CHAPTER IV

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President Nasser, "one of the most valued of men, the most important personality whose name and charisma electrified the whole Arab world and the globe", died from a heart attack at 6:15 p.m. on 27th day of Ragab 1390 H. corresponding to 28 September 1970. "while standing in the vanguard for the unity of the Arab people" and non-alignment for the world. The Nasserite era came to an abrupt end but not the Nasserite policy. Sadat continued:

Nasser has gone but his principles will always survive, his banners will always fly high, his struggles will never cease, his nation will never give in, and his victory, with God's will, is certain and will be achieved.

Amidst the chagrin and consternation which prevailed in the Arab public at the loss of what seemed an irreplaceable leader, Anwar el-Sadat emerged as the successor.

Anwar el-Sadat was the sole official Vice-President during that time. He took over the interim presidency by virtue of his position as Vice-President corroborated by Egyptian constitution. His presidency was confirmed on 15 October 1970 by the Egyptian Republic in a plebiscite with 90.04 percent votes.

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After becoming President, Sadat made his vows to proceed in Nasser's path and articulated to dwell on Nasserian themes, particularly non-alignment, Arab unity, national honour, anti-imperialism and anti-Zionism. Sadat had pledged himself to continue Nasser's policies. On 7 October 1970, in his capacity of President Designate, Sadat, while addressing the National Assembly, said:

We are required to adhere to the policy of non-alignment. The policy of non-alignment, as we learnt from Gamal Abdel Nasser, is not a negative attitude. As practised by him it means standing by our independence, standing for our freedom, for peace and progress.... Our special friendship with the Soviet Union, its great peoples and the big group of the socialist peoples behind it is fully compatible with the policy of non-alignment which is a practical and realistic application of one of the most prominent slogans of our great leader (Nasser) who said: we befriend those who are friendly to us and stand against those who are inimical to us.

Nasser's commendable policy of non-alignment coupled with a vibrant regional as well as domestic policy, which gave Egypt a national pride, restrained Sadat to change Nasser's policies all on a sudden in both foreign and domestic fields. On 19 November 1970, Sadat presented a ten-point programme for national action before the Egyptian Parliament that included working for Arab unity, playing a role in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and in the Third World revolutionary movements. In an article in Foreign Affairs, Sadat reiterated the

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5 *Speeches by President Sadat*, n.1, pp.9-10.

basic tenets of Nasser’s foreign policy: non-alignment and Arab unity. But Sadat’s policies were subject to his consolidation of power. The ruling elite had always to see this criterion as a primary one for pursuance of any policy. Ironically Sadat’s Egypt was to face a major leadership crisis as Nasser had failed to groom an obvious successor. On Nasser’s death the political elite was divided. On one side was a small but well-placed faction composed of left-wing Free Officers and their civilian allies who held high positions in the sixties. They were headed by Ali Sabri, a Free Officer, Senior Party (Arab Socialist Union) chieftain and the newly appointed Vice-President. This group also included a formidable number of top political elites among whom Sha’rawi Guma, Interior Minister and party boss; Muhammad Fa’iq, Information Minister; Sami Sharif, Minister of Presidential Affairs; Ahmed Kamel, Chief of the Political Police and General Muhammad Fawzi, War Minister; were very important. A large but more diffused faction was led by the new President, Anwar el-Sadat, whose elevation was approved by the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) and a popular plebiscite. He did not have an independent basis of power. His main asset was the legitimacy of his office. He had not been very close to the centre of power during the later

8 Robert Stephens, n.4, p.558.
period of Nasser's regime. Still his rivals agreed to his assumption of the presidency partly because they believed that he represented no threat to them and did not seem to be a real contender.\textsuperscript{11} At issue, between the two above mentioned factions, was the distribution of power, particularly presidential power. Sabry group wanted a collective leadership\textsuperscript{12} in which the president would be held accountable to the rest of the power elite, specifically to the Supreme Executive Committee of the Arab Socialist Union. Sadat promised to consult the party bodies over the main lines of policy. But, within these parameters, he fully intended to exercise the broad discretion Nasser had enjoyed and would accept no tutelage over the power to decide for Egypt which the people had deposited with him.\textsuperscript{13}

The institutionalisation of authority remained uncertain and each faction asserted the superior legitimacy of the constitutional body it controlled. At the base level, the struggle was over who would rule.\textsuperscript{14} On policy issues Sadat and Sabry represented two different trends of the course that Egypt should follow.\textsuperscript{15} However, Sadat assumed office under circumstances that obliged him to emphasize continuity with his predecessor's policies. The leadership crisis virtually ended with the diffusion of what were known as the 'centres of power'
when Sadat dismissed from office and arrested the potential opponents like Ali Sabri, Mohsen Abu el-Nur, Sha'rawi Guma, Sami Sharif, and 87 others when they tried to oust Sadat in a coup. This diffusion commonly known as "Corrective Revolution" of May 1971, was celebrated by Sadat with much eclat and even he bestowed on Jihan, his wife, the title of "First Lady of Egypt" (Sayidat Misr el-au/a). In the wake of his triumph over the Sabri faction, Sadat was in a position to constitute a loyal team and could be able to consolidate his power. Sadat extended his control over the structural bases of the regime. Pro-Sabri elements were replaced with trusted Sadat stalwarts like Mahmud Fawzi, who served as Prime Minister for about a year, and Sayyid Marei, Agriculture Minister and later ASU chief. Sadat also selected some Nasserite followers who were loyal to Sadat. They included Aziz Sidqi, Industry Minister and Mohamed Hassanein Heikel, the influential editor of al-Ahram.

Sadat's triumph over the powerful Ali Sabri group had important consequences. His main opponents were removed and their places were taken over by his allies and clients. The elites most committed to Nasserism, as it had matured in the sixties, were decimated. The suppression of Ali-Sabri, who was supposed to have close affinity to USSR, and his associates, who commanded a five to three majority in the Arab Socialist Union, had an indirect as well as direct impact upon USSR and Arab Socialist Union respectively. With his

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17 David Hirst and Irene Beeson, Sadat, London: Faber and Faber, 1981, p.120.
corrective movement, therefore, Sadat had destroyed the Soviet power group in Egypt. In a sense Sadat was now left free to steer Egypt into any direction. His process of consolidation to power had wide implications on Egyptian foreign policy and, in the same vein, non-alignment as well. Possibly he reiterated Nasserian themes, particularly non-alignment, during this time as his own position was at stake and Nasser was being hailed as a Godfather of Egypt. And after consolidating his initial foot-hold, Sadat moved to repair relations with Soviet Union - the strongest supporter during Nasser days. It should be noted here that Prime Minister Kosygin and his retinue were among the first foreign condolence guests to arrive in Cairo at the death of Nasser. But Ali Sabri's coup attempt brought about an emphatic and immediate repercussion. The Soviets were alarmed at the purge. Obviously concerned with the trend of events in a country in which they held such an important political and economic investment, the Soviets sent a high-powered delegation, led by President Podgorny himself, to Cairo in the latter part of May 1971. The result was the signing of a fifteen year Egyptian-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation on 27 May 1971. It is really strange as to why Sadat had first got rid of those members of the government who were regarded as pro-Soviet and then gone and signed a treaty with the Soviets which was something Nasser had never done! To find a clear-cut answer is a bit difficult. But one thing is clear that Sadat had explained his dependence on Russian aid as long as the Americans went on providing Israel

18 Peter Mansfield, n.12, p.353.
with everything it needed, but volunteered the information that, if the first phase of an Israeli withdrawal was completed, he would get rid of the Russians.\textsuperscript{20} It, more or less, implied that Sadat wanted to use the Soviet Union as a lever against the Americans and the West while Nasser had kept Egypt in the perfect middle of a balance between Soviet Union and the USA vis-a-vis the West. This significant undertaking was transmitted to Washington by Sadat through the Egypt-USSR Friendship Treaty of 1971. Sadat, on 10 June 1971, diplomatically declared to the People’s Council: "Our friendship with the Soviet Union is one of principle, not of expediency, this is a permanent, not ephemeral, friendship...." Nasser had established the Arab-Soviet friendship on very sound foundations and it is only natural that it should boom and burgeon to reach the climax on the Friendship Treaty between US and the USSR of which we are duly proud.\textsuperscript{21}

The military ties between the Soviet Union and Egypt received contractual confirmation in the agreement signed in May between the presidents of Egypt and the Soviet Union. As will be remembered, clause 8 of the agreement included a definite undertaking to help build up Egypt’s military strength in order to enable that country to liquidate by force the consequences of the aggression.\textsuperscript{22} In spite of this, Sadat managed to keep both USSR and USA guessing about his future relations. He had kept open his eyes towards the Americans and was visualizing

\textsuperscript{20} Mohamed Heikal, n.16, p.43.
\textsuperscript{21} Raphael Israeli, n.3, pp.77-79.
that the Americans were the masters of the world. Possibly he thought that if there was going to be any change for the better in the political or military situation in West Asia it would have to come from the Americans. In an interview to Arnaud de Borchgrave in the Newsweek (6 December 1971), Sadat had said, "I still feel that the US is the key to peace, but unfortunately, we are back where we started eight months ago." However, during this time Sadat initiated some policies designed to strengthen his mass popularity for the pursuance of a strong foreign policy. The first such measure was his proclamation that 1971 would be the year of decision - a year in which the stalemate produced by the 'no peace, no war' situation in the Arab-Israeli conflict would be broken. But the year passed without any decision. The Soviets apparently refused to back Sadat's determination to go to war, and they even refused to mention such a possibility in the joint communique issued after Sadat's visit to Moscow in April 1972. During this period, President Sadat made three programmatic speeches on 1 May, 14 May and 24 July in which he mentioned the inevitability of war and the necessity, for the Arabs in general and Egypt in particular, to adopt the path of self-reliance due to Soviet reserved commitments. Sadat's comments were carried by valid military and economic facts. Even after signing the Friendship Treaty in May 1971 when Sadat and General Sadek flew to Moscow in October 1971 and concluded Egypt's biggest arms deal so far with the Soviet Union, not

all the needs of ‘operation 41’ were met.\textsuperscript{24} In his book \textit{The Road to Ramadan}, Heikal contended that Sadat was genuinely irritated by what he perceived as the Soviet’s unnecessary delays in delivering some types of equipment.\textsuperscript{25} Despite the 100 MIG-21 FMs and the brigade of mobile SA-6 SAMs, that the deal had promised, Egypt’s air defense would still have remained too weak to repel the enemy air strikes if Egypt moved forces eastward beyond the Egyptian umbrella of static SAMs. The Deal assured to provide:

- 10 TU-16 bombers with air-to-surface missiles capable of hitting ground targets almost 95 miles away;
- 100 MiG-21 FM, fifty before the end of the year 1971;
- 20 MiG-23, to be supplied during 1972 with Soviet pilots until they can be replaced by Egyptians;
- One brigade of QUADRAT (the mobile SAM known in the West as SA-6).
- One 180 mm artillery battalion.
- One 240 mm mortar battalion.
- Three BMP bridges.

On top of this the Soviets had agreed to assist Egypt’s own armaments industry. They promised to help Egypt to produce:

- the D-30 120 mm gun
- the 23 mm twin-barrel anti-aircraft gun.


the AKM automatic rifle.
- the RPG anti-tank rocket launcher.
- Plus assistance with an enormous ammunition programme of Egypt's own:
  - 23 mm for the anti-aircraft gun;
  - 82 mm for the B-10 recoilles gun;
  - 120 mm mortar ammunition;
  - 122 mm for the M-30 gun;
  - the same calibre for the D-30;
  - 130 mm for the M-46;
  - 152 mm for the howitzer;
  - projectiles for the RPG; and
  - RKG hand grenades.\textsuperscript{26}

The Soviets themselves were to bear the burden of constructing factories in Egypt to supply certain other equipment and spares like a factory for spares for the MiG-17, MiG-21 and SU-7; a factory to make drop tanks for jet aircraft; one to produce B-15 radars; another to make the R-123 and R-124 tank radios etc. On operational matters, the Soviet Defence Minister, Marshal Grechko, agreed to an Egyptian request that the Soviet fighter squadrons based in Egypt should share Egypt's air-defense as far as a boundary 12 miles from the Egyptian-Israeli lines.\textsuperscript{27}

On 2 February 1972, Sadat flew to Moscow. On 15 February 1972, the Soviets, confirming their October Agreement, now agreed to supply:

\textsuperscript{26} General Saad EI-Shazly, n.24, p.78.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid, pp.78-79.
- 200 T-62, their latest and most powerful tanks; ten to come in March 1972 for training, the rest before the end of May.
- 20 TU-22 bombers (each with a payload of nine tons). Two could be delivered in March, the rest within the year.
- 25 MiG-17, to be delivered immediately, and
- electronic equipment, to uprate Egypt's electronic warfare capability.

The Soviets had also promised that they would help Egypt to manufacture its own MiG-21 MF; construction to swing by 1979.\textsuperscript{28}

On 10 March 1972 General Hassan set off for Moscow to sign the contracts for the equipment agreed with Sadat in February. He returned without having signed contracts for the promised T-62 and TU-22. The Soviets, he reported, were demanding payment in full and in hard currency. Egypt was dumb-founded. Since President Nasser's first arms deal in 1955, Moscow had granted Egypt the most generous terms. Egypt was charged half-price. Egypt was loaned the balance at 2 percent interest a year. Egypt could pay-off the loan over 10-15 years. Even at full price, Soviet equipment were to cost roughly half the price of its Western equivalent. The up-shot was that Egypt was getting its arms at roughly one-quarter of their Western price. For example the MiG-21 was costing Egypt about £E2,50,000 and the T-55 about £E25,000.\textsuperscript{29} In now demanding payment, in full and in hard currency, the Soviets, thus, effectively quadrupled their prices to Egypt and demanded cash on the barrel head. It baffled the Egyptians as to why the Soviets should have adopted this position.

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid, pp.90-94.

\textsuperscript{29} Ibid, p.97.
They must have known that the Egyptians could not afford it. The Soviet price was now 5.6 million roubles for each TU-22 and 250,000 roubles for each T-62. And the Soviets had asked even the ammunition be paid in hard currency.\textsuperscript{30}

Sadat visited Moscow again on 27 April to 10 May 1972. The Soviets agreed to offer:

- 16 Su-17 air-craft; four to come in the next month, the rest before the end of the year.
- eight BETSHURA (SA-3) SAM battalions.
- One QUADRAT (SA-6) brigade, to be delivered in 1973.
- Plus spares and miscellaneous equipment.

And the Soviets had also withdrawn their earlier claim to be paid in full and in hard currency.\textsuperscript{31}

But one day in May 1972, General Sadeq, who had played an important part in the putsch of May 1971 and later became the Minister of Defense, declared:

The Soviets are giving nothing fundamental to our armed forces.... The Soviet Union asks us to install a naval base at Mara Matruh and another at Az-Zafran on the Red Sea... that is a strange request. The Soviet Union is selling us arms at black market prices. A tank costing 25,000 pounds on the international market is sold to us for 44,000 pounds by the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid, p.98.

\textsuperscript{31} ibid, pp.105-7.

On 1 June 1972 Sadat sent a seven point questionnaire to Brezhnev and wanted to know yes or no regarding the supply of weaponry that he had requested and the Soviet had promised. By 15 June he (Sadat) wrote another letter as he got no answer to the earlier one. This time he got the answer on 7 July through Vinogradov, the Soviet ambassador to Cairo, but it had nothing regarding the weaponry. Rather, the letter was an attack on Heikal (who had been a close friend and adviser of Nasser and who continued to edict Cairo's influential daily, al-Ahram, after his patron's death. Later he lost Sadat's favour, due to his criticism of Sadat's regime and his glorification of Nasser, and he was removed from the editorship) as the man was allegedly responsible for the deterioration of Egypt-Soviet relation. Sadat, constantly harassed by the Soviets and denigrated by the Egyptian public due to his failure to achieve the goal in the decisive year of 1971, ordered:

1. All Soviet advisers in the Egyptian Armed Forces to leave within 10 days beginning on 17 July 1972.
2. All Soviet military installations were to be handed over to Egypt's control.
3. All Soviet equipment must be sold to Egypt or taken out of the country.
4. All further negotiations between Soviet Union and Egypt were to be conducted in Cairo and nowhere else.33

Sadat thought this new plan possibly in the hope of benefitting from the United States. He hoped that once the expulsion of Soviet advisers had been announced the Americans would be so delighted that they would give him

33 Raphael Israeli, n.3, pp.254-55.
anything he asked for. Thus, Sadat's foreign policy vis-a-vis non-alignment entered into an interesting phase.

Sadat expelled 21,000 Soviet personnel from Egypt. However, while signalling that he was the master of his own will, he refrained from totally breaking away from the Soviet Union, whose help he still solicited. On 28 September 1972, while addressing a gathering of Arab Foreign Ministers, Sadat said:

We are striving for preserving the foundation of our solid friendship and close cooperation with the Soviet Union, who has extended to us an aid whose value we cannot ignore, in the domains of industrialisation, development and agriculture.

Sadat, while trying to maintain the Nasserite policy towards Soviet Union, exhibited subtle differences in 1972-73. Though publicly he gave some statements to maintain the tempo of Nasser's policy towards the Soviet Union, still he searched for other options, particularly US option in his new foreign policy which had a profound impact upon Egypt's policy of non-alignment directly. After expelling the Russians from Egyptian soil, Sadat waited for the American reward but failed to get it during this time. Realising that USSR was his only military and economic resort, Sadat attempted to soft-pedal the gravity of the situation. He pursued a policy of mending his relation with USSR.

Prior to the October War of 1973 Sadat, in his renovation of friendship, got the Soviet military help, though in a limited and modest way. On the final deal with the Soviets at Cairo on 1 February 1973 (before the War) General Lashnekov

34 Mohamed Heikal, n.16, p.46.
35 A.I.Dawisha, n.23, p.191.
36 Raphael Israeli, n.3, p.268.
of USSR agreed with the list of Egypt's armament needs. In March 1973, General Ismail went to Moscow to sign a new arms agreement based upon that list. Under the agreement, Egypt was to get:

- One squadron of MiG-23,
- One brigade of R-17E surface-to-surface missiles (SCUD) to be delivered within the third quarter of 1973;
- about 200 BMP (mechanised infantry combat vehicles), some to be delivered at once, the rest in the third quarter of 1973;
- some 50 Malotka ATGW systems (known in the West as SAGGER).
- One QUADRAT (SA-6) mobile SAM brigade.
- Field artillery, including the 180 mm gun.\(^\text{37}\)

It was also agreed that the Soviet Union would send back to Egypt the four MiG-25 reconnaissance aircraft and the electronic reconnaissance and jamming squadron. The Soviets kept some of their promises by supplying them on schedule but they also deviated from some important promises as the MiG-25 aircraft and some other important aircrafts did not arrive before the War of 1973.

The October War which was the result of the frustration of Egypt\(^\text{38}\) was a turning point in Egypt's foreign policy. The Arab-Israeli War which commenced on 6 October 1973 brought Sadat's Egypt closer to other Arab regimes. Egypt, allied with other Arab states, like Syria, Algeria, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia etc. created

\(^{37}\) General Saad El-Shazly, n.24, pp.133-4.

a situation by which oil was brought into the centre of Arab war politics against the West. The OPEC used the oil weapon during the October War. On 21 October 1973 when Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and Dubai followed the example of the Saudis by imposing a total embargo on oil exports to the United States, Sadat himself wanted the boycott to be eased in recognition of the US contribution to the Egyptian-Israeli agreement. During the meeting of OAPEC's oil ministers at Cairo on 2 January 1974 Sadat publicly proposed to end the embargo against the US in the wake of the Egyptian disengagement agreement with Israel.

It should be noted here that while the 1973 War was a turning point in Egypt's foreign policy, the post-War period particularly late 1973-early 1974 period was a phase when Sadat's Egypt tilted towards the United States and also towards the pro-West Arabs, particularly Saudi Arabia. The year 1973/1974 formed an important watermark in this trend.

During the diplomatic peregrinations in late 1973-early 1974, Kissinger saw clearly that an Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement offered not only a means to lift the Arab oil embargo which had caused consternation in the United States, but also a means of setting in motion a broader peace process. From their first meeting in Cairo in November 1973, Sadat and Kissinger developed a close personal rapport. The American Secretary of State was impressed by Sadat's readiness to make tactical sacrifices in the negotiations leading to the Sinai-I disengagement agreement in January 1974; the Egyptian President was, in turn, heartened by Kissinger's personal commitment to the peace talks.

Diplomatic relations between Cairo and Washington were restored shortly after Kissinger's first visit to Egypt, and the newly appointed US ambassador, Hemann Eilts. When Kissinger and Sadat discussed ways of cementing the US-Egyptian relationship in early 1974, the issue of reviving American economic assistance invariably came to the fore. Soon after the first Sinai disengagement accord, the first 'Carrot' Kissinger dangled before Sadat was an offer of $85 million to help clear the Suez Canal of war debris and assist in reconstruction of the devastated cities bordering the canal. To reinforce Sadat's interest in the pursuit of a wider disengagement agreement the Nixon administration decided in March 1974 to request $250 million from congress to finance Egyptian development projects in fiscal year 1975.40 The pace of Egypt-US relations during this time was gauged by the visit of President Nixon to Cairo. The visit of Nixon to Cairo on 12 and 13 June 1974 reportedly surpassed the red carpet treatment given to Khrushchev when he visited Egypt in 1965.41 On 14 June 1974, the Egyptian regime had reached a somewhat politically decisive point marked by a joint declaration published under the title: "Principles of Relations and Cooperation between Egypt and the United States" which inter alia embodied:

The two countries must intensify their consultations, consolidate their economic, scientific, technical and touristic cooperation;

The two countries consider the meeting of the two presidents as the first meeting of the Egypto-American Co-operation Committee, 31 May 1974;


The Egyptian and American Ministers for Foreign Affairs were to consult with a view to defining common programmes support from the United States for the Egyptian financial situation, to begin negotiations concerning cooperation on nuclear energy for peaceful ends. Egypt undertook to give all the guarantees demanded by the United States to prohibit the use of a reactor for military purposes,

To set up groups to study questions like the deepening of the Suez Canal, increase of American private investments in Egypt, increase of Egyptian agricultural production, technological exchanges and scientific research, development of medical research, and also cultural exchanges;

To form a common economic council, comprising representatives of the private sector of both countries;

The United States undertook to provide the aid necessary for Egyptian economic development;

Both countries decided to do everything possible to consolidate the ties of friendship and cooperation in the interest of both countries.42

Thus, the Egypto-American Agreement automatically abrogated the Egypto-Soviet Treaty of Friendship. Article 4 of the latter Treaty stipulated the understanding of both contracting parties to fight against imperialism and to liquidate colonialism, totally and finally. In Article 10 both parties had undertaken

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42 Ghali Shoukri, n.32, p.160; also quoted in Al-Ahram, 15 June 1974.
not to conclude international treaties conflicting with the Treaty.\textsuperscript{43} In fact, it was two years later that the Treaty was officially abrogated. Thus, President Nixon's Cairo visit marked a new era in US-Egypt relations. As a reward for Sadat's cooperation in the Sinai-II negotiations Kissinger pledged in the fall of 1975 to provide Egypt with $750 million in grants and concessionary loans and $200 million in PL 480 Title I food aid.\textsuperscript{44}

It should be noted that the promised grants and loans were supposed to reward Egypt for its plans to restructure its economy and would also go far to insure that the Soviet Union did not regain its economic and political foothold in Egypt. Investments in the clearing of the Suez Canal and the reconstruction of Egypt's war-torn cities were psychologically important both in demonstrating American confidence that the peace with Israel would hold and in reassuring the Israelis of future Egyptian intentions.\textsuperscript{45}

Egypt, after it unofficially and officially broke its relation with USSR in 1975/1976, witnessed the rising graph of economic aid from the United States till the end of Sadat's reign. It is significant that the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), which was considered to be


\textsuperscript{44} William J. Burns, n.40, p.174.

working under the influence of the USA, also offered huge loans to Egypt starting from 1974-75. The trend continued throughout Sadat's reign.  

Following the Camp David Agreement which was a handiwork of the Americans, the US economic assistance to Egypt crossed $1 billion in the fiscal year 1979. For subsequent fiscal years 1980 and 1981, the US economic assistance to Egypt maintained this rising trend. The table below show a picture of promised as well as actual economic aid given to Egypt by USA from 1971 to 1981.

**Table: Economic Assistance Given to Egypt by USA: Fiscal Years 1971-81**
(In millions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Loans (I)</th>
<th>Grants (II)</th>
<th>Total (I + II)</th>
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<td>1972</td>
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</table>

* Year 1976 includes both fiscal year and Transitional Quarter (7/1/76-9/30/76).


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The US military relations with Egypt during this time (post-October War phase) is also worth-noting. Sadat’s Egypt accepted US conditions for military assistance previously rejected by Nasser.

On 14 July 1974 a 5-man US military mission led by Lt. General John Hennessy left Washington for Cairo.\(^{47}\) The mission was perhaps aimed at establishing contact with Egyptian military staff, which was not there for last so many years. Subsequently talks continued in a regular manner between Cairo and the Pentagon. In June 1975 during his meeting with President Ford at Salzburg (Austria) Sadat raised the issue of lifting the US arms embargo against Egypt. However, it was reported that President Ford, while offering Egyptian military officers’ training at West Point and Annapolis, did not encourage far-reaching expectation on transfer of US arms to Egypt.\(^{48}\) Still Sadat tried to secure US arms particularly after the conclusion of the Sinai-II disengagement pact with Israel on 1 September 1975. During his visit to the United States in between the last week of October and the first week of November Sadat asked for Hawk SAMs and some other combat aircrafts. And on 17 March 1976, when the annulment of Egypt-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1971 was over, the Ford administration wished to lift the arms embargo against Egypt. A few days later, Secretary Kissinger informed that the Ford administration had decided to allow Egypt to buy C-130 transport planes under Foreign Military Sales Act; in effect purchasing from the Pentagon channel. Subsequently the Congress was notified


\(^{48}\) Ibid, 6 and 12 June 1975.
about the arms sale worth $65 million to Egypt which included about $40 million for the C-130 planes and $25 million for spare parts and training.49

On 2 April 1977 it was reported that preliminary negotiations for sale of as many as 200 Northrop F-5E and F-5F (trainers) fighter planes were completed, but final approval of the agreement awaited President Carter's decision. During the April visit Sadat tried to obtain Carter's agreement on a supply relationship for "defense weapons" (F-5Es, APCs and TOW anti-tank guided missiles). Carter was reluctant about those advanced weapons. Still, he promised Sadat additional 14 C-130 military transport planes, 12 reconnaissance drones (Firebees) and sophisticated equipment for aerial photography and communication system.50

On 7 September 1977, the Pentagon formally notified the Congress its proposal to sell military reconnaissance and transport planes to Egypt. The delivery of the second batch of C-130s started in December 1978 and was completed by mid-1979. During his early February 1978 visit to Washington, President Sadat requested Carter to consider the Egyptian request for the sale of 120 F-5E and also advance F-15s and F-16 fighter aircraft to Egypt. It was reported that Carter agreed to meet at least part of Sadat's request. Reportedly, Saudi Arabia had promised to fund the purchase of F-5 jet fighters. But it backed out following Egypt's signing of the Peru Treaty with Israel and consequent Arab boycott of Egypt. Egypt sought to make good the gap caused by the loss of Soviet supply


after 1975-76 by acquiring F-6 jet fighters from China. In spite of the fact that the supply of F-5E fighter aircraft to Egypt did not materialise at all, the US Congress' approval of the sale in May 1978 was a major change in US arms supply relating to Egypt.

The USA approved a huge amount of military aid or sales credit to Egypt over a three year period from fiscal year 1979 to 1981 to enable Egypt to purchase 35 F-4 Phantom jets, 11 more Lockheed C-130 transport planes, 11 Hawk missile batteries, 100 Ford Aerospace AIM-9F sidewinder, 250 Raytheon AIM-9P sidewinder, 70 Raytheon AIM-7E sparrow air-to-air missiles for F-4s, plus 500 Hughes AGM-65A Maverick ASMs and 800 FMC armoured personnel carriers. On 25 February 1980 al-Ahram, the semi-official newspaper of Egypt, reported about a formal agreement concluded between the Egyptian Defense Minister, General Kamal Hassan Ali, and US Assistant Secretary, McGiffert, on the sale of US arms to Egypt. The sale included 244 M-60 advanced battle tank; 40 F-16 aircraft with spares, support equipment and armament, including an F-16 flight stimulator, related communication systems, training, 10 spare engines and air-frame components, 600 Hughes AGM-65 Maverick ASMs, 20 mm ammunition; 2500 500-16 MK-82 bombs; 850 2000-16 MK-84 bombs and associated services. Foreign military sales to Egypt totalled $900 million in 1982, in


52 Christopher S. Raj, n.50, p.145.
addition to $3 billion in US military aid extended over the preceding three years.\textsuperscript{53} Military credits extended or promised since March 1979 amount to at least $6 billion.\textsuperscript{54} By 1981, the office of military cooperation staff authorization had been increased to twenty-seven. But as a US Government document reveals,

This is only the tip of the iceberg... US technical assistance field teams, mobile training teams, and a variety of other groups are in Egypt working with Egyptian forces on specific weapons systems and programs. US embassy officials estimate that as many as 240 American servicemen were in Egypt in May 1981 in support of the security assistance field team for the F-4 program alone. The Army has training teams in Egypt for the M-60 and M-113 programs, as well as groups working on logistic problems, air defense surveys, quality assurance, and language training.\textsuperscript{55}

Thus, the military relations entered into an active phase during Sadat.

**MILITARY AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS OF EGYPT WITH USSR AFTER THE OCTOBER WAR, 1973**

The year 1973-74 formed an important imprint in Egypt's relation with Soviet Union as well. The Soviet Union replaced some of the equipments lost during the 1973 war but thereafter became increasingly reluctant to respond to Sadat's requests for more advanced arms. Thus, Sadat, disgusted with the experience before the War as well as after the War, announced on 18 April 1974 that Egypt would end its exclusive reliance on Soviet weaponry. As a result of that decision and together with the Kissinger-negotiated Egyptian Israeli

\textsuperscript{53} GAO 1982 (i), Quoted in Soheir A. Morsy, "US Aid to Egypt: An Illustration and Account of US Foreign Assistance Policy", Arab Studies Quarterly, vol.8, no.4, Fall 1986, p.368.
\textsuperscript{54} MERIP, September 1980, quoted in ibid, p.368.
\textsuperscript{55} GAO 1982, 27, quoted in ibid, p.368.
disengagement agreement of January 1974, all shipments of Soviet arms and badly-needed spare parts virtually came to a halt.\textsuperscript{56} In fact Egypt got only some of the back-logs ordered in 1973, 1974 and 1975. No fresh armaments were ordered either in 1974 and thereafter till 1981.

**ECONOMIC RELATION OF EGYPT WITH USSR AFTER 1973-74**

Economic aid from the USSR to Egypt also decreased considerably after 1973-74. In the decade 1955 to 1964, Egypt had received $1000 million. During the period 1965 to 1974 it had received $440 million as aid from USSR. But from 1975 to 1979 Egypt had received virtually nothing from USSR in terms of economic aid. Soviet economic aid to Egypt from 1954 to 1977, thus, totalled $1440 million.\textsuperscript{57} It implied that Egypt had received no economic aid from USSR during 1975 to 1977. It should be noted here that the Nasser period had reaped a good harvest from USSR than the Sadat period in comparison.

Economic aid and trade relations decreased during this period. The Soviet share of Egyptian exports fell from 50 percent during 1970-1975 to less than 15 percent in 1975. Egyptian imports from the Soviet Union also dropped from about 25 percent of Egypt’s total imports to around 10 percent. Soviet exports to Egypt dwindled from 301 million rubles in 1974 (about $4 million) to 200 million rubles in 1976, 148 million in 1978, and 127 million in 1979. Soviet imports from Egypt


decreased as well from 427 million rubles in 1974 to 331 million in 1976, and to 198 million in 1978 and 1979.\textsuperscript{58}

Culmination of the gradual deterioration in these relations was reached on 14 March 1976 when Sadat, in a speech to the Parliament, unilaterally abrogated the Soviet Egyptian Treaty of 1971; providing five main reasons for the decision:

(1) The Soviet Union showed no desire for peace in the Middle East;

(2) The Soviet Union opposed Egypt's new economic policy,

(3) The Soviet Union refused to reschedule Egypt's debts and demanded interest on military debts,

(4) The Soviet Union not only refused to overhaul Egyptian aircraft and provide spare parts - a clear violation of Article 8 of the treaty; it also forbade other countries (India) to do so, and finally,

(5) The Soviet Union had a hand in Ali Sabri's plot to overthrow Sadat.\textsuperscript{59}

Egypt's foreign policy relation with both USA and USSR in the first half of 1970s should also be marked with international changes. During the first half of the seventies the Cold War between the two blocs had turned into detente with hopes for an eventual entente. The detente was reflected in the Declaration of Principles signed in Moscow on 29 May 1972 by President Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev, composed of 12 articles which governed relations between the two


Super Powers. Since detente began between the Super Powers, they tried to instigate conflicts within international blocs that lay outside their spheres.

Both the Soviet Union and the United States had vital military political and economic interests in the Arab world and both shared a strong desire to strengthen their footholds in the area. This indirectly affected Egypt. During the October War of 1973 both the Super Powers opted to reduce the level of confrontation by working out a compromise. Following the October War the Soviet Union suffered a set back and there was a further decline in its influence particularly after its deteriorating relations with Egypt.

The competition for detente had a decided effect on the Arab world in general and Egypt in particular. Kissinger, who was acclaimed as the architect of detente and who also negotiated the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks-I (SALT-I) and laid the foundation for a new and constructive relationship with the USSR, played a crucial role in influencing the US foreign policy towards Egypt during this time. Once dismissing Sadat as a 'bombastic clown' before the October War he changed his view so superfinely that he termed him as the 'greatest statesman since Bismarck.'


61 Sadat's address to the Non-Aligned Conference in Colombo, Sri Lanka, MENA, Cairo, 16 August 1976.


63 Mohamed Heikal, n.16, p.xi.
It should be noted that USSR was on a better side than the USA in its relation with Egypt prior to October War. And SALT-I, which was signed before the October War, was the corner-stone of the co-existence declaration of May 1972 and the accord on avoiding atomic war signed in June 1973. The SALT-I agreement prompted the nations towards a SALT-II agreement in a strife-torn state of the global conflicts. However, the detente politics during this time became a cause of worry for Egypt. It affected the Egyptian foreign policy in general and the non-aligned angle in particular. Sadat in his speech on 27 October 1975 said:

Now that what is called detente has replaced discord, threat and the resort to means of violence, exploitation and pressure and despite the great difference between the two epochs, the Non-Alignment Movement has been able after having fulfilled its first mission during the Cold War honourably and sincerely - to adapt itself to the new world changes and to play a new fundamental role based on the movement's basic principles. 64

Sadat, possibly to rebuild an image for Egypt and to bring about a peace settlement in West-Asia and to get back Egypt's territories, switched on his Western button but pretended to follow a policy of non-alignment. However, the increasing domestic and foreign compulsions of Egypt compelled Sadat to come to the fold of the United States openly. The second half of 1970s, particularly 1977-78, should be analysed in the light of the new trends like the beginning of new Cold War and Egypt's relevance for the West, particularly the USA. The

Iranian Revolution of February 1979 also enhanced Egypt's importance for the West.

After the military and economic break between Egypt and USSR in 1976, the Carter administration, which came to power in January 1977, tried to foster good relationship with Sadat. The Camp David Accord and the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty symbolised close political and even military ties between Egypt and USA. The most important aspect of this intense relationship was reflected on the deployment of two-airborne warning and control systems (AWAC) in Egypt (in December 1979-January 1980) to improve US intelligence gathering in the area and practise combat operations. Three months later Qena Airbase in Upper Egypt was reportedly among the staging sites for the unsuccessful American rescue attempt in Iran.65

During July-October 1980 twelve USAF F-4Es were sent to Egypt for training in weather and desert conditions similar to those of the Gulf.66 Late in August 1980 Pentagon officials announced a plan to construct a staging facility for the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) near Ras Banes on the Red Sea.67 Finally, in November 1980, about 1400 personnel of the RDF engaged in a two-week exercise in Egypt in the first action involving US ground combat units in the Middle East for more than two decades. Problems of aircraft logistics,


67 Quoted, Ibrahim Karawan, n.65, p.172.
maintenance, communication and camouflage for ground troops in desert conditions were emphasized during the exercise.\textsuperscript{68}

Thus, Sadat's Western policies, especially his policy of arriving at a bilateral peace settlement with Israel via American mediation isolated Egypt from several so-called radical Arab states. Sadat, in the meanwhile, had already come closer to the pro-West Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia. Sadat's anti-Soviet orientations had equally alienated the 'radical' and 'leftist' forces inside Egypt as well as in the Arab world.\textsuperscript{69} Thus, the new rejectionist front composed of states and organizations like Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya and PLO emerged. It had a decided impact upon the foreign policy of Sadat and Egypt's policy of non-alignment as well.

These global and regional changes led to some policy changes in Sadat's Egypt. Egypt turned away from USSR and the Communist bloc states and came closer to the West and pro-West states on the region. Thus, the Friendship Treaty with the USSR was finally terminated in March 1976 and the arms transfer from USSR to Egypt virtually came to a halt and the Soviets were denied base facilities in Egypt.

In regional sphere, settlement with Israel started in 1974-75 (First disengagement in January 1974 and second disengagement in September 1975) finally ending with talks at Camp David in 1978 leading to a Peace Treaty in 1979. In a sense, Egypt turned away from confrontationism to cooperation with Israel.


\textsuperscript{69} A.I.Dawisha, n.23, p.182.
It not only alienated Egypt from the confrontationist Arab states but also made Egypt come closer to the pro-West regional powers. Many of them were also oil exporting states. In domestic sphere, Sadat started a policy of Infitah for a liberal economy which had a profound impact upon Egypt’s foreign policy vis-a-vis the policy of non-alignment.

In 1974, Sadat inaugurated the Infitah, the open door economic policy, to lure foreign investment into Egypt.\textsuperscript{70} His new policy was, thus, opposed to the previous Nasserite policy of protectionism, import substitution, state capitalism, nationalism and the creation of a dominant public sector. Sadat emphasized that building a social structure of a modern Egypt could be achieved only in an atmosphere of “freedom and democracy”.\textsuperscript{71} He embarked upon an economic liberalisation programme encouraging the emergence of a vigorous private sector.\textsuperscript{72} He justified the Infitah on the following grounds:

(1) the failure of Nasser’s socialist experience;
(2) the availability of Arab capital from the oil-producing countries; and
(3) the international context of detente.\textsuperscript{73}

From an economic stand point, the two essential purposes of open door economic policy were, first, to attract export-oriented foreign enterprises by the


\textsuperscript{71} The Times (London), 21 May 1971.

\textsuperscript{72} K.R. Singh, n.10.

\textsuperscript{73} Ali E.Hillal Dessouki, n.70, p.125.
establishment of duty-free zones, and second, to attract foreign capital through a liberal investment policy. However, the ultimate goal of the policy was to set the stage for the development of Egyptian economy through joint ventures and projects bringing together Egyptian labour, Arab capital, and Western technology and management expertise. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), private financial institutions and the oil-producing Arab states all played a role in influencing Egypt's economic policy. For two years (1975 and 1976) internal financial institutions and Arab and Western creditors pressurised Egypt to make its economy more acceptable and accessible to the world capitalist market by curbing subsidies and devaluing the Egyptian pound. In the fall of 1976 oil producing Arab states joined hands with the United States and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in pressing for more fundamental changes in the country's economy. In the winter of 1977, the government of Mamdouh Salem ordered a 50 percent cut in the E£553 million subsidy. But it resulted immediately in the January food riots that engulfed the whole country.

However, in 1977, foreign firms were allowed to buy foreign exchange with Egyptian pounds. Gradually the Egyptian pound was 'floated', that was official


77 Raymond A. Hinnebusch Jr., n.9, pp.272-3.
attempts to set the exchange rate for foreign currency were abandoned to the market. In consequence the value of the Egyptian pound declined rapidly. By the Spring of 1982, Mohamed Heikal noted, the dollar was officially worth £E 0.48, but any hotel or shop was prepared to give £E1.15 for it. Bilateral trade agreements which had previously been used to promote exports, mostly to the Eastern bloc, were phased out as Egypt's trade shifted Westward.

It is clear that actual investment expenditures ran well behind approved investments; in 1975-78 they amounted to much less, a mere £E 400 million over four years (compared to public sector investment of £E 900 million in one year) and by 1981, Law 43 projects underway were capitalized at only £E 900 million. Moreover, 60 percent of this total was Egyptian contribution, much of it from the public sector to joint ventures. In fact, only about one-tenth of new investment in the late seventies could be directly attributed to Infitah.

However, some Infitah projects did bring some results as the government had hoped for. Four major developments led to the rapid growth in Egypt's resources. They are: (i) The petroleum sector which emerged as the financially dominant sector of the economy with production rising from less than 8 million tons in 1974 to 32 million tons in 1981. That was partly due to the return of the Sinai oil fields to Egypt after the Peace Treaty; (ii) Remittances from workers abroad which increased from $190 million in 1974 to $2,900 million in 1981 - a dramatic increase averaging to 32 percent a year in constant dollars; (iii) The

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78 Mohamed Heikal, n.16, p.86.

79 Raymond A. Hinnebusch Jr., n.9, p.273.
Suez Canal which was re-opened and enlarged so that canal earnings reached about $900 million in 1981; and (iv) direct foreign investment and net MLT lending which also increased significantly.\(^80\)

But Sadat’s new economic policy of *Infitah* or Open Door, marked an entirely different direction in the existing socialist policy of Nasser. Sadat hoped to push economic growth well ahead of population growth. He was equally determined to free Egypt from dependence on foreign ‘largesse’, particularly reliance on the Soviet Union for arms. And in the process the main beneficiaries of the more liberal economic era inaugurated by Sadat had been the importers and consultants to foreign interests.\(^81\)

While the *Infitah* policy made Sadat to more West-ward, it also led to the erosion of state socialism in Egypt. As the restriction on private ownership on land were lifted, the state marched toward a capitalist economy forgoing Nasser’s state socialism. A coterie of rich people emerged and the state subsequently marched towards political changes like the erosion of single party system. Sadat initiated the move for multi-party system. The whole pattern of Nasserite state had, thus, changed.

These internal changes of Sadat possibly satisfied the West and further pushed the United States into supporting further mediation in Egypt-Israel relations. The Jerusalem visit of Sadat was made on the formal invitation given


to him on 15 November 1977 by the Israeli Premier through the American embassies in Cairo and Tel-Aviv.\textsuperscript{82} It showed the tempo of Egyptian tilt towards the West vis-a-vis Israel. In 1977-78, Sadat became more emphatic about the importance of the US role. The United States was not just a mediator, but a full partner in the peace process.\textsuperscript{83} The US mediation and US pressure on Israel to return the areas of Egypt lost during the 1967 War amidst global changes like new Cold War justified the US stand that led to the famous Camp David talks in 1978.

After the Jerusalem visit of Sadat on 20 November 1977, the day when Bairam fell,\textsuperscript{84} the Camp David talks in September 1978 followed by the Peace Treaty in March 1979 led to an Arab League boycott of Egypt. The Tripoli Summit held at Tripoli between 2-5 December 1978 declared, \textit{inter-alia}, that:

(i) the five signatories (Syria, Libya, Algeria, South Yemen and the PLO) would "freeze" diplomatic relations with Egypt and boycott Egyptian companies and individuals conducting business with Israel and (ii) the signatories would boycott meetings of the Arab League held in Egypt and would also raise with other members the question of continued Egyptian membership and the location of the League’s headquarters.\textsuperscript{85}

In the Arab League Summit at Baghdad on 31 March 1979, the conference, \textit{inter alia} decided:

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{83}] Ali E.Hillal Dessouki, n.70, p.139.
\item[\textsuperscript{84}] Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel, n.82, p.34.
\item[\textsuperscript{85}] \textit{Keesing's Contemporary Archives} (Harlow), 25 August 1978, p.29163.
\end{itemize}
(1) to suspend the Egyptian Government’s membership in the Arab League as operative from the date of the Egyptian Government’s signing of the peace treaty with the Zionist enemy; (2) to transfer the headquarters of the League from Egypt to other Arab states on a temporary basis; (3) to suspend Egypt’s membership in the Non-Aligned Movement, the Islamic Conference Organisation (OIC) and Organisation of African Unity (CAU) for violating the resolutions of these organisations pertaining to the Arab-Zionist conflict; (4) to halt all bank loans, deposits, guarantees or facilities, as well as all financial or technical contributions and aid by Arab governments or their establishments to the Egyptian Government and its establishments as of the treaty signing date; (5) to prohibit trade exchange with the Egyptian state and private establishments that deal with the Zionist enemy.\(^{86}\)

Egypt was expelled from Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) and the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development. The Egyptian based armaments corporation financed by the oil-producers, was disbanded. Saudi-Arabia withdrew the funds it had promised for Egypt’s purchase of American fighter aircraft.\(^{87}\) Thus, in the regional front Sadat had to face a lot of obstacles though Sadat had already said that “my obvious and only target was peace, and peace cannot be achieved under just any circumstances; and it can be achieved only through direct meetings between parties to the conflict.”\(^{88}\)

Sadat had to face a new challenge in the domestic front. The new challenge was from the Muslim fundamentalists who declared that any peace with Israel was ‘contrary to Islam’ and called for a \textit{jihad} (holy-war) against the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{87} David Hirst and Irene Beeson, n.17, p.323.
  \item \textbf{88} Anwar El-Sadat, \textit{Those I have Known}, London: Jonathan Cape, 1985, p.104.
\end{itemize}
‘usurpers’ (Egypt and Israel). But Sadat justified the Camp David Agreement to the Egyptians declaring on 2 October 1978 in the People’s Assembly that:

This was that Egypt would achieve at this stage and if the Arab rejectionists were able through their alliance with the Soviet Union to achieve more, we would support them, applaud them and extend our thanks to them. If any Arab leadership was able to get us to our hopes, we would be the first to say ‘yes’ with all sincerity, purity and true backing.  

Ironically it should be marked that all these developments coincided with another great event, the Iranian Revolution of February 1979, in the region. This event not only enhanced the importance of Egypt for the West but also necessitated the West, particularly the USA, to harvest a good rapport with Sadat’s Egypt for a strong base in the region. Thus, the Carter administration continued the earlier momentum of military and economic help to Egypt and in the process Egypt was tilted towards the West along with the pro-West Arab states and also pro-Western nations in the non-aligned group. It was reflected on the Sixth Havana Non-Aligned Summit of 1979 when resolutions were moved against Egypt by the radical Arab states and anti-Western non-aligned nations for a boycott of Egypt. Thus, the foreign policy pursued by Sadat had a direct impact upon the non-aligned image of Egypt. While Nasser operated from a position of strength in the NAM, Sadat batted on a sticky wicket in the NAM in his pursuance of pro-Western foreign policy.

89 David Hirst and Irene Beeson, n.17, p.324.