CHAPTER II

MAKING OF INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY: PARADIGM CHANGE

Two of the most important geographical characteristics of India which are also the most critical both from the point of view of security and development are indeed the Himalayas in the north and the Indian Ocean in the south. Strategically speaking, they are perhaps the most enduring of all the determinants of our foreign policy, less susceptible to change by the physical phenomenon, but holding a great deal of political importance in moulding of our strategic environment.

This, however, does not mean that both these regions have played an identical role in the formulation of our foreign policy perceptions or have been the focal centres of foreign policy planning. What is common about both these regions in the context of foreign policy is that the geo-political significance of both was not fully recognised and there was a certain amount of neglect or complacency, which the policy makers exhibited, in the initial stages.

Historically speaking, Himalayas cultivated an attitude of insularity among Indians. K.M. Pannikar described this as "the introspective attitude of the Indian."1 The Himalayas invoked feelings of awe and reverence and a tradition of serious intellectual study of the region, far less of its potential

1 K.M. Pannikar, Geographical Factors in Indian History, Bombay, 1986, p.50.
use for political and military purposes, was alien to the Indian experience. The centuries old image of the Himalayas serving as the sentinel on the northern borders, a sentry in whose lap people felt secure, made the leaders of free India oblivious of likely threats from across its ranges. Even organised adventures into the inner ranges were not planned and undertaken until some years after independence. Thus, for Nehru, these were “unblemished idyllic retreats from the world.” Consequently in our strategic planning and calculations sufficient attention was not paid, or at least not paid much in advance. That India may have to meet China in the Himalayas sooner than later, was not realistically assessed and analysed. Of the two Himalayan regions, western and eastern, it can be held true of the latter more than the former. In particular, an integrated policy approach dealing with the entire Himalayan region in the east, comprising not only Nepal and Bhutan but also a good part of India’s north-east region such as Arunachal Pradesh, Assam and parts of north-Bengal, was nowhere in the picture till almost the close of the decade of 1950s. What, therefore, could be described as India’s Himalayan policy was in fact a series of decisions, political, strategic and economic, taken from time to time, to meet a situation here and a crisis there, as and when they occurred. The policy was mostly in the form of “responses.”

Whereas, Beijing’s aim was to reach the roof of the world and occupy a commanding position in the Himalayas. Its “Bhai Bhai strategy” towards India was only to buy some time so that it could strengthen its position. The
road-building programme which China initiated was undertaken with this goal in sight. In 1950 there were reports in some of our newspapers that road building activities were going on in the Sinkiang region. Some of the roads, as in the Aksai Chin area, were completed by 1957. There were also roads in the Yatung region in the eastern Himalayan region. Incursions from the side of the Chinese into the Indian territories, though occasional, had started by now.

One explanation of the neglect on the part of India is that it had not yet fully grasped the geo-political realities and even the full facts of its boundary were not yet known and assessed from the point of view of defence and security. What is lamentable is that consciousness in regard to the Himalayan region was either weak or it was delinked from the total land mass of India which is so important for laying down a broad-based long term policy. It is also true that the economic resources at the disposal of India at that time were few and scarce they did not enable India to concentrate on the development of the Himalayan region.

The foreign policy of a country is nothing but a mix of principles and practices which regulate the intercourse of a state with other states. It not only aims at the promotion of national interest, but also works for the preservation of the present international system. At the present all the states have an interest in preserving the international system because they see in it as the only hope to save the world from the flames of war.
Our belief in the Non-Aligned Movement, implying independence of thought and autonomy of action, has been and will remain an important element of our foreign policy. We do not believe that its relevance has diminished as a result of the termination of the Cold War. The Non-Aligned Movement was not a by-product of the Cold War or a response to it, but to the inequity and severe and entrenched imbalance in the distribution of economic and political power and influence in the world. India, for its part, would continue to play a constructive role in bringing the developing countries together and jointly articulating their viewpoint.²

There is one factor which we have to take into account in future foreign policy formulation. This is the Indian diaspora. The overseas Indian community has an importance much greater than the contemporary usefulness of the NRI in India’s domestic financing. The Gulf war revealed to us the real significance of the community of “temporary sojourners” among Indian nationals abroad. They continue to be a very much part of India’s political arrangements and their economic contribution is by no means insignificant. The Indians in Kuwait demonstrated to us the need for understanding the precise manner in which individual consular problems can become a major factor of foreign decision-making.

Though India formally got the right to conduct her foreign policy in 1946 when an interim government was installed in the country, some principles of her foreign policy had been advocated even while she was still

under the British yoke. The Indian leaders started making voluminous pronouncements and announcements regarding the future foreign policy of India long before she attained independence. The leading most role in this regard was played by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. The best exposition of the view expressed by Nehru on India’s foreign policy in the pre-independence years is found in K.P.S. Menon’s book *Many Worlds, an Autobiography*.

Another significant pronouncement of India’s foreign policy in the pre-independence days is found in the Congress Resolution adopted at the Haripura Session of 1938. The resolution said: “The people of India desire to live in peace and friendship with their neighbours and with all other countries, and for this purpose wish to remove all cause of conflict between them ... In order, therefore, to establish world peace on enduring basis; imperialism and the exploitation of one people by another must end.”

But probably the most detailed and systematic exposition of India’s foreign policy was made by Nehru in a speech broadcast five days after the Installation of the Provisional Government (2, September, 1946). He said:

“We hope to develop close and direct contacts with other nations and to co-operate with them in the furtherance of world peace and freedom. We propose as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to distress on an even vaster scale. We believe that peace and freedom are indivisible and the denial
of freedom anywhere must danger freedom elsewhere and lead to conflict and war. We are particularly interested in the emancipation of colonial and dependent countries and peoples, and in the recognition in theory and practice of equal opportunities for all races.”

We are of Asia and the peoples of Asia are nearer and closer to us than others. India is so situated that she is the pivot of Western, southern and South-East Asia. In the past her culture flowed to all these countries and they name to her in many ways. Those contacts are being renewed and the future is bound to see a closer union between India and South-East Asia on the one side and Afghanistan, Iran and the Arab world on the other. To the furtherance of that close association of free countries we must devote ourselves. India has followed with anxious interest the struggle of the Indonesians for freedom and to them we send our good wishes. “We want to befriend every country so that our circle of friendship may grow and become wide and co-operation and peace may thrive.”

The principles outlined in the above speech were further elaborated by Nehru in a Press Conference held on 26 September 1946. According to certain critics Nehru did not make any reference to the promotion of India’s national interest neither in his broadcast of 7 September 1946 or the Press Conference of 26 September 1946. Nehru replies to this criticism in the

3 Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy, Selected Speeches, September 1946 – April*, New Delhi, 1961, pp.1-3.
Constituent Assembly on 4 December 1947. He said: “Whatever policy we may lay down the art of conducting the foreign affairs of a country lies in finding out what is most advantageous to the country. We may talk about international goodwill and mean what we say. We may talk about peace and freedom and earnestly mean what we say. But in the ultimate analysis, a government functions for the good of the country it governs and no government dare do anything which in short or long run is manifestly to the disadvantage of that country.”

A critical analysis of the observations and views of Nehru shows the India’s foreign policy possesses the following features. It may be noted that these features are largely the product of India’s traditions and her geographical and historical setting.

1. **Non-Alignment**: Non-alignment has been one of the basic features of India’s foreign policy. In fact India was the first country which initiated the policy of non-alignment which was adopted by most of the countries of Asia and Africa which attained independence in the post world war II period. India can play a big part, and may be an effective part, in helping in the avoidance of war. Therefore, it becomes all the more necessary that India should not be lined up with any group of powers which for various reasons are in a sense full of fear of war and prepare for war. In the interest of self-

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4 Ibid., p.28.
5 CAD Part-II, 8 March 1948, pp.1234-5.
interest of the country also Nehru justified a policy of non-alignment for India.

The geographical consideration also compelled India to adopt a policy of non-alignment. Any military alliance with the Western countries would have been treated as an unfriendly act by China as well as Soviet Union, the two major Communist countries on the border of India. On the other hand India could not have concluded an alliance with the Communist countries because of her liberal traditions. India could not reconcile to the ideology which preached open violence and revolution.

The Indian tradition was also in favour of a policy of non-alignment. As Nehru said in Lok Sabha on 9 December, 1958 that the policy of non-alignment is “inherent in the past thinking of India, inherent in the whole mental outlook of India, inherent in the conditioning of the Indian mind during our struggle for freedom and inherent in the circumstances of the case today.”

2. Anti-Colonial and Anti-Imperialist: Another basic principle of India’s foreign policy has been its anti-colonial and anti-imperialist stand. The Government of India has always championed the cause of the colonial people and exploited nations at the United Nations. This anti-colonial and anti-imperialist stand of India was partly due to the fact that she had suffered at the hands of British imperialism and did not want other countries of Asia and Africa to undergo similar suffering. While speaking before the UN

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6 Lok Sabha Debates, Vol.XXXIII, Col.3961.
Genera Assembly on 3 November 1948 Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru said: “Asia till recently was largely a prey to imperial domination and colonialism; a great part of it is free today, part of it still remains unfree and it is an astonishing things that any country should still venture to hold and to set forth this doctrine of colonialism whether it is under direct rule or whether it is indirectly maintained in some form or another. We in Asia, who have ourselves suffered all these evils of colonialism and imperial domination, have committed ourselves inevitably to freedom of other colonial countries.

This anti-colonial and anti-imperialist stand of India was bound to bring her in conflict with imperialist powers and doubts were expressed in certain quarters that this policy would earn the wrath of imperialist powers for India. However, Pandit Nehru always insisted on adopting an anti-colonial stand unmindful of the consequences, He said: “We are not citizens of a weak or mean country and I think, it is foolish for us to get frightened, even from a military point of view of the greatest of the powers today.”

This anti-colonial stand of India was not confined to mere pronouncements. The Government of India gave a practical shape to these ideas as well. Thus it extended support to Indonesia against the Dutch government. India not only convened a meeting of the Foreign Ministers at New Delhi to express sympathy for the Indonesians but also took the matter to the Security Council. It would not be wrong to say that the independence of Indonesia was rendered possible largely due to the efforts of India. The
Prime Minister of Indonesia (Dr. Ali Sastroamidjojo) also acknowledged this and observed.

3. Faith in Peace and United Nations: India has always held faith in peaceful methods for the settlement of international disputes. India has believed that peace cannot be promoted by creating positions of strength by military alliances (which only increase the possibilities of war) but by avoiding use of force. It has favoured peaceful methods like discussions, negotiations, accommodation etc. for settlement of disputes. India played a positive role in the resolution of Korean and Indo-China conflicts. It may be noted that India has been a strong supporter of the United Nations as well and has expressed full faith in its capacity to settle the disputes. It was precisely out of this faith that India took the issue of Kashmir to the United Nations. India also extended full support to the United Nations in tackling with the issues of Korea and Indo-China. In the United Nations India has taken stand on various issues on the basis of merit and has refused to blindly support one block or the other.

The chief motivating force with India has been the cause of world peace. India has also extended full support to the United Nations in the implementation of its decisions by providing military and other personnel. For example India sent a number of persons for the Observation Group in Lebanon, which was established by the United Nations with a view to ensure that there was no infiltration of personnel or supply or arms or other material across the Lebanese border. During the Congolese conflict also India made
available a large number of contingents to preserve peace in the region. The
valuable cooperation extended by India to the United Nations was
acknowledged by the U.N. Secretary General Hammarskjold in March 1959
in these words: "I would like to (acknowledge with gratitude) the co-
operation of the Indian people and the Indian Government first of all and
still on a very large scale in the Gaza operation with a very quick response,
with a very noble response because the Indian units in the Gaza were of a
very very high quality. I can speak from personal experience and I am not
flattering you. And also in the second case by the invaluable assistance in
the Lebanese affairs through the work done by the High Commissioner
Dayal. Both those contributions are very valuable contributions to the whole
development of the U.N. Security and legal system on which it is possible to
build the future."

4. Faith in Peaceful Co-Existence and Co-operation: Another outstanding
feature of India’s foreign policy has been faith in peaceful co-existence
amongst states professing different ideologies. It was in pursuance of this
policy that she developed very close relations with China, and concluded a
treaty with her in 1954 incorporating the famous Panch Sheel (Five
Principles). These five principles were mutual respect for each other’s
territorial integrity and sovereignty; non-aggression; non-intervention in
each other’s domestic affairs; mutual benefit and equality and peaceful co-
xistence. Faith in these principles was expressed on the occasion of
Bandung Conference held in 1955. In addition certain new principles were
also enunciated. These included respect for fundamental human rights right to defend singly as well as collectively; joining of pacts without any external pressure, participation in secret pacts for the sake of benefit, settlement of disputes peacefully and respect for justice.

5. **Opposition to Racial Discrimination**: India has consistently opposed racial discrimination. She has consistently raised the question of the treatment of the people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa and severally condemned the policy of racial segregation followed by the government of South Africa. In 1952, India along with twelve other Asian and African states raised the issue of apartheid (policy of racial discrimination) being practised by the Government of South Africa. India has taken the plea that racial discrimination not only constitutes a flagrant violation of the basic principles of human rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in the U.N. Charter, but also constitutes a serious threat to international peace. Condemning the policy of racial discrimination, Jawaharlal Nehru said, “We repudiate utterly the Nazi doctrine of racialism wherever and in whatsoever form it may be practised. We seek no domination over others and we claim no privileged position over other people. But we do claim equal and honourable treatment of our people wherever they may go and we cannot accept any discrimination against them.”

6. **Special Bias for Asia**: Though India believes in policy of co-operation and co-existence with all the countries of the world, she has a special bias towards the countries of Asia and Africa. Ever since the attainment of
independence, India has tried to develop close relations with the Afro-Asia countries and has shown keen interest in their economic development. With a view to forge some sort of unity amongst the states of Asia and Africa, India took initiative in organising two conferences at Delhi in 1947 and 1949, Pandit Nehru justified his special interest in the countries of Asia in the course of his address to the Asian Relations, Conference held in March 1947. He said, "In this crisis in the world history, Asia will necessarily play a vital role. The countries of Asia can no longer be used as pawns by others, they are bound to have their own politics in world affairs.

Though Nehru had a special bias for Asia, he was not interested in creating a separate Asian block. Due to the initiative taken by India in convening Conference of Asian countries in New Delhi, it was alleged in certain quarters that India was trying to assume leadership of South East Asia. It was also argued that India wanted to create channels parallel to United Nations. However, these allegations were denied by Nehru.

7. Close Relations with Commonwealth: India has always sought to develop close relations with the Commonwealth of Nations. Even though India decided to become a Sovereign Democratic Republic. The Indian leaders decided to continue her intimate connections with the Commonwealth. India's decision to adopt Republican system and still continue as a member of the commonwealth led to the creation of New Commonwealth which was multi-racial, multi-cultural. India decided to join the Commonwealth because of the numerous economic benefits which she could expect from its
membership. Explaining the reasons which prompted India to become member of the Commonwealth, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru said: "We have chosen to stay in the Commonwealth because we did not want to live in isolation and because it confers on us benefits which do not take away our sovereign status.

Changes in the Foreign Policy of India after 1962

The foreign policy of India underwent certain changes after crushing defeat at the hands of China in 1961. India's failure to meet the challenge of China was interpreted as a failure of her foreign policy and a demand was made for its modification. Though the chief basis of India's foreign policy in the post-1962 continued to be the same it became more pragmatic and realistic. India accepted armed aid from all quarters to meet the Chinese menace. Pandit Nehru openly declared that India was no longer non-aligned so far as China was concerned. However, before Nehru could provide a new orientation to India's foreign policy he was removed from the Indian political scene by death.

Lal Bahadur Shastri, who succeeded Nehru as the Prime Minister, made efforts to establish closer relations with neighbouring countries like Nepal, Burma and Ceylon. He was also keen to improve relations with Pakistan, but did not receive any favourable response from her leaders. India also cultivated very close relations with the two Super Powers. After a rebuff in Cuba, Soviet Union came more closely to the support of India against China. She provided military equipments and weapons to India to
meet the Chinese aggression. Soviet Union helped India in setting up a factory for the manufacture of MIG fighter planes in the country. Even U.S.A. offered liberal economic and military assistance to India. America not only offered American air-umbrella to protect India against the Chinese attacks, but also provided large supplies of arms. It is to be noted that the U.S.A. extended military aid and assistance to India much against the wishes of her ally Pakistan. this assistance was continued till 1965, when as a result of outbreak of war between India and Pakistan, America imposed an embargo on all military supplies to the two countries. In view of these developments in India's foreign policy, Profs. Palmer and Perkins assert that the Chinese attack "came as a traumatic shock to India, and caused a searching repraisal of India's foreign policies and her whole approach to the problems of national security and external relations." The basic principles of India's foreign policy continued to be the same as they were in the period before 1962. There were only some slight modifications in the method of the conduct of foreign policy. So long Nehru was at the helm of affairs he took all decisions regarding foreign policy of the country by himself without seriously consulting other members of his government. Under Lal Bahadur Shastri the emphasis shifted to 'collective decision making'.

After the death of Shastri, Mrs. Gandhi became the Prime Minister and continued to take keen interest in the foreign affairs. During the initials years of her leadership she continued the policy of 'collective decisions'

7 Palmer and Perkins: International Relations, p.711.
initiated by Shahstri and various pros and cons of India’s foreign policy were discussed with other leaders. However, slowly she was able to assert her supremacy in the party and assumed more domineering role in the various spheres of government policy. She made efforts to improve relations with U.S.A. with a view to meet the threat of Communist China. As a result India was able to secure large quantum of military and economic assistance from United States. It may be noted that the development of closer relations with U.S.A. did not in any way imply abandonment of traditional policy of non-alignment. India also tried to improve relations with the Soviet Union and succeeded in securing an alliance with her.

In short India under Mrs. Gandhi succeeded in cultivating closer relations with both the Super Powers. This was indeed a commendable achievement. for a short while India’s relations grew somewhat cold when Russia entered into an arms deal with Pakistan in 1968. India’s condemnation of Warsaw Pact Power’s action, under the leadership of Soviet Union, in Czechoslovakia also caused some uneasiness in Soviet Union. However, India did not go very far and refused to endorse the resolution of the Security Council which proposed to condemn Soviet action in Czechoslovakia. This was a clear indication that India was not willing to completely break with Soviet Union, and had kept the doors open for improvement of relations. It is sufficient to note that the foreign policy of India under Mrs. Gandhi continued to be based on the basic principles enunciated by Nehru and followed by Shastri.
After the assumption of power by Janata Party in the wake of its resounding victory in March 1977 elections, it was expected that the foreign policy of India would undergo drastic changes. Most of the people felt that certain amount of cooling off relations with Soviet Union was inevitable. An immediate corollary of this development was expected to be development of more warm relations with United States and other countries of West. This feeling existed because Soviet Union had closely identified itself with Mrs. Gandhi since 1967 and had denounced her political opponents as tools of imperialism. The members of the Janata Party, who formed a part of the opposition during Indira Gandhi’s rule were bound to react sharply towards Soviet Union. In fact some of these leaders had severely condemned India’s tilt towards Soviet Union and other Communist countries even when Nehru was at the helm of affairs. However, these doubts were set at rest when Atal Behari Vajpayee, the External Affairs of Janata Government, announced that the views expressed by him and his Cabinet colleagues while in the opposition will not influence their conduct of foreign policy.

The new government was fully aware of the benefits which India received as a result of close connections with Soviet Union such as sophisticated military hardwares, assistance in diversification of country’s economy through establishment of basic industries, and ever expanding trade between the two countries during the past two decades. It would have been suicidal to beat a retreat with Soviet Union which doing immeasurable harm to the interests of the country. But probably the most important change in
India's foreign policy, which was greatly emphasized by the Janata Party leaders was more closer relations with the neighbouring countries.

The foreign policy of India has met with severe criticism at the hands of critics. Some of the points of criticism are as follows:

1. Firstly, it is said that the foreign policy of India is unrealistic and lays too much of emphasis on idealism. India has tried to project herself as a moral leader and involved herself in the affairs of others in the interest of justice. This has not only resulted in creation of misunderstanding with other countries, but also led to neglect of self-interest. While it cannot be denied that idealism has an important place in India's foreign policy, it would be wrong to assume that it has not promoted her national interest.

2. Secondly, the policy of non-alignment adopted by India has also been made the target of criticism. It is argued that in a world divided into two hostile camps, India stands a loof and cannot depend on outside help in case of need. As a result of this policy India was looked upon with suspicion by both the Great Powers and they were reluctant to offer her assistance. On the other hand Pakistan by closely aligning herself received enormously by way of assistance from United States and other Western countries. However, this criticism is not quite valid. It is true that in the beginning India was looked upon with suspicion by both the Great Powers. Her non-alignment was interpreted by both the Powers as a clever way of befooling them and they suspected her of being in the rival camp. But slowly this misunderstanding
disappeared. Thereafter, India was able to secure financial as well as military assistance from countries of both the blocs.

3. Thirdly, the decision of India to maintain close connections with the commonwealth has also been subjected to criticism. The critics argue that the membership of Commonwealth has not only curtailed the sovereignty of the country but also impinged on the right of India to pursue an independent foreign policy. However, this criticism is also ill-founded. Commonwealth is a voluntary association and India chose to become its member because she expected certain benefits from this membership.

4. Fourthly, the foreign policy of India has completely ignored the importance of power in international politics and laid emphasis on settlement of international disputes through peaceful methods like negotiations. It is argued by the critics that these methods can be effective only if they are backed by power. In the absence of power no country would be willing to trust the other and leave its fate in the hands of the negotiator or mediator. The supporters of India’s foreign policy are not willing to agree with the critics and hold that the ‘doctrine of power’ is not applicable in the present context when the world is divided into two camps headed by U.S.A. and Soviet Union. The discovery of nuclear weapons has provided a further set back to the theory of ‘power politics’.

5. It is argued that Indian foreign policy has failed to secure the national interest. The Kashmir issue still continues to hang in the United Nations without any solution in sight. India wrongly acknowledge China’s suzerainty
over Tibet, and thus contributed to the removal of a buffer state which could prevent a direct clash between the two countries. Despite her consistent opposition to the policy of racial discrimination being followed by South Africa and Rhodesia she has not been able to get any redress from the International Organisation and these two countries continue to persist with their policies of racial discrimination. However, in fairness it must be said that it is mainly due to regular crusade carried by India that United Nations adopted a number of resolutions condemning the policy of apartheid and even called upon the member states to impose economic sanctions against these countries. If success has not been achieved, the fault lies with powers like Britain which have shielded these countries and refused to take any armed action. Again, the critics argue that the Government of India has not been able to settle the question of the citizenship of the Indians in Ceylon, which has resulted in frequent riots and loss of life. By making reference to these outstanding issues the critics try to assert that India's foreign policy has failed to protect the national interest. However, these critics seem to be biased. They refer to these lapses and failures of India, without bothering to look into its achievements.

But probably the most important achievement of India's foreign policy has been the valuable contribution towards the promotion of world peace. India not only popularised the peaceful methods for the settlement of disputes, but also played an active role in the reduction of tension by assuming responsibilities in Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.
India’s relations with Pakistan occupy a central position in her foreign policy, because her relations with other countries, were largely influenced by the nature of its relations with Pakistan. According to Michael Brecher, India’s relations with Pakistan have been “in a state of undeclared war, with varying degrees of intensity, throughout their brief history as independent states.” These hostile relations between Indian and Pakistan were inevitable in view of the manner in which the state of Pakistan was created and the problems created by the partition of the country. Some of the major problems created by the partition which strained the relations between the two countries included the problem of refugees, evacuee property, minorities, etc. But the factor which proved to be a major stumbling block in the way of developing cordial relations between the two countries was the feeling existing in Pakistan that India had not reconciled herself to the partition of the country and would make an attempt to destroy her entity at the first available opportunity Western Military Alliances, Transfer of Pakistan occupied Indian territory to China through an agreement etc. It shall be desirable to analyse the relations of the two countries in the light of these issues.

1. The Kashmir Problem: The issue of Kashmir has proved to be a permanent thorn in the Indo-Pak relations. The state Jammu and Kashmir like other states of India was given the choice to join either India or Pakistan or retain independent status under the Indian Independence Act 1947.

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*Michael Brecher, Nehru, Biography, p. 576.*
However, the King of Kashmir (Hari Singh) refused to accede to either of the countries and asked for a standstill agreement both with India and Pakistan, pending a final decision regarding accession. Though no such agreement could be concluded with India, Pakistan accepted the agreement. Simultaneously she also started applying economic pressure on the ruler to gain Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan. Ultimately the King signed the accession letters and the Indian troops were sent to Kashmir.

Pakistan not only refused to recognize the accession of Kashmir to India but also continued to assist the Azad Kashmir (an area of Kashmir forcibly occupied by Muslim tribesmen). Pakistan’s Prime Minister Liquat Ali Khan said, “The accession of Kashmir to India is a fraud perpetrated on the people of Kashmir by its cowardly ruler with the aggressive help of the Government of India, India’s Governor-General had said that after the expulsions of invaders and restoration of law and order in Kashmir “the question of state’s accession should be settled by a reference to the people.” India was willing to carry out this agreement regarding plebiscite after the secession of hostilities.

As the discussion failed to prove any agreed solution, India took the matter of Kashmir to Security Council under Article 35 of the U.N. Charter and charged Pakistan of an “act of aggression against India.” The Security Council after much consideration adopted a resolution calling on India and Pakistan to withdraw their troops and tribesmen respectively. It also favoured the establishment of an interim government containing
representatives of the major political groups. It also suggested that a five
man UNICIP be sent to Kashmir to exercise their good offices in restoring
peace and arranging a plebiscite.

The Security Council started fresh efforts to find a solution of the
problem. It appointed General Mc Naughton of Canada as the Informal
Mediator on behalf of the Council, but he failed to accomplish anything. In
February 1950 the Security Council appointed Sir Owan Dixon of Australia
as a Mediator. He came to the sub-continent in May 1950 and worked in
India, Pakistan and Kashmir. Ultimately he proposed a plan which combined
the twin principles of partition and plebiscite. However, his proposals were
not acceptable to either India or Pakistan.

In the meanwhile certain important developments had taken place in
Kashmir. The popularly elected Constituent Assembly confirmed its
accession to India on 6 February 1954. On 19 November 1956 the Assembly
adopted a constitution by which the state was made an integral part of India.
This accession was formalized by India on 26 January 1957 and it was also
made 'irrevocable'. Pakistan was not happy with these developments and
continued to insist on plebiscite at the United Nations. Thereafter India took
the stand that Kashmir's accession to India was 'full, complete and final'
and it would not be desirable to review the same.

The issue of Kashmir once again shot into importance soon after the
Kutch dispute in 1965 when Pakistan sent organized groups of infiltrators
across the cease-fire and mounted a large-scale attack against India in the
Chamb-Jaurian sector after violating the international border. As this posed a serious threat to the communication line of India in Kashmir, the Indian authorities reacted swiftly and sent her troops into action against Pakistan. Thus a full-fledged war broke out between India and Pakistan. On 2 September, 1965 the U.N. Secretary General U Thant appealed to India and Pakistan to cease fire. Two days later the Security Council adopted a resolution calling on the two countries to withdraw their forces to the old cease-fire. Though the cease-fire was effected as a result of the efforts of the Secretary General, but the negotiated settlement was made possible only through the efforts of Soviet Union. The Soviet Union took a lead in arranging a meeting between Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri of India and President Ayub of Pakistan at Tashkent and ultimately succeeded in getting the Tashkent Declaration signed on 10 January 1966. Under the Tashkent Declaration the two countries agreed to settle their disputes through peaceful methods.

The Kashmir problem continued to strain the relations between the two countries even in the subsequent years. Despite serious efforts made by the United Nations and other powers, no mutually agreed solution of the problem has been found as yet. Prof. Michael Brecher has rightly said, "Kashmir symbolises the root of the conflict between India and Pakistan. Here lies the last field of battle over the ideological cleavage which rent the sub-continent as under in 1947. Here is the final test of the validity of the two-nation theory, the basis of Pakistan and its continuing raisond d'etre'.
2. The Canal Water Dispute: The question of sharing of river waters has been another important factor in Indo-Pak relations. As a result of the partition of Punjab, the problem of division of water of rivers cropped up. Under the Stands till Agreement, India agreed to supply water to the canals in Pakistan from the headworks in India against payment till 31 March 1948. During this period, Pakistan was expected to make alternative arrangements and construct link canals to join up her irrigation works with the tributaries allotted to her. However, the standstill Agreement lapsed in April 1948 because Pakistan failed to renew the same. On 4 May 1948, India and Pakistan concluded another agreement which provided for progressive diminution of supplies to Pakistan by India. Pakistan also recognized India's own demands on water. This agreement worked for about two years before it was unilaterally repudiated by Pakistan in 1950 on the plea that she concluded the agreement under duress. In terms of this Indus Water Treaty, India not only agreed to allot the water of three western rivers viz., Indus, Jhelum and Chenab to Pakistan, but also agreed to supply water from the rivers Ravi, Beas and Sutlej on the Indian side. Pakistan was to be assisted by India and other countries in the construction of canals for link purposes. Thus the dispute over canal waters was amicably settled.

3. Pakistan and Military Alliances: As noted earlier, from the very beginning India had been opposed to the formation of military pacts and preferred to follow a policy of keeping aloof from the power blocs. It was therefore natural that India reacted very sharply when Pakistan became
member of the Western military alliances and received military assistance from United States of America. It may be noted that the U.S. took initiative in the matter and offered military assistance to Pakistan with a view to strengthen the defence capabilities in the Middle East, and South East Asia against Communist Threat, Pakistan became a member of the CENTO and SEATO in 1954. India strongly reacted to these moves because she apprehended that if Pakistan's army was built up and modernized, India would have to compensatory measures at the expenses of her economic development on which the future happiness of the country depended.

4. Sino-Pak Agreement: The growing intimacy between Pakistan and China, was another factor which strained the Indo-Pak relations. Pakistan could not develop good relations with China till 1962 partly because Pakistan was a member of the military alliances sponsored by the Western countries, and partly because China maintained very friendly relations with India. However, after the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962, the two countries came closer to each other – China made available to Pakistan large amounts as interest free loans and also assisted her in the establishment of a number of industries. On her part Pakistan agreed to surrender a large slice of Indian territory under her occupation to China.

5. Revolt of Bangladesh: The revolt by the Bengalis of East Pakistan also contributed towards the straining of relations between India and Pakistan. In December 1970 elections were held in Pakistan which resulted in absolute majority for Sheikh Mujib's Awami League in the Provincial Assembly of
East Pakistan. At the national level also his party secured a majority. However, under pressure from Bhutto, President Yahya Khan refused to summon the meeting of the National Assembly. Consequently in March 1971 Sheikh Mujibur Rehman started a civil disobedience movement. A people’s army known as Mukti Bahini was also formed with a view to achieve freedom. On 31 March 1971 the Indian Parliament adopted a resolution which said: “This House expresses its deep anguish and grave concern at the recent developments in East Bengal. Instead of respecting the will of the people so unmistakably expressed through the election in Pakistan in December 1970, the Government of Pakistan has chosen to flout the mandate of the people.

In view of India’s sympathy with the East Bengalis, Pakistan mounted an attack on India in the Western Sector. The Government of India acted promptly and despatched her forces to meet the Pakistani challenge. She also sent her troops to assist the Muktibahini forces. At this juncture, China came to the support of Pakistan and served an ultimatum on India. However, she was prevented from implementing her threat because of the Soviet intervention which warned all the third parties to abstain from interference in the sub-continent.

**Simla Agreement** : The liberation of Bangladesh led to the fall of Yahya Khan in Pakistan and Bhutto assumed power. Some how he showed willingness to improve relations with India and agreed to take part in a Summit Meeting at Simla. The meeting was actually held from 28 June to 2
July 1972, which resulted in the conclusion of Simla Agreement under this agreement both India and Pakistan agreed to settle their differences through bilateral negotiations in a peaceful manner. The two countries expressed faith in the principle of peaceful co-existence and non-interference in the internal affairs of each other. They also agreed to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of each other. The Simla Summit expressed the hope that in future the relations of the two countries would take a normal course and the tension of the past years would end. In the years after the signing of the Simla pact the relations between India and Pakistan continued to be less hostile, though they could not be conducted in the spirit of Simla agreement.

India's Relations with China: India's relations with China have been another important factor in her foreign policy. In fact these relations antedate Indian independence. India expressed full sympathy for China when she was subjected to Japanese aggression. After independence India preoccupied with a civil war, that no intimate relations between the two could be cultivated. According to Werner Levi during the initial years "direct relations between the two countries, apart from contacts in international bodies were mostly restricted to the formalities and routine of the usual international contact." 9 During this period the Nationalist Government of China took a stand on the Kashmir issue which was clearly pro-Pak and was greatly resented by the Indian leadership.

9 Werner Levi, Free India in Asia, p.85.
The relations between India and China suffered a setback when the Chinese leaders publicly declared their intention to liberate Tibet. This was quite perturbing to India which considered the existence of Tibet as a buffer state as vital to her security. In October 1950 China despatched an army to liberate Tibet, contrary to an understanding given to India that the issue would be resolved peacefully. Therefore India lodged a protest with China. Dalai Lama wanted to raise the question of Tibet at the United Nations, but was prevented from doing so by the major world powers.

In 1954 India concluded a treaty with China regarding relations with Tibet. This agreement India gave up all its extra territorial rights in Tibet and recognised Tibet as a region of China. But probably the most important feature of this agreement was that it enshrined the five principles (popularly known as Panchsheel) for the regulation of relations between India and China. These five principles were (1) mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) non-aggression; (3) non-intervention in other’s domestic affairs; (4) mutual benefit and equality; and (5) peaceful co-existence.

In 1959 hostilities broke out between the Tibetans and the Chinese forces, which were ruthlessly suppressed by the Chinese. Dalai Lama, the religious leader to the Tibetans, fled from Tibet and was granted asylum by India. However, Indian government refused to intervene in the affairs of Tibet because this would have meant violation of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other as enshrined in the
Panchsheel. Almost at the same time China started making incursions into the northern frontiers of India. In 1956-57 China built a road across the Aksai Chin area with a view to open up Western Tibet to Chinese immigration and diverting its trade from its southward direction, northward into Western China and Soviet Union. In January 1959 Prime Minister Chou En Lai of China challenged the established boundary between India and China. In September of the same year he put forward a claim to 50,000 square miles of Indian territory. A month later the Chinese troops penetrated into Ladakh and opened fire on the Indian patrol, which resulted in the death of some Indians.

The situation took a serious turn in 1962 when China mounted a full-fledged attach on India in NEFA and Ladakh. India also ordered her forces to move to NEFA to push back the Chinese intruders. Soon this conflict took the shape of a full-fledged war and ended in a military debacle for India. On 21 November 1962 China announced a unilateral cease-fire and her decision to withdraw.

China openly came in support of Pakistan during the Indo-Pak conflicts of 1965 and 1971. On both these occasions she rendered every possible assistance to Pakistan. In the war of 1971 she went to the extent of serving an ultimatum to Indian and would have even actively come to the support of Pakistan, but she was prevented from doing so by the warning of Soviet Union to all the third parties to desist from interference in the Indo-Pakistan conflict. However, China supplied huge quantities of arms and
ammunition to Pakistan to make good the losses suffered by her during the war.

Despite embittered relations with China, India always kept the door open for a negotiated settlement of the border dispute. She also did not change her earlier stand of supporting Red China's entry to the United Nations. But China, which had ambitions to act as the leader of South-East Asia, showed no signs of relenting her stand towards India and continued to encourage Pakistan in her anti-India activities.

Reference has been made earlier to the realization by statesmen like Gladstone of the close connection between the mestic environment in a country and the country's foreign policy. Prime Minister Nehru told the constituent Assembly: "External affairs will follow internal affairs." He told the Lok Sabha more clearly: "any part we want to play in world affairs depends entirely on the internal strength, unity and conditions of our country. Our views might create some impression on others for the moment, but they will attach importance to our voice only in proportion to the strength they knew we have (internally).

That theorists of foreign policy have also been aware of this connection is evident from the writings of the distinguished writer, James N. Rosenau: "Domestic factors may be of considerable significance even if

10 Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) Debates, Vol.3, p.1761.
they are not primary sources of foreign policy, and on some issues they may well be dominant."\textsuperscript{11}

We shall discuss here, briefly, three aspects of India’s domestic environment and their impact on its foreign policy, viz., India’s traditions and recent history, its plural society, which indicated a secular pattern of state for the country and the low living standards of the people which indicated the need to use foreign policy as a tool to raise the living standards.

That the geography of a country is important in shaping its foreign policy has long been recognized by students of international politics; the development of geopolitics as a science testifies to its importance. Geography helps to shape foreign policy, as geographical factors, like the size and the location of a country, its natural resources and the numbers of its population contribute to the power of the nation, which, in turn, shapes its foreign policy. But we must not exaggerate their importance, for their effectiveness depends upon a combination of several factors, including the quality of governmental leadership and technological strength. The equation of national power contains many variables, and it is the relationship among these variables that largely determines whether nations will be weak or strong. This point needs elaboration.

Of the geo-political factors of power, special attention may be drawn to location. Britain and Japan – small islands off the coasts of Europe and

\textsuperscript{11} Lok Sabha Debates, Second Series Vol.6, 26 August–5 September 1957, Col.1434.
Asia – became great nations because of their ability to use the oceans as highways of commerce. The presence or absence of natural frontiers, as Poland has discovered throughout its history, can decide whether or not national security can be preserved. Everyone agrees, for instance, that the fact that the United States is separated from the old world – by the Atlantic and the Pacific has been a considerable factor in its early development – secure and free to develop a Virgin country. So, too, everyone agrees that the fact that Britain is separated from Europe by twenty miles of water gave it an advantage denied to several countries, such as France and Germany which had to spend quite a lot of their resources in fighting each other on border problems.

It must also be pointed out that the discovery of air power has reduced the significance of this factor. The possession by a potential enemy, say the Soviet Union, of the intercontinental ballistic missiles has nullified the protection afforded to the United States by its location. Britain discovered to its dismay during the days of the Blitzkrieg by Hitler that its insular position did not, in an age of air power, give it security. Taking examples nearer home, can anyone doubt that the location of Pakistan adjacent to the Soviet Union and China has moulded its diplomacy in international politics and given it an influence out of proportion to its size and population?

India is, territorially, a big country, the seventh largest in the world: it is the second most populous country. It measures some 2,000 miles from north to south and about 1,850 miles from east to west and covers an area of
1,232,060 sq. miles. It has a land frontier some 9,425 miles long. According to the 1981 census, India’s population was approximately 690 million.

In the context of foreign policy, the huge size and the large population have a three-fold effect. First, they tend to give a sense of importance to the people about the role of India in world affairs, potential, if not actual. Size is not strength, but potential strength; wise and strong government, national unity and the effective development of technology would help to transform potential into actual strength.

India’s large size is a warning to potential aggressors not to attempt, by conquest to occupy the whole country. History shows, for instance, that Napoleon’s attempt to conquer Russia in 1812 failed largely because of the size of the country. The more the invading forces march into the country, the more difficult it would be for them to keep in touch with the lines of supply.

India’s huge population, growing at a high rate and the large bulk of them living at the subsistence level, has lent to the economic development of the country a high place among foreign policy objectives. The per capita income of the country was (in 1968-69) Rs.542.3 at current prices; it has to be raised substantially if the people should have a meaningful existence and if the rising expectation of a democratic society are to be fulfilled. Economic development, in its turn, has made the seeking of foreign aid and the import of considerable foreign capital and known-how and essential part of India’s diplomacy.
It is relevant to point out that a reading of Indian history also suggests that the idea of tolerance was not merely confined to the books but was a reality in the social tradition. Many immigrants and invaders came to India through the centuries, and since these were of the nature of gradual and protracted infiltration, they were assimilated, into the society, each group retaining its own characteristics. Ashoka's inscriptions on his rock-pillars highlight the prevailing idea of tolerance: “The King, beloved of the gods, honours every form of religious faith, but considers no gift or honour so much as the increase of the substance of religion; whereof this is the root: to reverence one's faith, and never to revile that of others. Whoever acts differently injures his own religion while he wrongs another’s”. It is also well known that there was hardly (at least up to the tenth century A.D.) any religious persecution worth the name; this suggests that practice was, in general, in accordance with the tradition. It is true that during the Muslim period of our history, particularly during the times of Mohammad Ghori (1175-1206), Alauddin Khilji (1296-1315), and Aurangzeb (1659-1707), there was religious persecution, but the tolerant attitude survived to some extent even during this period of our history.

The vital question for us to ask is, granting that the tradition of tolerance is still an active force in the thinking and the life of the common man in India, how is it of any value in understanding India’s international relations after she became independent? The answer has to be looked for in two directions, nonalignment and peaceful negotiation. The tolerant attitude
is one major factor in understanding the policy of nonalignment which India has followed since 1946; this has been testified by the Prime Minister himself. In the Cold War politics of the day, India has studiously avoided taking sides. The pluralistic outlook of the Indian mind has made the Indian people react instinctively against communism and its claim to be the sole truth; likewise, it has prevented them from joining the anti-communists and regarding communism in as horried a way as anti-communists do. Military alliances, in any case, provoke counter-military alliances and international tensions are not thereby reduced. In this situation, the only practicable way for the Indian people is to explore all the possibilities of negotiation and actively help in such peaceful methods of arriving at a settlement of disputes.

The Indian national movement, more especially from 1885 with the foundation of the Indian National Congress, has also had a significant impact on India's foreign policy. The wearer knows where the shoe pinches, as the saying goes. Having been a dependent people and having struggled — non violently — for freedom, India naturally supported the freedom movements of dependent peoples everywhere — Indonesia, Algeria, Vietnam, Morocco, etc. The genesis of this aspect of India's foreign policy can be traced to the resolutions passed by the Indian National Congress before 1947. It is interesting that when European Colonial Powers — Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal — suppressed freedom

12 Nehru's Speech, New Delhi, 1961, p.4.
movements in their Colonial territories, the international aims of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were defined as being to render support to "all the oppressed: to the labour movements in Capitalist Countries; to Colonial movements against imperialism and to the struggle against national oppression in every form."

The impact of this pre-independence attitude on independent India's foreign policy was markedly noticeable because, as it well known, Jawaharlal Nehru had also been primarily responsible for framing the resolutions of the Indian National Congress on foreign policy from 1930 to 1947 when India attained independence. India mastered the Bangladesh crisis with considerable aplomb and sophistication. Mrs. Gandhi had already won the Parliament elections in March 1971 with a massive two-thirds majority and secured a landslide victory in the State assemblies' elections that came in the wake of the Bangladesh events in March 1972. But the internal economic situation, blighted by the pressures generated by the Bangladesh crisis followed by once again as in the mid-sixties, two years of drought and inclement weather, deteriorated sharply during 1973-74. Prices rose rapidly and menacingly, inflation threatened economic stability and growth and the availability of many essential goods became fitful and scarce. A hostile domestic balance of forces was building up.

The country was plunged into political turmoil. The ruling party had lost its elan. The economic situation was posing an alarming threat to the stability of the system worsened by political anarchy in the country. The
ruling part was unable to meet the challenge on the political ground. The climax in the opposition’s struggle came when an appeal filed by an opposition candidate against Mrs. Gandhi’s election was accepted by a judge of the Allahabad High Court and her election to Parliament was declared void. The confrontation was complete and finally the Government declared a state of emergency in the country on 25 June 1975. The situation was quietened, but the events left their marks on foreign relations. The political turbulence while it lasted weakened the government and could not fail to have an impact on foreign policy, but it was the subsequent developments which influenced the country’s foreign relations.

REGIONAL COOPERATION

On the multilateral level Indo-Pak cooperation became a part of the South Asian effort to generate coordinated and concerted momentum for mutual development. India played a low-key role in the beginning for fear of arousing suspicion among smaller neighbours, but Bangladesh and Nepal displayed greater initiative. The Foreign Secretaries of the seven South Asian Nations (Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bhutan, Maldives and India) met in early 1981 in Colombo to promote mutual cooperation in areas which would benefit the entire region and set up working groups for studies for cooperation in the fields of agriculture, rural development, meteorology, health and population and telecommunications. The working groups identified some 13 projects in these areas. The second meeting of the Foreign Secretaries in Kathmandu in November 1981 expanded the scope of
regional cooperation by including for study three new projects, postal services, science and technology and transport. The Kathmandu meeting provided the much-needed spur and accelerated the process of finding common ground for cooperation.

In a major step forward in this regard the Foreign Ministers of these seven South Asian countries met in New Delhi in August 1983, resolved to work for collective self-reliance, to promote good neighbourly relations and to seek to remove poverty and disease and established a Forum for Regional Cooperation to realise these objectives. Their Declaration issued on 2 August decided upon an integrated programme of action, covering agriculture, rural development, telecommunications, meteorology, health and population studies, transport, postal services, science and technology, sports, arts and culture.

Inaugurating the Seven Nations’ Meeting of Foreign Ministers for south Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC, as it came to be known), Mrs. Gandhi pointed out that experience in other parts of the world had shown that regional cooperation was an important factor in bringing about economic and social progress. Unfortunately, countries of South Asia had been rather slow in realising this.

Indira Gandhi fell to the bullet subsequently, but the work for regional cooperation continued with the support of the new Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi. An important step forward was taken with the holding of the first summit of Heads of State or Government of South Asia in Dhaka from 7-8
December 1985. Attended by Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, summit formally established the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and adopted a Charter, a Declaration and a press statement to this effect. The Charter described the objectives of peace, freedom, social justice, and economic prosperity as best achieved in the South Asian region by fostering mutual understanding, good neighbourly relations and meaningful cooperation among the member-states that were bound by ties of history and culture.  

The South Asian region was beset by many political problems, besides the massive economic difficulties. The legacies of suspicion, often bitterness, loomed too large to be easily dismissed. Clearly regional cooperation could not take the form of political cooperation forthwith. Yet the lesson of history was equally clear. Either cooperate and advance together or suffer separately and individually. South Asia had to find its own road towards regional cooperation that would not ignore regional realities and would not, therefore, die premature death. Necessarily this road had to be the road of economic cooperation to being with, so as to lay a stronger foundation for overcoming political problems. The process had just begun and its was too early to say whether political turbulence would swamp it or whether it would be able to control political vicissitudes. But undoubtedly this was one of the most positive, hopeful and eventful development for the region in the last two decades. it was for the politicians, bureaucrats,  

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intellectuals, in fact for the whole people in all these countries to safeguard, consolidate and carry forward the process of regional cooperation.

It is India’s own experience which is the eventual determinant, the final arbiter, Non-alignment is a framework, not foreign policy is itself. It has proved to be a serviceable framework, not because it is a moral postulate, but because it has served the country’s interests well and helped consolidate India’s independence, unity and integrity. It has similarly served other developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, or else it would have been fast discarded by many of them nor would it still be a lodestar of attraction.

There may be no sacrosanctity of consistency or stability in foreign policy, but the phenomenon is all the same remarkable that stability has characterized Indian foreign policy much more than is has the foreign policy of many other countries. The general contours and the principles, the parameters and the direction have remained fairly steady. All countries make mistakes and India is no repository of any superior virtue, but if we look at the development closely of the foreign policy of USA or USSR, much more China, where it has been fluctuating rather sharply, Indian foreign policy has managed to retain the impression of stability and stolidity. That should say something about the viability of the framework of Indian foreign policy which was not shaken even by a stormy change of Government in 1977. No perching at a moral pedestal is required and is even less desirable. We need not be afraid of learning from our mistakes.
Passivity can afflict the foreign policy of many a country and India too has now and then fallen into the mire of inertia but has so far managed to shake it off and become more active. No country can claim that its foreign policy has been uniquely successful. In a plural society such as India's with some parts of its population following religions different from the religion of the majority community, secularism indeed is indicated as the natural policy. India's policy towards Pakistan, and in particular on the Kashmir issue, has in effect been determined by the secular character of the Indian States.

India's West Asian policy also is partly related to this. Israel has been recognized by the Government of India; but diplomatic exchanges have been delayed, partly because the government cannot afford to displease its large Muslim population who are naturally pro-Arab. Occasionally some sections of the public have displayed a pro-Israeli attitude; but the basic premises of the Government of India's foreign policy make it difficult for them to adopt any other course of action than the one now followed.

India is a developing country, with a per capita income among the lowest in the world; it is also a young democracy which has created rising expectations of a decent standard of living among its people. A bold and imaginative foreign policy had to be evolved to attract foreign capital and know-how to enable India to build up the infrastructure for industrial development and to develop industries.
Private foreign capital has also been attracted in some measure; the policy of the Government has been to make such investment possible. Prime Minister Nehru's statement in Parliament on 6 April 1949 may be cited as evidence: In the first place, I would like to state the Government would expect all undertakings, Indian or foreign, to conform to the general requirements of their industrial policy. As regards existing foreign interests, Government do not intend to place any restrictions or impose any conditions which are not applicable to similar Indian enterprise.

No country can live in isolation but they are inter-dependent for economic ties, external security etc. Hence a comprehensive policy towards internal and foreign affairs are a must for any country and India is no exception. A country's foreign policy assumes great importance in today's world. A new government at the centre naturally evolves interest as to possible changes or continuity in the policy. Foreign policy is never determined by any one factor or a set of factors, but is the result of the interplay of a large number of factors that affects the formulation of policy in different ways in different circumstances.

There are two important reasons why geography and geopolitics should be regarded as an important determinant of India's foreign policy. Firstly, the various expects of geography which tend to influence foreign policy irrespective of the degree of industrialization and level of technology. Secondly, India and most of the neighbouring countries will take a long time to obtain the technological level of the superpowers. Geography includes the
location size, topography, state boundaries, population, climate, hydrology, soil etc. all of these elements are important in ranging degrees for India's national policies and foreign relation. The strategic location of India at the centre of the great Asian Arc stretching from Aden to Tokyo has made it instable that she should play vital role in the history of Asia, also made India the bastion of the British Empire in the east, from Aden to Hongkong. India is a connecting link to West Asia, South East Asia, East Asia or Far East. The vastness of India has made it potentially big powers in material terms, which are capable of playing an independent and influential role in world affairs. It has also an important bearing on her internal security.

The great geopolitical significance of India's Himalayan frontier cannot be ignored. On the extreme west of the western frontier of the Indo-Pak subcontinent is the Pakistan occupied area of Kashmir (POK), which is continuous to the Sinkiang province of China and almost contiguous to the Tadjhik Republic. There are atleast 8 important passes in the Karakoram mountain range biting this area with Sikiang. Thus problem here is more political than military. Similarly India bordered with Tibet, Nepal and Bhutan which is again of great geopolitical significance. India's Himalayan policy can be described as a series of decisions, political, strategic and economic taken from time to time, to meet a separation here and a crisis there, as and when they occurred.\textsuperscript{14}

The Indian Ocean is vital to our international political and oceanic relation and even to our very national existence. Almost our entire foreign trade and our heavy coastal trade depends on the freedom of the Indian ocean. It calls for strong naval forces for their security and protection. Besides, several minerals and natural resources are lying unexplored and thus the oceanic waters must be free of military activities.

The growth of Islamic fundamentalism on India’s north-western periphery and beyond has further aggravated Hindu-Muslim relation with the country. Punjab, Kashmir, North East where secessionist movements have become endemic has threaten the country’s security. The dangerous nexus with the Afghan Mujahiddin, then North East with 3,700 k.m. border with Bhutan, Myanmar (Burma), Bangladesh, China has demanded more greater autonomy. The failure of government of Myanmar and its control of infiltrators has aggravated and the radicalisation of the secessionist movements in North East.

Before we see the changes and the continuity of India’s foreign policy, first and foremost is the personality factor of our few leaders starting from the pioneer of India’s foreign policy Jawaharlal Nehru to Lal Bahadur Shastri to Indira Gandhi. As President of Congress Jawaharlal Nehru opened a foreign Department of the Congress and he appointed a young radical, R.M. Lohia, as its Secretary. Since then very resolution of the Congress on foreign affairs was inspired, drafted and plotted by Nehru. As the Prime Minister of the Interim Government in September 1946, he laid down the
cardinal principles and basic application of Indian Foreign Policy formulated by himself, as also all subsequent pronouncement off the government on foreign policy. In no other state does one man dominates foreign policy as does Nehru in India. Nehru is the philosopher, the architect, the engineer and the voice of his own country’s policy towards the outside world.

Nehru’s Kashmir issue has probably been the most important single factor in Indian foreign policy. It has prepetually bedevilled relation between India and Pakistan since August 1947. It is the single most important factor which brought the cold war to the Indian subcontinent, and large military expenditure incurred upon it which in turn had adverse repercussion on economic growth and political viability. it has embittered in relation with the USA, made us heavily dependent on the Soviet Veto at UN, and put severe strain in own relation with the UK, and made it impossible to follow a truly independent policy with regard to West Asia. Even with the growing threat from China, we could not prevent from military arrangement with Pakistan regarding defence.

India did not have the military power to fight against both Pakistan and communist China in 1950. It would not take risk and defend Tibet in 1950 against China. Nehru realised the growing power of China but still believe in the development of an industrial infrastructure in India as the best long term guarantee of India’s security. Being a passionate anti-colonialist, he regarded the Chinese Communist revolution as basically a nationalist one and communism as a relatively superficial element in it. When China
occupied Tibet, Nehru still believe that China would never attack India especially after Panchsheel Agreement of 1954 with China, peace would be estimated not only between the two countries but with rest of Asia and world. Until late did he realise the Chinese had penetrated upto Ladakh after the Aksai Chin Road was completed by the Chinese, so early as October, 1947 the Tibetan government demanded the return of alleged Tibetan territories including Sikkim, Bhutan, the district of Darjeeling and Ladakh. His ‘Chini-Hindi bhai bhai’ attitude saw in the Chinese invasion of India in 1962.

Importance of India’s size and location and the geopolitical significance of Western Frontier enroute to West Asia and Arab States made Nehru realised and foresee that an alliance with any of the Super Power would only deteriorate India’s stance in international forum. And the country’s economic development had great influence in its foreign policy and he regarded peace on the borders an essential pre-condition. Also it was necessary for India to make maximum possible effort to get foreign aid channelised through international institution, to promote trade relation with the relatively under-developed trade relation with Japan, China, Pakistan and South East Asia. Non-alignment has helped the process of state building in India by harmonizing and stabilizing the demise of political forces in the country.

Reiterating India’s commitment to non-alignment, the Afro-Asian Movement, disarmament, the UN, Shastri replaced Nehru’s style by
pragmatism, bilateralism and institution building. Real test was Pakistan's sudden occupation in the Rann of Kutch. He warned Pakistan with counter attacking and Lahore was seriously threatened. Important is his joint Declaration at Tashkent with President Ayub Khan, where he proved himself as an able negotiator and peace maker. He negotiated with Pakistan in Soviet territories which others would not have done so. He also created the post of a whole time Foreign Minister and abolish the post of Secretary General of Minister of External Affairs.

The foreign policy makers had followed the policies where they find it suitable and changed wherever it needed. From the above discussion we can see the foreign policy of the various leaders where they have kept in mind India's national interest and security in maintaining a national foreign policy. A look at India's relations with the few countries would help in illustrating India's stance.

After the initial phase following the setback in 1962 views of India and the US considered mainly regarding China, but as regards the cold war between the USA and USSR, India took into no side. Since then Western efforts was to forge a unity between India and Pakistan against China, but it failed as suspicion grew greater between the nations on border issue especially the Himalayan border or Kashmir – Sinkiang border.

India's interest in the ASEAN was obvious. The grouping primarily centre communist, world check communism sway on SEA while their political stability would indirectly help India to go on with her parliamentary
democracy. ASEAN fear the inclusion of India because of her western reservation, her domination and also due to Indonesia that apprehend that her leadership would be jeopardised by India. And anti-Chinese feelings made Singapore fear India, this would disrupt all progress. Thailand and Philippines were approved to India’s non-alignment. Thus only Malaysia found/favour in India. India’s bitter relation seemed to be the strongest hurdle for India to play a significant role in the SEA affairs. By inflicting defeat on Pakistan in 1965, India was able to redeem her lost prestige in SEA to some extent, because to small countries military might matter more than anything else.

Thus since last 60’s India’s relation with SEA countries were influenced by the following factors affecting the geopolitical power balance in the region. (1) the possibility of limited US withdrawal from the region (2) Indo-Soviet Treaty (3) Super power rivalry in the Indian Ocean (4) India’s economic ties with SEA countries (5) The spread of the ASEAN influence in SEA affairs and India’s response to it.

Most important is the relation with Pakistan where India proposed bilateral talks, increased the strength of staff at High Commission. In 1996, two rounds of people to people dialogue in New Delhi and Lahore were arranged by Rajiv Gandhi Foundation. Besides, a new compact on nuclear comments between the two countries genuine trade, more self governance in Kashmir. But relation between the two countries got narrow in recent times

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due to Kashmir issue, shifting of Presslar Law by Americans. Chinese M-11 missiles sales and ring megments to Pakistan also Siachien problem also remains.

The major issues causing dissension between India and Bangladesh is the 5 years accord that was signed in November, 1977 for sharing of Ganga Waters, Chakma refugees, trade and commerce, demarcation of boundaries, and unchange of enclaves. The Indo-Bangladesh Joint River Commission came into existence to maintain a liaison, and operation of the Farakka barrage.

The visits of Nepalese Premier in February 1996, ratified the Mahakali Treaty by the Nepali Parliament after weeks of wrangling would certainly strengthen Indo-Nepal relations. Besides these the ever existing issue of trade cooperation in economic matters, sharing of water and demarcation of boundary.

India also build up strong ties with Bhutan when the Foreign Minister of India visited Bhutan in August 1996. Issues pertaining to trade, refugee, supply of electricity besides, Bhutani's support on India's claim for a permanent seat in the UN. Also India remain committed to non-interference in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka, and extended the ban on LTTE. The Sri Lankan Government removed a ban on entry of Christians coming towards South Sri Lanka from the northern mainland in a bid to prevent mass exodus of Tamilians to India. India also maintained neutral stand on recent developments in Myanmar, and has refrained from condemning military
attacks on pro-democracy activities in that country. It also refused to criticise the ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), Suu Kyi, the pro-democracy leader is loved by Indian and was incidentally given the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for international understanding in New Delhi.

It is the purpose of Indian Foreign Policy to promote harmony, trust and cooperative spirit among the South Asian nations particularly. Such a relationship among nations would strengthen peace, eliminate tension and reduce the danger of conflict. The main object of India's foreign policy is to create around an environment of peace, trust and stability, which would permit optimum utilisation of our natural and manpower resources for economic, social and cultural advancement.