CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS AND TRENDS

The foreign policy of India has had its critics, both within India and abroad. In order to evaluate the policy properly, it will be useful to have some idea of these criticisms: (1) India's policy has not been really nonaligned and independent; it has been, according to some, pro-West, and according to others pro-Soviet; (Russia); (2) the vital interests of India have not been advanced by the foreign policy, and (3) the Indian approach to peace ignores the place of criticism that India has not been really nonaligned is meaningless, as India is or is not in a political or military alliance. It is point of fact that India has not concluded a political or military alliance; with any country.¹ The criticism itself needs an explanation and this can perhaps be best done by citing some examples. George Meany "felt stronger than ever that Jawaharlal Nehru is an agent of the Soviet Union, and I hope to see him and tell him so to this face."² J.B. Kripalani, a former President of the Indian National Congress, and S.K. Patil, a former member of the Cabinet, have said that the tendency of the Government of India to be more nonaligned in favour of the Communist bloc is to be regretted.³ "...with regard to the view point of the Government of India on what it regards as

¹ Nehru's statement in the Rajya Sabha on 8 December, 1959, Rajya Sabha Debates, Col.171-72.
deplorable, the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China cannot but consider it as having been affected by foreign influences hostile to China in Tibet and hence expresses its deep regret.4 "In foreign policy, India is being progressively drawn into the orbit of the Anglo-American block."5

What the critics really mean is that though professedly independent, India's foreign policy was in fact pro-Soviet or pro-American. It is interesting to note that Prime Minister Nehru himself sensed this reaction though he maintained that such criticisms had been made because foreigners could not make out what we were aiming at: "There was a suspicion in the minds of one group that really we were allied to the other group in secret, though we were trying to hide that fact and the other group thought that we were allied to the first group in secret though we were trying to hide the fact."6

It is unnecessary to examine these criticisms here as, from all accounts, India's nonalignment policy which was misunderstood up to 1956 is now clearly understood in the West.7 With the passage of time, both groups have been convinced that India's policy has really been independent,

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5 New Times. (Moscow), 12 January 1949, p. 11.
6 Nehru in the constituent Assembly (Legislative), 4 December 1947. Constituent Assembly (Legislative) Debates, Col.14.11.5.47/904, p. 1261.
7 Alan de Rusett. On Understanding Indian Foreign Policy, International Relations (London), April 1959.
and indeed that the pursuit of an Independent policy by a state like India is advantageous from some points of view.

Indian critics of nonalignment strike a different note: in applying the principle of nonalignment in the case of the Soviet Union and China, India has been weak and afraid to take the risk of displeasing them.8 Thus, India’s “condemnation of Russian action in Hungary in 1956 was so halting and belated that it lost its merit. We were more forthright in condemning British, French, and Israeli action in Egypt, and also American and British action in West Asia, when troops were landed in Lebanon and Jordan. In the case of Tibet ...our attitude from the beginning has been in contradiction with (sic!) our avowed principles. It has had the appearance of weakness and opportunism, of purchasing Chinese friendship at the cost of Tibet.”9

The criticism that India’s foreign policy has not advanced its vital interests became somewhat vocal when the news of China’s occupation of Indian territory became public in 1959. It may be summarized in the words of J.B. Kripalani:

Whatever may have been the failings of the congress Party government in international affairs, it could always with some justification show that it had added to the prestige and standing of India in the international world. But all this prestige did not advance any vital interests of India or diminish tension on her borders. Our relations with Pakistan are

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as strained as ever. The Kashmir issue remains internationally confused. In the case of the tiny Portuguese imperial possessions in India, no progress has been made; indeed, the situation has deteriorated. On her northern frontier, India allowed the annihilation of the buffer kingdom of Tibet without a protest; we have recognized the legitimacy of the Chinese claim there. The question of the citizenship of Indian nationals domiciled for decades in Ceylon still hangs fire. There is no improvement of our relations with South Africa.\textsuperscript{10}

The facts are not disputed. Naturally, the blame is attributed to the policy of the government, or to its implementation, which has not, in particular, prevented the occupation of one-third of Kashmir, and thousands of square miles of territory elsewhere, by foreign countries. This is all the more so as the Indian people are, to a man, convinced that India's case in Kashmir and in respect of Indian territory taken by China is just without any doubt; the documentation on the subject is complete.\textsuperscript{11}

Indian approach to peace, at any rate in early years after independence upto 1962, ignored the critical place of power in politics is pointed out more especially by Western critics who believe in the balance of power as the effective principle to international politics. This argument has been stated admirably by Alan de Rusett. Power held in reserve has been, through history, the central factor in preserving peace. No doubt, the balance of

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., p.49.

\textsuperscript{11} White Papers (I-XII) on Sino-Indian Border Dispute. New Delhi, Ministry of External Affairs, 1962.
power system is not the best way of maintaining peace, a world government being the ideal. But, in the absence of either a balance of power or a world government, the will to negotiate vanishes when all can freely choose between negotiation and the violent achievement of their ends. The Indian approach to peace – the Panchsheel, the enlargement of the area of peace, and emphasis on the role of the United Nations for the tasks of peace, rather than of war-ignores the vital lesson of historical experience.  

The Government of India's earlier view (before 1962), as expressed by its spokesmen, is somewhat as follows. The balance of power, whether it was useful or not to maintain peace in the pre-atomic age, cannot preserve peace in the atomic age. Such precarious peace as it was able to maintain in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries was due to the prevalence of an intellectual and moral consensus in the European society at that time, and to the existence of some four to six not unequal Powers with one Power (Britain) who was able, so to say, to keep the balance. A deeper analysis would indicate that the military balance is "a slender reed" to lean upon for two reasons: historically, it is an ironical but demonstrable conclusion that nations which have armed themselves to preserve the peace have seldom been able to avoid war, if only because reason cannot always control political passions and, even if it does, accidents play a part in the shaping of events. And, secondly a nuclear stalemate can continue to be a stalemate only so long as the two nations, who possess the destructive weapons,

continue always to be equal in their power. Such as assumption can be valid only if technology is stabilized. But we know for certain that this is far from being the case where the development of weapons is concerned.

In these circumstances, India would subscribe to the view expressed by the President of the Bandung Conference, Ali Sastranamidjojo. 13 "We know well from the lessons of history that power politics, with an uneasy balance of power in its wake, cannot guarantee peace but will lead sooner or later to war," which, with the hydrogen bomb may, in Einstein's view, lead to the annihilation of any life on earth. 14

Hence, the Indian approach to peace, which is to explore, more fully than was perhaps necessary in an earlier age, the potentialities of negotiation and other means of peaceful settlement of conflict and to promote the active peaceful cooperation between states and agreements on non-aggression and mutual respect. If it be asked, "is your system likely to succeed, can you rely in it?" The answer, in the words of India's spokesman in the United Nations General Assembly, V.K. Krishna Menon, is:

With great respect, we are entitled to ask: have the other system succeeded? Can anybody turn round to us and say that the doctrine of the balance of power is more likely to help us. The statement of a great Frenchman, Rousseau, who said that the strongest is never strong enough to

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13 Asian–African Conference, New Delhi, Information Service of Indonesia, 1955, p.34.
be always master unless he transfers strength into right and obedience into duty is important.\textsuperscript{15}

It appears to us that India's foreign policy is on the cross-roads, not in the sense in which some members of the Indian Parliament viewed it—substitution of alignment for nonalignment—but in the more fundamental sense of finding adequate sanctions for a policy based on Panchsheel. A vicious circle, so to say, develops in the argument the application of force in a nuclear age to achieve peace is a contradiction in terms, in so far as it may lead to total destruction; it is against the principle of equality of means and ends. A limited war, it is agreed by experts, has the potentiality of developing into a global war. If an aggressor is amenable to reason, negotiation will succeed; if he is not, he gets away with the fruits of his aggression, and therefore the application of force is called for to prevent a result which is undesirable. It seems that vicious circle may be broken on one difficult assumption only. That assumption is that mankind, groping in the dark for a solution, may accept, in William James' telling phrase, a moral alternative to war, the alternative preached and practised by Mahatma Gandhi and a number of idealists before him, i.e., non-violence-resisting force by love and by self-sacrifice.

It seems true, therefore, that in some respects, the vital interest of India have not been adequately advanced by New Delhi's foreign policy and its implementation—a criticism which will, however, apply with equal force

\textsuperscript{15} U.N. General Assembly. Official Records, 3 February 1962, p.244.
to the foreign policies of many aligned nations as well. It is, however, too
one-sided and pessimistic a conclusion that India's foreign policy has no
achievements to its credit. Only history can measure the success which has
attended the foreign policy of a country during a particular period. Twenty-
five years are in any case too brief a period for taking stock of a dynamic
and revolutionary situation. Further, it is an obvious fact that such success as
any country sees in the fulfilment of its aims is due to the cooperation of
several like-minded states and to several other facts among which its efforts
is just one. Viewed against this background, several policies supported by
India have gained wide acceptance. There is a growing realization of the
urgency of international action in developing underdeveloped countries,
economically and socially; there is increasing participation of Asian and
African states in international councils; and world public opinion has almost
unanimously accepted the undesirability of colonialism and racialism.

While India's efforts in some directions of its foreign policy are
bearing fruit, we are still far away from an assurance of world peace. It is
clear that there are still many trouble spots in Asia and elsewhere; besides,
disarmament and the banning of nuclear explosions are yet to be agreed
upon. Self-government has still to be achieved by some dependent peoples;
racialism remains alive, more particularly in Africa. Indian territory
occupied by Pakistan and China has to be regained and a durable peace with
Pakistan established. Normal relations with China have to be achieved. It
seems to us that the first lesson that naturally dawns on us is that it is better,
for the time being, that the problems of India and the neighbouring regions of South, Southeast and West Asia have a priority in our foreign policy in preference to those of the world at large. Since 1971, India’s image has, clearly, improved; there is increasing realization that India is not so weak as it was earlier thought to be. Nevertheless, until India’s performance in the economic front improves, its image abroad must continue to remain not very flattering. A recent World Bank survey lists India as taking the 102nd place among the 122 countries listed in regard to per capita income.  

That the Government of India has been aware, for some six years now, of the need for greater emphasis in their foreign policy on India’s neighbours in South and southeast Asia is clear from a statement made by the Minister of States for External Affairs in the Lok Sabha on 4 April, 1968 and cited earlier in this book. He said that the Government had been devoting much more attention to India’s relations with its neighbours in South and Southeast Asia during the last few years; bilateral talks had been developed with Burma and Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, Laos and Cambodia and with the Philippines in the region; a large number of scholarships and training facilities had been offered, and a small beginning made in starting joint ventures to strengthen economic and cultural relations with these countries. The shift is also symbolized by the fact that in recent years, India’s top leaders including (the late) President Zakir Hussain, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the (then) Deputy Prime Minister Morarji Desai and

the (the) Minister of External Affairs M.C. Changla visited one or more countries in the region.

Jawaharlal Nehru, as Foreign Minister, depended on three means for achieving India's security; a peaceful, as distinguished from a power, approach to the solution of international problems, nonalignment and friendship with all countries. It will be relevant to ask if experience of the last twenty-five years (including continued occupation of parts of our territory by China and Pakistan) justifies the continued dependence on them for security.

Since 1962, according to available information, the lesson has been learnt, a higher place has been given to military power and the weakness in India's military preparedness to defend its security has been made up. According to those who should know, "we have gained confidence over the years that our military potential is adequate – if not to deter war against Pakistan, certainly to ensure a favourable outcome in the event, even if only marginally", the war with Pakistan in December 1971 proved that this forecast made on 1 September 1969 was correct. Again, "Indian forces", said Robert McNamara in 1969, "have more fire-power per man than the Chinese, and with vastly improved communications and transportation can move quickly to reinforce critical areas. The Indian forces deployed forward are much larger than they were in 1962 when the Chinese attacked."  

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17 D.K. Palit in *The Hindustan Times*, 1 September 1969.
In our view, however, there is still one lacunae: China has produced the hydrogen bomb and is known to be perfecting it as well as making the missiles necessary to carry it across to the enemies' territory. What is India to do?

Everyone of us knows the present decision of the Government of India, viz., on the one hand, it has announced its present intention not to make the bomb; on the other, it has also not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which has been signed by some 102 states, thus keeping open the option to make the bomb.

To take the Treaty, first. If India signs the Treaty in its present form, first, it will have no option to make the atom bomb if, in the dynamic international situation, it later considers it essential in its national interest to make it. India's position among non-nuclear-weapon states is, in this regard, peculiar. China is not friendly to it; its international boundary touches India's; it has the bomb; it is not likely to be a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Pakistan's attitude is not known; if Pakistan also does not sign the Treaty, collusion between Pakistan and China is one of the few guesses in international policies which may prove right. Pakistan too has declined to sign the NPT; according to authoritative US sources (as of the middle to 1984), Pakistan is on the verge of making or exploding a nuclear bomb.

If India does not sign the Treaty, five consequences may be envisaged:
First, it may be isolated from the international community. The large majority of members of the United Nations, it is now clear, will sign the Treaty; India will be in a minority of, say, half-a-dozen states which will not sign the Treaty.

Second, it has been argued, India’s image abroad will suffer, for, having repeatedly announced to the world that India is interested in nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only, not signing the Treaty will give rise to the suspicion that it has some mental reservations on the matter.

Thirdly, the possibility is there that cooperation of nations already advanced in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes may not be available to us in the same measure as to the signatories to the Treaty. This possibility arises from one of the provisions of the Treaty which says that parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other states or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear weapon states party to the Treaty.

Fourth, will economic aid be denied to us by friendly nations if we do not sign the Treaty? The Prime Minister declared in Parliament that we will face such a possibility. Our view is that the question does not arise, so long as India does not make nuclear weapons. The American Secretary of State is reported to have stated that aid would be denied to those states which go nuclear. Since India has not decided to go nuclear, it is a reasonable guess
that aid need not be denied merely because India does not sign the Treaty.

Fifth, will diplomatic relations with friendly countries like the United States and the Soviet Union be affected as they have sponsored the draft treaty. It is hard to tell. These big countries are likely to understand the special position of India – in relation to China; and in any case, so long as India remains non-nuclear, there should not be a serious fear of diplomatic unfriendliness. The Soviet Union's primary interest in the Treaty is, it should be clear to any one, to bind West Germany to remain non-nuclear.

On balance, therefore, it appears to us that the present decision of the Government of India is the best in the circumstances. It need only be added that any wise Government will immediately step up the acquisition of the scientific and the technical know-how needed to produce the bomb without avoidable delay when a decision is taken to make it, for in a dynamic international situation one cannot predict when it may be required to produce the bomb as a deterrent.

A properly coordinated foreign and defence policy should start with the dictum of Robert McNamara that defence policy has "only one purpose, and that is to act as the servant of foreign policy." This would imply that (i) national security demands that it is the task of diplomacy to secure national objectives without war if possible, and (ii) if that fails, national security demands, too, that the objectives be achieved by bringing the armed forces into the picture. The coordination needed is for the Ministry of External Affairs to judge (1) how far the objectives could be achieved without using
the military arm, and (2) when that arm would have to be used for the armed forces to be ready when called upon to execute their task with the optimum efficiency. "To be ready when called upon" implies a lot of homework at leisure keeping in touch with the Ministries of Defence and External Affairs; in particular it should be the job of the Chiefs of Staff to study the Report of the Joint Intelligence Committee which is under them, assess it and make recommendations. Maj. Gen. D.K. Palit has also pointed out one more objective for the diplomatic wing: it must aim at providing "a minimum buffer period of preparation during which national security can convert from a largely political programme to one of defence by military potential."^{19}

The existing machinery for coordination of defence and foreign policies comprises: (1) A regular meeting of the Joint Chief of Staff Committee, the senior-most among them functioning as its Chairman; the "Chairman has been given the right to see the Defence Minister whenever he desires and also the Prime Minister in his capacity as the Chairman of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet. (2) The Defence Minister's Committee which is composed of the Service Chiefs, the Defence Secretary, the Financial Adviser (Defence) and frequently the Defence Science Adviser. Important matters of policy are considered by the Committee. (3) The Defence Committee of the Cabinet which is composed of the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister (when there is one), the Defence Minister, the Home Minister and the Minister for External Affairs. The Defence

^{19} S.S. Khera, India's Defence Problem, New Delhi, 1968, p.217.
Committee considers matters brought up before it by the Defence Ministry and takes broad policy decisions.

It has been suggested\textsuperscript{20} that a National Security Council consisting of the five Ministers mentioned above, the three Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Intelligence, the Cabinet Secretary and the Secretaries of the Ministries concerned be the top deciding body in matters of defence policy.

A number of cobwebs have to be cleared up, we suggest, before one can go to the heart of the matter. First, is nonalignment a matter of policy or one of principle? Jawaharlal Nehru told the Rajya Sabha on 10 September 1959: “The Present government will hold to nonalignment because it is a matter of principle, not of opportunism or the convenience of the day.” We do not agree. In our view, nonalignment is a means to be used when it helps to achieve the end of foreign policy, but to be discarded when it does not help to achieve that end.

Second, what constitutes nonalignment? We have earlier stated Nehru’s view: it means for him not only not entering into military alliances with members of either block in the cold War, but not entering into military alliance with any nation. “It means trying to view things, as far as possible, not from the military point of view.”

Nehru’s understanding of nonalignment proceeds, technically, from the view that being a member of a military block in the Cold War precludes

\textsuperscript{20} K. Subrahmanyam in \textit{The Hindustan Times} (New Delhi), 6 July 1969.
the possibility of a real independence in the approach to foreign policy problems and of a genuine friendship with nations outside the membership of the bloc of which a nation is a member; it is also a product of a distrust of militarism, of power politics which has been the main characteristic of international politics so far. In his view, being apart from military blocs, a community of non-aligned nations would help to rid the world of militarism and fear and develop an area and a temper of peace.

The nonalignment does not preclude optimum military preparedness to meet a threat of aggression; indeed, it may be argued that a nonaligned country has to be even more militarily prepared than an aligned country, if only because, by definition a nonaligned country cannot depend upon the military strength of its allies. Nonalignment only ensures that you are not entangled in the struggles of the countries of either block and are not automatically drawn into a war initiated by either of the power blocs. It does not, by itself guarantee security.

One last point on nonalignment. We have earlier referred to the criticism that the Government of India was inclined to be more non-aligned in favour of the Communist bloc.\textsuperscript{21} There is, no doubt, some basis for the criticism, but how much basis there is, can be established only by a detailed study of voting in the United Nations by India. The United States and the Soviet Union and by a study of statements by the three countries on international issues; and until research of this kind has established the truth

of otherwise of the criticism, we must suspend our judgement.

Now, to the third means on which Nehru depended for the maintenance of India's security, viz., friendship with all countries. We have referred earlier\textsuperscript{22} to Nehru's view that a deliberate policy of friendship with other countries "goes farther in gaining security than almost anything else." It is sufficient to say that after 20 October 1962, Nehru himself was disillusioned in this respect. We have earlier cited his now-famous statement before the Conference of State Ministers of Information on 25 October 1962.

With the creation of overheads, the establishment of basic industries and the training of technical personnel, India has made some progress in economic development, which is in part due to our foreign economic policy. A recent World Bank survey states that "good deal" of progress has been made in India in the past decades of planned economic development: a "large and complex industrial structure" has been built up: the "foundations for accelerated growth in agriculture" have been laid and the national income has doubled since the inception of planned economic development in 1951.\textsuperscript{23}

The only point we would make here is that there is a growing public opinion in the country that the volume of foreign loans has reached the optimum limit, and it would not be in the national interest to increase it beyond the present amount. Economists are better qualified to deal with the

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{23} The Indian Express. 21 November 1972.
technical question; our own sympathies are with this view. That the Government of India has accepted the substance of this popular view may be seen from the speech of the President of India to the Parliament on 18 March 1967: "They have resolved to attain and sustain an adequate rate of economic growth so as to eliminate the need for external economic assistance by 1976."24

We may conclude with one observation: "The first condition of a good foreign policy is a good domestic policy"; let us hasten to add that the maxim is Prime Minister Galdstone's. A united people, well above the poverty line and bereft of the baneful influences of casteism, communalism and regionalism is the only sure base for an effective foreign policy.

Any part we want to play in world affairs depends entirely on the internal strength, unity and conditions of our country. Our views might create some impression on others for the moment but they will attach importance to our voice only in proportion to the strength they know we have. Therefore, both from the point of view of our primary needs and from the point of view of any desire, we might have to pay the first attention to our own country's affairs.25

It is to be hoped that the present Government of India, which professes to follow Nehru's principles, will count the connection between

internal strength and a fruitful foreign policy among the most important of them.

It does seem a little curious that developments in India’s foreign policy and relations during the 1990s continued to evoke the first two of the three criticisms of the developments in the previous period, namely: that India’s policy had not really been nonaligned and independent; and that the vital interests of India had not been advanced by the policy. It is noteworthy, however, that the third point of earlier criticism—that the Indian approach to peace ignored the place of power in politics—not only was not made in the past decade, but also it was said by some objective observers that India was, in fact, a little too conscious of the power factor in its role in world affairs.

That such internal party politics would intermittently continue to subject the policy of nonalignment to criticism seems now a permanent feature of India’s domestic policies—as, even, some “professional” critics of India’s policy in the Western Camp. There would be, from time to time, crises in India’s relations with the Superpowers (or problems and situations involving either of them) on which differences of views between the Ruling Party and the Opposition Parties would inevitably attract charges and counter-charges of India “tilting” its nonaligned policy towards the one or the other. This is precisely what happened when the Congress Party government which came back to power in the 1980 elections failed to take against Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as forth right a stand as was expected by some of the Opposition parties. But, after the initial criticism,
the charge of the Government being "soft" to the Soviet action has died
down. Both on this question and the question of the Indian Ocean being a
"zone of peace," the Government has taken an independent and nonaligned
position against the two Superpowers and the cold War blocs they head.

The criticism that India's foreign policy has not secured our vital
national interests is also, intermittently, aired by some critics—although less
often than used to be case in the 1950s and 1960s. The Kashmir question has
almost become a non-issue in domestic politics (for that matter, even in
international politics). The solution to the Sino-Indian border question is not
a major item on the agenda of normalization of relations between India and
China. Indian opinion is alive to any likely unfair compromise on the
question although, one ought to add in parentheses, it can only be settled on
the basis of some compromise, which it is always easy for Opposition Parties
to characterize as involving sacrifice or compromise of India's vital national
interests. During the 1970s, the charge of sacrificing India's national
interests was made mainly in connection with the solution of problems with
India's neighbours: the agreement with Pakistan on the construction of the
Salal Dam in Pakistan; the maritime border agreement with Sri Lanka
(involving the acceptance of the island of Kachchativu in Palk straits as
belonging to Sri Lanka); the signing of two separate treaties on Bangladesh
on the sharing of the Ganga waters. But one can readily exaggerate to say
that concessions to the neighbours on these agreements compromised India's
vital national interests. Objectively, they were possibly meant to be
investments in goodwill and good relations with the neighbours.

The overall result of all these developments in the 1990s is the altering among other nations of the traditional Indian image as a poverty-stricken, perennially food-begging, unhealthy, over-populated, tradition-bound, sloppy “sickman of Asia,” to that of a nation of some political, military or economic consequence in international politics and relations. Paradoxically enough, it was precisely when it had such a traditional image that India used to play (until the 1980s) a notable role in world affairs. Today, India is known as a sleeping economic giant, the fourth largest military Power (in conventional weapons), and the largest and most stable democracy in the world. The odd thing, however, is that, nowadays, India plays a much less active and important role in world affairs - for a variety of reasons, but especially because of the Government’s preoccupation with acute domestic problems, and of the standing threat to India’s security. Whether or not this is something that needs to be welcomed or regretted by Indian students of India’s foreign policy and relations, is naturally a matter of opinion or judgement.

The world is still in its early stages of specialization and hierarchical integration. At the geopolitical level, the different regions are at different stages of development. Their power and influence cannot be comparatively measured by the same criteria. They have varied attributes depending on their particular settings, including the locational presence or absence of major powers. Regional states play differing roles within their regions,
depending on their particular qualities and thus spatial and political-economic interactions with major powers and neighbours states. What helps to link the system is the drive of the less mature parts to rise to levels already achieved by the more mature sectors.

Development means greater strength and self-confidence for the individual parts. The world system since World War second has been hegemonic, characterized by attempts to regulate from the top. A more advanced system is one whose parts are more open, more capable of drawing in new energies, and more likely to find balance through self-regulation, either as the result of failure to achieve goals through war and competition on through cooperation.

The conclusions to be drawn from some geopolitical concepts and issues that have been:

1) The U.S. should unequivocally renounce the Nixon-era strategy that viewed the Sino-Soviet split as an important instrument for world equilibrium. Drawing Soviet military energies away from Europe is taking place because of the end of the Cold War, not because of the Soviet Union’s perception of an increased Chinese threat. The Soviet Union and China belong to one geo-strategic realm. We should do what we can to promote the conversion of the Sino-Soviet barrier boundary to one of accommodation and decrease the instability between the two powers. U.S. and Japanese coordination at the economic and military-levels can help. The two countries should also
adopt the collateral objective of easing tensions between Vietnam and China.

2) The U.S. has assumed the mantle of world military leadership. Germany and Japan are the cores of the Maritime realm’s two other key geopolitical regions. We should not press these most important geostrategic partners to share in the military burden, because they would surely be perceived as threats by the Soviet Union and China, leading to system destabilization. We need to reduce our military arsenals to levels that we can maintain through our own efforts and without involving Germany and Japan.

3) The U.S. should accelerate its withdrawal from many overseas bases. Air and sea technology make it possible to exercise power within the Maritime Realm without having to rely on a multitude of fixed land points. In general, land army overseas bases are unnecessary, as are nuclear weapons. Impoverished countries, whose people view us as colonial occupiers and/or are ruled by unstable regimes, are unsuitable partners. We should retain air and sea bases only where we are broadly welcomed as strategic partners, e.g., in Britain, Spain, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Turkey, Israel and Australia. Priority should also be maintained in Diego Gracie, Puerto Rico, Guam, Panama, the Azores, and Singapore. Politically vulnerable are bases in South Korea, Thailand, Guantanamo, the Philippines, Greece, Morocco, and if established, the Gulf. We should leave them.
4) In geopolitically independent South Asia, the U.S. should recognize the primacy of India as the core of the region. India's concerns over our military alliance with Pakistan are legitimate. This alliance drove India into the arms of the Soviet Union.

5) The Middle East Shatterbelt could shift to the Maritime World. However, this will not happen if America seeks to impose a PAXAMERICANA on the region. Maritime Europe must be treated as a full military and political partner in all U.S. efforts to achieve security in the Gulf, to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, and to restore peace in Lebanon. If there is a compelling strategic reasons for relocating the Forward Headquarter of the U.S. Central Command to Bahrain and placing a brigade in Saudi Arabia, there is even more compelling a reason to make this an allied effort. With two cooperating balancers and respect for Soviet concerns, the swing of the regional seesaw would be moderated substantially.

6) In our foreign aid priorities, we should give special attention to Gateway regions and states. These are areas with great promise for integrating and stabilizing the global system.

   Political systems that unravel so quickly are indeed cause for concern. The basis for this unraveling, the popular urge and will for democratic and human rights, also offers the hope that novel, more responsive systems are in process of being forged that will speedily contribute to a new, more stable, and peaceful map of the world.
There is hardly any doubt that the politics of mistrust and suspicion continue to reign supreme in the subcontinent and despite it stifling progress and normalisation of relations, political elites on both sides of the border have continued in a seemingly unchanging manner. India predominates Pakistan politics, and vice versa. but this predomination is based more on hatred and has become an important component of power politics, specially in the troika in Islamabad.

The future of India-Pakistan relations does not augur well, specially in the merging world order. Both countries seem out of tune with the existing priorities, and the danger of not reacting to increasing pressures will invite international opprobrium or make the international community forget the region as a lost cause. Both the countries, despite the political overlay of hate, have made progress and there is hope that the CBMs could be built upon in an incremental manner.

The United Nations, like the League, has proved ineffective as a check on national power. The reasons are three-fold.

First, the veto provision which was written into the Charter at the insistence of the Soviet Union and the United States ensures that it there were any collective security action, it could not be directed against any one of the Big Five, but could be directed only against lesser Powers. The only known instance of an application of collective security measures—in 1950 against North Korea— is no true example, as the decision to such action was
taken by the Security Council at a time when the Soviet Union was absent from the meeting, and as the collective action which was taken was collective in name only, as the predominant share was that of the United States.

Second, the forward commitment of which we spoke has not come into existence, for the special agreement which were to be made between the Security Council and member nations have not been concluded. The reasons is that the Military Staff Committee, consisting of the Chiefs of Staff of the Big Five, was not able to agree on the details necessary for the conclusion of the agreements between the Security Council and member nations; and they were not able to agree because of the Cold War (which we shall discuss later).

The third reason for the ineffectiveness of the United Nations as a check on national power is that the Superpowers have a nuclear capacity which can hardly be met by contributions from member states: the nature of power has changed.

India took the lead on global nuclear disarmament and was aiming the countries responsible for inscribing it on the UN agenda in the mid-fifties. Our view point was that nuclear weapons were inherently destabilizing and that the sooner the planet was rid of the last nuclear weapon, the better it would be for the security of the whole world.

Our position has been endorsed by the NAM Heads of State at their
last Summit in Colombia. The International Court of Justice recognised the pursuit and conclusion of negotiations on nuclear disarmament as the obligation upon all states. All over the world, major non-governmental organisations and former armed forces personnel are calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

The nexus between national interests and foreign policy is a running thread in the evolution of foreign policy, whether of India or of any other country. This should not lead us to believe that ideas play no role. Ideas and even ideals have their place and there is no need to snigger at them. Unprincipled pursuit of what might be considered immediate, narrow national interests can often be counter-productive. When you are functioning in a milieu, in which some 150 countries in the world are simultaneously trying to advance their interests, you must strive for the best possible harmonization under any given circumstances, Jawaharlal called it “enlightened self-interest”.

Nevertheless, in the final analysis, all said and done, foreign policy remains anchored to perceived national interests. It cannot be otherwise when some hundred and four-score and more sovereign states are operating in the international arena, some big and powerful, some big but not so powerful, some powerful but not necessarily very big, a large number small and weak. Internationalism has nor triumphed over nationalism. There can be cases when internationalism may win a victory here or there because a
country could be convinced of higher gains in the long run. but it is
inconceivable that in the foreseeable future countries would cease
functioning as national entities and that national considerations would not
generally override the appeal of internationalism.

Foreign policy is not the enactment of a morality play. Generally,
foreign policy stumbles through, and then, is significantly influenced by a
country's experiences. Perhaps one can even generalize that foreign policy is
the summation of experience in international relations of a country at a
certain given period of time.