Chapter-4

POLITICAL ASPECTS OF SECURITY DURING PERESTROIKA
4.1. The Nature of Political Security During Perestroika

The political aspects of security, which determined the course of strategic foreign policy of the USSR during the Cold War period, underwent a qualitative change within the conceptual framework of the 'comprehensive universal security', elaborated by the 27th CPSU Congress. It was based on the assumption that military power could not exclusively ensure security for any nation because security was a political problem and the most rational way to achieve security was by political means. As it has already been mentioned, Soviet concept of security during perestroika sought to achieve security by reducing nuclear weapons in a phased manner and aimed at complete elimination of nuclear arsenal over a period of time. This approach to security was taken after studying the objective conditions of the world and assessing the threat of nuclear war. As Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev said:

"Human thought does not adjust immediately to everything new. This applies to every one. We feel this. We have begun to reassess, are adjusting many customary things, including those in the military and naturally, the political sphere, in full conformity with new realities. We would like such reassessment also to take place in Western Europe and beyond."¹

The Central Committee of the CPSU at its plenary meeting critically analyzed the problems of international security and defined the practical

¹ Mikhail Gorbachev, Selected Speeches and Articles, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986) p. 373.
steps that could improve the situation. It stressed on the mutual and universal character of security. In this context Gorbachev said:

"The highest wisdom is not in caring exclusively for oneself, especially to the detriment of the other side. It is vital that all should feel equally secure, for the fears and anxieties of the nuclear age generate uncertainty in politics and concrete actions. It is becoming extremely important to take the critical significance of the time factor into account. The appearance of new systems of weapons of mass destruction steadily shortens time and narrows down the possibilities for the adoption of political decisions on questions of war and peace in crisis situation".  

The Soviet concept of security ensured peaceful development of the human community and opened up reliable prospects for international cooperation between peoples and states to resolve military, political, economic and other problems facing mankind. The Soviet approach to security sought to address the security needs of the entire world— i.e., "all governments, parties, public organizations and movements and all those who were genuinely concerned about peace". No doubt comprehensive universal security was inseparable from the concept of a nuclear weapons free world and it stemmed logically from the Soviet Union’s policy of peaceful co-existence. In this context, the resolution of 27th CPSU Congress stated that “the Congress notes the special significance of the fundamental principles for building an all-embracing system of international security advanced in the political report of the Central  

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Committee. Guided by them, it would be possible to make peaceful co-existence, the highest universal principle of inter-state relations".³

The Congress examined the tendencies in the coming world order taking fully into consideration the scientific, technical, military and strategic factors, and made a creative analysis of the correlation and interconnection between universal and national security. An objective analysis showed that national security could be achieved through the system of international security, which could be possible only through balance of interests, mutual friendship, and cooperation.⁴ Thus the Soviet concept of security during perestroika was comprehensive and universal which tried to ensure security of the Soviet Union and the security of the other nations of the world.

The West also recognized this new concept of security. In this context SPD Chairman Willy Brandt stated:

"Our technological revolution has progressed much faster than our political wisdom. We need to shed the ideas of the pre-nuclear age and formulate a political doctrine for the nuclear age. In my view that means that East and West can feel safe from one another only together with each other. Our aim must be mutual guaranteed security instead of mutual guaranteed destruction".⁵


⁵ Quoted in Kapchenko, op.cit., p. 86.
Similar views were expressed by US Defence Secretary Robert McNamara and Hans Batha, an eminent scientist. As Batha said, "post-Hiroshima history has taught us three lessons that shape the present proposal. First, all our technological genius and economic progress cannot make us secure if they leave the Soviet Union insecure; we can have either mutual security or mutual insecurity. Second, while profound differences and severe competition will surely continue to mark US-Soviet relations, the nuclear arms race is a burden to both sides, and it is in our mutual interest to rid ourselves of its menace. And third no realistic scheme that would rid us of all nuclear weapons has even been formulated".6

Nonetheless, the Soviet concept of security during perestroika was a realistic scheme and a sincere effort on the part of the Soviet leader Gorbachev to rid humanity of nuclear weapons and create a 'Common Security System' for ensuring security of the world. However, some Western scholars were a bit skeptic about the Soviet concept of security and they considered there was nothing new in Gorbachev's concept of security.

In the Soviet concept of security, the nature of today's world, which is interdependent and largely integrated, was clearly reflected.7 As it has

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6 Ibid., p.47.
been mentioned earlier, the different strands of the concept of security—military, political, economic and humanitarian—were woven together into a brilliant tapestry in the Soviet security structure during perestroika. The internal coordinates of security were given as much importance as the external ones and together they aimed at an integrated system of "comprehensive security system", which appealed to strategic thinkers all over the world. This, in fact, initiated a new wave of thinking that revolutionized the concept of security and compelled people to re-imagine security as a dynamic concept.

It was a fact that Soviet concept of security during perestroika tried to underplay the influence of strategic military doctrine and put equal premium on other aspects of foreign policy.\(^8\) The Soviet Union realized that mutual trust could be possible only through friendship and cooperation. Disarmament talks promoted stronger confidence between the two sides, which made it easier to reach new agreements strengthening mutual security. Thus, there was a positive feedback emerging between the enhancement of mutual trust and strengthening of security.\(^9\) Further, the Soviet concept of security during perestroika played a positive role in improving the mutual trust between each other by emphasizing on de-ideologization in inter-state relations which helped to

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certain extent in loosening up the power bloc system and improving cooperation with capitalist societies. Gorbachev's political opponents, notably Ygor Ligachev, unsuccessfully used the newly defined concept as a symbol in his attack on Gorbachev's entire reform program.\(^{10}\) It placed all human, moral ethical norms at the foundation of international politics and for the first time it tried to humanize inter-State relations.\(^{11}\) It stressed on mutually acceptable ways through constructive dialogues for the solutions of the problems faced by nations.

Soviet leader Gorbachev's emphasis on summit diplomacy opened up new ways and created a positive atmosphere for ensuring peace and security in the world. The communiqué of the PCC meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries held in Budapest in June 1986 stressed on the political means for the solutions of the global problems. The communiqué said, “The conference is convinced that only political means and joint efforts of all countries can ensure the reliable security of all countries and peoples, and peaceful conditions for their development and progress. This position corresponds to the realities of the nuclear age and testifies to the high responsibility for the destinies of their own peoples and the whole of mankind”.


Political aspects of concept of security tried its best to ensure security of the Soviet Union and the world through the process of demilitarization, democratization and humanization of international relations with a reliance on the prestige and resources of the UN organization. It highlighted on the political legal methods for the solution of global problems and for maintaining peace and security. Soviet leader Gorbachev in his address at the 43rd Session of the UN General Assembly said, "UNO is increasingly manifesting itself as a unique international centre serving the cause of peace and security". He believed that authoritative world organization was needed for strengthening security and submitted proposals at the Session of the UN bodies held in 1989 on building a model of security for ensuring peace and security not through the building of arms as the case in the past but through their reduction and through strengthening confidence, openness and co-operation in all spheres of inter-State relations. Gorbachev's statement, "On the whole, our credo is as follows: political issues shall be resolved only by political means and human problems in human way", clearly revealed his noble intention for solving global problems.

4. 2. The Common European Home

12 M. S. Gorbachev, On Major Directions of the USSR's Domestic and Foreign Policy, (Moscow: Novosti Press, 1989), p. 28.


In the analysis of political aspects of security, Gorbachev's ideas of 'Common European Home' appeared as a special feature. It appeared for the first time in December 1984 when Gorbachev delivered his speech in the House of Commons and referred to Europe as 'Our Common Home'. At that time, he considered United States as a Trans-Atlantic power, which had no business in that house. As Pravda editorial put it, 'Washington is a stranger to that house', but later on he changed his stand and realized that the concept of 'Common European Home' could be materialized with positive and reciprocal responses from USA. Another implication of the idea was based on the idea of 'Common European Interests', which needed to be safeguarded. Soviet leaders including Gorbachev tried to protect it for strengthening European security. A second theme which supplemented the first was the assertion that in addition to geography, 'Europe' is bound together by historical ties and a 'Common Foundation of European Culture', including a 'Common Political Culture'.

The concept of 'Common European Home' assumed a degree of integrity even if its states belonged to different social systems and opposing military political blocs. The concept took due account of burning

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16 Literally for Washington it is 'Chuzhoidom', i.e. a house that belongs to others: Europa-nash Obshchiidon, Pravda, 13 November, 1985.

17 Ibid.

problems and the ways for settling them. This concept tried to restructure international order by giving priority to European attitudes, orientation and value patterns disposing national chauvinism and bloc-egotism.

The objective of this 'Common European Home' was to develop genuine cooperation and constructive interactions with European power by removing ideological, military and undemocratic factors from international politics but without sacrificing its interests and loosing its identity. This concept gave prominence to non-military factors in the interaction among the actors of the nations and tried to ensure the European security by "Common European Security System" by replacing 'military alliance' system. As Soviet Union realized common European security was impossible without drastic military charges in the military set ups of two super powers, so Soviet Union tried its best to normalize its relation with USA. However, Gorbachev continued, "We are not for a single moment forgetting that the world is not limited to that country alone", but later on he confessed the relations between USSR and USA were extremely important part of international politics but he then added that "we are far from seeing the world through the prism of these relations. We understand the weight which other countries have in international affairs and take this


into account in the assessment of the overall situation in the world". This statement of course could be interpreted that Soviet Union had other options, which it could pursue in case of strained relationship with USA.

No doubt, in the concept of 'Common European Home', the emphasis was on European progress or he thought it would contribute to the world's advancement. Europe should not hesitate to help in the battle against hunger, backwardness, and foreign debts or to help in settling armed conflicts. Gorbachev stressed on the good neighbourly atmosphere of confidence, co-existence and cooperation among European powers which he thought essential not only from ethical grounds but also from the interest side of every European nation. He considered that the problems like terrorism, crime, drug addiction could be settled through European and world efforts.

Soviet Union's efforts to make a nuclear free world by dismantling nuclear missiles from Eastern Europe and the Western part of the Soviet Union and talks between NATO and Warsaw Pact created a positive environment, which strengthened this concept. In the beginning of 1989, Warsaw Pact came out with its proposal for cuts in its conventional arms and reduction of army under its command and expected similar measures from NATO. In summer 1989, it withdrew its troops from Hungary, Poland

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21 *Pravda*, April 8, 1985. Similar formulations were used by Gorbachev in his speech to the 27th CPSU Congress in February 1986.
and East Germany. It also proposed dialogues for disbanding both NATO and Warsaw. 23 Though NATO was not disbanded but during this phase it stopped its belligerent and jingoistic postures towards Soviet Union and its allies.

The concept of 'Common European Home' also needed a reliable economic foundation for the realization of it for which Gorbachev chalked out a plan for the formation of a single economic zone from Atlantic to Urals based on interdependence of the national economies of European nations. Though it was not fulfilled but Gorbachev's efforts during this perestroika period helped in strengthening the economic relationship between the West and the East. In 1988, an EC-CMEA treaty was concluded enabling individual CMEA members to deal directly with EC. 24 Gorbachev also worked hard to establish good bilateral relations with individual European countries. His efforts for strengthening European security by making nuclear-free zones and zones free of chemical weapons were positive in this direction. He also tried to implement the proposals of Rumania, Bulgaria and Greece for establishing in the Balkans

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a zone free of nuclear and chemical weapons and in the region of Finland and other European countries.\textsuperscript{25}

Soviet Union also appreciated the initiatives taken by Greece, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Finland and many European countries for Euro-missile settlement. Thus Soviet Union placed much importance on Europe for the successful of "New Political Thinking".\textsuperscript{26}

Though the concept of "Common European Home" seemed to be theoretically sound and a nice idea but it remained as an idea unfulfilled and unmaterialized. The objective conditions of East and West, which was diametrically opposite to each other, the problems relating to the integration of two opposite political and economic systems, unification of Germany, limited success of perestroika were impediments for materializing his cherished idea. As discussed earlier, the proposals relating to the political aspects of security played a decisive role in the concept of "Comprehensive Universal Security" and they expressed the crux of the problem by representing those elements of political inter-state relations without which the entire system was not conceivable. Gorbachev also expressed similar arguments in his speech to the Council of Europe in July 1989. He asserted that "respect for each people's sovereign right to choose a social system as it sees fit represents a most important precondition for a normal European process". And he stressed that any

\textsuperscript{25} Common European Home, op.cit., pp. 26-27.

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid.
interference in internal affairs of whatever kind, 'any attempts to limit the sovereignty of states, both friends and allies, no matter whose, is impermissible'.

4. 3. Political Aspects of Universal Security

In Gorbachev's scheme of things, "strict respect in international practice for the rights of each people to choose the ways and forms of its development independently" formed the core of the universal security doctrine. It did not recognize the supremacy of any state over other nations. Soviet Union opposed the attitude of the West of seeking to influence and interfere in the affairs of the Third World countries for their political and economic benefits. In the words of Gorbachev:

"It is high time to recognize that the Third World nations have the right to be their own bosses. They have attained political independence after many years of hard struggle. They want to be economically independent as well. The leaders of these countries enjoy the support of their people and to do something for them. They want their countries to be genuinely independent and to be able to cooperate with others on equal terms. The decision of these nations to use their vast natural and human resources for national progress is understandable. They want to live no worse than people in developed countries. What they have now is under-nourishment and disease. Their resources are exploited by developed states and incorporated into the latter's national incomes through the channels of non-equivalent exchange. Developing countries won't put up with the situation for much longer".

He blamed USA for its action against Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Angola and other states. The White House did not even hesitate to

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27 N. Kapchenko, op.cit., p. 88.

28 Gorbachev, Perestroika, op.cit., p. 178.
intervene in Grenada – the victim of US naked aggression. Imperialist action of subverting unsuitable regimes by fair or foul means reversed their development and made the situation worse. This was confirmed officially by US Secretary of State, George Shultz, who said in his speech in San Francisco as 'moral responsibility of USA'. Though the US doctrine of 'neo-globalism justified it, but it was inhuman and unethical. US News and World Report wrote, “the Administration is increasingly trying to support and find rebel insurgents – democratic resistance forces as Reagan calls them – who wants to fight against Marxist governments forced upon them with outside help”. 

In majority of cases US either tried to create a favourable public opinion in favour of its actions by resorting to propaganda wars, or else it remained insensitive to democratic values. It was clearly reflected in an article published in News Week Magazine, which said, in effect that Reaganisation of foreign policy called for three things. First, sticking to Reagan's doctrine of supporting the resistance movements on the margin of the Soviet empire (Nicaragua, Angola and Afghanistan). Second, use of military force in Libya and Grenada even without agreement of the allies. Third, restoring realism even by halting the arms control process, which created barrier for Soviet-American relations. 

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29 N. Kapchenko, op. cit., p. 89.
31 N. Kapchenko, op. cit., p. 89.
However, Soviet Union reacted sharply to US imperialism. The CPSU programme declared, "the threat of war comes chiefly from it. Claiming world domination, it arbitrarily declares whole continents to be zones of its 'vital interests'. The US policy of hegemony, the imposition of its will and unequal relations with other states, support for repressive anti-popular regimes and discrimination against countries that do not suit the US, disorganises inter-state economic and political relations and prevent their normal development".32

In the economic sphere, it also exploited the Third World countries through his policy of neo-colonialism. Newly independent nations particularly Afro-Asian countries were exploited by USA. Gorbachev believed that they should not be exploited rather they should be helped to stabilize their economic positions without any strings attached to it. American companies particularly MNCs and TNCs should not be exploitative in the network.

Although Gorbachev was very critical of USA during the early period, later on he took a positive stand and qualitative changes took place in Soviet-US relations. While both sides had sufficient reasons to differ over a number of issues, including important ones, the realities provided

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the requisite incentives for their joint efforts in solving shared problems.\textsuperscript{33} Leaders of both the nations emphasized on balance of interests as the basis for Soviet-American interactions in an inter-dependent world.\textsuperscript{34} They realized that the problems of Third World countries would definitely affect the healthy relationship (for which they tried for) between the two powers. So, these problems should be solved sincerely by taking joint efforts and positive involvement by overcoming the syndrome of ideological ‘irreconcibility’.

In late 1980s Reagan responded well to the initiatives taken by Gorbachev for the fair political settlement of international crisis and regional conflicts when he was convinced that Soviet leader was genuinely interested for a change. Even Western critics became Gorbachev’s silent admirers seeing his sincerity in this direction.\textsuperscript{35} Though Soviet leader did not succeed in his mission of making world free of regional wars as regional wars were still continuing and civil wars in some parts of the world

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Ibid., p. 176.
\item In this context Collins Gray argued, “It is inconceivable that he (Gorbachev) could direct and oversee the transformation of the brutal, continental, multinational empire that is the USSR into something so much kinder and gentler that a truly objective basis for a structural improvement in political security relations would be the consequence”. Collins S. Gray “Do the changes within the Soviet Union provide a basis for eased Soviet-American relations? A sceptical view” in Robert Jervis and Sewyn Bialer (eds.), \textit{Soviet American Relations After the Cold War}, (London: \textit{Duke} University Press, 1991), p. 61.
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had raised its ugly heads, regional conflicts of the third world were regarded as very important. Under the veneer of the ideological confrontation between the two Super Powers, such regional conflicts were passed off as unimportant and inconsequential and not accorded due importance.

4.4. Regional Conflicts: Negotiations of Their Settlement

Here one can draw attention to two problems related closely to the Third World: regional wars and conflicts, and the negotiation of their settlement. Soviet concept of security during perestroika tried to ensure the security of the entire world. It believed that without the settlement of regional conflicts, security of the world could not be maintained. History shows that "tension arises more frequently as a result of political conflicts than due to weapons deployment".36

This concept of security was based on the assumption that the primary cause of international crisis and large number of regional conflicts was the imperialist policy of diklat and interference in the affairs of sovereign states and the settlement of these conflicts could be possible when the imperialist forces would respect each people's right independently to decide its future. Thus, there was a logical relationship

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between first and second political components of the Soviet security system.37

In theory, the Soviet approach for the settlement of regional conflicts under perestroika was not confined to the conflicts in the third world. But in practice that was where most conflicts took place and where Soviet leaders applied their security framework. It was a fact that many regional conflicts were originated before the emergence of Gorbachev in Soviet politics and they were called national liberation movement, which the Soviet Union supported. But during this phase (1985-91) there was a substantive changes in the approach of Soviet foreign policy.

The priority of Soviet relations with the Third World had been on the Soviet agenda before Gorbachev assuming power, but Soviet leaders were disillusioned about the political reality and economic and social development of most less-developed countries.38 But there was a general feeling in the Soviet Union that these Third World conflicts could be solved only by political settlement not by military means, which also needed positive response and initiatives from US side. During the Geneva Summit, it was clearly mentioned that Soviet Union believed that these regional wars between different states were also rooted both in the past and their socio-economic conditions were responsible for that. It was wrong to

37 N. Kapchenko, op. cit., p. 89.

assume that these problems emanated from East-West competition. Here, of course, Soviet Union contradicted its earlier stand and tried to lay the blame at someone else's door; but it can be interpreted as an attempt to involve USA in the settlement of conflicts as it needed 'multilateralist' strategy even hard decisions to implement it as was expressed by US Sovietologists.\textsuperscript{39}

In the Middle East, the Arab-Israeli conflicts started five decades back. The United States supported Israel and in most of the cases took anti-Arabian stand and complicated the situation in this region. Of course, in early 1970s Richard Nixon tried to pacify the situation in West Asia through his shuttle diplomacy and Jimmy Carter also convened international conference on West Asian problems; but it did not yield any concrete results. But from 1967 till the advent of the Gorbachev era, the Soviet Union tried either to construct joint peace initiatives with the United States or to oppose US moves by extending helping hands to Arab radicals in the Middle East. Gorbachev, however, initiated two changes in his approach to regional conflicts as part of 'new thinking'. First, since 1985, Moscow broadened its option by opening a dialogue with the Middle East actors beyond the members of radical club. Second, he expressed

his willingness than his predecessors to press traditional allies towards moderation.40

These policy changes reflected ideological flexibility in moderation. It advocated stronger relationship with Third World countries having a capitalist leaning.41 In the Middle East various conciliatory moves were taken towards the Arab states and at the same time Gorbachev initiated greater interactions with Israel. Indeed, these efforts of Gorbachev improved the relationships phenomenally with Arab Gulf states, Egypt, and Jordan and in turn they extended their support for the idea of international conference. At the same time Gorbachev also distanced himself from Syria – supposed to be the closest ally of Soviet Union in the Middle East.

American President Reagan's policy in the Middle East in early 80s was not positive in solving problems. Rather he made the situation complicated by instigating internal conflicts in this region by supporting Israel and taking steps to curb the intifada of Arafat, the leader of Palestine. But in the second half of his tenure, he took a soft stand and keen interest in settling the problems through conferences and summits. The situation took a different turn at the time of George Bush. The changes in the Soviet domestic affairs, in Eastern Europe and Soviet


politics in third world in 1989-90 helped Bush in changing his stand. It was reflected in Malta Summit in late 1989 where he expressed his near unanimity on the question of Lebanon and West Bank.\(^{42}\)

During 1989-90, two super powers took a joint action to prevent UN recognition of a declared Palestine State. They exerted pressure on their respective allies to moderate their positions concerning the Israeli initiative to hold elections in the occupied territory and issued a joint declaration in June 1990 Summit in Washington against the settlement of new emigrants (mostly from the Soviet Union) in the territories held by Israel. They also held talks on arms control and non-proliferation of non-conventional weapons in the Middle East.\(^{43}\)

During summer of 1990, both US and Soviet opposed Iraq's aggression against Kuwait and succeeded in passing UN Security Council resolution seeking to impose economic sanctions and authorizing the use of force against Iraq in late November. The two super powers also agreed that following the resolution of the Gulf crisis, a major effort should be made to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict and that they should cooperate in this enterprise.\(^{44}\) Super powers also played an active role in favour of separate State of Palestine. Of course, the world public opinion, Sadam

\(^{42}\) Benjamin Miller, op. cit., p. 99.

\(^{43}\) Ibid., p. 99.

\(^{44}\) Ibid.
Hussain's linking of Palestine issue with Gulf problems helped in pressurizing USA to take a soft stand on Palestine.

Finally, with the end of the Cold War, Israel's opposition to the Soviet participation in the peace process died out. The USA also improved its relationship with Egypt and United Arab Emirates. It was quite obvious that Kuwait and its friendly nations developed some sort of obligation towards USA. Syria also improved its ties with USA. No doubt Soviet and US efforts changed the scenario of the Middle East during this phase.

In other parts of the Third World in Cambodia, Ethiopia and the Caribbean region, Soviet policy had a moderating impact. Nicaragua issue was more important for USA than for the Soviet Union. In fact, Moscow did not put Sandinista in power, though Daniel Ortega and Mikhail Gorbachev were good friends for some time. Soviet Union carefully avoided sending Nicaragua heavy arms that would provoke USA. As such it did little to inspire the Sandinista regime to reject free elections and their results. On the other hand, Soviet efforts were directed at encouraging a negotiated settlement of disputes in the Latin American region. During the perestroika phase, Soviet relations with Fidel Castro of Cuba were strained. Like North Korea and Iraq, Cuba was treated globally as an outcast and this might have influenced Gorbachev's decision to underplay the communist connection with Cuba.

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Soviet policy towards Third World under perestroika also changed US attitude towards Moscow as it stopped talking about ‘the hand of Moscow’ in Central American conflicts. On the other hand, it helped in creating a favorable atmosphere for joint initiatives for the settlement of international crisis and regional conflicts. In East Africa, Moscow was seen to be withdrawing whatever political and military support it had given earlier to Mengistu’s efforts to crush the Eritrean and Tigrean rebellions and persuaded the Ethiopian regime to negotiate with rebels.\textsuperscript{46} Soviet Union’s interest to reduce Moscow’s involvement in the conflicts of Africa was clearly revealed when in 1988 Soviet Union took a major role in ending the operation of thirteen years of Cuban expeditionary forces in Angola, the South African presence in Angola and South African administration in Namibia. The United States could not have mediated the agreement signed in 1988, at the UN without Soviet pressure on both Luanda and Havana. The resolution of the Angolan issue became the central point of Soviet-US co-operation aimed at resolving disputes in the Third World.\textsuperscript{47}

In 1990, Soviet and US persuaded the Luanda regime and UNITA for cease-fire and free election. In the same year, Ethiopian-Eritrea agreement was possible due to Soviet-US pressure, which also helped to


re-open the Red Sea port of Massawa and permit food deliveries to the millions of refugees.\textsuperscript{48} Against this backdrop, high power dignitaries like Soviet foreign minister Shevardnadze and US Secretary of State James Baker made their first visit to South Africa in March 1990 to participate in the independence celebrations in Namibia as well as Angola, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Namibia's independence was no doubt an achievement of Soviet-US successful joint venture in the field of resolution of regional conflicts.

In early 1990s, Moscow supported Nelson Mandela's conciliatory approach rather than that of the ANC party which was confrontational. In Asia, Soviet Union also took constructive measures in this direction. In 1979, Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan, the cold war situation resumed. A policy of national 'reconciliation' was adopted in Afghanistan following the Summit meeting in Tashkent in April, 1988 which sought to put an end to the war in Afghanistan. The joint declaration by Gorbachev and Najibullah also urged the interested States to search for settlement of the Afghan problem. Soviet troops began to withdraw from Afghanistan as May 15, 1988 and Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was completed in February 1989. In the later part of 1989 Soviet Union also put pressure on Vietnam to withdraw from Kampuchea.

In East Asia, Moscow emerged as a multi-dimensional actor and expanded its political economic and diplomatic connections with other

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.
actors by renouncing its ideological ambitions and reducing its military presence. The improvement of relations with China, the defusing of the tension along the Sino-Soviet frontier, its rapprochement with South Korea, Moscow's desire to end the stalemate with Japan, co-operation in solving the regional wars in the Peninsula of Indo-China, and the interest in the economic success of Hongkong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan were all indications of Gorbachev's desire to make Soviet Union a full-fledged member of East Asia 'co-prosperity' sphere. His desire was neither to oppose the dominance of USA nor to marginalise other powers in this region, rather it was only to participate in the prosperity of the two regions (Europe and Asia) of which it has been part geographically.\(^49\) Perhaps this was the reason for stressing the concept of 'Common European Home' and co-operation with Asian countries at the same time, for which he was criticized by Western scholars.\(^50\)

Gorbachev aimed at developing friendly relations with all States, and at the same time he opposed the extension of NATO's activity, particularly in Asia-Pacific region. He laid emphasis on the importance of UN and other international institutions and their sincere efforts in solving the regional problems through 'summitry'. The most important Summit

\(^49\) Roy Macridis (ed.) op.cit., pp.175-176.

\(^50\) Soviet Union has made intense efforts to be accepted as part of the Asia-Pacific region. Nevertheless, despite its enormous Asian territories, the USSR is commonly viewed as outsider. Gorbachev's own emphasis on the theme of a 'Common European House' appears to Asians to reflect Moscow's orientation towards Europe rather than Asia". Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Yasuhiro Nakasone, Henry A. Kissinger, "East-West Relations", \textit{Foreign Affairs}. (June 1989), p.16.
during those days was the Reagan-Gorbachev Summit, which helped the process of negotiation and settlement of the international crises and regional conflicts.

4.5. Peace and Security in Asia and the Pacific

Soviet concept of security, during perestroika, emphasised on peace and security of the Asia-Pacific. Gorbachev held that the comprehensive system of international security and world free from conflicts could not be achieved without restoring peace and stability in Asia-Pacific. No doubt, the situation of the Asia-Pacific was affected by the legacy of the past: differences of the historical evolution of nations, territorial disputes and clashes of local interest but, during 1980s the situation became complicated with the direct foreign military presence and spreading nuclear weapons race in the region.\(^5\)

In early 1986, Soviet Union took efforts for eliminating nuclear weapons for ensuring peace and security. In this context, Mikhail Gorbachev said:

"The Soviet programme for eliminating nuclear and chemical weapons by the end of the current century is harmonious with the sentiments of the people of the Asian continent, for whom the problems of peace and security are no less urgent than for the peoples of Europe. The implementation of our programme would fundamentally change the situation in Asia, rid the nations in that

part of the globe as well of the fear of nuclear and chemical warfare, and bring security in that region to a qualitatively new level."  

Soviet approach to the security of Asia-Pacific was the index of the changes in Soviet Union, both in internal and external sphere. This was based on the assumption that global affairs had reached a new stage, and hence a thorough critical appraisal has to be made in the field of security in light of this development. As he considered the world as 'interdependent and integral', the security of the world was also deemed to be related to the peace and security of this region. He argued that this "policy can only be effective if the novelty of the situation is taken into account." Hence, peace and security in Asia-Pacific was examined not in the regional context alone. It considered the interests of USA and USSR -- two major powers-- and other actors involved in it.  

In addition to above factors, socio-economic and military factors were also taken into consideration. While considering economic factors the importance of Pacific Rim/Basin is worth mentioning as Gorbachev thought it (Pacific Rim) would become the centre of global economic activity, more than any other region of the world.  

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52 Quoted in ibid., p. 109.  
54 In fact the beginning of this trend is already evident. This is a change of extraordinary historical proportions. As historically known, the critical matrix was the Mediterranean Basin till the Seventeenth Century. After this, the economic centre shifted to the Atlantic Rim and the Northern European countries. But almost since 1970 the shift has begun towards Pacific. This economic shift
For the first time Gorbachev's views on Asia-Pacific were expressed in the Vladivostok speech on 26th July 1986 where he stressed on five-point plan of action for ensuring security in this region.

- settlement of regional conflicts by political, not military means;
- the prevention of the proliferation and building up of nuclear weapons in Asia and Pacific;
- reduction of naval activities on the Pacific;
- radical cuts in armed forces and conventional weapons in Asia;
- confidence building measures and the non-use of force in the region.\(^{55}\)

Most of the nations like India, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and Australia responded positively to this proposal. This proposal was extended further during Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to India in November 1986. In his address to the Indian Parliament, the Soviet leader elaborated the above mentioned proposals for strengthening military and political stability of the Indian Ocean. The main outcome of this visit was the signing of the Delhi Declaration. The two leaders, Gorbachev and Rajiv Gandhi took important decisions relating to the security of Asia and the world. The ten basic principles enshrined in the Declaration sought to usher the world into a nuclear weapons free and non-violent world. The

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principles included a mature renunciation of nuclear weapons upon which an equitable international order could be built. "It aims at ending nuclear syndrome and move away from the dubious doctrine of 'mutually assured destruction' as the corner stone of deterrence" on which was predicted for decades the hope of détente and peace."\(^5\)

In July 1987, Gorbachev gave an interview to the Indonesian newspaper *Merdeka* where he reaffirmed the Vladivostok plan and came out with new clear-cut proposals. The most important among them was the proposal for scrapping Soviet intermediate range missiles in the Asian part of the USSR in conformity with the aspirations of China, Japan and other Asia Pacific nations.\(^6\) His other suggestions were:

- to take steps to reduce Soviet-US naval activities in the Pacific and Indian Ocean;
- to restrict the anti-submarine rivalry in this region;
- to restrict the anti-submarine movement in certain agreed areas;
- to abstain from using combat weapons at the time of naval movements in the zone of traditional sea lanes.\(^7\)

Besides military security, Soviet Union stressed on economic security for which it expanded trade and economic links between all

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\(^{6}\) Nikolai Nikolsky, op.cit., p. 113.

\(^{7}\) R. R. Sharma, op.cit., p. 205.
members of Asia-Pacific community on both bilateral and multilateral basis. Soviet National Committee for Asia-Pacific Cooperation was formed in March 1988 for expanding Soviet economic contacts in the region.

For promoting peace and security in Asia, Gorbachev submitted new proposals, which were formulated in his speech delivered in Krasnoyarsk, Siberia on September 16, 1988. First, Soviet Union decided not to increase the amount of any nuclear weapons in the region. It also called upon the United States and other nuclear powers not to deploy them additionally in the region. Second, Soviet Union invited the Asian naval powers of the region to hold consultations on non-increase in naval forces in the region. Third, the USSR suggested that the question of lowering military confrontation in the areas where the coasts of the USSR, China, Japan, North and South Koreas converge be discussed on a multilateral basis with a view to freezing and commensurately lowering the levels of naval and air forces and limiting their activity. Fourth, Soviet Union expressed its readiness to give up the fleet's material and technical supply station in Cam Ranh Bay, formally assented by the Vietnamese government too, provided the US agrees to eliminate the military bases in Philippines. Fifth, USSR suggested joint measures for the prevention of incidents in the open sea and air space over it. Sixth, the Soviet Union proposed that an international conference on making the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace be held not later than 1990. Seventh, the USSR suggested discussing with any interested country at any level the question
of creating a negotiating mechanism to consider Soviet and any other proposals relating to the security of the Asia-Pacific region.\textsuperscript{59}

Though Gorbachev's Krasnoyarsk proposals were supported by a large number of nations including the nations of Asia-Pacific, but, American and Japanese scholars were bit critical about it. Indian scholars non-officially supported it, but some of them differed on two points –

1. Though they backed the third proposal of Krasnoyarsk\textsuperscript{9} meeting, they had certain reservations. India's response, they said, should consider the concrete reality in view of growing naval and air forces of certain countries in this region;

2. Secondly the proposal that security dialogue on Asia and Pacific region could start between the Soviet Union, China and US, was also not accepted by the Indian scholars. It was suggested that Indonesia, India and Vietnam should also be associated with this dialogue.\textsuperscript{60}

In October, 1989 and September, 1990, the international meeting on 'The Asia and Pacific Region: Dialogue for Peace and Co-operation' was held in Vladivostok. The package of Soviet proposals in preventing the militarization of Asia and ensuring co-operation in the region created


\textsuperscript{60} V. D. Chopra (ed.), op. cit., p.149.
positive environment. It was a fact that, Soviet Union's efforts in Asia-Pacific were not confined to proposals, it also took concrete measures in late 80's even in 1990 for implementing the proposals for ensuring security in this region.

Though most of the nations expressed their satisfaction over these measures, some scholars particularly the Western writers were bit skeptic about the Soviet military strategic intentions and capabilities relevant to the region. The policies and measures taken by USSR in Asia-Pacific zone did not bear the desired fruits in terms of maintenance of peace and stability, nevertheless it achieved success in lowering the intensity of conflicts and in certain cases even solving it.

4.6. Confidence Building Measures and Zones of Peace

Confidence-building measures, which are based on mutual trust, are essential for eliminating nuclear arms race and creating a secure and peaceful world. Consensus on key issues and closeness of political goals intensify this process. In 1972, during the post-Stalin era, the US administration then in office had a realistic approach to the central issue: the need to avert war and to renounce a course for military supremacy

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61 They regard these developments as being useful for the relaxation of tension, and at the same time recognize them as flowing from a national calculation about their probable effect, i.e. a Soviet recognition that strictly guarding military secrecy by traditional methods has been rendered virtually useless by orbiting military reconnaissance satellites, and that the political gain to be expected from such apparent openness would far exceed any conceivable military strategic losses which might flow from it. Michio Royama, "The USSR and the Asia-Pacific Region: Paper II", in Francois Heisbourg, (ed.), The Strategic Implications of Change in Soviet Union, (London: Macmillan, 1990), p. 157.
over the USSR (of course it did not mean that it renounced its main ideological views). During that time, the Soviet Union had similar approach to security and thus the political goals of the two sides coincided and confidence developed automatically. But later on the situation took a different turn, the US administration tried to take unilateral advantage over the Soviet Union which ruptured the confidence-building mechanism.\textsuperscript{62}

During the \textit{perestroika} phase, however, this idea rose to prominence again in Soviet concept of security. Gorbachev along with the 'New Thinkers' realized that nuclear deterrence strategy would not be effective on the pretext of security parity. They even said: "As long as nuclear weapons exist, strategic parity can be a stabilizing factor with all its negative aspects".\textsuperscript{63} Stressing that security should be mutual in the nuclear age, even if it was difficult to eliminate mutual distrust completely, 'New Thinkers' sincerely tried to minimize the dangers of nuclear war through common strategic concepts and efforts at confidence building. In this context, Arbatov said:

"Stability implies an overall balance of the forces of both powers and a symmetrical, mutual confidence in the reliability of their deterrent potentials at, incidentally, the lowest level of these deadly arsenals, with the reduction to the minimum reasonable sufficiency and, ultimately, the complete abolition of strategic potential and nuclear weapons".\textsuperscript{64}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{63} \textit{Pravda}, 10 July, 1987.
\item \textsuperscript{64} Alexi Arbatov, "The illusion of an impenetrable shield", \textit{New Times}, 8 August, 1987, p. 15. Bovin called this shift in strategic concept the one from 'deterrence...
He first applied this confidence-building mechanism in the European context through a series of measures that would instill mutual trust among the European states. He believed that once confidence in each other's peaceful intention was established, it would be easier to negotiate on arms reduction. Soon after he came to power, the French proposal for a new round of European negotiations to be labeled the Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBM) and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) was accepted, which resulted in the Stockholm Agreement of 1986. The purpose of this Stockholm Agreement was to establish rules that would prevent from using force without notification, inspection and accountability. Though this process began in Helsinki Final Act, prior to this agreement, it was systematically formulated and elaborated in the Stockholm Conference. Prior to Gorbachev the Soviet scholars focussed on Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) but they were piecemeal in approach. Such efforts sought to bring about agreements on non-use of force in Europe and no-first-use of nuclear weapons. By then, Soviet Union was not even prepared to open its military activity to public scrutiny.

by threat; the threat of overall retaliation to 'defensive deterrence', based on military parity maintained at every level of nuclear disarmament. see A. Bovin, Novoe Mysh-lenie-novaya Politika, Kommunist, 9 July 1988, p. 120. Cited in Tsuyoshi Hasegowa and Alex Pravda (eds.), Perestroika: Soviet Domestic and Foreign Policies, (London: Sage Publications, 1990), p. 168.

However, by late 1985, Soviet delegation came out with specific detailed CSBM proposals, which finally led to this agreement, which was promulgated on September 19, 1986 after months of intense negotiations. Despite some shortcomings and ambiguities, this Stockholm Conference created positive atmosphere for removing mistrust and suspicion that surrounded its military power in Europe. Of course, some Western scholars had expressed their reservations on the issue as they suggested that major concessions on disarmament aimed at avoiding harder concessions on the area of human rights, which was another major

66 The Central provision of the agreement were-

i) All signatories agreed to "refrain from the threat or use of force in their relations with other States, regardless of that State's political, social, economic or cultural system and irrespective of whether or not they maintain with that State relations of alliance". The fact that the Soviets accepted this "Anti-Brezhnev Doctrine" provision was a measure of how important the CBM process was to Gorbachev;

ii) Forty-two-day advance notice of military activities involving land forces in excess of 13,000 amphibious landings or parachute drops involving at least 3,000 troops, and transfers of at least 13,000 troops into the zone of application (Europe to the Urals);

iii) Observation of military activities and transfers involving at least 17,000 troops or amphibious landings and parachute drops with at least 5,000 troops. This observation must "allow the observers to confirm that the notified activity is non-threatening;"

iv) Annual calendars of military activity;

v) Military activities involving more than 40,000 troops should have two years notice and if they involve more than 75,000 troops, they cannot take place without such notice;

vi) Each signatory may request M-site or air inspection, but no more than three inspections begin within 36 hours of request and may last no more than 48 hours and be carried out by no more than four inspectors.

component of Helsinki Final Act. Subsequent reforms in the sphere of human rights tended to overshadow these reservations.

Whatever be the motive of Gorbachev, the fact remained that he reversed the Soviet position on military secrecy; and even modified the Brezhnev's 'dual track policy' by incorporating 'public scrutiny of military activity' which strengthened the confidence-building measures. In 1987, it was extended to USA as part of the process of nuclear disarmament. An agreement on 'Risk Reduction Centre' was implemented to lower the possibility of 'inadvertent' nuclear war.

Another important idea in this regard was the creation of 'zones of peace' partially or wholly de-militarized zones and nuclear-free zones in the context of Europe and in the Third World. In June 1988, in an international forum held in Berlin, Gorbachev emphasized on 'nuclear free zones' which could 'help disengage the nuclear forces of confronting alliances, thereby scaling down the risk of nuclear conflict'. He and his officials also supported proposals by regional states for nuclear free zones in such varied locations as the Pacific, South-East Asia, the Korean

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68 Zwick Peter, op.cit., p. 263.

69 Ibid, p. 263.

Peninsula, the Mediterranean, the Balkans and the Nordic region.\textsuperscript{71}

Soviet leaders laid emphasis on a proposal adopted by Warsaw Pact in May, 1987 for a 'nuclear weapon free corridor' along the dividing line between Warsaw Pact and NATO.\textsuperscript{72}

As said earlier, in the Third World context, Gorbachev employed the zone concept for denuclearization of distinct regions and for naval arms limitations which played a decisive role in strengthening confidence-building measures. A reliable system of 'International Security' during \textit{perestroika} was also inconceivable without effective guarantees for States against outside attack and without guaranteeing the border inviolability. American invasion of Grenada and heavy bombardment in Libya showed that international community was in need of it, which could ensure their own security and the security of the world as a whole. Inviolability of the boarders was considered as the most important element for national and international security. All steps to carve the border of sovereign States created serious consequences for the nations.\textsuperscript{73}

What was the most worrisome feature in this regard was that the revanchist forces most notably in the FRG were encouraged even on


\textsuperscript{73} N. Kapchenko, op.cit., p. 91.
flimsy pretexts. Consequently Soviet Union and its allies felt that mere demand for the reviewing of boundaries demarcating various European States would severely impair mutual trust and understanding among the European nations.

During this *perestroika* phase, Soviet Union made genuine efforts in this direction and even succeeded in reducing danger from West German revanchism and militarism. USA on its part responded positively. Whatever might be the latent motive of US in the Gulf war, it took steps effectively against the illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq. Soviet Union also condemned the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, which reflected its sincerity in adhering to the principle of 'effective guarantees against attack from without and for inviolability of their frontiers'.

**4.7. Prevention of International Terrorism**

The political aspects of security under *perestroika* emphasized on the prevention of international terrorism including safe use of land, air and sea communications as it was one of the important political components elaborated in 27th CPSU Congress. Soviet Union sincerely tried to halt State terrorism, nuclear terrorism and terrorism in any other forms which could destabilize the situations of the various regions of the world and undermine the international security. It opposed Imperialist policy of 'State terrorism' which associated the struggle for liberation with terrorism and under the guise of anti-terrorist actions exported counter revolution and suppressed their legitimate rights. USA even tried to justify its aggressive
actions and threats against Libya, Syria, Iran, Nicaragua and other countries on the pretext of international terrorism.

In this context, the political report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th CPSU Congress said:

"Crisis and conflicts, are fertile soil also for international terrorism. Undeclared wars, the export of counter-revolution in all forms, political assassinations, the taking of hostages, the hijacking of aircraft and bomb explosions in streets, airport and railway stations – such is the hideous face of terrorism, which its instigators try to mask with all sorts of cynical conventions. The USSR rejects terrorism in principle and is prepared to co-operate actively with other States in order to uproot it. The Soviet Union will resolutely safeguard its citizens against acts of violence and do everything to defend their lives, honour and dignity."^74

Yet another form of terrorism was 'nuclear terrorism' which threatened global peace and security. Soviet Union called for prevention of nuclear terrorism as one aspect of nuclear security, keeping in mind the incidents of sabotage at atomic enterprises in the USA and Western Europe and theft of highly fissionable material.\(^75\) In land, though terrorism was confined to certain sensitive areas, but sometimes it created serious consequences for the security of the nations. In air, terrorists obstructed air communications, hijacked planes and engaged in disruptive activities. In sea, they violated the rules of international law, misused territorial waters and resorted to violence.

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^74 Quoted in Vadim Zagladin, op.cit., p.104.

^75 N. Kapchenko, op.cit., p.92.
In 40\textsuperscript{th} Session of UN General Assembly, the Soviet Union and other countries addressed with a call for resolute measures against international terrorism. In the address at the 43\textsuperscript{rd} Session of UN General Assembly, Soviet leader Gorbachev stressed on joint efforts to end political terrorism.\textsuperscript{76} His steps to create Tribunal on international terrorism, treaties between nations including extradition treaties to curb it helped in strengthening international security. USA also responded positively to the effort of Soviet Union to halt terrorism.


Soviet policies towards Eastern Europe underwent radical changes under \textit{perestroika}. On the one side, Soviet leader Gorbachev refrained from applying coercion, which was the binding force between the Soviet and its satellite countries earlier. On the other side, he encouraged reforms in those countries.

First, in late 1986, he privately expressed views to the East European leaders that they could no longer rely on Soviet military intervention to keep them in power if things went wrong.\textsuperscript{77} It clearly

\textsuperscript{76} M. S. Gorbachev, Address at the 43\textsuperscript{rd} Session of UN General Assembly, December 7, 1988, \textit{Soviet Review Documents}, (New Delhi: USSR Embassy in India, 1988,) p. 31.

reflected that he did not want to repeat the military intervention, which took place in 1956 in Hungary, in 1968 in Czechoslovakia, in 1980 in Poland against communist party reformers and/or against popular rebellion. Second, though the Soviet leader did not urge the communist friends to follow the Soviet path of reforms as it was contradictory to the principle of ‘freedom of choice’, it was amply clear from his speeches and actions that he was not in favour of the old party dominated ‘administrative command system’.

Third Gorbachev stressed on ‘freedom of choice’ for all nations. In his speech, delivered in October 6, 1989, he expressed at the 40th Anniversary of GDR that ‘the choice of the form of development is the sovereign affair of each nation’. And ‘each nation would introduce its own feature into the particular form of democracy and the various paces of Socialist transformation’. Thus he rejected ‘the attempts to unify and standardize social development to copy or impose some mandatory model’. 78

This changing approach of Soviet Union towards Eastern Europe coupled with liberalization process of Soviet Union helped in accelerating the process of reforms in those countries. In 1989, it started in Poland as the Polish leaders realized that fundamental changes were needed to strengthen their economic and political security. Inflation, debt crisis and

78 Address by M. S. Gorbachev at the meeting to mark the 40th Anniversary of the GDR, Berlin, October 6, 1989, (Moscow: Novosti Press, 1989), p. 7.
political instability made the situation worse. In June 1989 election, solidarity party came to power with a promise to change the situation. As a champion of 'International Security' Gorbachev accepted this change as he thought the security of other nations (political and economic) should be strengthened.

In Hungary, the wind of liberalization, which was started at the time of Imre Nagy, appeared again in a strong form. In September 1989, it broke the Warsaw pact commitment and opened the borders to the West. It also brought about political changes in East Germany. In October 1989, Erich Honecker stepped down and Kenz came to power with a promise of reforms in political and economic fields. The most important development in Eastern Europe was the reunification of Germany. The Soviet stand on German reunification was characterized by its reluctance to agree to complete support for the move in July 1990. Soviet reluctance was guided by its security concerns, but ultimately Soviet Union accepted the reunited Germany as a member of NATO. As Soviet Union relied on USA and Germany as partners for strengthening international security and source of economic assistance for internal

79 Comprehensive Universal Security, Common Security, International Security are interchangeably used


81 Ibid, p. 18.
development respectively, when two countries joined forces, virtually there was no way out.\textsuperscript{82}

Such political reform also reduced the importance of Warsaw Pact and it became irrelevant with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, Czechoslovakia and other parts of the world contemplating withdrawal from organization by the end of 1991. By August 1991 it had been formally disbanded. Now the most pertinent question was: "Did the reforms in the Soviet Union lead to the collapse of the ‘outer empire’ (Communist rule throughout the East European countries) of the Soviet Union?".\textsuperscript{83}

It is difficult to disagree with Michael MccGwire's assessment that 'the patterns of events in 1987-88 argues strongly that Gorbachev’s leadership deliberately set in motion the process that would lead to the collapse of the Communist rule throughout Eastern Europe by the end of 1989'.\textsuperscript{84} Whatever might be the consequences of reforms, but probably, he did it for strengthening ‘Universal’ (international) security with an expectation to get co-operation from USA and the Western powers, which could only be possible by convincing USA by his sincere efforts for a change.

\textsuperscript{82} Gerhard Wetting, "The Transformation from cold war to today’s challenges". \textit{Aussen Politik}, Vol. 11. (1997), p. 114.

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., p.114. Wetting has also used ‘inner empire’ while analysing the collapse of the USSR.

\textsuperscript{84} MccGwire Michael, op.cit., p. 860.
The shift from 'national security' to 'common security' clearly reflected the importance of universal security for which Gorbachev tried for. Even Gorbachev wanted to ensure Soviet security through the 'common security' paradigm with an assumption that Soviet security could be ensured automatically as a logical consequence. That was the reason, why national security policies were oriented towards strengthening universal security.\textsuperscript{85} Internal liberalization, which was started at the time of Gorbachev also aimed at it.

The emerging linkage between security policy and internal liberalization made it clear that liberal reformers under perestroika were trying for a peaceful world free from nuclear war for which they were seeking friendly relations with rest of the world and particularly permanent alteration in the super power relationship rather than temporary respite.\textsuperscript{86}

From the above analysis it was clear that under perestroika, Soviet national security was placed under the umbrella of 'common security'. It was obvious that changes in Eastern Europe and unification of Germany had influenced other nations, so also the republics of Soviet Union when they realized that Gorbachev would not resort to 'Stalinian measures' to


suppress them. Thus, the liberal atmosphere both internal and external dimensions of liberalization as discussed coupled with Gorbachev’s attitude towards non-interference and recognition of the ‘right of the people to choose the ways and forms of their development independently’ accelerated the process of disintegration and ultimately shattered the fabric of Soviet national security.

Gorbachev committed a mistake in encouraging the process of change without visualizing the intricacies involved in it, with an expectation that it would strengthen the security paradigm but it acted in a reverse way and belied his expectation. Whatever might be the consequences of the changes brought in Soviet Union during perestroika phase, but Gorbachev deserves credit for having given completely positive direction and essentially one without resorting to force to or process of change which helped in ending the Cold War, developing the confidence building mechanism between two super powers, settling international conflicts, preventing terrorism, improving an atmosphere of peace and security.

Though Soviet concept of security could not save Soviet Union from disintegration and with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ‘concept of common security’ which was the brain child of Gorbachev, lost its relevance for all practical purposes, but the ‘noble ideas’ elaborated in his concept of ‘comprehensive universal security’ still hold good.