Chapter 3
Theoretical Foundation

3.0 Introduction to the chapter:
I started this dissertation with a specific aim, which I stated in the first chapter itself, viz., to develop an account of the individuation mechanism, how it works in the language and how it is connected to the cognitive process. The previous chapter has shown how, in the DP structure, elements are ordered hierarchically, based on the feature individuation. Among the specific devices of individuation, the role of classifiers, esp. of the most individuated classifier /Ta/, had already been discussed in the second chapter. Chapter Four, which deals with non-finite verbal participles, will bring out the role of the other major device of individuation the language uses, viz., the emphaziser /l/. But before going back to a stream of empirical facts, which can sometimes bewilder a reader unfamiliar with the language and can thus obscure the point made by the analysis, I pause at this juncture to clarify my standpoint in relation to the already existing theories of grammar and meaning, and to explain in what way the present study advances the development of this standpoint.

The ordinary understanding of language takes it to be either primarily a means of communication (a frequently reiterated view in functionalist approaches to linguistics and several perspectives in the philosophy of language) or primarily a means of expression that may be put to communicative or other use (this is Chomsky's view, adopted by many generative grammarians), which has two core components, expression (the formation of composite expressions in the language on the basis of its primary vocabulary) and content (mapping between these expressions and their interpretations). The speakers of a language, on this conception, use an expression in this language to convey some meaning or message. The question then is how a formal theory of linguistics is to account for the way a
particular meaning can be associated with a particular use of a given
expression. One’s approach to this question remains incomplete if one
investigates the issue from inside the language alone, without taking into
consideration the surroundings of the communication, which include the
speaker, the hearer and the situation where the communication takes place.
To cater to these needs of a linguistic theory, pragmatics developed as a
bridge discipline between the language proper and the extra-linguistic world.
For readers who adopt this view of the matter, it is simplest to assume that
the present dissertation is situated at that meeting place and takes a broader
perspective of meaning in most of the cases; and, to do so, it takes into
consideration the speaker’s ability to choose from a range of available
linguistic tools to make his/her points clear to the hearer, who is the other
human component of a communication.

A reader who approaches the present dissertation on this basis can
legitimately use the material presented here. I have no wish to object to such
use of this study. However, one purpose of the present chapter is to clarify
the actual standpoint from which this work is being done. I now approach the
methodological issues in terms of an often unnoticed tension that lies at the
heart of the fairly viewpoint just presented. For simplicity, I will assume the
language for communication approach, as it is prevalent among most users
of pragmatics. Presumably extending these reflections to the language for
expression approach is a straightforward matter.

I detect a tension between the upward lexical projectionism implied in the
usual conception and the notion of the speaker being free to convey what
s/he wishes to. Let us suppose that larger structures are projected from
lexical heads as usually assumed. It follows that a given verb and a
particular nominal object of that verb, for example, should uniquely
determine whether and what inflection appears on that object. In that case
the speaker would have no choice as to the overt or covert Case marking of
a Bangla direct object, contrary to the fact. For the speaker to have some choice, the upward lexical projection process must be less strict than this picture would lead us to believe.

One way to handle this problem is as follows. We allow the speaker to assign surplus content to the whole, to the constitute, over and above the interpretive content that the constitute acquires by projection from the parts, the constituents. For example, consider the difference between (1) and (2) below:

(1) uni Sokal-Sondhe chatro pORan
s/he morning-evening student teaches
'S/he teaches (faceless) students in the morning as well as in the evening.'
(as a routine work).

(2) uni Sottii chatroder bhalobeSe pORan
s/he really student-PIAcc lovingly teaches
'S/he really teaches the students lovingly.'

We may suppose that the grammar proper leaves lexical projection mechanisms neutral between the unaffixed /chatro/ of (1) and the affixed /chatroder/ of (2) in the position of object of the verb /pORan/. On this account, affixation of the object is optional in these sentences at the level of the grammar of the language. The grammatically determined interpretations of the affixed and unaffixed versions of the object are also identical.

But there is an observed interpretive difference, as is familiar, between the specific reading of the affixed /chatroder/ in (2) and the nonspecific reading of the unaffixed /chatro/ in (1). If I propose an account based on the speaker's assignment of surplus content to the utterance, I attribute this difference to the fact that s/he has a choice between the affixed and the
unaffixed form of the object for such a nominal. The speaker can choose the unaffixed form /chatro/, for instance, as in (1). S/he thereby chooses to bring the sentence s/he utters into paradigmatic association with those sentences where the grammar requires an affixless nominal object, such as (3) below. Alternatively, the speaker can decide to use the form /chatroder/ as in (2), thus associating the utterance with sentences like (4) where the grammar forces an affixed nominal object:

(3) nisar tOrkari bEce.
Nisar vegetable sells
'Nisar sells vegetables'

(4) Sudhirbabu amader pORan.
Mr./Dr. Sudhir us teaches
'Mr./Dr. Sudhir teaches us.'

This account, call it the SACSI (Speaker-Assigned Constitute Surplus Interpretation) analysis, attributes the interpretive contrast between the affixed and unaffixed objects in (1) and (2) to the speaker's ability to assign surplus content to one of two choices that the grammar is neutral about. On this analysis, the speaker exercises this ability by paradigmatically associating his/her use of that particular form with other forms crucially resembling it. On these assumptions, the affixed nominal /chatroder/ in (2) carries no interpretive specificity as a matter of its grammar. The grammar treats /chatro/ and /chatroder/ in (1) and (2) as a matter of free variation. It is the speaker's decision to use one or the other, relating the utterance paradigmatically with either the (3) type or the (4) type which ultimately leads to the interpretive specificity or nonspecificity.

It follows that upward lexical projectionism coupled with standard compositionality operating over the interpretations of constituents does not
wholly determine the interpretation of a constitute. The speaker has an
overriding ability to assign surplus content to the composite. This ability is
exercised at the point where the constitute, which in this case is a sentence-
length utterance, is submitted to the syntax-pragmatics interface for
interpretation.

The working of this analysis brings out the tension between upward lexical
projectionism and the speaker’s right to modulate what s/he wishes to say. If
a grammatical description were to make only projectionism and
compositionality the relevant factors determining the interpretation of
utterances, then one would be forced to leave interpretation entirely, without
residue, to the social conventions of the language. That type of picture would
leave no role for the speaker, whose freedom to anchor an utterance in its
context would become vacuous. I am assuming a different picture, in which it
is crucial that the grammar leaves space for the speaker to exercise this
freedom.

What I have provided above is a first approximation, where I stick to the
assumption, standard in pragmatics, that the speaker submits the sentence-
long utterance to the pragmatic interface. If this is so, then no grammatical
unit smaller than a sentence is directly subject to Use and therefore to
pragmatic principles. Is this undesirable? Should I propose instead that, in
examples (1) and (2), it is the verb-object complex and not the entire
sentence that gets submitted to the interface between syntax and
pragmatics? Is it necessary and appropriate to suggest that a syntactic unit
of any rank (sentence rank, phrase rank, word rank) can meet pragmatics at
the interface?

The fact that I am forced to face such a question indicates that the work I
wish to do cannot be adequately described and done within the current
theoretical framework. No direct answer that accepts this formulation of the question offers a viable research programme.

One possible answer, (A), underscores the fact that allowing the speaker to submit units of any rank to the pragmatic interface will lead to a proliferation of distinct derivations of the same utterance-interpretation pairing, raising inappropriate issues about how to converge on the optimal member of this derivation set. Thus, only sentences should meet the interface with pragmatics, as- has been assumed by philosophers of language as the default of their speech act theories.

But an opposite line of reasoning, (B), equally plausibly stresses the lack of any conceptual basis in the theory of grammar for constraining the set of units that can legitimately interface with the pragmatics. From that consideration it would follow that the theory must allow the speaker in principle to submit any syntactic unit for independent interpretation at the interface, and that perhaps in cases like (1) and (2) one should consider the minimal pragmatically relevant unit (here the verb-object complex) as requiring study, not the whole sentence.

The benefit of my accepting proposal (A) is that I avoid a proliferation of needlessly distinct derivations of the same utterance-interpretation pairing that differ only in the details of which units get submitted when to the pragmatic interface. The cost is that I allow only the grammatically conceptualized Root of the Syntactic Derivation to meet the pragmatic interface. This move produces empirical difficulties. It has always been known that certain grammatically embedded clauses count pragmatically as illocutionary acts and exhibit syntactic root effects. Once I allow certain embedded units to break out of the tree and meet the pragmatic interface, I have no systematic basis for denying this privilege to other embedded units, and I am back in proposal (B), if I take this cost too seriously.
If on the other hand I accept proposal (B), the benefit just indicated needs to be balanced against the cost. For me, the cost of proposal (B) is extremely high. It forces me to abandon the study of individuation, for the concept makes sense only if I can validly speak about the anchoring of a particular constituent and its subconstituents. I am thus unable to prefer (B) over (A).

My response is to reject the very question whose formulation forces a choice between two unacceptable answers. I therefore find myself compelled to reject a conceptualization of language and its use where an expression (typically a sentence), generated by a grammar, is like a book stored in a library, and where a language user, or a speaker uttering an expression, becomes analogous to a borrower issuing a book from a library.

In that traditional picture associated with generative grammar, the competence or linguistic knowledge of the native speaker-hearer visualized as a perfect member of an ideal and homogeneous speech community is in effect a librarylike collection of infinitely many well-formed expressions. Performance occurs when a user puts a piece of this infinite knowledge to finite use in productive or receptive action in real space-time, analogous to borrowing a book from that library. My problems seem to arise from this visualization itself, but I need to preserve the many useful results of the research traditions that have depended on this conception.

The material I present in this methodological chapter is offered in response to this fundamental theoretical problem that I face. To summarize what I would like to do, my current inclination, which may change in the course of research now in progress, is to postulate an infinitely generous and comprehension-maximizing listener processing what is said by finite speakers in real space-time. Such a listener, in my conceptualization, submits to the pragmatic interface an entire clause, but with some
highlighting of relevant or crucial chunks of the clause such as the verb-object complex in (1) or (2). Call my move proposal (C).

Independently of the issues just considered, my need to advocate proposal (C) is related to my need to understand and work with a crucial move made by the minimalist syntacticians, the move of abolishing the system of (referential) indexing that used to be central to generative grammar. By making that move, minimalist scholars have basically proposed that it is not part of the grammar, neutral between speaker and hearer, for particular expressions to be anchored with respect to any concrete referent in space or time. In a certain sense, I welcome their move as it removes from the abstract formal grammar yet another matter that should concern the concrete actions of production and reception by speakers and listeners in real space-time. However, my concern is with the mechanisms whereby linguistic material registers individuation, and to this extent I have to solve the problems raised by the minimalist move.

Operationally, I have been using the machinery as it stood in the principles and parameters period of that tradition's research; this serves to avoid a confrontation with the logistics of minimalist implementations. I am now concerned to provide a conceptually well-founded response to the minimalist enterprise.

As my serious conceptual response to minimalism, I suggest that we reconsider the proper formalization of human knowledge of language. Specifically I advocate adopting the viewpoint of a listener monitoring and revisiting the speaker's actions and choices. I am not hereby reproposing what others have already suggested, to recast standard competence on the basis of listening rather than speaking. I am proposing to focus instead on an ideally comprehension-maximizing listener figure replaying what has been done by the speaker. By this I mean, echoing a point hinted at but not
rigorously formulated in the minimalist abandonment of referential indexing, that it is not in the formal construction of a syntactic object, but at the pragmatics-applying moment of the listener’s replay that entities get anchored in space and events in time. Speaker intentions with respect to referential anchoring, on this account, are always a matter of the speaker expecting the ideal listener to find out what intentions need to be reconstructed.

To return to the proposal whose theoretical background I have just explained at some length, proposal (C) is able to overcome the sterile dilemma of (A) versus (B) by rejecting the initial question’s premise that compelled the idealized speaker, in the course of assembling the sentence, to decide either to stop at the juncture where the relevant phrase had been built, or wait until the entire clause was ready, but without the option of considering both the clause and a highlighted phrase within it. I am now proposing to work with the listener, for whom this third option (C) is available without special stipulation. For the listener, the highlighting provided by intonation makes it natural in certain cases for a particular phrase to count as salient within a clause.

3.1 Organization of the chapter:
With these considerations in mind, in this chapter I shall try to connect the threads that make possible the operative work of this dissertation. Ordinary discussions of language as a system of communication naturally take the works of Strawson and Grice as their point of departure, for it is the theories about speaker’s meaning proposed by these philosophers of language that initiated this stream of inquiry. However, in this dissertation, I follow the hermeneutic approach developed by Ruwet where linguistic contributions are perceived and evaluated in a broader setting of non-linguistic factors.
My strategy in this methodological chapter involves finding ways to relate Ruwet to current generative syntactic work, which although it does not include pragmatics in the mainstream of linguistic theory nonetheless does make it appropriate to consider, for interpretive purposes, the possibility of taking a context larger than a sentence.

The recent minimalist move of postulating only two interface levels PF and LF for the computation system of human language makes one conceptualize a sentence or even a phrase or a clause just a product of a computational process involving words, which are usefully considered as the minimum unit of novelty for the speaker (or for the listener) and the maximum unit of oldness or establishedness for the speech community. I say this to bring my viewpoint to bear on the derivation and use of sentences in minimalism. Let us take a closer look at the elements involved.

Under minimalist assumptions, the words that will appear in a given sentence are selected from the lexicon and set up as a lexical array whose members are successively merged (and subjected to other formal operations) to assemble a sentence in the idealized process that generates sentences within language conceptualized as a library in the sense of my remarks in the introductory section above.

Now, is it accurate to say that exactly which words will be selected is entirely guided by what meaning a speaker wants to convey by the sentence to be uttered? Or that this allows a speaker to create new sentences every time s/he utters something? No, these statements do not hold within the minimalist implementation of the generative distinction between language system, formalized as a competence, and language use, visualized as a performance that lies outside the domain of that knowledge system. For minimalism continues to maintain what I have earlier characterized as the library approach to the formal representation of knowledge of language, and
the library look-up mechanism for describing the productive and receptive actions of the speaker and the listener. Given that approach, the selection of words for a lexical array underlying the derivation of a sentence is a library matter, not a look-up matter. Within the language as a library, no derivation is either old or new. Only the speaker, in performing, experiences a sentence-length utterance as new and its production or reception as creativity.

But one of the guiding intuitions in the growth of generative grammar has been the sense that recursion and creativity are central to syntax. It is thus important for the generative enterprise, and should become important for its minimalist implementation, that sentences are the minimal forms which a speaker can freely create as units of fresh, creative speaking. Sentences are understood at all, and are perceived as novel, in the context of larger stretches of discourse by the listener, a fact that becomes crucial to the recasting of the generative enterprise in terms of the infinitely generous listener revisiting the speaker's real-time performance if my proposals are adopted. Minimalism dismantles the specifically syntactic apparatus of D-structure and S-structure that gave a grammatically privileged status to the sentence as the domain within which derivations had to be managed. The minimalist move of claiming that the PF and LF interfaces obey the dictates of what lies outside language, given that neither sound as such nor interpretation as such is sentence-bound, opens up in a new way the option of going beyond the sentence domain in the linguistic understanding of how sounds and interpretations are paired with each other.

Note that Ruwet's hermeneutic approach to the study of meaning works in principle with discursive or textual units larger than the sentence in order to construct the context within which pragmatic principles apply. I will show that the proper expansion of Ruwet's hermeneutic approach helps to complete the direction taken by recent trends in mainstream generative grammar.
Specifically, when we look at the way a revival of GT (the Generalized Transformation device from very early generative syntax) is at work in the logic of minimalism, it can be plausibly argued that a syntax without deep structure provides a natural account of relations across clause boundaries in syntagmatic terms, and that extending this logic to the paradigmatic axis connects the generative enterprise as we know it to Ruwet. The bridge between these two threads in our concerns is provided by Bhartrhari. Accordingly, this chapter ends by reviewing, and showing the proper contemporary use of, the Vaakyapadiiyam, an important work by Bhartrhari in Indian philosophy of grammar. To anticipate briefly, the sphota view of language cognition, as developed by Bhartrhari, emphasizes the fact that a sabda is comprehensible in principle only from the idealized listener's viewpoint. The sphota views give an immense importance to the hearer's cognition of the utterances. I shall argue that, just as Bhartrhari's work makes possible a paradigm shift from etymologically oriented Paninian linguistics to a user-focused linguistics of listening within the Indian tradition, so also a proper use of his research today will enable the shift of perspective required for the purposes of the inquiry undertaken in this dissertation.

This paradigm shift proposed here will be described, for convenience of reference, as the transition from a formalist to a substantivist approach to the interface between generative syntax and pragmatics.

3.2 Some Western and Indian thoughts on meaning: -

Before developing the actual formulations of my main proposals, I shall first give a background exposition of certain classical theories of meaning from the Western and Indian traditions. These provide terms of reference that some readers will need in order to follow the logic of the programme developed here and the alternatives against which it is to be evaluated. Accordingly, section 3.2.0 will briefly present a review that begins with the
Russell-Strawson-Grice material and then turns its attention to Indian schools of philosophy.

3.2.0 Departure from Russell (1905):

In the beginning of 20th century, in a famous paper named 'On Denoting', Russell proposed that a linguistic expression never has a meaning in isolation; rather, every proposition in which it occurs has a meaning. This Russellian theory of meaning contradicted Frege's theory of sense and reference, where every linguistic expression itself has a denotation in the real world as well as a meaning, which is 'sense' in Frege's terminology. But the next half of the century witnessed two philosophers treating the Russellian theory literally as a point of departure. Departing from his view, Strawson and Grice made proposals, taken up in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, that allow a linguistic expression to have a meaning only in a context. No proposition in isolation carries a meaning. When this move was made, the 'context of utterance' became, for the first time, a crucial factor in determining the meaning of a sentence.

3.2.1 Strawson (1950):

Strawson in his essay 'On Referring' first distinguished between a sentence, a use of a sentence and an utterance of a sentence and correspondingly between an expression, a use of an expression and an utterance of an expression. He gave the example 'the king of France is wise', which is a sentence or an expression which can be uttered by n number of persons at different periods. If one man utters this expression in the reign of Louis XIV and another man utters it in the reign of Louis XIII, they will have made different uses of the same expression. If two different men use the same expression at one and the same point of time, these will also be different utterances of a sentence or expression. Contra Russell, Strawson did not judge a single expression in abstraction. He distinguished meaning, which is a function of the expression, from referring and mentioning, as well as from
truth or falsity, which are the functions of uses of expressions. Expressions themselves cannot refer to anything, though they can be used innumerable times to refer to many things. From Strawson's article onwards, the context of utterance became an extremely important factor co-determining a truth conditional value for the sentence as uttered in that context. In a way, Strawson is the true predecessor of Grice, who seven years later distinguished between sentence-meaning and speaker-meaning, taking the speaker into consideration. Pragmatics as we know it started with these two important papers, though the term Pragmatics is never used in either of them.

3.2.2 Grice (1957):
One of the definitions of pragmatics runs as follows:- 'Pragmatics is the study of all those aspects of meaning not captured in a semantic theory.' This includes those senses of meaning implied in a conversation which cannot be covered by truth-conditional semantics, e.g. metaphor, irony, presupposition and all other implicit aspects of meaning, which are not found literally from the utterance. To draw a distinction between the literal sentence-meaning and the other meanings intended to be communicated by the speaker, a very important idea was put forth by the philosopher Grice in an insightful paper 'Meaning' in 1957. He distinguished between two types of meaning: meaning natural, which he represented as $\text{meaning}_N$ with the subscript N, and non-natural meaning written by him as $\text{meaning}_{NN}$, which may be called speaker-meaning. Grice gave the following characterization of $\text{meaning}_{NN}$: "'A meant$_{NN}$ something by $x'$ is (roughly) equivalent to 'A intended the utterance of $x$ to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention.'"

This formulation may be expanded as follows: there is a speaker S in a communication, who by uttering U in front of a hearer H intends (this is the intention i) to produce some effect z in the recipient H, and the content of the
intention i includes the intention that that effect z should be brought about by H recognizing intention i.

This means there is a speaker S in a communication, who by uttering U in front of a hearer H produces some effect z in the recipient and that effect has to be recognized by H in order to have a fruitful communication. Certainly then in the process of communication, a shared knowledge of speaker and hearer is involved, otherwise the 'intention' of the speaker to communicate something fails. The most important part of Grice's meaning theory is what a speaker means by uttering U may not be closely related to the meaning (this is natural or literal meaning) of U at all. Therefore, there can be an interesting discrepancy between 'speaker-meaning' (Grice's meaning) and 'sentence meaning'. For example, a speaker by uttering 'I am feeling cold' can mean 'please shut the window' when cold wind is coming through it.

In the definition of pragmatics given in the beginning of the discussion, by the word 'meaning', this Gricean aspect of meaning has been tried to capture.

3.2.3 Indian schools of philosophy on the nature of meaning:
I now turn to the Indian side of the story. This is made necessary at least by the roots of today's international linguistics enterprise in the Paninian tradition. I need to present the original tradition and the seeds of the Bhartriharian critique of its formalistic version as part of the background for the proposals made in this dissertation in relation to contemporary work.

Right from the stage of the Vedas, Indians grammarians and philosophers were concerned about the theories of meaning. The study of language acquired a central position in all the schools of Indian philosophy. However,
there were differences of opinions among them regarding the nature of sabda (the 'word') and its meaning. The main two divisions among the schools of Indian philosophy on the nature of meaning were the Brahminical tradition (consisting of the saamkhya, yoga, miimamsaa and vedaanta schools) and the naturalistic tradition which includes Caarvaak and early Buddhism. The Nyaaya and Jaina schools fall somewhere between these two as stated by Prof. T.R.V. Murti and reiterated by Coward in their accounts of the philosophical history of the study of language in ancient India. The Brahminical school of thought envisaged the relation between sabda and its meaning as eternal and language as a divine entity. This school perceived sabda as identical with Brahman or the Supreme Being. What human beings utter for communication are manifestations of that absolute Brahman. Only those persons are able to cognize that impersonal knowledge who have made themselves fit to see and receive it. Therefore, Vedic rsis were the 'seers' of the hymns rather than their composers and the Vedas were sruti (or something which has to be heard) of non-human origin. Putting aside the metaphysical part of this, what remains important for our purposes is the fact that cognition in the form of understanding language depends on the hearer's capability for receiving such transmission.

The naturalistic school, on the other hand, views language as an arbitrary and conventional tool. The Caarvaaks and the Buddhists deny sabda as an authoritative source of knowledge and rely entirely on perception (pratyaksa) and intuition (prajnaa) respectively. The Nyaaya and the Jaina schools accept sabda as a pramaana or a source of valid knowledge.

However, there is a difference between their view about sentence meaning perception and the view of the Brahminical tradition on this matter. According to the Naiyaayikas (followers of the Nyaaya doctrine), meaning is compositional in nature. If one knows the meanings of all the constituting elements of a sentence, one also perceives the meaning of the sentence by
applying invariant procedures of meaning composition that a philosopher can derive from first principles. However, there is no natural relation and also no logical conceptual relation between a sabda and its meaning, for at that level everything is conventionally fixed by social norms not rooted in either nature or logic. According to this doctrine, we cognize meanings of a sequence of words in a sentence one after another and the meaning of the previous word is stored in our memory during the listening and cognizing process. Notice that these compositionalist assumptions about meaning leave no room for pragmatics to play any role in the determination of what the listener cognizes. By virtue of the conventions of a society, if the speaker and the hearer share some words and their meanings, every utterance of a speaker will be comprehended by the listeners automatically. This reduces the importance of both the speaker and the listener under the supremacy of conventional nature of speech acquired at the level of a society's habits or customs. In other words, what I have described as the SACSI analysis cannot be elaborated by adopting the Nyaaya doctrine.

3.3.0 Placing Ruwet in the Goldsmith Hierarchy of grammar types:
This section will introduce Nicolas Ruwet's work in the context of the grammatical description type hierarchy proposed by Goldsmith. Under Goldsmith's assumptions it is possible for Ruwet's and Chomsky's lines of inquiry to be jointly pursued without incoherence. The relation between Chomsky's minimalist program and Ruwet's hermeneutic approach will be the concern of the next sub-section at a more detailed level.

John Goldsmith, introducing his translation of Ruwet's work, describes a hierarchy of grammar types. H classifies grammars or grammatical descriptions into four types, which are as follows:

1) **Type 0** - the Platonic view of grammar which is an abstract object inhabiting the mathematical world of platonic abstractions.
2) **Type 1** - This is generative grammarian's competence view, where the grammar is physically embodied in a real world but silent about the subjective existence of the people of that world.

3) **Type 2** - This assumes Type 1's reality and also takes seriously the subjectivity of the speaker or the hearer, a type exemplified by the phenomenological view of grammar by Kuno.

4) **Type 3** - In addition to speaker's consciousness, this type takes into account a linguist's consciousness also; this is where Ruwet's hermeneutic approach is located in the classification.

But this type hierarchy proposed by Goldsmith does not make water-tight compartments for each of the types; rather, every lower structure, as Goldsmith himself states, is included at the next higher level in the typology. If this is taken for granted then there is no incompatibility between type 3, which is 'Ruwet's grammar ' and type 1, which is Chomsky's, as type 3 includes type 1 and as type 1 provides the foundation for the type 3.

**3.3.1 Relating Ruwet and the Chomskyan works:**

I turn now to the task of situating Ruwetian inquiry more carefully in an overall generative framework. For my purposes I need to revisit the chronology of the major moves in generative grammar. In the logic of early generative grammar (as in Chomsky 1957, 1965), the point is to think of a sentence as a unit larger than a word, and certainly much larger than a morpheme, but falling within the purview of the etic-emic format of structuralist inquiry. It is convenient to imagine that what early generativism introduces is in effect the idea of 'allo-sentences', if I may use a term that brings out the way they are similar to allophones and allomorphs in phonology and morphology respectively, for the alternative forms of a single sentence. Of course, generative invented its own distinctive terms for the notions of *sentenceme* (Deep Structure) and of *allo-sentence* (Surface structure) This view was thus very far removed indeed from the mentalistic
approach of language characteristic of generative grammar and from the later proposal that linguistics should be recast as part of a biologically founded theory of human psychology.

But with the next major development of generative grammar in 1980s (which is known as principles and parameters theory), the social rule-governed form of language had even at the operational level been replaced by the more psychological principle-bound form. In the 1990s, as part of the further progress of that generative work, when- the minimalist program was launched, there were only two interface levels, PF or the articulatory-perceptual level and LF or the conceptual-intentional level, which were necessary for computation of human language. A derivation has to meet some conditions at these two interface levels. Any derivation which fails to do so crashes. Words, as they are in the mental lexicon of a native speaker, are assembled to make a sentence or a construction. There is no readymade mental unit larger than a word (I offer this as a contextually usable first approximation; of course this and other theories recognize idioms). The acceptability of an utterance is judged in a context, which is of course larger than a word. There is no upper limit to this context, at least theoretically, be it a phrase, a clause, a sentence or even a discourse.

Chomsky's formal theory of language in the minimalist period, therefore, opens up a possibility for considering the grammaticality judgements of a native speaker in a context larger than a sentence. The current practitioners of generative grammar limit themselves to narrow context of a single sentence and leave the issues beyond narrow syntax to a residually defined pragmatics. This practice of avoiding some issues reflects their external decisions and not a true domain delimitation of their work. If on the one hand they admit that language has to meet some conditions at the conceptual-intentional level, the level of a speaker's mind, where language is situated, then how can a linguist in their view work without taking into consideration
the speaker and his/her intentions/views? Ruwet explored that very possibility and surely was ahead of his peers in this respect. He stood out as a thinker who scrupulously respected the valid needs of an autonomous syntax and at the same time drew attention to pragmatic considerations that many syntacticians were inappropriately setting aside. We can construe Ruwet's work as showing that pragmatics comes into play wherever a syntactic stretch displays any sort of illocutionary salience that involves evaluating exactly how a part is configured within a whole. These concerns thus do not wait until the so-called hard core grammar submits a complete syntactic assembly to the speech act system at the root sentence level. Pragmatics acts wherever it must and thus interpenetrates with so-called hard core syntax.

From this viewpoint, I find a fundamental difficulty with this 'minimalist program' in the recent works by Chomsky. Derivation and spelling out by phase do not enable an integrative view of a sentence. This atomistic part over whole analysis of a sentence is contrary to the position taken by Bhartrhari and Ruwet and defended in this thesis. For the comprehension of a unit of any size starting from a word, it is necessary to understand how a potential listener grasps the segments of the units as they come in sequence at the time of utterance as well as the whole within which that unit figures as a part.

But in Minimalism, once a phase is built, it is submitted for interpretation to PF and LF and the phase becomes inactive for any further processing. This approach to linguistic cognition is contrary to the position I advocate, where sentences are the smallest stretches at a macro-discourse level, not the largest stretches of a micro-grammar. A careful scrutiny of the logic of minimalism will reveal that on the one hand the mechanism of minimalism accepts only words as arbitrary parts of the system of language. The recognition that these alone belong to society is what technically enables
this theory of language, unlike late structuralism and early generativism, to allow for the creative freedom of the speakers in composing their own sentences. But on the other hand the theory models cognition in terms of syntactic phases being the smallest and the largest units submitted to phonetic and semantic interpretation. This model postulates cognitively isolable parts and does not provide a suitable platform for interpreting any item in a larger formal or performative context. I expect many linguistics, even non-minimalists, to agree that one of the goals of modern linguistics should be to address this tension which minimalism shows in a particularly frustrating version, since minimalism's focus on integral lexical items raises expectations. We all need to pursue the minimalist goal of rolling back society's incursion into the individual's free space.

To put it differently, I wish to reinforce Chomsky's latest claim that 'language is an optimal solution to legibility conditions' (Chomsky 1998) which means that issues related to the interfaces become of central importance in the coming days of linguistic research. Legibility conditions are the conditions given by the outside systems, therefore, designing an optimal device to satisfy these conditions become the primary task of the linguistics. However, the task is no doubt much difficult than it was before as the outside systems are yet to be known completely. Still, a decision to consider issues like grammaticality or acceptability of a sentence and the speaker's thoughts and intentions will surely move us closer to the common goal of designing an adequate theory of language.

3.4 Speaking vs. dialogue: --
To continue the discussion started in the first section of this chapter, I am here treating language essentially as a means of communication. When a speaker utters a sentence, (s)he has some will (vivaksaa) to express something and in this process (s)he expresses the utterance for somebody. Whether that listener is physically present there or not does not really matter
for a speaker. In case the hearer is also present, a dialogue starts. However, the forms that the actual utterance takes are always created keeping in mind a prospective hearer. Therefore, the maxims of a communication are always hearer-centred. If we see Grice's theory of conversational implicature, we find all the maxims are to account for what an intended communication should look like in order to be comprehended by a hearer. Making a contribution such as is required by the hearer following the maxims of quality (telling what one believes to be truth), quantity (making the utterance as informative as necessary, no more no less) and relevance (making an unambiguous, brief, orderly and clear utterance) is the core of Grice's conversational principles. When we perceive language in this mode of a speaker-listener interaction, we understand that it transcends the barrier of any fixed norms imposed by a society. To see this point, it is important to begin by recognizing the role that social norms do play in the conversational exchange.

Speakers utter only those expressions which are accepted by the listeners. For this acceptance, of course, they have to share some concepts coming from a specific socio-cultural background, which following Jackendoff (1992) we call E-concepts. Moreover, a language known by both the speaker and the hearer as instantiations of the ideal speaker-listener or Chomsky's E-language must also be shared. A speaker employs certain forms (speech-units such as sounds, syllables, words, sentences etc.) to convey some ideas. They help to manifest the speaker's thought in some observable sequential forms. The hearer also receives the signal in some sequential form and stores in some files for the next step of processing. But once this processing takes place, the whole thought flashes as one unit. The units that are postulated as connecting a speaker with a hearer are for the convenience of a speaker for speaking, a hearer for receiving and a linguist for analyzing the utterance. We normally conduct our linguistics on the basis of the hope that we can converge on a single set of units and combinatorial
principles that will equally well characterize what is psychologically real for the speaker, psychologically real for the hearer, and scientifically valid for the linguist at the ideal future time when linguistics can claim that its job is finished. In this setting, the grammaticality or acceptability of an utterance is not only judged on the basis of the principles shared by the E-language of the interlocutors, but also in response to the use of the words in a particular context, a response that may vary as what we are calling the context may be just a neighbouring word or may even be some passage larger than a sentence.

Nicolas Ruwet's discussions of grammaticality directly indicate the truth of this account of what kinds of judgments of acceptability linguistic study rests on. In this way, a linguist also becomes aware of the Wittgensteinian insight that language is essentially a form of life. Meaning lies in the practice of a language not in its form; hence Wittgenstein's maxim "Don't ask for the meaning; ask for the use."

3.5 Bhartrhari on nature of meaning and cognition: --

Bhartrhari, a great Indian philosopher of language of approximately the 5th century provides a very insightful and currently relevant theory of meaning for the study of language. His most remarkable contribution in the field of cognition is the sphota theory. The term sphota is derived from the Sanskrit root sphut 'to burst forth' and is defined as 'the idea which bursts out or flashes on the mind when a sound is uttered' by V.S. Apte in his Sanskrit-English dictionary. Sphota is responsible for a successful communication taking place. According to Bhartrhari, at first the words exist in the mind of a speaker in the form of sphota. When he/she utters them, they appear as a sequence of observable sounds which is received by the listener and ultimately the same sphota is perceived by him/her when the listener comprehends the meaning of a sentence. As in the case of a sentence, vaakya-sphota reveals the nature of meaning of the sentence, so also in the
case of a word or a sound cognition takes the forms of pada-sphota and varna-sphota. These three types of sphota exist in three different levels of cognition and are not in conflict with each other. In Bhartrhari’s theory, there are two types of sabda: one is nada or dhvani or vaikharii sabda and the reason for the other kind of sabda. The second kind of sabda is called sphota by Bhartrhari and it is the linguistic potency present in every human being through which transferability of meaning is explained by him from the speaker to the hearer. Sphota is sequenceless (akrama) but appears to be having sequence as well as parts as the properties of naada are transferred to the sphota (Vaakyapadiiyam canto I verse 48 & 49). For Bhartrhari, existence of both the sabdas in real time is quite striking. The vaikharii sabda or naada comes in a sequence to a hearer as produced by the speaker, and therefore is a reality to both of them. Although sphota is actually timeless and exists in our buddhi or intellect, yet its realization happens in a temporal sequence. The speaker cannot express the whole meaning all at once.

For the hearer, the ultimate realization of a linguistic expression becomes available through innumerable sequential bits of realizations happening in real time. The concept of time in Bhartrhari is introduced to understand the diversity and change of this world, our experience, speech and thought. A hearer gets the meaning of an utterance only when s/he can connect these temporal bits of linguistic elements together. In Bhartrhari’s system, therefore, the role of a hearer in cognition process is paramount. Comprehension of a word or a text is only possible if the hearer perceives the same sphota as the speaker. Bhartrhari said in the Brahmakaanda of the Vaakyapadiiyam that 'meaning is not understood from words which have not become objects (of the sense of hearing). Without being (thus) received, they do not express meaning by their own' (translation of Vaakyapadiiyam by Raghavan Pillai, Canto I, Verse 56). This implies that words are meaningful
only when they are used in an utterance. Secondly, it places the hearer in a higher rank in a communication.

The idea of sphota, however, was not an innovation of Bhartrhari. Rather, it originated in the time of Rgveda and was tacitly present in the concept of sabda-Brahman (word-Brahman) of Vedanta. But it was Bhartrhari who developed that idea into a full-fledged theory. Bhartrhari stated that the individual sound or word may vary with the speakers from region to region, but still the hearers understand them because of the sphota they share. Sphota, in some of its uses, corresponds to the notion of the competence of an ideal speaker-listener, the study of which is the goal of classical generative linguistics (Chomsky 1965). This is the internal knowledge of every person which is evoked through the stimulus of external language to get the meaning of some utterance. Even if someone utters something wrong, the hearer grasps its meaning by connecting it with the accepted form. Bhartrhari, in this regard, provided the comparison with a child who cannot utter the word *ambaa* properly, but still is understood by the adult listeners. In this theory a patient and generous listener has been placed in a central position of a linguistic theory. Modern generative grammar identifies the area of linguistic study situated in the typical individual human mind but fails to substantivize it in a social and dialogical real world. Generative grammarians leave that task to a psycholinguistics that they recognize and to a sociolinguistics whose legitimacy they have consistently denied (without any reasoned discourse explaining the basis of this denial). In contrast, Bhartrhari's sphota theory underpins the possibility of situating the work of the grammar in the hearer's mind. The switch from the speaker's mind to the hearer's is decisive. The hearer's mind considers the social context of dialogue, the actions of the speaker, and the grammatical underpinnings of these actions. Bhartrhari's account follows the hearer and thus brings all these considerations into the linguistic picture. Since Bhartrhari's listener is seen as assuming that the speaker uses a grammar to build the sentence, a
substantivist (sphota-based) account is only partly comparable to the purely listener-centred view of Kempson:2001. However, her work on dynamic syntax is of course a major contemporary contribution to the linguistics of listening and must form part of the reconsideration of methodology suggested here.

Crucially, a Bhartrharian approach can be implemented today in terms of how the conceptual (LF) apparatus of the listener can allow for perceptual (PF) deviations or variations in order to be "generous" as a way of reconstituting the LF speech-intentions that the listener can reasonably attribute to the speaker. This type of approach is perhaps compatible with some of the mechanics in a minimalist account. In that case dialogue with such accounts remains possible and of interest.

3.6 Whole over part' view: -
Bhartrhari's Vaakyapadiiyam instantiates a consistent primacy for the whole over the parts. This stand is radically different from the structuralist position as well as that of minimalism. The difference between Bhartrhari and the structuralist lies in their respective approaches to the social reality. Bhartrhari is following the typical listener's act of listening to a sentence-length utterance. The dialogical dyad of speaker and listener encapsulates for him what grammar needs to represent as the social nature of language. In contrast, the structuralist claims that a speaker, by using sounds and words drawn from a particular inventory of phonemes or of signs, projects a social congregation of fellow speakers who use just the same inventory. Thus the structuralist places the language in the socially shared common inventory of sounds and signs, and not in the person's free exercise of his or her right to combine these into sentences. The reason is that a structuralistic account excludes free actions from its purview. To compose and utter a sentence is, for structuralism, a free personal act.
In Bhartrhari’s view, a sentence too is unitary for the listener’s understanding. The flow of the sentence, perhaps most clearly embodied in its intonation contour, must therefore be described as unbroken at the level where grammar deals with the sentence as a whole. Such a whole must frame its parts. Such a framing enables this or that part to emerge as salient -- which is the topic of main interest in this study.

It is less easy to show exactly how Bhartrhari’s approach differs from the minimalist version of generative linguistic inquiry. Minimalism does allow a syntactic whole to frame a phrasal part along Bhartrharian lines, just as its Principles-and-Parameters predecessor theory did. But minimalist turns its "phase" (a revival of the classical transformational cycle) into a highly constrictive domain within which alone grammatical visibility is allowed to operate in any analysis. Bhartrhari’s approach is incompatible with the rigidity of the Phase Impenetrability Condition.

Consider, for instance, the interaction between the Interjection lol and the Surprise Peak /jiten/ in /o, prodip bhabchilo nira boleche JITEN thakte parche na!/ ‘oh, Pradip thought Nira said JITEN wouldn't be able to stay!’ Recall that such interaction cannot cross syntactic island boundaries (a long familiar fact, which, to save space, is not exemplified here). Therefore any minimalist account of the phenomenon must place the Interjection and some abstract copy of the Surprise Peak within the same Phase. Whatever coding devices one may use for this purpose, the intonation contour will still need to hold the speaker’s breath and the listener’s attention unbroken in a curve that stretches from lol all the way to /jiten/. Bhartrhari’s nonrigid approach gives the whole multicausal sentence carrying this intonation contour primacy over the parts lol and /jiten/ which interact.
The point is not confined to interactions within an utterance one sentence long. Bhartrhari’s whole over parts view of language orders successively larger constructions in a hierarchical fashion. Under this approach, a word is comprehended in the context of a sentence and a sentence in the context of a paragraph and so on. The interpretation of the elements of every linguistic level takes place in the context of the next higher level. In this system, there is scope for a hearer to understand the meaning of any utterance jumping (if need be) beyond the level where it occurs. This ‘whole over parts’ view equips us better than minimalism does to explain the phenomena of long-distance anaphors and logophors. It seems some strands of minimalist work place such matters outside the grammar. Once minimalists offer their account of this domain “outside grammar”, we may have to continue the debate with them in that new domain. Following Ruwet, we may wish to call that domain Hermeneutics.

3.7 Relating Bhartrhari and Ruwet: -

The affinity between Bhartrhari and the hermeneutic approach due to Ruwet is primarily observed in the way they deal with the linguistic elements against the setting of levels of linguistic description. For both of them a whole has primacy over its parts. For Bhartrhari, varna-sphota and pada-sphota exist as ancillaries of analyzing a sentence only to get into the vaakya-sphota, his primary concern. However, at the levels of varna and pada, each of them is considered as a whole in its own right. One more point is worthy of notice in this system and this takes Ruwet even closer to Bhartrhari. The approach they both adopt to the issues of level hierarchy and of the centrality of the listener allows pragmatics to interpenetrate closely with the system of linguistics proper, their work sets every stretch of speaking in a larger linguistic as well as social context; pragmatics for them transgresses the limits of a sentence quite often. The current syntactic theory allows interplay between two sentences when they are clubbed together as clauses under a
complex sentence head. But there is no formal mechanism available in such systems that can arrange any formal relations between one whole sentence and another whole sentence. The speech-act theory of Grice-Austin-Searle is primarily concerned with a single sentence. Though the conversational implicatures of Grice essentially guide how a conversation can be efficient and hearer-friendly, still the theory has limitations on its formal goals. The trans-sentential perspective of Bhartrhari can fulfill some needs unmet under those approaches. Once we can relate sentence to sentence, larger units of discourse such as paragraphs, chapters and texts can be included in the domain of this line of study.

The hermeneutic approach as taken by Ruwet is mainly concerned with the study of texts based on the interaction of 'grammatical understanding' and 'psychological understanding' (Friedrich Schleiermacher: 1834), thus following Bhartrhari and giving the human participants of a discourse the highest place. A hearer-centred study of linguistics and text analysis combining these two lines will lead us to envisage language as a dimension of human life without sacrificing results based on the formal problem approach.

3.8 Conclusion: -
This was by way of theoretical groundwork for the present study including some review of relevant literature. I stop now and proceed to the next empirical chapter on the non-finite verbal participles. The concept of blocking, which is empirically discussed in the next chapter, invites a trans-sentential framework of grammatical study of the sort indicated here. Another major move which has been made in this chapter is the shifting of focus of the grammatical analysis of a sentence from an abstract level of competence to the generosity of a real-life hearer. The full potential of this approach to cognition will become clearer, one hopes, in connection with the empirical material to be considered next.