CHAPTER IV

DEVELOPMENT AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY POLICIES

4.1 AN OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC POLICIES

Public policy is the action taken by government on a public problem to change the situation for better. It is a complex phenomenon that involves a number of societal and state actors and actions. Economic and socio-political environments influence the nature of the policies adopted and their effects on people. Policy is the outcome of the interaction of all these background factors with the desires and decisions of those who make policies. It is the result of the activities of governments whether acting directly or through agents as it has influence on the lives of the citizens.

The most important function of a government is to formulate and implement public policy. In essence, the aim of public policy is to give the people the basic provisions for an improved life, to help them develop socially and economically. In fact, it is the express will of the people for a better life that makes the state to formulate and execute its public policy. Therefore it is said that the only rationale for the existence of a state is good work for a better life done through its public policy.¹

Policies are the outcomes of government decisions. It is important function of any modern welfare state. The success of any government depends upon the well thought, clear and effective policies. Policies are guidelines for governmental action with defined objectives for the welfare and well being of the people. The policies are dynamic and subject to a continuous process. They

are the result of collective efforts of particularly governmental policy actors and institutions as well as societal groups and forces.

The state holds sovereign power on behalf of people. The individuals collectively entrust the state to formulate public policies for their own benefit and they submit themselves willingly to the disciplines imposed by such policies. It is only the interaction between the citizens and the political system that produce public policies. Policies are essential for socio-economic transformation and socio-cultural needs.

The actual concerns of public policy are indeed diverse. They include securing of high growth and the technology put in place in the economic system. Education is also an important concern. It is the foundation for providing the techno-structure in the economy. It is also responsible for inducing economic development. These concerns of public policy are indeed important for remedying the problem of poverty as well. The Indian economy could hardly neglect the emphasis that should be placed on these areas of public policy making. Other crucial concerns include health, removal of regional disparities, economic and political reforms and continuous efforts to promote communal harmony and pluralism.

Most countries, which have emphasized health and education, have been successful in population control and also in overall economic development. The health and education scene for the poor and disadvantaged in India remains bleak and will remain a serious policy challenge in the next decade or more.

In a democratic and federal setup like India, national policies evolve over a considerable period of time. The policies aim

2 Ibid., p. 88.
at ensuring the overall welfare of the people remains the common concern of any government. The basic aims of the national polices, therefore, remains largely unchanged irrespective of the changes in the complexion of the government from time to time. However, to make these policies more effective, suitable modifications have to be made according to the changing requirement of the nation.

In the present Chapter, the concepts of public policies are examined. Development and counter-insurgency policies in the context of Manipur are also discussed. An attempt is also made to evaluate development and counter-insurgency policies the light of past experience in the state.

India faces simultaneously complex challenges on several fronts. She has to manage political, social and economic changes with all its complexity make the problem more daunting and formidable. Much will depend upon the pace of economic transformations and leadership. Both are imponderables.

India’s economic policy and performance will remain a central concern in the coming years. There is no short cut to a sustained push, which will pull the country out of the problems of poverty and degradation on one side and giving India the stature its needs on the other. The institutional issues and problems of Indian polity will also raise the national temperature from time to time. The management of divisions based on caste, religion and region besides insurgency and terrorism will have a considerable influence on policy making.

Public policy focuses on what governments actually do. It is a complex process involving a series of decisions. In the real world


6 Panandiker, V.A. Pai, op. cit., p. VIII.
of public policy, technical superiority of analysis has often subordinated to political necessity. There are many competing definitions of public policy. Despite variations, they all agree on certain key aspects. They all agree public policies result from decisions made by governments. And to do nothing are also policies. In a simple sense public policy is a choice made by government to undertake some course of action.

The question of a government’s capacity to implement its decisions is also a significant consideration in the types of decision it takes. There are limitations on governments, which constrain the range of options they can choose from in a policy area. Internal and external constraints on government make policy making and efforts to understand it a difficult task.

Public policies are decisions taken by governments, which define a goal and set out the means to achieve it. Policies are often the result of multiple decisions taken by multiple decision-makers, often scattered throughout complex governmental organizations. It is influenced by the pressure groups though the political executive takes the ultimate decisions.

Thus, studying public policy in a particular area is a difficult task. It cannot be accomplished simply by going through the official records of government decision-making found in forms of laws, acts, regulations, promulgations etc. Although these are vital sources of information, public policies extend beyond the record of concrete choices to encompass the realm of potential choices or choices not made. Records of decisions do not reflect the unexpressed will of government decision-makers. The record does not reflect the interaction of the will of decision-makers with the constraints upon it at a given historical, political and social situation.

Often the government does not give any reason for making a decision. When it does, the publicly announced reasons may not
be the actual reason. The tasks of understanding why a policy was not implemented as intended or evaluating the outcomes of a policy are not simple. Explaining public policy depends on one's frame of reference, which in turn depends on one's interest, ideology and experiences. In brief, public policy is a complex phenomenon consisting of numerous policy actors and institutions. It is often shaped by earlier policies and is frequently linked closely with other seemingly unrelated decisions.7

The lessons that policy actors learn from their own as well as others' experiences are significant determinants of their behavior in the policy process. The objectives policy actors seek depend on what they believe to be desirable and achievable. This in turn depends on their previous achievements and disappointments, discussion and persuasion among policy actors are viewed as a process of learning by trial, error and example.8

Though a rational policy may be based on a consideration of all the options available, the analysis needed may prove to be a difficult exercise. They may not be explicit and the decision-makers may not be fully aware of all their implications. Even rational models based on choice from alternatives suffer because the models may not be related to the goals and values to which a society conforms. No remedies may be available to correct the shifts by which a policy may become distorted in practice. A policy needs to consider the events and ideas finding acceptance in the society.9

This is particularly true of India. There are various social, economic and political groups who have different views and interest. Social groups are complex and have conflicting interests.

8 Ibid. p. 40.
Political mobilization and electoral politics have rather encouraged social division. As a result finding a policy acceptable to all social groups is not easy in India. Political class irrespective of ideology or party affiliations has used and misused primordial identities to capture or hold power.

In India public policy making take place in a complex, vast and multi-plural society. India is like Europe with its many nations. But unlike Europe, it is under the authority of an established central government. Independent India inherited the imperial structure of governance. The imperial apparatus was "inherited intact" and adapted and extended to cover the wide range of new responsibilities of independent India. New Delhi emerged as far more significant in the nation's affairs and with much greater authority. The political structure and the popularity of the ruling party i.e. Congress, the preferred ideology of development, and the charismatic leadership of those united in the struggle for independence contributed to this result.

In pursuance of the objectives of a welfare state and rapid economic growth, India adopted Five Year Plans as a major instrument of public policy and the principle of mixed economy as the guiding ideology for planned developmental efforts. The planning objectives and social premises were derived from the Directive Principles of State Policy set out in the Constitution.

New Delhi's emergence as an "imperial Centre" is seen best when compared with the features of India as a multi-national state. The Union of India is today a political entity of more than a billion people, about a sixth of the world population. It comprises some 28 major nationalities in established territorial boundaries.


Each has a dominant written language and some with even separate scripts, distinctive literacy and cultural legacies.

A number of factors led to and sustained the imperial centre. Even before independence the Indian National Congress envisaged a dominant governmental role for realizing economic development, industrialization and social justice. The leaders of the Congress who were representatives of different nationalities held high offices in independent India. At the head of this was the charismatic leader Nehru who made national economic planning within a secular democratic framework the creed of the new India.

Thus, because of various historical and political factors, the planning system in India continues to be highly centralized. The prevailing ideology of development emphasized the pivotal role of government. Indeed most discussions do not distinguish between the state and government. It is pertinent to note that there was no major challenge to these objectives. The challenges were minor or insignificant for many decades.

Since the early 1990s, many of the policies have been in fact the reversal of the policies adopted since 1950. The economic logic of the new economic policy is based on the government failure. It points out that the system does not work efficiently under the direction of the state and hence advocates the minimal role of the state. The current economic reforms programme implemented by the government may be described as basically shift from central planning to market driven economy. At the core of the reforms programme is the new industrial policy with privatization,

12 Kannappan, Subbiah, op. cit., p. 283.
14 Kannappan, Subbiah, op. cit., p. 283.
competition, liberalization, deregulation and globalization as its cardinal features.

The excitement and optimism generated by the reform process have been reduced. The ability of policy makers to obtain radical changes in the early 1990s environment of macroeconomic crisis greatly diminished in the following years. Special interest groups in numerous areas have blocked the progress of reforms. Poverty, illiteracy and ill-health still remain major problems and are aggravated by the worsening environment.\textsuperscript{16}

Economic and related issues have become important in the politics and governance of the country. Economic reforms and policies though controversial at times have dominated many times. There has been a change in the role of the state and has increasingly assumed the role of regulator in the economy. These are in contrast to the pre-1990 period.

Privatization and economic reforms seem to be new mantras of the governments since early 1990s irrespective of ideological affiliations. All political parties, when in power, seem to share certain basic goals about economic transformation. However, they are cynically consistent in blocking reforms when out of power.\textsuperscript{17}

Economic policy judgments are also political statements.\textsuperscript{18} India’s technocratic and decision making elite which prided itself on being able to chart its own course are at too close an involvement with foreign agencies on policy choices. However, they had to reckon with powerful internal factors and forces. The Indian Planning Commission, which appeared at one stage as a potential super cabinet, faced major political challenges at home.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{18} Kannappan, Subbiah, op. cit., p. 285.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
The state level leadership showed more commitment to spending than raising resources. Their priorities were different and most of them have been in financial mess for a long time.

Policy making in India has not been taken very seriously as a scientific venture requiring various inputs. Many of the policies in government are usually the result of ad-hocism and expediency. It is often inaccurate to conceive policy making as a highly rational process characterized by foresight and the weighing of most alternatives. Instead much of the higher officials' time is spent shifting from one contingency to another. This reflects the lack of understanding of the importance of policy making as well as problem of public policies.

In the faculty of social sciences, public policy approach has emerged as an integrating concept. It has provided tools to integrate the diverse field of knowledge and research. In India, public policy approach has attracted the attention of academics and policy makers in the late eighties when the failure of political system comes in the light of development. Since it is comparatively new area and because of multi-disciplinary approach, studying public policy in India is a great challenge.

Public policy can be viewed simply as a course of action or inaction chosen by the state elite, governmental authorities and the political leadership in response to existing or perceived social problems. Policies can be perceived as general guidelines or actions which are required in order to respond to problems. These general guidelines are informed by the goals and objectives of the policy actors, involved their visions and plans for the society. The

22 Tremblay, Reeta Chowdhary, State Authority and Public Policy in India, New Delhi, National Book Organization, 1991, p. 7.
accumulation of decisions over a period of time may constitute policy.

Policies are not just wishes or declaration of objectives. They have to be implementable and should indicate the availability of resources, organization and personnel, allocation of responsibility and the time limit for implementation. "Policy making in India has suffered from many deficiencies- lack of clarity of goals and precise definition of objectives, inability to resolve the antinomy between short term and long term goals, resort to adhoc measures under the pressures of circumstances and lobbies of pressure groups, failure to think thoroughly taking into account direct as well as indirect consequences of policies.............absence of co-ordination of policies and sub-policies with overall goals and an absence of clear cut policies in respect of major problem areas. Policies are inevitably a political process and a product of interaction between the contending forces" 23.

There are many policy makers and institutions involved in public making in India. An agency that can assist to cabinet in policy making is the cabinet secretariat. But the secretariat is not so designed as to provide substantive assistance in policy making. It assists only in the meetings of the cabinet and its committees. Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) has grown in size and contains some officers with considerable expertise but it can hardly provide sustained attention to all that is involved in policy making. Thus, the most important function of government viz., policy making often gets neglected. 24 The exception may be the Union Budget which is prepared with inputs from various sources and requires the approval of the Parliament.

24 Ibid. p.62.
It has been felt that while India is rich in both policy and analytical expertise, it is rather poor in policy analysis. Capacity for introspection of both central and state governments and desire for self-improvement are limited. The scope for reasoned policy dialogues is rather limited. The first thing that strikes any student of public policy in India is the large mass of policies that exist in an articulated form. Starting with the Constitution of India, 25 policy statements can be located between Article 38 and 51 in Part IV on the Directive Principles of State Policy.

Each of Five Year Plan documents contains a series of social and economic policies that are proposed for pursuit in the relevant plan period. These documents also discuss the performance of established policies. Another policy literature in India consists of a whole series of specific policy statements e.g. foreign policy, industrial policy, export and import policy, food, agriculture, energy, education, health etc. Legislation is another source of policy literature. There are also a whole set of operational policies such as annual budgets in which action and policy coincide.

On the basis of both analysis and state conduct the bulk of social and economic policy in India may be categorized into 3 types. They are (1) aspirational type. These are statements of policy not intended to be implemented at all and can be identified by a reading of Part IV of the Constitution, (2) ritualistic type. Land reforms are the classic example. They are kept alive by a periodic reiteration of the intent to implement along with their difficulties. (3) The third category consists of policies that are sabotaged through executive action or inaction.

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26 Ibid. pp. 256-257.

27 See ibid., p. 258.
Given the nature of a highly fragmented and distorted economy received through a long period of colonial domination and the low level of infrastructure, human resource development and living standards in many parts of the country, the primary objective of economic and social policy has to be developmental. The pursuit of efficiency as an objective has to be followed and integrated into the design of development.

Development of the Indian poor is the central goal of policy makers and academicians. For this stress has been placed upon change, modernization, dynamics and ideological commitment over democratic values and institutions. Interestingly, the bureaucracy and administrative system, which have been adopted for development model, have not been modified specifically to the needs and purposes of the society, state and the political system. The heavy reliance upon bureaucratic methods and procedures has proved a stumbling block in the path of development. The result has usually been disastrous.

The Indian political system is structurally parliamentary and republican in character while its operation is nearly authoritarian. The main burden of the system is upon the rule of law i.e. what constitution speaks but the rule is in the hands of the leader of the ruling party.

The state economic regimes replicated the centre but with important differences. The state authorities were closer to the people and were more vulnerable to political pressures and opportunistic as well. Inevitably, ad-hocism, nepotism and corruption gained ground. These were aimed at building a

29 Saxena, Pradeep, op. cit., p. 6.
30 Kannapan, Subbiah, op. cit., p. 286.
political base where and when it counted and one can understand them only in terms of the dynamics and politics of each state.

Populism inevitably dominated because of universal adult franchise and the kind of political process that had been practiced. The state leadership also pressed for central projects and allocations of expenditures, revenues, scarce resources, or credit on concessional items. The centre's failure was of course, publicized.31

Thus, system was not designed to encourage the states to be self-reliant and to raise funds from private markets and other resource mobilization. The shortcomings of Indian policies can be traced to the deficient attention being paid to one of the two objectives namely strategic direction and efficiency. While a measure of growth has been achieved, the fundamental problem of the Indian economic namely uneven development and the need to generate sufficient employment opportunities remains.32

Development policy was a product of an appealing economic viewpoint and parallel political purpose. A pan-Indian and visionary ideology of secularism, economic progress and social justice proclaimed a strategy that was the very opposite of the minimalist state approach to development.33 As for the organizational framework the centre held command through its framework of appointed governors. They worked along side the elected chief ministers and all India frameworks of civil, judicial, security and professional cadre, who also manned the senior ranks of the state governments. The centre also had the reserve authority to suspend elected state governments as well as to intervene to maintain law and order.

31 Ibid., p. 286.
32 Alagh, Yoginder K, op. cit., p. 2.
33 Kannappan, Subbiah, op. cit., p. 287.
The sweeping economic policy changes introduced in 1991 were promoted by action from the top to deal with an economic crisis and not by radical political shifts. Democracy has not been an instrument of liberalization. Economic reforms and liberalization since 1991 have been towards privatization and in many ways reversal of strategy for development adopted since 1950.

India is still far away from the eradication of poverty, illiteracy, and has failed to provide the basic necessities like safe drinking water, shelter and basic health care to its people. These are despite declarations of them as priority areas in successive Five Year Plans and by successive governments. On these crucial areas which are critical to development, the performances of big states known as BIMARU states are disappointing. These social and economic situations represent the most outstanding failure of national development policy.

In India, the states have emerged as rival centres of power but replicate by and large the centre's economic regime. There is long lists of grievances the states have pointing to actions or inactions by the centre that have adversely affected their budgets or performance.

It was only after 1991 when economic reforms were introduced there was seemingly a break with the past. The main failure of the development policies of the 1980s would be related to the inability to improve the fiscal discipline of the system. This was mainly due to the inability of the government leadership to design and implement an improved system of governance. With the problem of governance virtually unresolved the process of economic reform at the end of the 1990s is confronted with almost the same problems it was a decade ago.34

The economic regimes of India at the centre, the states and in the centre-state relations are dominated by political transactions involving organized governments and increasingly autonomous nationalities. The political market place is wanting in providing a shared commitment and machinery for economic efficiency and productivity growth. Democratic politics has actually entrenched the rent-seeking economy in both the centre and the states, which is manifested in chronic excess demand, rationing, inefficiencies, delays and misallocations.35

Thus, public policies that are in response to complex problems are indeed diverse. There are number of problems facing the society. However all the problems are not taken up by the policy makers for policy decisions. Only those issues have taken up which can be implemented and appealing to the policy makers. Policies on removal of poverty, illiteracy, land reforms, illhealth and regional disparities have emphasized again and again by successive governments. But the policies on these problem areas have not able to achieve even the targeted goals.

Now we will examine the development policies and difficulties in development policy making in the context of Manipur and their evaluation. It is done largely on the basis of primary sources obtained during the fieldwork in Manipur through questionnaire and discussion.

4.2 DEVELOPMENT POLICIES AND THEIR EVALUATION

It is necessary to know the problems and constraints of development and its policies particularly in the context of Manipur. The general characteristics of the North-Eastern States as discussed in Chapter I are also found in Manipur. It is interesting to know that official documents of governments of both at the state and centre have used the terms like plans, planning,

35 Kannappan, Subbiah, op.cit., p.291.
schemes and programmes rather than policies. It is the reflection of state led development efforts which are characterized by domination of experts and bureaucrats in development policy and planning.

Policies are generally seen as decisions of the political executive or cabinet in partnership with top civil servants. Special bodies/departments are empowered to formulate developmental plans. Planning Commission at the centre, State Planning Board and Planning Department in Manipur are the examples. Normally, the respective cabinets accept plans formulated by these bodies. These bodies almost decide objectives, sectoral heads; plan priorities as well as allocation of funds in specific areas.

State governments/planning bodies generally follow the pattern and even objectives and priorities areas decided by central Planning Commission/centre. For instance, the state government is also “in general agreement with the national objective of “growth with equity” which inter-alia include; creation/strengthening of infrastructure, creation of large scale employment opportunities through production oriented/asset creation of schemes, providing of basic minimum services and ensuring food and nutritional security for all, particularly the vulnerable sections of society”.36

Thus, keeping in view of the National Objectives of the Ninth Five Year Plan and also the identified thrust areas, the state priorities and the critical requirements of the state, the Ninth Five Year Plan for the state and also Annual Plans 1997-98, 98-99 and 1999-2000 were prepared giving top priority in the development of infrastructure and provision of basic minimum services.37

A major problem of the state today is that of unemployment and also to some extent of underemployment. It is indeed

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37 Ibid.
considered to be the root of the problem of poverty, deprivation, social unrest and tension prevailing in the state. Unemployment especially among the educated is mounting. There is little or no scope for generation of large-scale employment opportunities in the industrial and other fields.

The major impediment in the way of rapid economic development of the state has been the absence of adequate infrastructure like availability of transport and communication, power and irrigation. Though efforts have been made for the development of infrastructure, the state has still a very low level of such facilities. Unless substantial improvements are made, any effort for the development of economy-industry, agriculture etc. may be abortive.

Manipur has all the basic features of a backward economy. Historically she throve on a self-sufficient agricultural economy with simple minimum needs which were produced locally. This background combined with the fast growth of population in the past few decades leads to substantially to the present economic malaise.

The border state of Manipur has only about 10 percent of its area in the valley but the remaining area is mountainous. Road transport is the only means of communication in the state. There is neither a railhead nor inland waterways system. The nearest railway station is at Dimapur (Nagaland) at a distance of about 205 kms. from Imphal. During heavy rains the two National


Highways Nos. 39 and 53 are cutoff due to landslides. Within the state all the district headquarters and sub-divisional headquarters are still to be connected by all weather roads. In fact, primitive transport system still continues to play a major role in the remote areas.

Thus, the rapid economic development in the state could not be achieved due to the lack of proper land communication within the state. The state is landlocked and isolated having no railways and additional resources mobilization is a difficult task. Liberal central assistance has to be sought for speedy development of the hill areas as well as the valley. The imbalance of development between the hills and valley has caused serious socio-economic and socio-political problems.

The Manipur hills were isolated for centuries by an unfavorable geographical position. The poverty of hill people is reflected in several forms which include illiteracy, illhealth, unemployment and failure of communication and general development. The main problems of development among the tribals include absence of infrastructure communication system, uncertain tribal land ownership system, absence of social services like medical and health and water supply. 40

The entire economy of the state of Manipur is agrarian and backward with most of the population without modern basic facilities. The contribution of large and medium scale manufacturing industry is negligible. Whatever development of the economy of the state has been almost synonymous with the development of agriculture since planning was initiated in the

40 Kamei, Gangmumei, "Problems of Development of Tribal Areas of Manipur", in Horam, M., (ed.), The Rising Manipur, New Delhi, Manas Publications, 2000, p.68. For a discussion on the problems of development of tribal areas of Manipur see ibid., pp. 59-73.
The progress of development in agricultural planning seems to be only in financed terms and not so much in physical terms. The state faces a very large-scale damage of standing crops due to frequent droughts and devastating floods. The irregularity of the monsoon is the most important factor responsible for the low production in the absence of adequate irrigation infrastructure. Due to these reasons state has an unstable agrarian economy.

Most of the schemes and plans for development and their implementations are interfered by politicians from time to time. These are done on the basis of motivation of the concerned voters of the ruling politicians not according to their suitability. There is no proper policy of the state government to procure the surplus agricultural production at reasonable prices. The management of production for marketing is still in the hands of very few persons just like a monopoly market. The unemployment and underemployment in rural area impedes the peaceful and normal life of village community.

Unstable political nature of the state by frequent changes of political leaders, insurgency movement and demand for separatism even within the districts are the regular political phenomenon in Manipur. Sometimes, law and order situations deteriorate affecting the entire economy. For instance, in the wake of ceasefire issue and protest in 2001, more than one month the entire state was paralyzed with bandhs, curfews and strikes.

It is important to understand and critically examine the development policies in the context of Manipur in particular and

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42 Ibid., p. 72.
Indian situation in general. It is also necessary to investigate the kind of development policies adopted and why certain areas have not been focussed or neglected. It becomes natural to investigate even the suitability of the past development policies in Manipur in the light of existence of poverty and inability to provide the basic necessities of life to the masses.

The present study attempts to find out who the policy makers are and why they choose certain policy decisions by rejecting the other options. The constraints in development policy making and linkages between the insurgency and development process are also important.

The examination of the above issues is important in the light of massive poverty, illiteracy, ill health and regional disparities in India as well as within Manipur. Without concrete and effective policies to reduce or eradicate them it is of not much significance to talk about the ideals of national unity and integration. We have already examined critically the concept and debates on development particularly in Indian situation in Chapter II.

Development policies include a vast area and it is a comprehensive term. They include and involve the various actions and activities of various departments and agencies of both central and state governments. Therefore it is not easy task to study the development policies. Here an attempt is made to examine the various policies on development in general and particularly in the context of Manipur. An evaluation of past development policies is also attempted.

The examination of development policies and their evaluation are done on the basis of analysis of data collected through fieldwork. In fact one of the focuses of the present study is on development policy making, neglected areas, limitations in development policy making, its linkages to the problem of insurgency and civil servants' role in development policy making.
and how the policy makers see the problems of development in Manipur.

Development is a comprehensive term and covers wide range of areas. There are national policies like National Agricultural Policy, Education Policy, Health Policy, Industrial Policy etc. There is no specific development policy as such since development has various dimensions and a lot of policies are adopted by centre and state governments as well as state agencies and NGOs.

What one notices about the development activities in Manipur is use of different terms, which are different from those of central government. At the central level, there are number of sectoral policies for economic growth as well as for overall development. The examples are industrial policies, population policies, health policies, EXIM policies etc besides number of specific area schemes, plans and programmes. However, at the state level official uses are plans (both annual and Five Year Plans), programmes, planning, schemes rather than policies.

There are 12 sectors for the purpose of plan allocation of funds under Five Year Plans and annual plans in Manipur. These sectors may be regarded as broad areas for economic planning and development in the state. Under these sectors targets are defined, funds are allocated and performances are reviewed. However thrust areas/priority areas vary under different plans.

The sectors are agriculture and allied activities, rural development, special area programme, irrigation and flood control, energy, industry and mineral, transport, communication, science and technology and environment, general economics services, social services and general services (including others). Of the sectoral heads, social services which include education and health

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care have the highest (25% of total outlay) in the Ninth Five Year Plan (1997-2002).\textsuperscript{44}

Besides the state plans there is tribal sub-plan which is meant to promote economic interest of the scheduled tribes. There is marked disparity in the development attained between the valley and hills as well as among the hill areas. The rapid economic development in the state could not be achieved due to the lack of proper land communication system within the state. There are many isolated tribal belts in hill areas yet to be connected with the sub-division and/or District Head Quarters.\textsuperscript{45}

Manipur still continues to be one of the most backward states in the country. As per the Index of Relative development of infrastructure (1991-92) prepared by the centre for Monitoring of Indian Economy, the state occupies a low place in the list. In terms of infrastructural development, the state lags behind the rest of the country by 21%.

Table 4.1 provides some of the indicators of the levels of development. The road length per 100 sq. km. of area in 1992 was only 30.30 kms. as against 62.82 kms for All India. In 1992-93 the per capita consumption of power was 140.40 Kwh as against 330.60 Kwh for All India. The per capita income in 1995-96 at current prices was only Rs. 6914 as against Rs. 9321 for All India. The same at 1980-81 prices is Rs. 1993 against All India Rs. 2573. The population below the poverty line in 1992 is 67.3% as against All India 26% in 1989-90. About irrigation coverage, only about 9% (20,000 Ha) of the total cultivated area (222.78 thousand Ha) has so far been brought under irrigation against the of All India level 35%.\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{44} For details see, \textit{Mid Term Appraisal for the Ninth Five Year Plan 1997-2002}, Planning Department, Government of Manipur, 1999, pp. II-IV.
Agriculture continues to be the backbone of the economy. As per the industrial classification of workers (1991 census) 66.38% of the total workers are cultivators and agricultural labourers. About 7.09% of the workers were found engaged in household

Table 4.1 Level of Development of Manipur vis-a-vis All India

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Ref. Year</th>
<th>Manipur</th>
<th>All India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Area</td>
<td>Sq. Km.</td>
<td>22,327</td>
<td>32,87,263</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Population</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(i) Total</td>
<td>Lakh</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>18.37</td>
<td>8463.03*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) S.C</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>16.48</td>
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<tr>
<td>(iii) S.T.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>34.41</td>
<td>8.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iv) Decennial Growth rate</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>1981-1991</td>
<td>29.29</td>
<td>23.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Literacy</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>59.89</td>
<td>52.21</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Workers</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>42.18</td>
<td>37.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Agriculture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) Rice production</td>
<td>Kg/Ha</td>
<td>1992-93</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>1740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Food production</td>
<td>Kg/Ha</td>
<td>1992-93</td>
<td>1195</td>
<td>1374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) Fertiliser consumption</td>
<td>Kg/Ha</td>
<td>1992-93</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>67.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Road length</td>
<td>Km.</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>30.30</td>
<td>62.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Per 100 sq. km</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Power:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i) Per capita consumption of power</td>
<td>KWH</td>
<td>1992-93</td>
<td>140.4</td>
<td>330.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii) Villages electrified</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Banking</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i) Banks</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>61852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii) No of Banks per lakh of population</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Per capita income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i) At current price</td>
<td>Rs.</td>
<td>1995-96</td>
<td>6914</td>
<td>9321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii) At 1980-81 price</td>
<td>Rs.</td>
<td>1995-96</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>2573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Population below Poverty line</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * Include the projected population of Jammu and Kashmir  
** The national target is to reduce from 37% in 1984-85 to less than 26% in 1989-90.

Source: Manipur State: State of Economy and level of development,  
Secretariat Planning Department, Government of Manipur, Imphal, 1998.
industries. There has been an increase in the agricultural workers; but the increase in net cultivated area has been insignificant. Therefore, the pressure on land has increased tremendously. The backwardness of the economy is evident from the fact that there has been virtually no diversion from agriculture to other activities such as plantation and forestry for which there is tremendous scope in the state. Settled form of agriculture still continues to be concentrated in the valley whereas jhum cultivation continues to be pre-dominant in the hills. Even more than 50 years of independence, agriculture continues to depend on monsoon and the state continues to be a net importer of foodgrains.

Presently, the two National Highways, namely, NH-39 and NH-53 are the only links (by surface transport) with the rest of the country. The traffic on both these Highways is often disturbed due to insurgency, ethnic disturbances etc. leading to public resentment and shortage of essential commodities.

The state government has been pursuing the proposal for construction of a Railway line from Diphu/Dhansiri (Assam) to Imphal via Karong since the Fourth Plan period. This line can be subsequently extended upto Moreh on the Indo-Myanmar border. Although a token provision appears in 1998-99 budget, the Ministry of Railways has taken no concrete steps so far. It has been the state government's view that such projects should not be judged on the basis of financial viability alone but in terms of the overall long term impact on the economic development of the state and region.

Unemployment, particularly among the educated youth, is a serious problem which is the main cause of socio-political tensions resulting in civil unrest, secessionism, drug addiction, ethnic classes etc. There were as many as 3.20 lakhs unemployed persons as on 31-12-97 in a total population of 18.31 lakhs. It is also a fact that almost all the employment-oriented schemes
sponsored by the Government of India are not found suitable to local conditions.\textsuperscript{47}

Policies on development consist essentially of adopting specific state actions designed to bring about desired changes for welfare of the people. In regard to policies on development there are four questions in the Questionnaire. These questions are intended to find out the problems of development policy making in the context of Manipur. The questionnaire was distributed broadly to three categories of people. They are civil servants, politicians and knowledgeable persons mostly the academicians. The sample size and other details are provided in Table No 4.2 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories (Cat.)</th>
<th>Number of Respondents (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil Servants (C S)</td>
<td>28(40.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians (Pol.)</td>
<td>16(22.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledgeable Persons (K P)</td>
<td>26(37.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>70(100.00)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Figures in brackets are in percentage. The same will be applicable for all the tables based on questionnaire data (Appendix-I).

The first question is regarding the importance given to the factors while making development policies and strategies. The factors given in the Question No. 1 are (a) unemployment of youth, (b) insurgency pressures, (c) poverty alleviation, (d) administrative accountability (e) any other.\textsuperscript{48} The respondents were asked to give ranking in order of importance. The assumption here is that the factors listed are important and the idea is to find out how much importance is given to these factors or any other factor while making of development policies and strategies in Manipur.

The research findings indicate mixed views on the factors listed and divergent rankings. According to all the respondents,

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid. p. 2.

\textsuperscript{48} The Questionnaire in Appendix – I, see Question No. 1 for details.
poverty alleviation has been the top priority in making of development policies and strategies. The 1st ranking is poverty alleviation provided by 40% of all the respondents. There is difference of opinion among the respondents. Thus, only 30% of the knowledgeable persons, 33% of the politicians also give it 1st ranking. In contrast, 55% of the civil servants give the poverty alleviation the 1st ranking and thus top priority for development policy making and strategy according to them.

The second priority is a mixed one. 36% of civil servants and 33% of politicians give unemployment of youth the second priority. In contrast, unemployment of youth has been given third priority by 40% of the knowledgeable persons. For the knowledgeable persons the second priority is the insurgency pressures. However, for civil servants insurgency pressures are the third important factor. The politicians express a different view in this regard. For them the third factor while making of various development policies and strategy is administrative accountability.

Some interesting factors that are not mentioned in the questionnaire development policy making and strategies are also identified. They are education, income generation, etc. In fact, some of the respondents have chosen them as top priorities while making for development policies and strategies in Manipur.

Thus, these findings indicate contrasting views on the importance given to factors for development policy making and strategies in Manipur. They reflect the perception and understanding of development policy making by policy makers as well as importance they give in making such policies. Except poverty alleviation in which almost all the respondents have given top priority, there is disagreement in other priority areas for development policy making and strategies.

Even in case of poverty alleviation only 40% of all the respondents give it top priority. Among the civil servants it is clear
top priority as it is expressed by 55% of them. In sharp contrast, only 33% of the politicians give poverty alleviation a top priority. From this, we can safely conclude that there has been no agreement between civil servants and politicians as to what would be the top priority for the development of the state. It also can be said that there is conflict of views and interests on what should be the priority for development policy making and strategy in the state.

These disagreement and conflicts particularly between the civil servants and politicians on what should be the top priorities have negative impact in development policy making in Manipur. These may have serious consequences not only in the policy decisions but also in the implementation of the selected policies in the state. This is because civil servants and politicians are main policy makers and partners in governance of the state and for the progress and future development of the state.

For effective policy making and policy implementation there must be broad agreement on priority areas and co-operation between the policy makers. The other interesting finding is difference of opinions among civil servants themselves on the priority areas for development of the state. Only 55% of them agree that poverty alleviation is the top priority but the remaining 45% do not agree to it.

There are the widespread disagreements among the civil servants on other priority areas for development of the state. Only 36% of them view that unemployment of youth is the second priority area. Again only 36% of them believe that insurgency pressures are the third priority area for making policies for development. Thus, there have been disagreements on the priority areas for development of the state even among the civil servants of the state.
The more profound disagreements on priority areas for development of state are found among the politicians who take the ultimate policy decisions. This is clear from the fact that only 33% of the politicians give poverty alleviation the 1st ranking. Similarly only 33% of them recognize the insurgency pressures as second priority area for development policy making and strategies. The third area according to them is administrative accountability which is expressed by 50% of them. Thus, there is clear lack of agreements among the main policy actors, the politicians, on what should be the priority area/s for development policy and strategy in Manipur.

The disagreements and conflicts on the priority areas for development not only have contributed to ineffective development policies but lack of development in the state. The situation is further compounded by the existence of insurgency problem in the state. In fact insurgency pressures have been recognized as the third most important factor by the civil servants while it is third according to knowledgeable persons. Thus, insurgency problem has an impact on development policy making and strategies in Manipur.

Now we will examine the neglected areas/priorities for development policy making in Manipur. The Question No. 3 is intended to identify the three areas which have not been given sufficient priority in development policy making. The identified areas in the questionnaire are (a) agricultural modernization, (b) small scale industries, (c) infrastructural growth (communication etc.), (d) social sector (education etc.), (e) administrative reforms (including recruitment), (f) any other (please specify).49 The respondents have been asked to provide ranking to find out the neglected areas for development policy making in the state. The

49 Ibid., see the Question No. 3 for details.
assumption is that the given areas have not been given sufficient attention/priority in the past.

The research findings show divergent views on areas which have not been given sufficient priority in development policy making. 30% of all the respondents say agricultural modernization has not been given sufficient priority in development policy making. 22% of them also believe that infrastructural growth like communication has not been given priority in the past.

The divergent views are found again among the civil servants, politicians and knowledgeable persons. For politicians, agricultural modernization has been the most neglected area expressed by 50% of them. 40% of the knowledgeable persons share this view. For civil servants it is third most neglected area, infrastructural growth like communication etc. is the first for them. According to politicians and knowledgeable persons infrastructural growth like communication is second most neglected area. Civil servants express the view that small scale industries are the second most neglected area in development policy making in the state.

For politicians and knowledgeable persons, administrative reforms including recruitment are the third most neglected area. About 27% of civil servants are of the view that administrative reforms is the most important area which has not been given sufficient priority in development policy making in Manipur.

Thus, on the neglected areas also there are different rather conflicting views. This is clear from the fact that none of the responses combined together have a clear view on prioritizing the neglected areas. None of the neglected areas identified have the support of even 35% of all the respondents. The conflicting views on priority areas that require sufficient attention itself have been a difficult problem in development policy making in the state.
These conflicting views on the neglected areas are not only between the civil servants, politicians and knowledgeable persons. They are also found among the civil servants as well as among the politicians. This is rather disturbing aspect of development policy making in the state. There is no single area in which majority of civil servants agrees as the most neglected area. Therefore, one can imagine the kind of development polices adopted and their effectiveness in the state in the past. It is because of the fact that for effective policy making not only there is need for cooperation among the key policy actors but also general understanding and agreement on important problem areas and their priorities are essential.

However, these findings are not surprising given the nature of plural society, existence of multiple problems and above all insurgency in the state. As discussed above, insurgency pressures have been one of the important factors which influence development policy making and strategy. Though there has been no agreement on priorities for development policy making, there is general understanding and agreement on problem areas that require sufficient attention.

The findings indicate that there are neglected areas in development policy making in the past. The important areas that are not in order of priority are agricultural modernization, infrastructural growth, social sector like education, and administrative reforms. This means that these areas have to be given priority in development policy making in the state. Next we will discuss the constraints on effective development policy making.

The general and substantial constraints have been noticed as discussed above. Here, we will examine the specific constraints in actual policy making for development. The question No. 6 of the
questionnaire deals with this aspect. The attempt is to identify major factors which act as constraints on effective development policy making by giving ranking. The major factors given in the questionnaire are (a) lack of adequate central funding, (b) lack of local resources, (c) lack of stable government, (d) lack of cooperation between political leadership and civil servants, (e) insurgency and (f) any other.

The responses indicate mixed views and no clear major factors which act as constraints on effective development policy making agreeable to all. *Lack of local resources* is the first major factor which acts as constraints on effective development policy making according to 41% of all the respondents. At the same time about 22% of them express the view that *lack of adequate central funding* is the first major factor.

*Lack of local resources* is the first major factor according to 64% of civil servants but for the majority of politicians it is second major factor. For the majority of the politicians, *lack of adequate central funding* is the first major constraint. In contrast, majority of the knowledgeable persons feels that *lack of cooperation between political leadership and civil servants* is the first major factor that acts as constraints for effective development policy making in the state.

Thus, the above analysis indicates that there is no agreement among the respondents on the single most important factor which acts as constraints on effective development policy making. The opinions among the respondents are highly divided. They all agree that there are factors which act as constraints but not on the ranking of these factors.

The more interesting one is the sharp difference of opinion and understanding of policy making on development by the actual

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50 Ibid., see the Question No. 6 for details.
policy makers i.e. civil servants and politicians. This is reflected in their responses. Thus, for the majority of civil servants lack of local resources is the 1st most important factor whereas lack of adequate central funding is the 1st most important factor according to half of the politicians.

According to civil servants, the three major factors that act, as constraints on effective development policy in order of ranking are lack of local resources, lack of adequate central funding and lack of cooperation between political leadership and civil servants. Except the lack of local resources, there is no majority agreement among the civil servants on the second and third most important factors that act as constraints. Lack of stable government is a major factor according to significant number of the civil servants. One third of politicians express the view that lack of adequate central funding is the third major factor. Some of them feel that lack of stable government is a major factor that acts as constraints on effective policy making for development.

Views of knowledgeable persons who are outside the actual policy making process are quite different from those of civil servants and politicians. For the majority of the knowledgeable persons 1st major factor is lack of cooperation between political leadership and civil servants. The second most important factor is the lack of local resources and about half of them feel that lack of stable government in the state is the third most important factor. Some of them feel lack of adequate central funding is the second most important factor. Some of them recognize insurgency as a major factor which acts as constraint on effective development policy making for in the state.

Knowledgeable persons have identified some factors that are not mentioned in the questionnaire. They are significant as these factors are identified by about 40% of them and these factors have been given the 1st ranking. Some of these factors are lack
understanding of the issues involved, lack of political will, lack of vision among the political parties/leaders, lack of comprehensive policy programmes and lack of "Manipuri nationalism" and sense of belonging. These different factors act as constraints on effective development policy making in the state according to them.

Thus, there are number of factors which act as constraints on effective development policy making. The difference of opinion and understanding of policy making and problems faced in the policy making process continue as we have seen in the earlier responses on the questionnaires on development. There is no majority agreement on a single factor which acts as constraint. This itself is a major constraint particularly considering the difference of views and understanding among and between civil servants and politicians. All these reflect the complexity of problems of development and difficulties in policy making for development.

From the analysis of the responses, the major factors which act as constraints on effective development policy making are lack of local resources, lack of adequate central finding, lack of stable government in the state and lack of cooperation between political leadership and civil servants. These factors are not in terms of ranking. Insurgency has been recognized as a major factor which acts as constraint on effective development policy making. Now we will make an attempt to evaluate development policies based on the questionnaire responses.

We have examined development policy making, significant problems, neglected areas and constraints on effective policy making for development in Manipur. Here the attempt is to evaluate development policies based on the responses of the questionnaire. Attempt is to focus on specific aspects.

There are three questions in the regard. The question number 2 is intended to evaluate the development policies in
terms of the results of the past policies. The question is "Do you agree that past policies for development have not produced the desired results?" The identified responses are (a) fully agree, (b) partially agree, (c) partially disagree, (d) fully disagree and (e) can not say.51

Table 4.3: Results of the Past Development Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cat.</th>
<th>Past policies for development have not produced desired results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a) Fully Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C S</td>
<td>18(64.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pol.</td>
<td>13(81.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KP</td>
<td>16(61.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>47(67.14)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on data of the respondents to Question No.2 of Questionnaire (Appendix-I).

There is a clear view for the first time among the respondents. This is clear from the Table 4.3. About 67% fully agree that past policies for development have not produced the desired results in the state. Only 33% of them partially agree with this view. Thus past policies for development have not produced the desired results in Manipur. It means that past development policies were ineffective. The ineffectiveness of past policies and failure to produce desired results has serious consequences not only in policy making but also in social and economic development of the state.

The fact that past policies for development have not produced the desired results has been more clearly expressed by 81% of the politicians who fully agree with it. About 64% of civil servants and 62% of knowledgeable persons fully agree with this fact. Thus, despite some variation all the respondents share the

51 Ibid. see Question No.2
same view that *past policies for development have not produced the desired results in Manipur.*

The next question is an interesting and significant one in the sense that there seems to be a popular belief on this aspect. The question is "Do you feel that the centre has no given adequate attention to the development needs of the state?" The grading of the responses is the same as in question No.2. Almost 90% of the respondents *agree that the centre has not given adequate attention to the development needs of the state.* About 49% of the respondents *fully agree* with this view while 40% of them *partially agree.*

Among politicians, civil servants and knowledgeable persons there are slight variation on the extent of agreement. These findings can be understood from the Table 4.4. 69% of the politicians, 54% of the civil servants *full agree* that centre has not given adequate attention to the development needs of the state. 50% of the knowledgeable persons *partially agree* with this view. From this we can say that policy makers particularly politicians tend to blame the needs and problems of the state to the centre. This is clear from the fact that 100% of the politicians agree with this view. Knowledgeable persons on the other hand recognize

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cat.</th>
<th>Centre has not given adequate attention to development needs</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fully Agree</td>
<td>Partially Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C S</td>
<td>15(53.58)</td>
<td>10(35.71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pol.</td>
<td>11(68.75)</td>
<td>5(31.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K P</td>
<td>8(30.77)</td>
<td>13(50.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34(48.57)</td>
<td>28(40.00)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on data of the respondents to Question No.5 of Questionnaire (Appendix-I)

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52 Ibid., see the Question No. 5 for details.
the local dimension of the problem. These are the significant findings in the sense that politicians along with civil servants are key policy makers for development policies and their implementation in the state.

Thus, the evaluation of past development policies clearly indicate the ineffectiveness of the policies and failure to produce the desired results. These are significant findings that are accepted by about 89% of the respondents. In fact there is almost unanimity among the respondents that past development policies have not produced the desired results and the centre has not given adequate attention to the development needs of the state. These findings are not surprising when we recall the development and other problems in the state as we have discussed. The present findings on the past policies for development and inadequate attention to the development needs of the state by the centre also confirm the popular perceptions and beliefs.

Now an attempt is made to examine the important criteria employed while evaluating the policies for development. The question No. 18 deals with this aspect. The question is “what are the three most important criteria employed in the evaluation of policies?” for development. The given criteria are (a) failure to achieve objectives, (b) administrative corruption, (c) change of government, (d) change in popular demands and pressures, (e) pressures from insurgency movements and (f) any other criteria (please specify). The respondents have been asked to give ranking with a view to identify the most important criteria.

The responses indicate extend of understanding and divergent views among the respondents. Failure to achieve objectives is the most important criteria employed in the evaluation of policies for development in the state. Administrative

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53 Ibid., see the Question No. 18 for details.
corruption is the second while change of government is the third most important criteria. However, these criteria are interchangeable in terms of ranking according to some of the respondents. A significant number of respondents say that pressures from insurgency movements are the third most important criteria in the evaluation of policies for development.

According to about 83% of the politicians failure to achieve objectives is the most important criteria employed in the evaluation of policies on development. Administrative corruption is the second and change of government is the third most important criteria. Politicians have more clear views on the criteria employed while evaluating the development policies.

The opinions of civil servants are divided. They also differ in the sense that a significant number of them express the view that change in popular demands and pressures, and pressures from insurgency movements are important criteria employed in the evaluation of development policies. However like politicians they feel that failure to achieve objectives are the most important criteria, administrative corruption, the second and change of government, the third. The difference lies in the extent of agreement and politicians have more clear views than the civil servants in this regard.

Lack of agreement among the knowledgeable persons indicates their understanding on the issue. Thus, 30% of them express no comments. Change in popular demands and pressures is the most important criteria, failure to achieve objectives, the second and administrative corruption, the third most important criteria employed in the evaluation of development policies according to them. At the same time administrative corruption and change of government are the important criteria employed according to a significant number of them.
The above data analysis of questionnaire indicates the acknowledgement and acceptance of the existence of administrative corruption in the state. In fact it is a significant finding as those including civil servants and politicians who actually govern the state express them. As discussed in the Chapter III about the cause and continuance of secessionist movements, administrative corruption has been a significant factor. Administrative corruption has not only been a social problem in the state but also a reflection of underdevelopment and ineffective development policies and strategy.

Thus, the most important criteria employed in the evaluation of policies for development are failure to achieve objectives, administrative corruption and change of government in the state. All these confirm the popular perception and beliefs about the development process, administration and governance in the state. The other significant criteria are change in popular demands and pressures, and pressures from insurgency movements. All these reflect the unsuitability and ineffectiveness of development policies as well as social reality particularly administrative corruption and pressures from insurgency movements.

From the examination and evaluation of development policies, it is clear that problem of development is complicated and multi-dimensional. The unfortunate reality is the lack of clear understanding of the problems and disagreement on the priority areas for development policies among and between politicians and civil servants. The problem is further complicated by the continuance of insurgency which started since 1978.

The disagreement on the priority areas for development policy making is the result of multiplicity of problem areas that require immediate attention. The problem is complicated with the lack of local resources, inadequate central funding and lack of
stable government in the state. The research findings clearly indicate ineffectiveness of past policies for development and inability to produce the desired results. Lack of cooperation between political leadership and civil servants, administrative corruption and insurgency are the main factors that directly affect the effective policy making for development.

Next we will examine the problem of insurgency as well as counter-insurgency policies and their evaluation in the context of Manipur. It is done largely on the basis of primary sources obtained from fieldwork through discussion and questionnaire.

4.3 COUNTER-INSURGENCY POLICIES AND THEIR EVALUATION

The single most critical issue for India's development agenda today and even perhaps for its long-term survival in the crisis of internal security is the rising scourge of terrorism. An increasing proportion of natural resources, efforts and attention are being diverted to the task of containment of a multiplicity of proliferating crises. These have crippled the economies of vast regions, paralyzed governance, administration and judicial system, disrupted the basic task of education, interrupted the growth process and crippled responses to the gigantic challenge of nation building.

The governmental response to these varied movements and tendencies in South Asia has been far from adequate. Indeed no single government in the region has been able to define a coherent and internally consistent policy on terrorism and each vacillates between the alternating extremes of conciliation, even appeasement, on the one hand and over-reaction or excessive use of force on the other.

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India, which has prided itself on the maintenance of democratic institutions, is at best a flawed democracy, tolerating gross violation of human rights alongside its democratic institutionalization.\textsuperscript{56} The neighboring states have yet to achieve any institutionalization of democracy and their human rights record is even more dismal.

These failures are well known but the causes are controversial. There has been a tendency to obscure the reasons rather than analyse them. Culture is at the root of human right abuses in South Asia as its development problems. The cultural roots are to be found in the dominant elite of South Asia who has determined the policy agenda and controlled state power.\textsuperscript{57} How elite perceive equality and comparative studies of their values have revealed national cultural differences, which are reflected in the priority given to welfare state policies.

State in India acting too late is virtually an art form. The maze of delays, of deliberate deferments and constraints, elaborate farce of inconclusive decision making, the evasion of responsibility, the sheer bloody mindedness of bureaucracy has kept the nation in a state of paralysis even on the life and death issues of terrorism.\textsuperscript{58} India has neither effective law nor a coherent policy framework to address a challenge, which has threatened the interest and integrity of the nation.

Each terrorist movement has also met with the collapse of virtually all the institutions of civil governance and criminal justice administration in the affected areas. The oldest insurgency in India - the secessionist campaign in Nagaland dates back to almost a half a century. Yet not even a

\textsuperscript{56} Mallick, Ross, Development, Ethnicity and Human Rights in South Asia, New Delhi, Sage Publications, 1998, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., p. 12.
\textsuperscript{58} Gill, K.P.S., op. cit., p. 11.
preliminary exercise in restoring the basic functions of government in large areas has been initiated.

India's experience in countering insurgency operations has been long and marked by a few dramatic hard won successes. With the exception of the extra ordinary and unconventional use of the civil police in Punjab, the Indian Army has been the primary force in counter insurgency warfare from the time of the country's independence in 1947.\(^{59}\)

In terms of strategic perspectives and control of operations, the army continues to dominate Indian State's response to low intensity warfare in most theatres, particularly and overwhelmingly in J&K and North-East. It is the North-East that insurgencies have proved to the most intractable and persistent.\(^{60}\) The army in the region has employed a wide range of strategies and tactics.

The success of Punjab was an exception. It was not a product of state policy, but primarily of the personal strength and vision of a single commander. Perhaps this is the reason why the experiment has not been replicated in other insurgency-affected areas. There is no doubt that army has contributed in the counter insurgency operations particularly in Mizo insurgency.

Central government has taken various steps to control insurgency in the North-East region. They include the signing of peace Accords, banning of armed groups under the *Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967*, declaration of disturbed areas under the *Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958* and deployment of Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and army units for the aid


\(^{60}\) Ibid., p. 215.
of civil administration. There are also impositions of President’s Rules particularly during the crisis or extreme violence.\(^{61}\)

In addition to normal central grants, special assistance is provided from time to time for the modernization of state police forces. There is also collection and sharing of intelligence information as well as coordination of various activities of army, central security forces and police forces to deal with such situations. There have been meetings of various agencies working in the region along with central agencies of affected states at the regional level for reviewing the situation and actions from time to time.

It is said that there are no consistent and effective counter-insurgency policies in India particularly in the North-East. This appears to be true even now except the case of Mizoram. The successive governments both at the centre and states have made efforts from time to time. The case of Mizoram may be treated as unique case considering different nature, causes, circumstances as well as response of the central government.

The responses included both military solution and constitutional devolution. Mizoram Accord provided the former rebel leaders with amnesty and creation of a new state for the Mizo people. Because of these reasons and different historical factors and circumstances Mizoram case can be considered unique. This is more so since such efforts or results have not occurred in North-East or other parts of India.

The most unique counter-insurgency operation by Indian army was in Mizoram in the mid sixties. The years 1967-69 saw the entire rural population of Mizoram (80% of the total) uprooted

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from their homes to be relocated miles away in what where euphemistically called “Protected and Progressive Villages”. The army argued that the segregation and control of the population by this method was necessary for a successful counter-insurgency campaign. The context for the policy of grouping of villages was created by the declaration of “independence” of Mizoram from India in March 1966. It involved general humiliation, loss of freedom and of property as well as injury and death.

The grouping contributed considerably to the success of the army’s counter-insurgency operations. But the irony is that the colonial strategies adopted by the British to suppress independent movements and other anti-colonial insurrections which were “decried most vehemently by our national leaders were used by us against some of our own people in the post independence era. One hopes that Indian government would not allow use of such outdated colonial military strategies while dealing with own ethnic minorities who have not been able to finally settle their terms of political association with India. The problem is that in the nation’s internal wars against terrorists and insurgents............. the village folk, most of whom knew very little about anything, have borne the brunt of an exasperated and often clueless, system of governance”.

Army played an important role in Punjab, Kashmir and other North-Eastern States, including Manipur. There are justifications for the army’s involvement. In one way, it is the failure of civil administration and political leadership to deal with these situations. In fact, they allow them to develop in a situation of crisis and a point where only army could control the situation. Thus, particularly in the context of Punjab, the situation as it developed was “primarily due to lack of a proper perspective of the problem and essentially due to inaction by the state

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administration to deal with acts of violence in a rational and effective manner. Timely action both at the political and administrative level to deal with the situation would have controlled it much earlier." 63

The concept of insurgency and nation state are always intertwined. In case of subversive, revolutionary and secessionist insurgency, the very existence and integrity of the nation state is in danger. 64 The primary objective of any state is to provide security, both internal and against external aggression. In an insurgency situation this objective is threatened and it is duty of the state to prevent such threats and to combat the insurgents. In a society where people lack even the basic necessities of life, it may not be easy to prevent insurgency or combat the insurgents.

The question of what constitutes the success or failure of insurgency is a very difficult one. Any theory of counter-insurgency is based on the perception of the theorist about the genesis and progress of the insurgency. Broadly there are three basic models of counter-insurgency emphasizing the technical, administrative and political aspects. 65

Insurgency is the result of interplay of various factors-economic, social, political, psychological, geographical, demographic, administrative, military and technological. It has been discussed as secessionist movement in the context of Manipur in Chapter III. Any counter-insurgency theory and practice must take into account all these factors. Therefore any strategy must be modified, altered and adjusted to suit the unique situation of each insurgency. If victory for the counter-insurgency were merely military victory over the insurgent, this would be

65 For details of these models see, ibid., pp.65-67.
repression and retrogression of insurgency. It must be permanent isolation of the insurgents from the population in physical, ideological and psychological senses.

In context of North-East and particularly Manipur, the strategy appears to be primarily of military strategy. Whenever there is violence or severe threat to security then only central government responses with military deployment. When violence reduces or insurgents are crushed militarily, government appears to be happy as if solution has been achieved. Such strategy has apparently failed in Manipur. Because the problem of insurgency in Manipur is not merely law and order or militancy, it is also a real social and economic problem as we have seen in Chapter III.

Once insurgency takes place, irreversible changes take place in the very fabric and structure of the society. Insurgency erupted due to the existence of economic, social and political contradictions leading to relative deprivation. Hence unless the basic cause, the inherent contradictions that structured the conflict are reduced or removed it will reoccur as it happens in Manipur.

Societal structure resulting in relative deprivation being the primary cause of insurgency, the counter-insurgent must study, analyse and identify the contradictions structuring the conflict. Removal of these contradictions and the relative deprivation has to be accompanied by the removal or replacement of the ideology and the cause. This will form the foundation of the entire counter insurgency enterprise.66

Therefore, it is not surprising that the insurgency or secessionist challenges continue in North-East particularly in Manipur. This is despite the periodic physical isolation of the insurgents by military tactics and strategy. Neither there have

66 Ibid., p.69.
been consistent policies to deal with the problem nor have the causes nor nature have been studied and understood properly.

National security is a government policy and execution of that policy is for the protection and promotion of national interests. It is not all military hardware and force though it is one of its major elements. It involves absence of social turmoil caused by communal, caste or ethnic based conflict. In such situation internal security can be maintained without the display, deployment or use of military force. Maintenance of internal security is the end and means by which the society and individual feels fairly secure. It also provides an environment wherein a nation's resources can be exploited by means of production, for the optimized development of a nation's economic potential.67

Such a situation of internal security does not exist in North-East India and Manipur. Insurgency has affected the internal security of the North-East, inhibited the development work and cost the lives of so many people. It is also costing the exchequer considerably for maintaining the security forces in the troubled areas and for the individual citizens, loss of their property by destruction.

Due to socio-ethnic tensions there are persisting problems of internal security though federal government circles label it as just "law and order problem". Notwithstanding the label, the individuals and society feel insecure. In Manipur there are about 25 militant outfits belonging to different ethnic groups. Most of these have come to notice after 1990. Out of these at least 8 to 10 outfits are very active and have gathered large strengths of well-trained and equipped cadre.68 Some of these prominent outfits

68 Sharma, S.C., Insurgency or Ethnic Conflict (with Special Reference to Manipur), New Delhi, Magnum Business Associates, 2000, p. 172.
have provided olive green uniform to their activities, which they wear while conducting attacks on security forces.

The young persons are selected after careful scrutiny for induction into their cadre. They impart military training and generally impose strict discipline. Most of the activists are known by their code names and they hardly reveal information about their organization if security forces capture them. Most of them are educated youths, due to acute unemployment and poverty in the state. The leaders of the militants have advantageously exploited this situation.

Most of the militant outfits have formed front wings that maintain close contact with intellectuals, politicians, social workers, media and bureaucrats. This is done to promote an indirect protective cover by propagating their cause and looking after their vested interests. They are able to organize such front wings due to wide public support which muster carefully by carrying all various social welfare activities. They impose punishment to those who defy them. The main targets of the militant outfits of all communities are security forces of the central government, which cannot be influenced by them. The state police personnel are being spared by the militant outfits from attacks unless they defy their dictats.69

Now we will discuss the problem of insurgency and counter-insurgency policies in Manipur based on the questionnaire data analysis. There are specifically five questions in this regard in the Questionnaire. They are question Nos. 12, 13, 14, 15 and 18. We already have discussed the problem of secessionist movements in their various dimensions in chapter III. Here the attempt is to examine the perception, understanding and solution of the

69 For details of the nature of the activities of the armed groups and the role of security forces in containing them, see ibid., pp. 172-184.
problem of insurgency from the politicians, civil servants and knowledgeable persons.

The first question relates to important causes for continuing the problem of insurgency in the state. The question is “what are the three most important causes for continuing problem of insurgency?” The identified responses are (a) unemployment of youth, (b) non-implementation of development programmes/policies, (c) corruption of political leaders, (d) governmental instability, (e) corruption of bureaucracy, (f) counter-insurgency measures, (g) any other causes (please specify). The respondents have been asked to provide the ranking also.

The analysis of responses indicates difference of opinion and understanding of the problem of insurgency among the respondents. They also reflect the multiple factors for continuance of insurgency in the state. Corruption of political leaders is the first most important cause according to 41% of them. However, 37% of them express that unemployment of the youth is the most important cause.

The opinions are more sharply divided on the second and third most important causes for continuation of insurgency in the state. Thus the second important cause is both non-implementation of development programmes/policies and unemployment of youth. Similarly the third most important causes are combination of non-implementation of development programmes/policies, unemployment of the youth, corruption of the political leaders and governmental instability. This is based on data of respondents who have similar percentage on these factors.

For civil servants unemployment of youth is the 1st most important cause for continuation of insurgency. Some of them believe that corruption of political leaders is the 1st most important cause...
cause. Non-implementation of development programmes/policies and unemployment of youth are other important causes. An important finding is the admission of corruption of bureaucracy as an important cause for insurgency by sizeable number of civil servants themselves.

The opinion and understanding of the problem is clearer among the politicians. Thus, corruption of political leaders is the first important cause for continuation of insurgency according to 67% of the politicians. Significantly, it is important finding as politicians admit it as and a critical factor for insurgency. Unemployment of youth and governmental instability are the second and third causes. Corruption of bureaucracy and non-implementation of development programmes/policies are other causes according to politicians for continuation of insurgency in the state.

For knowledgeable persons there is no majority agreement on the three most important causes. Corruption of political leaders is the most important cause, unemployment of youth and non-implementation of development programmes/policies are the second and the third causes respectively. Many of them feel that corruption of bureaucracy is an important cause.

Some of the knowledgeable persons also have pointed out some interesting causes. Thus, lack of development, economic underdevelopment and desire for ethnic identity, and “lack of Manipuri nationalism” and “identity crisis” are the most important causes for continuation of insurgency in Manipur according to some of knowledgeable persons.

From the above data analysis, the three most important causes for continuation of insurgency in Manipur are corruption of political leaders, unemployment of youth, and non-implementation of development programmes/policies. The other important causes are corruption of bureaucracy and governmental instability. Lack of
development and desire for ethnic identity has also been given as important causes.

Indeed, the problem of insurgency is a complex phenomenon which requires solution/reduction of the above important causes. In fact it is a difficult task. Therefore it is not surprising that problem of insurgency which started around 1978 is still continuing in Manipur. These are the significant findings as civil servants and politicians themselves express them. Both are involved in the governance and are actual policy makers in the state.

Next an attempt is made to find out the link between the development policies and their implementations, to the continuation of the problem of insurgency. The question No. 14 deals with this aspect. The question is "In your view, do the development policies and their implementations have significant link to the continuing problem of insurgency?". The identified responses are (a) fully agree, (b) partially agree, (c) partially disagree, (d) fully disagree, (e) can not say.

Table 4.5: Linkages between Implementation of Development Policies and Insurgency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cat.</th>
<th>Development Policies and their Implementation have a significant link with Insurgency</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fully Agree</td>
<td>Partially Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C S</td>
<td>13(46.43)</td>
<td>10(35.71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pol.</td>
<td>5(31.25)</td>
<td>5(31.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K P</td>
<td>13(50.00)</td>
<td>8(30.77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>31(44.29)</td>
<td>23(32.86)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on data of the respondents to Question No.14 of Questionnaire (Appendix-I).

Ibid., see the Question No. 14 for details.
The overwhelming majority of about 77% agree that the development policies and their implementation have significant link to the continuation of the problem of insurgency in Manipur. This is clear from the Table 4.5. About 44% fully agree while 33% of them partially agree with this view. Only a very few of them express that they cannot say with this view. This is one of the most important findings of the present study. One of the significant assumptions of the entire study has been that development process has a close link to the continuing problem of insurgency in the state. This assumption has found out to be true. It can be said clearly now that for a solution to the problem of insurgency there is fundamental need for alteration in the development process in the state.

Related to the above research findings, next question attempts to find out the essential parts in counter-insurgency policy making. Question No. 15 is on this aspect. The question is “Do you agree that solutions to unemployment of youth, and administrative and political corruption must form an essential part in counter-insurgency policy making?” The responses given are same as in Question No. 14.72

Almost all the respondents agree that the solutions to unemployment of youth, and administrative and political corruption must form an essential part in counter-insurgency policy making in the state. This means that these solutions have not been considered and formed a part of counter-insurgency policy making in the past. This also explains why the past counter-insurgency measures which heavily rely on security forces have failed in the state. Table 4.6 provides the detailed responses.

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72 Ibid., see the Question No. 15 for details.
Table 4.6: Solutions to Unemployment of Youth, Administrative and Political Corruption as a part in Counter-Insurgency Policy Making

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cat.</th>
<th>Solutions to unemployment of youth, administrative and political corruption must be an essential part in counter-insurgency policy making</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a) Fully Agree</td>
<td>(b) Partially Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>23(82.14)</td>
<td>5(17.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pol.</td>
<td>11(68.75)</td>
<td>5(31.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KP</td>
<td>16(61.54)</td>
<td>8(30.77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50(71.43)</td>
<td>18(25.71)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on data of the respondents to Question No.15 of Questionnaire (Appendix-I).

About 71% of the respondents fully agree with the above view while 26% partially agree with this view. All the civil servants agree the view that solutions to unemployment of youth, and administrative and political corruption must form essential part in counter-insurgency policy making. About 82% of them fully agree while about 18% partially agree with this view. All the politicians believe in this view with about 69% fully agree while 31% partially agree. Among the knowledgeable persons, about 62% fully agree while 31% partially agree.

Next attempt is to find out the extent of law and order situation and insurgency in different years of ten-year intervals, i.e. 1978, 1988 and 1998. The year 1978 is the time when secessionist movements actually began and it is the beginning year of the present study. The year 1995, the last year of the study period (1978-1995), was not specifically taken. It is because of the assumption that there have been no significant changes since 1995 and the situation is more or less the same till today. Question No. 12 deals this aspect. The main aim of this question is to find out the extent of the problem of insurgency as well as the present situation.
The question is “How do you describe insurgency and the law and order situation in the years indicated below?” The years are 1978, 1988 and 1998. The identified responses are (a) very bad (b) bad (c) satisfactory (d) good and (e) very good. The responses indicate the worsening problem of insurgency and law and order situation in the state.

Thus, it was very bad in 1978 but improved in 1988 but it became very bad in 1998. 66% of the respondents feel it was very bad in 1978. In contrast, 78% of them feel that it is very bad in 1998. On the other hand, it was bad in 1978 according to 44% of them, still bad in 1988 according to 48% of them, and it is bad in 1998 according to 11% of them. Few of them believe it was satisfactory in the years 1978 and 1988.

Thus, we find the worsening problem of insurgency and law and order situation. There was improvement in the year 1988. But it has become very bad since 1998 as expressed by overwhelming majority of the respondents about 78%. In fact none of them find it satisfactory in the year 1998. This means that the problem of insurgency has expanded and affected the whole society. In fact insurgents are involved and have interfered in every aspect of the society whether it is administration, political life or socio-cultural life. This view is shared by a wide cross-section of the society. Many respondents have expressed this view to the author during his fieldwork in Manipur.

The above findings and analysis reconfirm that the counter-insurgency policies adopted since 1978 have proved to be ineffective. The policies seemed to be guided by short-term objectives and use of force and military means. Central intervention in the form of President’s Rule and deployment of military and central security forces temporarily crushed the insurgency movements by early 1980s. Central intervenes when

73 Ibid., see the Question No. 12 for details.
the threat to security of Indian State was alarming and there is widespread violence. This was when the movements were directed against the Indian state particularly in 1978.

However, since 1990s the problem has changed significantly. It has deeply penetrated into the society and become a real social problem. There are so many factions and groups. It was quite contrast to 1978 when there were only 2 or 3 groups who did not involve and interfere in social life as it has been since 1990s.

Besides interference in every aspect of social life, insurgent groups allegedly collect “taxes” (extortion) from every government employee and rice/influential people. The real tragedy has been that neither central government nor political leadership in the state has made serious efforts to solve the problem since 1978.74

Though the situation is very bad in the year 1998, the extent slightly varies according to the respondents. Thus, 100% of the civil servants feel it is very bad in 1998 but 83% of the politicians and only 50% of the knowledgeable persons feel it is very bad. This may be perhaps due to the kind of interaction insurgents have and impact of their activities on the different sections of the society. Civil servants may perhaps be the most affected by the activities of insurgents than the other respondents. This may be due to the fact that they are the most visible symbols of government authority and easy access to them by the insurgents.

Thus, the above questions in general seek to evaluate the counter-insurgency policies since 1978. In one way, these findings indicate that counter-insurgency policies have been not only ineffective but also a failure. Instead of improving the situation, it

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74 This and above views are strongly believed and shared by a wide cross-section of the people including the respondents to the questionnaire. These were told by them to author during his fieldwork visits in Manipur.
has become very bad as expressed by the respondents compared to the past. In fact it is argued by many that there is no counter-insurgency policy as such but only temporary measures adopted from time to time.75

Next we will examine the important criteria employed in the evaluation of counter-insurgency policies. Question No. 18 of the Questionnaire seeks to find out the three most important criteria employed in the evaluation of counter-insurgency policies. The question is “What are the three most important criteria employed in the evaluation of policies” on counter-insurgency. The given responses are (a) failure to achieve objectives (b) administrative corruption (c) change of government (d) change in popular demands and pressures (e) pressures from insurgency movements (f) any other criteria.76

Though opinions are divided, failure to achieve objectives is the most important criteria, administrative corruption, the second and change of government is the third most important criteria employed in the evaluation of counter-insurgency policies. For some the above criteria are interchangeable in their ranking. A significant number of them express that pressures from insurgency movements and change in popular demands and pressures are important criteria employed while evaluating the counter-insurgency policies. Thus, there are no decisive criteria agreeable to majority of the respondents.

Comparatively, politicians have more clear criteria. 83% of them express that failure to achieve objectives is the first criteria, while 66% of them say administrative corruption is the second criteria. Pressures from insurgency movements are the third most important criteria.

75 This view has been expressed by some of the civil servants to the author during his fieldwork.

76 Questionnaire, see Question No. 18 for details.
According to civil servants, the three most important criteria in the evaluation of counter-insurgency policies are *failure to achieve objectives*, *administrative corruption* and *change of governments* respectively. *Pressure from insurgency movements* is an important criterion according to a significant number of them.

The responses of the knowledgeable persons indicate their little understanding of the process of evaluation of policies. Some of them have provided no comments. *Administrative corruption* is the 1st most important criteria. *The failure to achieve objectives* and *change of government* are the other important criteria. Some of them express the view that "so far no evaluation has been made" on the counter-insurgency policies in the state.

Despite the difference of opinion, the three important criteria employed in the evaluation of counter-insurgency policies are *failure to achieve objectives*, *administrative corruption* and *change of government*. *Pressure from insurgency movements* and *change in popular demands and pressures* are other important criteria.

These findings again confirm the failure of the counter-insurgency policies in the state in the long run. They also re-confirm the reality of *administrative corruption* that is a real social problem in Manipur. The view that "so far no evaluation has been made" on counter-insurgency policies reflects that no serious efforts have been made for effective policies. The difference of opinion reflects existence of multiple problems which have to be resolved simultaneously. The multiple problems have led to difference of opinion and conflict of interests over the priority areas which ultimately have contributed to complication in effective policy making in the state.

Thus, the problem of insurgency is a social reality in the state. It has become more widespread and become a more complicated one. The tragedy is that only adhoc measures have been adopted and governments and leadership of both at the
centre and state have made no effective policies. The development process has contributed to the continuance of the problem of insurgency in the state. Policy makers have to play more important and effective roles for improving the situation.

In the next Chapter we will discus policy making process and higher civil servants' role in policy making. Policy making, the redefined roles and powers of civil servants as well as policy priorities during President’s Rule are also examined next.