CHAPTER III

KING FAISAL: THE ARCHITECT OF SAUDI FOREIGN POLICY
The period covering the thesis saw one of the dynamic and foresighted Kings Faisal Ibn Abdul Aziz. He was a devout and practising Muslim, born in 1904, his world view was heavily influenced by Islamic ideology. Two significant events have far reaching effects on both his early upbringing and his public life. The first was the premature death of his eldest brother Tarki Ibn Abdul Aziz Faisal's next elder brother Saud Ibn Abdul Aziz was not so competent like him. Due to this he was entrusted with duties which would have been the privilege of the eldest son, had he been alive, or of the second after the death of the first had he show equal competence.

The second event was his mother's early death, which brought Faisal under the care of his maternal grand father a man known for his piety. This grand-father was a descendent of Mohammad Ibn Abdul Wahab, who had entered into an alliance with grand saud, the founder of the dynasty. It was in the tradition of this family that Faisal grew-up he learned to recite the Quran before he could read well, and he studied the prophet's traditions.

However it was from his father that he received his training for public life. While still a child in his maternal grand father's house, his father would take him out on some small outings. Remarks about men and public affairs

opened his eyes, and he began to mature early in life. From early childhood, Faisal combined an appreciation of reality about human affairs which had an imprint on Saudi Foreign Policy.

Faisal’s experience in Foreign affairs began long before he ascended the throne in 1964. His exposure to the intricacies of international politics began with his official visit to England in 1919, when he was barely fourteen years old. Faisal was given the opportunity to represent his father as head of the Saudi delegation in London at the celebration of the Allied Victory in World War-I. He was also present at the negotiations during this visit over various issues between the two countries. He remained in Europe for several months during which, as well as in subsequent exposures he achieved a working knowledge of other languages. King Abdul Aziz, being unable to leave his country at that crucial juncture, informed the British government that he would send one of his sons. Since Turki, his eldest son, had died a year before, he named Faisal rather than Saud to represent him. The selection of Faisal may be regarded as a sign of his father’s appreciation of his potential capacity his dignity and self-possession to act his representative in a foreign country.

Another important task given to Faisal was political and administrative. He was made the viceroy of the Hijaz and minister of foreign Affairs in 1930.

5. Belling Willard A; Ed; op.cit p.9.
post he held—except for a brief period in 1960 for the rest of his life. These were important responsibilities which were conferred on him by his father, king Abdul Aziz, since his diplomatic abilities had been widely noticed. Before as well as after he became the Foreign Minister, he travelled to Europe, (in 1926, 1932 and 1939), including an official visit to the Soviet Union.

It is obvious that foreign policy was the most favourite subject to king Faisal and consequently it was in the field of foreign affairs that his true interests and talent's lay that is why since World War-II his foreign travels, both before and after he became king, became frequent covering almost all important regions of the World. There was no doubt, even before the death of his father in 1953, that Faisal had become the most experienced member of the house of Saud. If it can be asserted that king Abdul Aziz was the founder and architect of the nation building of modern Saudi Arabia, it can be equally asserted that king Faisal was the architect of the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia. 7

Faisal, on becoming King and Prime Minister in 1964, formed a new council of Ministers and became the ultimate source and final authority in all matters related to foreign policy. It followed that nobody had to inquire about the source of any foreign policy decision and the extent of its compatibility with the basic elements of the country's policy. This centrality in king Faisal's approach to foreign policy making was an extension of his approach to internal politics. His domestic policies since he returned to the Prime Ministership in

1962 reflected his concern with accommodating the opposing forces of tradition and modernity. In that he was essentially a gradualist, limiting the rate of change to that which the traditional Islamic order can accommodate.\(^8\)

In spite of having unlimited power, Faisal's centrality in foreign policy decision-making was not based solely on personal initiative nor was purely individualist in nature; it was the end result of a careful process of consultations with whatever close advisory and administrative apparatus the government possessed. There were many bodies which were used to assist directly in the making of foreign policy. Also, there were more than one advisors to the King i.e. Prince Nawwaf Ibn Abdul Aziz and Dr. Rashid Pharaon, on whom he used to rely in different foreign policy matters.

One of those bodies was the High Committee which comprised a number of the Royal Family who occupy key positions in the government. The king used to refer to this committee all vital and strategic matters in foreign policy which had a bearing on the national security of the country. The Committee's role was to study these matters and present its recommendations and whatever course of action it might deem advisable.

Most of the matter related to foreign affairs, e.g., agreements and treaties, were discussed and studied by the council of Ministers before they were presented to the king for his final approval,\(^9\) and all matters pertinent to Saudi

\(^8\) Vincent Sheean, "King Faisal's First Year," \textit{Foreign Affairs}, 44, No. 2 (January 1966), P. 306

Arabia's petroleum policy, e.g., the level of production and prices, were referred to the Supreme Council on Petroleum. Faisal was also a strong believer in specialization. All his decisions whether in domestic or foreign policy were based on carefully prepared studies and/or recommendations provided by various governments departments. For example, defense and armament issues were referred to the Ministry of Defense, border problems to the Minister of Interior, loans and financial aid to the ministry of Finance and National Economy.

Apart from these, there were some personal characteristics which must be taken into account in order to analyse king Faisal's policies. For example, he was known for his ability to insist on what he believed was right, regardless of the degree of opposition he might encounter. His attitude toward the Yemeni dispute, his call for Islamic solidarity and his strong opposition to Zionism, were examples of the reflection of these characteristics on his foreign policy attitudes. Furthermore, he believed that not to take a decision is better than to make a wrong one.

One of the main characteristics was faisal's realistic approach to international politics. This realistic approach was motivated by his experience in foreign affairs and his living through many international political events of great importance. His realism was also reflected in foreign policy by his precise evaluation of the country's capabilities. He realised the danger awaiting a state which assumes a role larger than its capabilities.

Faisal was not a revolutionary leader by temperament and upbringing. He had studied the Islamic religion and Arab Tribal and customary lore and took pride in this heritage. This attitude represented one of the important points of disagreement between the "revolutionary" camp in the Arab World led by colonel Naser of Egypt and the moderate led by him. He was also aware that he was the leader of a country that revered religious values and regarded itself bound by the sacred law.\textsuperscript{11} He was, therefore, not prepared to break completely with the past or to accept purely secular legislation which would be a threat to the monarchy and traditional polity. That is why in 1962, even before his becoming the king of Saudi Arabia, he announced a ten-point programme in which upholding the Islamic principles was discussed at length.

King Faisal believed that the conduct of foreign policy is an intricate and delicate process. Therefore, it should be approached with carefulness, proper training and mental and psychological preparedness. More importantly, it requires a clear distinction between what and what should be. He also believed that foreign policy should be executed through quiet diplomacy and should be based on realistic evaluation and analysis of the situation rather than on emotions.\textsuperscript{12}


When king Faisal began to take responsibility for public affairs, he was engaged in a thorough and realistic evaluation of the country's conditions and capabilities. He soon discovered that the country was deeply entrenched in hereditary tribalism. It was a vast country, like a continent, and yet it was almost devoid of the basic infrastructure necessary for developmental. As a result of his understanding of the country's conditions Faisal realised that the development of this country should enmate from its actual circumstances. He declared that Saudi Arabia is a Sovereign Arab-Muslim state. Its constitution is the Koran and the Hadith, the King-Imam should assume supreme responsibility for his subject.

The unique attributes of decision-makers, their mental and psychological makeup-play a vital role in the final determination for foreign policy. Consequently their decisions may depend in part upon their attitudes towards foreign statement they know, but, more importantly, these decisions are greatly influenced by their ideological conception of world. Faisal was a keen student of history in general and Islamic history in particular. The Islamic conception of the world and the international system of Islam greatly influenced his thinking and the development of his theory of international relations.

Faisal's foreign policy was based on a number of principles from which he never swerved. These principles were: the spread of Islam, and its use to

enhance Saudi Arabia's influence in the world; a pathological hatred of communism and by extension of anything progressive, since these were associated in his mind with atheism; hatred of Zionism; and finally the maintenance of the alliance with the United States.  

The application of these principles is easy to see in the foreign policy pursued under his control. Having taken over in the midst of a period of conflict with Egypt, during his first years, Faisal concentrated on improving Saudi Arabia domestic situation, whilst managing to maintain cool but cordial relations with Nasser. But by the time Yemen War broke out and Faisal was once again put in charge of a situation bungled by his predecessor, he had for years tolerated daily broadcast about his country entitled 'Enemies of God' on Cairo's Voice of the Arabs, in which the regime was virulently attacked by Nassesists and other opponents.

The hostility between Saudi Arabia and Egypt which had been simmering in the late 1950's exploded after the creation of the Yemen Arab Republic in 1962 and the beginning of the Civil War. Egypt sent troops and weapons to the Yemeni republicans and threatened to bring down the Saudi monarchy; and Faisal, in alliance with king Hussein of Jordan, supported the Imam. Both the leaders had their prestige at stake: Nasser could not want to abandon the Yemen since his leadership of the Arab world had already taken a blow with the breakup of the United Arab Republic in 1961; and Faisal, with his position strengthened at homes was developing hopes of turning Saudi Arabia into a dominant force in

the Arab and Islamic world, which was then dominated by nationalists: Nasser in Egypt and Qasim in Iraq.  

The Yemen war brought Nasser of Egypt and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia in direct conflict. It also provided the backdrop for the diplomatic initiative which took place in the coming years. Nasser's tool was the Arab League which, founded in 1945 had since he came to power become an instrument of Egyptian ascendancy in the Arab world. Through its auspices he set up the first two Arab Leaders Summits in Cairo and Alexandria in 1964, during which he discussed the Yemen issue with Faisal. Given the trend in the Arab world in favour of progressive regimes, these summits were likely to adopt political positions influenced by Nasser which Faisal would regard as anti-Islam and procommunist, so Faisal responded by trying rival summitary.

In December 1965 Faisal and the Shah of Iran launched the idea of an International Islamic conference, and Faisal planned to visit a member of Islamic countries to promote the idea. After the fourth Arab summit in Cairo in 1966, relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia deteriorated further as Faisal encouraged other regimes to object to domination of the Arab league by one state, which everyone knew to be Egypt. In August 1966 Faisal started a series of visits to Muslim states; by the end of the year he had obtained the support of Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, Somalia and Iran. During this period the proposal for the conference was violently attacked by Nasser, who compared it to the Baghdad pact and described it 'reactionary'. Before Faisal had opportunity to

make capital of his success and get the Islamic conference off the ground, the June War 1967, broke out.

The 1967 defeat reversed the balance of forces in the Arab world. It marked the defeat of 'petty bourgeois' Arab nationalism and the strengthening of right wing regimes. This was not only due to political strengths of the ideologies but also to the relative financial power of the states involved. Egypt, the leader of the nationalists, was a poor, heavily populated country, which had already been bankrupted by the Yemeni war even before the June War and, by July 1967 was economically and politically in a shambles. Saudi Arabia, the leader of Arab Conservatism, had in recent years strengthened its financial position thanks to its increasing oil revenues, and has skillfully acquired political credibility. It was therefore, in the summer of 1967, in a position to call the tune in the Arab World.

The June 1967 defeat marked the decline of nationalist domination in the Arab world. Although Nasser lived on and there appeared to be an increase in radical policies in the following years, the good days of Arab nationalism ended with the Israeli attack. Therefore, Arab politics were dominated by Saudi Arabia and pro-US policies, and Saudi Arabia dominated the tone of negotiations. The Khartoum Islamic Summit Conference in August 1967 formalised the new relationship between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In exchange for a regular subsidy, Nasser finally agreed to withdraw its troops from the

--

Yemen. The 'Enemies of God' programme was stopped during the June War and never resumed, ending the publicity given to anti-regime activities and the encouragement to rebellion against the regime.

Although Saudi Arabia's domination over Egypt became clear after 1967, the apparent expansion of progressive movements after that date is often understood as a radicalisation brought about by the defeat of petty bourgeois nationalism. Although left-wing movements did develop in the 1967-73 period, Faisal's domination of Arab politics was firmly established in the aftermath of the 1967 war, and that far from petty bourgeois nationalism being displaced in favour of truly 'progressive' movements, the bulk of the nationalist movement lost out to Arab reaction.

Islamic identity is vital not only to the internal political structure of Saudi Arabia but also to its foreign affairs. It is of course well known that during Nasir's last years, all Arab states were willy-nilly divided into 'Progressive' and reactionary and that in the hope of countering Nasir's initiates King Faisal spent much effort trying to construct an Islamic pact. Faisal's foreign policy between 1967 and 1973 achieved a strong measure of control over the confrontation states. While Nasir was still alive, Faisal encouraged him to accept the Rogers Plan and thus shift his position in favour of a US solution to the Israeli problem. But it was only after Nasir's death and once Sadat was in control of Egyptian politics that the American interest flourished. After Sadat's


May 1971 victory over the left Nasirites, the road was open for an improvement in Egyptian-US relations and the easing out of the Soviets from Egypt. In June 1971, King Faisal paid his first official visit to post Nasir Egypt on his way back from the USA. Saudi Arabia agreed to pay for Egyptian weapons if bought in the west, and the plans for a changeover in arms supplies were mooted, particularly after the expulsion of Soviet advisors in 1972. Even plans for an Arab arms industry financed by Gulf states and located in Egypt have made some progress since then.

As a part of his policy of having good relations with the Arab states Faisal also turned toward Syria. Saudi Arabian relations with Syria were improved after the coup by Hafez al Assad who, in late 1970, overthrew the more radical Jadid faction from power. In 1971, with Assad in power, economic overtures were made, meeting in Kuwait between the Syrian Foreign Minister Abdul Halim Khaddam and the Saudi Foreign Minister Omar Saqqaf Syria was included in the search for a US-oriented solution to the Palestinian problem.

Jordan and Egypt, and, after 1968, the PLO were financially dependent on Saudi Arabia, which tried to influence their policies towards a US-Sponsored solution to Palestine. Saudi Arabia acted as an intermediary between the Arab and American leaders, and Faisal expressed his constant concern for the recovery of the occupied lands. This was, on his part, a genuine concern based on religion. As the leader of Islam, the Guardian of the Holy Places, and a devoted believer, Faisal had stated on numerous occasions his desire to pray in Jerusalem, Islam's third holiest place before he died. He wanted occupied

22. Helen Hackner, op.cit, p.118.
lands returned to the Arabs, less out of solidarity with the Palestinians and concern for the liberation of Palestine, than from religious objections to Jewish presence at a site holy to Islam.

From 1972 onwards, while the Egyptians and Syrians were preparing in total survey for war, Faisal was the only Arab leader who was informed in advance of their plans. This was no mere courtesy to the paymaster, but was rather based on the reality that the limited military aims of the war could only be achieved if the struggle was accompanied by the power of Saudi Arabia through its possible use of the oil weapon on the one hand, and by influencing the US on the other.

Oil embargo of 1973 was an important act enhancing Faisal's prestige in the Arab and Muslim world which has been lowered in the early 1970s. Earlier Saudi Arabia had regularly denied any intention of using the 'oil weapon'; As late as November 1972, the Saudi Arabian Minister of Petroleum, Shiekh Yemeni, explained the country's interpretation of oil power.

We don't believe in the use of oil as a political weapon in a negative manner. We believe that the best way for Arabs to employ their oil is as a basis of true cooperation with the west, notably with the United States. In this way very strong economic ties are established which will ultimately reflect on our political relations. Between November 1972 when this statement was made and May 1973 when the first suggestion of Saudi Arabia's use of the oil weapon


24. Middle East Economic Survey 03.11.1972.
was mentioned, a member of things had failed to happen. It had been Saudi Arabian policy in the previous years, particularly since Sadat had come to power, to persuade the Arab leaders that the solution to the Israeli problem could only come from the USA, since the USA was the only state which had power over Israel and could therefore compel it to return the occupied territories. The Saudis had succeeded in persuading the Arab leaders: the Egyptian had expelled the Soviet advisor, and prevented a progressive coup in Sudan in July 1971, the Syrians had made their willingness clear after Assad’s takeover, and the Jordanians had always been in agreement, while the Palestinians had been forced into a position where their objections could not prevent such a solution if it were agreed. But the Americans had made no response to the many Arab overtures, and the only signs of action were increasingly defeatist and conciliatory statements, from the Arabs, while no comparable development was taking place in Israel or in the USA.

Hostility to this line of policy grew in the Arab world and, by early 1973, Saudi-Arabia was losing its grip on Arab leaders. In March 1973 the Saudi Arabian embassy in Khartoum was seized by Black September guerrillas, leading to bloodshed, and revealing the extent of Saudi Arabia’s loss of prestige: no Palestinian group would have dared make a military attack on the Saudis in any form or shape earlier, nor have they since. At that particular moment Saudi Arabia’s prestige had sunk very low. The policies which the Saudis had forced onto everyone had failed.25

Faisal's awareness of his loss of prestige combined with his bitterness at the failure of his policies and, in May 1973, for the first time, he summoned the President of Aramco, Carl Jungers, and told him that 'Saudi Arabia was not able to stand alone much longer as the USA's only friend in the West Asia and that he was subject to considerable pressure. The constituent companies of Aramco then immediately proceeded to take out full page newspaper advertisements in the American Press calling for a more 'evenhanded' US policy towards the West Asia. The only concession obtained as a result, was the sale of Phantom jets to Saudi Arabia, which had previously been refused on the grounds that the jets might be used to attack Israel. In June, the US, as usual, vetoed a Security Council Resolution deploring Israel's continued occupation of Arab territories.26

Even once the October War had started, Faisal was reluctant to use oil weapon despite the fact that Saudi Arabian officials had been making 'threatening' noises on the subject for months. It is also significant that Israel is the only serious problem on which Saudi Arabia and the United States disagree. In this context, Faisal's reluctance to take any action against the USA may be an indication of the country's dependence on the United States of America.

Eventually under pressure from other oil producing Arab states, from a visit by a special emissary from Sadat, and particularly after the USA had snubbed the Arabs by voting $2.2 billion in emergency aid to Israel, the Saudi Arabians agreed to participate in a reduction of oil production and an embargo on the closest allies of Israel.

------------------

Although the oil embargo did not influence any Israelis withdrawal in any way, nor bring about any change in US policies, the embargo worked like magic. Within hours Saudi Arabia had regained all the prestige lost in the last year and more. The oil price rise made unilaterally during the war and the subsequent one in January 1974 multiplied the financial resources of Saudi Arabia, giving the regime massive financial power over the Arab world and beyond. A well-managed public relations campaign in the west described Saudi Arabia as a heartless blackmailer, thus, at last giving the mistaken impression that Saudi Arabia was on the side of the Arabs and not the prime supporter of the USA, an image which was very helpful to the Saudi regime in the Arab world.

Since the October War Saudi Arabia has been in a position of overwhelming strength in the Arab World, and has remained at the center of negotiations over the Israeli problem. Saudi Arabian objectives in this field are therefore of some importance. Under Faisal the question of Palestine was understood primarily in religious terms and his main objective was to regain Jerusalem for Islam.27

Apart from the question of Jerusalem, a priority for king faisal, the return of occupied Arab land was the main objective. Faisal was in no way prepared to accept the continued existence of Israel on any part of Palestinian territory, but has closeness to the US meant that he was not prepared to support openly the total de-zionisation of Palestine and the control of Palestine by the PLO. Faisal


73
regarded Zionism as being the same thing as communism and both to be cursed atheistic movements.

Relatively free of the Western, secular influence that had begun to influence political thought in the rest of the middle East, young Prince Faisal's world view was relatively closer to classical Islamic theory than many of his contemporaries. The vast changes in his life time, however, which thrust a formerly isolated and insular monarchy into the mainstream of world affairs, seems to have had its effects on Faisal's View of the world as well. In his formative year, Saudi foreign policy, beyond his father's immediate aim of re-establishing and maintaining Saudi rule, was almost entirely Islamic in its focus. This was in part because the Wahhabi religious revival, which served as the ideological base of the regime, had throughout most of its history concentrated more on the reformation of the Muslim world than on confrontation with the non-Muslim world.28

In the intervening years, however, several developments occurred which were to greatly influence how Faisal viewed the world and Saudi foreign policy priorities. The first was the capture of the Hijaz by King Abdul Aziz in 1924. Thereafter, the Saudis have felt a special responsibility as custodians of the Muslim holy shrines, Mecca and Madina, for the spiritual welfare of the Muslim world and with the subsequent accrual of oil wealth, for its economics welfare as well.29

------------------------

28. Followers of the revival movement generally do not use the term 'Wahhabi'! They generally prefer the term Muwahidin (Unitarians), emphasising their strict monotheism.

A second development was the increasing contract and growing interdependence of Saudi Arabia with the western world through the discovery of oil and Saudi Arabia's subsequent role as the world's key oil-exporting country. In Faisal's eyes, contacts with the west were on the whole beneficial to Saudi Arabia. Thus, while he often, recognised imperialism as a major threat to Saudi Arabia and to the Arab and Islamic worlds, his concept of imperialism incorporated far less western xenophobia than that of Arab contemporaries from countries which had experienced a western colonial part.  

The aftermath of World War II brought two new threats to the Arab-Islamic world. One was the spread of radical Marxist-socialist ideologies throughout the West Asia. For Faisal, these ideologies were atheistic and totally alien to his Islamic perception of the world stressing as they do material and Secular goals over religious Values. Thus he called on all Muslims to observe the Koran and the Sunnah and reject any system, ideology or positive (i.e. Secular) law which contradicts the Koran and Sunnah.

The second threat to the Muslim world was the creation of a Zionist state in 1948 on what King Faisal regarded as sacred Arab oil. Faisal always claimed to distinguish between religious Judaism, which he recognised as one of the peoples of the Book, and Zionism which he castigated as a secular political


When Israel captured the west Bank in 1967 including the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, the third holiest site in Islam, Faisal was particularly bitter. In an impassioned speech at the Hajj the following year, he charged that the Muslim Shrines did not belong just to the Arbs but to all Muslims and called upon them to rise up and defend their faith and their 'profaned sanctuaries'.

By the time Faisal became King in 1964, he seemed to have completely formulated the concepts of his world view, taking into account the development of the past forty years. At the center, as in classical theory, was the Islamic world, although only in modern times is it weak and disunited. 'It is incumbent upon us', he exhorted to a group of Hajiis in 1970, 'to go back ad ask ourselves... why we are subject to....... aggression from the enemies of Islam and the enemies of humanity.'

Spiritually, on the periphery of the Muslim world but politically and militarily stronger was the western free world, which roughly corresponded to the Peoples of the Book. Faisal's perception of the United States as a Christian nation ('One nation Under God') rather than a secular democratic state, was no small oversight. He believed that the West and particularly the United States had a moral obligation as well as a political interest to protect and defend the entire

32. Beling Willard, Ed. op.cit, p.179.

33. For the text of the speech, see al-Ukaz, 4 Dhul-Hijjah 1387 A.H. (5 March 1968).

free world, including the Muslim World.\textsuperscript{35}

In an array on the other side were the forces of communism, Zionism and imperialism. Faisal was very explicit about this threat and spoke of it repeatedly during the years of his reign.\textsuperscript{36}

By analogy with classical Islamic theory, this tripartite threat roughly corresponded to the dar al-harb. By coincidence, though there is no evidence that Faisal ever saw their writings, a number of scholars in the 1920s and 1930s had already made a roughly similar analogy of the inherent conflict between Islam and communism and of the similarities of their concept of universalism. From the communist viewpoint, of course, the conflict is between Marxist socialism and capitalism which would presumably also include the Islamic world.\textsuperscript{37}

By using this model of Faisal's world view, a number of possibly otherwise confusing elements of Saudi foreign policy during his reign and afterwards can be seen in a somewhat better perspective. For example, the apparently ambivalent Saudi attitude towards the third World and what has become known as the North-South dialogue can be better understood. For Faisal and his successors the distinction between developed and underdeveloped countries was never as important as that between God-fearing and Godless regimes.\textsuperscript{38} Thus Faisal spent a great deal of time and resources promoting a call

\begin{footnotes}
\item[36] al-Ukaz, 29 March 1966.
\item[37] Madani; \textit{The Islamic content of the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia}, pp. 15-16.
\item[38] Mohammed Iqbal, Sheikh, \textit{Saudi Arabia, an epitome of history and Progress} (Sri noqar; Saudiyah, 1982) p.26.
\end{footnotes}
for solidarity among the Muslim states, virtually all of which are in the Third World, by virtue of their creed rather than their economic circumstances.

In addition to the political conferences, Faisal laid the groundwork for Saudi foreign economic assistance that has become one of the most generous in the world. Saudi aid priorities, however, continue to be: the Arab States first, the greater Islamic world second and finally the non-Islamic Third World. In the case of the latter, the greatest prerequisite which motivates economic assistance is to oppose the expansion of radicalism, which is viewed as a common threat.

Faisal's world view, however, must also be viewed with flexibility. It was a perception, not a blueprint for policy action. There is an inherent tendency throughout the Arab and Muslim world to compartmentalise policy problems, and Faisal often viewed a single problem or country differently, which was dependent upon the context in which he viewed it. For example, the United States as the leader of the free world was seen by Faisal as the chief protector of the Arab and Muslim world against communism, while in a different context, the United States was also seen as the chief protector of Zionism. This conflict helps to explain Faisal's ambivalence toward the United States, an attitude which has been greatly misunderstood. Where many in the west thought his efforts to combine Zionism and Communism as a common threat were


inconsistent, Faisal always believed that the United States support of Zionism was a major factor in radicalising the Arab world and was thus, inconsistent with United States opposition to communism.\textsuperscript{42} To the end of his life, he tried to show the United States this inconsistency, instituting the Arab oil embargo when he felt all else had failed.\textsuperscript{43} At the same time, Faisal never failed to consider the United States interests in his oil pricing and other economic policies, convinced that only a strong United States could protect the stability of the Muslim world and the rest of the free world together.

With the coming of king Faisal the setback was reversed and positive progress both at internal and external level was inaugurated. Faisal was a remarkable man in more than one respects. He was a shrewd and astute, masterful and energetic imaginative and modern. The situation in the country and the region was also improving. In the internal level many favourable developments were taking place: more and more oil revenues, fast developing bureaucracy, planning and managerial staff, technical, engineering, and greater Sense of Unity, responsibility and common destiny among people. In the external atmosphere favourable elements were developing and the number and intensity of the enemies and opponents of Saudi Arabia were decreasing.\textsuperscript{44}


\textsuperscript{43} Akin, James E., "The Oil Crisis : This time the wolf is here", \textit{Foreign Affairs}, 51, No.3 (April 1973) p.p. 482-90.

\textsuperscript{44} Khan Saleen M.A., \textit{Evolution of Arabia, A Socio-political Interpretation} (Aligarh; Print well Publication, 1982) p. 62.
Apart from these, communication, defence and development flourished under King Faisal. But more than that, in a few brilliant, diplomatic strokes he provided direction to the coming administrators and the Muslim world. Faisal's Significance is that when other Muslim Afro-Asian leader talked of Russian and Chinese socialism or westernised democracy, he espoused Islam.

Faisal pushed Muslim heads of States to meet in Robat in 1969, after the fire in Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem. In 1972 he goaded Anwar Sadat into throwing the Russians out of Egypt. Next year he backed Sadat's October war against Israel. More important in 1973 he launched the movement to use oil-more correctly, oil prices - as a strategic weapon. Prices went up and money now poured into Saudi Arabia. Next year he was the Star of another conference of Muslim head of states in Lahore. From a marginal player in world politics Saudi Arabia was emerging as a central super star. Faisal was not only changing Arab destiny but the world. More than any other individual Faisal set Saudi Arabia on the paths that it has followed in both external relation and internal development.

