CHAPTER-V

CULTURAL REVOLUTION IN CHINESE CENTRAL ASIA: 1966-76

CH’INGHAI PROVINCE: 1966-69

GEOGRAPHY

Ch’inghai (Qinghai) in P’in-yin is a province in northwestern China in the Tibetan Highlands. It has an average elevation of 13,000 feet and is bounded on the north and east by Kansu, on the southeast by Szechwan, on the south and west by the Tibetan Autonomous Region and on the west and north by the Uighur Autonomous Region of Sinkiang. Ch’inghai derives its name from a large lake—the Ch’inghai Hu i.e., a blue lake and it is customarily known as Koko Nor in the northeast. Ch’inghai is spread over an area of 737,000 square kilometers. It is the fourth largest political unit in China and sparsely populated. The capital of Ch’inghai is Sininig which is located 120 miles west of Lanchow, Kansu province.

PEOPLE

A majority of Ch’inghai’s population is Han and the rest are minority nationalities which include Tibetans, Mongols, Hui, Salar and Tu. About half of the population lives in minority nationality autonomous areas. The majority population is concentrated in eastern Ch’inghai in the Sininig valley, which is considered to be the main agricultural and industrial center. Added to this a number of cities have grown substantially with development of the province’s mineral, oil and natural gas industries.
MINORITY POPULATION

The minority population according to 1982 census was 1,535,727 or 39.4 per cent of the total population of the region. The most populous minorities in Ch‘inghai were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minority nationalities</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tibetans</td>
<td>754,254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hui</td>
<td>533,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu</td>
<td>128,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salar</td>
<td>60,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongols</td>
<td>50,456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchus</td>
<td>3,048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhs</td>
<td>1,497</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CULTURAL LIFE

Ch‘inghai has very few urban cultural institutions such as museums, theaters, universities and libraries. The day-to-day life is largely rural and is strongly influenced by the traditional culture of several ethnic and nationality groups that constitute the population. For instance, among Mongols and Tibetans, one son from every family is supposed to enter a lamasery. The chief monastery in Ch‘inghai is about 20 miles from Sininig. It is considered as the center of Tibetan Buddhism and thousands of believers make their pilgrimage to this place from Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, Tibet, Sinkiang and Szechwan.

GOVERNMENT

Sininig is the capital of Ch‘inghai province. The province is subdivided into one prefecture (ti-ch‘u), six autonomous prefectures (tzu-chih-chou), and one municipality (shih), under provincial jurisdiction. These were further subdivided into countries (hsien) and autonomous counties (tzu-chih-hsien). The mineral rich Tsaidam Basin was accorded special status in late 1956 with the establishment of a

---

separate Tsaidam Administrative District with its headquarters at Ta-ch’ai-tan. Later in 1964 the Tsaidam district was again incorporated into an autonomous district designated for the Mongols, Tibetan and Kazakh minorities.

CULTURAL REVOLUTION

Material on “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” (GPCR) in Ch’inghai is sparse. Difficulty in making an exhaustive study is further compounded by the fact that the minorities were less in number (39.4 per cent of the total population of the region) and lived in rural areas, while the ‘Cultural Revolution’ was most felt in urban centers. Further, various aspects of ‘Cultural Revolution’ were not introduced into the rural minority areas until after the more extreme manifestations of whatever reforms were being introduced had moderated.² Whereas Red Guards movements against the “Four Old Things” (Si jiu: old thinking, old culture, old morality and old customs), and mass struggle were well developed in Sining area by August 1966,³ not until late May of 1967 did the provincial radio station call for extending the class struggle to those comparatively remote chou and hsien, where most of the provinces’ minorities lived. The move to extend the ‘Cultural Revolution’ into rural areas preceded the announcement of the formation of a preparatory committee for the provincial revolutionary committee by a scant three weeks.⁴

However, the ‘Cultural Revolution’ in Ch’inghai made an initial dent with the advent of students, acting as pioneers of the revolution, who operated in Red Guard detachments. The official media called on the people of the region, including those of others regions, to support the revolutionary students wholeheartedly and help them. The paper Jen-min Jih-Piao said the revolutionary youth and children of China were the most stalwart defenders and reliable standard bearers of the


⁴ Dreyer. n. 2. p. 231.
proletarian revolution. The Red Guards, after attending the meeting held on 31 August, returned to Ch'inghai and started to circulate appeals, proclamations and demands pasting them on the house walls, fences and shop windows. Every person including the minorities were expected to always carry a copy of Mao's utterances, study it all the time and religiously act in accordance with what was stated in them. The Red Guards demanded installation of loud speakers in squares, streets and parks so that along with them, similar other organisations could popularise Mao Tse-tungism and tell the population about the situation at home and abroad.

On orders from the revolutionary students a number of book shops that sold political literature and fiction were either closed or destroyed and others have had their books taken away. Empty shelves were lined with clean paper and a new collection of Mao Tse-tung poems and pamphlets, with his articles arrayed on them, his portraits, posters and pictures were put on sale. Further publication of provincial news papers and magazines ceased, and for the publication of Mao's books, the province was directed to print its own collection in pamphlets. Though Ch'inghai was backward, the region was not labeled as special or backward. Traditional products for the minorities in the region were no longer produced or grown, and cultural traditions were denied through such pronouncements as "They should live in houses instead of tents, wear normal clothes instead of their costumes, pigtails instead of turbans and they should eat and drink in mess halls."


6 Ibid.

7 SWB/FE/2260/A3/1, 9 September 1966.

8 SWB/FE/2293/A3/1, 18 October 1966.


10 Union Research Service, (Hong Kong), vol. 44, no. 17, 26 August, 1960 and also see Peking Review (Beijing), no. 33, 12 August 1966, p. 13.


Further, the languages and scripts, and customs and manners in the region were condemned as backward and an attempt was made to abolish them officially. Among the written scripts, only Mongolian, Tibetan, and Kazakh were allowed but even their use was restricted. Only Chinese was to be spoken at meetings and in many places it was a misdemeanour to use one's native language. Further, the national characteristics of minority dances in the region were emasculated. It is well known that the traditional dances of Mongol and Tibetan nationalities in the region are distinctive for their head, shoulder, and waist movements. But it was insisted that when the minority dances were presented the dancer should not perform these movements.

Additionally, the minorities in Sinkiang, especially the Hui, happened to swallow a bitter pill when Red Guards attacked and tore down mosques, and to discredit religion forced believers to raise and eat pigs. And in Tibet the Red Guards destroyed ancient culture and art and temples of the minorities. If this was the fate of minorities, specially the Tibetans and Hui in Tibet and Sinkiang respectively, there is every possibility that the same groups might have faced similar fate at Ch'inghai chief monastery and other places.

As already stated, the 'Cultural Revolution' in Ch'inghai was initially confined to urban centers. The Deputy Commander of the Ch'inghai Military District, Chao Yung-tu, tried to utilise the gloomy political situation because of rivalry between Maoist and anti-Maoist factions and seized power after serious riots. But soon the Beijing authorities, realising the unfaithful attempt of Chao in using the troops against the Maoists, issued a directive replacing him with General

---

Liu Hsieu chu’uan, who brought the situation under control on 12 August 1967. Chao Yung-tu was finally overthrown and a revolutionary committee was formed with Liu as Chairman, and in the standing committee four out of nine members were military men.18

INNER MONGOLIAN AUTONOMOUS REGION (IMAR):1966-69

GEOGRAPHY

Inner Mongolia (Neimenggu) in P’in-yin is one of the five autonomous regions of the People’s Republic of China. It has an area of 1,183,000 square kilometers. It shares its border in the north with the Mongolian Peoples Republic, in the east with the Chinese provinces of Kirin and Liaoning, in the south with the Chinese provinces of Hopeh, Shansi and Shensi and the Hui Autonomous Region of Ningsia, and in the west with the Chinese province of Kansu. Since 1952, (Hui-hao-t’e) Huhehot is its capital.

PEOPLE

In Inner Mongolia a maximum number of people belong to Han community and the largest national minority population is that of Mongols. Apart from these two ethnic groups there are other minor ethnic groups like the Oroqen, Solund, Ewenki, Korean, Daghir and Manchu.19 The population in the region is unevenly distributed, where most of the people are concentrated in the southern agricultural belt and in the south of Ta-ch’ing Shau stretches of Mongolian plateau near Huang Ho. The most widely used language is Chinese. This is probably because a majority of people here are Han.

18 New China News Agency (hereafter NCNA), 13 August 1967, quoted from Domes. n. 16, p. 122.

The Mongolian dialects belong to the eastern branch of Mongolian languages; phonetically, morphologically and syntactically are almost similar to Khalkha Mongol dialect of Outer Mongolia. The use of Cyrillic alphabet was introduced in 1955. This system is identical to the one used in Outer Mongolia. By the year 1956 this new Mongolian was taught in the first grade of all schools and by 1960 all the publications, except the classics, were printed in that alphabet.

MINORITY POPULATION

The minority population in Inner Mongolia according to 1982 census was 2,996,380 or 15.5 per cent of the total population of the region. The most populous minorities were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minority Nationalities</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mongolian</td>
<td>2,489,780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchus</td>
<td>236,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hui</td>
<td>169,096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daghur</td>
<td>58,611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ewenki</td>
<td>18,139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koreans</td>
<td>17,564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oroqen</td>
<td>2,055</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RELIGION

In this region in addition to ancestor-worship most of the Han follow a religion formed out of the elements of Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism. Most of the Mongols are followers of Tibetan Buddhism with almost every Mongol family having at least one son in a monastery. Despite the existence of Buddhism, which has characteristics like rituals, and a dominant hierarchical monasticism these are some aspects of Shamanism. The stronghold of Shamanism among the Mongols is the Hu-lun-peri-erh league (meng) and the Chinese centered on Huhehot are adherents of Islam. It is needless to say that at one point of time the Roman Catholic church exercised some influence, especially in Lin-ho county.

20 For details see *ibid.*, p. 1259.

21 Mackerras and Yorke, n. 1, p. 207.
CULTURAL LIFE

The cultural life in Inner Mongolia has Tibetan Buddhist influence with respect to liturgical music, monastery and temple architecture, scriptural learning and commentary, and in religious art the Mongols have accepted the forms of Tibet. Though some of the specific content and emphasis of Mongol legends differ with the location and tribal history concerning their origins, most of the clans have legends of their founders as a 'mythical animal,' or a 'hero,' while others preserve legends about historical figures which were prominent at one stage in the life of their clan.

The disciplines and themes of Mongol folktales and other forms of vernacular literature tend to be standard among all the tribes. A large number of them deal with the lamas and religious life. Legends and songs, riddles and jokes dominate during the leisure time of the night camp and its fireside circle, which is considered as a major aspect of Mongolian life. The music of the Mongols is not an independent art but helps in accompanying the songs, dances and rites. Singing is a form of entertainment, communication, historical recollection, and group fellowship. There is no doubt that these songs demonstrate the close affiliation of individual Mongols with their culture and traditions. By and large, singing is a sociable activity which mostly takes place around campfires in the post-dinner session.

The Mongols observe seasonal celebrations namely the 'New Year', 'The White Month', which signify rebirth, in spring. 'Midsummer Festival', on the Twelfth day of the sixth month, 'Autumn festival, which signify festival of fire on the first day of the eighth month of the Chinese Lunar Calendar and the Great Sacrificial Feast to the fire God' on the 23rd day in the 12th lunar month and Nadam Fair.22

22 For details see, Questions and Answers About China's National Minorities (Beijing, 1985), pp. 86-88.
Besides, the 'Obo Festival', is held in the fifth month of every year. It is worthy of note that towards the end of the ceremonies the festival takes a joyful course without restraint. They hold wrestling and archery competitions and a race in which young men of the tribes ride their best horses. This is the time when the Mongol nomads demonstrate their talent and vigour. However, with the increasing Sinicisation of the region, in terms of numbers and influence, many of the Han cultural forms have become prominent.

GOVERNMENT

The administration in Inner Mongolia is different in name and composition when compared to other parts of China. The region is divided into eight leagues (meng), which are similar to that of sub-provincial units in China proper, and four prefecture level municipalities (shih). The local level administrative units are called banners (ch'i) in Mongolian areas and counties (hsien) in Han areas, where the latter is predominant. In Mongol areas the banners are further subdivided into administrative villages (gatsaa) or animak, which constitute two or three villages. In the case of nomadic region the banners are sub divided into (sumun), which are further subdivided into bag-who constitute groups of nomad farmers, (Khoto) towns and (ail) settlements of few families of nomads.

To foster unity between various nationalities, by way of a policy, an effort was made to set up democratic coalition governments in localities where both the Mongols and Han were represented in substantial numbers.

CULTURAL REVOLUTION

An important aspect of the GPCR has been to maintain a tight control over the least stable areas of China, geographically and politically. One of these is Inner Mongolia. In almost all the areas of China, political upheaval can be ascribed to a
power struggle between the party, Red Guards and other semi-organised groups. But the 'Cultural Revolution' in Inner Mongolia takes an added significance in the sense that local nationalism among the Mongol national minority played an important role in the conflict between the established political structure and the efforts of the Maoists to seize power.

By 1965 Ulanfu (Yuntse) and his supporters were already potential targets. They made changes in party plans, necessitated by the local conditions in Mongolia and the pressures of Mongol nationalism. But some of Ulanfu's colleagues in other places were attacked for lack of pragmatism and for bureaucratic inertia, whereas Ulanfu's sin, supposedly, was his extreme flexibility in adapting party directives to special Mongol situations, although a similar attitude was urged upon cadres in non-minority areas. In April 1966, the North China Party Bureau issued a statement saying that the political consciousness of the cadres in Inner Mongolia was very low and failed to apply correctly the thought of Mao in “revitalising” their “revolutionary spirit.” For these reasons the party bureau directed that the GPCR be implemented in Inner Mongolia and that a movement to study the thought of Mao be promoted.

Not willing to get involved in another campaign, Ulanfu and his associates had become convinced that the thought of Mao Tse-tung had little to offer with respect to the problems of Inner Mongolia. The Vice-chairman of the Autonomous region, Wang I-lun, a Chinese, supported Ulanfu and formed, along with him, a core of resistance to the 'Cultural Revolution'. However, they did not totally disregard party directives, for they could see CCP leaders like P'eng Chen being purged, and

---


26 Ibid., p.119.

27 Ibid.

hence wanted to safeguard their own positions. Therefore, they decided to stage a mild ‘Cultural Revolution’ and thus buy time, during which to strengthen their positions. Subsequently, in May 1966, a call was given for all nationalities in the region to participate in the GPCR.

In June Wang I-lun presided over a conference of cadres, officials and members of the university in Huhehot, in which a resolution was passed supporting the decision of the CCP’s Central Committee to reorganise the party committees of the Peking municipality and Peking University. This pretense enabled Ulanfu and his associates an opportunity to purge some of the pro-Maoists.

The municipal party committee of Huhehot was purged in August, ostensibly because of its members’ ‘national splittist’ and ‘capitalist’ activities. Li Chih, First Secretary of the Huhehot Municipal Party Committee, a Chinese and a Maoist, was accused of ‘destroying the unity of the nationalities’, and of ‘opposing socialism, the party, and the thought of Mao’. Li was dismissed for saying that the two or three hundred years ago Huhehot was a Mongolian city and was replaced with Batubagin, a Mongol, with a responsibility of reorganising the Huhehot party committee. Further, attacks were directed against other pro-Maoists, of whom most of them were considered to be Chinese.

Immediately after the Eleventh Plenum of the CCP Central Committee the Red Guard groups came into action. Ulanfu and his associates hoped to give them a moment of glory, clam them down and then gradually ease them out of Inner Mongolia. On the other hand, pro-Maoists on the region’s party committee saw the

---

29 Hyer and Heaton, n.25, p.120.
31 Hyer and Heaton. n. 25, p. 120.
33 Lu Wen-hsin, “Nei-meng Tung-luan wen-t’i te yen-hsi” (An Analysis of the Disturbances in Inner Mongolia), Fei-Ch'ing Yen-Chiu, vol. 1, no. 7, July 1967, p. 68, cited in Hyer and Heaton, n. 27, p. 120.
presence of the Red Guards as a means of retaining their own power and resisting Ulanfu. Kao Chin-ming, a pro-Maoist, urged the Red Guards to engage in “revolutionary activities to destroy the four-olds in Huhehot” and urged the local leaders not to oppose them.34

A few weeks later they demanded that old habits and customs be discarded and Inner Mongols “take up the iron broom of revolution to wipe out the dust of the old society.”35 In Inner Mongolia they printed quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung and the Three Constantly Red Articles in separate volumes and sent them to each peasant family, forcing them to study. Further, two copies of quotations from Chairman Mao were sent to each household, plus one copy of Three Constantly Read Articles was given to every child over seven years of age.36 Later, the Inner Mongolian Communist authorities again directed that Mao Tse-tung’s thought-study-classes be established in every government or civilian organisation, school, enterprise, factory, store and people’s commune.

Alongside, in the cities it was directed that the study classes be established in every street, every private yard and home; in rural areas, in every commune and production brigade and team in addition to those family study classes each jointly sponsored by two or three households.37 Further, all individuals over seven, including-gray-haired old men, had to attend study classes with the result that the father and sons become classmates, husband and wife taught each other and sister and brother compete in their study.38 These study hours were held during breaks between working hours in the day and people had to participate in collective study for two hours in the evening.

34 Hyer and Heaton, n. 25, p. 120.


37 Ibid.

38 Ibid
Many Red Guard factions were formed out of which two main groups coalesced—namely the Inner Mongolia East Shines Red United Revolutionary Rebels, abbreviated as the United Rebels and the Third Head Quarters of the Revolutionary Rebels of the capital, Huhehot, abbreviated as the Huhehot Third Headquarters. Those who were accused of inciting discord between the Mongols and the Han people were purged. Further, they were also accused of overemphasising the problem of national minority affairs and hampering nationalities’ solidarity.39

The confusion caused by the Red Guards enabled the pro-Maoists to begin attacking Ulanfu and some of his supporters indirectly. A number of Ulanfu supporters were denounced for such crimes as “opposing the theories of Mao on the nationalities question”, “abandoning the class struggle in favour of a policy of mutual harmony for the different nationalities”, and attacking Mao’s policies on autonomy for the minority nationality areas.40 But slowly these denunciations took a nationalistic colour. The Chinese Maoists accused Mongol party figures of turning the ‘four cleans movement’ into a struggle against “great-Hanism”.41 They were also accused of having stated that the Han were oppressors of the Mongols and of advocating Mongols’ united effort at seizing true autonomy. Chang Ju-Kan, a Mongol official, was denounced for having said, “The Chinese oppress the Mongols; they give us new rice bowls and then tell us to go beg for rice.”42

In mid-September the acting mayor of Huhehot, Ch’en Ping-su, was dragged out by the masses for frenziedly promoting revisionism and nationality splittism. He was said to have forced the masses to study Mongolian in order to divert their attention from the works of Chairman Mao and to have told them that

42 Hyer and Heaton, n. 25, p. 121.
so long as they raised hogs properly he could not care less whether they read the
works of Mao. Further, Ch'en was accused of having ordered Chinese cadres to
learn Mongolian and of telling them that "not learning Mongolian is a question of
being revolutionary or not revolutionary." On the other hand, the Mongols who
were said to be resisting attacks on their decadent customs, party and government
organisations, apparently ceased to function. The Huhehot Radio stopped
broadcasting local news and began to relay Peking Radio's domestic service.

Beginning early fall 1966, until mid-March 1967, the Inner Mongolian
Autonomous Region virtually disappeared from the mention in Chinese mass media.
Whatever was lacking in official data was supplanted by rumours and Red Guard
news papers. Ulanfu, the Chairman of Nationality Affairs Commission, who was
noted to have been holding monopoly over the regions' top positions like the Party
First Secretary, governor, commander, and political commissar of the Inner
Mongolia Military District, President of the Inner Mongolia University and as an
alternate member for a minority nationality, made his last public appearance at the
October First National Day rally in Peking.

In January 1967 a Peking wall newspaper accused Ulanfu of backing anti-
Maoists in a speech calling for Mongolia for the Mongols. He was also accused of
seeking to restore capitalism. Ulanfu and his close associates responded by
publishing an order in Inner Mongolia Daily to suspend 'Cultural Revolution'. But
making an excuse out of approaching harvest, the order directed the Red Guards to
go to the rural areas and assist in the harvest. Later both sides sought to

43 Radio Huhehot, 18 September 1966, cited in Dreyer, n.2, p. 211.

44 Yuan Chia-ho, "The Chinese Communist Controlled Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region," Studies

45 Dreyer, n.2, p. 211.

46 Ibid.


48 Inner Mongolia Daily, 24 September cited in Hyer and Heaton, n. 25, p. 121.
consolidate and expand their respective positions. The Peking Red Guards established a liaison group in Huhehot and began recruiting local youth to form Red Guard units. They sought to penetrate schools, factories and the bureaucracy to establish their own revolutionary organisation. On the other hand, Wang I-lun and Wang To began to organise rival revolutionary organisations composed of workers, peasants, teachers and PLA veterans, many of whom had settled in Inner Mongolia. These anti-Maoists were supported by PLA troops armed with rockets, artillery and machine guns.\(^49\)

The Red Guards' control on the party machine throughout China was resumed and reached a climax towards the beginning of January 1967. The 'January Revolution' elsewhere encourage Red Guards in Inner Mongolia in their venture to seize power. By mid-January they had seized many government buildings in Huhehot, the telegraph office, railway station, Radio Inner Mongolia and *Inner Mongolia Daily* press.

The Vice-Commander of Inner Mongolia Military Garrison Political Department, Liu Ch'ang, an Ulanfu supporter, ordered the troops at Huhehot to surround the headquarters of the Red Guard organisations. With the result, the troops beat up a member of Red Guards and demanded the remainder to surrender, but the clashes between troops and Red Guards became inevitable towards the end of January. On 5 February, the Red Guards held a rally protesting against the presence of the troops, but due to the orders of Liu Ch'ang the troops fired at the demonstrators and killed several of them, which resulted in a state of anarchy in Huhehot. Liu then brought in PLA troops stationed on the border with Mongolian People's Republic and established order. These troops arrested more than 100 Red Guard leaders and reoccupied all the facilities previously seized by them, arrested many Red Guard agitators from Peking, smashed their propaganda equipment, and put a halt to their activities.\(^50\)


\(^50\) Yuan Chia-ho, n. 44, pp. 94-95.
During the same time the Peking Red Guard newspaper reported that Inner Mongolia had been cut off from the outside world for the past several months and that a small group of “addled eggs”\(^{51}\) led by Liu Ch’ang had established a “fascist dictatorship”, which was terrorizing and suppressing the revolutionary left wing elements. Revolutionary rebels from places like Peking, Shanghai and other places were reported enroute to Inner Mongolia to help their besieged comrades.\(^{52}\)

But the Peking Maoists were concerned with the deterioration of their position in Inner Mongolia. Chou En-lai sent a communiqué requesting both sides to send a delegation to Peking to settle the dispute. Though initially Ulanfu rejected Chou’s request, he later sent a delegation, representing his views, to Peking as did a pro-Maoist delegation. Finally both the delegations met Chou and agreed to cessation of fighting, rioting, demonstrating, arresting, publishing inflammatory materials or engaging in provocative activities of any kind.\(^{53}\) However the clashes continued. In fact, Ulanfu and his supporters viewed Chou’s intervention as an attempt by the Maoists to gain time and strengthen their position vis-a-vis Ulanfu’s revolutionary organisations.

Ulanfu again directed troops to surround the Red Guard headquarters and to re-arrest those who had been released two weeks prior to Chou En-lai’s truce. The Ulanfu organisations and his supporters then planned to stage a coup on 18 April and seize total power in the Leagues and Banners in order to establish an Inner Mongolian Revolutionary Committee.\(^{54}\) With the deterioration of their control in Inner Mongolia, the Peking Maoists concluded that the only remedy was a direct intervention by military force. The Military Affairs Committee of the Central Committee directed Teng Hai-ch’ing, Deputy Commander of the Peking Military

\(^{51}\) Dreyer, n. 2, p. 211.

\(^{52}\) Peking Ts’ ai mao hung-ch’i quoted by Radio Sofia, 18 February 1967, cited in Dreyer, n. 2, p. 211.

\(^{53}\) Yuan Chia-ho, n. 44, pp. 94-95.

\(^{54}\) Ibid.
Garrison, to take command of the PLA 21st Army stationed in Shensi and occupy key areas in Inner Mongolia. Teng finally succeeded in taking control of Huhehot. Other army units also moved in to consolidate the position of the Maoists. Martial law was declared and curfew put into effect which resulted in establishing order.

At last Huhehot Radio resumed broadcasting locally originating material. The regions' Military District Command announced that it had convened an urgent meeting to mobilize all forces for the completion of 'spring farming' in order to combat the class enemies' sabotage. Its deputy commander, relaying on the instructions from Lin Piao, emphasised that production must be put on a practical basis. The Municipal Revolutionary Committee of Huhehot was formed, and its three-way alliance with military men, which included the leader of 'addled eggs', Liu Ch'ang, was established. Further, it was reported that with the active support of PLA officers and men, production was proceeding smoothly and order restored.

In mid-April the Party's Central Committee in Peking handed over the Decision on the Correct Handling of the Inner Mongolian Question, which criticized the army for its suppression of the leftists. The five major points in the Decision included (i) the dismissal of Ulanfu from all positions, including commander of Inner Mongolian Military Region and First Secretary of the Party; (ii) the reorganisation of the Inner Mongolian Military Garrison; (iii) the appointment of Lin Hsien-ch'uan as commander of the Military garrison; Teng Hai-ch'ing as Chairman of the preparatory committee for the establishment of a revolutionary committee; and Wu T'ao as political commissar of the Military Region; (iv) the initiation of a struggle movement against Ulanfu, Wang I-lun, Wang To and their associates; and (v) the rehabilitation of Maoists, such as Li Chih, who had been purged by the anti-Maoists. The directive issued by the new military garrison, and approved by the CCP Central Committee Military Affairs Committee,
directed the troops in Inner Mongolia not to participate in revolutionary exchanges "but to remain in their units, maintain stringent discipline and to support the new leadership." 58

This was amply a clear response to the shifting power relationships in Peking, for just a week prior to the Decision on Inner Mongolia, the radical Maoists, led by Madame Mao, Chiang Ch'ing, succeeded in issuing a directive limiting the authority of army to intervene and instructed the commanders to support the revolutionaries.

Though the army took power and replaced regional and district party committees during February in most other areas, this event was dodged till April in Inner Mongolia. Sporadic clashes occurred between Army troops and Ulanfu supporters. In mid-June, Radio Inner Mongolia acknowledged that the supporters of Ulanfu had sabotaged the "three-way alliance" and forestalled a "great revolutionary unity" between the military forces and the pro-Maoists. 59 After several months of clashes the top Mongol leadership was purged but resistance continued, and factional fighting had become the order of the day.

Nevertheless, the decision concerning the Decision of Inner Mongolia approved the membership of a preparatory committee for the regions' revolutionary committee, which was dominated by the military in its upper echelons. The radicals were not discouraged by these developments, and it was later admitted that the "national splittists, capitalist roaders, and those with extreme leftist ideas had forced the region to the brink of civil war during this period. Transport and communications were repeatedly disrupted and production suffered very badly.

Cheng wei-shan, acting commander of the Peking military district, reported to a conference in August that Inner Mongolia cadres were following a well planned

58 Lu Wcn-hcsin, n. 33, pp. 70-71.
59 Hyer and Heaton, n. 25, p. 123.
scheme to corrupt troops stationed in Inner Mongolia by means of the "fair sex".60 Cheng also said that troops had received many letters and that over seventy men had been influenced through contact with women.61 This alarm was echoed by K’ang Sheng who blamed Ulanfu for the plot.

In August Ulanfu was publicly condemned by name. He was accused of holding a secret meeting to plan a counter-revolutionary coup on the Twentieth Anniversary of the founding of Inner Mongolia Autonomous region.62 He was also accused of having slighted the role of Mao by advocating and integrating Mao’s thoughts with the reality of Inner Mongolia.63 Further, Ulanfu was said to have opposed class struggle by ‘arbitrarily quoting’ Mao, as having written that the heart of the nationalities problem is unity as well as development of production. He was accused of ignoring directives by the North China Party Bureau.64

An editorial in the Inner Mongolia Daily, on August 29, entitled “Overthrow Ulanfu”, accused him of such crimes as “being the agent of China’s Khrushchev [Liu Shao-Ch’i] in Inner Mongolia, trying to establish an independent kingdom”, opposing the thought of Mao Tse-tung on minority nationalities questions, opposing the class struggle, and instead seeking to harmonize relations between the minorities, seeking to revert to ‘nomad economics’ and achieving peaceful transition.65 This was named as “national splittism.”66 Ulanfu was accused

60 Ibid., pp. 123-24.

61 Ibid., p. 124.

62 Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region was established on 1 May 1947, for details see Information China: The Comprehensive and Authoritative Reference Source of New China, n.19, p.1280 and for details also see, Questions and Answers about China’s National Minorities, n.21, pp. 186-93.

63 Dreyer, n. 2, p. 212.


65 Quoted from Hyer and Heaton, n. 25, p. 124.

of dividing different nationalities and gambling on setting up an independent kingdom.\(^{67}\)

Disorder reached its peak and in September the military districts’ powers to curb radicals were expanded. It is to be noted that this, again, was in response to the shifting power relationship in Peking, where two leading radicals had been purged and Madame Mao induced to accept a more conservative course. In September, two counter-revolutionaries were sentenced to death by means of public trial and many more were imprisoned.

When a reasonable level of normalcy had set in, on November 1, the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region’s Revolutionary Committee was formally inaugurated in which the army dominated in terms of its representation.\(^{68}\) This new Revolutionary Committee, dominated by Han leadership, “Strengthen[ed] the unity among the revolutionary peoples of various nationalities.”\(^{69}\) Except Wang Tsai-t’ien, all the Mongols associated with Ulanfu were purged with him, including K’uei pi, Chi Ya-t’ai and Wang To. Only two Mongols among the top leaders- Wang Tsai-t’ien and Paojihletai,\(^{70}\) were present on the revolutionary committee.\(^{71}\)

After the inauguration of the revolutionary committee, Chairman T’eng Haching warned the saboteurs. Radio Huhehot quoted T’eng’s first official speech: “While the enemies had been dragged out, they would surely attempt a come back. Chairman Mao’s theory on the question of nationalities must be vigorously propagated in order to wipe out thoroughly the anti-Mao poisonous influence

\(^{67}\) SWBI/FE/2261/A1/1, 10 September 1966.

\(^{68}\) China News Summary (Hong Kong), April-December 1968, no. 239, 26 September 1968, p. 14; and also see June Teufel Dreyer, “National Minorities in Cultural Revolution,” The China Quarterly, July-September, no. 35, p. 103 and for details of list of representatives see China News Summary, n. 68, pp. 14-15.


\(^{70}\) Dreyer, n. 2, p. 213.

\(^{71}\) Yuan Chia-ho, n. 44, p. 97; and also see China News Summary, n. 68, pp. 14-15.
spread by Ulanfu on the nationality question” and went on to say “All commanders and fighters in Inner Mongolia were warned to strengthen their combat readiness in order to ensure success.” 72 T’eng called upon all nationalities to work together in bringing peace in the region. Mass organisations and individuals were not allowed to exchange revolutionary experiences in the frontier areas and none was to interfere or obstruct the army and local security departments in fulfilling their duties. T’eng warned that such persons or groups, saboteurs and speculators would be dealt with an iron hand. 73

It was indicated that despite subsequent speeches it failed to make much progress; later at a Huhehot rally, the Vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee Wu T’ao stated, “The great victory we have gained may be lost again...we must carry forward the spirit of ‘beating the dogs in the water’ and...eliminate the poison of revisionism and national splittism”. 74

Several weeks later the revolutionary committee issued a warning against sabotage and called for tighter market controls to cut down on speculation. People of various nationalities in the frontier and port areas were asked actively to help the PLA and local public security organs to maintain peace in the frontier areas. Accepting that the great victory may be lost again the revolutionary committee launched a mass campaign to denounce Ulanfu. He was said to have distorted the role of the party in its relationship to the Mongolian people’s revolution in the 1930s and 1940s; to have eulogized Genghis Khan; to have placed undue emphasis on the study of the Mongolian language and cultural heritage in order to divert people’s attention from the study of Mao’s work; and to have believed himself to be superior to Mao, to the extent of wishing to replace the study of Mao’s thoughts with the study of his thoughts. 75


74 Radio Huhehot, 8 November 1967. cited in Dreyer, n. 68. p. 103.

75 Dreyer, n. 2, p. 213.
In November 1967 Ulanfu was accused in an NCNA release that he led the "small handful of those in power", who...opposed Mao Tse-tung's thought and undermined the mass movement of various nationalities to study and apply Chairman Mao's works creatively under the pretext of "putting the question of nationalities to the fore"...[They] put reactionary and counter-revolutionaries in important posts under the pretext of respecting local minorities in selecting cadres.  

Ulanfu is said to have continued to resist the influx of Han into Inner Mongolia, thereby proving that he regarded the question of nationality as of far greater importance than that of class.

Further, he was also said to have designed a plot to reunite Inner and Outer Mongolia as an independent kingdom with himself as the ruler. On the other hand, a group of Mongols, pleading for reversal of his verdict allegedly argued that if Ulanfu was finished the Mongols were also finished, and reports of groups seeking to reinstate him continued to be heard for several years thereafter.

In January 1968 Ulanfu's supporters launched attacks against the government forces and bloody clashes occurred, particularly in Huhehot. The Chinese broadcasts of 21 January named Tai Shih-hou, formerly Deputy Mayor of Huhehot, as the person who directed the attacks against the new Revolutionary Committee. Claiming that he was under the instructions of Ulanfu, his house was raided and TNT, rifles and steel tubes for making guns, were found there.

In January it was reported that "after several days of struggle, the agents of Ulanfu such as Wang I lun, Wang To and Ch'en Pi-li were brought to light. Bad
elements sabotaging the GPCR were exposed and a handful of bad leaders who had wormed their way into the revolutionary ranks were purged. This dealt a telling blow to the special agents of the US, Japan, the Chiang gang and Soviet and Mongolian revisionism, all ghosts and monsters of society, land lords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements, and rightists, who have not been reformed, and the handful of ruffians, bandits, black-mailers, swindlers and speculators disturbing the market. Ammunition, blue prints for manufacturing guns, radio stations, material collected and plans hatched by Ulanfu’s remnant clique for attacking the new red power, badges, seals, name lists of the counter-revolutionary organisation, incriminating funds, and goods obtained through illegal profiteering and speculation were also seized”.

Attempts to topple the Revolutionary Committee in Inner Mongolia continued in February, despite Ulanfu being captured and put behind bars and his predecessor, prince Te, head of the Inner Mongolian government during Japan’s occupation, was once again put under house arrest. On the other hand, the anti-Maoist forces involved in this fighting called, “unending civil war” by Peking itself, styled themselves as “Genghis Khan combat Squards,” organised to support Ulanfu; a name reflecting Mongol nationalism. During the same time the new Revolutionary Committee attacked Ulanfu and his supporters and engaged in a propaganda campaign, to identify with all of the nationalities in Inner Mongolia.

Inner Mongolian newspapers carried stories about the welcome the PLA troops received from Mongol peasants. One account, for example, pointed out the gratitude of Mongol herdsmen to the troops of the PLA for teaching them to sing “The East is Red”, in Chinese. Another account claimed that Mongol peasants carved “Long Live Chairman Mao” on their pumpkins, and yet another told of a

---

82 Cited from Hyer and Heaton, n. 25, p. 125.
84 Ibid.
blind Mongol herdsman who required all visitors, prior to entering his tent, to render a quotation from Chairman Mao so that he might ascertain whether or not they were true friends. In fact, all these reveal that the new revolutionary committee was concerned with its image and equal efforts were made to glorify PLA in Inner Mongolia, but opposition to the Revolutionary Committee continued.

In March 1968, the Revolutionary Committee launched a large scale clean up campaign against the followers of Ulanfu. Throughout China party-building has been the major task during 1968, but, as elsewhere there was the knotty problem of reconciling "new rebels" and "old cadres" and for getting local support for Teng Hai-ch'ing and the new establishment appointed by Peking. The fact that this was not going smoothly was confirmed by Inner Mongolian radio broadcasts monitored in Tokyo and Taipei denouncing attempts to undermine the Revolutionary Committee.

In sum, it is worthy of note that there were no reports of organized Mongol participation in the events of the 'Cultural Revolution.' Their resistance was confined to the ad hoc attempts to defend their property, persons and customs from the attacks of zealots. Most of the reports concerning the fighting came from the capital Huhehot and some other large cities where the Mongols are a small and generally well assimilated minority.

It could be said that the effects, on Inner Mongolians, of the 'Cultural Revolution' were definite. It was said that 'Cultural Revolution' in the region had claimed more lives among the Mongols than the massacres of the famed "slayer of Mongols" (a famous Han General) of Ming dynasty. As per the indictment against the Gang of Four, 34,600 persons in Inner Mongolia were wrongfully accused and persecuted under the pretext of having formed a so-called Revolutionary People's

85 Ibid.


87 Dreyer, n. 2, p. 213.
Party of Inner Mongolia" These persecutions claimed 16,222 lives.\textsuperscript{88} Because this fictitious party was theoretically pursuing separatist goals, allegedly led by Ulanfu, and because the "unity between the nationalities had been undermined" by this affair, those persecuted might have almost exclusively been Mongols.\textsuperscript{89}

Further, if the Mongolian population in the region was 1.45 million in 1965, then more than 20 per cent of the Mongolian population there was persecuted in connection with this affair, and more than 1 per cent killed. In addition to this, the area of the region was reduced by nearly half in 1969 and 1970 under the guise that it was necessary as a security measure vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{90}

To conclude, it can be said that the protected position given to the Mongolian language and culture by previous party policies constituted one of the main basis for radical attacks during the 'Cultural Revolution.' Reports indicated that there was continuous existence of ethnic group sentiments; but these sentiments were not as strong to enable the formation of Mongol groups which were willing to fight for the retention of this protected position or for more Mongol representation in positions of power. The party must be given the credit for having made progress in its efforts towards integration, for this relative passivity would have been unthinkable soon after the liberation.

Nevertheless, the victory was only partial. The 'Cultural Revolution' in Inner Mongolia centered in and around urban areas where ethnic ties were weak and was also limited in the frontier pasturelands where they were strong. However, ethnic animosities, of minor import, in comparatively isolated and sparsely populated areas, became exacerbated by the proximity of urban living. But this was not the case in Inner Mongolia, for Mongols are a small fraction of the population

\textsuperscript{88} Renmin Ribao. 21 November 1980, in German Beijing Rundschau 48(190).

\textsuperscript{89} Quoted from Herbercr. n. 11, p. 27.

\textsuperscript{90} Herbercr. n. 11, p. 27.

\textsuperscript{91} Ibid., p. 28.
of the major urban areas and many of them do, in fact, seem to have been well assimilated.

**KANSU PROVINCE: 1966-69**

**GEOGRAPHY**

Kansu derives its name from the old names of two of the most important market towns on the classical 'silk route'—now called the ‘emperor’s route.’ The towns—Kanchow, now Changyeh, and Suchow, now Kiuchuan. Kansu is one of the classic Chinese provinces, which formed part of Chinese state territory since ancient times. Kansu is also known as Gansu in *P’ìn-yìn*. Administratively Kansu is a part of northwest region and stretches up to the center of People’s Republic of China. It shares border with the Mongolian People’s Republic in the north, with the Chinese province of Ch’inghai and Szechwan in the south, with the Hui Autonomous Region of Ningsia, the province of Shensi and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region in the east and with the Uighur Autonomous Region of Sinkiang in the west.

Kansu is located at a strategic point where it links China proper with that of extreme west. It has a long corridor and has acted as a passage between the upper Huang Ho (Yellow River) area and the Chinese Turkistan. Kansu covers an area of 454,000 square kilometers. Lanchow, situated on the southern bank of the Huang Ho, is its capital.

**PEOPLE**

The Han constitute the main racial group in Kansu, others are the Mongols, the Turks (Salars and Sarig Uighurs) and the Tibetans. The Mongols live to the west of Lanchow and the Tibetans are scattered over an area which is

---

encircled by the Chuang-lang Ho, Ta-t'ung Ho and Huang Ho. The Han majority follow religious practices such as Buddhism. The Hui is the most important minority community in Kansu. They live mostly in north and west, of whom some have Arab and Mongol origin. A few Muslims are converted Chinese. The Hui minority includes both Sunni and Shia traditions and the Sunni's follow more of traditional Islamic interpretation but the Shia's do not recognise hereditary religious leadership. The Tibetans and Mongols follow Tibetan Buddhism and every Tibetan family has at least one son in the Buddhist monastery.

Most of the minority groups in Kansu speak Chinese as a second language, except for the Mongols who rarely speak a second language. The Hui employ both the Chinese and the Arabic scripts though Arabic is usually used only for religious purposes. The rural life among the Han inhabitants is more or less similar to that of those of North China. But in the Hui village the religious and communal life style is distinctly different. There are small public buildings that serve as mosques, where children gather regularly to receive religious instruction and learn the alphabet and phonetics.

It is worthy of note that the Hui villages are more organised and possess more community spirit than Han villages. Nevertheless the two communities have been mutually segregated. Tibetan villages are, in many respects, similar to those of Han villages. Some Tibetans do not have well defined clan organisation and their family ties are much looser than among the Han. Their village dwellings are huts made of mud. Some live in caves with fine furnishings or simply scooped. And brick structures predominate in cities and towns. The Tibetans in this region eat coarse grains and wheat flour, rather than rice as consumed in other parts of China.
MINORITY POPULATION

The minority population in Kansu according to 1982 census was 1,548,975 or 7.9 per cent of the total of the region. The most populous minorities were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minority Nationalities</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hui</td>
<td>950,974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tibetans</td>
<td>304,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dongxiang</td>
<td>237,858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu</td>
<td>12,567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugurs</td>
<td>10,227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchus</td>
<td>8,499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonan</td>
<td>8,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongols</td>
<td>6,226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salar</td>
<td>5,116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhs</td>
<td>2,367</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CULTURAL LIFE

The people of Kansu represent a mixture of races, customs and cultures. Kansu also has a number of monasteries, mosques and Chinese temples. The people of Kansu, particularly Han villagers, observe rituals like worshipping ancestors, seasonal celebrations like the New Year, Aragon Boat festival, Moon Festival, and customs relating to birth, marriage, funerals and burials. It is worthy of note that all these activities are similar to Han throughout the nation.

On the other hand, the Mongols and Tibetans have abandoned their nomadic way of life and now lead a settled life in villages. They live in brick and mud dwellings which resemble their former tents. Tibetans insist on simultaneous group action in the villages. For example, when the first day of spring planting is divided by the horoscope the villagers go to the fields in their best clothing and plough simultaneously, while seeds are sown at the same time in each field. And if it is

92 Mackerras and Yorke. n.1. p. 208.
during the course of the growing season, the villagers parade through the fields carrying holy books periodically on their heads.

The Hui are faithful followers of Islam and observe the month-long fast of Ramadan. During this month they abstain from food, drink and sexual intercourse between sunrise and sunset. Before sunset religious men say their prayers in public and one of the elders preaches points of theology by quoting the Quran in Arabic. At night community feast is organised for dinner. Community fires blaze all night and people call and shout to one another. Among the Hui, the Hajis, those who have completed the pilgrimage to Mecca, are highly respected.

The western part of Kansu is renowned for its ancient and classic artistic works. To mention a few, the stone caves in Tun-huang have many kinds of religious paintings on their walls which belonged to T'ang dynasty\(^4\) (618-907 AD). In Wu-wei large number of writings on bamboo slips have been found at the sites of old frontiers of the Han Empire (206BC-220AD). During mid-60s a bamboo text consisting of a large part of classic works on ritual the ‘Ili’ was found in the excavations at western Kansu.

GOVERNMENT

From 1949 to 1954 Kansu was under the control of Northwest Military Affairs Commission. Provincial and northwest regional authorities were composed of leading soldiers from the army units who have occupied the area in 1949, local supporters of the party and local elite. And since 1954 Kansu directly came under the control of the Peking government. The capital of Kansu, Lanchow, remained the headquarters for provincial government and regional military.

In Kansu there are three municipalities (shih), namely: Chia-yu-kuan, the western part of Great Wall and Chin-ch’ang in the central sector of Kansu.

\(^4\) Myrdal, n. 91, pp. 236-37.
Besides this there are eight prefectures (ti-ch’u) which act as intermediate administrative divisions and two autonomous prefectures (tzu-chih-chou) namely the Lin-hsia-hui-tsu Autonomous prefecture\(^{95}\) inhabited by Hui and the Kan-nan-tsang-tsu Autonomous prefecture inhabited by Tibetans.\(^{96}\) At the third level of administration, the province is further divided into counties (hsien), autonomous counties (tzu-chih hsien) and municipalities (shih) under county jurisdiction.\(^{97}\)

**CULTURAL REVOLUTION**

At the beginning of the ‘Cultural Revolution’ Wang Feng was in power in the region. In addition to his position as First Secretary of the Kansu Provincial Committee, Wang Feng was Vice-Chairman of the Nationalities Affairs Commission and Secretary of the North-west China Regional Bureau. Wang was an experienced administrator who had served for a considerable time in Kansu, a place quite remote from Peking.

Be that as it may, Wang Feng was reported to have been repudiated by the masses, for he resisted the ‘Cultural Revolution’ and ventured to sabotage the movement to study Chairman Mao Tse-tung’s works.\(^{98}\) Besides being removed from the post of Vice-Chairman of the Nationalities Affairs Commission, Wang was labeled as “China’s Khrushev’s agent in Kansu”. But he was not criticised for his attitude towards minorities as such.\(^{99}\) This is in spite of the fact that Wang, as a major spokesman on the minorities policy, had long been associated with the


\(^{98}\) SCMP, no. 4057, 7 November 1967.

“gradualist” approach, now numbered among the “towering crimes” of Liu Shao-ch'i and his henchmen.\textsuperscript{100} This makes him unique among those engaged in minorities work who have been criticised. Alongside, Chao Yung-fu, formerly deputy commander of Ch’inghai provincial military district, was executed for having brutally suppressed the Red Guards and leftist rebels during the first stage of ‘Cultural Revolution.’\textsuperscript{101} Coming to the other aspects of ‘Cultural Revolution’, like in Ch’inghai, unlike in Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet, the minority population in Kansu is very less. Further, the minorities in the region experienced similar fate with respect to their cultural aspects when compared to other minorities in Chinese Central Asia.

The minorities in the region were denounced, mainly the ultra-left forces, saying that China was a multinational country and that nationality issue was settled and that the nationality policy was no longer needed.\textsuperscript{102} The traditional products for the minorities were no longer produced or grown, and the cultural traditions were denied through such pronouncements as: they should live in houses instead of tents, wear normal clothes instead of their costumes, pigtails instead of turbans.\textsuperscript{103} The minorities’ customs in Kansu were condemned as backward and were termed as Four Olds. The traditional holidays of the minorities were forbidden and those who celebrated them were not allowed to wear their national costumes, and in many places the minorities were forced to abandon their religious traditions.

The Red Guards permitted the use of written scripts of Mongolian, Tibetan and Kazakh but restricted their use.\textsuperscript{104} All most all the educational institutions for the minorities were disbanded, and any institution that functioned taught only in

\textsuperscript{100} Wang’s editorial in Min-ts’u T’uan-chieh, nos. 10-11. 1961, pp. 2-8. quoted from Dreyer. n. 75. p. 106.


\textsuperscript{102} NCNA. 29 January 1978 and also see Remin Ribao 3 October. 1978. quoted from Heberer. n. 11. p. 25.

\textsuperscript{103} Minzu Yanjiu 6. 1980: 6-7 Quoted from Heberer. n. 11, p. 25.

Han—and not in the local language. Further, the minority cadres were designated as "culturally inferior" and sinister pullers of the strings of the tribal chieftains. They were said to lack proficiency, to have difficulty in organizing activities. Many a time minority cadres were replaced by Han cadres and their training and advanced education were discontinued.\footnote{Renmin Ribao, 3 October, 1978, 28 August, 1978, quoted from Heberer, n. 11, p. 27.}

Minority songs, dance, films, folk songs and the like were called feudal, capitalist, revisionist, poisonous weeds; most of the time they were prohibited or experimentally cleansed, with a view to making them adapt Han taste. The traditional songs of the Hui, Tibetans, and the Mongols were also prohibited.\footnote{Minzu Tuanjie 1(1980):41, quoted from Herberer, n. 11, p. 27.} The Red Guards, in order to fight against the bad old customs, destroyed the ancient cultural relics and classic artistic works at Tun-huang.\footnote{Myrdal, n. 91, pp. 236-37.}

Like in Ch’inghai, on the orders from the revolutionary students, a number of book shops that sold political literature and fiction have been closed or were destroyed\footnote{SWB/FEI/2250/A3/1, 30 August 1966.} and publication of provincial newspapers and magazines have ceased.\footnote{S WB/FEI/2322/A3/1, 2 December 1966.} The Beijing government directed the province to print its own Mao’s collections in pamphlets.\footnote{Union Research Service, vol. 44, no. 17, 26 August, 1966, and also see Peking Review, no. 33, 12 August, 1966, p. 13.} In addition to official propaganda the ideas of Mao were championed by the Red Guards. They demanded that the portraits of Mao should be put in all the offices, backyards and in living rooms. Further, the red flags with quotations from Mao were attached to all the cars and bicycles. The people were forced to pin badges with the image of Mao or tabs with his quotations to their clothes, and the Red Guards demanded the bus passengers and cinema audience to learn Mao’s quotations by heart.\footnote{S WB/FEI/A3/16, 2 December 1966.} Similar events in a similar vein were done at the
stadiums during sports events. The Red Guards were to salute each other by holding up booklets of Mao with his saying. On the other hand, factional fighting precipitated, and violent clashes occurred in December 1966 between Red Guards and workers who represented party committees and local government bodies in Lanchow.\footnote{SWB/FE/A3/16. 7 December 1966.} But the army units stationed in Kansu did not show any positive response to the Maoist call for supporting the left.

Further, the Deputy commander of the Lanchow Military Area, General Yang Chia-Jui, expelled the revolutionary rebels by force when they took control of the provincial newspaper.\footnote{Asahi Shim bun. 27 April 1967. quoted from Domes. n. 17. p. 125.} Now to re-establish the coordination of local military policy with the Centre, the commander of the military area, General Chang Ta-Chih, and the area's First Political Commissar, Hsien Heng-han, met Chang and Hsien in Peking, which resulted in giving a freehand to the local military leaders while dealing with the competing groups of revolutionary rebels in Kansu. Finally, the army combined the four rebel groups to form the Third Headquarters of the Kansu Red Rebels, and with consent of the Centre, the PLA men supported the Third Headquarters, and formed a preparatory team with the PLA garrison as its center.\footnote{Domes. n. 16. p. 125.} Finally, order was established and the Revolutionary Committee was formed and Hsien Heng-han was made the Chairman. There was only one revolutionary cadre, one representative from the mass organisations on the standing committee and out of 11 members, nine were military men\footnote{NCNA. 24 January 1968, quoted from Domes. n. 16. p.125; and for details of members see China News Summary, n. 68. p. 17.}
SINKIANG UIGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION (SUAR): 1966-69

GEOGRAPHY

Sinkiang was called Hsi Yueh (meaning countries bordering western China) in ancient time. The area formally became a province of China during the late Ching dynasty and hence was named Sinkiang, a new territory. It was renamed as Uighur Autonomous Region after the Communist government seized power.

The Uighur Autonomous Region of Sinkiang (Xinjiang) in P' in-yin is located at the northwestern corner of the People's Republic of China. It shares its border with the Mongolian People's Republic in the northeast, Russia in the northeast, Afghanistan and Jammu and Kashmir in the southwest, the Tibetan Autonomous Region in the southeast and the Chinese provinces of Ch'inghai and Kansu in the east. Sinkiang is the largest political unit of China and it occupies about 1,600,000 square kilometers or one-sixth land area in China.

The population of Sinkiang is composed of various ethnic groups out of which Uighur is the largest. The capital city of Sinkiang is (Wu-lu-mu-ch'i) Urumchi when Sogdia. Sinkiang came under the Chinese rule in the 3rd century B.C. Ever since, the Chinese name Sinkiang was applied to this area. This region was known as Chinese Turkistan to the westerners so that it could be distinguished from the Russian Turkistan.

PEOPLE

Sinkiang is inhabited by more than 40 different national minorities which also includes Han. The largest minority nationals are the Uighur. The Han and the

---


other major ethnic groups include the Mongols and Khalkha, Hui, Kazakh, Uzbek, Tungusic speaking Manchu and Sibos, Tadzhik, Tatars, Russians and Tahurs. In fact, prior to 1949, 94 per cent of the region’s population was Muslim and non-Han. By and large the Han migration altered the pattern of population distribution and ethnic composition in the region. In 1953 three-fourths of the population lived south of the mountains in the Tarim Basin but the change occurred when the Han influx was directed mainly to the Dzungarian Basin because of its potential resources.

The Kazakh, the third largest minority group, are nomadic herdsmen in the steppes of the Dzungarian Basin and are especially concentrated in the upper Ili valley. There are two major language groups in the region, besides Chinese. The Mongols speak languages of the Mongolian branch of the Altaic group. The Uighur, Kazakh and Uzbek speak the Turkic branch of the Altaic group. The Tadzhik by and large belong to the Iranian branch of the Indo-European language group. And in terms of script, the Mongolian, Uighur and Kazakh are written languages used in day to day life. Mongolian has its own script whereas Uighur and Kazakh are written in Arabic script. Further, in terms of religion, the largest Muslim groups in China are the Uighur and the Hui, while the Kazakh and Tadzhik also follow Islam, whereas the Mongols are adherents of Buddhism.

MINORITY POPULATION

The minority population in Sinkiang according to 1982 census was 7,795,148 or 59.6 per cent of the total population of the region. The most populous minorities were:

- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- Ibid., p. 1261.
- Mackerras and Yorke, n. 1, p. 207.
### Minority Nationalities Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minority Nationalities</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uighur</td>
<td>5,949,661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhs</td>
<td>903,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hui</td>
<td>570,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongols</td>
<td>117,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirghiz</td>
<td>112,979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sibe</td>
<td>27,364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajiks</td>
<td>26,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbeks</td>
<td>12,433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchus</td>
<td>9,137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daur</td>
<td>4,369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatars</td>
<td>4,106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**CULTURAL LIFE**

The indigenous people of Sinkiang exhibit their own cultures. The dominant are farmers and their social organisation is centered upon the village and many of the important Uighur cultural forms are rooted in Islam.\(^{125}\) Though the Beijing government tried to popularize Chinese, spoken Uighur dominates. As of now despite many socio-religious upheavals there are many mosques and a new training academy for clergy. The traditional Uighur arts emphasises ancient songs and dances accompanied by traditional instrumental groups. Professional troupes are dominated by Uighur balladeers and dancers, although administrative duties are often performed by Han troupe members.

Besides the Uighur, Kazakh are the pastoralists who are related to the people of the Kazakh of Soviet Central Asia.\(^{126}\) They migrate seasonally in search of pasture lands and live in a kind of dome-shaped portable tents, which are known as *yurts* and horses are kept for the sake of prestige. The basic social unit is the extended family and political organisation extends through a hierarchy of chiefs; though there is a concept of national origin, the chiefs are seldom united. The Mongols are also pastoralists who live in *yurts* but definitely more organised when compared to the Kazakh. The basic social unit is the nuclear family. There is an


\(^{126}\) *Ibid.*
established political level or hierarchy of groups and the smallest is a group of several households known as a bag. Though the national power is fragmented, the average person owes allegiance to nobles (taiji) and princes (wang).

GOVERNMENT

The administrative structure of Sinkiang reflects the policies of recognition of national minorities and self determination. Local leaders are appointed to governmental positions in the region. The Uighur Autonomous Region of Sinkiang is divided on the sub-provincial level into three types of administrative units. There are three municipalities (shih) under direct regional administration, five autonomous prefectures (tzu-chih-chou), and seven prefectures (ti-ch’u). The region is further divided into countries (hsien) and autonomous countries (tzu-chih-hsien).

CULTURAL REVOLUTION

‘Cultural Revolution’ in Sinkiang began a month later than in Inner Mongolia, in September, when four hundred Red Guards arrived in the region’s capital, Urumchi, with a view to exchanging revolutionary experiences and destroying the said ‘Four Olds.’ During the initial years, however, the attack on the ‘four olds’ by Red Guards in the minority regions has been drastic and far-reaching. The Red Guards quickly tore down the mosques in most of the major cities. To further discredit religion, they forced believers to raise and eat pigs. Of the written scripts only Mongolian, Kazakh and Uighur were allowed but even their use was restricted. The policy of national regional autonomy was condemned as creating independent regions and dividing the nation. Minority songs, dances, films, folksongs, operas and the like were called feudal, capitalist, revisionist, poisonous weeds. As far as literature was concerned, no minority dared to write

127 For details see Information China: The Comprehensive and Authoritative Reference Source Of New China, n.19, pp. 1280-81; and also see Myrdal n. 91. p. 41.
anything during the ‘Cultural Revolution’; most of the writings were banned. Further, the Red Guards closed down mosques, prohibited Muslims from holding services or observing their religious festivals, obstructed the people’s traditional celebrations, forced them to cremate the dead and even burned their national historical books, including Islamic scriptures.

Taking advantage of the situation, Han youth, who were settled in Sinkiang against their wishes in the pre-GPCR years, fled to the coastal cities on the plea to exchange revolutionary experience. Wang En-mao was for sometime successful in his position perhaps, ironically, because of attacks by Soviet Union. It would seen plausible for Wang to argue that any disruptions caused by the ‘Cultural Revolution’ in Sinkiang would simply play into the hands of the arch-revisionists across the border. There was also a question of protecting Karama, one of the China’s chief domestic sources of oil and her nuclear installation site at Lop Nor.

But true to the word, headquarters began to be bombarded by the young activists. Sinkiang came to be branded as a “revisionist independent kingdom” and thus, radical Red Guards made persistent efforts to dislodge Wang En-mao’s entrenched leadership. During the same period Peking wall posters soon began to complain that the Eleventh Plenum’s decision on Great Proletarian ‘Cultural Revolution’ was not being implemented in Sinkiang and the nationalist, religious, and counter-revolutionary elements were opposing it. The First Party Secretary,

130 Nei Menggu Shehui Kexue 1(1982):8 quoted from Ibid., p. 27.
133 Dreyer, n. 72, p. 107.
136 Belgrade Rate, 6 October, 1966, quoted from Dreyer, n. 2, p. 214.
Wang En-mao, did not bother to keep the disorder under control. With the result, numerous Red Guard and wall newspapers might have accused him for suppressing the revolution.

Coming to the radical organisations, the Sinkiang Red Second Headquarter came to the forefront. The same organisation’s journal claimed that Chou En-lai had certified the revolutionary credentials of the group.¹³⁷ In Sinkiang region the group was supported by the No. 7335 unit of the PLA, though the group was sent to Sinkiang by the Peking radical leaders. On the other hand, the conservative Red First Headquarters was backed by the August First Field Army.¹³⁸ Wang En-mao was targeted by the radical leftist groups, which alleged that he was supporting their rival, the conservative Red First Headquarters.

The Sinkiang Red Second Headquarters and the Red First Headquarters clashed at Shih-ho-tzu, in January 1967, which resulted in the death of a hundred and left five hundred injured and also caused the defeat of the leftists. Later the leftists claimed that Wang En-mao was responsible for their defeat¹³⁹ and claimed revenge for the same, which later came to be known as the ‘January 26 incident.’ Fortunately, Wang En-mao was at Peking at that time, probably discussing the Shih-ho-tzu clashes with the authorities to quell the disorder. Finally, on January 28, the Central Committee’s military commission, referring Sinkiang, authorised the border area military regions to postpone the ‘Cultural Revolution’ for the time being.¹⁴⁰

Later, following the joint directives of the Central Committee’s military commission and the State Council, the production and construction corps in Sinkiang carried out its ‘Cultural Revolution’ under military control. At the same


¹³⁸ Ibid., pp. 1-2.

¹³⁹ For details see Current Background, no. 853, pp. 5-8.

¹⁴⁰ For details of the directives see Current Background, no. 852, pp. 54-55.
time, to enable war preparations, the members of the production and construction corps were prohibited from participating in the "four bigs", namely: 'big airing', 'big blossoming', 'big debate', and 'big character posters.'\textsuperscript{141} Besides, several restrictions were placed on power seizures, while people who possessed stolen arms and ammunition were branded as counter-revolutionary and arrested.\textsuperscript{142}

Besides, a Peking Red Guard poster reported that the Central Committee had authorised the indefinite suspension of the 'Cultural Revolution' in the whole of Sinkiang. On the other hand, Wang En-mao's mission was a success and he returned to Urumchi. Nevertheless, Wang's victory had been achieved during the country-wide "adverse current" of conservatism.\textsuperscript{143} The developments in April took a new turn. The Chiang Ch'ing faction in Peking ascended further, which encouraged the radicals and a fresh fighting began.

Shih-ho-tzu, a new town, chiefly composed of members of Sinkiang Production and Construction corps and the Tu-shan-tzu oil fields, started experiencing constant disruptions. The rebels referred to Shih-ho-tzu as an "old den of the conservative August First Field Army" and described in bloody detail the fate of the rebels at that place.\textsuperscript{144} At this juncture, it is to be noted that in an "Urgent Notice of the CCP's Central Committee and the State Council on the Need for Workers Aiding construction in the Hinterland and Frontier land to Participate in the Great Proletarian 'Cultural Revolution' in Their Own Localities,"\textsuperscript{145} in February 1967, some persons were sent to Sinkiang region, but the same absconded from their entrusted duties. In this state of affairs repeated calls were made for persons who were sent to Sinkiang to return. This indicates that the absconders too posed serious problem.

\textsuperscript{141} Dreyer. n. 2, p. 215.
\textsuperscript{142} For details of the regulations see Current Background, n. 139, pp. 68-70.
\textsuperscript{143} Dreyer. n. 2, p. 215.
\textsuperscript{144} For a detailed description of Shih-ho-tzu see Current Background, no. 855, pp. 5-8.
\textsuperscript{145} For details of the notice see Current Background, no. 852, p. 85.
Reports from radical publications stated that the severity of the events in Sinkiang had made Chou En-lai to show personal interest in the situation and also stated that the Urumchi-Lanchow railway line, Sinkiang’s chief link with the mainland, had been cut off. Meanwhile, PLA unit 7335 and August First Field Army supported groups, in November 1967 which resulted in Wang En-mao reporting back to Peking. On the other hand, the leftist publications claimed that Wang had been dragged back and that they had been assured by the members of the Central Cultural Revolution Group that his political demise was in the offing. But Wang’s social position was high enough in the eyes of Mao.

At Peking Wang En-mao was said to have argued that the disturbances of the ‘Cultural Revolution’ would encourage rebellion and might even lead to a war with the Soviet Union. Later, there were continuous rumors that he had threatened to capture China’s nuclear installations in Lop Nor if his demands were not complied with. However, Wang failed to keep the ‘Cultural Revolution’ out as at maintaining his position. Be that as it may, later, Wang disappeared from the sight for a couple of months after his trip to Peking, but attacks on him continued. Wang was charged with revisionism in nationalities policy. Wang, a Han, was not accused to the same degree of local nationalism as it was with the case of Ulanfu, but he was said to have pandered to counter revolutionary nationalist interests, therefore to be guilty by association.

Apart from Wang En-mao, Imonov, Uighur Vice-Chairman of the regional people’s congress, and Burhan, a Tatar, who was the ex-Governor of Sinkiang,
were denounced as 'local nationalists', national splittists and traitors who linked up with foreign countries from within.\textsuperscript{151}

Now, one should not lose sight of China's immediate communist neighbour, the Soviet Union. The Soviet intervention of Czechoslovakia and a series of Sino-Soviet border clashes, along the Ussuri River and in Sinkiang, during this period, strengthened Beijing's apprehensions regarding the Soviet's propensity to fish in troubled waters. On the other hand, the strategic importance and rich mineral resources of Sinkiang have been the two major factors for Moscow's plot against the area, because the control of the area would not only have facilitated Soviet expansion southward into the Neareast, but also would have meant possession of the third largest uranium deposits in the world.\textsuperscript{152} Further, Moscow's subversive activities, then, included promotion of the movement for an "East Turkestan Republic" in 1940-44 and the movement to establish "East Turkestan", "Uighur" and Ili Kazakh republics in 1954-58,\textsuperscript{153} resulting in the deterioration in the USSR's relations with Beijing. In 1960, the Russians retreated for a while but have never abandoned their plans for the area.

In 1962 they again engineered a movement for an "East Turkestan Republic" in Ili and Tahcheng, which the Chinese quelled and the main force of the insurgents fled to Kazakhstan, they totalled over 100,000. During their hunt for escapees the Chinese constantly clashed with Soviet troops on the border. Put together, official Moscow sources and refugee sources, in East Turkestan, there were 5,000 incidents on the Sinkiang border.\textsuperscript{154} To enhance the tempo of infiltration the Soviets established, in Alma Ata, the headquarters for supporting the Independent Movement of Nationalities in Sinkiang. They also set up broadcasting stations to carryout

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid., 5 September, 1968, quoted from Dreyer, n. 2, p. 216.


\textsuperscript{153} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{154} Ibid., p. 15.
psychological warfare against the Chinese, reinforced their military strength in the Far East and trained youth to cope with Chinese communist provocation's during the 'Cultural Revolution.' True to the word, the Soviet Union’s Tashkent Radio, stepping up its Uighur language broadcasts, itemised Red Guards’ attacks on Uighur cultural centers and mourned the burning of Uighur books and works of art. Further, it claimed that almost all the important positions in administration and party in the minority areas were held by Han, that clerical work was done only in Chinese, and that even in elementary schools, minority languages were now used only in the earliest years.\footnote{Radio Tashkent, 19 October, 1967, quoted from Dreyer. n. 72, p. 107.}

The Moscow government utilised the opportunity to the possible extent. An article in Izvestiya commented that during the past few years Hung Chi (Red Flag) had stated several times that the ultimate goal of China’s nationalities policy was "the complete liquidation of national characteristics and distinctions", and concluded that "the Maoists, openly challenging Marxism-Leninism in this field, too, have declared as their goal the assimilation of the non-Han peoples.\footnote{A. Dymkov, “Peking Chauvinists” Izvestiya, April 1967, p. 3, cited in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. 19, no. 13, p. 21.}" Talks about the development of Uighur culture in Soviet Union began and interviews were held with refugees from China describing their harrowing experiences. A similar pattern was also employed for Kirghiz and Tadzhik listeners.

Peking accused the Soviet Union of deliberately trying to forment dissension among various minorities in China. Radio Urumchi gave indirect confirmation of the turmoil in minority areas by warning against the "wreching activities and bloody incidents," perpetrated by "local nationalists," colluding with "rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements and rightists in the countryside", and "ultra reactionary Muslim leaders in religious circles."\footnote{Radio Urumchi, 11 February 1967, quoted from Ibid.} Further, the Red Guards’ newspaper quoted Chou En-lai as saying, "Soviet revisionists were not to be given
a chance to lead the people astray."\textsuperscript{158} Besides, the government evacuated residents living within 12 to 18 miles of the border and increased border patrol. They set up radio broadcasting stations beaming messages to Central Asia inciting the Russians to rise against their government.\textsuperscript{159}

On the other hand, it was alleged that Wang En-mao was offering special treatment to minorities but there were no reports of his being defended by his minority constituents. In 1967 it was said that there was savage fighting between separatists, Uighur nationalists and the PLA. Referring to this, a native of the Ining said that the cause for the revolt was the earlier attempts during ‘Cultural Revolution’ at suppressing Islam. Finally, the death of separatist leader Meejit saw the end of the uprising.

The hardest hit during this tumultuous period was the nationalities work. A Red Guard paper, in 1967, inveighed against the policy of moderation pursued by the United Front Work Department (UFWD). Minority languages in the region were vilified as backward, and literary works on themes about the minorities were labeled as big poisonous weeds of feudalism, capitalism and revisionism.\textsuperscript{160} Further, ethnic peculiarities and minority problems were denied under the pretext that under socialism there were no such things as minorities. Consequently, the nationalities work units in the local levels, along with the central organisations, were shut down.

On April 30, 1968, an affiliated group of Red Second Head quarters ransacked the residence of Uighur governor Saifudin, and Bushan Shahidi was denounced as one of the party members who took the capitalist road.\textsuperscript{161} Displeased, Chou En-lai, with a view to checking such acts in the future, issued an official

\textsuperscript{158} \textit{Ceteka}, 1 March 1967, quoted from Dreyer, n. 72, p. 108.

\textsuperscript{159} Tsao Ching, n. 152, p. 15.

\textsuperscript{160} The Uighur in Sinkiang--Part II, \textit{China News Analysis} (Hong Kong), no. 1052, 3 September, 1976, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{161} \textit{SCMP}, 12 September 1968, no. 4256, p. 17.
directive with immediate effect. \(^{162}\) Accordingly, whatever was taken away had to be returned immediately and those who failed to comply were branded as anti-Maoist. \(^{163}\) Additionally, efforts were made to send rusticated youth, who had returned to places like Shanghai, back to Sinkiang and non-compliance was considered an act of anti-Maoist stance. \(^{164}\) On the other hand, Wang En-mao attended the May Day celebrations in Peking but the imminent possibility of his fall from power was round the corner, which finally saw his political debacle soon after the formation of the revolutionary committee of Sinkiang.

The revolutionary committee of Sinkiang was finally formed on 5 September, \(^{165}\) but, unlike, other provincial level areas, was formed without prior preparatory committees. The revolutionary committee was chaired by Lung Shuchin, a military man and a newcomer to Sinkiang. Lung was a protege of Lin Piao \(^{166}\) and was a member of the latter’s Fourth Field Army. \(^{167}\) Lung assumed the office of the commander of Sinkiang Military District in the place of Wang En-mao and the latter, who was associated with the First Field Army, \(^{168}\) was demoted to the level of a vice-Chairman of the revolutionary committee. Along with Wang, Saifudin was also named as a Vice-chairman.

The second plenum of Sinkiang revolutionary committee, held in December 1968, criticized Wang En-mao, without actually naming him, as actively promoting Liu Shao-ch’i’s counter-revolutionary line during the course of the great social revolution and construction and also in the fields of culture, nationality relations, and


\(^{163}\) Ibid.

\(^{164}\) *Wen-hui Pao* (Shanghai), 26 May in *SCMP*, no. 4207, pp. 16-17.

\(^{165}\) *China News Summary*, n. 68, p. 45.

\(^{166}\) *Current Scene* (Hong Kong). vol. 7. no. 5. 19 March 1969. p. 11.


\(^{168}\) Ibid., p. 118.
religion and the united front,\textsuperscript{169} which further deteriorated Wang's position in the region.

In Sinkiang, among all issues, the major focus of criticism during the 'Cultural Revolution' was on nationalities affairs. On the other hand, the radical groups were much bothered about the attitudes of the leaders in the top echelons of power towards the execution of nationalities policy, instead of showing concern with the nationalities themselves. Fighting between various factions were almost confined only to the Han and there was no incident of mass exodus of minorities towards the Soviet Union, as it has happened during 1962, when thousands of them have fled.

\textbf{TIBETAN AUTONOMOUS REGION(TAR):1966-69}

\textbf{GEOGRAPHY}

Tibet is an autonomous region of China. It is often referred to as the roof of the world, a lofty country, the source of great rivers, the center of snow mountains, a pure land, the hidden land, secret Tibet and a strange country.\textsuperscript{170} Tibet occupies 1,228,400 square kilometers of plateaus and mountains of Central Asia, including Mount Everest. Tibet covers 12.5 per cent of the area of People's Republic of China (PRC) but is home to only under 0.002 per cent of PRC's population. Tibet shares borders with Szechwan province towards the east, Yunnan province towards the southwest, Ch'inghai province towards the northeast, Uighur Autonomous Region of Sinkiang towards the northwest, the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir towards the west and India, Nepal, Bhutan towards the south.

\textsuperscript{169} Radio Urumchi, 28 December, 1969. quoted from Dreyer. n. 2. p. 217.

\textsuperscript{170} Christopher I. Beckwith, \textit{The Tibetan Empire in Central Asia: A History of the Struggle for Great Power among Tibetans, Turks, Arabs and Chinese during the Early Middle Ages} (Princeton. 1987) p. 5.
Lhasa, the forbidden city, is its capital. The original home of this vast region was Bod-yul which became Bo-th, To-both, Ti-both and then Tabet and Tibet. Till date the native inhabitants call Bod (Poyul) - the land of snows. It is called (Xizang in P‘in-yin). The name Tibet is derived from the Mongolian Thubet, the Chinese Tufan, the Tai Thibet and the Arabic Tubbat. Before the first half of 20th century Tibet was a unique entity and deliberately chose isolation from the rest of the world. It is a cultural and religious whole, marked by the Tibetan language and Tibetan Buddhism. Tibet lacked adequate communication with other countries and economic development was at the lowest slab. It was only after it was incorporated into China that adequate efforts were made for the development of Tibet. But one should not forget that the incorporation of Tibet into China led to ethnic tensions between Hans and the Tibetans and Tibetans often resisted the imposition of Marxist values.

PEOPLE

The population of the region is almost entirely Tibetan along with Han, Hui, Hu, Moinba and other minority nationalities. A majority of the people have the same ethnic origin, same religion and speak the same language. The spoken Tibetan has developed a pattern of regional dialects and sub-dialects which can be understood mutually. The dialect of Lhasa is used as lingua franca. There are two stratified social levels of speech, namely honorific (Zhe-sa), and ordinary (skad). It is needless to say that their use depends upon the relative social status between the one who speaks and the one who listens. Chinese language has been employed since 1960s.

Tibetan is written in a script derived from Brahmi and Indian Gupta scripts around 600 AD. It has a syllabary of 30 consonants and five vowels; six additional symbols are used in writings Sanskrit words. The Tibetan script itself has four


172 A. Tom Grunfeld, The Making of Modern Tibet (Bombay, 1987), p. 6; and also see Ibid., p. 1.
different variations, namely *dbu-cau*, which is primarily used for Buddhist text books, *dbu-med* and *Khyug-Yig*, used for general purpose, and *bsu-tsha*, which is employed for decorative writings.

MINORITY POPULATION

The minority population in Tibet according to 1982 census was 1800673 or 95.2 per cent of the total population of the region. The principal minority nationalities were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minority Nationalities</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tibetans</td>
<td>1,786,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moinba</td>
<td>6,193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lhoba</td>
<td>2,023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hui</td>
<td>1,788</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RELIGION

Bon is considered to be the first known religion of Tibet. It is a form of Shamanism in which contains belief in gods, demons and ancestral spirits who are responsive to Shamans or priests. With the emergence of Buddhism in Tibet, Bon adopted some of the Buddhist rituals and concepts and in the same way Buddhists also adopted some of the features of Bon. Hence, both religions resemble at many levels. Though Chinese Buddhism came into existence during the ancient period, the mainstream of Buddhist teaching came to Tibet from India. The first Buddhist scripture arrived in 3rd century AD and was promulgated during the 8th century. In later centuries a number of Buddhist sects came up, including the *Dgelugs-pa* sect which emphasised monastic discipline. During the 17th century *Dgelugs-pa* sect also came to be known as Yellow Hats sect and retained political supremacy till 1959.

173 McClellan and Yorke, n. 1, p. 207.
Presently a majority of Tibetans are Buddhists. Before the communists came to power prayer flags flew from every home and monasteries were established throughout the country. There are a small minority who are adherents of Islam, Hinduism, Bon or Christianity.

CULTURE

Tibet is known for its religious scroll paintings, tankas, metal images and wooden block prints. There are three different categories of images which represent the peaceful, moderate and the angry deities. There are three schools of paintings namely, the Smanthang, Gong-dkar Mkhan-bris and the Kar-ma Sgar-bris and are differentiated by their colour tones and depicted facial expressions. The ancient culture of Tibet is based on religion. The gar and the cham are stylistic dances performed by the monks by showing the behavior, attitudes and gestures of the deities. Additionally, ancient legendary tales, historic events, classical solo songs and musical debates are elaborately staged in the open air in the form of operas, operettas and dramas. There are many folk songs and dances of local regions with colour, joy and simplicity. For instance, the bro of the khams region, the sgor-gzhas of the dbus-gtsang peasants and the Kadra of the A-mdo area are spectacles that are performed in groups; during the festivals they are performed for several days.

CUSTOMS

The traditional Tibetan marriage ceremonies involve consultations with both a lama and an astrologer in order to predict the compatibility of a couple. The contract of marriage is followed by an official ceremony at the home of the bridegroom. After a couple is officially wedded the members of the bride’s family hoist prayer flags upon the rooftop of the bridegroom’s house only to symbolise the equality of bride in her new home. Though polygamy was practiced on a limited scale, monogamy is a generally predominant form of marriage.

175 Grunfeld, n.172, p. 18.
If any death occurs in a family, the members of the family make charitable contributions with a hope for a better reincarnation for the deceased. If it is the death of an important religious figure, his body is preserved in a tomb. Otherwise, according to the tradition, the corpse is fed to the vultures as a symbol of charity. On the other hand, the customs of burial and cremation exist, but are seldom practiced. A white scarf (Kha-btags) is offered during death ceremonies, greetings, visits to shrines and marriages. This practice of offering white scarf symbolises purity and has become a custom. And the unique tradition of hoisting of prayer flags on rooftops, tents, hilltops signify fortune and goodluck.

As far as the food habits are concerned, barely flour (rtsam-pa) is their staple diet. Other food items include, wheat flour, yak meat, mutton and pork. Dairy products like butter, milk and cheese are also popular. Those who live in higher attitudes generally consume more meat than those of the lower regions, where a variety of vegetables are available. Besides, rice is generally restricted to the well-to-do families, particularly to monks and farmers of southern border. Tea and barley beer (chang) are common beverages.

The Tibetan festivals are both national and local in character but local celebrations are varied. The first day of the first month of the Tibetan calendar is marked by the New Year celebrations all over Tibet. On this day monasteries, temples, stupas and home chapels are visited at dawn and offerings are made to statues and relics of deities and saints. A special fried cookie known as Kha-zas is prepared in every home. Either a real or an artificial head of a horned sheep adorns the offerings. A colourful container filled with barely flour and wheat grain and another container of chang are given as presents to all the visitors. The visitors in turn take a pinch of the contents and make an offering to the dieties by throwing it in the air.

176 Ibid., p.27.

177 For details of the Festival see Questions and Answers about China's National Minorities, n. 22, pp. 90-91.
The *Smon-lan* prayer festival, which begins just three days after the New Year festival, is celebrated for 15 days. This is in commemoration of Buddha’s victory over his six religious opponents through debates and performance of miracles. During this festival special prayers are offered daily and prayers, fasting and charitable donations mark ‘*sa-ga zla-ba*’, the celebration of the anniversary of Buddha’s birth, enlightenment and death. These three events occur on the 15th day of the fourth month of the Tibetan calendar. Further, the ‘*lnga-mchod*’ festival is celebrated in commemoration of Tsong-kha-pa’s death (the founder of the Dge-lugs-pa sect). This is celebrated on the 25th day of the 10th month by burning butter lamps on the roofs and window sills of every house.

Last but not the least, the ‘*dgu-gtor*’ festival or the festival of the banishment of evil spirits takes place on the 29th day of the last month of the Tibetan year, during which at night a bowl of flour soup and a bunch of burning strans are taken into every room of every house and the evil spirits are called out. And outside, at a distant path, the soup and strans are thrown and left to burn.

**GOVERNMENT**

Before communist occupation, Tibet had a theocratic government headed by His Holiness the Dalai Lama. After 1951 the Chinese controlled it militarily and granted regional autonomy, which finally came into existence in 1965. Since then, as a part of separation of religion and civil administration, Tibet has been an autonomous region (*tzu-chih-chu*) of China. The region is divided into the municipality (*shih*) of Lhasa, which is directly under the control of regional government and seven prefectures (*ti-chu*), which are again subdivided into counties (*hsien*). The army in Tibet consists of regular Chinese troops under a Chinese military commander who is stationed at Lhasa. Besides, there are military cantonments in major towns along the borders with India, Nepal and Bhutan. And Tibetans have been forcibly recruited into regular army and militia segments.
CULTURAL REVOLUTION

The decision of the Eleventh Plenum was celebrated in Lhasa by holding a rally on 13 August. By unleashing the ‘Cultural Revolution’ in Tibet, the Maoists were to enhance their power and create an obedient military administrative apparatus with a view to completing the reorganisation of its socio-economic structure after the model of China. Further, to establish peoples communes, brainwashing of the local population was intensified, so that the thought of Mao should oust nationalist prejudices, including those based on religion, and thereby prelude all the existing or potential opposition on the part of the Tibetan people to Beijing. Approximately 1 per cent of the total Tibetan population directly participated in the ‘Cultural Revolution’ in the region.

It was on the twentieth day of the sixth Tibetan month, in August 1966, that the Red Guards targeted Jokhang and Ramoche temples in Lhasa. Several Chinese and Tibetan Red Guards, in their late teens, barged into Jokhang together with the Chinese cadres. Several hundred chapels, save two, were looted and defecated. Every single statue, holy scripture and ritual object was either broken or taken away, while the Sakyamuni Buddha statue, at the entrance of Jokhang, escaped the fury. The pillage of Jokhang continued unabated for a whole week, left a dozen dead and 50 injured, and was finally turned into barracks for Chinese soldiers. A corner of the temple was converted into a toilet, while another part was used as slaughterhouse. The lamas were rounded up and were forced to do handicrafts work or hard labour on the farms.

Further, for five days, the Red Guards made a bonfire of every relic they found. Unique pieces of Tibetan cultural heritage were burnt to ashes—Chenrezig,
the protector of Tibet, the Buddha of Infinite compassion represented in the form of
a large statue with eleven heads and a thousand arms, was smashed to bits by the
Red Guards.\textsuperscript{181} Atop the Potala Palace, the earlier residence of the Dalai Lama,
considered sacred to every Tibetan, a red flag was hoisted, and two large resoles
bearing the words ‘Long Live the Chinese Communist Party’ and ‘Long Live
Chairman Mao’, visible from quite a distance, were hung.\textsuperscript{182} Over with Jokhang, the
Red Guards moved to Norbulingka, the Jewel Park, and destroyed every treasure in
each on of its pavilions. Fragments of statues, decapitated, and the Buddha’s
pulverized figurines were piled in every corner.\textsuperscript{183}

Further, at ‘Ganden,’ 25 miles from Lhasa, one of the largest monasteries,
where several thousand trapas and Lamas had studied and prayed, was soon
reduced to a smoking heap of rubble. The demolition of the monastery began on the
third day of the seventh month of 1966 (19 August, 1966). First, the Red Guards
tackled the large hall, a meeting place for monks, and then they knocked down
every single room where the monks had lived. Dynamite was employed to speed up
the process by inserting sticks of dynamite in the walls, which blew them up.\textsuperscript{184}
Finally, teams were brought with hoes to put the finishing touches. The villagers
managed to hide the statue of the founder, Tsong khapa. But for the statue,
everything was reduced to rubble, and its stones were used as construction material
and distributed all around.\textsuperscript{185}

Now the struggle against ‘four olds’ spread throughout Tibet and its capital.
Only the Potala and thirteen other places of worship in Tibet were placed off-limits
and protected by army detachments. Red Guards went on attacking the temples and
monasteries, for, surely, they knew what had to be destroyed. Valuables from

\textsuperscript{181} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{183} Donnet. n. 128, p. 78.

\textsuperscript{184} Ibid., p. 83.

\textsuperscript{185} Ibid.
temples like Tsuglak Khang, Ramoche Tengyeling, ZongKyap Lukhang, etc were transported to a safer place, and only then the Red Guards were given a free hand to destroy.\(^{186}\) The scriptures in Tsuglak Khang were burnt in Lhasa. Further, when local Tibetans requested the Red Guards to spare the metal pinnacle of Ramoche temple the latter refused saying: “If this pinnacle is taken off, it will produce thousands of bullets, with which we can oppose our enemies and ensure peace and security.”\(^{187}\) The Ramoche temple was razed to the ground on the pretext of building a highway.\(^{188}\)

Further, Drepung Monastery, the largest in Tibet, with a population of ten thousand, was destroyed and it turned out to be a ghost town.\(^{189}\) Sera Monastery met with similar fate. Innumerable other ritual objects and sacred scriptures were thrown into huge bonfires on the grounds of the monasteries. The Red Guards then invited the Tibetan masses to attend those ‘celebrations’. Further, materials taken from sanctuaries and monasteries were used for building stables and public toilets and for surfacing the pavements. The innate intention was to desecrate and humiliate and to identify religion with the lowly and the vile.\(^{190}\) Predictably, holy Dharma texts were converted into toilet papers.\(^{191}\) When temples and monasteries had been gutted, Tibetans were forced, at gun point, to level the walls by hand; to deal with the thickest walls, the Red Guards brought in dynamite and artillery—testimony abounds in extreme cases, the holy sites were bombed from the air.\(^{192}\) In a matter of months, there was nothing left but for collapsed roofs, shattered walls, crumbled metal, crushed stones and shapeless, unrecognizable ruins, and the remnants of the temples and monasteries, curiously reminiscent of western cities

\(^{186}\) “Fate of Monks and Monasteries” *Tibetan Review*, March 1976, p. 5.


\(^{188}\) *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), 23 December 1966.

\(^{189}\) Donnel, n. 128, p. 87.

\(^{190}\) *Ibid.*, p. 82.

\(^{191}\) *Ibid.*.

\(^{192}\) *Ibid.*.
that were bombed and razed during the Second World War: inanimate ghost towns.193

The Red Guard activities were not only restricted to the religious institutions but made their way into private homes; things without religious significance were attacked, too. If old Tibetan items or artifacts were found hidden, the heads of the families were punished.194 Every religious practice including Tibet’s folk fairs and festivals were forbidden. It became mandatory to wear Chinese clothes, which meant a pair of cotton pants and a jacket, and the colours allowed to be worn were restricted to blue, gray or military green. But the shortage of cloth forced Tibetans to wear their traditional costume. People possessing traditional Tibetan dress were paraded and humiliated in the streets.195 Tens of thousands of Tibetans were arrested, sometimes repeatedly by each of the rival faction in turn, sometimes when a victim was released by one faction he would be detained by the other who vied to undo its rival in subjecting him to the most inhuman treatment.196

Braids worn by men and women were branded as the dirty black tails of serfdom and lopped off in passing. In Nagchu and Gyangtse the Red Guards forcibly cut off the Tibetan braided hair so that they would look more like Chinese.197 The Tibetans who had a ‘bad class background’, the sons and daughters of landowners or noble families, were unrelentingly persecuted by the Red Guards.198 Tibetan names were altered to Chinese ones: Tenzin became “Mao Sixiang” (Mao’s Red Thought), Khechog Wangmo, “Da Yuejin (Great Leap Forward)199 and Yishey became O-tung. Similarly, some place names were also

193 Ibid.
194 Norbu, n. 187, p. 274.
195 Ibid.
196 Donnet, n. 128, p. 80.
198 Donnet, n. 128, p. 81.
changed: Tsuglak Khang, Tibet’s holiest temple became “Zhaodai Suo” (Guest House No. 5). Norbulingka, the Dalai Lama’s summer place, changed to Renmin Gongyuan (People’s Park)\(^{200}\) and Bargor street at the center of the old town in Lhasa, known for its superstitious activities, was renamed the Lihsin.\(^{201}\) This road was considered holy in traditional Tibet, for it went round the temple Jokhang which is an important place of worship.

Furthermore, a crowd of teenage enthusiasts (Red Guards) reached Walung Goupa, situated atop a hill, far above La village. It consisted of two groups of Tibetan youth; those working for the Beijing administration in La and the progressives, who displayed an unusual enthusiasm for Chinese initiatives and volunteered for any audacious activities. The crowd split into two groups. The larger one proceeded to the main hall and demolished statues and walls. On the other hand, the smaller group ransacked the men’s quarters and brought out all the religious artifacts and scriptures which were later loaded on to the senior men. The senior men were driven to the village in the valley. Further, in each village of La, the senior men were stopped for *thamzing* and then again driven to the next. The whole village was ransacked, as was the nunnery. Religious artifacts were brought into the open, the villagers’ long hair was forcibly shortened, prayer flags were pulled down,\(^{202}\) and the portraits of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama were prohibited from being exhibited.

In fact, the whole exercise was meant to humiliate the believers and force them into submission to the new doctrine.\(^{203}\) While the senior men were taken round the village, the juniors were ordered to pull down the central hall where once stood precious images. When some of the men refused to obey the orders of the Red Guards, they were made to watch the unimaginable and frenzied vandalism.\(^{204}\)

---

\(^{200}\) *Ibid.*, and also see Burman. n.182, p.145.

\(^{201}\) Cited from Burman. n.182, p.145.

\(^{202}\) Norbu. n. 187, p. 269.


\(^{204}\) *Ibid.*
In another case at Chokhor Lhunpo, the Ugen Lhakhang with the golden image of Padmasambhava, the Tsong Khang (Central Cathedral) used by monks for daily prayers and the Nyunned Lhakhang which was used for the purpose of common fast by the villagers on holy occasions, were all destroyed. A new building was erected over the remains of Tsong Khang to house offices and officers. Further, in another case, Shangri-La’s residence was engulfed in ruthless ideological battle that was alien to its own people. Religion suddenly gave way to crude utilitarianism and gross materialism.205

Further, the cultural destruction in Sakya area, close to Sikkim, was not that different. Out of 108 monasteries and temples only Sakya Lhakhang Chenmo (Central Cathedral) escaped from Red Guards’ destructive activities, while the rest were all razed to the ground. In fact, these religious buildings were destroyed by a crowd from Dongka village when the majority locals in Sakya abstained from doing so. Of course, when destruction began a large number of youth from Sakya joined the pillagers! One of the motivating factors behind destroying the monasteries, by the Tibetans, was the hope of taking away scarce wood for erecting their own dwellings in Sakya.206 Precious metals like gold, silver and jewellery, from 108 monasteries, which were studded into statues, were collected by the so-called commission for cultural relics before the Red Guards arrived and were said to have been transported to China. In some cases items made of brass, tin and other metals were sold to foundries in Shanghai, Szechwan, Taiyuan, Peking and elsewhere. For instance, the Shiyou Qingru (precious metal) foundry, three miles east of Peking, brought 600 tons of metal objects looted from Tibet’s temples and monasteries.207

Further, papier-mâché statues were thrown into the river and scattered or spread over in the Sakya bazaar. People failing to walk over such holy objects was

205 Ibid., p. 271.
206 Ibid.
207 Ribhur Tulku, The Search for Fowo Mikyoe Dorjee, The Office of Information and International Relations, Central Tibetan Secretariat Dharamsala, 1988 quoted from Donnet, n. 128, p. 82.
questioned and were compelled to stand in public places while passersby were forced to pull their hair in struggle (thamzing) sessions. This was solely intended to punish those harbouring religious sentiments during the 'Cultural Revolution.'

When people met anywhere they were expected to exchange quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung's Little Red Book which were distributed freely. Simply put, when one person recited Mao's quotations the other had to continue from where the first speaker had stopped; failing to do so correctly, irrespective of their sex, resulted in subjection to thamzing session. Further, Red Guards inscribed quotations from Mao's Little Red Book in the place of the sacred mantra, 'Om Mani Padme Hum' carved on rocks. Portraits of Mao were hung all over the cities, at major cross roads, villages, offices and factories, and at least one in each house. In a way Mao replaced the Buddha in every respect during the course of 'Cultural Revolution.' People who shred Mao's pictures or have committed a mistake in inscribing Mao's quotations on a rock were sent to the firing squad.

The 'Cultural Revolution' in Lhasa was more intense and devastating than in other parts of the Tibet Autonomous Region. The reason is not far to seek. Chinese Red Guards viewed the 'Cultural Revolution' in Tibet essentially as an opportunity not only to spread communism but more importantly, to Sinification of communist rule in China including the Tibetans who had succeeded in retaining their cultural identity over centuries. In the same vein, Tibetans regarded 'Cultural Revolution' as a Han export. It was said that about 8,130 Chinese Red Guards, from twelve educational institutions in China proper, came to Lhasa and only three Tibetan

---

208 Norbu, n. 187, p. 271.

209 Ibid.

210 Ibid.


schools in Lhasa were involved in the beginning of the ‘Cultural Revolution.’ It appears that these Chinese Red Guards came not only with an ideological mission but also with a Han-man’s burden in Tibet - the Sinicization of Tibetans in the name of Mao’s thought.214

Additionally, apart from the local power struggle between the bureaucrats and the Red Guards, as there were differences between the policies of the Maoists and the Liuists in Lhasa and Shigatse, the ‘Cultural Revolution’ in Tibet was one of systematic destruction of indigenous cultures and civilisation, and forced attempts to impose the Han culture on unwilling Tibetans in the name of the Great Proletarian ‘Cultural Revolution.’215 Further, quite naturally, one of the priorities for this enterprise was to eradicate the monasteries, which were held to be spawning-grounds for counter-revolutionary notions.216 It was said that there were some 6,000 temples, holy sites and monasteries before 1959. A large number of them had already been razed to ground, badly damaged or closed during the initial phase of ‘Cultural Revolution.’

Chou En-lai ordered to put an end to such acts, but the Red Guards were allowed to destroy other vestiges of the feudal society. In the next month it was reported that prayer flags that were fluttering from the roofs of Lhasa were destroyed and replaced by the five star national flag. The walls and household shrines now contained the images of Chairman Mao Tse-tung in lieu of "superstitious" pictures.217 And by the end of September all Buddhist monasteries were closed.218

---


215 Ibid.

216 Donnet, n. 128, p. 81.

217 NCNA (Peking), 29 September, 1966, quoted from Dreyer, n. 2., p. 217.

The emergence of ethnic and geographical origins of the Red Guards in Tibet Autonomous Region is quite unclear. A group of revolutionary teachers and students of the Tibetan Nationalities Institute at Hsiyang, Shensi, entered Tibet during early September and during the same time a group of Peking's Third Red Guard Headquarters was also in Lhasa. Nevertheless, several other groups were said to have been waiting in the nearby provincial areas suggesting that some contingents considered permission necessary before they entered Tibet.\textsuperscript{219} It may quite be possible that the Red Guard groups from Peking and Hsiyang were composed of Tibetan youth.

In October the exchange of revolutionary experiences by Han youth in Tibet was forbidden due to Chou En-lai's instructions. However, the Red Guards entered Tibet Autonomous Region by charging that the region's party committee was attempting to circumvent the Great Proletarian 'Cultural Revolution'.\textsuperscript{220} Thereafter, the majority ethnic composition of the Red Guard groups was Han and a very limited number of Tibetans figured during the course of 'Cultural Revolution.' Some one per cent of the total Tibetan population had actually directly participated in the 'Cultural Revolution' in Tibet.\textsuperscript{221}

The maximum number of Tibetan students, about 4,000, joined from Shenyong Tibet minorities school, called the Tibet Autonomous Public School.\textsuperscript{222} This group was mostly composed of emancipated serf and middle peasant Tibetans. The Chabzinghingka Tibet Autonomous Region staff and the Teachers Training Institute sent about 500 members.\textsuperscript{223}

\textsuperscript{220} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{222} Burman, n. 182, p. 144.
\textsuperscript{223} Ibid.
Finally, by November it was found that more than a thousand Red Guards were not natives of Tibet and the State council once again reiterated its previous order banning the exchange of revolutionary experiences in Tibet. But the Red Guard encountered this directive by appealing to the 'Cultural Revolution' Small Group in Peking and stayed back. This development, no doubt, annoyed the members of Tibet committee which had already given the Red Guards a farewell celebration. 224

The differences among the Red Guard organisations were nothing but the offshoot of the differences between the party leadership in Tibet and the more radical members of the 'Cultural Revolution' Small Group in Peking. Factionalism centered—around clashes between the Lhasa Revolutionary Rebel General Headquarters and a much more radical Great Alliance Rebel General Command Post of the region's proletarian Rebel Revolutionaries. The Rebel Headquarters accused the Great Alliance for having been founded by First Party Secretary Chang Kuo-hua to safeguard his power.

Meanwhile, towards the evening of 1966, Chang made it clear to Peking that unless the 'Cultural Revolution' was kept out of Tibet, he could not guarantee even such precarious stability as the area had enjoyed ever since the suppression of the March 1959 revolt. In particular, the Red Guards and exchange of revolutionary experiences must be forbidden he said. In retaliation, the Red Guards accused Chang of being the head of a handful of counter-revolutionary revisionists within the party committee of Tibet Autonomous Region. They further warned that ‘the long spear of revolution is heading straight for Chang Kuo-hua’s last stronghold and refused to accept a self-criticism he had made as valid. 225 While Chang was being attacked by the Rebel Headquarters as rotten and the ‘emperor of Tibet’, the Great Alliance argued that despite Chang’s shortcomings he need not be overthrown. 226

225 SCMP, S-219, 27 January, 1967, and also see SCMP, no. 204, 12 February 1967.
226 Lhasa Leaflet, 27 January, 1967 in SCMP, no. 219, p. 23; and also see SCMP, no. 204, p. 18.
Various issues separated one Han faction from another, but two major issues which separated the factions require special attention. First, on the degree to which they thought radical, social and economic policies ought to be applied to Tibet, and how this reflected on the ideological orthodoxy of the present leadership. Second, the matter of status positions of the various Han groups in Tibet. During the course of the 'Cultural Revolution' people were sent down to the countryside, in contrast to various other areas of China, the Han sent to Tibet held skilled or semi skilled positions. But many of the Han who held these positions were extremely dissatisfied for some of those jobs included truck driving, factory work, and the bottom echelons of the army, which had low status and difficult working conditions. Thus, many of them wanted either to return to their homes or an advance in their status. And they resented what they referred to as "the entrenched power holders."

In January 1967, the Red Guards arrived from Peking to assist the more radical Rebel Headquarters. Their ranks swelled with the arrival of 8,000 additional Red Guards and enhanced their number to 20,000 - all young people grimly intent on dislodging the traitors who held power in Lhasa. The Tibetan Daily was brought under their control. Attacks were mounted on First Party Secretary Chang Kuo-hua. At Lhasa street fights soon broke out between rival factions and spread over to towns like Shigatse, Gyantse and Nagchuka. Finally, the Rebel Headquarters announced that it had seized power. At this juncture their chief

---

227 Dreyer, n. 2, p. 218.
228 Ibid.
229 Ibid.
230 Gittings, n. 221, p. 518.
231 Donnet, n. 128, p. 79.
232 Grunfeld, n. 172, p. 179; and for further details also see Burman, n. 182, p. 148.
target, Chang, was transferred to Szechwan as head of the preparatory group of the Szechwan Provincial Revolutionary Committee and political commissar of Chengtu Military Region, without naming his successor.

Chang remained free from the attacks until the Red Guard newspaper in Peking quoted Chiang Ch’ing herself as accusing Chang both of trying to suppress the ‘Cultural Revolution’ and of risking to protecting and rehabilitating Li ching’ ch’uan, the ousted party chief of Szechwan, whose place Chang has held since mid-1967.

The Red Guard newspaper further accused the now disgraced General Secretary of the party, Deng Xiaoping, of being responsible for the Tibetan revolt, as a result of his policy of gradualism in Tibet. Evidence was adduced to prove that Deng, in the name of United Front (between CCP and the government of the Dalai Lama), deliberately protected persons of known anti-Communist sympathies.

Even the few Tibetan collaborators who held position of power in government and party seem to have been deposed by the Red Guards and were not restored. This must have given a setback to the CCP’s indoctrination programme. Now it was Chang’s erstwhile subordinates who suppressed the Rebel Headquarters during the ‘February Adverse Current’. The deputy commissar of Tibet Military Region, Jen Jung, ordered the military to suppress the anarchist thinking. The Lhasa Daily wrote that disorders were being caused by enemies of the ‘Cultural Revolution’, who were deceiving the masses with false rumours. Additionally, the Rebel Headquarters’ pledges to install radical changes in Tibetan society

---


235 *SCMP*, no. 4181, 20 May 1968.

236 *SCMP*, no. 4086, 22 December 1967.


alarmed the Tibetan masses as "entrenched power holders had to quit to point out."239

Peking again encouraged the rebels and a fresh wave of fighting broke out in April, in which the Tibetan collaborators had been publicly denounced in Lhasa. 240 Ngapo Ngawang Jigme was under attack, on the other hand Chou En-lai issued a directive to stop the attacks on Ngapo, because Ngapo had gained much merit by denouncing the Panchen Lama. 241 Tibetans fled to India, Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan during this time even as reports of sabotage by Tibetan guerrilla groups poured in. 242

Tibetans seem to have regarded the ‘Cultural Revolution’ as a Han export for Han consumption and that it had to be kept away as far as possible. Further, the Han fought against other Han and without fear of any reprisal, supply depots and hidden ammunition could be raided by Tibetan guerrillas. Meanwhile, by September, the line in Peking moderated once again which resulted in the Central Committee ordering the Rebel Headquarters and the Great Alliance to resolve their differences, lay down arms and return to work. 243 Nevertheless, factionalism continued unabated, for the members of the Rebel Headquarters may have felt that they were unlikely to achieve a fair compromise under Jen Jung, who moved against them only a few months back. 244

As fighting escalated between the two factions of Chinese Red Guards, punishments inflicted on the Tibetans became increasingly serious. Gang rapes

---

239 Gittings, n. 221, p. 518.
241 Kwang-yin hung-ch'i, 5 March, 1958, SCMP, no. 4162, p. 10, and also see Burman, n. 182, p. 150.
244 Dreyer, n. 2, p. 219.
became common; the victims included children. Women were stripped and forced to stand on frozen lakes. Brutality and torture in public became common place all over the Tibetan plateau. A victim’s hand, ear, nose or tongue would be chopped off. People about to be executed were forced to dig their own graves.²⁴⁵

By June 1968 Jen Jung made an appeal to put an end to the civil war and restore means of communication and transportation. Considering the instructions from Chou En-lai, Ch’en po-ta and K’ang Sheng,²⁴⁶ Jen Jung warned that factional fighting reduced attention to national defense and cautioned against border incidents. Indian, Soviet and US reconnaissance patrols had been detected along the borders, and ‘traitors and bandits within Tibet were ‘itching for action’ there.²⁴⁷

On September 5, 1968, a revolutionary committee of Tibet was inaugurated without a prior preparatory committee.²⁴⁸ Tseng Yung-ya, a member of the Fourth Field Army²⁴⁹ and a close associate of Lin Piao²⁵⁰ was appointed Chairman of the Committee Prior to this, Tseng was appointed acting commander of the Tibet Military Region after Chang Kuo-hua’s transfer to Szechwan.²⁵¹

Though Jen Jung was not more acceptable to the radicals than Tseng,²⁵² the former was appointed first Vice-chairman of the revolutionary committee. These two appointments might have been designed by Peking as a compromise to pacify

²⁴⁵ Donnet, n. 128, p. 81.

²⁴⁶ For details of the instructions see Important Instructions of Premier Chou En-lai, Ch’en po-ta, K’ang Sheng and other leaders on the question of Tibet, 6 June 1968, SCMM, no.622, pp. 1-2.

²⁴⁷ Gittings, n. 221, p. 518.

²⁴⁸ China News Summary, n. 68, p. 43.

²⁴⁹ Whitson, n. 167, p. 197.


²⁵¹ Whitson, n. 167, p. 332.

both the major factions in the Tibet Autonomous Region.²⁵³ Neither of the two major factional leaders have been included in any positions in the committee. The eleven other Vice-chairmen included four Tibetans, namely Ngapo Nagwang Jigme, Thubten Nima, Tsering Lamu and Pa Sang.²⁵⁴ Be that as it may, neither the leadership compromise designed in Peking nor the repeated orders from Peking could end factionalism and cease hostilities.

Later, in February 1969, both Wang Ch'i-mei and Chou Jen-shan, who were the members of the Secretariat of the Tibet's party committee until 1966, and favorite targets of the left, were formally repudiated. This action was not intentionally taken by the Peking government, though the decision came in favour of the leftist faction. It, however, was possible since the representatives of both the factions were at Peking for their study classes to improve their attitude towards unity.²⁵⁵ The Ninth Party Congress was held in April but Tibet was yet to form many of its sub-regional revolutionary committees, and, thus, the existence of factionalism²⁵⁶ is demonstrated. But these conflicts with the Han Chinese elite did not preclude social reform within Tibet. Communes were introduced in Lhasa area in mid-1966 on an experimental basis and Liu Shao-ch'i and other leaders, who were bitterly denounced, were later held responsible for the long postponement of collectivization.

It should be noted that like in Inner Mongolia even in Tibet the ‘Cultural Revolution’ was confined to major urban areas like Lhasa Shigatse, Gyantse, Chanado and their suburbs and other places of strategic communication lines. Towards the early months of 1969, strict discipline was maintained on the borders and despite Jen’s warning there were no reports of factional fighting on China’s frontiers.

²⁵³ Dreyer, n. 2, p. 220.
²⁵⁴ For details of the list of representatives see China News Summary, no. 68, p. 43; and also see NCNA (Lhasa), 6 September 1968, SCMP, no. 4256, pp. 13-16.
²⁵⁵ Dreyer, n. 2, p. 220.
²⁵⁶ Jen-min Jih-pao (hereafter JMJP), 12 April 1969, SCMP, no. 4401, p. 3.
The 'Great Proletarian 'Cultural Revolution' ' covered a period of three years starting from August 1966 effectively, during which almost 90 per cent of Tibet’s monasteries, temples and historical monuments were destroyed. What was economically precious was carted away, and what was historically important and connected to Imperial China was safeguarded. This was the reason why the Gaden Monastery, from which the Dalai Lama’s old government originated, was razed to the ground. On the other hand, the ruins of Sera and Drepung monasteries are still intact. In the same fashion, the Red Guards destroyed Tashilhunpo Monastery, but left intact the Amban’s chamber in the monastery. "Such a well planned execution of destruction demonstrates that the Chinese Red Guards in Tibet were both ideological fanatics and Han nationalists bent on the Sinicization of Tibetans. When western journalists happened to visit Tibet in the late 1970’s they described it as 'the grave yard of a murdered civilization.'\textsuperscript{257}

THE CHINESE CENTRAL ASIAN REGIONS IN THE POST-CULTURAL REVOLUTION: 1970-76

In retrospect, the minorities in the post-Cultural Revolution period gave a muted presence in China. Their existence was hardly acknowledged by the 1969 Constitution of the party. The minorities were increasingly nudged to unite with all Chinese against the Soviet Union, due to border incidents of the same year, instead of presenting an accommodative attitude towards them. Further, the theme of friendly relations between army and minorities was also stressed and where ever problems existed collective Mao study was considered the key to their solution as well as the \textit{sine qua non} for increasing production in minority areas.\textsuperscript{258} Special characteristics were mentioned only in the context of denouncing the fact that Liu Shao-ch’i had encouraged the continued existence of these characteristics. Radio broadcasts in minorities languages were largely restricted.

\textsuperscript{257} Dawa Norbu, n. 187, p. 276.

\textsuperscript{258} "Family Study Classes in Mao Tse-tung Thought Thrive in Minority Nationality Production Brigade in South West China," \textit{NCNA} (Kunming), 1 August 1969, \textit{SCMP}, no. 4471, p. 19.
At the time when Defense Minister Lin Piao and several others of his Fourth Field Army faction were purged, a shift occurred in the nationality policy which started encouraging minorities languages, a more positive view of the minority characteristics, including religion and a drive to recruit more minorities into the party and government institutions\(^{259}\) came into place. Changes in leadership was not without changes in the heads of Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet, which tended to confirm Mao's claim of having mixed in some sand in an effort to reduce the disproportionate power of Lin Piao and his Fourth Field Army. The changes made in Chinese Central Asian Regions during in 1971 and 1972 were no doubt accompanied by the evidence of different changes in terms of moderation in the policy towards minority groups. This moderate policy is quite evident with respect to Tibet, and in the content of mass media in Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia.

Further, from November onwards, efforts were made to recruit more members of minority cadres into leadership positions but a proverbially small number of minority cadres were discouraged due to their low level of culture and were suggested remedial measures for such problems. On the other hand, the cadres experienced surge in their ideological consciousness and were more confident of themselves and were now in a better position to lead and serve their respective areas. Besides, minorities' special characteristics were once again referred to. All over Chinese Central Asia, factory workers began paying heedful attention to retain the traditional nationality characteristics of their products, while leading cadres and technically sound personnel visited rural areas regularly to seek the views of herdsmen regarding their products and arrangements were made to reach out to them.\(^{260}\)

The Central Nationalities Institute reopened in early 1972 with a class of 700, in which 46 out of the 54 officially recognized ethnic minorities were

\(^{259}\) Dreyer, n. 2, p. 238.

\(^{260}\) NCNA (Sining), 21 November 1971. SCMP, no. 5026, p. 201.
represented along with Han youth, who had been sent down to nationalities areas.\textsuperscript{261} By October the institute's enrollment rose to 1,100, which included 48 nationalities,\textsuperscript{262} who were trained as cadres, teachers, translators, and literary and art workers. The faculty in the Institute included representatives of more than 20 nationality groups and teachers who spoke their native languages in the class.\textsuperscript{263} It was found that 20 per cent of the students belonged to Han and 60 to 65 per cent were ethnic minorities from southwest.

Academic standards were liberally applied when compared to the political standards and major attention was paid towards translation work. The teaching staff comprised 27 different nationalities, and at several times in the 1950s and early 1960s enrollment had ranged between 2,300 to 3,000\textsuperscript{264} which was more than twice the number in attendance in 1972. However, the Institute could venture only to remedy the academic deficiencies of only a small number of minorities. Hence efforts were made to improve the educational standards in minority areas themselves.

Though it is not clear whether the medium of instruction was in the minority languages concerned, that emphasis was laid on Han teachers learning the language of the area of their employment indicates that minority languages were used, at least in the lower grades, or at least till the said minorities had gained sufficient proficiency to follow Chinese so that classes could be conducted in the same. The minority students with good caliber were sent out for further training, and graduates who had returned to their production brigades were often asked to serve as accountants, teachers, recorders at work place and as barefoot doctors.\textsuperscript{265} Efforts

\textsuperscript{261} NCNA (Peking), 13 February 1972 SCMP, no. 5081, p. 27.
\textsuperscript{262} Kuang-ming jih-pao (hereafter KMJP), 19 October, 1972, SCMP, no. 5241, p. 71.
\textsuperscript{263} NCNA (Peking), 13 December 1972, SCMP, no. 5282, p. 173.
\textsuperscript{264} Min-tsu t'uan-chieh (hereafter MTTC), no. 3, 1957, pp. 18-20; Min-tsu t'uan-chieh, no. 8-9, 1961, p. 1, quoted from Dreyer, ibid., p. 243.
\textsuperscript{265} KMJP, 29 January 1972, SCMP, no. 5074, p. 186.
were also made to teach Chinese to the minorities along with an equal amount of encouragement towards minorities' own language. Further, P'ín-yín script was introduced for which efforts were made from 1971. Publicity was given to the new script and minorities were taught to employ the same. This non-Han script was popularised by holding regular study classes and workshops.

Besides, since 1972, minority culture saw a return to the "national in form socialist in content dictum". By mid-1972 the minorities were listed as a separate category for the first time since the 'Cultural Revolution' began.²⁶⁶ News regarding minorities had been categorized under general topics with the heading "Living Study and Application of Chairman Mao's works". "Mao Tse-tung thought lights up the Hearts of the people of all China's nationalities."²⁶⁷

Health care services in minority areas were improved and minorities were trained for technical jobs providing increased opportunities for promotion. By mid-1972 Mao's statement was quoted, "Without a large number of cadres of minority nationalities it would be impossible to resolve the nationalities problem."²⁶⁸ In fact, it was argued that minority cadres, better acquainted with local conditions, were in a better position to establish ties with the masses²⁶⁹ and this helped to rally the minorities for the socialist revolution and the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat.²⁷⁰

The above factors were also employed to justify the rehabilitation of minority cadres who had been purged during the 'Cultural Revolution'.²⁷¹ The anecdotes of the efforts of newly appointed minority cadres were typically followed

---

²⁶⁸ NCNA (Nanning), 23 July 1972, SCMP, no. 5187, pp. 111-12.
²⁶⁹ KMJP, 26 October 1972, SCMP, no. 5252, pp. 151-52.
²⁷¹ KMJP, 10 November 1972, SCMP, no. 5259, p. 17.
by the claims of higher crop yield or fulfillment of State Plans beyond the laid targets. Undoubtedly, increase in the number of minorities in responsible positions resulted in increased production.

The Tenth Party Congress, held in 1973, ventured to rehabilitate some of the high ranking party officials of Chinese Central Asia, who had been criticised for their handling of minority issues. Further, the Congress did not mention the nationality of its delegates. Instead, the official communique just mentioned that a certain percentage of national minority representatives were present. However, at least 7, or a minimum of 3.6 per cent of the 195 full members, and 6 or 4.8 per cent of the 124 alternate members who were elected to the Tenth Central Committee, can be positively identified as minorities. Those honoured with membership on the Tenth Central Committee represented an admixture of various nationalities and backgrounds. And the same kind of themes also characterise the careers of the few alternate Central Committee members. The background of these newly elected members seems to epitomize the advice on the nationalities given in the party Constitution passed by the Tenth Central Committee, which stated that “the party must ..., lead the people of all nationalities of our country in carrying on the three great revolutionary movements of class struggle, the struggle for production, and scientific experiment.” But, the Constitution failed to mention the party’s duties towards minorities.

Further the government failed to reasonably justify the return of those who had been vilified during the ‘Cultural Revolution’, and also to explain the changes in the policy towards minorities that had occurred in the preceding two years. The post-Tenth Party Congress also witnessed a criticism campaign against Lin Piao and

272 Ibid., pp. 17-18.
273 NCNA (Urumchi), 17 May 1972, SCMP, no. 5153, pp. 22-23.
275 Dreyer, n. 2, p. 248.
Confucius. Simultaneously, the minorities were informed that Lin Piao had sabotaged the party’s policy on nationalities, thereby splitting the unity of the ancestral land, and also that he held minorities in low esteem. In general Lin Piao was declared a pro-Soviet and his mistaken policies were linked with those of the Soviet Union. Finally, the end came when Lin Piao died in an air crash. After Lin Piao’s death the Beijing government made a major effort to refute the charges of the Soviet Union with regard to China’s nationalities’ policy. The Chinese also tried to disprove the charges that its ill-treatment of nationalities alienated their loyalties.

Lin Piao’s death was followed by the intensification of Hsia fang or rustication movement, during which it was mandatory for the educated youth to go to the countryside to receive re-education from the poor and lower middle peasants. It was reported that by the beginning of 1975 not less than 10 million educated youth were sent to rural areas. And it was expected that 1 to 2 million more youth would join them each year. The authenticity of the figures is, of course, much in doubt.

The movement met with mixed success. The youth chose legal routes like joining the PLA to stay away from Hsia fang. For some urban youth Hsia fang involved settling on a sub-urban commune within the geographical proximity to their parents and friends and distancing from the amenities of their former life styles. It is to be noted that their problems and their impact on the areas to which they have been sent was far different from those young people’s who were sent to remote areas which meant a totally different way of life, and, perhaps, an adjustment to vastly different climate and food.

The Hsia fang movement involved a large scale influx of Hans into minority areas in Chinese Central Asia, which resulted in change in life styles. To check this the Chinese officials designed careful plans to keep this mixing of nationalities to a

---

277 Radio Nanning, 10 January 1974; Radio Huhehot, 23 November 1974, quoted from Dreyer, n. 2, p. 249.

278 Radio Peking, 8 January 1975, quoted from Ibid.
minimum. Youth not absorbed into minority collectives but not placed in separate units shared life with fellow Hans alone, mostly. The fact that educated youth stayed apart from the minorities, in whose areas they had settled, is reinforced by the lack of reference to members of minorities in the accounts of these youth. Nevertheless, despite Beijing government's plans to keep the mixing of various nationalities to the minimum, mixing of nationalities was inevitable. Large scale influx of Han youth to minority areas in Chinese Central Asia might certainly have affected the traditional life styles in those areas.

Be that as it may, the implications of the *Hsia fang* movement was that, liberal policies, in general, were continued by emphasising the need to implement the 1973 party Constitution's enjoinder on tempering the minority cadres in the three revolutionary movements. Through Chinese official pronouncements it was claimed that this venture was a grand success, but adequate data concerning Chinese Central Asia in particular, and the whole country in general, is lacking. Typically, a report gave statistics on the increased party membership in a single *hsien*, with that *hsien* being chosen more because it was unusually successful than because it could be considered representative. However, an approximate country-wide figure made public in June 1973 stated that over 143,000 members of minority nationalities had been admitted to the party in the five autonomous regions, which also include Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet, and Yunnan. The above data does not include other important minority areas like Ch'inghai and Kansu provinces of Chinese Central Asia.

Further, the above figure, i.e., 143,000, does not make it clear that all of these new admissions to the party. Efforts to rehabilitate those who have committed mistakes during the 'Cultural Revolution' period might have resulted in a number of re-admissions. Hopes held for them than of their levels of achievement at present. Moreover, party membership seems to have been unevenly distributed, with

---


280 Dreyer, n. 2, p. 255.
particular efforts being made to recruit individuals from the smaller nationalities. Admitting so many new party members within a short span of time implies that lesser ideological and leadership skills were expected of them than was of other party members. This would make it difficult for them to play the role in society normally expected of party members. Thus, their presence in the ranks of the CPC is more indicative of future hopes than of their levels of achievements at present.\textsuperscript{281}

The Fourth National People's Congress (NPC) held in early 1975 brought in major changes with regard to minorities. The phrase "people of all nationalities" was included in the official communique and other Congress documents and affirmations of the great unity of all of China's nationalities were also numerous. Additionally, women, workers, peasants and soldiers were allotted certain percentage in the Congress to attend. Despite this, in the official communique it was simply stated that there were deputies from 54 minority nationalities.\textsuperscript{282} Out of the list of twenty three persons chosen as permanent Chairmen of the Presidium, four persons belonged to national minorities. And the same four were elected as Vice-Chairman of the National People's Congress (NPC).\textsuperscript{283}

The NPC adopted the new Constitution which reaffirmed the equality of all nationalities. The minorities were given freedom to use their own spoken and written languages and to exercise autonomous government. The preamble of the new Constitution recognized the need for the consolidation of the unity of all nationalities and for the development of a united front with revolutionary spirit. In fact, the Constitution of 1975 curtailed all rights of the nationalities and in their place made class struggle its objective.\textsuperscript{284} Articles relevant to the minorities were reduced when compared to the 1954 Constitution. Brevity of expression, rather

\textsuperscript{281} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{282} Peking Review, no. 18, no. 4. 4 January, 1975, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{283} Ibid., p. 8.

\textsuperscript{284} Dreyer, n. 2, p. 256.
than an intention to reduce minority rights, could have been the motivating factor behind such a move.285

Finally, in September 1976, Mao Tse-tung died, and three and a half weeks later, the army arrested the ‘Gang of Four’, the leaders of the extreme left wing of the party who were led by Mao’s wife, since the death of Lin Piao in 1971. Later, within two years, Deng Xiaoping, leader of the moderates in the CCP, had effectively assumed power, and heralded some of the most significant changes in China.

CH’INGHAI PROVINCE: 1970-76

In the post-Cultural Revolution phase, in the Ch’inghai province minorities’ languages were encouraged and there was a positive view of minorities’ special characteristics, including religion. Along with other regional minorities, the minorities from Ch’inghai were recruited into party and government institutions. With respect to minorities’ special characteristics it was reported that factories in Ch’inghai had been organised to supply food suited to the special needs of the province’s minority groups.286 A sizable list of examples was given; besides felt boots, Tibetan-style knives, cooking utensils and other staple items, including such non-essentials as ceremonial caps, sashes and ornaments were given in the list.287

Further, factory personnel strove to retain the traditional nationality characteristics of their products. Leading cadres and technicians of the region visited grasslands regularly to learn the views of the herdsmen regarding their products. In places where it was inconvenient for herdsmen to come to the state stores, trading agencies in many places, arranged to send goods by yak or camel

285 Heberer, n.11, pp. 28-29.

286 Dreyer, n.2., p.242.

directly to the herdsmen's tents.\textsuperscript{288} Besides, arrangements were made to have small factories to manufacture the types of farm tools the Ch'inghai minorities preferred and to produce shotguns and ammunition, so that they could hunt in their usual pattern. In Ch'inghai the personnel of commerce department were expected to make on-site investigations to determine the kind of goods the minorities desired and how their departments could improve service.\textsuperscript{289}

Later, in early 1972, when the Central Nationalities Institute was reopened the officially recognised minorities from Ch'inghai were also represented. As a result of the Institute's failure to remedy the academic deficiencies of all the students, it resulted in raising educational standards in minority areas, including Ch'inghai. Teaching material was revised, flexible forms of school operation were adopted to enable the minority children to attend school, and efforts were made to adapt education to minority lifestyles.\textsuperscript{290}

Teachers were directed to study the language of the minorities in Ch'inghai, where they were posted. It implies that minority language was employed at least in the lower grades. Promising minority students were sent out of Ch'inghai for further training, and the students, after their graduation, returned to their production brigades who were, intern, asked to serve as accountants, teachers, recorders at work points and barefoot doctors.\textsuperscript{291} Further, special efforts were made to train Ch'inghai minorities as teachers to serve in their native places. On the other hand, the Beijing government, as it did in other minority areas, ventured to teach Chinese to Ch'inghai minorities and at the same time encouraged minorities' own language. Steps were also taken during this time to expand health care services in Ch'inghai minority areas.

\textsuperscript{288} NCNA (Sining), 21 November 1971, SCMP, n. 260, p. 201.

\textsuperscript{289} NCNA (Nanning), 28 October 1972, SCMP, n. 269, p. 118.

\textsuperscript{290} Radio Sining, 15 June 1972, quoted from Dreyer, n. 2, p. 244.

\textsuperscript{291} For example see, KMJP, 29 January 1972, SCMP, n. 265, p. 189.
In the Tenth Party Congress at least 7 (3.6 per cent) of the 195 full members, and 6 (4.8 per cent) of the 124 alternate members elected to the Tenth Central Committee, were minorities, in which minorities from Ch’inghai were also represented.

Coming to the Hsia fang movement, it was learnt that educated young people, as in other regions in the countryside, came to Ch’inghai to receive education from poor and lower middle peasants. But the exact member of youth that came Ch’inghai is not clear. Later, in the Fourth National People’s Congress Presidium, though 6 per cent of national minorities were elected, the exact number of minorities elected from Ch’inghai is not known, for many minority group members have Han-style names.

**INNER MONGOLIAN AUTONOMOUS REGION(IMAR): 1970-1976**

The situation in Inner Mongolia in the post-Cultural Revolution period was similar to that of other minority areas which we have discussed in the beginning. The changes in the leadership in Peking preceded the changes in the policy with three of the five autonomous regions, including Inner Mongolia, receiving new heads. As a matter of fact, this change appeared marginally to favour the members of the Second Field Army and to bring down the position of several members of Lin Piao’s Fourth Field Army.

In Inner Mongolia, in 1971, Yu T’ai-chung, who was transferred from Fourth to Second Field Army in 1937, was now appointed as the first Party Secretary and Chairman of the revolutionary committee in place of T’eng Hai-ch’ing who had affiliations with the Third Field Army. Later, the Beijing government started following a moderate policy towards minorities. In May 1971 the Hulun Peierh and Chelimu leagues, which had been detached from the Inner

---


293 For details see *Ibid.*, Chart ‘E.’
Mongolian Autonomous Region, in 1969, and were placed under Helungkiang and Kirin respectively, now began broadcasting local service in Mongolian.

Towards the end of 1971, during the drive to recruit more member of minorities into leadership positions, minorities in Inner Mongolia were recruited and those cadres who were involved, thus, raised their ideological consciousness and were more confident of themselves and, now, were in a better position to lead and serve their areas. And many of these persons had assumed the first and second positions in the positions of power at different levels.

Further, trade fairs which were branded as revisionist were revived in Kirin, which was a Mongol banner that had been transferred from Inner Mongolian Autonomous Area. Special minority commodities were allowed to be bought and sold, with state trading agencies participating in the exchange process in Kirin. Visitors to the trade fairs were entertained by the Ulanmuchi troupes as well as with Chinese films.294

The Central Nationalities Institute was reopened in early 1972. Out of the 54 officially recognised minorities, 46 were represented, which also included minorities from Inner Mongolia to which Han youth were also sent.295 Students from Inner Mongolia were trained as cadres, teachers, translators and literary and art workers, along with other minority students. Out of the teaching staff comprising more than 20 nationalities, teachers from Inner Mongolia, who spoke their native languages in the class, were also included.296 However, the Institute failed to remedy the academic deficiencies of all the students. With the result, efforts were made to raise the educational standards of the minorities in the minority areas themselves and these new efforts were followed in Inner Mongolia as well. And as far as the medium of instruction was concerned, the Han teachers were

295 NCNA (Peking), 13 February 1972, SCMP, n. 261, p. 27.
296 NCNA (Peking), 13 December 1972, SCMP, n. 263, p. 173.
expected to study Mongolian language to be used in the lower grades or until the pupils learnt Chinese for lessons to be conducted in Mandarin.

Further, the students of Inner Mongolia with good caliber were sent out for further training. Graduates who returned to their production brigades were often asked to serve as accountants, teachers, recorders at work places and barefoot doctors. Efforts were also made to train minorities in the region as teachers, to serve in their native places, which naturally resulted in the increase of minority teachers in the area.

Besides, efforts were also made to teach Chinese to the minorities in the region and they were also encouraged to learn Mongolian. It was said that in 1972 and 1973 the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region had published five million copies of books in Mongolian which was equal to the total number of Mongolian language books published between 1960-65. On closer scrutiny it becomes evident that this development is contrary to the Beijing government’s allegation against Ulanfu, during the ‘Cultural Revolution,’ with respect to his emphasis on Mongolian language.

Further the Beijing government made efforts to establish a Mongolian Language Research Institute and the state enterprises and government organs were expected to employ both Mongolian and Han as working languages. Radio broadcasts in the region were made bilingual. The minorities in the region were encouraged to write books in Mongolian. State subsidies were provided to books written in Mongolian, whose prices were lower than those printed in Chinese. By mid-1972 the minorities in Inner Mongolia were listed in the list of minorities as a separate category for the first time since 1966. Henceforth the news about

---


299 Peking Review, n. 266, p. 23.
minorities in Inner Mongolia in general, and minorities in particular, was categorized under more general topics.

Health care services in Inner Mongolia were expanded further. It was said that the doctors and nurses learnt local languages in order to provide better services to the people.\textsuperscript{300} The doctors, in addition to performing conventional medical works, also ran classes to train people of the region as barefoot doctors.

The Tenth Party Congress with a view to rehabilitating the high ranking party people, who were criticized for their handling of minorities policy, rehabilitated Ulanfu and appointed him as the full member of the Tenth Central Committee and he remained in Peking and appeared frequently in ceremonial capacities.\textsuperscript{301} His presence in Peking, rather than in his former province, indicated a more conservative post-Lin leadership’s desire not to anger leftists. That Ulanfu was segregated from his political power base suggests that he probably was divested from the decision-making activities in his region. On the other hand, Paojihletai, a Mongol, was described as having been tempered in the struggles of the ‘Cultural Revolution.’ Paojihletai, member of a commune which had been designated “the Tachai of the grasslands”, had dared to repudiate old customs and the “Liu Shao-ch’i--Ulanfu line” in order to grow grain in what had been regarded as pasturelands.\textsuperscript{302}

Later, she was made the Vice-chairman of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region Revolutionary Committee. Thereafter, she was also made deputy Chairman of the autonomous region’s party committee. This was a token of reward for her efforts in heading the commune in grain production.

\textsuperscript{300} For example see \textit{NCNA} (Kuning), 17 May 1972, \textit{SCMP}, no. 5143, pp. 23-4.

\textsuperscript{301} \textit{Peking Review}, vol. 18, no. 19, 9 May 1975, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{302} Dreyer, n.2, p. 248.
During the *Hsia fang* movement educated youth came to Inner Mongolia to receive re-education from poor and lower middle peasants. There, however, is no authentic data on the number of rusticated youth sent down to IMAR. Many of the young settlers in Inner Mongolia were absorbed into the Production and Construction Corps. The fact that these educated young people stayed apart from the minorities, in whose areas they had settled, is reinforced by the lack of any reference to members of minority nationalities in the accounts they gave. In a typical case, a young man who was sent to Jahoda (*chao-wu-ta*) league, a Mongol area transferred to from the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region to Liaoning in 1969, writes of the conflict between bourgeois and proletarian definitions of love. A member of the “Educated youth learn from Lei Feng” production team, the name virtually confirming its non-indigenous membership, did not mention minorities at all.\(^{303}\)

Liberal policies set in at the time of Lin Piao’s demise, in general, continued in Inner Mongolia as in other regions. Special emphasis was placed on the need to implement the 1973 Party Constitution’s enjoinder on tempering minority cadres in the three revolutionary movements. This venture, though a success, lacks in hard data with respect to Inner Mongolia. It was reported in June 1973 that over 143,000 members of minority nationalities were admitted to the party in the five autonomous regions, of which Inner Mongolian Autonomous region was one.\(^{304}\)

In the Fourth NPC minority nationals from Inner Mongolia were also represented. Out of the twenty three persons chosen as permanent Chairmen of the Presidium, Ulanfu was one; he was ranked 17 in the Congress’ communique,\(^{305}\) and he was also elected as Vice-chairman of the NPC Standing Committee.\(^{306}\) Further, the NPC adopted a new Constitution in which the equality of Mongol nationality


\(^{305}\) *Peking Review*, vol. 18, no. 4, 24 January, 1975, p. 6.

along with the others was reaffirmed. They were given freedom to use their own spoken and written languages and to exercise autonomous government. The minorities in Inner Mongolia were said to have been happy with the new Constitution; the Changchun Radio, on 20 January 1975, reported joyous response from the Mongols.

KANSU PROVINCE: 1970-76

Material on Ch'inghai and Kansu provinces of Chinese Central Asia, with respect to post-Cultural Revolution period is very sparse and calls for a special study. Coming to the main focus, factories in Kansu had been organised to supply goods suited to the special needs of the province's ethnic groups. The factory personnel paid a close attention to retain the traditional nationality characteristics of their products. Further, leading cadres and technicians visited the remote areas of the region to learn the views of the herdsmen of their products. Wherever it was not convenient for herdsmen to come to the state stores, the trading agencies, in many places, arranged to send goods directly to the herdsmen's tents.307

Further, arrangements were also made to have small local factories manufacture the types of farm tools preferred by the minorities in the region. Later in 1972, when the Central Nationalities Institute was reopened the minorities from Kansu too were represented in the Institute. Tutors spoke their native languages in the class. But due to the failure of the Institute to remedy the academic deficiencies of all the students, the Beijing government ventured to raise the educational standards in the minority areas, including in Kansu. Like in other areas, it would also be possible to say that in Kansu, too, the Han teachers were directed to study the language of the area in which they were posted. This implies that minority language was used at least in the lower grades. Minorities in the region, with good caliber, were sent out of the region for further training and the returnees were directed to serve as accountants, teachers, recorders at work points and barefoot

307 For example see, NCNA (Sining), 21 November 1971, SCMP, n. 260, p. 201.
doctors. Like in Ch’inghai, special efforts were made to train minorities as teachers to serve in their native places.

Alongside the other areas, the health care services in Kansu were also expanded. Minorities in the region were also trained for technical jobs, which resulted in increased opportunities for promotion. In summer 1972 Mao’s statement, that without a large number of cadres of minority nationalities it would not be possible to resolve the nationalities problem, was once again upheld. It was reported that in K’anglo hsien in Kansu, 54.3 per cent of the newly promoted cadres in the hsien were Hui or Tunghsiang. Here, as the minority population of K’anglo was about 50 per cent of the total, it would seem that the aim of this new drive was to have the percentage of minorities cadres approximate their percentage in the population of the area as a whole.

In the Tenth Party Congress the minorities from Kansu were also represented in the 3.6 per cent of the 195 full members and 4.8 per cent of the 124 alternate members elected to the Tenth Central Committee.

Coming to the Hsia’fang movement, educated young people were directed to go to the countryside to receive re-education from poor and lower middle peasants. It was reported that 1,060 people from 202 urban households in Huining county had gone to the front-line for agricultural production between July and December 1968 and that all the junior and senior middle school graduates, during 1966 1967 and 1968, returned to the countryside to participate in production--"a result due entirely to the guidance of Mao Tse-tung’s thought." The Huining Revolutionary Committee started its mobilisation work by holding Mao study classes for students. Besides, family-Mao study classes were held, too. The

308 For example see, KMJP, 29 January 1972, SCMP, n. 265, p. 189.
309 KMJP, 10 November 1972, SCMP, no. 5259, p. 17.
rusticated youth left for the countryside to settle down there paying heed to Mao’s words, and, thereby, displayed loyalty to Mao.

Further, under the illumination of Mao’s thought, many people enlisted to go down to the countryside. Those residents who earlier headed for the countryside but flowed back to the towns returned to the front-line of agricultural production on their own volition. Families of cadres which were earlier reluctant to leave urban areas also moved happily to the countryside to settle down there.\textsuperscript{312} Now, to mention of minorities in Kansu, in the Fourth NPC they, too, were included among the 54 deputies representing national minorities. In the newly elected Presidium of the same Congress, though 13 minority nationalities were included, it is not known whether there was any representation for Kansu. Additionally, as many minority group members have Han-style names it is difficult to ascertain the same.\textsuperscript{313}

**SINKIANG UIGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION (SUAR): 1970-76**

Following the ‘Cultural Revolution,’ Sinkiang, for the next couple of years, experienced a succession of leaders and policies that fluctuated according to the prevailing currents of the nation-wide ‘two line struggle’.\textsuperscript{314} Besides, Sinkiang experienced similar situation like that of other minority regions, but the changes in the leadership occurred later in Inner Mongolia. Lung Shu-Chin, who was associated with the Fourth Field Army, relinquished his posts as the Chairman of revolutionary committee and First Secretary in favour of Saifudin. This development is worthy of note, for it was for the first time that a civilian and a native i.e., Uighur was made the incharge of the SUAR. On the other hand, Yang Yung, a member of the Second Field Army,\textsuperscript{315} was appointed commander of the Sinkiang Military Region.

\textsuperscript{312} *Ibid.*

\textsuperscript{313} Dreyer, n. 2, p. 257.

\textsuperscript{314} Millen, n. 134, p. 571.

\textsuperscript{315} Whitson, n. 167, p. 130; and also see chart ‘C,’ p. 29.
Subsequent to Lin Piao's downfall in 1971, and much to the displeasure of the radicals, there was a halting return to many of the policies previously advocated by the ousted Wang administration. This moderation was, of course, only relative.\textsuperscript{316} Further, minorities in Sinkiang were also recruited into leadership positions, who in turn raised their ideological consciousness and were now in a better position to lead and serve their areas.

Minorities' special characteristics were referred once again. Factories in Sinkiang had been organised to supply goods suited to the special needs of the province's ethnic groups. Further, factory personnel did pay close attention to retain the traditional nationality characteristics of their products. Prominent cadres and technicians visited the remote areas of the region to learn the views of herdsmen of their products. If herdsmen faced difficulty in reaching state stores, trading agencies in many places sent goods to the herdsmen's tents.\textsuperscript{317} Arrangements were made to have small local factories manufacture the types of farm tools the minorities preferred.

Minorities of Sinkiang, too, were represented in the Central Nationalities Institute when it was reopened.\textsuperscript{318} Minority nationality students of Sinkiang were trained as cadres, teachers, translators and literary and art workers, as in other areas. The faculty members included teachers from Sinkiang who spoke their native language in the class.\textsuperscript{319}

As the Central Institute failed to remedy the academic deficiencies of all the persons in the institute, a major effort began to improve and raise the educational standards of minorities in Sinkiang itself. Pupils were instructed in their native

\textsuperscript{316} The Uighur in Sinkiang-Part II. \textit{China News Analysis}, no.1052. 3 September 1976. p.3.

\textsuperscript{317} For example see \textit{NCNA} (Sining). 21 November 1971. \textit{SCMP}, n. 260, p. 201.

\textsuperscript{318} For example see \textit{NCNA} (Peking). 13 February 1972. and \textit{SCMP}, n. 261, p. 27.

\textsuperscript{319} \textit{NCNA} (Peking) 13 December 1972, \textit{SCMP}, n. 263, p. 173.
tongue in the lower grades or until they learnt enough Chinese for lessons to be conducted in Mandarin. Reportedly, in Zhangji Hui Autonomous Chou in Sinkiang alone, 581 schools were said to have been in operation in 1974 in contrast to 435 prior to the GPCR.\textsuperscript{320} Promising minority students were sent up for further training. On return after graduation, their services were often utilised as barefoot doctors, teachers, recorders at work points and accountants.\textsuperscript{321} Also, minorities were trained as tutors to serve in their own areas. The minorities own language was encouraged, too.

During this period, Chinese culture, aptly dubbed, ‘Chiang Ch’ing Culture’ was imposed on minority regions with renewed vigour. Following the forceful imposition of Latin alphabet over the indigenous scripts, local literacy traditions faced near extinction.\textsuperscript{322}

In 1971 the Beijing government ventured to introduce \textit{P’}in-yin\textit{ script in SUAR;} widespread publicity was given with respect to the advancement of the script. The people of the region were taught to use the \textit{P’}in-yin\textit{ script. During the time of its introduction, script reform was depicted as “an intensive revolution involving an acute struggle between the two classes and line.”}\textsuperscript{323} All that could be said after two years of struggle between the two classes and line was that, fairly good results have been achieved.\textsuperscript{324} This non-Han script i.e., \textit{P’}in-yin\textit{, was popularised at higher levels and later it was reported that the circulation of the new script edition of the \textit{Ining Daily} exceeded that of the old script edition.}\textsuperscript{325} Further, it

\textsuperscript{320} Israeli, n. 287, p. 907.

\textsuperscript{321} For example see \textit{KMJP}, 29 January 1972, \textit{SCMP}, n. 265, p. 189.

\textsuperscript{322} The Uighur in Sinkiang Part-II, \textit{China News Analysis}, n. 316, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{323} \textit{Radio Urumchi}, 15 June 1973, quoted from Dreyer, n. 2, p. 245.

\textsuperscript{324} \textit{Ibid}.

\textsuperscript{325} \textit{Radio Urumchi}, 14 December 1974, quoted from Dreyer n. 2, p. 245.
was reported that over seven million books were published in minority languages in the SUAR during the first half of 1974.\textsuperscript{326}

In 1972 minority culture in Sinkiang saw a return to the national in form, socialist in content dictum, as in other regions. It was reported that in spring Urumchi Radio announced that literary and art workers in Ili had launched a mass movement for creativity. Paying heedful attention to the special characteristics of the area and its peoples led to emphasising the development of national forms in order to make literature and art serve socialism better.\textsuperscript{327} It also enabled adopting revolutionary model operas, inviting cultural workers to transplant \textit{(Yi-chih)} the operas and put forward their ideas through nationality’s art forms.

Later after two years, it was reported that Chiang Ch’ing Revolutionary model plays like the ‘The Red Lantern’\textsuperscript{328} were translated into Uighur and performed in Sinkiang, including in non-Uighur parts of the region in order to enrich the national minorities with socialist art.\textsuperscript{329} Further, the troops in Sinkiang adopted such operas as “on the Docks \textit{(Hai-Kang)} and “White-Haired Girl”, using the languages and folk songs of Uighur, Kazakh, Kirghiz and Sibo nationalities.\textsuperscript{330} It was claimed that spare-time cultural workers in a Kazakh area travelled from one tent to the other collecting indigenous folk songs.\textsuperscript{331} But there is no doubt that there is an element of possibility that the songs, once collected, were changed to give them a more ideologically orthodox content.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{326} \textit{Radio Peking}, 9 August 1974, quoted from Dreyer, n. 2, p. 245.
\item \textsuperscript{327} \textit{Radio Urumchi}, 14 May 1972, quoted from Dreyer, n. 2, p. 245.
\item \textsuperscript{328} For a detailed discussion on this opera see Colin Mackerras, “The Chinese Opera after the Cultural Revolution (1970-72),” \textit{The China Quarterly}, no. 55, July-September 1973, pp. 484-87.
\item \textsuperscript{329} The Uighur in Sinkiang Part-II, \textit{China News Analysis}, n. 316, p. 5.
\item \textsuperscript{330} \textit{Radio Urmuchi}, 9 October, 1974, cited in Dreyer, n. 2, p. 245.
\item \textsuperscript{331} \textit{Radio Urumchi}, 14 May 1972, quoted from Dreyer, n. 2, p. 245.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Basic health care services were also expanded in the region. Doctors and nurses learnt the local languages in order to offer better service to the people. The doctors also ran classes to train minority people as barefoot doctors. As part of the Beijing government's efforts to train minorities for technical jobs, classes were held for Uighurs and Kazakhs in Sinkiang to teach the operation and maintenance of farm machinery. This increased training resulted in increased opportunities for promotion. It was reported that in Kangsu mining area of Sinkiang 70 per cent of the mine's new cadres were members of minority ethnic groups, and about 50 per cent of them held leading posts in the party and revolutionary committee.

The Tenth Party Congress rehabilitated high ranking party men in the region who had been criticized for their handling of minorities-policy. SUAR minorities too found representation on the Tenth Central Committee. The Tenth Central Committee honoured Saifudin, who was attacked in 1968 by some radicals, with membership and Ismail Aymat was described as having been tempered in the struggles of 'Cultural Revolution'.

After the demise of Lin Piao, however, leadership of the party and government came to be separated from the command of the Army. Further, the Beijing government made efforts to refute the charges of the Soviet Union with regard to China's nationalities policy. The Chinese propaganda on the subject of minorities has involved an attack to show that the charges of oppression made by Moscow government against Beijing were not true. Further, China's historical control over the disputed areas was asserted. At a rally in Urumchi in 1974, organised by personnel of the Sinkiang Cultural Relics Museum, 15,000 participants saw archaeological finds proving that Chinese influence in Sinkiang had existed since antiquity. A similar kind of multiethnic groups' meeting was held in Turfan,

---

332 *Peking Review*, vol. 17, no. 34, 23 August 1974, p. 23.


a place where ancient tombs were excavated, proving that Sinkiang, by then, has been an inseparable part of the motherland for the last 200 years.\footnote{Dreyer n. 2, p. 252.}

Alongside, the Beijing government also tried to disprove the charges that China’s ill-treatment of her nationalities has alienated their loyalties. Later, when a Soviet helicopter was captured in Sinkiang, in early 1974, the Chinese press was at pains to point out that it was captured by members of various nationalities standing together to defend their country. The commander of a militia platoon in the hsien where the helicopter was captured, himself a minority groups’ member, was brought to Peking to participate in anti-Soviet rallies and the Chinese official media made special note of his presence at the National Day celebrations in Peking.\footnote{Radio Peking. 1 October 1974, quoted from Dreyer, p. 252.}

It was reported that during the Hsia fang movement 200,000 educated youth had settled in the rural areas of SUAR and many of the young Sinkiang settlers were absorbed into the Production and Construction Corps.\footnote{Radio Urumchi, 23 December 1974, and 10 January 1975, quoted from Dreyer, n. 2, p. 253.} In continuation of liberal policies, special emphasis was also laid on the need to implement the 1973 party Constitution’s enjoinder on tempering minority cadres in the three revolutionary movements. In this connection there was an increase in party membership. A report in June 1973 stated that over 143,000 members of minority nationalities had been admitted to the party in the five autonomous regions in which the Sinkiang Autonomous Region was also included.\footnote{NCNA(Peking), n. 279, p. 106.}

The Fourth NPC was attended by minorities from Sinkiang, too.\footnote{Peking Review, n. 305, p. 7.} As stated earlier, Saifudin was ranked Eighth in the Congress’s communiqué\footnote{Ibid., p. 6.} and was one of the four national minorities of the twenty-three persons chosen as
permanent Chairman of the Presidium. Further, he was also elected as Vice-
chairman of the NPC Standing Committee along with Wei Kuo-Ch'ing, Ulanfu, and
Nagpo Nagawang Jigme. The new Constitution reaffirmed the equality of all
nationalities, including nationalities in Sinkiang. It further gave freedom to all
minorities in Sinkiang to use their own spoken and written languages and to
exercise autonomous government in Sinkiang Autonomous Region. Hailing the new
Constitution the provincial broadcasts expressed joyous response from Kazahks.

This comment is more indicative of how the party leadership at Beijing hoped that
the nationalities would respond to the Fourth NPC than how the nationalities
actually felt. For instance, a Uighur fighter said, “Representatives of all the minority
nationalities attended the Congress. Our Uighurs’ representatives discussed the
major affairs of the state and decided on the Constitution[,] together with the
representatives of all nationalities. This fully embodies the political situation in
which the labouring people of all nationalities are the masters of the country. The
new Constitution adopted by the Congress made particular stipulations on the rights
of the minority nationalities. This fully shows that the socialist motherland led by
the CCP and headed by Chairman Mao truly embodies the equality and unity of the
people of all nationalities. No enemy can destroy this steel-like unity.”

In sum, the developments in the post-'Cultural Revolution period in
Sinkiang clearly demonstrate the cautious blow hot--blow cold policy of Beijing
towards the internal affairs of Sinkiang. This, however, does not mean that both the
radical and moderate factions were equally poised in the power struggle. In fact, a
collective leadership evolved in Sinkiang during 1975-76 that was not dominated by
any one all-powerful faction or an individual. Hence, there was a lack of real
leadership in the region and meant a continuation of the factional bickering until
after the death of Mao.

342 Ibid., p. 8.
343 For details see NCNA (Urumchi) 25 September 1975, quoted from Israile, n. 287, p. 908.
In the post-Cultural Revolution period in Tibet, the vigorous purges that had been taking place to eliminate those accused of 'sabotaging the unity of nationalities and using religious superstitions in a vain attempt to restore the feudal serf system', were brought to an abrupt end. The army maintained its strong hold on the region, probably because of its strategic importance. The police and the army took the traitors, conspirators, saboteurs, criminals and other elements to task. Executions were repeatedly held in public to serve as an example for the masses and the crowded Lhasa's prisons. 346

Coming to the change of leadership in TAR, Tseng Yung-ya, of Fourth Field Army, who was a Chairman of the revolutionary committee and a commander of the Tibet Military Region, was transferred to a less prestigious position in Shenyang Military Region. Jen Jung succeeded Tseng as the Chairman of the revolutionary committee and was also appointed as the First Secretary of the TARs party committee, which was formed during mid-1971. Jen Jung, who was affiliated with the Fourth Field Army, did not escape criticism during the course of 'Cultural Revolution' for his conservatism. 347 The post of Tibet Military District commander which fell vacant due to Tseng's transfer was given to Ch'en Ming-yi who was a veteran Second Field Army commander. 348 This bifurcation of the powers held by Tseng, when taken with the initially temporary status as party first secretary given to Jen Jung, might have been aimed at restricting his actions. 349

Alongside the above changes, Tibetan communists like Tashi Wangchuk, Lo Tenga, Phuntsog Wangyal and Ngawang Kalsang were liquidated for their Tibetan

346 Donnc, n. 128, p. 84.

347 For details see Chinese Communist Affairs: Facts and Features; n. 267, pp. 22-23.

348 For details see Whitson, n. 167, Chart 'C.' p. 29.

349 Dreyer, n. 2, p. 239.
nationalism. But prominent Tibetan communists like Samgye Yeshi, Sherab Thondup and Pa Sang became secretaries in the TARs Party Committee. It can be said that the leadership changes in Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet Autonomous Regions were part of Mao’s plan, in a venture to reduce the powers of Lin Piao and his fourth Field Army which had become so disproportionate during 1966-69 period.

It is difficult to document the exact connection between the changes in leadership and changes in political decision making. But personnel changes made in the minority areas towards the second half of 1971 and in 1972 were no doubt accompanied by the evidence of distinct changes in the policy towards ethnic minorities. For instance, in Tibet a vigorous purge that had been taking place during 1971 was brought to an end. In fact, during ‘Cultural Revolution’ the old forces of the Tibetan elite’s were completely wiped off.

Later, it was reported that the Tibetan people had taken rapid strides and in mid-1971 four Tibetans were supposed to have attended the Ninth Party Congress in Peking, of whom one had been elected as an alternative member of the Party Central Committee. Further, the biographies of the new committee member and of several other outstanding Tibetan cadres were also included. This is almost an acknowledgment of the right to existence of nationalities’ special characteristics as it was in the previous years.

In 1972 the Beijing government geared up towards moderation, which resulted in the party undertaking repairs of monasteries and other historic buildings. All these efforts were a success to a large extent. The smelting of looted metal objects from Tibet’s temples and monasteries ceased in 1973 when it came to the

---


352 Manaranjan Josse, “The Dalai Lama, the Sore Point,” South China Morning Post, 14 June 1976.
knowledge of top cadres like Li Xiannian and Ulanfu, himself a Mongolian.\textsuperscript{353} The Beijing government also relaxed the restrictions on Tibetan religious practices and cultural activities. Besides, the same year the CCP enabled the minorities to avail of the four basic freedoms which dealt with religious practices, trade, lending money on interest basis and keeping servants for domestic purposes.\textsuperscript{354}

Immediately after this development a series of mass meetings were held in various parts of Tibet with the higher level cadres asking the people to be neither excited nor to show any abnormality if the Dalai Lama chose to return to Tibet, influenced by the victories of Mao Tse-tung.\textsuperscript{355} This sudden shift in the policy was rationalised by explaining that previous repression’s were the faults of anti-Mao revisionists. This development led to widespread rumours regarding the negotiations between the Chinese and the Dalai Lama and how the latter would be convinced to return to Tibet. During the same time, the Tibetan leader, on his trip to Great Britain, stated that he had developed respect for his former enemies and he liked Mao and admired him very much.\textsuperscript{356}

Later, at Geneva, the Dalai Lama praised the Peking government for the recent changes in its policy towards Tibet and said that he might return to his country soon.\textsuperscript{357} As the negotiations between the Beijing government and the Dalai Lama were secret nothing could to ascertained. Nevertheless, analysing on the basis of concessions the Chinese have offered in the religious sphere, it is probable that the Chinese were willing to accept the Dalai Lama as the religious leader. Further it is also probable that the Chinese wanted to limit his influence in the political sphere to the sanctioning of policies which were previously decided upon elsewhere.

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{353}] Donnet. n. 128. p. 82.
\item[\textsuperscript{354}] John F. Avedón, \textit{In Exile From the Land of Snow} (London, 1985), p. 312.
\item[\textsuperscript{356}] “The Dalai Tribute to Mao”, \textit{Tibetan Review, Ibid.}, p. 22.
\item[\textsuperscript{357}] “The Dalai Lama Hopeful of Return to Tibet”. \textit{Ibid.}, p. 22.
\end{itemize}
Besides, the Beijing government’s pressure on India to accept that the Tibetans should no longer be called refugees was to make the latter ineligible for United Nations aid.\(^{358}\) In a way this was a venture to force Tibetans to choose between Indian nationality in India, Chinese nationality in Tibet or a stateless and almost certainly scattered existence in whatever countries would be willing to accept groups of them.\(^{359}\) On the other hand the Tibetan refugee groups were also aware of the fact that the CIA had lost interest in subsidizing them. If we take note of the Dalai Lama’s constant calls for a free and fair plebiscite to decide whether the people of Tibet favoured to live under the Chinese rule,\(^{360}\) it may not materialise unless and until the Beijing authority is confident of winning such an election.

Apart from the above, the Dalai Lama hoped to induce the Chinese to give the concept of regional autonomy for Tibet more in actual content, appointing Tibetans in real political and administrative positions of power, protecting and preserving the Tibetan language and culture and allowing freedom of movement into and out of Tibet.\(^{361}\) It is on this basis that negotiations might have taken place.

Later, in November, there started a drive to recruit more cadres from minority ethnic groups into leadership positions. But the proverbially small number of such cadres were discouraged due to their low cultural level and were suggested solutions for such problems. The cadres involved had raised their ideological consciousness and were more confident of themselves and were now in a better position to lead and serve their areas. The minority special characteristics were once again referred to. Factories were organised to produce goods suitable to needs of the province’s ethnic groups. Industrial development slowly enhanced its pace. Coal mines were worked, chemical and machinery plants were established, and electricity


\(^{359}\) Dreyer, n. 2, p. 241.


production increased. In 1971 it was reported that about 100 medium-sized hydro-electric stations were functioning and the output increased. The Linchi Woolen Mill, with more than 1000 workers, produced blankets and various other types of woollen goods. Certain consumer goods such as cooking vessels, thermos flasks and porcelain cups made in China became popular among the Tibetans.

Factory personnel paid intimate attention to retain the traditional nationality characteristics of their products. Further, the leading cadres and technicians visited the grasslands regularly to seek the views of the herdsmen of their products, as elsewhere. So also, if it was not convenient for the herdsmen to come to the state stores, the trading agencies made arrangements to send goods by yak and camel directly to the herdsmen’s tents. In order to start a pattern of settled life many animal shelters were built, fodder was provided and the herdsmen were encouraged to settle down. Veterinary help was provided.

The Tibetan Nationalities Institute was reopened in Hsienyang in Shensi after the reopening of the Central Nationalities Institute. It was found that a large number of students were illiterate and had to be taught Tibetan as well as Chinese. But the Institute could attempt to remedy the academic deficiency of only a small number of students. Resultantly, a major effort immediately began to improve the educational standards in Tibet. But it is not clear what exactly was the medium of instruction in the schools. That the Han teachers learnt the language of the area to which they were posted implies that the minority language was

employed in the lower grades or until the people had mastered enough Chinese for classes to be conducted in Mandarin.

It was reported that the number of students in the field of education was 73,600 in 1965; in 1971 their number rose to 83,000. The number of primary schools was 1,970 and that of secondary schools was seven. However, emphasis was laid on vocation-oriented curriculum. Political ideology formed an important part of the syllabus even in the primary classes. In response a large increase in the field of adult education has been reported. In 1972 not less than 39 primary and secondary schools functioned in Lhasa with a strength of 10,000 students. Further, minority students with good abilities were sent out of their areas for further training. Graduate returnees were often asked to serve as accountants, teachers, recorders at work places and barefoot doctors.

Further, efforts were made to train minorities as teachers to serve in their native places which resulted in the large scale increase in the percentage of minority teachers. Efforts were also made to teach Chinese to the minorities in Tibet along with an equal amount of encouragement given to teach minorities' own language. With a view to publishing books in minority language a printing house was established in 1972 exclusively to publish Tibetan books. In this context Doji Tsaidan, a Tibetan and head of the Tibet's Bureau of Culture and Education, said that a new socialist Tibet offered bright prospects for the development of the Tibetan language. Apart from the translation of Marxist classics, traditional works were also translated, including almanacs and catalogues of indigenous medicinal herb's. Doje Tsaidan pointed out that because of the party's enlightened educational policy, literacy had increased greatly, as indicated by the fact that circulation of the Tibetan edition of the Tibet Daily rose from 2,000 in 1956 to 25,000 in 1974. A huge number of original theatrical works were composed in

---

368 "Education in Tibet." Peking Review. vol. 15. no. 11, March 1972, p. 23.


370 Dreyer, n. 2, p. 244.

371 Ibid, p. 245.
Tibetan, and Han actors in Tibet learnt to speak Tibetan and to sing Tibetan songs. In 1964 the Han-Tibetan dictionary was revised and more Tibetan-type writers were manufactured.372

Regarding cultural aspects, revolutionary operas were started.373 Traditional Tibet-based religious and methodological dance-drama formed the basis of cultural life. On the contrary, in modern operas new values of socialist reform, and emphasis on production, etc. were introduced, and formed a part of mass media. Films showing the success of democratic reforms were shown. Mao-thought study circles were started during the ‘Cultural Revolution’ and by 1971 a large number of Tibetan students were attending them. Later, by June the same year, the minorities in Tibet were listed as a separate category for the first time since the ‘Cultural Revolution’ began.374

Efforts were also made to expand health care services in the minority areas. It was reported that medical teams from eight different provinces and municipalities were active in Tibet.375 One such team stationed in desolate Ari area for one year had to cope up with the language difficulties, besides cold temperatures, due to the area’s high altitudes and the necessity of learning how to ride yaks.376 Apart from performing conventional medicinal tasks under these difficult conditions, the doctors conducted classes to train minority people as barefoot doctors.377 Additionally, emphasis was also paid to train minorities for technical jobs. It was reported that in Menpa, one of the small ethnic groups in Tibet was being trained as


374 Peking Review. n. 266, p. 23.


376 Ibid., p. 246.

recorders at work places, health workers, movie projectionists and electrical workers, all of which resulted in increase in promotion chances.

Now, by mid-1972, Mao's previous pronouncement that without a large number of cadres of minority nationalities it would be impossible to solve the nationalities problem was quoted once again.\(^{378}\) It was reported that in Langkatzu, in the Shannan area of Tibet, Tibetan cadres were, now, almost a nine-tenth of the cadres at *Hsien, Commune* and township level.\(^{379}\) As all the inhabitants of Langkatzu were Tibetans, it seems that the aim of the new drive was to render the minority cadres' percentage approximately equivalent to their percentage of the population of the area as a whole.

While this is in consonance with the nationalization policy that had been advocated nearly two decades ago, the discredited term--'nationalization policy' was not used. Instead, it was argued that minority cadres, being familiar with the local conditions, were better equipped at forming ties with the masses.\(^{380}\) And this helped to reorganise the minorities for the socialist revolution and the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat. There is doubt that these factors were also employed to justify the rehabilitation of minority cadres who had been purged during the 'Cultural Revolution'.\(^{381}\)

Further, efforts to train new minority leaders and to rehabilitate the old ones were justified on the grounds of increased production figures. A brief sketch of the efforts of the newly appointed minority cadres was followed by the claims of higher yields\(^{382}\) or fulfillment of the state Plans beyond the expected targets.\(^{383}\) However,


\(^{382}\) Ibid., pp. 17-18.

one cannot deny the fact that the increasing number of minority group members in responsible positions led to increased production.

In 1973 the Tenth Party Congress made an initial effort to rehabilitate some of the high ranking party officials who had been criticized for their handling of minority policy. However, Ngapo Ngawang Jigme, though not in Tibet since the onset of ‘Cultural Revolution’, happened to appear regularly in ceremonial capacities in Peking. In fact, he was ranked fourth after Chou En-lai, Chiang Ch’ing and Li Hsien-nien in a delegation welcoming Tobago, the premier of Trinidad during his visit to Peking, and fifth in a similar delegation greeting the President of Congo.\footnote{Ngapo also figured prominently in television broadcasts on major state occasions such as the National Day celebrations. He is a tangible symbol of the party’s willingness to cooperate with it. The presence of Ngapo in Peking indicates a more conservative post-Lin Piao leadership’s conscious effort not to annoy the leftist faction. Though Ngapo had high social status, he was isolated from his political power base, and, hence, was presumably distanced from the decision-making process in TAR.}

The representation of Tibetans at the Tenth Party Committee compares favorably to the minimum percentage of 2.9 per cent and 3.7 per cent for full and alternate members of the Ninth Central Committee. Among them, T’ien Pao was an old revolutionary of Tibet. On the other hand, Pa Sang, a Tibetan, was branded as having been tempered in the struggle during the ‘Cultural Revolution’ period. Pa Sang was said to have been a slave during the pre-liberation days and was sent to school by the party. Later, for having been active in the democratic reform movement, she was made chairman of a hsien women’s federation and a deputy hsien head at the time of the ‘Cultural Revolution’.\footnote{Radio Peking, 27 July 1973. quoted from Dreyer, n. 2, p. 247.}

\footnote{Peking Review, vol. 14, no. 25, 18 June 1971, pp. 20 and 22.}
The post-Lin Piao’s fall period saw a major push for economic development in Tibet. To begin with, the negotiations between the Dalai Lama and the Beijing government broken down in 1973 which resulted in widespread repercussions on Tibet. The Beijing government dared renewed attacks on the Dalai Lama and the Panchan Lama. A high level Chinese official stated that two dangers still confronted Chinese rule in Tibet: externally, the Dalai Lama in exile, backed by India, and internally, the Tibetan people’s continued admiration of the Panchan Lama for defying Beijing.\(^{386}\) The official media started attacking the Dalai Lama. The *New China News Agency* sponsored a mobile exhibition on life in Tibet before the democratic reforms, replete with examples of the Dalai Lama’s alleged cruelty.\(^{387}\) Further, the revolutionary art portrayed the erstwhile religious head of Tibet i.e., the Dalai Lama, with a butcher’s knife and prayer beads in hands. Other exhibits included a rosary made of the cranial bones of 108 persons said to have been used by the Dalai Lama.\(^{388}\) The propaganda machine branded him as a ‘bandit and a traitor’ and ‘a butcher with bloody hands who lived off the flesh of the people.’\(^{389}\)

Meetings were held to denounce the exhibition where the emancipated slaves declared that they would never tolerate restoration.\(^{390}\) The Beijing government, along with its efforts of repudiation of the Dalai Lama, also made efforts to develop Tibet with a view to integrating it with the mainland. This resulted in conducting a scientific survey of the Ch’inghai-Tibet plateau in 1973, which was further expanded in 1974. Thirty survey teams each consisting members from the Chinese Academy of Sciences and prominent Chinese universities were commissioned to study topics *viz.* optimal growing range for winter wheat, causes for the degeneration of domesticated animals at high attitudes, potential for expanding irrigation facilities and the location of mineral reserves.

\(^{386}\) Avedon. n. 354, p. 312.

\(^{387}\) Dreyer. n. 2, p. 249.


\(^{389}\) Donnel. n. 128, p. 84.

\(^{390}\) *Peking Review*, vol. 17, no. 29, 7 July 1974, pp. 9-11.
Fresh efforts were made to communise Tibet. The cornerstone of people's communes was to herald total collectivization of agriculture and animal husbandry. Land, livestock and tools were snatched from the peasants and were made a collective property of the people’s communes. Each commune was sub-divided into production brigades. Family holdings and privately owned fields were banned. Irrigation activities, in 34 per cent of the hsiangs, where more than 600 communes were operating, with the help of pumping stations, were expanded.\(^{391}\)

The local communes dug a canal for drinking water to Shigatse.\(^{392}\) The knowledge of commune experiment spread all over Tibet. Protective of their personal freedom by nature, the Tibetans--particularly the nomads--immediately developed a deep-seated feeling of aversion to the concept. They viewed them as just another type of prison or labour camp,\(^ {393}\) because the Tibetan peasants lost all freedom of movement.\(^ {394}\) To venture beyond their living and working quarters, special permission was now required.

The communes were generally smaller in Tibet consisting of one to two hundred families. On the whole, 90 per cent of people's communes were established in the region's township by the end of 1974 and was virtually complete by December 1975.\(^ {395}\) There were almost 2,000 communes scattered throughout, in almost every district of central Tibet (U-Tsang).\(^ {396}\) Agricultural specialists, efficient party members who could mobilise masses, army units and the Tibet Production and Construction Corps made joint efforts to make communisation programme a grand


\(^{393}\) Donnet, n. 128, p. 85.

\(^{394}\) For details see *Ibid*.

\(^{395}\) "Peoples Communes set up in 90 per cent of Tibet's Township," *Peking Review*, vol. 17. no. 45. 8 November 1974. p. 5.

\(^{396}\) Donnet, n. 128, p. 85.
success. It was reported that the volume of freight brought into Tibet in 1973 was almost 50 per cent higher than that in 1965, and the amount of goods shipped in for agricultural use increased by one hundred per cent. 397

The official media emphasised that this was one more manifestation of the Central government’s generosity towards Tibet, pointing out that from 1960, for one and a half decades, state outlays for agricultural and industrial development, health care, pensions, and relief amounted to three times the total taxes paid by the people of the region. 398 Further, in order to impress upon the Tibetans that natural conditions could be altered, irrespective of its backwardness, Tachai tours were organised.

Towards the end of 1974, Ch’en Yung-kuei, a leading personality of Tachi, made a visit to Tibet to investigate the situation and pass important instructions on work in the region. It was claimed that a grand success was made in the agricultural sector. It was reported twenty one varieties of vegetables were then being grown but was not as successfully as was expected. 399 The region’s First Party Secretary, Jen Jung, spoke of work falling short of the demands of the party Central Committee. The blame for some localities not recording increased agricultural and livestock production was placed on the masses, rather than on the different production conditions. 400 Further, the acreage involved was small, with expenditures necessary to provide the equipment in the agricultural sector being made as a matter of political faith and a hortatory mechanism, rather than actually attempting to change China’s food situation by any significant amount. 401


400 Dreyer, n. 2, p. 250.

401 Quoted from Ibid.
Besides, efforts were made to expand the educational system on par with the rest of China. In mid-1974 about 389 tutors were selected from half a dozen provinces, municipalities and departments under the State Council by means of a screening process. These tutors were given orientation courses before they were sent Tibet. Most of them were assigned to eight middle schools of the region, and some were involved in establishing a teacher’s college in the capital Lhasa. In 1973 and 1974, approximately, 1,000 Tibetans were sent to universities in the mainland for further studies.

In retrospect it was reported that adult education increased on the whole.\textsuperscript{402} If the preceding developments after the fall of Lin Piao were analysed, the efforts at collectivization, transfer of material and personnel into Tibet, and the setting up of a teacher’s college in Lhasa, probably, might have been aimed at tightening party control over Tibet. Further, in the Fourth NPC, out of the twenty three persons chosen as permanent Chairmen of the Presidium, that Ngapo Ngawang Jigme ranked 18 in the Congress’s communique and was one among them can also be considered as a pointer to the above fact.

**CONCLUSION**

During the decade long turmoil (GPCR), Ch’inghai, Kansu, Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet did not suffer anything more than the rest of China, say all of the China’s official publications, without the exception of any of them. In fact, it was a disaster for all Han and non-Han nationalities of China. The religious believers among the Han were forbidden to engage in religious activities and were prone for severe dress restrictions, just as the national minorities were. The majority Han were forced to wear the Chinese drab tunic suits of gray, blue and grass green and Han women were browbeaten if they happened to wear skirts. Thus, the decade-long turmoil of GPCR was not the offshoot of one nationality pitting itself against the other, but the two counter-revolutionary cliques lead by defence minister Lin

\textsuperscript{402} "Education in Tibet." *Peking Review*, vol. 15, no. 11, March 1972, p. 23.
Piao and Chiang Ch’ing directed their repressive acts against the people of all the nationalities. This frenzied period left deep imprints on the minds of national minorities in Chinese Central Asia. Additionally, the Beijing government never admitted that the Red Guards committed yet another heinous crime after the other, in the regions of Chinese Central Asia. It has proved far more difficult for China to deny it and to try to conceal it from the outside world since the death of Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

With the on set of the GPCR the five regions saw the Red Guards engaged in a systematic, methodological calculated, planned and comprehensive destruction of the minority civilization in which the minority youth too participated, though to a minimal extent. But these minority-Red Guards’ participation along with the Han Red Guards can be attributed to the very element of the unruly nature of teenage human psychology. On the other hand, forced execution of Mao Tse-tungism, non-compliance of which lead to *tanzing*, must have also compelled the minorities to participate in the GPCR. In retrospect the minorities in Chinese Central Asia were subjected to humiliation, insults, oppression, and an attempt at forced assimilation, destruction of the ecological equilibrium and suinous exploitation, as well as economic plunder. If this was the case, then there is no wonder that the relations between the Han and minorities in Chinese Central Asia remain emblematic in many places. It would take a long time to heal these wounds.

At the national level the United Front Work Department (UFWD) and the Nationalities Affairs Commission-officials responsible for minorities work were purged, as were the minority officials, too. Besides, a shift in power relationships in Beijing coupled with uncertainty over the specific ideological direction that was sought to be taken might have hindered the execution of routine matters relating to minorities.

Now, coming to Chinese Central Asia regions, the first party secretary of Tibet, Chang Kuo-hua, of TAR, was transferred to Szechwan, and suitably positioned. In all the revolutionary committees that were established army men
were at the helm of affairs. In case of Inner Mongolia the army leaders had replaced civilians in the top administrative posts. Besides, the new leaders had no precise ideological or institutional affiliation. With respect to the field armies the new leaders of Sinkiang and Tibet were members of Lin Piao’s Fourth Field Army. They replaced first party secretaries who had been affiliated with the Second Field Army in Tibet and First Field Army in Sinkiang. Nevertheless, Chang’s transfer to Szechwan cannot be considered as a demotion, and T’eng Hai-Ch’ing, the new leader of Inner Mongolia, was a member of the Third Field Army.

The Chinese Central Asian Regions, with the exception of Ch’inghai, being border areas, as they were, and strategically important, the Beijing authorities were forced to maintain adequate defence; this particular factor has also contributed to question the very survivability of leaders in Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang, Tibet and Kansu. The radicals in these four regions accused power holders of manipulating ethnic differences to reinforce their own positions by putting forward an argument that instability in the nationality areas played into the hands of the imperialists beyond the borders of China.

Despite its alleged links to Liu Shao-ch’i, to waving the red flag in order to oppose the red flag, and to base self-interest, this argument seems to have been purchased in Beijing. It may also have been instrumental in the political survival of Chang Kuo-hua and his successor, Jen Jung, in Tibet and Wang En-mao also seems to have benefited by the very necessity to maintain border defence. However, his success was short-lived. In case of Ulanfu, he failed to survive in Sinkiang. It is perhaps noteworthy that Saifudin, a prominent minority party member to survive, who had no connection with united front work and linkages with the united front, entailed cooperation with upper strata personage and a tolerant attitude towards atleast some of the minority customs and traditions. These accusations carried much weight in the attacks against Ulanfu and Wang En-mao and they were also made the first party secretaries of Yunnan and Szechwan respectively. Nevertheless, Chang Kuo-hua survived, despite his tenure in Tibet having necessitated a high degree of toleration of minority traditions along with the co-operation with the upper strata.
Added to the above, one should not fail to take into consideration Beijing’s desire to retain some minority group representation in highly visible positions. For instance, Saifudin, the only popular Uighur Communist in Sinkiang, had in addition been particularly vigorous in his denunciations of both Uighur nationalism and Soviet revisionism. Further, Saifudin’s continuation of these activities during an ebb in Sino-Soviet relations must have appeared advisable. Ngapo Ngawang Jigme, one of the few able collaborators the CCP had been able to produce in Tibet, where there had been no prominent native CCP member, had symbolic value. Thus, survivability in minority areas during GPCR was predicated by a number of factors, while none of it was overly significant in itself. The ability to maintain proper defense in the four regions of Chinese Central Asia and communication lines where others failed to maintain was quite important. Non-involvement with the economic retreat from the Great Leap Forward and being the only well known members of a minority group in that particular group’s three autonomous areas also might have helped these leaders to retain their positions of power and prestige.

Affiliation with Lin Piao might probably have become a positive factor in some cases. Success lay in being able, or not, to project these advantages at precisely the right moment, i.e., during the shifting power relationships in both Beijing and one’s own areas. In any case, a lot depended upon one’s ability to persuade the powers that be, while the role of chance cannot altogether be ruled out. Added to this, the radical attacks during the GPCR in the five regions were not without any validity. They felt that the previous minority policy that caused nationality-differences was overdrawn; under the Chinese Peoples Republic it had been a mere continuation of a historic mesh of tensions that were heightened by the party’s uncompromising methods of dealing with minorities. However, one cannot deny the united front apparatus’ contribution to the perpetuation of nationalities as separate entities and in the sense the radical charges were true to the word, for the united front stood in the way of nationalities’ unity. The accusation that some of the leaders in power in the United Front surrendered to the minorities’ upper strata and formed cliques with them for their personal benefit holds water.
It is true that by establishing the apparatus of minorities work, the party created an organisation with a vested interest in the perpetuation of minority separateness with a view to perpetuating its own power. The necessity for a certain amount of cooperation with the minority upper strata was built into the concept of United front and it is likely that this cooperation became the basis for a certain amount of what could be constructed as factionalism. The party officials and the traditional upper strata co-opted into government positions shared administrative responsibility and this kind of similar interest would naturally tend towards establishing some degree of rapport in certain cases.

Further, the radicals' charge, that policy making for the minority areas in the five regions was controlled by a group of entrenched power holders, was usurped. In fact there is no doubt that there was substantial continuity in the party and government personnel engaged in minorities' work; the Nationalities Committee of the National Peoples Congress shows that 43 out of the 84 members elected in 1965 were also members in 1955. But many of these members of the original body were senior local patriarchs whose absence from the 1965 committee was a result of natural death and not purge. Thus, continuity becomes quite evident.

Additionally, there was continuity in the government personnel pre-occupied in minority affairs without any change. For instance, the first party secretaries of the three autonomous region in 1966 held similar positions earlier, too. Ulanfu had held his position in Inner Mongolia since 1947 and Wang En-mao in Sinkiang since 1952. And Chang Kuo-hua, who was appointed as the First Party Secretary in 1965 in Tibet after its founding, had been in the region since its liberation.

An offshoot of this stability in the elite group engaged in minorities work was that those minorities' activists trained by the party since liberation dropped into lower level positions. Out of the 23 successful minority activists none held a party office higher than the Hsien level or a government position higher than the Chou
level. Five had been named as delegates to provincial or autonomous area peoples congresses in retrospect.

Radical attacks against individuals led to errors of judgment and were perceived as premediated crimes. Hence Deng Xiaoping's wish to avoid bloodshed in Tibet by enabling its dissident prime minister to leave the country was seen as complicity in the revolt that occurred seven years later. Ulanfu was charged of being a secret nationalist who designed a plot to detach Inner Mongolia from China and unify it with the Mongolian People Republic under his leadership. He was also accused of being the agent of China's Krushchev in Inner Mongolia; opposing the movement to study the thought of Mao and ignoring the directives of and not submitting their decisions for the approval to the North China Party Bureau. Of course, these accusations cannot always be taken at face value in China, particularly during a period of emotional turmoil on the scale of Cultural Revolution. But these accusations reflect the persistence of a Mongol-desire for self determination as well as a deep schism and factionalism within the CCP.

Further, Ulanfu, a member of the CCP since his youth, was nationalist to the core, for he did not speak Mongolian. And if he was of the opinion to join Soviet Union or Mongolian Peoples Republic he could have done it by taking advantage when the CCP power in his area was weak. Along side Ulanfu and his associates were also accused of "forcing Chinese cadres to learn Mongolian," "advocating that the Chinese are oppressors of the Mongols," and demanding that the Mongols and other minority nationalities be given genuine autonomy. But if this fact is analysed, Ulanfu's protection of Mongolian language and culture was designed to attract conservative citizens of the Mongolian Peoples Republic away from their increasingly Russified government and back towards China. In fact, this fact was magnified into a plot to promote "national splittism." Apart from this Ulanfu realised that preserving the Mongol nationality depended upon continued strength of the Mongols. If the Mongol problem was solved i.e., if the Mongols were assimilated, the necessity of Ulanfu and other such leaders would have vanished, and they would have most likely been replaced by Han Chinese.
Further, the element of party disruption can be viewed in the willingness of some Chinese, notably Wang I-lum, to support Ulanfu in the anti-Mao sentiment which prevailed not only in the countryside but also in the cities which were largely populated by Chinese and in the support given by army troops stationed in Inner Mongolia to the Ulanfu group, even though most of these soldiers were Chinese. Thus, the Chinese element of Ulanfu's support cannot be called local nationalism but it demonstrates that there were those within the party who were apparently willing to support Ulanfu because of disagreement with Peking's Cultural Revolution policies.

On the other hand, irrespective of the extent of the charges made by extreme radicals, the Cultural Revolution Group itself saw to it that the attacks were made on the old society and on entrenched power holders in Chinese Central Asia till the nationality differences threatened national unity and defense, a compromise was ordered. Further, the Cultural Revolution, with its spokesman Chou En-lai, intervened to ensure that the exchange of revolutionary experiences did not disrupt border areas and made repeated calls for the unity of nationalities. Minority representation in the revolutionary committees was minimum. It was hardly in single digits. In fact it was the army which dominated both in Chinese Central Asia and in the mainland. The Han army men dominated in the committees where Han were predominant and the same pattern occurred in non-Han-predominant areas. It goes without saying that the Han were in a majority. Apart from the above, there is no doubt that efforts were made to include minority group members on revolutionary committees. The appointment of Ta Lo as a ranking Vice Chairman in Ch'inghai revolutionary committee is evidence for this fact.

Cultural Revolution in Kansu province, a frontier region, failed to carry much weight like it did in the other three autonomous regions of Chinese Central Asia. The movement was restricted only to major cities. But this was not the case with Ch'inghai province. Initially various aspects of Cultural Revolution were introduced into rural minority areas only after the more extreme manifestations of
reforms that were introduced had moderated in mid-1967. The move to extend the Cultural Revolution into outlying areas preceded the public announcement of the formation of a preparatory committee for the provincial revolutionary committee. If these were the precautions taken in Ch'inghai province, which does not have an international border and does not occupy any important position within China unlike the other four regions of Chinese Central Asia, either economically or strategically, it is likely that a similar, if not greater degree of caution, was exercised in bringing the revolution to minority areas of Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia and Tibet, which are definitely vital areas to China's defense against external attacks specially the Soviet Union.

Further, the Cultural Revolution diehards’ demand for reforms in Chinese Central Asia were introduced with caution. The case of Tibet is quite illustrative—here, communes were initially introduced on an experimental basis in the capital, Lhasa, and were later spread to other areas. By mid-1970 only 34 per cent of Tibetan villages had communes and within a year 60 per cent of Tibet's hsien had small communes, each having a size of a thousand people. Additionally, taxes from agriculture were collected on an individual basis and not on a collective basis. All these thus demonstrate that special characteristics of minorities continued to exist, in fact, though not in name. Similar recognition existed when the educational institutions were reopened towards the end of 1960's, wherein specific number of places were reserved for minorities by categorising them separately for admission. Thus, the above account demonstrates that the diehards of the 'Cultural Revolution' had as their ambition the undermining of all nationality differences. But, it was not accomplished; in fact, the GPCR resulted in minorities in Chinese Central Asia losing power and cohesiveness as minority groups. Further, the events after 1968 tried exhibit this impression and signalled a policy that was slower in pace than the radicals would have wished and also less gradualistic than what the conservatives aimed at.

In 1968 the decline of Red Guards occurred, resulting in an effort to move the Hsia fang members of disbanded youth organisations to frontier areas,
particularly to Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia of Chinese Central Asia. This diluted the percentage of minorities in these areas. The clashes with the Soviet Union along the Ussuri river and on the border of Sinkiang in 1969, along with intensified Soviet propaganda that was aimed at minorities in China, served to enhance the desirability of settling the Han along the borders, and, thus, the hsia fang movement was further expanded. Besides, the Production and Construction Crops of Han settlers was established along the borders of Inner Mongolia and Tibet. Additional PLA troops were deployed along these borders and security was tightened. Alongside, three leagues from Inner Mongolia were removed and incorporated into Heliungkiang, Kirin, Liaoning and Kansu, resulting in the loss of one-third of the Inner Mongolia's territory. Additionally, the region's Military region was reduced to a military district subordinate to the Peking Military Region. This measure must have probably been intended to resist the Soviet Union in case of a war and also seems meaningful viewed in the context of the existing means of communication links.

Further, this reorganisation of Inner Mongolia has also resulted in the separation of the Alashan Mongols from the Mongols of the more eastern areas. That no major conflagration resulted from this reorganisation is indicative of Beijing's success in reducing Mongolian nationalism. On the other hand, coming to the autonomy, there was a streak of hope, for though they were vastly outnumbered by the Han Chinese, they were Mongols and they still had leaders who tended to be inclined towards local nationalism and presented a serious problem for the Chinese leadership. These bottlenecks become critical when it is recollected that the Mongol minority resided in the borderland between China, Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia. The IMAR's political capital Huhehot is just 250 miles from Peking and this fact explains why Ulanfu and his associate and supporters failed to maintain a degree of autonomy on par with other anti-Peking leaders of more distant places such as Sinkiang and Tibet.

Additionally, another crucial factor which cannot be authenticated is that one of China's two nuclear centers-Paotou-is near Huhehot on the strategic railroad
linking Peking with the western regions. A fear exists that the revisionists might manipulate the Inner Mongol’s dislike for the Chinese Communist and make political capital by embarrassing the Chinese in this strategic area.

The new party Constitution of 1969 mentioned the minorities only once and noted that the party must spearhead all the nationalities in carrying out class struggle. Further, the list of the party’s Ninth Central Committee, after the promulgation of the new party Constitution, failed to indicate the nationality of the members though there were 5 minority members out of 170 full members and 4 out of 109 alternate members. Fortunately five full members represent the major nationalities of the three Autonomous Regions in Chinese Central Asia namely, Paojihletai a Mongol; Saifudin Uighur and T’ien pao a Tibetan.

The draft state Constitution of 1970 upheld the inalienable existence of three autonomous regions of Chinese Central Asia, but slashed down their rights of minorities, failed to mention the retaining of their customs and habits and clauses like discrimination on the basis of nationality group was dropped. Though the use of minority languages was allowed to be in vogue, the Constitution failed to mention anything to encourage the same.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union did not stop its propaganda alleging that the GPCR was a Maoist plot to exterminate the national minorities, demonstrating that the members of national minorities were left with an option either to assimilate with the Han Chinese or for physical annihilation. The non-Han names started appearing in the newly formed party committees in proportion to the numerical strength of a minority in a given region, finally giving way for minimum non-Han groups’ presence, approximating the actual proportion of national minorities in the population as a whole. On the other hand several of these unassimilated minority representatives held positions in official capacities, for example Tibet’s Ngapo Ngawang Jigme.
Be that as it may, the newly formed party committees had freshers who represented the CCP’s views of the minority group instead of their concerned minority groups’ interests. Probably this could be the reason why Pa Sang in Tibet To Lo in Ch’inghai and Paojihletai in Inner Mongolia have been selected to the then newly formed party committees. Further, the Uighurs and Tibetans were represented less than their proportionate share of the population. Coming to the Mongols, the number of purges and deaths were more when compared to other regions of Chinese Central Asia. This could be the reason why Mongols in Inner Mongolia had less representation.

In retrospect, though the UFW Department and the Nationalities Affairs Commission were revived, the radical GPCR-goals on national minorities were not a complete success. The minorities’ economies in Chinese Central Asia were brought in line with that of Han China which obviously resulted in a huge influx of non-Han, resulting in further dilution of ethnic cohesiveness. Though this change in the economies can be viewed as the general goals of Beijing government and can not be viewed in terms of radicalism of the GPCR, the CCP failed to protect minority cohesiveness. On the other hand, differences on the appropriate time and conditions between the moderates and radicals has separated these groups during the GPCR.

Now coming to the post-Cultural Revolution period, there was a significant change in the Beijing government’s attitude towards the minorities in Chinese Central Asian Regions. Minority representation existed irrespective of the change in the Beijing leadership, specially with reference to Lin Piao. In fact, it was the extremist faction which executed the total destruction of ‘four olds’ in these five regions. Besides this, the changes in Beijing’s attitude towards minorities in these regions, ever since the demise of Lin Piao, was no doubt abrupt without any uniformity and pluralism in the policy.

The leadership, despite giving encouragement to minority languages in the region, continued to insist on Chinese, the language of the majority Han. If it is
analysed, one cannot resist to accept the fact that the Chinese wanted to popularise their new line of thought with the minorities and also to Sinize them linguistically. Further, the encouragement given to minority traditions appears limited or moderate. This could probably be due to the differences in the aims and objectives between the moderates and leftists, though their primary inherent motive was assimilation. Added to this, an abrupt change in the policy towards minorities in these regions since Lin Piao's demise can be identified with differences in plans and procedure—the leftists venturing a haste attempt, and on the other hand, the moderates turning down the same. Hence, a balanced stand accommodating both the groups views would be appropriate.

In addition to the above, the Beijing government also intended to demonstrate to its communist neighbour, the Soviet Union, and disprove the latter's charges on the CCP's policy towards minorities in the five regions, specially Sinkiang. The CCP also aimed at building confidence among its minorities towards its policies and leadership, forced assimilation or pleasing persuasion. The objective was not to lose control and confidence of the people in its land. The nationality policy in China was the offshoot or influence of the Soviet model, but in Chinese dress. In the same way, the Chinese attitudes towards its minorities might be styled in Soviet fashion or better than that in the future.

Now to conclude, the prospects of minorities. One cannot avoid to accept the fact that the Cultural Revolution involved intense factional fighting all over the country and ruptured the Han's 'united front' towards national minorities. In Chinese Central Asia the conflicts of Han verses Han took precedence over Han relations with the natives. The influx of Han Chinese into this areas have also slowed down due to a lack of economic development and this no doubt is a welcome gesture for the minorities. The element of radicalism in the Chinese revolution, which involved a greater degree of Sinification of the minority territories and loss of leaders like Ulanfu, certainly weakens the Mongols' influence in Beijing. Further, the revolutionary committees formed during the Cultural Revolution were apparently designed to assign a key role to the military, i.e., to the Han Chinese.
The Cultural Revolution and its aftermath have resulted in worsening the position of minorities. At present they seem atomized, divided and lack an effective organisation or leadership.

The Han Chinese, who had settled in minority regions of Chinese Central Asia, continue to pose the most serious long term threat, more ominous even than collectivization and communisation. Industrialisation and urbanisation usually favour Han over non-Han. In addition to this, the more the economic development in minority areas the more that transportation is improved, the more Han Chinese move in. Hence, unless the Beijing government provides special treatment to the minorities in the five regions they can survive as 'identifiable cultural units.' And a completely consistent line of equality would only lead to their disappearance. But the natives desire a meaningful autonomy which they might get it.

Apart from the above, the imminent danger now is not segregation but rather assimilation and absorption. And the long-term survival of the peoples and cultures geographically situated between Russia and China seems very doubtful. It would be possible for the Beijing government to protect the national minorities against Han chauvinism. Indeed, in the past, the Beijing government some times did endeavour to help the non-Han against Han incursion and arrogance. But if Beijing's policy is otherwise - as it now seems to be the case, special protection of the national minorities is denounced as Lin Shao-ch'i--Krushchevite deviation--the minorities are in grave danger. Further, whatever the course of the Cultural Revolution, the problem of Chinese-minority relations will continue to harass the Chinese government until the Beijing authorities are willing to accede the demands of the minorities and either integrate them into the society or grant them true autonomy.