Chapter-3

MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY DURING PERESTROIKA
3.1. Origin of Military Security During Perestroika

Military aspects of security played a subdued role in Gorbachev's concept of common security, which was enshrined, in the 27th CPSU Congress of 1986. He tried to ensure the security of the Soviet Union through the security of the entire world. Security under perestroika stressed more on 'comprehensive universal security' i.e. common security, than on national security. Changes had to be brought in the national military policies and strategies for materialising this dream and under Gorbachev's leadership, Soviet national security was intertwined with the concept of 'comprehensive universal security'. Though during this phase, concept of security bore the stamp of political and economic colour but military aspects of security could not be underrated. He brought radical changes in the military thinking on security. Unlike his predecessors, he de-emphasized on defence build up and the development of nuclear capability of the Soviet Union. He realized that the entire world was on the brink of nuclear war. The only panacea to save the world was to reduce the defence build up of the Soviet Union and the West.

The 27th Party Congress became a watershed in Soviet defence agenda after which one doctrinal principle after another was subject to review, discussion and revision. From that point on Gorbachev's New Political Thinking on security grew by accretion. What compelled to revise Soviet military doctrine and to go for a new military doctrine and strategy? Some Western scholars argued that Soviet leadership since 1966 had
systematically been altering doctrine to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war. Soviet security changed under perestroika was nothing but a logical extension of Soviet military strategic trends spanning the last twenty years.¹ Others had suggested that deterministic forces within Soviet society produced an inevitable and irreversible shift in doctrine. In particular, a shift from extensive economic growth to intensive growth, and the expansion of the Soviet “intellectual class” — for whom defense occupied lower priority were seen as important engine of change. Besides this factor, his personality factor particularly his perceptions, impressions, recollects, biases and above all interest to change for a better world affected significantly the Soviet defence agenda.

Of the many factors contributing to change in the Soviet security under perestroika, those had the most important impact, were of course the mix of economic reforms and institutional changes that had been occurring over the past several years. The nature of defense burden and its weight in the Soviet economy compelled Gorbachev to change and innovate new military policy that would satisfy the need to change the economy and satisfy the military at the same time. Gorbachev further realized that in building the political, economic and social bases underlying Soviet super power status were intimately tied to economic reform that in turn had

important implications for defense.\textsuperscript{2} Seen in this light, security of Soviet Union under \textit{perestroika} was perceived more as a product of instrumental necessity than of military strategic enlightenment.

3. 2. Components of Military Security During Perestroika

Given its instrumental origin, it was not surprising that the defence agenda under \textit{perestroika} had emerged in a piecemeal fashion rather than as a master blue-print, designed once and for all times to come. Nevertheless, by 1987, Gorbachev's new political thinking on security had been clearly expressed. In the military sphere, the concept of security stressed:

- \textit{Renunciation of War}: No war including nuclear war could be considered a rational continuation of politics; and inadvertent paths to nuclear war were as likely as, if not more likely than, deliberate paths.

- \textit{Prevention of Arms Race and Destruction of Chemical Weapons} was a fundamental component of Soviet military doctrine.

- \textit{Security is Mutual}: Soviet security could not be enhanced by increasing other State's insecurity.

- \textit{Reasonable Sufficiency} should be the basis for the future development of the combat capabilities of the Soviet armed forces.

\footnote{Snyder, op.cit., p. 113.}
- **Defensive Defense**: Soviet military thinking should give priority to defensive (non-provocative) defence, not offensive capabilities and operations.

- **Disbandment of Military Alliance.**

- **Reduction of Military Budget.**

3. 2.i. Renunciation of War

Soviet security, under *perestroika*, stressed on the idea of renunciation of war as the then Soviet leader Gorbachev was the first political leader who realized the futility of nuclear war and tried his best to renounce war for the survival of humanity. In his words: "We want a world free of war, without arms race; nuclear weapons and violence; not only because this is an optimal condition for our internal development. It is an objective global requirement that stems from the realities of the present day". As the world was living in an atmosphere of nuclear threat, stockpiling of weapons especially missiles made the situation more precarious and the war might breakout for a slight human error, so steps for renouncing war was inevitable. In this context Gorbachev said:

> "Everyone seems to agree that there would be neither winners nor losers in such a war. There would be no survivors. It is a mortal threat for all. Although the prospect of death in a nuclear war is undoubtedly the most appalling".

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4 Ibid., p. 11.
scenario possible, the issue is broader than that. The spiraling arms race, coupled with the military political realities of the world and the persistent traditions of pro-nuclear political thinking impedes cooperation between countries and people – which East and West agree- is indispensable if the world’s nations want to preserve nature intact, to ensure the rational use of and reproduction of her resources and, consequently, to survive as benefits human beings".\(^5\)

Gorbachev's efforts for a nuclear free and safe world were positive direction in this regard. On January 15, 1986, the Soviet Union announced programme for the stage by stage elimination of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction.

At the first stage, Soviet Union and USA would reduce half of the nuclear weapons from their stockpiles, while complete ban would be imposed on the development, testing and deployment of space strike weapons. The intermediate-range missiles of the USSR and USA located in Europe would be scrapped.\(^6\) At the second stage, the other nuclear powers would join the disarmament process initially by freezing their arsenals and agreeing not to transfer nuclear weapons to other countries. Secondly, the Soviet Union and the United States froze their tactical arsenals and move to eliminate remaining medium range forces, while all other froze their tactical arsenals. Thirdly, he took steps for banning nuclear testing by all countries and banning space strike weapons by leading industrial nations. At the third stage, Gorbachev tried for abolishing

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\(^5\) Ibid., p. 12.

remaining nuclear weapons. Thus he mapped out a stage by stage plan for nuclear disarmament.\textsuperscript{7}

From Gorbachev's approach to disarmament, arms control and peace initiatives, it was revealed that he was genuinely interested in the renunciation of war. He felt that "security can no longer be assured by military means – neither by the use of arms or deterrence nor by continued perfection of the "sword" and the "shield". Attempts to achieve military superiority are preposterous. Now such attempts are made in space. It is an astonishing anachronism, which persists due to the inflated role played by the militarists in politics. From the security point of view the arms race has become an absurdity because its very logic leads to the destabilization of international relations and eventually to a nuclear conflict. Diverting huge resources from other priorities, the arms race is lowering the level of security, impairing it. It is in itself an enemy of peace. The only way to security is through political decisions and disarmament. In our age genuine and equal security can be guaranteed by constantly lowering the level of strategic balance from which nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction should be completely eliminated".\textsuperscript{8}

3.2. ii. Prevention of Arms Race and Destruction of Chemical Weapons


\textsuperscript{8} Gorbachev, \textit{Perestroika}, op.cit., p. 141.
The second idea behind the proposal of 27th CPSU Congress in the military sphere stressed on it. Before Gorbachev, this idea was also mooted. As long as June 19, 1946, the Soviet Union proposed a convention prohibiting the production and use of atomic weapons at a session of the International Atomic Energy Commission which had been created in accordance with the resolution of the General Assembly of UN. But this plan was rejected, as the United States did not favour it.

After that Soviet Union also submitted several proposals to avert the danger of nuclear war; but the proposals were not accepted as imperialist powers turned cold shoulders to such recommendations. But when Gorbachev came to power, he consistently tried to implement it.\(^9\) His new political thinking on security was the formal shift in emphasis in military doctrine to prevent war. The inclusion of war-prevention, as a strategic goal, in Soviet military doctrine during the perestroika phase changed the military aspect of security by giving greater weightage to politico-military consideration (such as strategic stability) and politico-diplomatic efforts such as arms control and actions that reduced regional and international tension.\(^10\) As far as strategic stability was concerned, his efforts for disarmament and arms control were positive in this direction. He concluded

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\(^10\) Stephen M. Meyer, "The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking on Security" in Sean M. Lynn Jones et.al., *Soviet Military Policy*, op.cit., p.120.
several treaties and agreements with USA and other European powers for preventing arms race and maintaining global peace and security. In this perestroika phase, international treaties, and legal documents like Helsinki Final Act, Geneva, Reykjavik, INF treaties played a decisive role in the military sphere of security. Gorbachev not only tried for implementation of the security proposals but also made it a code of conduct for all practical purposes. Gorbachev's security doctrine was the manifestation of his deep understanding of the security issues of the world and keen desire to share responsibility with other powers.\footnote{Pravda, October 15, 1986.}

His efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear war, to prevent a race in space strike arms and to stop the arms race on earth got a practical touch in Geneva Summit concluded on November 19-21, 1985 by both the super powers. But ultimately it did not yield any concrete result as USA decided not to stop its Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) programme. No doubt the spirit of this Summit played an important role for easing out tension from Europe and the world.\footnote{The Soviet-US Summit, November 1985, Geneva, (Moscow: Novosti Press, 1985).}
The next important Summit was concluded at Reykjavik on 11-12 October 1986 between Reagan and Gorbachev. Gorbachev submitted several proposals to American President Reagan for making a nuclear free world possible. The first proposal was on strategic offensive weapons. He declared his readiness to have these cut by fifty per cent in the course of the next five years. He also proposed that the strategic weapons on land, water and in the air i.e. ballistic land based missiles, sea-launched missiles and aircraft would be halved, fairly and equally. The second proposal of Gorbachev at the Reykjavik Summit meeting was dealt with medium-range nuclear missiles. He suggested to Reagan that both Soviet and American missiles of this class in Europe be completely eliminated. Since Britain and France opposed inclusion of their nuclear weapons in the general count during the negotiations between USA and Soviet Union, Gorbachev accepted this position at Reykjavik. Soviet Union also agreed to freeze missiles with a range of less than 1000 km and to begin talks on their future. Soviet Union also accepted the American proposal to limit the number of medium range missiles deployed in the Asian part of the Soviet Union. The third proposal was to strengthen the regime of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and achieved a nuclear test ban. USA did not give a positive response to Gorbachev’s defence proposal as it did not want to limit its SDI programme because of its commitment to the ABM. But the Soviet Union wanted the ‘Star Wars’ programme of US to somehow not be allowed to proceed on planned. This meeting was useful as it paved new ways for
further discussion between two powers on the important issues of security
and disarmament of the Europe and the world.\textsuperscript{13}

Another important area where he tried for solution was Euro-missiles
issue. Gorbachev spoke about "reduction and eventual elimination of the
tactical nuclear weapons, to be coupled with a drastic reduction of the
armed forces and conventional weapons; withdrawal of offensive weapons
from direct contact in order to rule out the possibility of a surprise attack;
and a change in the entire pattern of armed forces with a view to imparting
an exclusively defensive character to them at a meeting in Prague.
Proposals on that score were detailed in Budapest programme of the
Warsaw Treaty organization".\textsuperscript{14}

Soviet Union and other Warsaw Treaty countries announced a major
confidence building measure in the spirit of 'New Thinking' concerning their
military doctrine, which was strictly defensive in all its components at a
meeting of their political consultative committee in Berlin in May 1987.
Soviet Union also took efforts for creating Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
(NWFZ) and zone free from chemical weapons as they would help in
strengthening the security of Europe. He also accepted gladly the offer of
the GDR, Czechoslovakian and West German government to create a
nuclear free corridor in Central Europe. Another important milestone in the

\textsuperscript{13} The Result and Lessons of Reykjavik, (Moscow: Novosti Press, 1986), p. 29. see for
further details, Gorbachev, Perestroika, op. cit., pp. 236-240.

\textsuperscript{14} Gorbachev, Perestroika, op.cit., p. 203.
area of nuclear disarmament was the historic visit of Gorbachev to Washington where he signed famous INF Treaty with USA in December 1987.

As far as military aspect of security under perestroika was concerned, the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) treaty was essentially a unique document. It was unique in the sense that the agreements concluded between the USSR and USA in this field in the past dealt with the limitation of arms, but the new treaty provided for the actual reduction and physical destruction of part of the nuclear arsenals possessed by both the super powers.

Following were the important decisions taken in INF agreement –

- INF forces comprising of two categories of land-based, intermediate and shorter-range missiles stationed in nine European countries were to be destroyed. It included SS-20, SS-4 and 387 shorter-range missiles (SS23s, SS22s and SS12s deployed by USSR and 429 US Pershing II and ground launched cruise missiles.

- This treaty also provided for cutting down of 50% of their conventional weapons and to abandon secrecy by setting a new standard for rigorous intensive verification of nuclear arms reduction agreement.15 The President of US paid return visit to Moscow in May 1988 and Gorbachev went to USA again in December 1988. The decisions of this important treaty were implemented and the

destruction of those missiles actually took place in early summer 1988 under mutual supervision which indeed ushered a new era in global peace and security.\textsuperscript{16}

George Bush also responded positively to the peace initiatives from the side of the Soviet Union. In September 1989, he agreed to a Summit meeting with the leader of Soviet Union and signed a joint agreement with the USSR for substantial destruction of chemical weapons. This important decision was taken after USSR dropped its insistence to link up joint initiative for Strategic Arms Reduction Talk (START) with the scrapping of Strategic Arms Defence Initiative (SDI) programme.\textsuperscript{17} Gorbachev met Bush in December 1989 at a short notice in a ship off the Coast of Island State of Malta. Though there was no fixed agenda but it was significant in a sense Gorbachev declared that Cold War was over. Malta Summit was followed by Washington Summit who was held in June 1990. Import decision relating to the destruction of chemical weapons was taken in this Summit.

On October 5, 1991, Soviet President Gorbachev responded positively to the nuclear reduction initiative of Bush with his own initiative. He agreed to match US demands. He destroyed Soviet nuclear artillery, short-range missiles and landmines and also shifted war-heads for air-defence missile from deployment areas and stored or destroyed them and


removed bombers from alert duty and stored their nuclear weapons at storage depots. Moreover, he removed from alert duty all those ICBMs slated for retirement under the START treaty and removed tactical nuclear weapons like ships, submarines and land based air craft from naval forces. He created a single unified strategic command and removed 6 SSBN with 92 SLBMs from operational duty (Five Yankee-I vessels and the only Yankee-II submarine were included). Gorbachev declared that the USSR would reduce its strategic forces to a level of 5000, i.e., 1000 fewer than required by the START treaty and challenged the USA to match this additional reduction. He announced that 503 ICBMs including 137 MIR ved missiles, would be removed from operational alert duty, thus eliminating 1094 warheads from the available force. This included 366 SS-11 and SS-13 missiles, 47 SS-17s and 90 SS-19 missiles, all of which were slated for retirement under the START treaty.

Gorbachev agreed to remove all tactical naval nuclear weapons from ships, submarines and land-based aircraft bases, but suggested elimination of them altogether unlike Bush's idea of storing them. Gorbachev proposed removing tactical air delivered bombs and missiles from forward deployed units and storing the warheads at separate bases. In addition to announcing Soviet strategic cuts to 1000 accountable

18 Gorbachev used the figure of 134 MIR red missile but this was corrected later as 137. see "Nuclear Note Book", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, (March 1992), p. 49.

19 Ibid.
warheads below the START Treaty limits, he proposed that both powers proceed to negotiate additional cuts of one-half in their strategic weapons. Soviet Union and USA also agreed to stop the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. Finally, Soviet Union announced a one-year moratorium on nuclear testing and proposed that other nations should do likewise. In this phase, Gorbachev announced the cancellation of several modernization and deployment programmes. He said that Research and Development (R&D) would cease for a new short-range missile for the bomber fleet and for a new mobile SICBM. The rail mobile SS-24 was frozen at the existing level and no R&D would continue for a follow on missile. Gorbachev announced that the SS-24 would be confined to its three permanent garrison and not deployed in a dispersed manner.\(^{20}\)

The United States and the Soviet Union had been negotiating since 1973 for the reduction of conventional forces in central Europe but this negotiation known as the Mutual and Balanced Force (MBFR) talks had made little progress. The major disagreement was over verification measures that impeded this process. But when Gorbachev came to power, Soviet officials had publicly indicated greater flexibility on the verification issues, called for major reduction in forces and urged the expansion of the geographic area covered by the talks and claimed that asymmetries should be corrected. On December 7, 1988, Gorbachev announced for unilateral

reduction of 500,000 men and 10,000 tanks from Soviet forces. After four rounds of talks on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) the two leaders exhibited their desire for the reduction of these forces.

The first round lasted until 23 March 1989 and Gorbachev gave figures for total Soviet force levels. He said that on 1 January 1989 they numbered 4.25 million and after the completion of the unilateral reduction would be down to 3.76 million, at which time those would be approximate parity with NATO. Before the beginning of the 2nd round talk on CFE, Gorbachev had given a public version of the reductions being sought by the Warsaw Pact by 1996-97 at a meeting in Moscow with the U.S. Secretary of State, James Baker. A rough account for aircraft trade off was implicit in the figures he gave: 1,350,000 men should remain on each side along with 1,500 strike aircraft, 1,700 combat helicopters, 20,000 tanks, 24,000 assorted artillery system and 28,000 assorted vehicles. On May 25, the Warsaw Pact gave a proposal incorporating Gorbachev's figures into sub-ceilings of troops and equipment for single countries and foreign deployments as well as alliance totals, and ceiling for three geographical sub-zones as well as for the entire Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU) region. In subsequent round of talks with USA he took efforts for the reduction of the troops, helicopters, air-crafts and combat air-crafts from both the sides. He


also took steps for reducing troops from GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland.\textsuperscript{23}

The second part of the programme for the creation of all-embracing system of international security proposed by 27\textsuperscript{th} CPSU Congress dealt with the problem of chemical weapons. After World War I, there was lot of discussions to ban chemical weapons. Even on 28 March 1972, the socialist countries submitted to the Committee on Disarmament the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. In 1976, the USSR and USA started bilateral talks concerning the prohibition of chemical weapons. But no concrete progress has been achieved till mid-\textsuperscript{80}s. Touching upon this issue, Gorbachev in his speech on 15\textsuperscript{th} January 1986 stated that the task of eliminating chemical weapons in this century is feasible. In April 1986, the USSR advanced a set of proposed on the elimination of the industrial base for the production of chemical weapons, and these proposals made it possible to unite one of the tightest knots at the negotiation. During summer of this year at the 40 Nations' Conference on Disarmament, the Soviets agreed in principle to allow foreign inspectors to witness dismantling of chemical arms factories by accepting the proposal of U.S.A. In November of the same year, the Soviet side came up with a proposal for preventing the production of chemical weapons in the commercial (civilian) industry.

In the year 1987, the Soviet Union offered new proposals relating to the chemical disarmament. In February of that year, the Soviet Union announced its willingness to declare the location of all the chemical weapon stockpiles shortly after a treaty is signed and a willingness to accept inspections on short notice of suspected chemical weapon facilities, except in case where supreme national interest would be jeopardized. On April 1987, Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union had stopped the production of chemical weapons and had no such weapons beyond its borders. At the same time he declared that a special plant was being constructed to destroy such weapons. In October Western officials visited Soviet chemical weapons production facility at Shikhary but the progress was not up to mark as controlling and eliminating chemical weapons was not an easy task as it needed the involvement of many other nations in the process of negotiation.

3.2. iii. Security is Mutual

Since the end of the Second World War, Soviet military doctrine was based on the principle of deterrence by defence. Soviet leaders and strategic experts realized that Soviet security could be ensured by increasing the insecurity of its neighbours and other nations. So, the defence policy was designed to carry out this objective. But Gorbachev who was inspired by the work of Palme Commission redefined Soviet

24 Arnett, op.cit., p. 289.
perceptions of national security by introducing his new thinking in Soviet defence and foreign policy calculation. He viewed that Soviet security must be intertwined with American and global security. It was clearly revealed when he answered to questions “You asked me what is the primary thing that defines Soviet-American relations. I think it is the immutable fact that whether we like one another or not, we can either survive or perish only together”.

Soviet strategic experts also adopted Gorbachev’s line of thought. The editorial of a leading confidential military journal assessed his defence policy positively:

“Security in the nuclear age must be evaluated differently. Assessing security is more and more becoming a political task. It can only be resolved by political means through détente, disarmament, strengthening confidence, and developing international cooperation. It is unthinkable and even criminal to seek to resolve the problems of security in an arms race, perfecting the ‘shield’ and the ‘sword’.

Thus, his approach of mutual security, which was an antithesis of unilateral security, was based on the premise that meaningful, stable and psychologically reassuring security could never be possible through the efforts of individual states. Mutual security considered both sides hostages

25 “Mikhail Gorbachev’s Answers to Questions put by Time Magazine”, Novosti Press Release, (Moscow, 1985), p. 5

to the nuclear arms race. The only way out of this relationship was to strengthen security through cooperation and mutual friendship. Mutual security accepted on a fact that in the nuclear era security of a nation could not be achieved at the expense of the other.\textsuperscript{27} If one side felt its security was threatened or damaged by the actions of other, such is the threat perceived by the United States from Soviet heavy missiles and by Europe from Soviet SS20 or by the Soviet Union from America’s Pershing II intermediate range or MX ICBM, then it would take compensatory actions that in turn might be perceived by the other side as reducing its own security.\textsuperscript{28} In the words of Gorbachev:

"In the context of the relations between the USSR and the USA, security can only be mutual and if we take international relations as a whole it can only be universal... it is vital that all should feel equally secure, for the fears and anxieties of the nuclear age generate on the predictability in politics".\textsuperscript{29}

The implications of mutual security for the military policy and the conduct of US-Soviet relations were profound. The idea of mutual security tried to lessen the threats by mutual actions. Gorbachev and Reagan outrightly rejected the deterrence theory and agreed to reduce the nuclear weapons from both sides as they realized it could only increase the sense of security. They took steps for the reduction of nuclear weapons,

\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Tass Press Release, July 28, 1986.}


\textsuperscript{29} Gorbachev’s Political Report to 27\textsuperscript{th} CPSU Congress, 1986, (Moscow: Novosti Press, 1986), p. 74.
conventional forces from Europe and destination of chemical weapons as explored earlier. So, the steps taken by USSR and USA for disarmament clearly expressed the significance of interdependence in ensuring security. According to Gorbachev: “Today, world nations are interdependent, like mountain climbers attached to one rope. They can either climb together to the summit or all fall into the abyss”.  

Both the leaders realized that earlier military doctrine which viewed security dilemma as a zero-sum game was no more relevant; rather the mutual efforts and joint initiatives were the only way for the solution of the global problems. In this context, Gorbachev further said:

“The Soviet Union alone cannot resolve all these issues. And we are not ashamed to repeat this, calling for international cooperation. We say with full responsibility casting away the false considerations of ‘prestige’ that all of us in the present day world are coming to depend more and more on one another and are becoming increasingly necessary to one another”.

3.2. iv. Doctrine of Reasonable Sufficiency: Its Relevance

Doctrine of reasonable sufficiency, which was a new doctrine in Soviet strategic thinking first, appeared in 27th CPSU Congress when Gorbachev endorsed a military strategy of rational sufficient defence. In

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31 Gorbachev, Perestroika, op.cit., p.137.
May 1987, the meaning of sufficiency was elaborated in Warsaw Pact meeting where he unveiled this new doctrine of reasonable sufficiency characterizing the pact policy. Gorbachev asserted that "Warsaw Treaty signatories have clearly stated their military doctrine, one that is subordinated to the task of preventing both nuclear and conventional war, is oriented on reasonable sufficiency in both volume and nature of arms and armed forces, and is exclusively defensive in nature". The objective of this military doctrine is to maintain global peace and security through minimum defence arrangement by keeping strategic parity with USA at low level. The principal difference between the old and new version of Soviet military doctrine was summarized by Colonel General M.A. Gareyev, a Deputy Chief of the Soviet General staff and a leading military theorist at a press briefing this way: "What is new here is the fact that, whereas military doctrine used to be defined as a system of views of the preparation for war and the waging of war, its substance is now based on the prevention of war. The task of preventing war is becoming the supreme goal, the nucleus of military doctrine, the basic function of the state and the armed forces. Of course, a world war must be prevented chiefly by political means, but this must also be reflected in defensive activity. The chief essence of the political aspect of our military doctrine is that socialism unconditionally

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rejects war as a means of resolving inter-state political, economic and ideological differences". 33

The clearest elaboration of this doctrine of reasonable sufficiency was written by Lev Semeyko, a senior researcher at the Institute for the study of USA and Canada, in the newspaper Izvestia in August of 1987. He argued that old strategic thinking "more is better" in security affairs which stressed on the military dominance over opponent was the necessary condition for victory in a war. But this new doctrine outrightly rejected this notion and recognized that it was no more relevant in the present world. According to Semeyko, it had three dimensions: political, military-technical and economic.

The political aspect, which dealt with the non-aggressive orientation of Soviet military doctrine, tried to solve security issues through political means i.e. through arms control, disarmament etc. The military dimension of reasonable sufficiency was linked with several other principles of the new political thinking on security. The military potentiality of the Soviet Union must be sufficient to face any attack under the worst imaginable conditions and to reliably rebuff the aggression unleashed by the West, but it must not be so great as to threaten the security of other nations. There should not be unreasonable surplus of military potential. It should also be

33 Ibid., pp.165-166.
manifested in the structure, character composition and deployment of the Soviet forces. Marshall Akhromeyev also highlighted on this dimension of reasonable sufficiency. According to him, in the event of aggression, the main type of military operation by our armed forces would be defensive in nature. He also emphasized on the defensive way to challenge the enemy.

The economic dimension of reasonable sufficiency recognized that there was a law of diminishing returns in the arms race. Marginal increase of military power came at ever-greater cost. However, those increments of military power added very less to the military capability of the state.

So, the strategic experts who were supporters of the doctrine of reasonable sufficiency argued that Soviet Union should not go for huge expenditure on defence as compelled by USA to maintain parity with USA as it would wreck the Soviet economy and threaten the security of the world. Thus, the doctrine of reasonable sufficiency highlighted the lowest possible level of strategic parity for maintaining genuine security. Gorbachev mentioned that strategic parity had already been achieved and the existing correlation of military forces had to be maintained. Of course, he admitted the existence of asymmetries between two forces for which steps had to be taken to correct it. This doctrine also tried to maintain


35 Steven Adragna, op.cit., p.169.
parity between NATO and Warsaw. According to the Defence Minister of Soviet Union, Yazov, it could be possible only through the reduction of defence potential of the West.\textsuperscript{36} Soviet Union solely relied on reciprocity for reducing military weapons and they assumed that NATO should cut its military forces to meet the sacrifices made by Warsaw countries in order to maintain strategic parity at lower level. It could be only possible through diplomacy of disarmament.\textsuperscript{37} This conclusion fitted well with the repeated Soviet statement that the internal security must be preserved through arms reduction from both the sides and reorganization of the inter-state system that would cease the confrontational postures of the West and the East.\textsuperscript{38} This doctrine also tried to ensure the security of the Soviet Union and other Warsaw countries in case of a sudden attack by the West for which they must have enough potential to face this eventuality.

So, the Kremlinologist had highlighted on the three basic requirements:

- The enemy forces who played the role of an aggressor must be stopped at the border of the Soviet empire and instantly be thrown back to its territory;


\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.
• The Soviet homeland must be protected from the external aggression which would cause damage to its political, economic stability and territorial integrity;

• The belligerent attitude of the enemy must be dealt with a heavy hand by destroying the aggression; hence Soviet military superiority was required in the European theatre.39

Vladimir Lobov of Soviet Union clearly elaborated this idea of 'defensive sufficiency', "What we mean by reasonable or defensive sufficiency is not simply a reduction in troops and armaments but a thorough revision of modernization program and redeployment of forces, primarily with the aim of greatly strengthening country's defence on a long-term basis".40 Another important aspect of this defensive sufficiency was counter-offensive in case of extreme situation. In this context, General Yazov said:

"The defence cannot defeat an aggressor on its own. Therefore, after repulsing the attack, troops and naval forces must be capable of carrying out a decisive offensive. The transition to the offensive will take the form of counter offensive, which must be carried out in a complex and tense situation or combat with well armed opponent".41


40 Alexi Arbatov, "How much defence is sufficient", International Affairs, (April 1989), pp. 31-44.

41 Quoted in Holden, Soviet Military Reform, op.cit., p. 80. Similar views are also expressed by Colonel General Gareyev, Lt. General Vladimir Serebryannikov and the Chief of the Staff of the Warsaw Pact General Lobov.
The writings of the scholar of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) and IUSAC threw enough light on the several aspects of this doctrine. This doctrine stressed on minimum deterrence; it would accelerate the process of arms control talks by creating a favourable atmosphere; it would be helpful for strengthening the economic situation of Soviet Union by reducing nuclear and other weapons through negotiation; and it favoured qualitative improvement of weapons by rejecting the old approach of quantitative parity.\(^{42}\)

The operational aspect of this doctrine largely depended on the response of the West. But this response was not up to Soviet expectation. It was slow and even some times Americans were not ready to reduce their weapons and missiles from the sides of the Soviet Union. No doubt the hawkish attitudes of the Americans compelled Gorbachev to think about the ways to strengthen the defence mechanism of Soviet Union. But he was not at all in favour of offensive operation and his only intention was to safeguard Soviet Union by repelling the aggressor in case of attack. In this context, Mikhail Moiseyev said:

"Hundreds of American military bases surrounding the territory of Soviet Union, US carrier task forces, carrier based air craft and naval forces, in which the US has substantial advantage over the Soviet navy are constant source of anxiety to us. The sea launched Cruise missile which the US is unwilling to reduce and the deployment of Stealth air launched Cruise missiles, which are undoubtedly a first strike

\(^{42}\) Alexi Arbatov, "How much defence is sufficient?", *International Affairs*, (April 1989), pp. 31-44.
weapon, represent a growing danger. Can all this be qualified within the category of peaceful intentions?".  

Whatever might be the intentions of Americans, he was ready to convince them to go for arms control. Even he was prepared for unilateral cuts in defence expenditure and withdrawal of equipment’s and troops from the Soviet periphery in conjunction with achieving reasonable sufficiency. As Moiseyev stated:

"The reductions will be made on a unilateral basis. By agreement with our allies in the WTO we have made the decision to withdraw six tank divisions from the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Hungary and to disband them by 1991. The Soviet forces in those countries will be cut by 50,000 persons and their arms by 5,000 tanks. In addition, in the Europe part of our country and on the territory of our European allies, the Soviet armed forces will be reduced by 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery and 800 combat air craft".  

It is important to note that the doctrine of reasonable sufficiency envisioned the most finite deterrence on both the nuclear and conventional level: a parity in defence potential. This doctrine on the nuclear level aimed at reducing nuclear weapons to a minimum level for which he signed several treaties with USA. The INF treaty was of course a radical shift in Soviet arms control policy. For the first time, Soviets had not only accepted asymmetrical reduction in missiles and warheads but also relinquished weapons system in which they were in advantageous position over the US. In addition the concept of reasonable sufficiency also envisioned reductions

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44 *Pravda*, December 8, 1988, p. 2.
on the conventional level. The genesis of reasonable sufficiency, like that of the New Thinking is rooted in a decision by the political leadership to achieve foreign and domestic reforms.

In summary, the increasing proliferation and lethality of the super power's nuclear arsenals helped Gorbachev in conceiving the doctrine of reasonable sufficiency in national defence. A careful analysis of Soviet doctrinal writings revealed that two decades of Soviet military thought had led logically to reasonable sufficiency on both nuclear and conventional level.

3.2.v. Disbandment of Military Alliances

Before the introduction of perestroika, both the military alliances i.e. Warsaw Pact and NATO were very active. Like NATO, Warsaw Pact played also an active role in defending the security of the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union and East European countries. But in the beginning of 1970s when Europe started moving towards institutionalization of the territories of the European States including East Europe, Warsaw took the initiative for proportional reduction of arms in Europe with NATO. After the mid 80s when Gorbachev assumed power, he drastically changed the concept of security by introducing changes in military strategy and defence
policies. No doubt his reform policies posed a challenge to both the alliance systems.\textsuperscript{45}

The 27\textsuperscript{th} Congress of CPSU dealt with "the disbandment of military alliances and as a stage towards this, renunciation of their enlargement and of the formation of new ones".\textsuperscript{46} This proposal on disbanding military organizations and military blocs had been repeatedly put forth by the Soviet Union separately and Warsaw Pact member States together. It was clearly revealed in one of the important proposals of the Berlin Declaration on May 31, 1987.

Eventual liquidation of the Warsaw Pact and NATO as an extension of the view that the "continuing division of Europe into opposing military blocs is abnormal", and supplanting them with an all embracing system of international security".\textsuperscript{47} But the West had ignored this proposal. In fact, it took steps in the other direction by expanding its sphere of action. Washington proposed various schemes for strengthening NATO. Even NATO countries went to the extent of claiming its responsibility for the situation in the Middle East and South Atlantic etc. Though it was opposed by some of its European members. When Soviet Union did not succeed in the dissolution of both NATO and Warsaw Pact; it decided with other


\textsuperscript{46} Gorbachev, Perestroika, op. cit., p. 231.

\textsuperscript{47} Izvestia, May 31, 1987, p.1.
Warsaw members to disband Warsaw Pact in 1991 as it lost its relevance under the impact of Gorbachev's grand design of new thinking.\(^48\)

No doubt, the disbandment of Warsaw Pact has tremendous impact on both West European and East European nations. Not only it has military implications, but also far reaching political and economic implications. It has drastically changed the political and economic equations of Russia (claimant of erstwhile Soviet Union) with East European countries. It has also replaced bipolar world for a uni-polar world order. Though it seems to be a New World Order but it is really not a New World Order, rather a world to be ordered.

3.2. vi. Reduction of Military Budget

The crisis of the 'militarized economy' coupled with the ideas of global peace and security forced Gorbachev to go for reduction in military budget. No doubt, before Gorbachev, several proposals were tabled by Soviet Union and its allies before UN General Assembly in 1973, 1976, 1978, 1982 to this effect. The Warsaw Pact countries also came forth with proposals for reducing military budget on a collective basis, even at the beginning of 1984, the Warsaw Pact countries came forth with detailed

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proposal on freezing and reducing military expenditure of States. But there had been no progress in this sphere due to opposition put up by NATO countries. But Gorbachev thought seriously in this direction and took concrete steps to solve this problem as he feared that unless his idea of ‘balanced proportional reduction of military budget’ materialized, there was risk of ‘serious destabilization of society’ as it would shatter the Soviet economy. In October 1988, the then Finance Minister, Boris Gostev, published an assessment that Soviet budget deficit stood at 38 billion roubles. By the following year this figure had risen to 100 billion roubles. The defence budget was considered as one of the most important area where some inroads might be made into the deficit. Gorbachev in his UN speech promised a cut of 14.2% in the military budget, although at this stage the size of that budget had not been announced. Gorbachev and other leaders also promised further military budget cuts.

There was unanimous official opinion for reducing defence spending though it was opposed non-officially by few military leaders. In February 1989, General Moiseev said, “To be blunt, we must also find ways of economising on defence”. Of course in early 1990 some strategic experts even Moiseev himself expressed his discontent on this issue. At the Congress of People’s Deputies Gorbachev announced 77.3

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49 “Komulyudi doveryaayut” in Pravda, 13 April, 1989.

50 Izvestia, 4 June 1989.
billion roubles figure for the military budget and proposal for a 14% cut in 1990-91. Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzkov also expressed his intention to cut the burden of military spending on national income by 33 to 50% by 1995. He further said that the USSR would press ahead with the conversion to civilian production of the defence industry. In late 1980s particularly after INF treaty, many military production plants in the USSR made civilian products. In this phase, funds were also cut for military research and development. This reduction of military budget had impact on the military budget of USA and other European nations. Though they did not come up to the expectation of Gorbachev, but the West, particularly USA decided to reduce their military expenditure in half in relation to GNP – i.e. to three per cent. No doubt the cut in defence expenditure helped in strengthening his idea of 'Comprehensive Universal Security' and paved the way for the solution of economic problems faced by numerous countries and peoples.

3.3. Internal Changes in Military Thinking Under Perestroika

Soviet concept of security under perestroika focussed its attention on 'Comprehensive Universal Security'. For attaining 'universal' or 'common security' changes were brought in both external and internal aspects of military thinking. Internal changes were made in military thinking to cater the needs of 'universal security'. There was a need for new institutions and ideas. The days of military-industrial complexes, the reigning ideas of old style ideologues and autarkic interests had begun to eclipse. Civilian defence intellectual reformists and supporters of liberalized
trade policies among the intelligentsia gained influence and tried to institutionalize the policy. During this phase Gorbachev brought drastic changes in Soviet armed forces and personnel, a drastic cut in resources aimed at slimming down the corpulent military bureaucracy. Unilateral reduction of Soviet troops coupled with proposal of further military troops cut through an agreement of CFE. The emphasis was on the training programme for officers and higher military education to defence personnel. Those were in top positions. There were proposals for adopting small voluntary army instead of universal military service. In the institutional level, he brought changes in the politburo, Defence Council and Central Committee Secretariat. His supporters occupied central position in military set up. He increased party's control over the military leadership in the politburo and defence council.

At the 27th Party Congress and at the successive Central Committee plenums, Sokolov, the institutional representative of the military, failed to attain voting membership in politburo and Marshall Ogarkov was sidelined. Gorbachev also replaced Sokolov with a relatively unknown army General Dimitri Yazov. During this time, Gorbachev occupied a key position by tightening his personal control over the entire military set up. He brought Anatolii Lukianev, Chief of the Central Committee (CC) General Department into CC Secretariat and gave him defence task to supervise the work of the CC administrative organs department, which dealt with appointments, promotion in the Ministry of Defence, the KGB and in the
Ministry of Internal Affairs. He also set up two departments for arms control, one in the MFA—the Administration for problems of Arms Reduction and Disarmament headed by Viktor Karpov—and the other, an Arms Control Sector in International Department (ID) of the CPSU Central Committee led by LT. General Viktor Starodabov.

As the emphasis was on quality rather than on quantitative factor in defence, so steps were taken to scrap majority of old ships and submarines for navy those needed special attention and more money for maintenance. Most of the 'New Thinkers' felt that there was the need of scientific and technological base rather than outdated technological base for strengthening Soviet defence. In this context, Shevardnadze said "any advantage enjoyed by the aggressor can be reduced to naught if the state possesses a developed industrial and scientific and technological base". For resuscitating the moribund economy of Soviet Union and also for maintaining global peace, arms control measure and reduction of military troops were carried out unilaterally in an effective way without waiting for the response of the West.

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51 Lukianov headed the General Department from 1985 until May 1987, when Gorbachev's aide for domestic affairs Valery Boldin was given this new assignment. It is important to note that both Lukianov and Georgii Razumovskii, Gorbachev's Secretary for Cadres had close ties with General Secretary and were hand-picked by him for these positions.

During this phase of perestroika, not only Soviet Union but the members of Warsaw Pact also stretched their cooperation to accelerate the process of disarmament changing their offensive military doctrine and posture. Soviet and East European force reductions in Europe would amount to nearly 300,000 troops, 12,000 tanks, 9,130 artillery systems and 930 combat aircraft. In this stage decision was also taken to reduce Soviet military personnel by 500,000 men including roughly 400,000 conscripts and 1,000 officers.

Another important military reforms was renewed emphasis on training. Many military officials and civilians occupied the fact that there was incompetent and useless people in Soviet defence. "It is no secret" commented one high ranking official, "that we have people that don't meet today's high requirements, they bring discredit to Soviet officers uniform." Akhromeyev also expressed similar opinion about the incompetence of

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53 On December 7, 1988, Gorbachev announced the USSR's intention to cut from the Soviet Armed Forces by the end of 1990: (1) half a million men, including 100,000 officers; (2) 10,000 tanks world wide, including six tank divisions (5,000 tanks) in the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Hungary; (3) one air assault brigade and all assault-landing bridging formations forward deployed in Eastern Europe; (4) nearly one-fifth of all Soviet armament production; and (5) the level of defence spending, by 14.2%. Moscow would reduce its troop strength by 12 per cent, including approximately 240,000 from Eastern Europe and the Western USSR, 200,000 Army and Navy personnel in the Far East and 60,000 personnel in the southern USSR. For details see "Restructuring in the USSR Armed Forces Toward Reasonable Sufficiency", Bratislava Pravda, February 23, 1989, in FBIS-SOV, March 2, 1989, and "Lebodev's Briefings before the press on Troops Reduction", TASS, December 22, 1988 in FBIS-SOV, December 23, 1988.


junior officers due to lack of skill and proper training. Corruption and drug addiction among officials made the situation even worse.

Yazov also introduced reforms, including reorganizing higher military schools, improving instruction through stricter certification of teachers and modifying the course structure. Some schools those lacked proper facilities and competitive environment were decided to be closed. There was also emphasis on higher military schools, which would produce skilled and intelligent officers.\(^{56}\)

In 1988, the most controversial matter relating to conscription and universal military service system was approved when restructuring in Soviet Armed Forces was going on. Various proposals were tabled for adopting a smaller, volunteer army, a conscripted territorial militia or combined cadre-militia system. There was much hue and cry inside the Soviet army against it. Military personnel opposed it with an apprehension that they might lose their jobs. Most of the senior officials saw this move as threatening to undermine the power and prestige of the military and exacerbating the already complicated recruiting problem.

The most realistic alternative for replacing conscription was a compromise cadre-militia system— "a relatively high-tech equipped, professionally trained and manned, predominantly volunteer cadre military

\(^{56}\) Krasnaia Zvezda, March 30, 1989, p. 4.
organization, supported by a broad network of territorial-militia formations." 57

But Soviet military officials opposed any move towards professional army as the threat of war had not vanished and the response of the USA to the peace initiatives of Soviet Union was also not up to mark. So, the conscription could provide adequate pool of reserves in case of war. 58 Secondly, the expense of moving towards voluntary army was exorbitant. Akhromeiev and Moiseyev both agreed on this point. Moiseyev declared that it would cost 'five to eight times' as much as the present system and later on he lowered his estimate to 'three to four times'. 59 Another small change related to the internal security forces was the creation of “special purpose detachments” in several cities to check mob and demonstrations. They were recruited mainly from former paratroopers and Spetsnaz soldiers with an average age above 30. They were well trained to curb mob with little physical force. 60

From the above analysis, it was clearly revealed that Soviet concepts of security, particularly its military aspects, underwent a radical change under perestroika. Perestroika changed both internal and external dimensions of security too. It was a fact that domestic, social and economic compulsion coupled with Gorbachev's ambition for a better world was the driving force behind such a change.

New thinkers (Vitaly Zhurkin, Sergei Karaganov, Andrei Kortunov, Zhillin, etc.), Old Thinkers (Yazov, Kostev, Varenikov, etc.) and even Western scholars studying Soviet security, accepted the inevitability of change, but there were differences of opinion among the scholars about the ways and means of achieving this desired objective. There was a debate between the New Thinkers and the Old Thinkers about the military aspects of security. On the other hand, most of the Western scholars were skeptical about the changes in the military field during this phase. New thinkers considered nuclear war as accidental whereas the old thinkers considered it deliberate. For them, the cold rational decision to initiate a nuclear strike was a remote possibility.⁶¹

In the new thinking, therefore, nuclear war was portrayed as a threat in its own right—irrespective of its political content. The greater danger, as

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⁶¹ See Vitaly Zhurkin, Sergei Karaganov and Andrei Kortunov, "Vyzovy bezopasnosti-staryei novyye", Kommunist, No.1 (1988), pp. 43-46. In Fall 1987 Gorbachev speech in Murmansk, noted that if one gauged the threat facing the Soviet Union by the rhetoric and statements of Western leaders, then the threat would not appear to be declining. However, he pointedly observed, such words are always forgotten in a few days.
one of the central committee consultant of that time put it (in most un-Marxist terms) was that "nuclear war could begin and without political decision". In other words, technology, not politics might be the cause of nuclear war. They tried to minimize the chance of nuclear war through maintaining strategic parity with USA at lower level. But the old thinkers disagreed with this notion as USA did not stop its belligerent attitudes even after Soviet leaders took peace initiatives. Secondly, new thinkers considered security as mutual and inter-dependent as no country could defend itself by military technical means alone, national international security were intertwined, the other side's security concerns must be taken into account. So, they expected a cordial response from the West. But the old thinkers rejected this premise that Soviet Union's effort to reduce military weapons and expectations of USA's cooperation in this regard would be interpreted as threatening to the security of the Soviet Union.

The most controversial idea relating to security was the 'doctrine of reasonable sufficiency'. Of course, there was general agreement among new and old thinkers that the Soviet defence posture should be based on sufficiency. But differences appeared when the issues of "What is

63 Ibid., p. 124.
64 Ibid., p. 128.
65 Brezhnev first raised the notion of sufficiency for defense in his Tula speech in 1977.
sufficient?” and “how is sufficiency to be determined?” were addressed. As this doctrine was confusing, it served Gorbachev’s best interests by making it a wild card, which could be applied according to the need of the time, so far as the operational aspect of this doctrine was concerned. The new thinkers favoured unilateral restructuring of Soviet forces without waiting for the West to agree to bring about mutual change in the number of forces, as they thought it would represent a net increase in Soviet security.⁶⁶ Even they argued unilateral reduction in combination with bilateral and multilateral action would strengthen Soviet security by reducing the overall level of the East-West military confrontation.⁶⁷ They thought there was no harm in resorting to asymmetric responses as it could neutralize the Western strategy of wrecking Soviet economy by compelling Soviet Union to buy inappropriate military products.

In contrast to new thinkers, old thinkers stressed on strict parity. This involved careful analysis, forecasting of Western military trends and timely procurement of forces needed to compensate for any deviations from strict parity.⁶⁸ Skeptics preferred to use the term, “defensive sufficiency” or “just sufficiency” instead of “reasonable sufficiency”. They emphasized importance of possessing every type of weapons, which could only make

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⁶⁷ This was not a widely shared perspective among new thinkers and some openly disagreed with their colleagues who advocated unilateral Soviet reductions in the name of reasonable sufficiency.
⁶⁸ Stephen Meyer, op.cit., p.133.
Soviet Union defensively sufficient to face any attack from the West. They argued that asymmetries in the European theatre needed to be corrected and unilateral reductions should be stopped, as such actions would not improve the security and rather they would magnify the threat.69

Internal military reforms during perestroika phase were also not free from contradictions. Military officials opposed the dominance of civilians on the military matters and criticized the ideas contained in a draft paper prepared by Supreme Soviet Committee on defence pointing out that Soviet army were already a "professional army working on the basis of a mix of voluntary and compulsory service. They also expressed their apprehensions about the material cost of the reforms suggested by the deputies group and opposed armed formations on national ethnic basis as it would do untold harm to the nation".70 Military officials, particularly old thinkers argued to moderate the pace of the military reforms; otherwise it might unsettle the military which was already worried by the internal changes in the military.71 Even they expressed their dissatisfaction about the defence budget cuts and reduction of military personnel in Soviet army. They founded an union named ‘Shield’ to defend their rights and tried to

69 Ibid., p.135.
70 Article in Krasnaya Zvezda (April 14, 1990).
71 Ibid.
make the new model army ‘free of bureaucracy, protectionism and nepotism, as well as of barrack-room bullying’. 72

The Western critics considered the changes in the military sphere as a hoax. ‘There was neither a methodology nor a system of criteria for defining security requirements. It was a set of notions that was ex-post-facto could be used by Gorbachev to justify doctrinally and ideologically, his efforts to manipulate the Soviet agenda. The elements of ‘new thinking’ could be used to rationalize any force posture and defence policy. Thus, it would be fruitless to use this framework to attempt to predict specifically what Soviet forces might look like in ten years, since neither Soviet Minister of Defence Dimitri Yazov, Chief of the General Staff Akhromeyev, nor Gorbachev himself could do this objectively’. 73 They were also against the defence cuts like military officials of Soviet Union as they argued it would sharply diminish the USSR's ability to launch deep offensive on short notice. 74 Some of them were also skeptic about the intention of Gorbachev for ushering in a new era free from nuclear holocaust. They also argued that Soviet party military relations were inherently conflict-ridden. 75 So, it would put Gorbachev in a critical juncture.

It was a fact that military aspects of security during *perestroika* had some theoretical and operational flaws. The internal military changes that were introduced during this phase had following effects:

- It encouraged the dissatisfaction among military personnel by appeasing civilians through military reforms.
- It reduced the strength of KGB and the intelligence departments, making it almost defunct.
- The military dimension of security was underplayed by Gorbachev as he stressed on political and economic aspects of security. At the same time, international security got priority over national security.
- Gorbachev's broader reform agenda was having paradoxical consequences. The very strategy of *glasnost* and *perestroika* removed the rationale for a large standing military. Thus, military reforms weakened the internal security set-up of Soviet Union. The weakening influence of the military had devastating effect on the internal socio-political scenario. It stimulated divisive forces and led to ethnic assertions in a number of republics. The reliability of the army was put to question too because of the inter-ethnic division with the armed forces. That was dramatically visible during the intervention in Baku in 1990 when Soviet army expressed their unwillingness in this operation.\(^7\)
- The frailty of the internal security set up was quite visible when the Soviet Army, enfeebled by the reduction of the forces, was

unable to check the secessionist movement in Tajikistan, Georgia and Baltic republic through military force.\footnote{William Odom, op.cit., p. 291.}

At the operational level, American response and reactions was not upto mark. Unilateral reduction of forces exhibited the weaknesses of the Soviet Union. American penetration in Soviet Union's internal affairs aggravated the situation and ultimately helped in the process of disintegration of Soviet Union.

It was a fact that disintegration of the Soviet Union was inevitable. Gorbachev, through his reforms, was only seeking to stem the tide of an impending doom. Soviet Union was facing crises on all fronts and Gorbachev sought to face them through measures outlined above. But the situation was so bad and the time so inopportune for a reformer that in spite of all his good intentions he could not avert the crisis. This has led many to opine that Gorbachev was responsible for the failure of the Soviet system. However, whatever might be the intentions of Gorbachev in bringing about changes in the military sphere of Soviet security, the steps he took to bring about widespread reforms, could not be underrated as they helped in ushering in a new era.

Gorbachev led the foundation of a more peaceful world by ending the cold war. At the same time he sought to liberate USSR from the conceptual and ideological baggage that had heavily influenced it in the
past. Though Soviet Union is no more, but his military reforms have had an enduring impact on Russia and the World. The ideas like renunciation of war, the danger of inadvertent nuclear war, prevention of arms race, interdependence in the sphere of security and acknowledgement of strategic theatre, nuclear sufficiency have eternal significance.