CHAPTER-I

SOUTH ASIAN REALM

Ever since the idea of regional cooperation in South Asia was conceived by the late President Zia-ur Rahman of Bangladesh in the late seventies, India's role as the core country in the region has been watched with curiosity by scholars of international relations. In the youngest and yet the largest regional grouping of states, its successes and failures have been largely linked to the intensity of involvement of the two large regional powers, India and Pakistan.

The objective here is to diagnose New Delhi's changing perceptions towards the South Asia with a general backdrop of its foreign policy objectives, especially in the immediate neighbourhood. The study is mostly in the form of post-mortem in the sense that it scrutinizes a number of official-level, ministerial level and summit-level meetings held so far in the realisation of the SAARC journey. Therefore, some content analyses has been made.

The India ruling elites right from the time of Jawaharlal Nehru till Rajiv Gandhi have planned the foreign policy of the country with certain clear-cut objectives. These may be briefly identified as national security, friendship with the neighbours, development and the world peace. As regards, the question of security, it is considered to be primary in the sense that before everything else, the issue of survival comes first. The nation can
think of socio-economic prosperity only, if it is secured against any external threats. The very fact that there have been four major armed attacks on India from her neighbours during the last four decades, demonstrates that it cannot afford to ignore its security interests. Very closely linked with then in the top priority given to neighbourhood diplomacy in India's foreign policy calculations. Unless it improves its ties with its neighbours, most of its energy will be diverted to defend its borders against any possible aggression. The quest for economic development is naturally another major goal. The challenges of poverty, hunger, unemployment, inflation etc. can drain the vitality of the nation and in due course it may lose its hard won freedom.

SAARC can be considered as an offspring of NAM in the sense that it was the latter which gave a major thrust to South. South cooperation and economic cooperation among developing countries(ECDC). Besides, NAM provided a changed context to a largely hostile bilateral climate in the South Asian region, As one after another, all the South Asian states joined NAM, there was a frequent meeting of minds in several deliberations and it was often found that the barriers among these states were often artificial and there was no reason why they could not be surmounted.

When in the late 1970s, President Zia-ur Rahman during his visits to some South Asian capitals, hinted at the possibility of a South Asian summit in order to explore the scope of regional cooperation. Zia-ur-Rahman's dreams were completion when the first-ever official meeting of seven South Asian states (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri
Lanka) was held in Colombo during April, 1981. Foreign Ministers and the Heads of Government, on the other, we have tried to identify and diagnose the role of India in these deliberations. On the basis of our general observations through these graphic aids, we will attempt an evaluation of New Delhi's record of success and failure at the SAARC forums.

The Colombo meeting of Foreign Secretaries broadly accepted the idea of regional cooperation in South Asia on the basis of unanimity, non-interference and equality. However, it suggested a step-by-step approach. It went a step further by identifying five study Groups on Agriculture, transport, rural development, meteorology, health and population activities. Significantly enough, New Delhi maintained a low profile and was very cautious in suggesting a gradual evolution of regional cooperation.

At the second meeting of the Foreign Secretaries in Kathmandu in November, 1981, while three new Study Group were initiated in the areas of transport, post and telegraph science and technology, the existing Study Groups were converted into Working Groups. It was also decided to coordinate the planning organisations of the concerned states. Significantly enough, New Delhi's position on regional cooperation and become quite positive by then, although Islamabad was still lukewarm to the idea. The former in fact wanted to go a step further by advocating a common stand of the South Asian States on economic issues while deliberating at the international forums.
The third meeting of Foreign Secretaries in Islamabad during August, 1982 is a landmark in the sense that a committee of whole was established to launch an integrated programme of action and funding modalities were decided. Besides, in response to earlier suggestions by India, it was decided to coordinate the suggestions of the South Asian states in global forums. Islamabad, New Delhi's pleading for the expansion of regional cooperation to areas like sports, arts and culture, was duly accepted.

At the next official level meeting in Dhaka (March 1982), India's emphasis for a step-by-step approach was broadly accepted in the final communique. The fifth meeting of Foreign Secretaries held in New Delhi during July 1983, provided an useful backdrop to the first-ever meeting of South Asian Foreign Ministers. It took several momentous steps which gave a concrete shape to future SAARC. Here, it was decided in definite terms to formally launch the idea of South Asian Region Cooperation (SAARC).

The SAARC Declaration, which was signed by the Foreign Ministers at the end of their New Delhi meet broadly formulated the eight objectives. In its view, in order to realise collective self reliance, and socio-economic development of the region RC was an imperative need of the hour. The document gave a clear emphasis on sovereign equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of others and mutual benefit. It suggested a three-tiered institutional structure (Technical Committee, Action Committee and Standing Committee) for the operationalisation of regional projects. As
regards financing the projects, while voluntary contributions sources would be the rule, financial grants from external sources were welcome.

The Male meeting of Foreign Ministers (July 1984) made a number of recommendations as follows: it appreciated the useful role played by the standing committee of Foreign Secretaries in the coordination and monitoring of IPA (Integrated Programme of Action). The Thimpu meeting of Foreign Ministers (May 1985) was a prelude to the Dhaka Summit as it finalised the SAARC Charter and recommended the constitution of a Ministerial council as an apex body of the organisation. However, the standing committee was to monitor progress in various areas of cooperation. The Thimpu meeting however remained charged with tension due to the initial boycott by Sri Lanka on the ground of a statement made in Indian Parliament on the ethnic conflict in the island.

The first SAARC Summit held in Dhaka (December, 1985) heralded a new chapter in the history of inter-state relations in the subcontinent. Rajiv Gandhi on behalf of India, played a sobering and non-controversial role. A comparatively low-profile by India, in spite of some provocative remarks by Pakistan's Zia-ul-Haq helped a smooth delivery of the new born child. In new Delhi's perception, SAARC was in tone with the political realities of the region. At the second Summit in Bangalore (November 1986) when Rajiv Gandhi succeeded HM Ershad as the Chairman of SAARC, a new responsibility fell on India to steer the new ship in the desired direction. Incidentally it was at a time when terrorist violence was on a fantastic rise in
India and in neighbouring Sri Lanka, New Delhi not only expressed its concern over this and another menace like drug trafficking but also wanted SAARC to take some constructive steps in order to prevent them. India also vigorously championed the cause of expanding cooperation to core economic areas. Out of the two documents, which emerged as a result of formal and informal consultations the first over increasing global insecurity and a retreat from multilateralism.

At the third Summit held in November 1987 in Kathmandu New Delhi again left its mark. During his tenure as the SAARC Chairman, Rajiv Gandhi pleaded for creating a South Asian Food Security Reserve, which was finally agreed in Kathmandu. India's earlier plea to include in SAARC, hard core economic areas like trade, money, finance banking was tentatively agreed in Kathmandu a convention on Suppression of Terrorism. As has been seen India has gradually moved from a relative indifference to that of a cautious and yet dynamic partner in the SAARC experiment. In fact, although Islamabad still continues to be lukewarm in its support to expansion of SAARC areas of cooperation, New Delhi has been advocating along with the smaller South Asian states the inclusion of core economic area like trade, money, finance and banking into the SAARC parameter.

India has vigorously championed the cause of greater popular involvement in SAARC. For instance, the creation of SAARC chairs, fellowships, exchange of scholars and SAARC vision will take a long way the idea of cooperation to the grass root level. The holding of third South
Asian Federation Games, held in Calcutta soon after the Kathmandu Summit, should be seen from that perspective.

ETHNIC

The post colonial world order, engineered on the concept of supremacy of the state, anchored on a super imposed nationalism, legitimized by secular or religious ideologies and enforced by an extreme and imposed great strain. Two dissimilar and parallel realities—greater demand for a participatory system to be encouraged by dismantling some of the coercive forces of the state, and strong trends for regional integration have unleashed unsettling forces. (Nasir A Naqash and G.M. Shah, Ethnic configuration in South Asia).

Ethnic separatism, either in the name of sheer autonomy or in terms of better politico-economic institutions, poses a severe challenge both to the regional security and the territorial integrity of the state in South. Given the internal and regional ramifications of ethno-nationalism a multi-tiered dialogue accompanied with participatory political policies and egalitarian economic system, is the best way out.

India has an ethnically heterogeneous and fragmented population, with hundreds of ethnic groups transforming over time, into self conscious ethnic communities competing for greater access to power and resources. Ethnicity plays a significant role in directing the course of Indian policies with ethnic mobilization assuming various forms, including divisions along
linguistic, territorial tribal and religious lines. Ethnic assertion has increasingly taken an violent shape.

In the state of Jammu and Kashmir, the movement has largely a historical and geo-political background. Ethno-nationalism supported by a defined territorial, cultural and constitutional distinctness wins it a major following. One section largely led by Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) stresses a supra religious Kashmiryat in a very ideological and strategic sense of the word so as not to alienate Buddhists in Ladakh and Hindus of Jammu from the predominantly Muslim population of the valley. The other section of the population, on the contrary led by Jamati-Islami and its militant wing and many other such groups who follow the Jamat ideology, while banking on territorial sub-nationalism, stress the religious component of the of the Kashmir identity which to them is to join Pakistan in the true tradition of millat. The cause enlists support from religious groups in Pakistan, Afghan, Mujaheddeen, Iranian and Arab Islamists. Those favouring independent character of the State, ensure support from some regional and extra-regional quarters, given the fact that the Indian secularists, for their own reasons are almost unanimous in keeping Kashmir as an integral part of India. (Urmila Phadnis, 1989).

Noteworthy here is the fact that ethnic based violence have not only put individual countries of the region in a vulnerable position but have also constantly disrupted inter state relations in South Asia. Disorder in Sindh at the behest of factionalized Sindh nationalists or the Urdu speaking organized
Mohajjirs or the case of Indian Punjab, Assam, North East the Tamil problem in Sri Lanka, the ethno-rationalism in Kashmir, pose a serious threat to the very existence of their respective states. In most cases, the countries of the region (India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh) accuse one another of inflaming and helping the 'secessionists' (Erfan Habib, 1991)

The Kashmiri Muslims seem to reject India secularism, quite contrary to the Indian Muslim who strongly believe in its efficacy. The geo-political changes in Eastern Europe and Central Asia strengthened their ethnic assertions and intensified their desire for the struggle against what they allege alien rule. New Delhi would like to see all the blame to be burdened over the shoulders of its traditional rival Pakistan for encouraging ethnic assertion in many parts of India including Kashmir. Pakistan accepts its involvement in the revolt only upto the limit of moral, political and diplomatic level it counter charges India of fanning ethnic violence in Pakistan's Sindh and North Western Frontier provinces.

The insertion of Article 370 in the Indian constitution implied a constitutional assurance that the Kashmiris would be free to shape their future destiny as they desire without any attempts to impose upon them anything by sheer force of numbers. But this has not happened. Over the years all our efforts have been made to dilute Article 370 so as to assimilate and integrate Kashmiris in the national mainstream. It is observed that the inspiration for the present crisis lie primarily in Kashmiris preservation of its cultured industry in the face of the advance of the Hindu nationalism.
Cultural marginalism of a people due to a process of state sponsored imposition of pan Indianess represents an important sources of crisis in the valley. This is not only a glaring contravention of Article 370 but also Article 371, applied to the North-Eastern region of India to ensure the preservation of cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious identity of the tribes.

The Kashmiri identity has, in the recent past, also been under strain owing to reasons from within. Discouraged by Hindu nationalists in the country. The sizeable section of Kashmiri Muslims appear to have been led to a course, where the religion's edge of Kashmiri identity is getting more and more sharpened to the effect of diluting the Kashmiryat. For various political and economic reasons, the Kashmiri pandits, who laid the foundations of this ethnicity have been also down-playing with this identity. They have started identifying themselves with the beliefs of traditions of Hindu regions majority of India.

The Kashmir issue, at no less a significant level emerges as a bilateral issue between Indian and Pakistan. The secular nationalism of Indian National Congress discredited religious nationalism. It faced an ideological adversary in Muslim nationalism besides intra-party rival in Hindu nationalism, fed, as the latter was by a be; oef om "Muslim disloyalty" to India. The accession of Kashmir to India however, provision, discredited this Hindu nationalist argument that "Muslims" are essentially disloyal to the country. Once Kashmir became a part of India, however, provisionally, it became inextricably tied up with India's secularism. Nehru argued he always
regarded the Kashmir problem as symbolic, as if illustrated that we are a secular state. Speech in Parliament, New Delhi, 17 Sept., 1953. However, this view proposing a link between Kashmir and Muslim welfare is dubbed as a 'hostage theory' by scholars in Pakistan.

Nehru's fears however, were not imaginary. In 1952, Hindu communalists launched a full-fledged movement in Jammu against Kashmir's vacillations on a full-fledged movement in Jammu against Kashmir's vacillations on a full fledged imagination with India. But more than ever before, the wounds have reopened in the late 1980's. Burdened with the feeling that India's secular state has gone too far in appeasing minorities, Hindu nationalism has gained remarkable strength in recent year. The demolition of Babri Masjid in Ayodhya in October, 1990, is the most conclusive demonstration of a deepening political trend that has already set in motion in the country. Pakistan, at its part, feels denied an area otherwise belonging to it due to religious geo-political and economic reasons. The Kashmiris are caught between two pulls. A complex of emotions has marked their relationship with the two countries. Since 1947, the time Kashmir acceded to India, the issue of its relationship with India could not be decided. The legality of accession was to be politically reaffirmed in a plebiscite. A plebiscite was never held because both India and Pakistan could not overcome the mistrust.

The atmosphere of mutual suspicion, has given rise to a number of India-Pak divergencies such as mutual allegations of interference in internal
affairs, suspicion of each others military programmes or even the relationship with extra regional powers. Collectively, these provide substance to the historical discord, which has once again come into focus due to a massive show of defiance against the authority in the state. The allegation by India that Pakistan provides arms support to the Kashmiri activists has added a military dimension to the issue. The general alienation of Kashmiris from the mainstream is generating enough emotional heat on both sides of the international border. One again it is felt that without resolving this major stumbling block one way or the other, the bilateral relationship between them will continue to remain hostage to the forces of militarism, conflict and self assured destruction.

Both the United States and the United Kingdom wanted to resolve the crisis swiftly at the time of its emergence because of their fears of communist expansion from the North. Nehru due to his emotional attachment to the Kashmir and not willing to appear weak before his rightist opponents was always forced to take a stubborn attitude towards the problem.

In 1950 Sir, Owen Dixon, undertaking arbitration took on behalf of the UN, offered his partition-cum-plebiscite formula in Jammu and Kashmir so as to meet the sensitivities of both the contenders. But despite Dixon's shuttle diplomacy, the formula could not mature as a result of evasiveness of both the parties. In the same manner, the Nehru-Ayub talks could not materialistic. Neither the wars nor the various summit meetings between the
leaders of the two countries resulted in any tangible solution of the problems.

The present uprising in the state and its intensity almost took both the parties by surprise. In 1988 SAARC Summit Rajiv Benazir showed quite an optimum for a thaw in Indo-Pak relations. But in 1989, both the countries once again began gearing up for another war over Kashmir. The changes in East Europe and the neighbouring Central Asia, besides from within such as frustrated at the undue political interference by the Central Government in the administration of the state and the mounting economic burdens, greatly moved the local youth, who shunned all the stereotypes about their traditional docility and launched a two pronged resistance to the New Delhi's rule. India put the entire blame for the Kashmiri resistance to Pakistan. The rhetoric for war increased with Indian rightist demands for hot pursuit of the Kashmiri activists, and the dismantling of the alleged training camps across the border. At the international level, both the Western powers and the Soviet Union seeing the clouds of war looming large over South Asia, and its ramifications in the form of a nuclear holocaust, kept on dissuading the contenders to desist from any active military overture.

Keeping aside all the bitterness, the two countries commenced Foreign Secretary level negotiations to arrest the growing tensions over the borders. Situation, as expected did not improve. New Delhi continues to blame its adversary for training the activists of the resistance, besides pushing in the foreigners to take part in the resistance Islamabad denies it
and insists on addressing the main issue of a Kashmir plebiscite. The Kashmir issue has essential regional and extra-regional dimensions. It presents first serious possibility of altering the status-quo in the region of South Asia, since the birth of Bangladesh in 1971. The result in Kashmir, together with insurgency in Punjab provides a situation where two regions in the Indian Union both constituting non-Hindu majority are in turmoil.

Almost whole of South Asia has complex and equally violent ethnic loyalties overriding the borders, and worst of all skirmishes over un-settled political issues. The ethnic loyalties cutting across the borders have been breeding mistrust and ill feelings. For each fear provocation of these loyalties by the other. Each alleges to be victim of low intensity war and subversion by the other consequently, a diversity of opinion regarding the security issue prevails from country to country in the region. While India, the Core state, is inclined to evolve a security framework in regional terms, the rest of the major South Asian states have fear perceptions leading to trans-regional linkages.

It is in the interest of the region to suggest that India owns greater responsibility owing to its pre-eminence in the region to initiate some concrete confidence building measures, for its as well as for the sake of sub-continental peace. It may not be out of place to note that the drastic changes in the Soviet Union have given a severe set back to India. Similarly, the things having lost interest for west and the United States in Pakistan after the cold war, the scenario offers a ripe opportunity for understanding
efforts towards resolution of long standing political issues. The Kashmir issue also implores an analysis in the context of extra-regional unrest that is manifest in the strategic Islamic crescent of conflict which begins from the middle East and goes through India. This chain of unrest includes popular resistance in Pakistan, the struggle in Afghanistan, the stirrings in the Azerbijan, Tajakistan and the Kashmir.

It may be concluded that it is a combination of internal and external factors that has created conditions for the Kashmir situation in 1990's. Externalization of the situation puts regional security into the doldrums. The issue needs to be comprehended on the basis of ethno-nationalism, historical claims and regional implications. One of the major dilemmas faced by multiethnic democracies in the demand for self determination by various ethnic groups.

The essential question here is whether the democratic rights of citizen can be extended to the point that the state may disintegrate. In many parts of the world demand for self determination with the objective of seceding from the state have inevitably led to the central government's insistence on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state. In rejecting the rights of Kashmiris, Sikhs, Nagas and other minorities to self determination India has frequently argued that the democratic rights of individuals and group cannot be allowed to lead to the self-destruction of the state.

However, the separation of Pakistan from India in 1947 demonstrated that secessionism did not solve the original problem of Hindu domination of
Muslims. The demand for Pakistan was most acute in those regions of India where Muslims were a minority, so that after the creation of Pakistan, these Muslims found themselves to be in an even smaller minority in a more dominant and hostile Hindu majority state. The partition of India merely introduced more Hindu-Muslim strife territorial disputes, were conventional and nuclear arms races between India and Pakistan, and the sapping of productive energy for alleviating the misery of the poor in both countries. These long-term problems were in addition to the immediate massacre of about half a million civilians in interreligious communal strife and the uprooting and refugee flows of about 15 million people. The secessionist struggle in East Pakistan in 1971 resulted in the massacre of about a quarter million. Bengalis by the Pakistan Army and the flow of 10 million Bengali refugee (mainly Hindu) to India. Although these refugees were returned after Bangladesh was created, through armed Military intervention by India, a new minority and refugees problem was generated. Half a million Urdu-speaking Bihari Muslims who had supported the Pakistan Army were reduced to second class citizens or driven out to Pakistan. Similarly, the recognition of Croatia and Bosnia as independent states has created more problem that it has resolved. Indeed if what was done in Yugoslavia were done in India, several new states would emerge, and there would be millions of refugees and communal massacres on a scale that would be completely out of control. Any decision to grant self determination to ethnic minorities in India
conjures up the image of such a massive carascrophe that makes the partition of India in 1947 look tame.

Although Pakistan failed to crush the Bangladesh separatist movement in 1971 because of Indian military intervention, most secessionist movements in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka have been suppressed or crushed. This has been the worldwide standard response to secessionism, justified on the basis of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the same. In 1990, this policy of crushing separatism through sustained military force has become a matter of controversy. The question of whether democracy should be extended to include the right of national self determination will not be easily resolved.

Perhaps international pressure should focus on pushing for decentralization, democratization, and the prevention of human rights violations in areas where violent secessionist movements prevail - and not on granting recognition to new state. In choosing between ethnic-self determination and the territorial integrity of the state, there is a need to maintain the territorial status quo. It is important to recognize the freedom and democracy are derived from appropriate political institutions and processes, not from breaking away from an existing state. After all, ethnic nationalists who succeed in creating a new independent state could then well set up authorization or fascist state. The new majority could oppress members of the old majority now turned minority. On the other hand, political decentralization and free market economies can do more for the
political freedom and economic well-being of all citizens including
minorities, than the creation of new states. India's foreign policy makers
have also been conscious of the impact of India's location on its role in
world affairs. Two aspects of the location may be mentioned here.

India's strategic location in South Asia-that it is a connecting link
between West Asia, South Asia and East Asia- is an important factor in its
foreign policy. "Look at the map" Jawaharlal Nehru told the members of the
Constituent Assembly, on March 8, 1949, ' If you have to consider any
question concerning South East Asia, you cannot do so without India. So
also with the Far East. While the Middle East may not be directly connected
with South East Asia, both are connected with India. Even if you think in
terms of regional organizations in Asia, your have to keep in touch with the
other regions. And whatever regions, you may have in mind, the importance
of India cannot be ignored.¹

A second aspect is India's location in relation to the Indian Ocean and
the importance of that ocean to India's foreign trade and defence. The
peninsular character of the country with its extensive and open coast line,
and with a littoral which is extremely fertile and rich in resources, as K.M.
Panikkar has pointed out makes India entirely dependent on the Indian
Ocean.² It would be correct to say that some eight five percent of India's

¹ Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, Selected Speech: Sept., 1946, April 1961,
New Delhi, 1961, p.22.
² K.M. Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean, London, 1945, p.82.
foreign trade passes through the Indian Ocean, this trade includes import of the essential capital goods and the raw materials needed for India's economic development. A hostile power dominating the Indian Ocean could be harmful to such trade, it could be dangerous for India's security.

He added that Japan, China, Britain, the United States and the Soviet Unions were all competitions, actual or potential, for the control of the Indian Ocean. It was well that India's Prime Minister told the Lok Sabha on 23 February, 1968 that the Government of India maintained "a close and careful watch over the political and other developments" in the Indian Ocean area. It is known that the United States had already built a base in the Indian Ocean: the Soviet Union too, it may be expected, will follow suit. That India desires the neutralization of the ocean, free from big power politics, has been publicly stated: Indian diplomacy has succeeded in winning the support of friendly states in the region.

Reference has been made earlier to the fact that India has a long land frontier of some 9.425 miles bordering China and Pakistan and Bangladesh too, since 1971. To take China first: the central geographical fact here is the existence of the Himalayas, the abode of snow, that great line of bright, inviolate peaks, symbolizing the beauty, the majesty, the spiritual aspiration and exaltation of all those who live within its reflected beams of light. 4

3 Selected speeches of Indira Gandhi, New Delhi, 1971, p.39.
Nehru spoke of it as Indian Crown. Flanked on the west by the Hindu Kush and the Lushai Hills on the east, the Himalayas extends from the Indus to the Brahmaputra—a length of 1500 miles and runs through the entire northern boundary of India with an average width of some 150 miles and an average height of 20000 feet; several peaks rise much higher, the Everest rising to 29028 feet. Behind the Himalaya lies the Tibetan plateau with an elevation of some 15000 feet beyond the plateau are the Kuenlun mountains— in them-selves only a little less formidable than the Himalayas beyond them lie the Mongolian and the Gobi deserts." Well might it be said that "for over a thousand miles to the north, Hindustan has a protective area which no other country possesses."5

India's foreign relation would have altogether been different (from what they have been) if the natural protected barrier sketched above had fulfilled the natural expections of the Indian people. K.M.Panikkar himself, with his usual sagacity, foresaw that conditions might change and the Himalayas might not give India from invasion from the north for ever. Stating that it was a matter of significance that there had never been (till 1955 when he wrote the book) the slightest disturbance of social life by invasion across the Himalayas, he raised the significant question: "can the immunity of India from the northern side be maintained in the face of aircraft which fly over higher and ever faster."6

5 K.M.Panikkar-Geographical factors in Indian History Bombay, 1959, p.57.
6 Ibid, p.69.
In particular, he wanted that 'an organized modern state in Tibet will alter the character of the Himalayan problem.'

The Chinese invasion of India in 1962 shows the significance of two facts about the Himalayan border on India's relations with China. The first is that there are several passes in the Himalayan, such as the famous Shipki pass, which have natured pilgrimage and trade in the past and which may also be used for military invasion, especially when modern roads are constructed through them. In 1962, the Chinese army crossed into India (in the east) through them.

Indeed the terrain makes it impossible to have the demarcation by pillars on the border, although, as Caroe rightly pointed out, "the absence of pillars in no way illegalizes frontier well known by tradition, well marked by mountains or other natural features or well described in a map."

Another point of importance in the Himalayan border is the existence of two border states, Nepal and Bhutan—with whom friendly relations are important for the preservation of India security. Nepal and Bhutan are sovereign independent states; Bhutan has special relations with India; under 1949 Treaty, Bhutan has agreed to be guided by the Government of India in regard to its external relations, just as it is also to China's interest to have them in its sphere of influence.

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7 Ibid on this issue, Chapter 4 provides more details.
The foreign policy problems involved in relation to Nepal and Bhutan will be dealt with later in this book in this context, it is sufficient to draw the attention of the reader to the geo-political significance of these two states in India's foreign relations. Likewise, India's entire north-eastern flank, bordering Burma, has represented a major factor in its relation with its neighbour Burma.

On India is frontiers with Pakistan, the relevant facts can be stated briefly. Essentially, those frontiers are man made frontiers, carved out after the partition of India in 1947. The Radcliffe Awards—the settlement of the boundaries by Cyril Radcliffe to whom was entrusted the difficult task of carving out the boundaries at the time of partition—and the later award by Justice Bagge, to whom were referred the dispute relating the territories of the Eastern Region, constitute the bases of the frontiers. More especially in the eastern region, there were continuing disputes about the frontiers, partly because of the nature of the border region. To cite an illustration, there was originally 23 enclaves of Indian territory in Pakistan and similarly some 70 Pakistani enclaves were surrounded by Indian territory. As indicated later (in chapter-2), these disputes were settled through negotiations. In the western region the proximity of Kashmir—which acceded to the Indian Union in 1947—to Pakistan is a geographical factor of importance, and this led perhaps, to the most complex problem in India's foreign relations, the Kashmir problem is dealt with in detail later in this book. One dispute-relating to the Rann of Kutch—(also in the west) was settled by arbitration.
The sixth round of India-Pakistan talks at the level of Foreign secretaries did much better than expected with the signing of the agreement on a bilateral non-development, non-production and non-attack chemical weapons agreement. Of even greater importance was the fact that they were held in the first place. But the wide divergence in the interpretation of agreed issues by both sides is indicative of the mutual drop mistrust that exists. Adversarial perceptions have been so deeply ingrained into the subconscious of the ordinary people, that government officials on the either side just cannot appear to have "conceded" anything to the other side.

The end of the sixth round has sparked off a debate as the Pakistan Foreign Secretary Shahryar Khan, in a bid to project his successful diplomatic efforts, announced in vague and ambiguous terms that both sides had agreed to demilitarise the Siachin area. It drew sharp reaction from New Delhi, which contended that the demilitarisation of the Siachin are was a continuation of the 1984 deal and the present talks represented no new stance or initiative on either side. In almost certain retaliation Indian Defence Minister Sharad Pawar told Indian press that just prior to the Foreign Secretary level talks, a skirmish in the cold and cruel terrain had taken place with the Pakistani side ending up with the substantial losses and two Majors.

There have been three "constraint" that have a characterised relations between India and Pakistan since 1947. A first and most glaring constant has been the lack of resolute political will on both sides of the border to come to
grips with reality in larger interests of peace, tranquillity and economic development of the region. The second constant flowing from the first has been the generation of a deep and almost hysterical sense of mistrust and suspicion of intentions on every conceivable issue—from politics to sports, culture and people to people contact. The third constant derived from the internationalism of these feeling by the common folk in both countries is that anti-neighbour haranague is a tried and tested method of being able to divert attention from domestic issues. Take, for example the issue of the Ram Janma bhoomi-Babri Masjid controversy in Pakistan. The politicians and the press have been hyperactive in proclaiming their view on the issue, condemning the “lamentable” condition of Muslims in a Hindu India, while ignoring that sectarian feuds and minority-bashing have reached such proportions in Pakistan, where the minorities—both religious and sectarian—equate the emerging of cult of majorityism with a systematic attempt at religious and sectarian “cleansing”.

Reinforced by the “constants” that have characterised Indo-Pak relation, the historical past, too has played its part in ensuring that the gulf is never bridged. For Pakistan, the raison d’etre for its existence as a nation is its Muslim credentials, which curiosity has dominated the ethnic struggles that are raging in all the provinces. In Sindh, the issue of the Mujahirs to consider themselves as Pakistanis first has created an opposite reaction of ethnic awareness among the Sindhis who believe that they are Sindhis first. The sons of soil through-out Pakistan, both at the provincial and micro-
levels (Seraiki, Hazara and Hindko areas) resent their being short changed by the creators of Pakistan over a federal structure and today their anger has assumed political overtones in the form of ethno-national movements.

On the other hand, the "secular" nature of state in India has stirred up a debate that is best represented in the political arena between the ruling and main opposition party, in which minority rights, protection of their culture, language, customs and laws are always linked to the issue of the creation of Pakistan itself. The bitter irony for the Pakistani elite has been that despite an over attempt to look upon themselves as the guarantors of Muslims consciousness throughout the subcontinent, they themselves have followed a closed door policy both immigration and people to people contact.

The ideological contest has not rem confined to the subcontinent. Both the countries have clashed bitterly in international forums. The interpretation of the Shimla Agreement over the kashmir issue exemplifies this trend. While India has continued to believe that the Agreement prohibits either party to internationalise the issue with the international audiences because the dispute has always been on the UN agenda following the Security Council resolutions.

Such intentions have their trickle down effect even on multilateral negotiations like the chemical weapons convention in which both countries despite publicity reneging the possibility of development, production, stockpile and use of chemical weapons against each other, are highly suspicious of each other's moves Islamabad has been dragging her feet on the
In the post 1971 period, the first meeting between a disembered Pakistan and triumphant India was at Murree in the Pir Panjal ranges. Murree was followed by Shimla where the historic agreement was signed in 1972. But no sooner did Bhutto fly back to Pakistan, than he announced to a massive crowd in Lahore that the peace was only a temporary massive to overcome the shame that the generals had covered Pakistan with and the only option for him to bring back the 90,000 prisoners of war from Indian custody, Bhutto declared that 1000 year jihad would continue after this brief but necessary respite. Bhutto clearly outlined his limitations in dealing with India.

The coup of 1977 and the subsequent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan qualitatively changed the pattern of Indo-Pakistan relations. Lack of a political base meant that Zia had to take advantage of the Soviet move to consolidate himself in power. But it required that the first front against an historical foe had to be neutralised to enable him to concentrate on his Western borders. By 1980, as a American support to the Afghan reistaence and the military dictatorship move Zia sought to put a temporary hold over into Pak disputes.

The SAARC summit meet in Islamabad in December, 1989 provided the first opportunity for both the countries to look at building better bilateral
relations. A democratic government was in place in Islamabad the Afghan war had begun unwinding with Gorbachev taking quick steps to gradually induce soviet involvement, and the Pakistan military recovering from the shock of Zia's death was faced with an upsurge of democratic sentiment that it could afford to contest.

Bilateral talks between Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi led to the establishment of an international mechanise under which Foreign secretaries were to meet periodically to discuss a wide range of issues. The first meeting was held in July 1990 that saw India put forward an integrated package of confidence building measures (CBMs) whose object was to reduce tensions and create transparency through information sharing that would reduce the chances for misrepresenting each other's intentions.

From then on in the space of one year, the Foreign Secretaries of the two countries met alternatively in each other's countries five times but somehow the underlying lack of trust failed to produce any concrete improvement in the relations or show any sign of flexibility on well-stated positions. The Foreign Secretary-level talks were a forum, unlike the Joint Commission where all issues, including contentious political ones were discussed. Their significance lay in the fact that for the first time, both countries agreed that there was need for confidence building measures and as specific CBMS the two sides formalised the agreement on prohibition of Attack on Nuclear installation and facilities that was signed in December 1988. The instruments of ratification were exchanged by the two sides in

Another CBM on Advance Notice on Military Exercise maneuvers and Troop Movements was concluded during the Fourth Round of talks. This meeting by far was the most productive as it also produced another agreement in Prevention of Air Space Violations and permitting overflights and landings by Military Aircraft. The sixth round now has produced the bilateral CW agreement. Although both sides have accept that CBMs are intrinsic to the peace process in the subcontinent the lack of trust and political wisdom has meant that disputes manifest the differing ideological basis of the two countries and they, in turn continue to haunt bilateral relations.

Jammu & Kashmir today in easily the most inflammable issue and both sides have adopted maximalist positions, although it must be said that there is an inherent flexibility in New Delhi's overall outlook towards solving the problem. Islamabad has been careful in never stating that its covert mikotary support to the militants in Punjab & Kashmir in a logical extension of its material and moral support, incontrovertible proof has been obtained by independent agencies that the anti-state activity is fulfilled by Islamabad's intelligence agencies. In a bid to confuse issues, Islamabad is crying hoarse about Indian activities in Sindh. Even more bizarre allegations of Indian intelligence agencies having infiltrated sectarian and ethnic outfits are being made but the only difference between kashmir and Sindh is that in
the former case Islamabad's covert activities are being documented meticulously, forcing Western nations to take stand against it.

The third issue that has defied resolution is the nuclear tangle. Both countries profess peaceful intentions but both have been increasing their military might. Yet both refuse to work for a bilateral deal largely as a result of the enormous district that has been generated in 45 years. Other issues that have become obstacles are the Wallower Barrage (as called by Pakistan) or Tulbul Hydroelectric Project (as called by India). While Delhi has consistently held that the project is only to stimulate economic development in Kashmir, Islamabad has raised fears that in its construction there is a wartime role for the dam of flooding the Punjab to deny Pakistan the strategic depth it requires. The Sir Creek issue more a technical problem, has been caught in a political storm, defying movement. There are other larger issue like economic cooperation even in those areas earmarked by SAARC declaration that have fallen victim to political pressures.

Five out of the seven nations in South Asia are former colonies which become independent in the last 50 years. The exceptions being Nepal and Bhutan. All the seven are developing nation in different stages of development. This process of development has always been turbulent one. During this process in Europe and North America history records a number of wars, revolutions, revolts and other forms of inter and inter state violence caused by the ambitions of rules, religious and sectarian animosities, rising political consciousness on the part of the people for increasing
representational rights, assertion of ethnic, linguistic and other identities
downright oppression and discrimination etc.

Such has South Asia is also surrounded on all sides by turbulence. Iran had a violent revolution and is currently engaged in the longest war between tow developing countries since 1945. The insurgency in Afghanistan continues unabated, South East Asia too is witnessing an insurgency in Kampuchea and there are major interests tensions in the area. Northern Burma continues to be under unsettled conditions. Tibet too is sullen. Bearing a few exceptions most of the developing world is experiencing the growing pains of nation state building and turbulence. In 1984 the South magazine published from London, identified 42 instance of ongoing and potential conflicts in the developing world. Nearly 40 percent of the developing nations were under military rule.

The problems of nation-state building and development in the developing world have been further exacerbated by the population explosion and the expectation among the people that the process that took more than two centuries in Europe North America with more favourable population to resources ratio should be compressed into a few decades in the present day developing world. The very existence of the affluent societies of Europe and North America and the easy access to them through jet transportation and electronic media add to pressures building up within the developing nations.

The overall international political environment too has not been conductive to tension free evolution of nation states and smooth
development in the post-colonial societies. The superimposition of cold was rivalries, the transfer of resources from developing to developed countries through high oil prices and investment of petrodollar surpluses in Western banking systems, use of arm transfers as selective instruments of policies and interventionism of the industrialised world have all contributed to the security problems of the developing world.

South Asia is a civilizational area inheriting millennia old common culture, traditions and shared memories. It is easily distinguishable from the great civilisation to the North and West and perhaps to a lesser extent of the East. Whatever might have been the attraction to the British and the European to this area in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries, in the post-colonial era in terms of relative strategic importance West and Southeast Asia on one side and southeast Asia on the other side rate much higher in the priorities of the major powers of the world, however lying in between those two areas of vital strategic importance and commanding the communications in the Indian Ocean area South Asia derives its strategic relevance.

Measured on population scale, the subcontinent consists of one very large nation, two large nations, two medium-sized nations and two small nations. This is a major factor of stability. Though two nations resulted from their secession from a single large unit the partition here has been accepted politically and legally and has been put to test and endured. This is different from situation elsewhere as in the case of two Germanys, China and Taiwan,
Korea and Palestine. This yet another factor of stability. Except for Kashmir there are no irredentist issue among the nations. The status quo in Kashmir has survival by and large at the end of three wars and there is no reason why it should not further endure. In other words, the present state structure of the sub-continent has come to enquire durable characteristics and there is not reason why the South Asian Regional Corporation forum should not formally proclaim this durability through adoption of a declaration antigous to the Helsinki Final Act- that the present state structure and boundaries are not to be altered by forcible means. If, as quite a few Pakistani hold Kashmir can be left to be settled by four generations, there are no border dispute on land. One may draw attention to the Siachin issue. Given the nature of the terrain and the respective concerns of the two sides it should be possible to settle this issue in the light of the principles that led to the line of control in Kashmir.

While maritime boundaries between India and Pakistan and India and Bangladesh are yet to be settled, the maritime boundaries of India with Sri Lanka, Maldives, Burma, Indonesia and Thailand have been settled and enough case law is available to guide us in the settlement of other boundaries. In the light of this analysis it would appear that territorial disputes cannot give rise to concern on security within the nations of the subcontinent. It is a somewhat different issue when we consider the territorial issue between the nations of the subcontinent and extra regional powers such as China.
Such conflicts arise as a result of ethnic, linguistic and religious differences, demands for representational governments and increased share in decision making and due to dissatisfaction in the share of allocation of developmental funds. Excepts perhaps for the present Bhutan and Maldives, all other states of South Asia are subject to such internal conflicts. The conflict resolution procedures and mechanisms vary from nation to nation. However, given the close interlinkages among the peoples of the countries of South Asia developments in one country have their reverberation in neighbouring ones. These conflicts lead to trans border movement of refugees, activists arms etc. These are perennial sources of mutual suspicion among the states and potential sources of conflict among them.

This need not be an insuperable problem in South Asia. Here again the Helsinki approach can be adopted. The SAARC nations can collectively commit themselves to each other's unity and integrity. This may not put an end to all trans-order movement of personnel and material but will serve as a confidence-building measure.

Vietnam, Afghanistan and Lebanon. Even native rulers find it increasingly difficult to govern people who are not willing to accept that rule. This is one of the reasons underlying the turbulence in many developing nations. In a densely populated area like the subcontinent the probability of war serving as an instrument of policy is, therefore, negligible.
In today's world many factors of inhibitions and norms have developed which have created certain amount of self-deterrence in the behaviour of nations, though there continue to be breaches of these norms of behaviour. It is these norms more than any security mechanisms which ensure that small nations survive in this world of nuclear-armed mighty powers.

The Pakistanis believe that India as disproportionately stronger and larger power will impose its hegemony on Pakistan. Most Indians have not entirely got over the suspicion that Pakistan may still thing that military force can be used as an instrument of policy and that Pakistan is waiting for a chance to harm India in whatever manner feasible. Neither India nor Pakistan can successfully use military force to its advantage as an instrument of policy against the other. The Iran-Iraq war demonstrates the facility of use of force as did the 1965 war between Pakistan and India. Nor can India exercise any hegemony on its neighbour, and so far no one has presented a persuasive case or scenario on it. Such perception is usually based on an inapt analogy with the behavior pattern of certain other major powers and their neighbours.

Various measures have been suggested to address this issue of mutual suspicion and fear. It is obvious that the mutual security perceptions between India and Pakistan are not determined merely by levels of forces but by the state of political relations and political perceptions. For instance when Prime Minister Bhutto expanded the Pakistani armed forces by 60 percent between
1972 and 1977, there were no adverse comments or perceptions in India. As
the regime in Pakistan changed the perception in India changed perhaps
influenced by historical memories-though this was the period of the Janata
government initiated the $1.8 billion arms deal with the Soviet Union. The
reason for this was that in spite of the exchange of pleasant rhetoric, the
expectations raised by the normalisation of relations between the two
countries 1976 were not fulfilled in terms of expansion of trade and
increased interaction between them. The change of regime in Pakistan
produced an adverse perception and political relations sharply deteriorated
following the developments in Afghanistan.

Similar suspicion and distrust prevail on the nuclear issue as well
between the two countries. The fact that Pakistan has offered a mutual
inspection proposal and nuclear weapon free zone proposal to India
highlights that India's bonafides in regards to its not having built up a
nuclear arsenal are accepted. This is further confirmed by the fact that the
US has not invoked against India the symington amendment-which it has
against Pakistan, and subsequently waived indefinitely. The US
Administration is also not willing to furnish annual certificate to its congress
as demanded by it about Pakistan not making efforts to develop a nuclear
weapon. These signals from the US, a total absence of literature on
Pakistan's plans for peaceful use of enriched uranium and reports of
clandestine acquisition equipment and materials relating to nuclear effort in
contravention of export regulations of several nations have generated intense
suspicions in India on the nature of the Pakistani programme. The Pakistani offers made so far, instead of contributing to confidence building, have created additional problems of credibility.

Here again the political approach is easily available but has not been availed of. Instead, the emphasis has been wrongly laid on an arms control approach, Indian has rejected under total national concensus, the Non-Proliferation Treaty. No Indian Government will be in a position to accept the NPT through the back door in the form of nuclear weapon free zone safeguards and mutual inspections etc. Though India has not stocked up a nuclear arsenal, it has its concerns vis-a-vis a nuclear China. This factor cannot be overlooked by any Government which wants to build up mutual confidence with India, especially when there are suspicions on a China-Pakistan nuclear collaboration. The Pakistani may loudly protest that all these are not true. In the light of the waiver of the symington amendment, the US Administration's inability to certify to the Congress that Pakistan is not making the nuclear weapon and the extensive debate in the American Press on the alleged China-Pak nuclear collaboration the burden of proof that Pakistan is not engaged in nuclear weapon development is on Pakistan and the US. Mere statement by the US that Pakistan has not reached weapon capability or by Pakistani leaders that they are not engaged in weapons development will not do.

Pakistan might turn round and say that they have similar ground to suspect India. Let them then say so. If they did, there would be no point in
their making the offer on nuclear weapon free zone or natural inspection. If they suspected India of having a few weapons then they could not be serious in making these offers. They would then amount to only propaganda plays. As pointed out earlier in respect of conventional arms, in this case also weapons by themselves will not create tensions, but the politics underlying them do. Without attempting to disarm India of its nuclear option vis-a-vis China, Pakistan can take advantage of the identities in approaches between India and Pakistan on the various aspects of nuclear issues in the international fora and other to join India in a renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons and declaring their use and threat of use as crimes against humanity. China and the Soviet Union have also voted for the adoption of a convention to out law the use of nuclear weapons. Such convention in respect of chemical weapons adopted in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 has by and large been successful notwithstanding the reason use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War. Such a convention can also address India's concerns vis-a-vis China even as it can Pakistan's concerns vis-a-vis India. In addition to such a convention there can be bilateral agreement between India and Pakistan that their respective nuclear capabilities will not be directed against each other—they will not attack each other's nuclear installations and they will not use chemical weapons against each other. On all these issues the two countries have identical views.

There are other security issues between the countries of Asia and extra regional powers. Pakistan has a security problem arising out of the
Soviet presence in Afghanistan. India has a security problem in the Chinese development of forces in Tibet and the Chinese projection of forces in Southeast Asia. The US presence in the Indian ocean area, with US central command with its operational jurisdiction encompassing Pakistan, has security implications for the subcontinent. The British Indian imperial security policy for the subcontinental region envisage three buffers (i) to keep the Russians out of Afghanistan (ii) to keep the Chinese off Tibet though recognising their suzerainty over it, and (iii) to keep the Indian ocean free of all external natives. All the three buffers are now gone. Therefore it becomes necessary for the nations of the subcontinent to pool their resources rather than countervail each other.

It is unrealistic to envisage, in the light of the economic and political realities on the ground, that the South nations will arrive at a common security perspective in the near future in the manner of the EEC, CMEA or ASEAN. It will be self-defeating and counterproductive if the countries adopt the arms control approach and freeze adversarial relations among themselves and try to manage, control and regulate an arms race in the region. An even whose folly will be attempts at disarming each other against extra regional power. The only sensible course is to intimate political dialogues to improve our political relations, formulate and implement mutual confidence-building measures and step up intro-subcontinental trade and economic cooperation and people to people contact to get over the
distrust and suspicion. Hopefully over period of time the nations may be able to develop a consensus on a security perspective.

The SAARC is a good beginning and a political commitment. It attempts to build on mutually beneficial areas of collaboration that have been identified, and seeks to enlarge on those areas of collaboration. Increasing contacts among officials have served to build up a level of confidence and increasing interaction. At the political level it should help to strengthen and consolidate such mutual confidence.