

CONCLUSION

Soviet concept of security has traversed a long way from peaceful co-existence to mutual security, from the days of October revolution led by Lenin to perestroika set into motion by Gorbachev. The first Soviet leader Vladimir Illyich Lenin was a pragmatist and gave importance to national considerations over international priorities during the early years of communist rule, when he sought to consolidate the base of communism in Soviet Union. But as far his international agenda was concerned he was not a pacifist as his main objective was to overthrow capitalism and to establish supremacy of communism practised in Soviet Union over capitalism. He also supported the struggle of colonised people for independence, against imperialism and worked towards global peace and security. Besides this external dimension of security, he also stressed on internal security in all its dimensions. With his sincere efforts, Soviet Union gained political and economic stability and developed military capability. But after Lenin when Stalin came to power, he gave priority to offence rather than defence as his views on security was based on the assumption that Soviet Union was surrounded with enemies who were desperately trying to destroy it. He was against détente as he thought it would work to the advantage of the forces opposed to Soviet Union. As such, he was in favour of adopting policies that would deter enemies of Soviet Union from contemplating sudden attack against it. No doubt his military theory was influenced by the Clausewitzian themes – that war was an act of violence. During the last part of his tenure, he challenged the hegemonistic tendency and imperialistic designs of USA and during the Second World

War, Soviet Union extended its influence over its bordering nations and even militarily occupied Eastern Europe. The East European countries acted like Satellite States and helped Soviet Union in its agenda of expansion of communism on one hand and strengthening its economy through mutual trade relations on the other. However, Soviet Union's over-emphasis on military might and faith in armed forces for preserving Soviet security interests underwent significant changes during the time of Khrushchev, who tried his best to meet the exigencies of time. He was the first Soviet leader who intertwined proposals for peace and military strategy for ensuring Soviet security. His defence strategy in the 1950s was aimed at averting the possibility of any nuclear war and the settlement of crisis by peaceful means. But at the same time, he laid emphasis on the development of nuclear technology, especially on the designing of high quality nuclear weapons. Thus, Khrushchev's offensive détente was the strategic ideology for ensuring the security of the Soviet Union. Of course, the objective conditions of Soviet Union forced Khrushchev to take this peculiar approach to security, which laid emphasis on peace yet at the same time prepared unabashedly for war. With the emergence of Brezhnev again the Soviet approach to security changed again and strengthening of Soviet forces was given top priority. In late 60s, Brezhnev undertook serious efforts for the accumulation of military force and modernization of technology to improve the quality of the Soviet forces. During this time, while formulating security policies, he gave top priority to the expansion of communism and at the same time sought to check the

belligerent activities and the supremacy of United States over other nations. But during 70s, he changed his stand and accorded importance on détente when he realized that the world was on the brink of a nuclear war and that the entire world would perish if the nuclear war were to break out. Thus, he broadened the concept of security and tried to ensure the security of Soviet Union through the security of the entire world. His keen efforts to develop friendly relations with USA, Europe and Asian countries clearly reflected his inner desire for global peace and security. Besides military security, he also tried hard to strengthen political and economic security of Soviet Union by establishing good political and economic relations with CMEA and other countries of the world. Thus, during the later part of his rule, the tree of détente planted by Khrushchev came to blossom. Though he stressed on détente as it was the cardinal principle of his security policy, this was not to be at the cost of his ideological conviction. After Brezhnev, there were no spectacular changes in the Soviet concept of security during the time of Andropov and Chernenko. Andropov was convinced that peace could be achieved and security could be ensured not by arms build up, but by reducing existing armaments to lower levels.

In the mid 80s when Gorbachev came to power, there was economic stagnancy coupled with political instability and international turmoil. Gorbachev introduced the policy of "acceleration" (*Uskorenie*) to boost the efficiency of the ailing Soviet economy and allowed people to enhance their abilities appropriately – just after his assumption of power.

But he announced *perestroika* (restructuring) officially in the 27th CPSU Congress, 1986 and continued it upto December 1991, i.e. the end of his tenure. During this *perestroika* phase, he came out with a package of security proposals. The proposal for *perestroika* did not come as manna from the heaven; it was his own brain-child, prepared after a careful and realistic assessment of the politico-economic situation of Soviet Union. A statesman and a visionary, his approach to security was humanistic. For him security was a holistic concept. His concept of security was integrated with the security of all members of the international community, where the opponents of Soviet Union became partners in its security endeavour and together they aimed at achieving universal security. In his words, "it is a way of mutually advantageous and reciprocal compromise, on the basis of which the supreme common interest prevents any conflict where there should be no striving for security for oneself at the expense of the other". This concept of Soviet security during *perestroika* known as 'comprehensive universal security' or common security which was enshrined in the 27th CPSU Congress. It was broader in connotation as it encompassed military, political, economical humanitarian aspects of security and tried to ensure the security of the Soviet Union through the security of the entire world. Though the external dimension of security was emphasized in such a universalistic security paradigm, the internal military, political, economic and humanitarian spheres were not underplayed but they were made to adopt a direction that would lead to universal security.

In the military sphere, there was a growing need of new institutions and ideas because the military-industrial complexes, old style ideologues and autarkic interests seemed outdated by then. Drastic changes were brought about in the Soviet armed forces and personnel. In fact Gorbachev went in for drastic cut in resources aimed at slimming down the corpulent military bureaucracy. At the institutional level, changes were brought about in the politburo, Defence Council and Central Committee Secretariat. The old military doctrine was rejected; the role of KGB was also drastically reduced and it was accorded responsibilities of lesser importance.

New military strategy and doctrine of reasonable sufficiency was given prominence for ensuring the security of the Soviet Union on the one hand and the security of the world on the other. The external dimension of military security during *perestroika* concerned 'the renunciation by the nuclear powers of war against each other or against any third country with either nuclear or conventional weapons'. When the world was on the brink of nuclear war, Soviet Union under the leadership of Gorbachev took consistent efforts to ease out the tension from the globe. Soviet concept of security also aimed at the "prevention of arms race in space, cessation of all nuclear weapons tests and total destruction of chemical weapons and renunciation of the development of other means of mass annihilation".

Soviet security model during *perestroika* was known as the doctrine of 'reasonable sufficiency' to guarantee security not by the highest

possible but by lowest possible level of strategic parity with the western block. The disbanding of military alliance and the renunciation of the policy of parity along the upward spiral clearly reflected the New Thinker's desire for ushering in a noble world of cooperation and friendship instead of hatred and enmity. Thus the Soviet decision to spend money in civilian sectors, cutting down of the defence budget was the manifestation of the slogan 'Disarmament for development'.

In the political sphere, Gorbachev introduced changes in the Soviet state's approach to security at both internal and external levels. At the internal level, he introduced his policy of *Glasnost* (openness) which aimed at democratization of Soviet polity and freedom to the people through open debates and discussions. During this time, Soviet Union witnessed a fundamental political and constitutional revolution that sought to lead his country towards an open system. Gorbachev thought it was needed for strengthening the internal environment and political structure of Soviet Union. His introduction of the factor of openness into internal political structure had had tremendous impact on the domestic decision-making apparatus and resulted in the gradual withering away of the ideological stiffness that led the block-politics going. This was something fundamentally different happening to the Soviet political system known for its 'rigid command structure' and its inscrutable ways that had led many to call it 'a mystery wrapped in an enigma inside a riddle'.

Thus the external dimension of Soviet security, ensuing from such openness, aimed at removing all the factors that led to antagonistic relationship between the two power blocs. It laid stress on the 'right of each people to choose the ways and forms of its development independently'. It also prepared the grounds for the 'just political settlement of international crises' and regional conflicts. Gorbachev realized that regional conflicts would weaken the security structure of the world and for a better and prosperous world these problems had to be solved amicably. His bold steps in this direction helped him in solving some of these problems. Soviet decision for creating an all embracing system of international security resulted in the 'elaboration of a set of measures aimed at building confidence between States and the creation of effective guarantees against attack from without and for inviolability of their frontiers'. This idea materialized in the Stockholm Conference, which created barriers against the use of force or constant preparation for war, whether on land, sea or air. Soviet Union also took steps for prevention of international terrorism, which was a threat to international security by destabilizing various parts of the world.

The economic security of Soviet Union under *perestroika* had two main extrapolations. In the domestic front, it tried to bring in reforms to boost the stagnant Soviet economy through structural changes and integrate Soviet economy into the new global economic order. Gorbachev revised the traditional Soviet approach to the world economy and sought to integrate Soviet economy with the economies of the rest of the world

through mutual friendship, economic co-operation and trade relationship and the issue of ideological divide was pushed to the background. During this *perestroika* phase, Soviet Union improved the quality of Soviet manufactured goods and increased its exports. It expanded its trade with the West. The co-operation in the form of joint ventures was a major step taken by Soviet leader Gorbachev to strengthen the economic security of Soviet Union internally. As far as accession to international economic organizations was concerned, Soviet Union tried to become a member of GATT/WTO, World Bank and IMF. This had had good effects on the crisis-ridden Soviet economy and thus Gorbachev sought to transform it by preparing it to adjust to the new rules of the game in the world market.

In 1988, Soviet Union established official relations with EC. This was followed by the signing of the first long-term agreement on trade, economic and commercial cooperation in the year 1989. The 1989 agreement, which came into force on 1 April 1990, served as a legal foundation for the USSR-EC relations. As the situation in Europe and Soviet Union started changing during the *perestroika* period, Soviet Union was forced to take steps to integrate itself into the new European space; otherwise it would lead to isolation and threaten the stability and security of Soviet Union on the Continent. The relations between Soviet Union and EC also cleared the way for bilateral trade and cooperation between individual CMEA countries and EC.

Under Gorbachev's leadership, Soviet Union also tried its best to improve the efficiency of the CMEA, obviously, to get maximum economic benefits out of it. It initiated measures to strengthen the CMEA by intensifying the cooperation in the field of science and technology, the establishment of joint ventures, direct links between CMEA enterprises, joint exploitation of energy sources and convertibility of the transferable of the ruble. In the international front, several proposals were introduced and Gorbachev genuinely tried to implement those proposals for ensuring peace and security of the entire world. The most important proposal relating to international economic security was the "exclusion of all forms of discrimination, renunciation of the policy of economic blockades and sanctions, if this is not directly envisaged in the recommendations of world community". It condemned the policy of economic blockades and sanctions and demanded the abolition of those practices pursued by imperialist powers, which aimed at the economic isolation of certain State or group of States. It endorsed the UN move that States could only use collective measures for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security and only by the decision of the UN Security Council.

Another important proposal of this economic security was the "call for joint quest for ways of settlement of the problem of debts". In this context, Soviet Union supported the move taken by NAM, UN and the Latin American countries to solve this debt problem in a proper way adhering to the principle of justice and equality. Soviet leader Gorbachev favoured the NAM appeal for an urgent action to ease the burden of the

debt. Soviet Union also took concrete steps in this direction. The third world countries and those who were in debt trap were to benefit from that measure.

During this phase, Soviet Union also supported the move of the Third World countries for the establishment of NIEO which aimed at creating cooperation among all States irrespective of their social economic systems, correction of existing inequalities, elimination of gap between developed and developing countries and ensuring economic and social development and peace and justice for coming generation. During this phase, Soviet Union expressed its keen desire to cooperate UN and other organizations in order to remove discriminatory restrictions and other artificially created obstacles for international economic relations.

Soviet Union also emphasized on North-South dialogue, which it considered essential, for strengthening international economic system. As Soviet Union considered the solution of international economic problems was closely connected with the termination of confrontation and arms race. So, it stressed on the "elaboration of principles for utilizing part of the funds released as a result of a reduction of military budgets for the good of the world community, of developing nations in the first place". Gorbachev tried seriously in this direction and even succeeded in changing the attitude of USA to cooperate in reducing armaments.

Another important proposal, which was emphasized by Soviet Union at the UN, was the one that sought to project a reasonable

alternative to an arms race in outer space – a stage by stage programme for international cooperation in the exploration of outer space for peaceful purposes.

Humanitarian security during *perestroika* stressed on the inter-State relations and contacts among the people of various nations for the solution of the global problems as it believed in the principles of mutual trust and understanding of common problems and joint efforts for the solution of those problems. It concerned with Soviet human rights policy as a domestic issue and the issue of foreign policy. In the domestic sphere, democratization and glasnost (openness) were introduced which provided adequate freedom to the people by encouraging people of the Soviet Union to participate in open debates and discussions. It also tried to ensure a decent living to the people by improving Soviet economy as it was essential for them. During *perestroika* direct personal contacts in the cultural field both on individual and collective basis and contacts between cultural institutions and associations were encouraged. Soviet Union also took adequate steps for the abolition of genocide, apartheid and racial discrimination against the people. New laws were enacted for guaranteeing freedom of expression and freedom from religious persecution.

Soviet Union also tried to ensure socio-economic rights such as right to work and right to housing for its citizens. The provision of the international covenant on economic, social and cultural rights were

formalized not only in the constitution of Soviet Union, but also in the fundamentals of labour legislation.

Soviet Union took genuine steps for re-orienting families, marriage and the promotion of contacts between people. It stressed on the exchanges of ideas in the sphere of art, science, education and medicine.

It is a fact that the concept of security evolved during *perestroika* was an alternative to power paradigms for it put least importance on power and considered security not as a derivative of power. However, even if the ideas of 'New Thinking' were idealistic in nature, the Soviet doctrine of 'reasonable sufficiency' took note of the fact that the issue of power could not be divorced from the concept of security. Thus, it was a complex combination of realism and idealism.

Soviet concept of security during *perestroika* had both theoretical and operational flaws for which it could not ensure the security of the Soviet Union from the conventional point of view. The fact that the policy of openness led to disintegration of the mighty Soviet Union has led many to conclude that the Gorbachev's approach to security had many loopholes in it. Firstly, his concept of security over-emphasized international security or universal security at the cost of security of the nation-state. It tried to ensure the security of the Soviet Union through the security of the entire world, which was not possible as nations could not change their attitudes at the cost of their national interests.

Secondly, the Soviet concept of security during *perestroika* was not enduring as it was a subjective concept and depended on the perceptions of the individuals, leaders in power, which were unpredictable. As international actors change, so do their approaches to security.

Thirdly, it could not hold good as objective factors were not under absolute human control.

Fourthly, there were inherent inconsistencies among the different levels of security, as was enunciated by Gorbachev's new thinking. Particularly, the internal security of Soviet Union was not assessed properly. The peculiar problems facing the Soviet state at the internal level were not taken into consideration. The adoption of a liberal domestic policy at the internal sphere, which was a product of Soviet leader Gorbachev's international outlook made Soviet Union pay a heavy price as it led to disintegration of Soviet Union. In the military sphere, the internal and external changes in Soviet Union during *perestroika* had some negative effects, which made the Soviet security weak and not viable. It encouraged dissatisfaction among military personnel by its policy of appeasement of the civilians through military reforms. It also weakened the security set up as Soviet Union's broader reform agenda was having paradoxical consequences for it. The very strategy of *glasnost* and *perestroika* removed the rationale for a large standing military which stimulated internal political developments as secessionist movements and ethnic strife in a number of republics in Soviet Union. The doctrine of reasonable

sufficiency, unilateral cut, attitudes of compromise were interpreted as weakness of the Soviet Union by the West and contributed also to the rise of his opponents inside his country which contributed to the shattering of the internal fabric of security. As military security was under-emphasized in relation to political and economic security, the concept of security did not evolve properly.

At the operational level, it did not succeed in changing the belligerent attitude even after Soviet leader took peace initiatives. Soviet Union's efforts to reduce military weapons and expectations of USA's cooperation in this direction had not produced expected result; on the other hand many analysts believed that USA penetrated into the internal politics of Soviet Union and hastened the fall of the Soviet empire.

In the political sphere, the internal reforms through '*Glasnost*' or openness provided enough liberty to the people to raise voice against the Soviet leader. The internal liberalization also encouraged the secessionist movements inside Soviet Union. The changes in Eastern Europe and unification of Germany had also influenced other nations, so also the republics of Soviet Union when they realized that Gorbachev would not resort to 'Stalinist' measures to suppress them. So this internal and external liberalization which led to social, environmental change together with Gorbachev's liberal attitude of non-interference and encouragement to the people to 'choose the ways and forms of its development independently' accelerated the process of disintegration. In fact,

Gorbachev was not solely responsible for disintegration of Soviet Union but he committed a mistake without visualizing the 'destructive potential' of the *perestroika*, which belied his expectations by weakening the security set up instead of strengthening it. Another important factor, which accelerated the process of disintegration, was the attitudinal changes of the people of Soviet Union. As the Soviet Socialist System matured at the time of Gorbachev and citizens came to know about the pitfalls of the system, so the citizens of 80s and 90s were very much critical of the system than their predecessors. When freedom was given to them, ethnic, nationalist and regional problems, which were suppressed for a long time, surfaced in violent forms and those forces encouraged the secessionist trend in Soviet Union.

In the international front, the political changes aimed at a peaceful world. But when Soviet Union was out of power race, the balance of power tilted in favour of USA and made USA more powerful. Thus, it helped in a 'world to be ordered than a new world order'. In the economic sphere, Soviet concept of economic security did not succeed in overcoming its economic crisis. There were innumerable problems obstructed for an effective participation of Soviet Union in global economy. Though Western technology provided relief, yet it was constrained by foreign currency reserve as the COCOM regulations restricted technology transfer. In such a situation, it was too difficult on the part of the Soviet Union to involve seriously in the international economic system. Even western countries did not come forward to help *perestroika* by extending

subsidized credits or allowing Soviet products to be sold in their market. Several other factors like the shortage of skilled and experienced executives to run things in a new way; the rigid bureaucratization; the imbalance between demand and supply; the difficult system of export licensing; the problem relating to internal convertibility of the rouble; the constraints of getting financial help from international institutions obstructed to engage actively in world economy. Further, the mismanagement of Soviet economy and misutilization of foreign borrowing coupled with the ineffectiveness of CMEA partners pushed Soviet Union into economic crisis.

In the international front, the economic security did not yield an expected result as USA and other western powers responded half-heartedly being guided by their interests rather than purely humanitarian concern. Even they were not keen to take some benevolent measures like helping the poor nations and spending a sizeable amount of money for solution of global problems.

Complete disarmament was also not possible as it required attitudinal changes of international actors, which was too difficult. Even Soviet Union did not play that much effective role as it was hard pressed with its own problems. Its poor economy, collapse of CMEA and resistance from Gorbachev's opponents brought obstacle in realizing his dream of a New World. Further easy way of accepting the payment of debts and assistance to third world countries during the early *perestroika* period

aggravated the economic situation. Soviet leader Gorbachev's even took some measures at the cost of Soviet economy only to exhibit his noble desire for a peaceful world, which, of course, later on put him into real problem. Although it is too difficult to establish any direct linkage between economic security during *perestroika* and the end of Soviet system, yet, there is a perceptible link between economic changes at the internal level in Soviet Union and (*Glasnost*) and a positive international environment, which worked together to lead to the fall of Soviet Union.

In the humanitarian sphere, changes in Soviet culture, art, literature and the emphasis on human rights through *Glasnost* had some negative effects as Soviet society was toiling under the repressive policies of the communist dispensation for a long time. When people enjoyed liberty, they started revolting against the state mechanism and tried to secede from Soviet Union. Further, good relations with the West, compromising attitudes of Soviet Union, relying heavily on Western science and technology provided enough space to USA and other Western powers to penetrate into the internal security of the Soviet Union, which ultimately helped in the process of disintegration.

From the above analysis, it is clear that even if it was ideally designed, the Soviet concept of security during *perestroika* was unable to resolve the security problems of Soviet Union. Soviet concept of security during *perestroika* could have been more viable and sound had it looked into following questions.

1. There could have been efforts aimed at striking a balance among the three levels of security, i.e. individual, national and global security. Individual security should have been guaranteed not at the cost of national security and national security not at the cost of global security. An intelligent compromise between national security and international security or universal security was the need of the hour. The domestic security arrangements could have been evolved in such a way that it would not have created any operational complications during this phase.
2. While formulating Soviet security policies, psychology of the individuals, nation state, peculiarities of that nation, world public opinion should have been taken into consideration. As perceptions vary so do the concepts of security, that is why some individuals feel secure with minimum security arrangements and some feel insecure with relatively better security arrangements. It is same also in case of nation states. Another important factor, which was not given due weightage by the 'New Thinkers', was the peculiarities of Soviet Union, which constituted its social structure, geography, culture and attitudes of the people.

At the time of formulating security policies, these factors should have been considered and security arrangements should have been done in such a way that they should have catered to the needs of the people of Soviet Union without leading to security breakdown. It could have been possible if security policies were formulated after studying the situation in a proper context.

3. Soviet concept of security during *perestroika* could have been really universal in scope if it would not have been stable and could have adapted itself to the changing needs of the people.

4. A compact security system without any systemic problem could have been possible, if two sets of security set up would have been evolved. One could be 'Common Security' i.e. security for all nations. The other could be 'particular security', i.e. security arrangements taking the peculiarities of the domestic environment of the erstwhile Soviet Union.
5. As the concept of security is multidimensional and new dimensions can be added at anytime, the concept of security during this phase should have been flexible enough to accommodate the changes.
6. In fact, there was need of rational contextual study while formulating Soviet security policy, which could have been given a new direction to Soviet security.

Whatever might be the effects of Soviet security during *perestroika*, still it has contributed positively to the world and it has still some relevance after the disintegration of Soviet Union, particularly in the post-Soviet era, as it brought changes in military, political, economic and humanitarian spheres. It led to a new era by ending the cold war in a more peaceful way. At the same time, it liberated Soviet Union from the conceptual and ideological baggage that had heavily influenced in the past. Though Soviet Union is no more, the military reforms have had an enduring impact in post-Soviet phase. The ideas like renunciation of war, the danger of inadvertent nuclear war, prevention of arms race, interdependence in the sphere of security contributed positively in the making of a peaceful world free from nuclear holocaust. During this phase, confidence building mechanism between super powers, efforts for settling international conflicts, preventing terrorism, improving an atmosphere of peace and

security ushered a new era. In the post-Soviet world, the Soviet concept of 'Comprehensive Universal Security' has been re-conceptualized and reformulated in a better way and strategic experts are trying to apply this for solving the problems of the world including the problems of South Asia.

In the economic sphere, though Soviet efforts for ensuring security did not succeed too much, yet it integrated Soviet economy with the global economic order and strengthened the relations between East and West, which moved towards stabilization and rapprochement. It also helped Soviet Union in various ways like exporting high quality of manufactured goods, improving trade with European community and the West by enjoying Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status, encouraging private investment in Soviet economy and also favouring the presence of MNCs in Soviet Union. It also encouraged cooperatives, individual enterprises and developed the idea of cost accounting culture. Though Soviet Union is no more, still this process of liberal economy is continuing in CIS countries including Russia. In fact, it can also be interpreted as a failure of socialism to pose as an alternative to capitalism for which it has been striving. It also exhibited the inner weakness of socialist system, which cannot be corrected and systemic change is inevitable. Soviet concept of international economic security tried sincerely for strengthening international economic system through various measures as discussed and also restructuring of it towards the establishment of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) based on sovereign equality, justice, equity mutual interest and benefit.

In the humanitarian sphere, though this concept of security has negative effects, yet it is more positive nature as it makes the system open and stresses on the human rights policies by giving complete liberty to the people, which is essential for the growth of the society. Its emphasis on democratization, cooperation among people and organizations in various spheres of activities like art, science, culture also exhibited the desire of Soviet leader Gorbachev and the 'New Thinkers' for a better mutual dependent 'one world' which in fact the need of the present world.

Though Soviet Union is no more, the broader framework during last two years of *perestroika* is still continuing in CIS, which came into existence after the declaration of Minsk and Alma Ata in December 1991. The CIS does not have a security structure as such and the efforts for an Unified Armed Forces (UAF) do not materialize due to internal differences among the states of CIS. CIS members such as Azerbaijan, Moldova and Ukraine discarded the unified command structure, Belarus adopted a 'middle position' and other CIS states including Central Asian Republics are also reluctant to remain within the structure as they fear the hegemony of Russia. Thus CIS states are no more a-force to be reckoned with. The CIS including Russia are following Gorbachev and Andrei Kozyrov's approach of cooperation with the West in military, political, economic and other spheres of activities. Though Yeltsin, the President of Russia, mentioned that 'Russia has a right to act tough when it is really necessary' yet it cannot stop NATO's expansion and bend to the pressure of the West. In fact, the disintegration of Soviet Union has made the West more

powerful and the West has known the weakness of Russia. So, it does not consider new Russia as a major power. The cooperation with the West can also be interpreted as inevitable for Russia to overcome its economic and social problems. Another factor is that Russia is a fractured nuclear power and it has much difference with other CIS members. Another important factor, which hinders the relationship between Russia and rest of the CIS states, is Russia's interference in the internal affairs of other states for protecting the rights of the Russian minority. The Russia's indirect backing to those minorities encourages secessionist trend, thus impedes in framing a security set up for the CIS.

In fact, initially, CIS members were misdirected; but gradually they are in a better position and moving towards integration. But they may take time to evolve the security structure provided they sort out their differences. The efforts in the sphere of disarmament, reduction of military budget and emphasis on 'conversion process', i.e. converting military expenditure to civilian products also reflect the significance of Gorbachev's security approach in CIS. In Russia, the Yeltsin government has pledged to continue with strategic arms reduction process began during Reagan Gorbachev period. Russia has also taken concrete steps in the direction by signing START II Treaty and CFE Treaty.

In the political sphere, CIS members are gradually gaining political stability. In the recent elections liberal political forces have won the election in the states of CIS which reflect people's support for democracy,

liberty and open system, which has been started during *perestroika* period. But some states of CIS, particularly in Central Asia troublemakers and rabble-rousers have dominated and they are abetting terrorism, which is threatening to the security of those states. Serious steps should be needed to check it. The members of CIS should iron out their internal contradictions for strengthening political security, which is the need of the time.

At present, there is a need of confidence building mechanism for the stability of the CIS and to solve the problems of the world. Here, one can argue in favour of Soviet security during *perestroika*, as it was the cardinal idea in Gorbachev's concept of 'Comprehensive Universal Security'. In the economic sphere, CIS members have failed to integrate economically as they have differences. Central Asian states are supporting the move, but other CIS members are opposing it. At present, successor states of Soviet Union, particularly the Central Asian states, are in deep economic crisis and they are in need of economic stability, which may not be possible in near future for which they continue dependence on Russia. But, Russia is unable to then as it is also in economic crisis. Russia is seriously trying to overcome its economic crisis and help other CIS members by its new economic policy and getting financial support from other countries and institutions like G7, IMF and World Bank. The only prescription for the treatment of the CIS including Russian economy is the reduction of the burden of the state through various measures. As far as the economic policy of the states of CIS are concerned, they are following

the same liberal economic policy of the *perestroika* period and trying to integrate fully with Liberal International Economic Order. Now CIS members are trying seriously to improve trade relationship among themselves and with the West, which can reduce and redress their economic hardship. Russia– the true successor of erstwhile Soviet Union is taking measures like reducing state spending; providing a non-deficit budget; going for new borrowings; moving towards the paying off the debts; completing the privatization of the remaining state enterprises; pursuing tough monetary policies; de-regulating economic activity in sweeping fashion to strengthen its economic security etc. In fact, all the members of CIS including Russia are supporting the move of the Third World countries for the establishment of NIEO.

In the humanitarian sphere, the CIS members are determined to take steps to further human rights both at the national and international level. In this direction, Russia is trying its best to uphold personal rights and freedoms inside Russia and other parts of the world. Russia's efforts for ensuring minority rights are significant for the cause of peace and stability. Further, Russia is also trying to safeguard the economic and cultural interests of every nationality in the territory of the Russian Federation in accordance with national identity. Thus the humanitarian face of Soviet security during *perestroika* is reflected in Russia as it is trying for improving its relationship with other nations including the West and a transformation of the international political system towards humanization of international politics.

In the conclusion, one should admit the elements of continuity in post-Soviet phase. But in the present time, CIS can be a viable alternative to the USA if they iron out their differences and make efforts for a security structure with rational contextual study of the situation under the dynamic leadership of Russia and adhere to a common policy in the days to come.