Chapter-2

SOVIET CONCEPT OF SECURITY: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
2.1. Historical Background of Soviet Security

Soviet concept of security had undergone a tremendous change from the days of Lenin to Gorbachev. One can surmise the Soviet perspectives on security; if one studies closely the approaches of the leaders, the security requirements of the erstwhile Soviet Union, the steps taken by the leaders for satisfying the requirements and the extent to which they succeeded in that mission. Really, it is a tough job to study a concept as dynamic as the concept of security, for there is no fixed criteria to determine the way the decision-makers approach issues relating to security from time to time. Another problem related to Soviet security system was the 'closed' nature of its operation for security was considered the most delicate and secret affair by the people at the helm.

However, Gorbachev was the first person to open the 'Pandora Box'. Before him Soviet leaders handled security questions in a very diplomatic manner as security was regarded as a very sensitive issue, especially in the wake of the cold war competition going on between the two super powers. The world outside was so convinced about the opacity of the security system operating within Soviet Union that Churchill's famous pet-phrase that Soviet Union was "a riddle wrapped in an enigma" was passed
off as the most acceptable elucidation of Soviet functioning in matters of security. Such obvious opacity led to lot of complexities and confusions.¹

Before Gorbachev, security as a concept was analyzed within the framework of power paradigm; thus strategic dimension of security dominated over other dimensions of security. As perceptions vary so also the notion of security. Some nations feel secure with less power; others feel insecure with relatively more power. In the same way when some tried to overcome it by military strength, others sought to do it by relying on alliance and diplomacy.² From Stalin onwards, military was the prime consideration of Soviet policy makers. Soviet leaders laid more emphasis on military strength than on concepts like mutual friendship, interdependence and institution building. They tried their best to defend the State borders and protect the interests beyond the State borders. Thus, they intelligently combined both 'maximalist' and 'minimalist' approaches to security. The need of the time and national interest were the guiding factor for formulating security policies. From the above analysis it is reflected that it was a 'realist' approach to security rather than the combination of 'realism' and 'idealism' which they claimed.


² Ibid., pp.1-2.
2. 2. Lenin's Views on Security

Like Marx, Lenin did not write any book or article on security. But from his writings and speeches, it is possible to deduce his views on security. Lenin in his work *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, analyzed the social contradictions of capitalism, which culminated in the imperialist stage and ultimately led to war. Lenin rightly mentioned that the motives of the great powers were to enslave other nations, seize colonies as source of raw materials and places for the export of the capital. The whole world is merging into a single economic organism and divided up among a handful of great powers. The objective conditions for society have fully matured and the present imperialist war is a war of the capitalists for privileges and monopolies to postpone the collapse of capitalism. He argued that imperialist war made the time ripe for socialist revolution and transition to socialism. It could be possible only through transformation of imperialist war into civil war followed by seizure of power by workers. Thus, he advocated capture of power by the Bolsheviks in Tsarist Russia. Lenin was convinced of the Marxist view that socialism could bring about peace and security.

The workers' movement will triumph and pave the way for socialism. After the socialist revolution, the bourgeois machinery must be

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smashed and proletariat dictatorship should be proclaimed. Proletariats should develop an effective mechanism to crush the remnants of capitalism. They should make the economic situation viable for the growth and sustenance of socialism and the maintenance of global peace and security. It could be possible only through proletariat solidarity at international level raising a powerful army and getting help from the working class from outside. Lenin was in favour of national liberation movement as he was thinking socialism is the only way to maintain security all over the world. For achieving this objective, he stressed on proletariat internationalism. The amalgamation of the workers of different nationalities in a single organization would enable the proletariat to wage a victorious war against the bourgeois, which would establish democracy not only by treating nations equally but also by realizing the right of the oppressed nations to self-determination.\footnote{V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, (Moscow: Progress, 1964), pp. 143-46.}

Spirited by the ideals of ‘world revolution’ and proletariat internationalism, Bolsheviks after capturing power in Russia tried to spread the revolution all over the world, but failed miserably. On the other hand, capitalist powers helped the white guards in the civil war. Lenin realized that it was not the right time for world revolution, so, he dropped the idea till the revolution in other countries could take place and join hands with Russia. As Soviet Union was the only socialist country surrounded by capitalist bloc and security was primary need of the State, so he
enunciated the concept of peaceful co-existence among all States with different social system.\textsuperscript{6} Lenin staunchly advocated peace with Germany as it was most important for Soviet Union to save its revolution. Lenin was a pragmatist who gave importance to national considerations over the international revolutionary priorities, but he was not a pacifist who could abandon the principles of arm struggle. He struggled seriously to search out a programme of cohabitation, a plan to learn to live with the capitalists. His main motive was to defeat capitalism peacefully by producing superior social and economic system and supremacy of Soviet Union over capitalism. This was revealed from his address to 8\textsuperscript{th} Party Congress held in March 1919, when he said:

"We are living not merely in a State, but in a system of States; and it is inconceivable that the Soviet republic should continue to exist for a long period side by side with imperialist States. Ultimately one or the other must conquer. Until this end occurs, a number of terrible clashes between the Soviet republic and the bourgeois States are inevitable".\textsuperscript{7}

Even in the struggle between socialism and capitalism, co-existence between the two antagonistic ideologies was not ruled out. Lenin tried his best to avert world war and secure peace for which he developed good and cordial political and economic relations with other countries of the world. As he pointed out "the Russian Socialist Federation Soviet Republic wishes to

\textsuperscript{6} V. I. Lenin on \textit{Peaceful Co-existence: Article and Speeches}, (Moscow: Progress, 1975).

life in peace with all people and devote all its efforts to internal development."\(^8\) Lenin stressed on New Economic Policy for rebuilding war devastated economy and safeguarding the economic viability of the Soviet Union. Thus, under the dynamic leadership of Lenin, Soviet Union ensured both internal and external security. Lenin realized that socialism was the only panacea to reduce and redress the sufferings of the people and maintain peace and security in Soviet Union and rest of the world. Keeping this in mind, he developed friendly and warm relationship with other countries on the basis of respect for their independence and equality. He supported the struggle of these countries against colonial atrocities and neo-colonial imperialism and for universal peace and security.\(^9\)

2.3. Stalin’s Approach to Security

Stalin’s views on security were based on his attitudes towards West, which was greatly influenced by experimental and circumstantial evidences. During the World War II, Soviet Union under the leadership of Stalin collaborated with capitalist block, of course changing its initial stand of supporting fascist power for the protection of its national security. But after the World War II, the situation took a different twist as USA changed its stand, which created a sense of suspicion and hatred for them and marred the smooth and cordial relationship between two powers. Stalin in


February 1946 speech referred to the inevitability of conflict with Western power as he thought it was the right way for maintaining Soviet security. Stalin's views on security was based on the proposition that Soviet Union was confronted by implacable enemies with whom no friendship could be possible as they were dedicated to the destruction of the world's first socialist State.\(^\text{10}\)

Soviet Union was an infant socialist country surrounded by capitalist countries. Those were bent upon utilizing every means at this disposal to undermine and weaken it. So the need for vigilance was over-emphasized as Soviet security was in danger and the most importance was given to the survival of socialism by Stalin for which he stuck to offence than defence as the security measure. As Sonnefeldt and Hyland write:

"Stalin had increased substantially the sphere of dominant Soviet power and had thereby seemingly strengthened the physical security of the USSR. Yet he never lost the siege mentality that had marked Soviet revolution in 1920s and 1930s. 'Capitalist encirclement' remained for him a reality, both in terms of military threat to the Soviet Union that he envisaged and in terms of potential connections between internal opposition to the regime and external enemies. Internal repression was, therefore, as necessary an expedient for him as defence against external aggression".\(^\text{11}\)

Soviet insecurity was further heightened as the hectic environment continued and it was not possible on the part of the Soviet Union to alter it. It was further asserted that world wars remained an inescapable feature in

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\(^{11}\) Sonnenfeldt and Hyland, op.cit., p. 9.
international politics under capitalism. During Stalin's period international relations was depicted as zero sum game where there were two players - socialist camp and capitalist camp involved in direct conflict. The gains of the one side were inevitably the loss of the other. The easing out of the international tension was viewed as dangerous from Soviet security point of view. Stalin's concern was to preserve the tension as it would be vigilant towards its enemies and could easily spot them out. Stalin was against 'détente' as it was not possible to detect enemies from its sudden attack, hence, weaken the security of a nation.

From the above analysis, it is clearly reflected that the objective condition of the Soviet Union moulded the security policies of Stalin. His prime task was the safeguard of the security of the Soviet Union and its territorial unity and integrity for which he stressed the military potential of Soviet Union to deter or ward off the potential invader. His military theory was greatly influenced by Clausewitzian themes – an anti-thesis to the Western deterrence theory based on the rejection of "both the optimism and dogmatism of 18th century theory that war was neither a scientific game nor an international sport but an act of violence". Clausewitz did not appreciate the victory of a nation without bloodshed as it undermines the terrible nature of war and might lead to a condition whereby "we allow our swords to grow blunt ... until some steps taken with a sharp sword and
cuts our arms off our body".\textsuperscript{12} Some of the Clausewitzian military ideas are used by Soviet strategic thinkers, for the justification of the offensive mobility theatre warfare with or without the use of nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{13} Trotsky, the founder of the Red Army also expressed the similar view that "war bases itself on many a science; but was itself is no science; it is a peaceful art, a skill, a savage bloody one".\textsuperscript{14}

Stalin realized that offence is the best defence for ensuring the security of a nation, as it was the viable technique to face the challenges of the enemies effectively. During later stage of his tenure when USA was rated as the most powerful nation of the world after acquiring nuclear capability and dictated terms and conditions to other nations. Stalin challenged the hegemonistic tendency and imperialistic design of USA for preserving global peace and security. For this purpose, he renovated the Soviet military set up and expanded the Soviet military power beyond the borders of the Soviet Union incorporating nuclear weapons in the Soviet forces. Thus, he laid the economic and technological foundation of the Soviet forces.

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\footnote{13} C.V. Clausewitz, \textit{On War}, (Combat Forces Press, 1953), p.16.
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The World War II put Soviet Union in an advantageous position as a result of which it extended its influence over its bordering nations and finally it had militarily occupied Eastern Europe. Thus, the post World War security arrangements got a new shape after the installment of communist regime. These satellite States of Soviet Union strengthened its security militarily and otherwise. When Soviet Union consolidated its hold over Eastern Europe, it expected some reaction from Western powers as they harmed western values. USA also reacted sharply and developed a belligerent attitude towards Soviet Union. It further aggravated when USSR supported communist parties for coming to power in Western Europe and Asian countries like Manchuria, outer Mangolia and North Korea. Thus, in late forties, Soviet Union dominated the 'global society' and it appeared as if capitalism had been camouflaged under the neon light of socialism. The Stalin's famous slogan for communism in one country that was pronounced in 1920s was no more relevant. The security of the Soviet Union and its friends was strengthened through military alliances and they desperately tried to weaken the non-Communist regime of the world. It was clearly reflected in the Soviet perception of security – "that the politburo ... believes that its very life remains acutely threatened as long as major enemies exist. Their utter defeat is a sheer necessity of survival".15 George Kennan also mentioned that Russia's age-old sense of insecurity was the main cause for its expansion move. In late 40's and 50's the hostile

relationship between Soviet Union and the West got widened when Soviet Union reinterpreted its national interest from security angle and over-stressed its policy of isolationism, non-cooperation and consolidation of communist regime. The Soviet attitude towards the West compelled USA to take counter measures to check the influence of the communist power. Thus, in 1949, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created under the leadership of USA, comprising of countries lying on the Atlantic coast to prevent the aggression of Soviet Union in Western Europe. In a counter move to this military alliance, Warsaw Treaty was formed in 1955 with the leadership of Soviet Union taking its allies to defend its national interest and that of its allies in terms of security. During this period, military security was the prime concern of the Soviet Union for which Stalin stressed on modern warfare. Although in Stalin's scheme of things, political and economic aspects of security did not play any significant role, still, he tried his best for the expansion of communism as that would strengthen his position as the leader of the communist block.

It is interesting to note that he had developed very good relationship with the West during the early phase of his career. His decision to cultivate the West was conditioned by economic considerations as Soviet Union was facing terrible economic crisis during the days of the two World Wars. Stalin was desperately trying to strengthen its economy and he stressed on campaign for peace and tried to whip up anti-American feelings in Western Europe. Malenkov offered peaceful co-existence with
the West and co-operation on the basis of equality and non-interference. After the Second World War, Soviet Union developed a sisterly relationship with its Satellite States and cultivated a strong and stable relationship. It sought to boost its economy through Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). Soviet Union also revived Communist International by forging together all the anti-imperialist forces, “COMINFORM” in September 1947 for the coordination of the work of the Communist parties of various nations. The primary task of this organization was to popularise Communist ideology.

In the mid 1950s, Soviet Union also tried to win over Middle East and South Asian regions as it carried relative weight in security calculations. Even though few observers claimed that Soviet Union’s position was secure in early 50’s, his successor Khrushchev expressed his dissatisfaction. In his memoirs, he gives a summary of this period: ‘We had our own doubts about Stalin’s foreign policy’. He overemphasized the importance of military might and consequently put too much faith in armed forces. After Stalin, the most important task before his successor was to

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17 Communist Information Bureau (COMINFORM) - The purpose of COMINFORM was to tighten the Soviet control over Eastern Europe. It might be Stalin’s practice or due to cold war. It published a journal for transmitting directives to its members. COMINFORM was dissolved by Khrushchev in April 1956 as he felt it was no more relevant.
broaden their horizons and grope for definitions more suited to the emerging situation.\(^\text{18}\)

### 2.4. Khrushev’s Period

Soviet security policy during the subsequent days under Khruschev was the reflection of this notion as he was the first Soviet leader who intertwined his peace proposal and military strategy for ensuring Soviet security. He realized that offence was the best defence but at the same time he stressed on peaceful means for the settlement of international crisis. In fact, the transition from Stalin to Khrushchev was a shift from the regional conception of security to a global one, from basically defensive orientation to an offensive and from the era of World War II to the nuclear rocket age.\(^\text{19}\) His defence strategy in the 1950s was to avert the possibility of any nuclear war. He had realized by then that a nuclear war could never be won.

This motive of Khrushchev was clearly reflected in 20\(^{\text{th}}\) CPSU Congress when he said that war was not inevitable and could be prevented. Thus he rejected Stalin’s statement that advocated the inevitability of conflict with capitalist block. It was held that though future conflict could not just be postponed, nevertheless, any internal crisis could

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\(^\text{19}\) Ibid., p.10.
be settled by peaceful means and not by war.\textsuperscript{20} So, he stressed on 'peaceful co-existence as it was the objective necessity for the maintenance of peace and security'. Khrushchev also succeeded in persuading American President Eisenhower to acknowledge in principle the necessity of renouncing war between their two countries. Like Khrushchev he also condemned nuclear war which he saw as no less than 'the possibility of civilization destroyed ... and the condemnation of mankind to begin all over, the age-old struggle, upward from savagery'.\textsuperscript{21} In the 21\textsuperscript{st} Congress, in 1959, Khrushchev came forward with a proposal of ban on testing, production and use of atomic weapons but at the same time glorified Soviet's military achievement – USSR could launch 'powerful rockets with pinpoint accuracy to any place in the Globe'. It was clear that though disarmament got priority but Khrushchev was not in favour of complete disarmament. It was widely recognized that nuclear weapons have little political utility, they remain weapons nonetheless they are to be used if deterrence fails and military organizations of both sides develop plans for their use.\textsuperscript{22} He was also influenced by another consideration for which he did not reject nuclear weapons and rightly, though nuclear

\textsuperscript{20} Summarized on 20\textsuperscript{th} CPSU Congress Documents, (Moscow: Novosti Press, 1956).


weapons unusable as military instruments, are paradoxically important political symbols, which confer certain advantage on their possessors. These advantages, moreover, seem to accrue not merely in a general way, but rather precisely in proportion to the size and sophistication of the various national arsenals. Conditions like inferiority, superiority, parity have become politically significant, even though the sheer unusability of nuclear weapons would seem to argue against the political relevance (indeed the military relevance also, assuming that deterrence holds) of even quite large disparities between the various national arsenals.\(^{23}\) The attitude of the Khrushchev was further reflected in his apprehension of World War. If there were another World War, he said, 'it would begin with missile strikes deep into the enemy interior and end with the victory of socialism. In 1962, V.D. Sokolovskii, Chief of General Staff from 1952-60 put forward the military strategy of Soviet Union described by Khrushchev. Sokolovskii argued about the importance of the initial period of the war, the main problem was to master "methods of reliably repulsing a surprise nuclear attack and also methods of frustrating the aggressive plans of enemy, by means of a timely shattering blow against him."\(^{24}\)

Thus, Khrushchev's 'offensive détente' was a strategic ideology that served to legitimize the outcome of political logrolling. His offensive détente

\(^{23}\) Ibid., p. 8.

relied on nuclear technology and especially on the Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). Khrushchev believed that it would change the equation with the West by paving the way for a political settlement in Europe, and it would lower the cost of security and contribute to the rise in Soviet living standards.  

Despite his fascination for high quality nuclear and other weapons, he also recognized that these nuclear weapons alone could not guarantee security and that the arms race and high military expenditure could economically undermine the prospects of socialism in USSR. No doubt, Khrushchev’s proposal on defence cuts in January, 1960 was motivated by this recognition. In the 21st CPSU Congress, he stressed on the ‘prevention of thermo-nuclear war and establishment of ‘everlasting peace’ to save the mankind from the scourge of war. His speech in UN General Assembly amply proved it –

"With the present nature of international relations and the present level of military technology, when any military conflict can lend to a Nuclear-Missile war, a radical solution of the problem of security for all States involves precluding the very possibility of wards being started. So long as there exist large armies, air forces and navies, nuclear and missile weapons, so long as young men on the threshold of life are first of all taught the art of warfare and general staffs are busy working out plans for future military operations, there is and can be no secure peace among nations in the present situation".  

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Both internal and external situations compelled Khrushchev to take this confusing stand on security. The emergence of United States as a powerful nation and the nuclear competitor of USSR, the Suez crisis of 1956, Berlin question and the final settlement of the German problem were the motivating factors behind his security policy. The problem of adjusting to the nuclear age was no doubt a cardinal security issue in the 1950s, which also influenced his concept of security. Besides external issues, internal developments like the initial 'thaw', the subsequent de-Stalinization and the disappearance of mass terror had a bearing on security problems. Khrushchev continued to see Stalinists as his principal opponents and tried his best to drive them to extremes. Even he went to the extent of reversing Stalin's policy to prove that his anti-Stalinism would be successful: where Stalin ignored the third world, Khrushchev courted it; where Stalin insisted on iron rule, Khrushchev proclaimed relaxations; where Stalin rule Eastern Europe through the army and KGB, Khrushchev hoped for loyalty to principles; where Stalin sought security in Red Army, Khrushchev sought it in the strategic rocket forces (though he bluffed about the strength).  

As Khrushchev defined Soviet interests broadly, the area of the security concern obviously expanded. By 1964, national security of Soviet Union took a complex turn. It involved calculations concerning the internal repercussion of foreign policies, cost of the fulfillment of the political and

economic commitments made to Eastern Europe and other areas, the burden of armaments to challenge the hegemony of Western powers.

2.5. Brezhnev’s Period

The emergence of Brezhnev in this critical juncture twisted the Soviet approach to security. Of course, like Khrushchev in late 60’s, his emphasis was on the accumulation of military force and the extension of its reach beyond the Eurasian landmass. The main purpose behind this was to equate Soviet Union with United States in nuclear capability for which it took steps like modernizing ground and air forces, increasing and diversifying the navy and updating technology to improve these forces. As power grew so did the definition of security. The safety of the home land was no doubt the prime consideration, the inviolability of Soviet predominance in Eastern Europe was a close second; finding power elsewhere on the Soviet periphery were next; and entitlement to a role at least equal to that of the United States elsewhere came last. The implementation of such plan was problematic. With the increase in forces, the home-land was safe from land attack, but it could not be protected from a nuclear war. Secondly, the Eastern Europe which was under Soviet control fluctuated in his stand. Other countries on the periphery were not hostile towards Soviet Union but not friendly and were not deterred from maintaining and building military forces and alliances that enabled them to

28 Ibid, p.16.
resist Soviet pressures. China was hostile, an active rival of Soviet Union and Japan was not also that much friendly.

Though Brezhnev proceeded methodically to build Soviet military power in all dimensions but failed to change the attitude of China and the surrounding that were negative at that time. He realized that the pace at which nuclear stock piles were built in the name of equal security was feverish. This was the paradox of the nuclear arms race, nuclear weapons did not provide additional security and yet they were built in the name of the security. So, he changed his approach to security in early 70's. He stressed on 'détente' for the security of the Soviet Union, when the entire world was on the brink of nuclear war. Thus, he broadened the concept of security and tried to secure Soviet Union through the security of the entire world. He developed new and friendly equation with Europe, China and other Asian countries. His motive of maintaining world peace and security was clearly reflected in 24th CPSU Congress 1971. In this Congress he highlighted on the 'peaceful co-existence' and normal mutual co-operation in the fields of human endeavor. This peace programme regarded the following as the set of objectives for ensuring peace and security –

29 Ibid, p.16.

• To extirpate the hot-beds of war in South-east Asia and Middle East and to promote a political settlement in the regions on the basis of respect for the lawful rights and people's suffering from aggression;

• To discourage belligerent States and the acts of violence by promoting peace and security and for this purpose the UN must be used to the fullest extent;

• To solve political problems through mutual friendship and cooperation for which it proposed to conclude bilateral and regional treaties.\(^3\)

This programme further emphasized the need for renouncing the use of force in international relations and banning nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons, ending nuclear weapon tests by all countries everywhere including underground tests and establishing nuclear free zones in different regions of the world. In this context Brezhnev said: "We are for the nuclear disarmament of all states possessing nuclear weapons and for this purpose holding conferences of the five nuclear powers – the Soviet Union, the U.S., the People's Republic of China, France and Britain". This 24\(^{th}\) Congress of the CPSU stressed on improving the relationship with capitalist countries particularly with the United States.

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adhering to the principle of "peaceful coexistence". This peace programme was further given logical continuation in the 25th CPSU Congress with special emphasis on peace and international cooperation and for the freedom and independence of peoples.\(^{32}\)

This programme emphasized on the following:

- Consolidation of peace all over the world while strengthening the unity of socialist countries;

- Efforts to end arms race which is endangering peace and steps to reduce accumulated stockpiles of arms;

- To take adequate steps for conducting world conferences on disarmament;

- To work for ensuring security of Asia on the basis of joint efforts by the states of that continent.\(^{33}\)

It was only in the 25th Party Congress held in 1976, where he seemed to be optimistic about international situation that he began to use détente more frequently and often without accompanying 'peaceful coexistence'. No doubt détente was confined to easing out of tension particularly military tension from the globe without sacrificing the basic

\(^{32}\) Ibid., p. 157.

\(^{33}\) Ibid., p. 159.
principles and ideology of socialism. His reservations about détente clearly reflected when he upheld: "Détente does not alter nor can it change the laws of class struggle. It is for creating favorable conditions for the peaceful socialist and communist construction."

With efforts towards disarmament, a new era of friendship and cooperation began in global politics where two opposing social systems created a favorable climate and the Soviet Union joined hands with U.S.A. in signing Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968. In the year 1969, Brezhnev came forward with a new doctrine popularly known as 'Brezhnev Doctrine' where Asian security was given importance. He tried to make the continent free from intercontinental tension and conflicts so that it would deter U.S.A. to interfere in the matters of Asian countries with a pretext of sorting out internal conflicts. He tried to ensure the security of Asian countries not only by providing peace and stability but also by solving social and economic problems of that region. In early 70's he seriously tried for maintaining peace and security all over the world. He conferred with American President Richard Nixon in May 1972 and concluded famous Strategic Arms Limitation Talk (SALT-I) treaty, Anti-

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Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty and other agreement relating to trades. In 1973, Brezhnev met USA President Nixon in Washington and discussed widely on strategic arms control and trade and technical cooperation. In June-July 1974, he decided to extend SALT-I treaty from five years to permanent one and to take adequate steps for banning underground nuclear tests and for that purpose again he met Nixon in Moscow. With the change in leadership in the United States, Brezhnev continued his peace efforts with redoubled spirit and new vigour and in November 1974, a meeting was arranged between Brezhnev and American President Gerald Ford in Moscow where tentative agreements on limiting strategic nuclear weapons and future strategic arms control were discussed. This principle of 'peaceful coexistence' was further accelerated to such an extent that ultimately it culminated in Helsinki Peace Process where two power blocs decided for social, economic, technological and cultural cooperation. The Soviet Union regarded this as an important stage of détente. The principle of inter-state relations to which the Soviet Union agreed in Helsinki Final Act were:

"Sovereign equality, the non-use of force, the inviolability of frontiers, non-interference in international affairs, respect for human rights and the basic freedom, equal rights and the right of people to be their own masters, cooperation between states and the conscientious fulfillment of obligations".  

Though the second half of the 1970s witnessed strange relationship between two powers and ultimately SALT-II treaty, which was signed between Brezhnev and the USA President Carter in June 1979, was not ratified by the Senate, yet Brezhnev continued his peace process. It was clearly reflected from his Tula speech, where he stressed on “minimum security and futility of nuclear war”. In his speech, he mentioned that the Soviet defence would be guided by the needs of defence sufficiency and Soviet policy would be aimed at the prevention of nuclear war, parity at low levels, balance of interest approach and defensive military doctrine.\(^{38}\)

Brezhnev’s proposal to take several foreign policy initiatives for maintaining global peace and security and to make 1980’s renewed success of détente by supplementing political détente with military détente faced terrible set back as it was disrupted by west through escalating arms race. In 26\(^{th}\) Party Congress report, 1981, he hardly mentioned détente and blamed the USA for infringement of détente.\(^{39}\)

From this analysis, it is clearly reflected that Brezhnev tried his best to ensure global pace and security. For this objective, he not only stressed on political and military aspects of security but also economic aspect of security. The CPSU attached special importance for developing healthy cooperation with communist parties of the fraternal countries. It developed


healthy economic relations with the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) countries on a long-term basis. During his tenure, active work was done for organizational structure and technical basis for multilateral economic cooperation. He had done a great deal to promote major advances in the specialization and cooperation of production, trade, finance and scientific-technical research among CMEA countries. During his time, CMEA member states had multiplied their economic potential. The member states of CMEA, Brezhnev stressed, “are active champions of equal and mutually beneficial economic cooperation between countries belonging to different social systems. This basic approach follows from their devotion to peace and is inalienable element of the policy of easing international tension”. Chernenko also glorified the peace efforts of Brezhnev:

“The Soviet Union, together with the fraternal socialist countries, is ready to do everything possible to help development in our continent to lead to the elimination of the military threat, and to the creation of an atmosphere of confidence in the inevitability of its peaceful future, as well as to an expansion of all round cooperation between states for the good of the people”.

Really, the steps taken by Brezhnev were praiseworthy. He tried to ensure the security of the Soviet Union and socialist countries through the

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40 Brezhnev, *Pages from His Life*, op.cit., p. 104.

security of the entire world but without deviating from the ideological framework of Soviet Union. In this context, he said:

"That realism in politics and the will for détente, for progress will eventually prevail, and mankind will be able to step into the 21st century in conditions of peace dependable as it has never been in the past and we will do all in our power to make this come true". 42

After Brezhnev there was no spectacular changes in the concept of security. His successor Andropov restrained himself within the framework of 26th Party Congress resolutions. He continued the same security politics of Brezhnev. He realized the consequence of nuclear war and he took steps to save the world from nuclear threat. He appealed to U.S.A. and other European countries to stretch their hands in fulfilling this mission. In this context he said, "We are prepared for radical solutions. The ball is in the other side's court. Like all people of good will you must rest assured that the USSR will continue to do everything that depends on it to ease international tension, to curb the arms race – both on earth and in space – and to prevent a nuclear blaze". 43 For maintaining peace and security of Europe and the rest of the world, he favoured approximate balance of military forces including nuclear ones between the states of NATO and Warsaw Treaty states. He opposed to the deployment of American nuclear


missiles in Western Europe. In his view, the appearance of Pershing-2s and cruise missiles of U.S.A. in the European continent particularly in the Soviet border was not intended for ensuring security of Europe as USA was already in an advantageous position so far as the military parity between two forces were concerned. So, the only motive behind USA's action was to exhibit its hegemony in Europe. That was the reason in June 28, 1983, Soviet Union declared to take adequate measures to stop the superiority of the NATO bloc over the countries of Warsaw Pact.

It adopted the following four measures. First, since by its actions the United States has torpedoed the possibility of reaching a mutually acceptable accord at the talks on question of limiting nuclear arms in Europe and their continuation in these conditions would only serve as a cover for the actions of the United States and a number of other NATO countries directed at undermining European and international security, the Soviet Union considers its further participation in that talks impossible. Second, being cancelled are the Soviet Union's unilateral obligations, which had the objective of creating more favourable conditions for success at the talks. Thereby the moratorium on the deployment of Soviet medium range nuclear weapons in the European part of the USSR is abrogated.

Third, in agreement with the government of the Germany Democratic Republic (GDR, before reunification of Germany), and Czechoslovakia, the announced preparatory work to deploy on the territory of these countries operational-tactical missiles of increased range, that was started some time
ago will be accelerated. Fourth, since by deploying its missiles in Europe, the United States increases the nuclear threat to the Soviet Union, the corresponding Soviet systems will be deployed, with due account taken of this circumstance, in ocean areas and seas. By their characteristics these systems of ours will be adequate to the threat which is being created to us and our allies by the American missiles that are being deployed in Europe. It goes without saying that other measures too will be taken to ensure the security of the USSR and other countries of the socialist community.44

But he was not in favour of Soviet military superiority over the United States. He expressed his willingness to restore the previous situation if USA stopped from these belligerent activities and responded positively to his desire for maintaining global peace and security. Andropov was convinced that peace could be strengthened and the security of people guaranteed not by way of building up and inventing new types of armaments but on the contrary by way of reducing the existing armaments to lower levels.

2.6. Gorbachev’s Period

Gorbachev’s concept of security which brought radical changes in the security structure of the world, reorienting the basic components and stressing more on the political and economic aspects than the militaristic side was a novel approach to the concept of security. His ideas, which

44 Ibid., pp. 298-299.
were enshrined in the 27th CPSU Congress reflected his pragmatism and vision by combining the philosophy of ensuring security in nuclear age with an agenda for action aimed at creating a peaceful world. His ideas of security were broader in connotation as they offered a comprehensive approach to the future development of international politics, not only by creating a conducive atmosphere for favourable interactions among the international actors in various spheres of their activities, but also by guaranteeing the security through peaceful coexistence and cooperation with the west. His concept of comprehensive universal security had four major dimensions - military, political, economic and humanitarian. The military aspect concerned 'the renunciation by the nuclear powers of war against each other or against any third country with either nuclear or conventional weapons, which reflected that peace could be achieved only by terminating the material preparation of a nuclear war'.

45 When the world was on the brink of nuclear war, Gorbachev took consistent efforts to ease out the tension from the globe for a secured and prosperous world. He took the initiative to bridge up the gap between the two super powers towards which he concluded various treaties with USA. Geneva, Reykjavik, INF, Moscow, Malta and Washington summits were milestones in this regard. The second idea behind the proposal of the 27th CPSU Congress relating to the military aspect of Gorbachev's concept of security was aimed at the "prevention of the arms race in space, cessation of all nuclear weapon tests and total destruction of such weapons, a ban on and the destruction...

of chemical weapons and renunciation of the development of other means of mass annihilation".\textsuperscript{46} To materialize this proposal Gorbachev attended various summits and concluded the famous INF agreement in December 1987. Gorbachev's security concept, which formed the basis of new thinking on security, was the doctrine of ‘reasonable sufficiency’ or ‘non offensive defence’. This doctrine rejects the idea of developing military potentiality of a country to maintain equality with its enemy for safeguarding its security. This doctrine acts like an antidote against nuclear arsenal that destabilizes sound relationship among states.\textsuperscript{47} On the other hand it aims at guaranteeing security not by highest possible but by lowest possible level of strategic parity with western bloc.

Gorbachev tried his best to maintain parity between two blocs and to correct the asymmetries existed in both sides. Even he took steps to eliminate the disproportion of military strength between NATO and Warsaw Pact for which he stressed on the approach of reciprocity and cutting down of military weapons from both the sides.\textsuperscript{48} His decision for the disbandment of military alliance and the renunciation of their enlargement clearly reflected his inner motive of making a noble world of cooperation and friendship instead of hatred and enmity. Warsaw is no more an active


\textsuperscript{47} Alexi Arbatov, "Reasonable Sufficiency", \textit{International Affairs}, (October 1988), p. 77.

organization. It is a defunct body. His decision to spend money cutting down from the defence budget was a reflection of his slogan 'Disarmament for development'. To sum it up, the provision of Comprehensive Universal Security measure was the real basis of putting an end to the Cold War by reducing armaments and defense expenditure and above all eliminating the nuclear threat from the globe. The implementation of these programmes could free planet from the threat of war.

The political aspect of Gorbachev's concept of security aimed at removing all the factors that led to antagonistic relationships between two power blocs. It was clear that East-West political rivalry included regional conflicts, human rights issues and the totalitarian regime of East European countries etc. On this front the most important proposal was the "strict respect in international practice for the right of each people to choose the ways and forms of its development independently". 49 Gorbachev tried his best to develop peace and cooperation among various countries for which he advocated multilateral cooperation and reliance upon the political process. Security is to be sought through the give and take of international negotiations. In the words of Gorbachev:

"The nature of current weaponry leaves no country with any hope of safeguarding itself solely with military and technical means, for example, by building up a defence, even the most

49 Gorbachev, Perestroika, op.cit., p. 231.
powerful. To ensure security is becoming more and more a political task and it can only be resolved by political means.

He also spelled out an important corollary to this perspective by stressing the need for mutual security and stressed on the need of the deeper understanding of the security considerations of other nations which could refrain a nation from pursuing their policies which other nations found threatening. He acknowledged the intimate connection between Soviet and American security interests. The Soviet Union would not be secured until other nations—especially the U.S.A. truely feel secured. For this reason, he emphasized on the balance of interests rather than balance of forces and underlined the supremacy and imposition of the will of the power blocs over small independent nations.

The second proposal of 27th CPSU Congress on political aspect of security prepared grounds for ‘a just political settlement of international crisis and regional conflicts’. Gorbachev took bold steps to solve major international problems. His initiatives for the solution of Middle East problem, Central American problem, Asian and African problems were in the positive direction. He also realized that crises and conflicts, which provide the seed-bed for international terrorism endanger World Peace. All nations should take steps to curb it through cooperation. This problem could be solved by the initiatives of US and USSR and other nations under


51 Ibid., p. 21.
the leadership of the United Nations. He genuinely tried for the solution of regional conflicts amicably for a better and prosperous world as he realized that it would weaken the security structure of the world.

Soviet Union's decision to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and its pressure on Vietnam to withdraw from Kampuchea reflected his inner motive for global peace and security. Gorbachev's decision for creating an all embracing system of international security consisted in the "elaboration of a set of steps aimed at building confidence between states and the creation of effective guarantees against attack from without and inviolability of their frontiers". The proposal along these lines materialized in the Stockholm Conference, which created barriers against the use of force or constant preparations for war, whether on land, sea or air. Gorbachev stressed on the reliable system of international security and inviolability of the borders was the most important element of the security. It could be conceived with effective guarantees for states against outside attack. The American invasion of Grenada and heavy bombardment in Libya revealed the need of it, which could only ensure the security of a nation and the security of the world as a whole. He also condemned the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. The final proposal relating to the political aspects of Gorbachev's concept of comprehensive universal security deals with "effective method of preventing international terrorism

52 Gorbachev, Perestroika, op.cit., p. 173.
53 Ibid., p. 231.
including those ensuring the safety of international land, air and sea communications".  

In the 40th Session of UN General Assembly, Soviet Union and other socialist countries stressed on Gorbachev’s ideas of preventing international terrorism through effective methods. In his letter to the UN Gorbachev made some proposals for activating and strengthening the world body. These proposals were:

(i) a special humanitarian development/disarmament fund and friendly relationship with NGOs;

(ii) efforts for strengthening environmental agency with power to check transnational ecological degradation;

(iii) protection of human rights;

(iv) a tribunal on international terrorism including state sponsored terrorism;

(v) mandatory jurisdiction for international court;

(vi) More special session of the UN General Assembly.  

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54 Ibid., p. 231.

In his UN speech, Gorbachev underlined three principles of peaceful international relations. First renunciation of force, both nuclear and conventional; freedom of choice and freeing of international relations of ideological bondage. Second, he enumerated the "global task to be taken up by the international community for maintaining peace and security. Third, UN should be treated as an embodiment of interests of various states. It should try to sort out the problems of the world in all the spheres, i.e. military, political, economic, scientific and technical, ecological and humanitarian.56

The economic aspect of Gorbachev's concept of security had two main extrapolations. First, to boost up the stagnant Soviet economy through its integration into the emerging global economic order, his concept of comprehensive international security envisaged stable economic relations, mutual trade and aid among socialist and non-socialist countries on equal basis. For achieving this objective, he emphasized on restructuring international economic relations and establishing New International Economic Order (NIEO).57


Second, to bridge up the gap between two antagonistic blocs through mutual friendship, cooperation and trade relationship. He tried to better up Soviet economy through trade relationship with western bloc. Unlike his predecessors, he tried for restructuring (Perestroika) Soviet economy through opening up new avenues for westerners to invest their money in Soviet Union. His focus was on market oriented economy instead of regimented or closed economy. He was guided by cost-accounting culture and demand supply considerations. His economic reforms could not bring as much change as was expected of them; however it certainly resuscitated a moribund economy. It also helped in improving the economic positions of the people.

On the international front, an important proposal made on this regard aimed at 'exclusion of all forms of discrimination from international practices, renunciation of the policy of economic blockades and sanctions if this is not directly envisaged in the recommendations of the world community'.\textsuperscript{58} It also stressed on normalization of international economic relations among various states which was essential for the economic development of the countries whose economic backwardness was the result of exploitation by the capitalist policy of neo-colonialism.

The second proposal relating to the concept of economic security was the call for "joint quest for ways for a just settlement of the problem of

\textsuperscript{58} Gorbachev, Perestroika, op.cit., 231.
debts". The Third World countries and those who were in debt trap were benefited out of that measure. Soviet leader Gorbachev's ideas of 'Common European Home', 'Common Market' and 'Common Currency' for entire Europe were definitely positive steps in this direction.

The most important proposal of the economic aspects of security under perestroika was the "establishment of a New World Economic Order guaranteeing equal economic security to all countries". Soviet Union tried seriously within and outside the U.N. framework to cooperate with interested parties to remove all types of discriminatory restrictions and barriers from international economic relations. During this phase, Soviet Union and other socialist countries developed equitable economic relationship with the rest of the world. Soviet leader Gorbachev also emphasized on North-South dialogue and played a decisive role in restructuring of international economic system towards the establishment of NIEO based on sovereign equality, justice, and mutual interest.

The fourth proposal in the economic sphere stressed on the "elaboration of principles for utilizing part of the funds released as a result of reduction of military budgets for the good of the world community, of developing nations in the first place". Soviet Union under perestroika

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59 Ibid., p. 231.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
emphasized on 'disarmament for development' rejecting the earlier notion of 'armament instead of development'. In this context Abel Aganbegyan has rightly said:

"If the Soviet proposal for disarmament, security and stable peace are accepted, the means and resources liberated from the military sector could augment the rate of growth of the economy".\(^{62}\)

The last proposal in this sphere dealt with "the pooling of efforts in exploring and making peaceful use of outer space and in resolving global problems on which the destinies of civilization depend".

During this perestroika phase, Soviet Union took steps for environmental protection, solution of the problems of food, energy and population, the peaceful exploration of space and resources of the world oceans, the elimination of the economic backwardness of newly independent countries, the eradication of diseases etc. The humanitarian aspects of security had not been underscored in Soviet security plans. From the above discussion, it was quite clear that Soviet security during perestroika period was concrete, comprehensive, and holistic in nature. This was the approach the world was clearly in dire need of.

A critical study of Soviet concept of security revealed that there were three important factors or as Geoffrey Roberts would say "grand narrative

themes", which moulded the security decisions of the Soviet leaders and strategic experts. First factor was the bi-polarity, which stressed on the polarization of world politics into two opposing camps and contest between Soviet Union and USA for power and position. Second factor was the ideological competition, which was about the struggle between communism vs. capitalism. Third factor was about systemic crisis. The focus was on internal weakness, contradictions and conflicts of Soviet and Communist system.

Besides, the above mentioned factors, Roberts pointed out certain "meta-narratives", like particular and local considerations, also influenced perceptions of decision-makers in formulating security policy. As perceptions and objective conditions of USSR changed from time to time, so also did the security policies of Soviet Union. It had traversed a long way from peaceful co-existence to mutual security via confrontation.

But now the USSR no longer exists. Soviet concept of security under perestroika did not succeed in ensuring the internal security of Soviet Union, which ultimately broke up into fragments. The operational failure of such a framework would suggest serious theoretical and operational flaws in the Soviet security system during perestroika. This is discussed in succeeding chapters and in the conclusion.

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64 Ibid., pp. 101-102.
But still Gorbachev's approach to security has its own relevance as it brought an end to the second Cold War in the most peaceful manner possible and contributed to global peace. Russia's (true successor of USSR) security system is also based on the broader framework of this security system with very little modifications to meet the exigencies of the time.