CHAPTER I

NATIONAL SECURITY: AN INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

Concern for the security of the nation is as old as the nation-state itself. In a way it can even be traced to the evolution of civil society when man transformed himself from the (Hobbesian) state of nature, which was a state of war, to the civil society, where he could seek security for himself and his fellow-beings. However, a serious awareness of the security problems of nations and academic interest in national security studies began only in the aftermath of World War II. Decolonisation resulting in the emergence of a host of new nations in Asia, Africa and Latin America also underlined the need for an awareness of the security problems of modern nation-states.

India like any other modern state is conscious of the need to make itself secure. The task is, however, qualitatively different. India is insecure internally due to the armed separatist movements and domestic ethnic strife. Externally, the demise in late 1991 of the Soviet Union, which had provided India with a nuclear security umbrella and a military counterweight to China, made New Delhi isolated and friendless. Moreover, Indian traditional developing country support had evaporated in the post-Cold War and Post-Soviet era. Lonely and friendless, India is in search of its security in an era of strategic uncertainty. However, before proceeding further, it is pertinent to know how India perceives its national security since the answer to this question sheds light on the important issue of India's security strategy in the 1990s and beyond. But it is difficult to know the Indian security perspective without a clear cut understanding of what national security is all about.

Scholars have not agreed on a definition of national security. As investigations into the national security concept have indicated, the phenomenon of security is hardly precise. Lack of agreement on the nature
of the phenomenon under investigation adds more complexity to an already ambiguous and complex subject: "it is one of the reasons why national security theory is less advanced and less coherent than other areas of the theory of international relations." \(^3\)

The term 'security' originates from the Latin word 'securus' meaning free from danger, safe.\(^4\) These two elements, the notion of danger or threat and the desire for protection against danger, are central to virtually all definitions of security. But here the consensus ends. There are at least four major schools of thought on the question of national security. Each of these is briefly discussed as under:

1. **SECURITY IN ANARCHY: THE REALIST THEORY**

For the Realists, the meaning of security is subsumed under the rubric of power.\(^5\) Conceptually, it is synonymous with the security of the state against external dangers, which is to be achieved by increasing military capabilities. This focus on a state-centric definition of security grows out of realist assumptions of a sharp boundary between domestic 'order' and international "anarchy" a 'state of nature' where war is an ever present possibility.\(^6\) Given the lack of an international authority with the power to curb others aggressive ambitions, states must rely on their own capabilities for the achievement of security. As realists have acknowledged, this self-help system often results in what they describe as a "security dilemma": what are justified by one state as legitimate security – enhancing measures, are likely to be perceived by others as a threatening military build up.\(^7\) Such behaviour can lead to destabilising arms race which may decrease the overall security of the system and its member states. For realists, what stability does exist in such a world can be attributed to the balance of power which should be hierarchical rather than equivalent and which result from decisive wars and skillful diplomacy. When effective power balances and diplomacy produce system equilibrium (or stability), some co-operation
becomes possible in the form of international law, negotiated treaties or international organisation.

The classical realists attribute such international behaviour mainly to human nature, which, they allege, is selfish, avaricious, prejudiced and power-hungry. The neo-realists disagree, contending that the main cause is the anarchic structure of the international system. All this can be explained in the following manner.

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\begin{array}{c}
\text{State System} \\
\downarrow \\
\text{Structural Anarchy} \\
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\text{Primacy of Security} \\
\downarrow \\
\text{Self Help} \\
\downarrow \\
\text{Balance of Power}
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These assumptions about the nature of the international system and the security seeking behaviour of states fit with realist analysis of the behaviour of the Great Powers in the post-Second World War period. Two major systems that appeared after 1945 can be defined broadly as the World Capitalist System and the World Socialist System. The United States as a nuclear Super Power took the responsibility to defend World Capitalism and Western democratic institutions from the Socialist System led by the other Super Power, the USSR. Western leaders assumed that the evolution of the strong socialist state with the former Soviet Union and China, possibly supported by the weaker but strongly non-western cultures of Asia, Africa and the America's, would end their global influence. The US perceived a need for a new global security doctrine that would defend the interests of capitalism and Western civilisation. It was this conviction that led American leaders to reshape their doctrine of security and develop new doctrines,
particularly the containment of the former Soviet Union and the economic integration of Western Europe and Japan.

For socialist countries, capitalist expansion was an effort to encircle socialism and threaten the security of the entire socialist system. This expansionist tendency in the West in conjunction with unstable conditions internally and on its borders led to Soviet Union to design its own version of a new security doctrine to defend itself. It become involved in both conventional and nuclear arms production. Thus, the two world systems each developed on elaborate alliance systems-NATO and the Warsaw Pact-to protect their own individual states in the process integrating a number of other states into their defence systems through military alliances.

In spite of this extensive military alliance system, leaders of each system made it abundantly clear that the only way security could be guaranteed was for one system to have nuclear hegemony over the other. This had resulted a massive arms race between the two Super Powers. The escalation of this arms race between the US and the Soviet Union could be characterized as a classic case of the security dilemma, yet the Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) enabled the Super Powers to agree about the balance of power because their leaders realised that a World War, which could be nuclear, would be suicidal for both sides. So now, security was synonymous which the nuclear deterrence and nuclear power balancing.

The emergence of a new Cold War, which fuelled fears about the possibility of nuclear exchange, raised concerns as to whether the escalation of the arms race was compatible with the enhancement of security. By 1980s, nuclear weapons, deployed in the name of national security, were making certain people feel very insecure: paradoxically, national security thinking had reached its height a time when, as the Reagan Administration's Strategic Defence Initiative made clear that the state could no longer assure the security of citizens within its own boundaries. To those critical of realist
strategic thinking, the military security of the state seemed synonymous with the insecurity of individuals held hostage to nuclear deterrence. 14

'As the conflict between the Great Powers de-escalated rapidly at the end of the 1980s and the World seemed poised on the verse of another new international order, Realists reviewed their perception of security. They offered two contrasting perspectives of national security. First, there are realists who analyse security in terms quite similar to the post-1945 era but adapted to the post Cold War world. Assuming the state as a unitary actor, their definition of security priorities international order and stability to be achieved by a modified version of Pax Americana. 15 After the demise of the Soviet threat, the US, with its continued strong military capabilities and the help of its Cold War alliance partners, is seen as having the potential to become the guarantor of global security, a role that is less ambiguous and dangerous than it was during the bipolar rivalry of the Cold War.

In recent years, Bary Buzon in his book, People, States and Fear (1991) has extensively examined security from a neo-Realist perspective by attempting to go beyond the military, state centric focus on national security. Buzon examines security from the perspective of the individual and the international system and concludes that the most important and effective provider of security is likely to remain the sovereign state. Refuting the claim that state can be a threat to rather than a source of security, Buzon argues that the evolution towards "strong states" more typical of the West, will result in a greater degree of security for individuals.16

In terms of the international system, Buzon does not feel that the elimination of anarchy is the answer to the security dilemma. Accepting the realist boundary distinction between domestic order and international anarchy, he predicts that "as the system moves towards" what he terms 'mature anarchy'- a more stable form of international anarchy which is co-evolving along with progress towards stronger states- international security
will be enhanced."¹⁷ Buzon also claims that the integrative features of an increasingly inter-dependent global market economy contribute to the movement towards nature anarchy with its promise of greater international security.

2. SECURITY IN ORDER; THE PEACE THEORY

Many peace theorists have objected the narrow and the simple definition of security as given by the realists. They argue that security is linked with order and the maintenance of peace and justice all over the world which can not be achieved merely by producing or reducing nuclear weapons.¹⁸ For peace and justice, the conditions of war have to be addressed. In other words, the maintenance of peace and justice must include socio-economic, cultural and political factors.

Certain peace theorists including E.H. Carr question "whether the state system as presently constituted can continue to be an effective security provider; in an increasingly inter-dependent world, where weapons of mass destruction threaten both victors and vanquished alike, self-help is not considered a viable method of security provision."¹⁹ Many peace theorists have, therefore, postulated a new or dramatically reformed world order as a necessary step towards greater security. Within this reconstructed global framework, security of the individual takes precedence over the security of the state.

There will be "peace, economic well-being, human rights and environmental balance in this reformed world order which can be achieved not by state institutions but by international or transnational functional institutions appropriate to the task."²⁰ They insist that the United Nations is best suited for this. The UN is committed "to save the succeeding generations from the scourge of war" and affirms its "faith in fundamental human rights in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal
rights of men and women and of nations large and small... and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.... to ensure that armed forces shall not be used save in the common interest and to employ international machinery from the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all people." There is, however, little that is strikingly new or innovative about any of these goals but the fact is that inadequate attention to such elementary, but transdental, ideals has led to the global war.

The peace theorists see social and economic changes not as a threat but an integral part of security. They find "the present structurally hierarchical international political system as morally unjust and ultimately unstable as it creates a hierarchy of beneficiaries in both economic and political terms where the developing countries find themselves at the base of pyramidal structure while the developed countries occupy varying positions towards the apex." They warn that "the continuity of this international political system should not be taken as evidence of its stability." For some peace theorists the security of the individual is a prerequisite for the security of states and indeed of the international system. Ken Booth, an influential peace theorist, claims that "individuals not states must be the fundamental referents of security." According to him, the language in which security has been framed is one of division and exclusion. Booth argues for a position that sees security from a holistic perspective rather than one that privileges the state and its military power. Ultimately, he looks to a democratic form of human security not achieved at other's expenses. Like Booth, R.B.J. Walker is also critical of the language of division associated with the realist thinking. To him, "this division is necessary for the legitimisation of the concept of national security but is incompatible with the search for world security and the security of the individuals."
Using a definition of security which focuses on the elimination of all types of violence both direct and indirect, Galtung and Wallensteen introduce the concept of structural violence by extending the meaning of violence beyond its association with physical violence to the indirect violence done to individuals when "unjust economic and political structure reduce their life expectancy through lack of access to basic material needs."26

In a similar voice Robert McNamara advocates that "the roots of man's security does not lie in his weaponry, it lies in his mind."27 He considers "security as development and without development, there can be no security."28 But why is development the essence of security? McNamara argues that the two phenomena are very closely connected because as development progresses, security also progresses.

Richard Ullman defines "national security as an attempt to protect against events that threaten to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of the state."29 Among these threats, he lists the inability to meet basic needs, environmental deterioration and natural disasters. Jessica Mathews claims that the definition of "security must be expanded to include environmental, resource and demographic issues, resource degradation and pollution together with population growth causing damage that increasingly impacts on people's ability to meet their basic needs."30

Many other peace theorists are addressing issues involving military conflict. They are also making links between military operations and environmental degradation as well as drawing attention to trade offs between military and social spending. Some others are advocating "non-offensive defence and denuclearization as ways of scaling down military spending and decreasing the likelihood of global war."31

3. NATIONAL SECURITY: THE NORTHERN PERSPECTIVE

There are two sharply, divergent trends in contemporary Northern definitions of security. One is associated with the proponents of 'Common'
or 'Comprehensive Security' and the other revives the Realist/Neo-Realist perception of national security. Common Security represents a significant departure from the realist security paradigm because it eschews competitive, zero-sum notions of deterrence and power and emphasises instead co-operation, dialogue and confidence building, averring that genuine security can never be achieved unless all states recognise and accept the legitimate security concerns of others. In short, "achieving security with others, not against them."  

Proponents of 'Common Security' have adopted a multi-dimensional definition of security which emphasises security interdependence rather than the zero-sum notion of security more typical of national security thinking. The contemporary definition of 'Common Security' was first given political prominence in the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (1982) which claimed that "the nuclear paradox (i.e. the security of states depended on the insecurity of their citizens) had stretched the traditional concept of security to its limit." Common Security assumes that there are global dangers which threaten the entire system and which can not be solved by boundary protection: by emphasising common dangers, it bases its appeal for co-operative behaviour, not on altruism but on a larger sense of collective self-interests.

Elements of Common Security thinking entered into certain policymaking circles in the North in the 1980s. A 1980 report on 'Comprehensive National Security to the Prime Minister of Japan' defined "security as protecting people's lives from various forms of threats both internal and external." According to this report, "insecurity includes economic vulnerability as well as ecological threats and natural disasters." In the mid 1980s, Gorbachev proposed a comprehensive system of international security which would include disarmament as well as global economic and ecological security. He urged an enhanced role for the UN as global security provider. This enhanced role is comparable with expanded UN peace-
keeping functions as well as UN involvement in humanitarian relief efforts in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia.

This multidimensionality of security defined in military, economic and ecological terms and the interdependence between them is at the heart of common security thinking and make a significant departure in thinking about security from that of the realist orthodoxy. It calls into question the state as a security provider because in the nuclear age, no state can find security by itself. The proponents of Common Security have proposed definitions of security which "challenge the boundaries and institutions within which our traditional understanding of security is framed." 37

Unlike the 'Common Security' adherence, those who revive Realism/Neo-Realism find security through a new and modified Pax Americana. For them, the U.S. along with its Cold War alliance partners as having the potential to become the guarantor of global security. In other words, their definition of security priorities international order and stability to be achieved by a modified version of Pax American which includes co-operative collective security arrangements among the great powers. Acknowledging that US pre-eminence can not last and that the US can no longer act alone, Henry Kissinger associates "security with the re-creation of a concert of powers in the North: Northern states should also support attempts to create regional power balances in unstable areas of the South such as Middle East." 38

In similar terms, Charles and Clifford Kupchan propose a new version of collective security consisting of the major powers, similar to the 19th century Concert of Europe. Defining security in terms of systemic stability, the Kuchpans claim that "universal collective security organisations are doomed to fail because they require an unacceptable loss of sovereignty and do not reflect power realities." 39 One of the functions of the security group of the militarily powerful is to ensure that peripheral conflicts are
"fenced off or resolved". Charles Krauthammer sees evidence of what he terms the 'unipolar moment' in which 'an ideologically pacified North seeks security and order by aligning its foreign policy behind that of the United States. Claiming that the UN is a guarantor of nothing, Krauthammer maintains that we are entering an era of 'pseudo-multilateralism' in which effective security can be guaranteed only by US military power. He asserts that "most of the dangers are located in the South, where small and backward states are emerging as threats to both regional and global security."40

William Odom equates "security with a new Pax Americana in which US military dominance in key strategic regions keeps the peace."41 He urges that US military forces increase their capabilities for rapid interventions in the South to (a) protect minority groups from oppression, (b) defend severe ecological degradation, (c) protect 'democracy', (d) secure 'human rights' and (e) prevent 'excessive militarisation' or 'irresponsible' arms acquisitions.

4. NATIONAL SECURITY: THE SOUTHERN PERSPECTIVE

Unlike the above three perspectives which are based on the assumption that "threats to a state's security principally arise from outside its borders,"42 the Southern conception of security has both internal and external dimension. In other words, the sense of insecurity from which the countries of the South suffer arises from both within and outside their boundaries. This will be clearly evident when we explain the problems of nation-building and the security doctrine of the Cold War era as experienced by these countries.

The Post-World War II era saw the dismantling the old empire and the emergence of new states in Africa, Asia and Latin America, popularly known as the South or the Third World. While independence did provide these countries the right to govern their own territory, "governance has become difficult due to the inadequate 'stateness' of these countries."43 Their inadequate stateness is a reflection of the scarcity of the time factor, vital
in the nation building process. While it took four to five centuries for the European countries to become the modern nation states, the countries of the South wanted to accomplish the enormously complicated and often traumatic process of nation building in a matter of three to four decades. Moreover, the belief that they must embark on all areas of development — political development, economic modernisation and social change — at the same time has made the process of nation building extremely difficult and complicated task. Thus, with time a scarce commodity and with various phases of state and nation-building telescoped into one mammoth endeavour, these nascent political systems face the problem of overload which leads repeatedly to near breakdowns and augments the sense of insecurity from which countries of the South and regimes suffer.

This insecurity has been further compounded by their colonial legacy. Most of the Southern countries are artificial creations of the European colonial powers. In some cases, the colonial power left the colony in such haste that arbitrarily defined boundaries were set up in near total disregard to the native populations pre-colonial affinities and loyalties. Consequently, "a number of these so-called nation states did not have a common nationality; rather they inherited an irrational and arbitrary division of their sub-societies into an equally irrational and arbitrary new social formation." Moreover, the colonial power has not only liquidated the indigenous population but sometimes replaced it with new populations transplanted sometimes by force and left them to create a new society. It would be more appropriate to call these 'state nations' where the state preceded the nation and civil society rather than the nation states in the Western fashion.

Such arbitrariness, which paradoxically provided the stamp of legitimacy to post-colonial boundaries in the South, was bound to create internal as well as external insecurities. Multi-ethnic societies ruled by
mono-ethnic regimes provide ample reasons for internal and intra-state conflicts escalating into secessionism and civil wars. These internal conflicts and insecurities frequently get transformed into inter-state conflicts because of their spill over effects into neighbouring states that often suffer from similar domestic insecurities.

The problem of internal insecurity within the South was further compounded by the colonial powers proclivity "to use multiple 'traditional' structures of authority in the colonies as instruments of control that mediated between the colonial power and the colonized populace." The 'tribal chiefs' in various post-colonial African states, the 'native Princes' of the Indian sub-continent and the 'Sultans' of Malaya all provide instances where the departing colonial power left behind multiple structures of authority in actual or potential competition with the authority structure of the 'legitimate' post-colonial state.

These two major colonial legacies — arbitrary boundaries and multiple authority structures — have contributed for the lack of unconditional legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens. When combined with their relative infancy in terms of the process of political development, economic modernisation and social change - a function of the scarcity of the time factor — and, therefore, their inability to create a consensus on fundamental issues of political and social organisation, the lack of unconditional legitimacy becomes the major source for their current state of inadequate stateness. This lack of unconditional legitimacy is reflected in the sub-national challenges to the very concept of the post-colonial nation-state. Suffice is to say that this lack of legitimacy creates the problem of internal insecurity for most of the countries of the South.

While many of these countries were confronted with security as an issue among divergent communities with their own state, they entered into a state system riven by the Cold War politics which in fact increased rather
than decreased Southern insecurity. Now it is necessary to outline the security doctrine of the Cold War period. The two major systems that appeared after the Second World War can be broadly defined as the World Capitalist System and the World Socialist System. Because of their mutual distrust and antagonism, these two systems were finding it difficult to coexist. The US as the nuclear Super Power took the responsibility to defend World Capitalism and Western democratic institutions from the Soviet-led Socialist System. For the socialist countries, capitalist expansion was an effort to encircle socialism and threaten the security of the entire socialist system. The expansionist tendency of the West led the Soviet Union to take the mantle of the socialist world. These two Super Powers developed a security doctrine which was based on an alliance system – the NATO and the Warsaw Pact – to protect their own individual states. They also made it clear that "the only way security could be guaranteed was for one system to have nuclear hegemony over the other." This led to the proliferation of military alliances and massive arms race between the two power blocs. The vast majority of the newly independent states were asked to simply integrate themselves into the global alliance system because it was stressed that "the non-nuclear states could only have their security if they aligned themselves with one of the power blocs." The result was a security doctrine which substituted national security to transnational security.

This substitution of national security to transnational security was not, however, without its dangers. First, the most immediate consequence was "the absorption of internal, local and regional differences of newly-independent small and medium sized states into the East-West competition, contributing to military interventions or political settlements that favoured the security interests of the Super Powers." Second, "the transnational security system had made national sovereignty an unavailable option for small states as it reduced their capacity to conduct independent foreign relations and held their internal development hostage to larger regional
interests. Third, "in areas where there was direct conflict between the US and the USSR, regional security was regarded as secondary." For example, during the American invasion of Grenada, the security of Caribbean states was subsumed by the requirements of the USA. Fourth, "the nature of alliances and of Super Power commitments to their allies in the South were vastly different from the character of alliances and of alliance commitments in the developed world." For instance, while conflicts have proliferated in the South, the industrial and strategic heartland of the globe had been free of major inter-state conflict since the end of the Second World War. Lastly, as was evident from the transnational security, "the militarily powerful had dominated the definition of international security and determined it as synonymous with their own national security." In other words, during the Cold War, the concept of national security was essentially that of the national security of the United States and the Soviet Union.

At this time, especially in mid 1950s, and early 1960s, the security of the South was perceived in terms of national independence and territorial sovereignty. Since the developing countries were just freed from the colonial yoke, the essential question before them was how to maintain independence and sovereignty – the newly acquired national goals. Concerns and fears about external threats and foreign interventions in the internal affairs of the newly emerging nations was overwhelming. Therefore, major regional powers such as Egypt, India and Yugoslavia rejected all forms of alignment with any of the Super Powers.

By the mid 1950s, the dychotomy of the world system into competing Super Powers and newly independent states began to crystalise. Security of the "upper dogs" (using Galtung's concept) was perceived in terms of containment, brinkmanship and alliance building, while security of the "under dogs", was seen in the light of independence, sovereignty and neutrality.
At this stage, Southern countries followed a three track security policy: (a) building their military strength, (b) taking a position of non-alignment and (c) exercising economic power through the formation of the Group of 77.

A. The Military Build-up

National security has always been equated with the military strength of nation states. Leaders of developing nations were concerned with having an adequate military apparatus to defend their newly acquired independence against external threat or internal insurgence. This strategic perspective was the result of two political facts: (a) the tremendous fear existing that ex-colonial powers would try to regain dominance, and (b) in most developing nations, the military apparatus was the institution to which the ex-colonial powers transferred authority. Consequently, when socio-political and structural changes were initiated in the developing nations, usually the military elite were the decision-makers. This self-perceived role stimulated the military elite to allocate a large proportion of the national revenues to build up armies.

B. Non-Alignment

While military build-up was necessary, but it was not sufficient to ensure national security. The countries of the South realised that "the creation of an international environment conducive to co-operation and stability was the proper way for these nations to achieve their security aims." For this the policy of non-alignment and positive neutrality were thought to be the proper policy orientation that would be sufficient to reduce world tension and conflicts and to enhance world peace, co-operation and stability. The non-aligned nations perceived their role to be that of a "regulator" between the conflicting parties.

Non-alignment was also perceived as essential in establishing co-operative arrangements among developing nations and reducing the chances
for regional animosity. This concept was strengthened by emphasising the similarities and, in fact, the homogeneity among developing nations more than the differences. Third World unity of interests was seen as fundamental and it was thought that this unity would act as an incentive to the co-ordination of foreign policies.

C. International Economic Co-operation

Towards the mid 1960s, the concern about the political and military aspects of national security turned as outdated for resolving socio-economic problems. Hence, it became extremely important for the developing nations to understand and work towards changing the deformed international economic system. The reduction of international inequalities in the structure of the world economic system was perceived as an essential step toward the reduction of internal inequalities and the re-establishment of a more egalitarian environment both within countries and between them. Economic abilities, then, have to precede any other ability in achieving the stability and consequently, the security of poor nations. Hence, the formation of the Group of 77 and the demand for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) through the UN General Assembly. Although the establishment of the NIEO in April, 1974 had contributed very little to the challenges that confronted these nations, yet it was a symbolic success for the developing nations because it recognised their demands.

In the mean time, political tensions and internal economic difficulties together with an international impasse led both the Super Powers to recognise that "the nuclear arms race and regional wars did not guarantee the kind of security they thought would be achieved through the establishment of an elaborate international security system." They also realised that "without economic and political security at home, there was no military security abroad."

This type of realisation not only led to the end of the Cold War but also the end of the security doctrine on which it was based.
The Post-Cold War Security Paradigm

The post-Cold War Southern security paradigm is inextricably linked with its threat perception/insecurity. Insecurity here refers to the relative weakness, the lack of autonomy, the vulnerability and the lack of room for manoeuvre which the Southern countries have on economic, political and, of course, military levels. The countries of the South suffer from an acute lack of control over the international environment in which they must function and of all states, they are the ones for whom the economic alternatives of survive or perish are the most pressing. There lack of control over the post-Cold War external environment has great implications on their security – both internal and external domain – and it will be of interest to explain it in detail.

First of all, while the end of the Cold War and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union have no doubt lowered global tensions and temporarily reduced the intensity of Great Power competition in the South, yet "these events by themselves can not alter the fundamental phenomenon of the division of the world between the industrial and strategic heartland, where violent inter-state conflict is not possible as it can escalate into a nuclear holocaust and the grey areas of the globe where interventions, wars by proxy and the probing of global adversaries political and military weaknesses are not ruled out." Moreover, the withdrawal of one Super Power from areas of conflict in the South has not been an unmixed blessing. It has prompted the only residual Super Power to act even more cavalierly as far as the security and the vital interests of Third World states are concerned and may tempt it to intervene militarily if developments in what it considers to be the 'strategic regions' of the South are not to its liking. Important countries of the South, deprived of the presence of a balancing power that can neutralise in some measure the dominant Super Power's interventionist proclivities, have, therefore begun to feel more vulnerable and insecure."
The United States in its military adventurism has the support of the industrially advanced countries of the world and together they control the political and military power structure in the post Cold War international system.\(^{71}\) During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was the chief contender of the USA. In the post-Cold War world, both the Russian Federation and China have become collaborators of the United States for many purposes in the interests of their own military and economic security.\(^{72}\) It is worth emphasised that whenever allies of the US chose not to go along with it they carefully refrain from opposing its actions. For instance, the sanctions the US slapped on India and Pakistan after their nuclear tests could not get a similar response from Britain, France, Italy, Russia and China. Russia was critical of this move, but the Chinese, with their silence conferred on the sanctions a virtual kiss of approval. Moreover, "although we find these countries to have differences among themselves on vital matters, they stand together to defend their interests against the developing countries."\(^{73}\)

With only one Super Power, many turned to the UN as the arbiter of world affairs and the primary organisation to deal with the smaller, though intense, crises and conflicts. Many countries of the South resent what they see as US domination of the UN. The United States for all practical purposes uses the UN legitimacy but actually operates outside the UN framework and its potential checks and balances. The recent US and British air-strikes on Iraq, the NATO led air-strikes on Yugoslavia etc. clearly exemplify this. It is because of this reason, Southern countries prefer that "the UN should be more independent of any one power and deal with the numerous world conflicts collectively."\(^{74}\) They believe that an enlarged Security Council with more permanent members would be a step in the right direction. As constituted now, the UN has tried, but with modest success, to grapple with the world's problems. However, it is not properly organised to operate peace-keeping missions or command military forces, as has been demonstrated so clearly in Bosnia and elsewhere.
The fragmentation and marginalisation of the South is yet another security problem. Although the process of fragmentation and marginalisation of the South had began in the 1980s, the countries of the South stand completely disunited and marginalised in world politics of today. The heyday of unity of the South was the 1960s and 1970s. After the demise of the Soviet Union, its countervailing strategic and diplomatic support was no longer available. The leading countries of the South feel increasingly dependent on the support of the United States alone. Moreover, since most of the countries of the South are undergoing the process of economic liberalisation in recent years, they look toward the USA, Western Europe and Japan for investments, trade and multilateral financial support. Their attitudes towards the developed North are formulated in terms of their national interest rather than the solidarity of the South, even if the dynamics of the growth at the global level still necessitates common strategies on the part of the South. The leading countries of Latin America, Africa and Asia allowed themselves to be subjected to politico-economic pressures from the industrial North and are dissuaded from adopting unified positions on critical global issues. This was evident from the result of the UNCED held in Rio in June 1992, the Uruguay Round of Trade negotiations concluded in Marrakesh in April 1994, the NPT Extension Conference concluded in New York in May 1995 and the negotiations on the CTBT concluded in New York in September, 1996.

The regionalisation of global economy in the form of cohesive trading blocs is another threat to Southern security. Three of such blocs have clearly emerged. One is the North American hemisphere common market. This bloc, which at present comprises of the US, Canada and Mexico may grow in its membership. The second bloc is Europe which has emerged as a solid economic grouping. The third bloc is Asia-Pacific Community (APEC) supposedly under the Japanese leadership. All these three blocs put together account for more than 65 per cent of the world trade, leaving a meagre 30
to 35 per cent to be shared by Russia, China, Eastern Europe and the Third World. The emergence of trade blocs may thus lead to further hardships and marginalisation not only of the poor or Third World countries but also of the comparatively well to do newly industrialised countries of Asia.

The Malaysian leader and the South Korean President came out openly against the affluent industrialised countries of the West for carving out economically preferred blocs. Such bloc formation will most likely lead to economic fortification and further protectionism which may be harmful not only to the developing but also the industrialised countries and the world economy as a whole in the long run. The possibilities of competition among these trade blocs and their respective leaders may offer limited advantages to a very small number of economically resilient Third World countries like India, South Korea etc. but a majority of poorer countries would suffer. Their dismal economic prospects may lead consequentially to "greater social unrest, political turmoil and overall insecurity in a number of developing countries." The Southern security has been further compounded by a genuine disentanglement on the part of the major powers from arenas of tension and conflict in the South as this has removed some of the restraints on the conflictual behaviour of important developing countries whose aggressive potential was constrained by the apprehension that it may draw negative reactions from one or both of the Super Powers and thereby end of tipping the regional balance against them. Such a situation has led to "greater assertiveness on the part of regionally pre-eminent powers interested in translating their pre-eminence into hegemony or at least into a managerial role within their respective regions" (North Korea). Resistance by other countries in a particular region to such regionally hegemonic behaviour may, in turn, lead to situations of violent inter-state conflict relatively free from concerns regarding external intervention.
Another threat for the Southern countries arises from the post-Cold War disarmament initiatives undertaken by the Great Powers. The conventional arms control pacts and troop reduction agreements among them are expected to lead to major redundancies in the Great Powers's military arsenals. This may encourage especially both Washington and Moscow to increase their arms sales abroad. This tendency will accelerate once these pacts start becoming realities forcing both the US and Russia to remove various categories of conventional weaponry including tanks, artillery, aircraft and helicopters from their inventories. Much of "this surplus hardware is expected to be sold to the Southern countries to fill hard currency needs, to shore up friends and allies by making them more 'self-reliant in terms of 'hardware' and to find alternative sources of profitable returns for domestic arms industries."

This projected escalation in the transfer of sophisticated weaponry to the South will further enhance the destructive potential of the Southern conflicts.

Another factor adversely affecting the Southern security is "the increasing consolidation of international norms." These norms have more and more come to demand that Southern states closely approximate a certain ideal type of behaviour in the sphere of domestic policy, especially in relation to human rights, basic needs, political participation and social welfare. On the other hand, the same international norms (inalienability of juridical personality of a state) prevent the abdication of juridical statehood once achieved by even the most unviable states, like Rwanda, Burundi or Afghanistan which fail to meet not only the normative demands of civilised conduct, but even the basic yardstick of effective statehood – the provision of the minimum amount of political order necessary for the physical security of its citizens.

The two sets of norms mentioned above make contradictory demands on the countries of the South. While on the one hand, they subject nascent
states to socio-political and economic demands which only the most established and developed states can meet successfully, on the other hand, they prevent even the most unviable Southern states from abjuring juridical personality once it has been achieved. As a result, the immense problems created by the international norms and those internal to the nation-building process in the Southern countries make security the primary pre-occupation of most of the developing countries. The basic cruel dilemma that they face is that "they have neither the luxury of solving their immense problems of state and nation-building over a lengthy period of time during which they are relatively insulated from external pressures, nor do they have the alternative of opting out of the traumatic struggle for survival of relinquishing their juridical statehood either voluntarily or by force." It is no wonder, therefore, that it is the security imperative that dominates the political landscape and the policy agenda of the overwhelming number of states in the South. Thus, "in the strategic and security field, the Third World countries may have to confront a formidable challenge and living with conflicts and tensions externally and to grapple with turmoil and instability internally." To this will be added the possibilities of pressures and interventions (subtle and direct) from the major powers. This put together may even lead to what Richard Falk once described as "the 'Lebanonization' of many a weak and vulnerable Third World countries."

All this shows how difficult it has become for the Southern countries to make themselves secure. The environment in which they are trying to modernise and create a better for their inhabitants is highly unpredictable and their ability to cushion themselves against this is very limited. These states are pushing over a wide range of sectors and issues for greater autonomy but their achievement, individually and collectively, has been small. Some have traded one form of dependence for another but while the particular states concerned may feel that their security has thus been increased in the international arena, the increase will not be sufficient until
they can feel they are their own masters. Security for the South, thus, remains elusive.

Critical Perspectives

An appraisal of all these theories reveals that there are widely divergent views on national security and each of them contains some elements of truth. Together they provide a comprehensive understanding of national security. Although the best elements of each of these theories is reflected in India's perceptions of national security, yet they have not been found fully acceptable. This is because each theory has its strong as well as weak points.

For instance, the importance of Realism is that it draws our attention to one of the most important dimensions of national security – the politico-military dimension. But it is criticised because of exclusive importance to the political/military factors in a state's security parameter. In this context, the Peace Theory is a major improvement of the Realist Theory. This theory takes a holistic approach to national security by recognising the interdependence between military factors on the one hand and political, economic, social and humanitarian factors on the other. Moreover, the Peace Theory also "sees social and economic change not as a threat to but an integral part of national security." Yet this theory has been criticised since it believes that only piecemeal reform is viable in the present circumstances.

Like the Peace Theory, the Northern perspective adopts a multi-dimensional definition of security which emphasises security interdependence rather than the zero-sum notion of security. But this paradigm of security has been criticised as it "sees the North as the guarantor of global security and finds insecurity, whether it be in the form of war, economic deprivation, over population, human rights abuses or environmental degradation located only in the South." Moreover, this perspective is "in favour of creating a world order which affects the South more harshly and more adversely than the rest of the world on almost all accounts."
However, unlike the above three perspectives, the Southern perspective is the most comprehensive one since it includes both internal and external dimensions of security. Internally, "the very slow progress of state and nation building, the arbitrary nature of territorial boundaries, the challenge of modernisation etc. are seen as major security problems." Externally, the great power rivalry, the fear of direct or indirect military intervention, exogenous economic factors such as "instability in the international monetary system, higher oil prices, falling commodity prices, global recession and fluctuating interest rates" are considered as equally threatening and in some ways more of a constant problem.

India belongs to the countries of the South and shares the later's perspectives on national security. But the Indian perception is not completely synonymous with the Southern perspective on national security. First, unlike many other Southern countries, "India is a large industrialising country, the second most populous nation in the world and has a potential of developing into a major power." It has also got its own world view. Second, India's threat perception, unlike many other countries of the South, is different and even still evolving. So, India's national security perspective is based on its power potential and the present and future threat perceptions.

NATIONAL SECURITY: THE INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

Before initiating the discussion on India's post-Cold War security perspective, a critical appraisal of India's security paradigm over the years is strongly needed. Such a historical perspective will not only help us to understand its present security perspective but also shed light on how India will perceive its national security in the times to come.

Indian history can well be described as a chronicle of military disasters. Yet paradoxically, except during the time of active conflict, security issues do not enjoy primacy on the Indian agenda. On the normative
basis the justification probably is that since India does not threaten any other country, there is no reason for others to pose a threat to her. The roots of this perception go far back to antiquity which can be explained by factors such as geography, history, culture and the colonial legacy. Geography had profoundly affected India's perception on national security. For instance, "Indians had long regarded the mountains and seas as protective barriers against outside interference and invasion." The sense of security based on geography had made India essentially an inward looking state.

The neglect of security got further accentuated due to the lack of political unity throughout most of India's history. Over the centuries, the warriors from Central Asia and Persia had invaded the sub-continent by land and Europeans by sea. Rarely did the Indians succeed in repulsing invaders and they seemed not to learn from past experiences how to change. The small Indian states concentrated more on fighting each other or assisting the invaders against a rival than in turning back the invaders collectively. Indian armies seldom attempted a forward strategy against the invaders and thus most of the fighting took place on Indian territory.

Culture was the third factor which was responsible for the neglect of security by Indians. "Hindus consider life as mystery, largely unknowable and not entirely under man's control." If the future is unknown and unknowable, why to plan? Moreover, the Hindu concept of time or rather the lack of a sense of time – "Indians consider life as an eternal present, with neither history nor future" – discourages planning. Finally, India for a long period of time formed a part of the British Empire. Indian security was thus a concern of the empire and was handled from London. A noted Indian scholar observed nearly 50 years ago that the Indian elites had only dim awareness of "that dark thing called power".

India arrived on the world scene as an independent nation after a long and protracted struggle for over two centuries from Britain. Her economic
strength was devastated and more importantly the fruits and benefits of the Industrial Revolution were lost to Indians by de-industrialisation and foreign rule. In view of this, "there was a strong sentiment in favour of sovereignty and autonomy on the one hand and establishing a sound base for industrial and technological development on the other." ¹⁰¹ A security policy was thus designed in the post-1947 period which negatively meant a strong strategy that did not accept anything which involved slightest degree of dependence on any other authority. Positively, "it was equated with true or complete independence (Purna Swaraj)." ¹⁰²

To ensure her security, India formulated a policy of non-alignment externally and economic and industrial self-reliance internally. The non-alignment policy was intended to steer on independent course between the two Super Powers who were fighting a cold war against each other and in the process pressurising to absorb the newly independent countries into their spheres of influence.¹⁰³ India also took the initiative to unite the newly independent countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America on matters of common concern. Besides, India followed an economic strategy whose objective was to develop a self-reliant and self-sustaining economy. Such a broad developmental strategy was based on three considerations.¹⁰⁴ The first was ideological and based on the logic of self-reliance in which the role of the public sector would have to be crucial. The second was political and based on the assumption that excessive economic interaction with the developed countries would make India unavoidably too dependent on powerful manipulative external forces - clearly an unacceptable situation for a country which had just gained her independence and which had unanimously decided upon a policy of non-alignment. And the third consideration was economic. For a developing country like India, international trade could hardly be an engine of growth, since whatever little India did export was essentially composed of primary commodities whose absorption by the international market could only be limited due to
the inelasticity of demand. An import substitution policy was thus perceived as the only viable solution for the country - "a solution that would open the prospect of rapid and all round development on the lines a country like India would like to follow."\(^{105}\)

Thus, "for India internal and external autonomy were the two sides of the same coin and a country which could not protect its own national economy could not also protect its genuine security and defence concerns."\(^{106}\) However, it was only after the Chinese attack in 1962, Indian leadership realised that India's goal of national security could not effectively be met only through the policy of non-alignment. Military power should also be given equal importance in the country's security strategy. This realisation led to "the adoption of a dual strategy of upgrading the armed forces (building tanks, air-planes and ships, developing missiles and conducting a peaceful nuclear explosion) and of securing a security guarantee from the Soviet Union"\(^{107}\) and both of which were a clear break with the security policy crafted at the time of independence - thus, giving a new direction and a broader definition to the concept of national security.

On the face of it, the two strategies seemed contradictory. Why did India need external allies if she had decided to upgrade her military power? But in fact, they were not. Opting for a self-reliant military development did not necessarily mean that India would become powerful enough to face any eventuality of a threat. For there might well be situations, eventualities or threats that despite military upgradation, India might not be able to meet all by itself.

India's perception on national security went further changes after the Indo-Pak war on Bangladesh. Emerging victorious in 1971 war, India viewed the entire sub-continent as a single strategic area and sought security as a regional power in South Asia. India considered that (a) "she would not allow a neighbouring state to undertake any action in foreign affairs or
defence policy that seemed potentially inimical to her security and (b) she would not permit foreign governments to establish a presence or influence neighbouring states that she viewed as unfriendly. 

India's actions in Sri Lanka in 1987 and Maldive in 1988 were undertaken with such a security perspective.

However, the Indian thought on security had so far remained focused on the external military threats. In early 1980s, when "Pakistan taking advantage of internal dissensions in Indian polity actively encouraged separatist movements and inter-communal tensions in India," the focus was shifted to internal security. Confronting the 'enemy within' had complicated the business of confronting the 'enemy without'. This was compounded when the two enemies acted in tandem. Kashmir was a good example.

**India's Post-Cold War Security Paradigm**

Indian perception of security went a sea-change in the post Cold War era which was evident in several important spheres. The reasons are not difficult to find. The end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the loss of India's traditional developing countries support necessitated such a change. Now, military security was given top priority. Although, "India had long sought to be self-reliant in its military weapons and supplies," yet deterioration of the country's security environment and the disintegration of the Soviet Union which had provided nuclear security umbrella and a military counterweight to China, only sharpened such a desire. The test and deployment of ballistic missiles, the decisions to go nuclear, and seeking outside support for some of its military projects such as the Light Combat Aircraft project clearly explain India's determination to be self-reliant in the military sphere.

Following the foreign exchange crisis of 1991, economic security has emerged as a significant component of India's post-Cold War national
security strategy. Abandoning the highly regulated and protected economy, India went for a process of economic liberalisation in July, 1991. The overall nature of Indian reforms are three fold: first, "there will be no new public sector undertakings or expansion but these will continue temporarily as restructured units. Second, privatisation will occur through a slow process of government disinvestment whereby the shares of public sector undertakings will be auctioned periodically, thereby diluting government ownership. Third, India will remove all obstacles to foreign and domestic private sector investments and industrial expansion through the diminution of license and permits." This opening up of India's economy has made it necessary for New Delhi to look abroad for markets. The conclusion of SAFTA, the establishment of IOR-ARC, full-dialogue partnership with ASEAN, signing a treaty to establish a free trade area with Sri Lanka, initiating a sub-regional co-operation with Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh etc. by India are to be seen in this context. Moreover, India's economic liberalisation has attracted the attention of many other important countries which see India as a huge potential market and a great area for investment. As the rich industrial countries, invest in India, India will become a much more important player in world affairs.

Clearly linked with this is the Indian perception of security through partnership. Following the Gulf War, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and an economic crisis at home, India increasingly moved towards the West especially the USA. In early 1990s, there were several exchange visits by top military and economic delegations from both sides. However, as old disputes continued to resurface and new ones began to emerge between New Delhi and Washington, India moved towards Russia for closer political, economic and defence ties. Mutual security concerns such as the potential rise of unstable Islamic Government in Central Asian republics, the manipulative tactics by the remaining Super Power also opened the door for a new partnership. Similarly, India also realised the need to establish
new political, economic, technological and strategic relationship with the countries of the European Union.

India also extended this policy of "security through partnership" with the nations which are situated in its immediate neighbourhood more especially with Pakistan and China. Such a close partnership arose due to the enormous costs India was paying for its internal security as the result of the involvement of its neighbouring countries. For instance, Pakistan has become embroiled in India's ethnic and religious conflicts in Kashmir and Punjab. Similarly, the Chinese have been encouraging tribal unrest in the North Eastern part of India. The LTTE activities in India and the Bangladeshis' incursions into the Indian tribal areas of the North-East and Assam are also not unknown.

Of late energy security is given priority in India's post-Cold War security agenda. Energy security can be defined "as long term measures to adequately maintain the required supplies of energy resources, both domestic and imported, for a country at all times and at minimum costs." Of all the foreign dependencies of India, there is little doubt that the country's energy requirements are paramount. There is also no doubt that "proven oil reserves that will last beyond 50 years exist only in the Saudi Arabian Peninsula." There is some possibility of large finds in Central Asia. Preservation of oil supplies to India from both regions is undoubtedly a national security objective. So, "a careful watch on the energy front and effective measures to ensure that India's growing needs for the imports of oil, petroleum products and gas are met uninterruptedly at reasonable costs," will be paramount in any strategy India adopts for its energy security.

Thus, security has become a multi-dimensional phenomena for India in the post-Cold War era which includes military capability, internal stability, political partnership, economic growth and energy viability. Combiningly together they give the country its sense of security. For
instance, India's latest nuclear tests are made possible because of its moderate economic growth and this is one reason that no pressure was felt despite sanctions by the West.

But this does not mean that all these security aspects are given equal importance in India's post-Cold War security strategy. For instance, as we have seen, military security has become more paramount over all others including economic security. The recent nuclear and ballistic missile tests by India despite Western economic sanctions clearly prove this. There are several reasons for this. These have been explained in the second chapter.
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