CHAPTER - I
INTRODUCTION: JAPAN'S POST SECOND WORLD WAR DEFENCE PARAMETERS

Japan's surrender in World War II, following the devastation of two of its cities by nuclear bombs, was to change the face of Japanese politics for ever. The occupation forces compelled Japan to demilitarize completely and democratize its polity. Purges, land reforms and zaibatsu reforms followed. The new constitution, noted for its abnegation of war as an instrument of settling international disputes, became the hallmark feature of post war Japanese diplomacy.

Successive Japanese governments adopted a defence policy that took into account the pacific orientation of the Japanese people, chastened by the trauma of a lost war. The 'peace clause' (Article 9) of the new constitution became a standard which no government could violate with impunity.

Nakasone Yasuhiro, Prime Minister from 1982 to 1987, had strong views about Japan's defence policy, which he vocally expressed during his early political career. Once he became Prime Minister, no doubt he had to modify his stance in keeping with the demands of office, but strove at the same time to initiate changes. Starting as the
Director-General of Japan's Defence Agency (JDA) and later as Prime Minister, Nakasone certainly tried to broaden, expand, and if possible change or scrap some of the existing parameters. The present study concerns Nakasone's role, in moulding Japan's defence policy.

**TWO PHASES OF DEFENCE POLICY**

Post-war Japanese defence policy evolved in two phases. In the first phase, covering the period 1945 to 1960, efforts were made to safeguard Japanese security by raising the Self Defence Forces (SDF) and giving shape to Japan - U.S. security arrangements. In the second phase i.e. after 1960, modifications were brought into Japan's defence build-up plans and various strategic doctrines adopted, that gave the Japanese defence policy a unique character. Obviously, the period of our study falls in the second phase.

**PHASE-I**

The Japanese governments in the post-war period have adopted a defence policy which is governed predominantly by the following defence parameters-

A. the U.S. drafted Japanese Constitution;

B. the Principle of Civilian Control;
C. the Japan-U.S. Security arrangements; and

D. the Basic Policy of National Defence.

The Constitution and the Principle of Civilian Control came to be adopted during the Allied Occupation. These were consciously adopted to eliminate any possible reenactment of what had happened in pre-war Japan. But security thinking in the U.S. underwent change following the growth of communism in the neighbouring areas. The Japan-U.S. security arrangement was fashioned due to the changing military environment in the Far East. Japan, an enemy nation, was turned in to an ally by the Americans. The Basic Policy of National Defence was formulated only after Japan resumed its sovereignty in April 1952. In this chapter effort has been made to discuss these four parameters and also some other issues that have shaped the postwar framework of the Japanese defence policy.

A. The Constitution:

The post-war Japanese Constitution has generated intense debates all these years over the manner of its promulgation. The present constitution promulgated on 3 November 1946 and enforced on 3 May 1947 was greatly influenced by the United States. It was drafted by the Government Section of the Supreme Command for Allied Powers
(SCAP) and thrust upon the Japanese. The anti-war sentiment of the time was very much evident as can be seen in the opening paragraph of the constitution, which says,

"We shall secure for ourselves and our posterity the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all nations and the blessings of liberty throughout this land and resolved that never again shall be visited by the horrors of war through the action of government."\(^1\)

Article 9 of the Constitution has been a subject of animated discussions both in and outside Japan in the light of the present strength of the Self Defence Force (SDF).\(^2\) The Japanese armed forces have a peculiar and delicate existence because of Article 9. Even many legal battles have been fought on the legality of the SDF.\(^3\) The SDF has won political credibility in recent years because of the change in the attitude of the Socialists towards it.

On 26 July 1945, the Postdam Declaration was issued by the Allied Powers. The Declaration aimed at the elimination of the authority and influence of those who had misled the Japanese people

\(^1\) The Constitution of Japan.


during the war. War criminals would have to be punished. The Japanese government would “remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of the democratic tendencies” among the people. “Freedom of speech, religion and thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights would be established.”

Demilitarization and democratization of Japan, were the two major objectives of the Allied Occupation authorities. The U.S. State Department in the Summer of 1945, in a policy statement, approved by President Harry S. Truman directed the SCAP, that,

“Japan will be completely disarmed and demilitarized. The authority of the militarists and the influence of militarism will be totally eliminated from her political, economic and social life....Disarmament and demilitarization and the primary tasks of the military occupation shall be carried out promptly”.

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General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP) suggested to the Japanese government in October 1945 to take up the responsibility of writing a new constitution.  

The Japanese government under Shidehara Kijuro submitted a draft constitution, known as the "Matsumoto draft" to the SCAP on 1 February 1945. The draft did not make any major modifications in the Meiji Constitution. On the status of the Emperor, the Matsumoto draft declared that, "the Emperor is supreme and inviolable" (The Meiji constitution had declared the Emperor to be "sacred and inviolable"). It revealed that the draft was basically an attempt to retain the Meiji Constitution with only slight modifications. MacArthur immediately denounced it as "nothing more than a rewarding of the old Meiji Constitution". The draft thoroughly demolished American faith in the

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Japanese ability to write a draft constitution. General MacArthur then organized an American study group to prepare a draft constitution which would be based on three important principles, renunciation of war, the abolition of armed forces and the denial of right of belligerency to the state. The study group completed the task in seven working days in February 1946 and handed over the draft to the Japanese government.

The Japanese Diet discussed all aspects of the draft, but was not permitted to tinker with any of the fundamental principles set forth. The constitution was approved by the Diet on 7 October 1947 and promulgated on 3 May 1947. Article 9 of the constitution clearly reflected MacArthur's ideas. The final version of Article 9 reads as follows

"Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international dispute.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential will never be maintained. The right to belligerency of the state will not be recognized."

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10 Article 9, *The Constitution of Japan*. 
The article eliminated Japan's right to maintain armed forces. It became a subject of serious discussions in Japan. People like Ashida Hitoshi held that Japan had the right to maintain armed forces. It was argued that renunciation was conditional upon the realization of international peace. But most of the Japanese politicians did not support any armament efforts even for self-defence.

The SCAP, in the early days of the enactment of the Japanese constitution, had declared that Japan surrendered the inherent right of self-defence or renounced war even for its own security. However MacArthur took a contradictory view in the later years which he proclaimed in his memoir. He wrote,

"Nothing in Article 9, however, prevents any and all necessary steps for the preservation of the safety of the nation. Japan can not be expected to resist the overweening law of self preservation. If attacked she will defend herself. Article 9 was aimed entirely at eliminating Japanese aggression".  

The occupation authorities had achieved complete disarmament of Japan. But before the occupation came to an end, the question of Japan's national security arose in view of the Korean War, the rapid

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12 Douglas MacArthur, n.8 p. 304.
growth of communist military power in China, the Soviet Union and North Korea and the general state of tension in world affairs. Just after the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, MacArthur authorized the establishment of the National Police Reserve (NPR) of 75000 men. The NPR was a para-military force designed to assist the police in maintaining internal security at a time when most of the occupation troops were doing duty in Korea. The occupation authorities thought there was a possibility that the Japanese communists might coordinate a programme of violence and subversion at that crucial moment. This hastened MacArthur's decision to organize the NPR. The NPR was converted to the Self Defence Force (SDF) and put under the Defence Agency in July 1954.

I. The Self Defence Forces (SDF)

There has been widespread controversy in Japan regarding the maintainability of armed forces under Article 9. Many hold that Article 9 does not deprive Japan of the right of self defence, which is inherent to a sovereign nation. There are four schools of thought regarding this

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13 John M. Maki, n.9 pp. 102-103.

14 The Supreme Court in its judgement in the Sunagawa case on 19 December 1959 has maintained that Article 9 does not deny Japan the right of self-defence.
issue which may be succinctly described as:

a) no right to Japan even to wage war for self-defence;

b) the abnegation of war is contingent on peace being achieved internationally;

c) minimum force for self-defence is allowed;

d) no obligation on Japan to abjure war.\(^{15}\)

\(^{15}\) No right to Japan even to wage war for self-defence. The argument of the first school is that Article 9 prohibits Japan from waging war for self-defence. It holds that the second paragraph of Article 9 categorically denies the right of belligerency. Further, Preamble of the constitution speaks of the resolve of the Japanese to preserve the security of the country "trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world." Moreover it is difficult to distinguish a war of self-defence from war of aggression.\(^{16}\)


ibid. pp.22-24. Late Tatsukichi Minobe, a former Professor of Tokyo University, was the proponent of this School.
(b) **The abnegation of war is contingent on peace being achieved internationally.** The second school places great importance on the addition of the phrase "In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph..." to the second paragraph of Article 9. The proponent of this school hold that renunciation of all war potentials was aimed at securing international peace based on justice and order. In the event of international peace being achieved, such renunciation would be justified since use of force would not be required at all for self-defence. But non-realization of the aim would not oblige Japan to stick to renunciation. It thus concludes that Japan can maintain armed forces only for self-defence. 17

(c) **Minimum force for self-defence is allowed.** The third group specifies the levels of armed forces needed for Japan's self-defence and argues that these armed forces would constitute the minimum necessary for Japan's self-defence within the framework of Article 9. 18

(d) **No obligation on Japan to abjure war.** The fourth group

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17 Soichi Sasaki, a former professor of Kyoto University is a proponent of this School. For details see, *Nippon Koku Kenpo Ron* (The Constitution of Japan) (Tokyo, 1949).

maintains that the Article 9 is nothing but an international manifesto expressing the desire for peace. It further states that the article does not have any legal power and Japan being an independent and sovereign nation can maintain armed forces to exercise the right of self-defence.\(^\text{19}\)

Successive Japanese governments have adopted the argument offered by the third group which interprets Article 9 as permitting "minimum necessary capability for self defence." The minimum necessary capability is understood as denying the maintenance of offensive weapons. But characterising a military equipment as offensive or defensive is difficult. So with each new purchase of military equipment, the Diet witnesses furious debates as regards the nature of the equipment.\(^\text{20}\) The Japanese government has taken the stand that weapon systems that pose a threat of aggression or total destruction of other countries such as ICBMs, SLBMs, IRBMs, attack aircraft carriers etc. can not be deployed by the SDF.\(^\text{21}\)

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\(^\text{19}\) For details see, Takayanagi Kenzo, \textit{Tenno Kenpo Dai 9 Jyo [The Emperor, Article 9 of the Constitution]},(Tokyo, 1963) pp- 84-89.

\(^\text{20}\) In 1968, the LDP government and the Defence Agency were forced to remove air-refueling and bombing devices from the U.S. F-4E inteceptor planes following the Japan socialist Party's claim in the Diet regarding the offensive nature of the same. Also See \textit{Mainichi Daily} (Tokyo), 9 and 18 October 1968.

Apart from the above mentioned legal restriction on Japan's military capability. Article 9 is also interpreted as putting constraints on the SDF. The SDF is "exclusively defensive." The term conveys a "posture of passive defence". Adhering to this policy, Japan will initiate its defence operation only when its land is attacked by a foreign power or powers. The government's position regarding the SDF is as follows:

1. The self-defence capability which Japan is permitted to possess within constitutional limitation should be the minimum necessary military capability.

2. The exercise of the right of self-defence is mainly restricted to the situation when there has been a sudden and unjustifiable aggression against Japan.

3. The government believes that the constitution does not permit it to despatch armed forces to foreign territorial land, sea and air space for the purpose of using force, because such deployment of troops overseas generally goes beyond the minimum limit necessary for self-defence.

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4. Even though International Law allows a state the right of collective self-defence, the Japanese government is of the view that the exercise of the right of self-defence as permissible under Article 9 is authorized only when the act of self-defence is within the minimum limit. The government, therefore, believes that the right of collective self-defence exceeds the minimum limit and is constitutionally not permissible. 23

As to whether the SDF can be sent abroad under the banner of the United Nations, it is understood to depend on the objective of the UN forces. If the objective is other than using military capabilities such as peacekeeping operations, a dispatch of the SDF is constitutionally permitted. But the Self-Defence Forces Law for a long time did not have any provisions that authorized the SDF to undertake such missions. It was during the premiership of Miyazawa Kiichi in 1992 that the SDF finally went on a Peace Keeping Operation (PKO) to Cambodia under the UN banner following a change in SDF law but not before a lot of acrimonious debates engulfed the nation for a long time.

23 ibid., pp. 70-71.
II. Constitutionality of the SDF

The nature of the formation of the SDF aroused strong resentment among the Japanese people. This was due to the predominant role of military in the state of affairs of prewar politics and society and the subsequent disasters in World War II. The goals of the occupation authorities drastically changed following the Korean War and the emergence of the communist threat in the form of Soviet-China-North Korean alliance. The Americans now wanted Japan to undertake its own share in defending itself and not entirely depend on the U.S. The postwar Japanese leaders like Yoshida Shigeru had declared that even though Article 9 did not renounce the right of self-defence, armaments even for the purpose of self-defence, would be illegal. Because of the disaster that Japan faced during the World War II, the postwar Japanese people came to have negative feelings towards their own military. In a situation like this the public posture adopted by important political personalities like Yoshida on the question of armament in the context of Article 9 did not help matters much. Thus, when the SDF was created, it aroused skepticism, suspicion and distrust. Not many Japanese supported the existence of the SDF. Also very few wanted to
assign the function of "national security" to the SDF.\textsuperscript{24}

Successive LDP governments, have taken the stand that the SDF does not violate Article 9 of the constitution. But the socialists and the communists took the stand that the SDF was unconstitutional. The Japan Socialist Party (JSP) admitting that every nation has a right to self-defence, argued that no nation would ever say "our country has an armed force for aggression".\textsuperscript{25} The Japan Communist Party (JCP) attacked "the subservient nature of the SDF to American military strategy" while holding the SDF as violating the constitution. The constitutional experts have consistently held that the military force is unconstitutional as per Article 9.\textsuperscript{26}

The question of the constitutionality of the SDF has been dealt with by the courts in Japan. In the Eniwa case, two brothers in the

\textsuperscript{24} In a 1965 public opinion Poll by the Prime Minister's Office, only 15 per cent of the respondent mentioned "maintenance of national security" should be the function of the SDF. Around 40 per cent mentioned "disaster relief" and 16 per cent mentioned "internal security"


\textsuperscript{26} As high as 73.4 per cent of Japanese constitutional experts held the SDF to be unconstitutional at the time of its creation. In 1981, 71.3 per cent held that SDF was unconstitutional. See Kobayashi, Kenpo Dai 9 Jyo (Article 9 of the Constitution) for details.
town of Eniwa in Hokkaido, complained that the productivity of their dairy firm was damaged by the noise from a nearby SDF training base. They cut the communication wires near the firing range and were subsequently charged for violation of the Self Defence Forces law. It was an opportunity for the opponents of the SDF to challenge its constitutionality. The Sapporo District Court on 29 March 1967 held the two brothers guilty of the crime charged but gave the verdict that SDF law was not applicable to the case. The court, however, refrained from passing judgement on the constitutionality on the SDF laws and the SDF itself. 27

Another was the Naganuma case in which a group of residents in Naganuma in Hokkaido complained against the construction of an SDF base in the Sapporo District Court in July 1969. They held that the SDF had violated the constitution and thereby the construction of the SDF base would not serve any public interest. The Sapporo District Court gave a sensational decision on 7 September 1973 that the SDF was unconstitutional. It was perhaps the first occasion in which any court in Japan declared in a clear cut and unambiguous manner that the

27 For the full text of the judgement, see Jurisuto [Jurist], (Tokyo), no. 370, 15 May 1967 pp. 53-55.
SDF was unconstitutional. The then LDP government of Tanaka Kakuei immediately appealed to the High Court. On 5 August 1976 the Sapporo High Court struck down the District Court order and ruled,

"whether the existence and other aspects of the SDF are compatible with Article 9 of the constitution, is a judgement related to sovereign act, and as a political act of the Diet and Cabinet it should be entrusted ultimately to the people as a whole for their political judgement".

It was thus interpreted that the court can not rule on this matter. The dissatisfied plaintiffs further appealed to the Supreme Court, The Supreme Court on 7 September 1982 ruled that the case was not a constitutional but a civil case and declared that the plaintiffs did not have the right to sue in this case.

Amendment of the constitution is the only way to solve the vexed issue. The LDP since 1955 has advocated constitutional revision. The constitution was prepared at a time when the Japanese as a nation did not enjoy full sovereignty to express their views. The subsequent

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30 Nishi, n.15, p. 22.
regaining of independence and sovereignty makes it imperative for the Japanese to freely discuss and make suitable amendments wherever required so that it reflects the true aspirations of the people and also make it flexible enough to adapt to the changing conditions inside and outside of Japan.

Hatoyama Ichiro was the first Japanese Prime Minister to propose revision of the constitution in 1956. The JSP bitterly opposed the move and tried to preserve the postwar constitution at any cost and strike down the SDF. A Constitution Investigation Commission was set up in May 1956. It held many meetings to discuss the relevant issues. It also organized public hearings throughout the country. But despite that the commission could not find consensus among people on the issues. Also lack of two third majority in each house of the Diet forced the government not to press for constitutional revision. The status quo has been maintained since then.\(^{31}\)

**B. Principle of Civilian Control**

The defeat of Japan, though painful from the nationalistic point of view, was a relief to many Japanese. It put an end to the endless drift of

\(^{31}\) For details, see John M. Maki, \textit{n.9}, p. 205-212.
Japan towards more devastations. The occupation made the Japanese introspective of the past. They analyzed the events that had led to Japan's participation in the war and the subsequent destructions that the war brought. It was well known that the Japanese military was responsible for this state of affairs. The military was under the direct control of the Emperor and virtually free from any control by the Diet. The Meiji constitution allowed a special status to the military in the prewar Japanese Society. The military authorities had a direct access to the Emperor and could dictate terms to the governments in the prewar days. They played a significant role in the process of thought control of the ordinary people which was responsible for the emergence of fascism in Japan. The subsequent devastation and suffering that people faced, made them adopt a totally negative attitude towards the military. People looked down upon the military and held it responsible for Japan's destructions. The SCAP authorities were determined to eliminate the military altogether in the constitutional set-up of the nation. The Japanese leaders at that point of time did not have a major say in drawing up the future constitutional framework of the nation. The SCAP made elaborate provisions for civilian control of the military.

32 Article II and Article 12 of the Meiji Constitution.
The Japanese leaders went along with the arrangement witnessing the working of the western liberal democracies. There was a widespread feeling among the Japanese leaders that the cause of their nation would be best served under a civilian government and not under the military.

The development of western liberalism saw nations adopting the capitalist methods in the task of nation-building. Emphasis on industrialism and non-interference of the state in the economic life became the order of the day. "Laissez fair" came to be regarded as the most important means for attaining individual as well as social happiness. Capitalism succeeded to a great extent in raising the life standard of the people in European societies. Various institutional frameworks were adopted that ensured that attempts to interfere in the life of individuals were reduced to the minimum. The military which had the potential to interfere had been sidelined and was made to perform specific tasks under certain conditions by creating new and conducive environment for constitutionalism. Civilian control was one method of maintaining the western liberal framework to maximize social prosperity as well as social harmony and minimize state interference.

The idea of Civilian Control can be found in the Western liberal...
democracies of Europe and America. It has been adopted to differing political traditions of these nations. The structures, systems and modes of operations differ from country to country and hence the difficulty in the visualization of a single satisfactory definition of civilian control. However in the democracies of Europe and America, civilian control has come to mean politics having priority over the military. Military power is an essential and important means to guarantee the peace and security of any nation. But at the same time its misapplication could lead the country to a major catastrophe as was the case with Japan. In order to avoid this possibility western democracies have attached importance to the concept of civilian control. Reflecting on the state of affairs that led it to the World War II and the consequent disasters, Japan adopted a system of uncomprosing civilian control as available in other democratic nations.

Japan has adopted a number of measures for ensuring civilian control in Japan since 1 July 1954 when the Defence Agency Establishment Law and the Self Defence Forces Law came into effect. Those are as follows:

i. The SDF is under the control of the National Diet which represents the Japanese People. The Diet makes all the crucial
decisions regarding the legal strength of SDF, organization and budget. The Diet always deliberates on various problems related to the SDF. The SDF's defence operations require the approval of the National Diet.34

ii. The cabinet makes decisions on legislative and financial bills to be submitted to the Diet to gain its approval. It also determines key policies and plans concerning national defence. It is to be noted that the cabinet, comprising of the Prime Minister and other Ministers, must be made of civilians. Article 66 (2) of the constitution says “The Prime Minister and other ministers of state must be civilians”. The Prime Minister enjoys the supreme right of exercising direction and supervision of the SDF. A civilian Minister of State is appointed as the Director General of Defence Agency and reigns over SDF affairs.35 The low priority assigned to defence can be measured from the fact that the Defence Agency is not a full fledged Ministry and the post of the Director General is given to a junior politician of the rank of Minister of State.

iii. The National Security Council (NSC), which replaced the

35 ibid.
National Defence Council (NDC) in July 1986, is an important organization within the cabinet to discuss matters concerning national defence. The permanent members of the Council are the Prime Minister who presides over the Council, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Finance Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Secretary General of the Cabinet, Director Generals of the Public Safety Commission and the Defence Agency. The Prime Minister can also pick as ad hoc members other ministers concerned with security affairs and the chairman of the joint staff council of the SDF. 36

iv. Within the Defence Agency, the Director General who supervises the SDF, is assisted by Parliamentary and Administrative Vice Ministers in governing and operating the SDF. 37 There are ten civilian Defence Counsellors below the Vice Ministers, who assist the Director General in the formulation of basic defence policies related to the SDF. They head the Internal Bureaus of the Defence Agency. 38 The staff officers of the three services who function as professional advisors, work under the supervision and control of these Internal

36 ibid. p. 66.

37 ibid. p. 73.

Bureaus. Thus, it is a system of rigid civilian control in which the role of the military has been deliberately minimised. The net result of this practice is the emergence of a tendency among the civilian officials to treat those in uniform as being inferior. However, it is not within the scope of this thesis to examine correctness of the system.

C. Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

Maintenance of peace and independence are the most basic and inherent rights of any sovereign nation. It is just and correct for any nation to establish a defense posture capable of meeting any conceivable situation ranging from small scale wars involving conventional weapons to wars of sophisticated weaponry. But Japan's case is altogether different. The Japanese people, because of their sufferings during the war, developed antipathy towards the military. When the Occupation administration undertook demilitarization, it won widespread support among the ordinary people. People in general, were happy that the army was being eliminated altogether.

But soon the situation surrounding Japan as well as the international scenario underwent great changes. It became evident that Japan would have to find ways and means to defend itself. We have
already discussed about the creation of the SDF and its role in Japanese defence. But that itself was not adequate. As an independent and sovereign nation Japan had to look for options which could provide it with a reliable defence system. The security arrangements with the U.S since 1952 has been very useful for the Japanese. It has more than made up for the absence of adequate defence capabilities such as deterrent power against nuclear threats and counter attack capability against a large scale invasion with conventional weapons. 39

A brief look at the change in the U.S. policy towards Japan particularly after 1947 is relevant here.

The Allied Occupation of Japan had begun with the aim of turning Japan in to a “Switzerland in Asia”. The occupation authorities wanted to make Japan an ideal state based on justice, equality and democracy. They ‘demilitarized’ Japan completely. The post war Japanese leaders like Yoshida supported the occupation plans and held that the “security of Japan would be preserved by trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world.” 40 But the occupation of Japan itself

was proving to be expensive for the Americans financially. The U.S. taxpayers had started complaining against the U.S. involvement in Japan the U.S. government was trying to reduce its financial commitments and encourage Japan to attain economic stability and progress.

But international politics underwent sweeping changes. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were competing with each other to enhance their influence in the East Asian region. In September 1948, a Soviet supported communist government came to power in North Korea. China came under communist control in 1949 despite American help for Chiang Kai Shek. The Chinese government signed a Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union in February 1950 promising mutual cooperation and joint resistance against a resurgent Japan. The Korean war broke out in June 1950. The communist threat looked real and dangerous. It looked almost impossible that an unarmed country like Japan could maintain political neutrality in such a volatile region.

The above mentioned events compelled the U.S. government to change its security attitude towards Japan. The independence and neutrality of Japan could be maintained only if Japan had sufficient military capability. But that would clearly go against the provisions of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution. Further, such a policy could
arouse the misgivings of the neighbouring countries. The Americans had to tackle the situation quickly and in a realistic manner.

John Foster Dulles was appointed Foreign Policy Advisor to the Secretary of state on 6 April 1950. He was assigned the task of preparing a peace treaty for Japan. But it would however be wrong to say that the momentum for a peace treaty with Japan picked up only after Dulles came to the picture. The formulation of a peace treaty had been contemplated in the U.S. government circle as early as 1947. Different views had then been expressed regarding the kind of peace to be made.\(^{41}\) Only MacArthur had advocated a quick and generous peace for Japan. In the U.S. State Department two distinct views were propagated. While Hugh Burton wanted punitive peace for Japan, George Kennan advocated the prolongation of the occupation period till the political and economic stabilization of Japan were ensured Kennan had even had questioned the wisdom of formulating a harsh peace treaty for Japan. The Department of Defence on the other hand had advised the retention of Japan from the viewpoint of military interest.\(^{42}\)

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\(^{42}\) See ibid. pp. 54-62.
The U.S. government had undertaken in 1947-48 a number of economic measures to make the Japanese economy self-sustaining. The measures were taken as per the reports of the committees headed by Clifford Strike and Percy H. Johnston. The reports highlighted the grave difficulties facing the Japanese economy. The measures which included the stopping of advance repatriation, drew protests from many countries. The U.S. government justified the measures arguing that democratization and political reforms could succeed only in a "tolerable economic environment" in Japan. The U.S. had till then single-handedly assumed responsibility of providing assistance to Japan and that it "can not bear the burden of Japan's support" not only because 'the American tax payer is already carrying a heavy load" but also because 'there is a limit to the U.S. resources." 44

A draft treaty was drawn by the U.S. Government in October 1949 envisaging a mild peace for Japan. 45 The National Security Council


44 See K. V. Kesavan, Japan's Relations with Southeast Asia: 1952-60. (Bombay, 1972) pp. 42-45.

45 Frederick S. Dunn, n. 41, pp. 77-78.
(NSC) of the USA decided in November 1950 to consider Japan as a friendly nation. It wanted to offer Japan a favourable peace treaty and make her a dependable ally.\textsuperscript{46}

In January 1950, the U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Acheson gave clear and unmistakeable expression to the new U.S. policy towards Japan. He declared that the real threat to peace in the Far East was the Soviet Union and not Japan. He turned Japan as a “vital link in the security of the free world”.\textsuperscript{47}

Thus, when John Foster Dulles took up the task of drafting the peace treaty, U.S. policies had already crystalized. All that he had to do was to embody them in a treaty. Dulles had two main tasks at hand in this regard. First, the spirit of the treaty should be governed by justice. Second, the greatest threat that the world faced was communism. The outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950 strengthened his conviction in the two concepts and encouraged him to draw up not only a “just” treaty but also a “prompt” treaty. He called for quick action in Japan. He cautioned ‘neglect and indecision in Japan could lose the gains of


\textsuperscript{47} ibid., p. 83.
General MacArthur's superb administration. We could indeed lose more in Japan than can be won in Korea. 48

Dulles held negotiations with the Japanese leaders. He visited other countries which were interested in the Japanese peace settlement. He had to negotiate tactfully between the Defence Department and the State Department which initially had different perceptions regarding future status of Japan. The San Francisco Peace Treaty was finally signed by Japan and forty eight other nations on 8 September 1951. Simultaneously a Security Treaty was also signed between Japan and the United States on the same day.

The peace treaty made it mandatory for Japan to work in accordance with the UN Charter which obliged nations to settle international disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. This was designed to prevent a recurrence of military aggression and to bind Japan to the security arrangements of the United Nations. Article 5(c) of the peace treaty recognized that Japan as a sovereign nation possessed the inherent right of individual or collective

self-defence referred to in Article 51 of the UN Charter and that Japan could voluntarily enter into collective security arrangements.\textsuperscript{49}

The recognition of the right of individual and collective self-defence formally ended the occupation policy of complete disarmament of Japan. The right to enter into collective security arrangements gave implicit approval to the security treaty with the United States.

The Security Treaty between the U.S. and Japan came into force in April 1952. But certain provisions of the treaty were not appreciated by the Japanese people. It was clearly an unequal pact with the U.S. enjoying a dominant position. The treaty allowed the U.S. armed forces to intervene during any internal Japanese insurgency. It also provided that Japan could not grant base rights to a third party without the U.S. approval. Such provision surely compromised with Japan's sovereignty. The treaty did not have a time limit and was to run indefinitely.\textsuperscript{50} The treaty was viewed as an unequal one by most of the Japanese. Naturally there was a demand for eliminating the loopholes in the pact.

The Security Treaty was revised in January 1960 in order to

\textsuperscript{49} K.V. Kesavan n. 44, p. 50.
\textsuperscript{50} See Appendix I.
eliminate those defects. Apart from public sentiments, some other reasons may also be cited, which necessitated the revision of the Security Treaty.

First, Japan had been admitted to the United Nations in 1956. In the same year it was accepted in to the Security Council as a non-permanent member. Second, Japan had normalised relations with the Soviet Union in 1956. Third, it had normalised relations with most Asian countries by 1960. The diplomatic successes of the 1950s encouraged Japan to play an important role in international affairs. Thus, Japan wanted equal treatment from the USA. So it wanted a revision of the 1951 Security treaty which would be in consonance with its national esteem.

The revised security treaty looked more balanced as it had eliminated the earlier defects of the 1951 treaty. Unlike the original treaty, the revised treaty embodied formal U.S. guarantee for security of Japan. 51 Article V stipulated that:

"Each party recognizes that an armed attack against either

51 The obligation of the U.S. to protect Japan under the 1951 treaty was worded less categorically. Article I of the treaty stated that,"...such forces may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack....."
party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes."

Article III states,

"The Parties.... will maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack." 52

The emphasis on "constitutional provision" in both the articles have come to be interpreted as the tacit U.S. understanding of the Japanese constraints because of the stipulations of Article 9 of the post-war Japanese constitution. It is further held that Japan can depend on the U.S. to supplement its own defence. The security arrangements, whose core is the U.S. obligation to defend Japan, ensures that as armed attack against Japan by an outside party could possibly be confronted directly by the immense U.S. military might as well as by the efficient and strong Self Defence Forces of Japan. 53 Under this treaty, the United States has the obligation to defend Japan in case of an armed attack against it, but Japan is not required to defend United States even if the latter were attacked in places other than territories under Japan's administration. This is due to Japan's constitution precluding the right

52 See Appendix I.

to collective self-defence.\textsuperscript{54}

Article VI of the treaty further states that,

"For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan."\textsuperscript{55}

It is under the provisions of this clause that the United States stations its forces in Japan. The presence of the U.S. forces is considered as important component of U.S. strategy to maintain peace and security not only in Japan but also the entire East Asian region.

Finally, unlike the 1951 Treaty, the revised treaty had a duration of ten years and each party has the right to terminate thereafter with one year's notice.\textsuperscript{56}

The Japan-U.S. security arrangements have greatly benefitted the Japanese all these years. The treaty freed Japan from heavy economic and financial burden of rearmament and thus allowed it to devote itself

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{54} ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{55} Appendix II.
\item \textsuperscript{56} ibid.
\end{itemize}
to the task of postwar reconstruction and socio-economic development.

The U.S. security umbrella coupled with financial and technological assistance on a massive scale, contributed to the speedy restoration of Japan's economy.

The ratification of the revised security treaty, however, was not easy. It met with a storm of protest from the socialists, communists, trade unions and students. They staged demonstrations on the streets of Tokyo which turned violent most of the times. The visit of the then U.S. President Eisenhower to Japan had to be cancelled. The treaty was finally ratified on 21 June 1960.

In 1970 both Japan and USA decided to continue the life of the treaty "automatically". The treaty has continued till to date without any major difficulties so far.

D. Basic Policy for National Defence

The Basic Policy for National Defence was initiated by the Kishi Cabinet in May 1957. It called for the promotion of peace through international cooperation and improvement of national security keeping in view the nation's resources and other domestic situations. It serves as a basis for the gradual improvement of an efficient defence capability
as well as the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. The following is the full text of the Basic policy:

"The objective of national defence is to prevent direct and indirect aggression, but once invaded, to repel such aggression, thereby preserving the independence and peace of Japan.

To achieve this objective, the Government of Japan hereby establishes the following principles:

1. To support the activities of the United Nations, and promote international cooperation, thereby contributing to the realization of world peace.

2. To promote the public welfare and enhance the people's love for the country, thereby establishing the sound basis essential to Japan's security.

3. To develop progressively the effective defence capabilities necessary for self-defence, and the nation's defence, and the nation's resources and the prevailing domestic situation.

4. To deal with external aggression on the basis of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, pending the effective functioning of the United Nations in the future in deterring and repelling such aggression. 57

The Basic Policy for National Defence declares the objectives of progressively strengthening the SDF to prevent direct and indirect aggression against Japan, supporting the UN activities and depending on the Japan-U.S. security arrangements until a U.N. collective security system becomes operational. It has functioned as a basis for Japan's defence policy. But it came under close scrutiny in 1970 under the

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initiative of Nakasone Yasuhiro while he served as Director General of the Defence Agency. It will be dealt separately later.

**PHASE - II**

Japan slowly settled down to the task of nation-building in the 1960’s. The turbulent 50s had made people weary of too many complicated political issues. People looked less interested in ideologies. Successive governments started adopting an “economy first” approach: The economy started showing growth and the benefits passed on to the people in the form of enhanced life standards. Hence, the government’s emphasis on economy got full-scale approval of the people. The 60s was a quiet period in comparison to the earlier decade. A number of major policy decisions, aimed at steering Japan clear of political and strategic involvements were taken. These policy pronouncements, born out of the unique post-war Japanese pacifism, were designed in such a way that the nation pursued its economic goals single-mindedly without getting involved in controversial strategic issues. These policies, relevant to this thesis, are as follows;

i. The Three Non-Nuclear Principles (1967)

ii. Ban on Export of weapons technology (1976)

iii. Adoption of the National Defence Programme Outline (1976)
iv. Setting "One-Per-Cent-Ceiling" on Annual Defence Budgets (1976)

v. Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defence Cooperation

i. Three Non-Nuclear Principles

Japan was and remains till to date the only nation in the world which has endured a nuclear attack. This experience hardened the attitude of the people on nuclear weapons. They wanted total elimination of nuclear weapons from the Japanese soil. Seeing the public sentiments, the Japanese government took the stand in the 1950s that it had no intention of developing and maintaining nuclear weapons. But significantly the Japanese Constitution does not specifically prohibit Japan from maintaining nuclear forces.

Successive LDP governments had adopted the position that theoretically Article 9 of the constitution did not prohibit Japan from developing and maintaining defensive and short range nuclear weapons that do not pose a threat to other countries. The argument behind this interpretation is that Article 9 does not deprive Japan of its inherent right of self-defence. The first post-World War II White Paper on Defence was published in October 1970 under the direction of Director General Nakasone Yasuhiro. It stated.
“...If small-size nuclear weapons are within the scale of real power needed for the minimum necessary limit for self-defence, and if they are such as will not be a threat of aggression towards other nations it is possible to say that possession thereof is possible in legal theory.”

Thus, Japan can maintain nuclear weapons if these are exclusively for the purpose of self-defence. These legal points were not strong enough to overcome the anti-nuclear sentiments of the Japanese. The reversion of Okinawa looked a possibility in 1967. There was strong belief among the Japanese that Okinawa was a repository for U.S. nuclear weapons. During 1967, the Diet opposition parties, supported by a strong anti-nuclear popular sentiment demanded that Okinawa should not be returned unless it was free of U.S. nuclear weapons. Sato Eisaku, the then Japanese Prime Minister argued that it would be totally free of nuclear weapons and on 11 December 1967 announced in the Diet the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. As per this Japan will not possess and produce nuclear weapons and will not permit their introduction into Japan.

Successive LDP governments accepted these principles as a matter of national policy. Further, Japan ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in June 1976 and placed itself under an

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obligation as a non-nuclear weapons state which would not produce or acquire nuclear weapons.

ii. Ban on Export of Weapons Technology

According to the constitution Japan has renounced the right to wage war. It believes that its security can be preserved by trusting in the justice and faith of the peace loving peoples of the world. This constitutional declaration forms the basis for the present defence policy as well as for a restrictive arms export policy. However, restrictions on arms export were not introduced immediately after the war. Some exports of small quantities did occur in the 50s when arms production began. In 1960 following the assumption of office by Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato, Japan adopted a policy aimed against the export of arms.

Prime Minister Ikeda adopted a “low posture” on political issues as he took over power after the tumultous events following the revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Efforts were made to avoid political controversies and give maximum emphasis on economic development in the hope of pacifying the people. As arms export was a controversial issue, the Ikeda government decided against permitting ‘exports of arms that would be used to kill or injure people’.

decided to allow export of such soft items as military uniforms or medicine. During this period Ikeda refused permission to export bullet manufacturing facilities to the Philippines even though the request was made on the basis of the war Reparation Treaty.\(^{61}\)

In 1964, Sato Eisaku succeeded Ikeda and he decided to adopt a more liberal position regarding export of some specific type of arms. But a rocket developed by the Tokyo University and exported to Yugoslavia and Indonesia in 1967 generated further debates in the Japanese Diet. It was held that since the rocket could be turned into a destructive weapon and hence would violate the spirit of the constitution, any kind of arms export should be totally stopped.\(^{62}\) Sato maintained the Japanese arms meant for purpose of defence only did not pose any threats to others.\(^{63}\) But he held that export of arms was subjected to rigorous scrutiny. He further enunciated the Three Principles of Arms Export according to which Japan will not grant approval for arms export under the following circumstances.

1. When exports were bound for the Communist nations and were subject to COCOM-embargo.


\(^{62}\) Ibid.

\(^{63}\) For further details see, Nagamatsu Keiichi, *Nihon no Boei Sangyo* [Japan’s Defence Industry], (Japan, 1979), p. 72-80.
2. When exports were bound for countries to which export of weapons was banned under the United Nations resolutions.

3. When exports were bound for countries involved in international conflict or countries which might be involved in international conflicts.\(^64\)

In the mid 1970s debates continued inside and outside the Diet over the principles of arms export. On 27 February 1976 Prime Minister Miki Takeo announced a new policy in the Diet which is as follows

1. The export of weapons would not be approved for areas covered by the three principles (on the export of weapons).

2. For areas other than those covered by the three principles, the export of weapons would be carefully dealt with in accordance with the spirit of Foreign Exchange Law and the Foreign Trade Control Law.

3. In exporting equipment exclusively used for the manufacture of weapons, such equipment would be treated the same as weapons.\(^65\)

This meant a virtual ban on arms export to any country.

iii. The National Defence Programme Outline

Central to Japan's defence policy is the National Defence Programme Outline (NDPO) or Taiko. The study of the NDPO is relevant here as Nakasone had to operate within the framework of the


\(^{65}\) *Japan Times*, (Tokyo), 28 February 1976.
Since 1958 Japan had progressively built up its defence capabilities keeping in view the nations resources and the prevailing domestic conditions. The Japanese defence capabilities were built up in accordance with one three-year plan (FY 1958-60) and three successive five-year plans (FY 1962-66, 1967-71 and 1972-76). As a result Japan's defence capabilities substantially increased (Table 1). These plans produced a 180,000 men Ground Self Defence Forces (GSDF), a 4-escort flotillas Maritime Self Defence Forces (MSDF), and a 17 Squadron Air Self Defence Forces (ASDF). The Miki cabinet adopted the NDPO or Taiko in 1976 which placed a limit on the size of the SDFs. (Table 2).

The outline took the stand that the SDF had reached approximately the size that was sufficient for the nation's defence in the prevailing international environment and stressed the need for qualitative improvement in both organization and equipment.

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66 See Appendix III.
## Table - 1
Development of Defence Capability Buildup

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<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self-Defense official quota</strong></td>
<td>170,000 men</td>
<td>171,500.00 men</td>
<td>179,000 men</td>
<td>180,000 men</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Units deployed regionally in peacetime</strong></td>
<td>6 Divisions</td>
<td>12 Divisions</td>
<td>12 Divisions</td>
<td>12 Divisions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GSDP</strong></td>
<td><strong>Basic Units</strong></td>
<td><strong>Mobile Operation Units</strong></td>
<td><strong>3 Composite Brigades</strong></td>
<td><strong>1 Mechanized Combined Brigade</strong></td>
<td><strong>1 Mechanized Division</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low Altitude Ground to Air Missile Units</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2 Anti Aircraft</td>
<td>4 Anti Aircraft</td>
<td>8 Anti-Aircraft</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anti-Submarine Surface Ship Units</strong></td>
<td>3 Escort Flotillas</td>
<td>3 Escort Flotillas</td>
<td>4 Escort Flotillas</td>
<td>4 Escort Flotillas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anti-Submarine Surface Ship Units (Regional District Units)</strong></td>
<td>5 Divisions</td>
<td>5 Divisions</td>
<td>10 Divisions</td>
<td>10 Divisions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Submarine Units</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2 Divisions</td>
<td>4 Divisions</td>
<td>6 Divisions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mine sweeping Units</strong></td>
<td>1 Flotilla</td>
<td>2 Flotillas</td>
<td>2 Flotillas</td>
<td>2 Flotillas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Land-based Anti-Submarine Aircraft Units</strong></td>
<td>9 Squadrons</td>
<td>15 Squadrons</td>
<td>14 Squadrons</td>
<td>16 Squadrons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Major Equipment</strong></td>
<td><strong>Anti-Submarine Surface Ships Submarines Operational Aircraft</strong></td>
<td>57 Ships</td>
<td>59 Ships</td>
<td>59 Ships</td>
<td>61 Ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aircraft Control and Warning Units</strong></td>
<td>24 Groups</td>
<td>24 Groups</td>
<td>24 Groups</td>
<td>28 Groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interceptor Units</strong></td>
<td>12 Squadrons</td>
<td>15 Squadrons</td>
<td>10 Squadrons</td>
<td>10 Squadrons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support Fighter Units</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4 Squadrons</td>
<td>4 Squadrons</td>
<td>4 Squadrons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Reconnaissance Units</strong></td>
<td>2 Squadrons</td>
<td>1 Squadron</td>
<td>1 Squadron</td>
<td>1 Squadron</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Transport Units</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3 Squadrons</td>
<td>3 Squadrons</td>
<td>3 Squadrons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Early Warning Units</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2 Groups</td>
<td>4 Groups</td>
<td>5 Groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>High Altitude Ground to Air Missile Units</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ASDF</strong></td>
<td><strong>Basic Units</strong></td>
<td><strong>Operational Aircraft</strong></td>
<td>(Ap x 220 Aircraft)</td>
<td>(Ap x 240 Aircraft)</td>
<td>(Ap x 300 Aircraft)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Major equipment</strong></td>
<td><strong>Operational Aircraft</strong></td>
<td>(Ap x 1,130 Aircraft)</td>
<td>(Ap x 1,100 Aircraft)</td>
<td>(Ap x 940 Aircraft)</td>
<td>(Ap x 510 Aircraft)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Defence of Japan, 1979* (Tokyo, 1979) p.70
Table - 2
National Defence Programme Outline (1976).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GSDF</th>
<th>Self-Defence Personnel Quota</th>
<th>180,000 Men</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Basic Units</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Units Deployed Regionally in Peacetime</td>
<td>12 Divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mobile Operation Units</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low-Altitude Ground to Air Missile Units</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| MSDF                  | Basic Units                  |             |
|                       | Anti-submarine Surface-Ship Units (for Mobile Operations) | 4 Escort Flotillas |
|                       | Anti-submarine Surface-ship units (Regional District Units) | 10 Divisions |
|                       | Submarine Units              | 6 Division  |
|                       | Mine sweeping Units          | 2 Flotillas  |
|                       | Land-based Anti-submarine aircraft Units | 16 Squadrons |
|                       | Low-Altitude Ground to Air Missile Units |             |

| ASDF                  | Basic Units                  |             |
|                       | Air Craft Control and Warning Units | 28 Groups  |
|                       | Interceptor Units            | 10 Squadrons|
|                       | Support Fighter Units        | 3 Squadrons |
|                       | Air Reconnaissance Units     | 1 Squadrons |
|                       | Air Transport Units          | 3 Squadrons |
|                       | Early Warning Units          | 1 Squadrons |
|                       | High-Altitude Ground-to-Air Missile Units | 6 Groups   |
|                       | Main Equipment Combat Aircraft | Apex. 430 Aircraft |

The Official Explanatory Note detailed the thinking underlying the new policy. The principal reasons for the adoption of the NDPO as per the note were as follows:

(1) public pressure demanding that the government set a clear target or limit the defence build-up; (2) the existing imbalance between the fighting units and rear support capabilities and (3) the financial problems including the shift in the Japanese economy away from high growth, sharp increases in the price of up-to-date equipment following the oil crisis and difficulties in obtaining sufficient personnel and land for further expansion of size.67

The Taiko was based on certain assumptions about the international situation. It was thought that the size of the Taiko would remain fixed so long as these assumptions remained the same. The assumptions were

- The United States and the Soviet Union would continue to avoid nuclear war as well as conventional war of total involvement.

- The Soviet Union would continue to be occupied with European problems such as confrontation and with NATO maintaining its hold over Eastern Europe.

- There was little possibility of Sino-Soviet confrontation being resolved, although relations might be partially improved.

67 Quoted in Okazaki Hisahiko, n. 29, p. 472.
The United States and China would continue mutual negotiations to adjust their relations.

The situation on the Korean peninsula would generally remain as it was, with no major armed conflict.\textsuperscript{68}

Until these assumptions were challenged, improvements in the nature of the SDFs would concentrate on qualitative upgrading of weapons systems, logistical infrastructure and command and control systems. Under the NDPO the 3-year or 5-year defence build up plans were cancelled. Instead the defence build up went on according to annual plans. This new "per fiscal year formula" was adopted due to strong pressure from the Ministry of Finance. The Defence Agency was also reluctant to accept the fixed five-year formula as it would be obliged to announce the huge amount of defence expenditure in implementing the NDPO.

The NDPO delineated the SDF's quantitative military capability (Table 2). Qualitative upgrading of the SDF was NDPO's principal policy goal. In order to achieve this goal, the NDPO listed: 1) establishment of reasonable standards for personnel recruitment and of measures aimed at enhancing morale, 2) effective maintenance and improvement of defence facilities and improvements of defence

\textsuperscript{68} Defence of Japan. 1977, (Tokyo, 1977), p. 70.
facilities, and 3) effective implementation of equipment acquisition programmes and 4) improvements on the R & D of military technology. 69

iv. The "One Per cent Ceiling" on Defence Budget

The NDPO, unlike the earlier defence build up plans, did not give any specification regarding the duration and total outlays required. This was bound to create more confusion and invite criticisms regarding the size of defence budgets. The Miki Cabinet adopted a new policy on 5 November 1976, a week after the decision on the NDPO, calling for a ceiling on annual defence spending. It stated:

"In implementing defence improvements, a total amount of defence-related costs for each fiscal year will be appropriated, for the interim, programmed not to exceed one, hundredth of the gross national product (GNP) in any given fiscal year." 70

The choice of "One Per cent" was not without any basis. Japan's annual defence spending since FY 1967 had been consistently less than one per cent of GNP each year and there had emerged a tacit consensus among the people that annual defence budgets should be less than one per cent of GNP. The one per cent ceiling seemed to satisfy those who were demanding more money for defence. They were convinced that

69 See Appendix III.

70 *Defence of Japan, 1977*, Defence Agency p. 79.
more money would be allocated to defence sphere with the growth of the Japanese economy. It also satisfied those who were opposed to greater defence spending because they believed that the ceiling would reduce the possibility of massive and rapid rearmament. The détente between the U.S. and the Soviets in the early 1970s was cited by them as one important reason for limiting defence spending. 71

v. Guidelines for Japan - U.S. Defence Cooperation

Japan and the United States were aware that the effective functioning of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was contingent upon the two countries maintaining close cooperation both in times of peace and emergency. From this standpoint both the countries agreed to study and discuss bilateral cooperation in military and other aspects to ensure attainment of the objectives set forth in the Security Treaty. After a series of studies and discussions, the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee approved the "Guidelines for Japan - U.S. Defence Cooperation" on 27 November 1978. The Guidelines were approved by the Japanese cabinet on 28 November 1978. 72

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72 Mainichi Shimbun, 29 November 1978.
The Guidelines set forth the principles to guide future joint studies to be undertaken by the two countries. It was made clear that Japan would possess appropriate defence capability within the scope necessary for self defence. As for deterring aggression it held that both the countries would carry out joint operations planning; study enforcement procedures, perform combined training and exchange information vital to the interest of Japan. It also discussed the various actions that Japan would take in case of threat or armed attack on it. The Guidelines held that Japan was entitled to repel a limited or small scale aggression by itself. In case of difficulty Japan would repel the attack with the cooperation of the U.S. In case of crisis situation in the Far East, the guidelines emphasised on mutual studies on the scope and modalities of facilitate assistance to be extended by Japan to the U.S. within the legal framework of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, other relevant arrangements and the pertinent laws and regulations of Japan.73

The Guidelines enjoyed the support of the Japanese governments in the subsequent periods. It continued till 1997 when a new set of Guidelines were adopted.

When Nakasone took over as the Prime Minister of Japan, the most important aspect of Japan's defence policy was to depend on the Japan - U.S. Security Treaty while at the same time seeking to enhance its defence capability. But the defence environment was conditioned by various limitations such as the constitution, the non-nuclear principles, the one-per cent ceiling etc. Nakasone during his tenure as Prime Minister had to handle these issues to implement his ideas on defence of Japan. But before that, it is important to know Nakasone's defence orientation. It will be dealt with separately in the next chapter.