political upsurge of the Swadeshi movement on the other. It was an age when many political questions or formulations were still rather nebulous and ill-defined. Community identities were still relatively untainted by comunal zeal and although later-day political formulations like that of a future 'Hindu Rashtra' may have had some roots in the period under review only more intensive research into these aspects of our history will lend greater credibility to these linkages. It is important for instance that we explore more fully, the question whether the growing self-awareness among Hindus and Muslims based on language, religion, ethnicity or even common-sense perceptions of daily life could find its logical culmination only in ideas that perpetuated a permanent communal divide in 1947. Above all, it must be remembered that in dealing with Hindu revivalist thought we also touch upon, whether happily or unhappily, some of the most gifted and sensitive minds of nineteenth century Bengal. One has to deal with the self-imposed but self-edifying madness of Kamalakanto and be struck by the sense of pathos and tragic self-consciousness in people otherwise known to have been orthodox. In my attempt to sum up the mood of Bankim's age, I really cannot think of anything better to cite than the following passage I found in the 'poet of Hindu revival', Nabin Chandra and which I thought very poignantly summed up the travails of contemporary life:

There is no reason why the lives of men such as I should be written down
for posterity.... it has evidently been without any usefulness. I have received occasional letters asking details of my life. To a certain gentleman who repeatedly made this request, I wrote back saying that my life was made up of just three events—birth, matrimony and bondage. What I now await is death. However, I also let him know that this destiny would befall every great man of Bengal.

To extend, on a comic plane, the Cocteau travel metaphor: the explorer who crosses nineteenth century French literature by the traditional path can be said to enter via the steaming jungles of Romanticism, emerge on to the harsh, clear-atmosphered plateau of Realism, with the lofty, somewhat uncharted Parnassian mountains to right and left, and progress eventually into the thick mists and eternal twilight of Symbolism. The bird’s eye-view afforded by an aerial tour serves to correct the over-simplicity of such a charting. Throughout the century intellectuals and artists remained acutely aware of certain essential problems: the nature of man, his relationship with the universe, the guarantees of morality, the duties of the artist. The continual rehandling of the same issues from different aspects gives a remarkable consistency to the literature of the period taken as a whole.

Looking at the problems from a chronological perspective it is possible to show dominant trends in the way they were handled at particular moments. For three or four decades there was a sharp reaction against the application of reason to such matters, and solutions were sought through intuitive appeals to ill-defined metaphysical forces. This is the period of Chateaubriand’s redefinition of religious sensibility and the Mme de Stael’s championing of German metaphysical systems. In the following twenty to twenty-five years the virtues of scientific method were reasserted and all man’s problems subordinated to material solutions.
which remained nonetheless highly coloured by idealist notions. Positivism becomes entangled with Comte's religion of humanity and Renan's scientism. At the same period a completely opposite stream of thought, which rejects the value of sense data and the traditional methods of interpreting the outward manifestations of 'reality', finding significance only in the subjective vision of mystic forces, keeps surfacing in isolated writers, particularly poets, from Nerval to Baudelaire and on to Rimbaud. The end of the century sees all these forces at work together—scientism in the later works of Zola, total subjectivity in Laforgue, aesthetic religiosity in Huysmans, mystic individual vision in Mallarme and his disciples. Added to these are the new ideals of collectivism, identified with political and religious reactionary forces, mystical but curiously pragmatic, reaching their natural culmination in the activities of the Action Francaise.

However, here too there is a danger of accepting an unjustified sense of 'waves of development' represented by definable groups of writers, a sense disguising both the co-existence of minority viewpoints and the constant modulation of ideas held by individual authors. Leconte de Lisle and Hugo both their cases, by an extensive period of creative production, leads to interesting cultural overlaps.

The preoccupations of the age can be defined not only in terms of their intellectual import but also in terms of the practical aesthetic problems and solutions they entailed. The world of the Stendhalian, Balzacian or Flaubertian novel cannot be divorced from the concepts of individualism it contains or from the special methods of fictional construction the authors evolved in order to express those concepts—methods which in themselves relate to issues of subjective and objective reality and to the reader's own perceptions thereof. The same is equally true of the poets, however different the texture of their poetry may seem. The superficial impersonality of Leconte de Lisle's descriptions is an embodiment
of his pessimist philosophy, just as in Baudelaire's poetry what the poet calls 'the duality of man' and 'the duality of art' are inseparable.

A further dimension which can bring a closer appreciation of many nineteenth-century works is an awareness of the social conditions that produced them—if only, in most cases, by reaction against society. The main reason for this is the simple fact that the philosophical concerns about the nature of man which underlie the novels or poems are closely tied to questions of practical ethics, the possibility or impossibility of changing society, and the ways an individual can or cannot relate to his fellows without being false to himself. To give one instance—the rise of political of values stimulated by the Dreyfus affair—a knowledge of the precise social state of France is essential for a proper understanding of the literature. In other cases, as with Balzac or Zola, it is more a question of how historical awareness can illuminate the novelist's preoccupations. Once these various issues—philosophical, aesthetical and historical—have been grasped, the complexity of the inter-relationship of cultural phenomena becomes increasingly more striking.

The advent of the twentieth century did not, of course, radically alter the preoccupations of French artists and intellectuals. Certain writers, such as André Gide, were already, by the end of the 1890s, embarked upon interpretations of life which, though well rooted in the problems of the period, are more coherently viewed as foretastes of later philosophical developments. The fact remains that, though definition by dates is an arbitrary process, there is in nineteenth century French literature trends a surprising coherence derived from the tensions between convention and illusion, objective definition and subjective vision, around which the major works are constructed.
Looking at Flaubert and Bankim, two canons of French and Bengali literature respectively, one has to consider their cultural worlds. The immense intensity of their works invites admiration as well as comparison. It is interesting to note that these two writers writing across the globe in the same century, wrote path-breaking masterpieces in the same genre—the novel form. Flaubert's Emma Bovary has withstood the test of time as an immensely debated nouelistic heroine. While comparing Bankim's heroines with Emma, one must remember the different socio-historical-cultural patterns of nineteenth century Bengal.

In that sense one may say, with Matthew Arnold:

*The epoch ends, the world is still.*

*The age has talk'd and work'd its fill—*

.........

*And o'er the plain, where the dead age*

*Did its now silent warfare wage—*

.........

*The one or two immortal lights*

*Rise slowly up into the sky*

*To shine these there everlastingly,*

*Like stars over the bounding hill.*
NOTES

1. Derrida in De la grammatologie.

2. Culler in On Deconstruction on the problem of framing.

3. Propp. in his Morphology of the Folk Tale, elaborates on the important distinction between character and function.

4. Reader - Oriented criticism is by now past.

5. Partha Chatterjee in Culture and Power.

6. Brahmo enterprise on a bigger scale seems to find some mention in the contemporary press.

7. One should understand the Bangabasi argument that status derived neither from wealth nor the new learning but social position.

8. Translated from the preface to Nabin C. Sen., Amar Jeebon.