Chapter 4
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The Final Phase, August-December 1991

On 18 August 1991, G.I. Yanayev, the Vice President of the USSR issued a decree which announced that since Gorbachev was sick and unable to perform his duties as President of the USSR Yanayev had taken over as acting President on the basis of Article 127.7 of the USSR constitution. The decree cited the ill-health of Gorbachev as the only reason for change in leadership. However, the statements that accompanied the decree revealed more. They said that the situation in the Soviet Union warranted immediate introduction of a state of emergency and therefore “the need to take very decisive measures to prevent the society from sliding toward a nationwide catastrophe and to safeguard legality and order.” An eight member State Committee for the State of Emergency (SCSE) in the USSR was formed to provide effective administration during this time. All measures were directed to bring everything under the control of this committee. Various structures

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2 Ibid.
of administration and power had to confine to the directions of this committee. Autonomy in a lot of areas acquired in the perestroika and glasnost years was now curbed. In particular, control was established over the mass media. It seemed that there was total reversal of everything the state had gained in the past few years. According to the coup leaders, the reforms initiated by Gorbachev with a view to develop and democratize the country had only brought the country to a standstill. All their efforts were now directed against perestroika on to its achievements and its future course.

It was to Yeltsin’s advantage that, with Gorbachev being held captive where he was holidaying, it fully fell on Yeltsin to defend against the coup. The coup decisively aided in the ascendancy of Yeltsin. Even by August 1991 Yeltsin had acquired considerable authority for himself in the Russian republic. In fact, the power and prominence of Yeltsin was a direct outcome of perestroika. The coup leaders made a grave mistake in ignoring this fact. “While the putschists arrested Mikhail Gorbachev, their real targets escaped: Boris Yeltsin, Democratic Russia and the separatist

\[\text{Ibid.}\]

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republics.”4 Together with Gorbachev these also should have been targeted and dealt with simultaneously. Yeltsin lost no time and immediately started his efforts to rebuff the coup. According to Yeltsin, the coup was “right wing, reactionary, unconstitutional.”5 Though Yeltsin was a leader of only a Republic, he acted on behalf of the Soviet Union and took concrete measures to bring the situation under control. Being the President of the largest Republic, Yeltsin was fully aware that future depended on his moves. However, in this context though Yeltsin worked hard against the coup, everything seemed guided to his benefit. He was instrumental in passing a decree that transferred executive powers of the USSR bodies to the control of the President of RSFSR until such a time when an extraordinary Congress of the USSR People’s deputies would be convened.6 Thus all the Union administrative structures which operated in Russia were placed under the control of the Republic authorities. It was a crisis situation and it warranted such moves. But Yeltsin’s skillful maneuvering was evident in that the


6 Ibid.
emergency decisions continued to be in operation even after tiding over the emergency situation.

Even as Yeltsin’s efforts were on, simultaneously the coup leaders also further strengthened their position. Most of the republics had passed certain laws in their respective Supreme Soviets which established the primacy of their laws over that of the USSR. But now with the coup it was announced that the USSR constitution and laws were to take precedence over all other republic constitutions and laws throughout the USSR. All newspapers were temporarily banned with the exception of the central and Moscow newspapers. Though there were moves and countermoves, eventually the coup was defeated and Gorbachev returned to Moscow. However, Gorbachev returned to a centre which had undergone a drastic change. Though the coup was defeated, it had completely rewritten everything about the Soviet Union. The August Coup seemed as the final attempt by a small group of communists to restore the past glory of communist tradition which they felt the reforms had destroyed. But, the failure of the coup only “pushed the Soviet Union well beyond any

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parameters envisioned by the very process of reform the putschists were attempting to stem." In the final analysis, the coup only spelled despair for the Soviet Union and destroyed every prospect of its survival.

There were several reasons why the coup was defeated. The fundamental flaw of the coup leaders was that they were not well organized and thus it made Yeltsin's victory easy. Yeltsin also had a large mass support. According to experts, the coup leaders underestimated the ability of Yeltsin to garner support and his high level connections which provided him both inside information and help to form a parallel government if anti-coup efforts failed. The coup may not have succeeded but its effect was detrimental to the ongoing reform process. The coup also set in motion several things which did not provide the scope for a reversal.

According to Yeltsin, August coup was not an accident but a logical result of the policy that was pursued in the country. These policies included verbal reforms elusive of real action, totalitarian

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8 Bialer, n. 4, p. 166.


bodies carrying out reforms, protecting the old party and state structures and leaders of reactionary forces being in charge of transformation. Yeltsin also came down heavily on Gorbachev. He blamed, "his inconsistency in carrying out reforms, his indecisiveness and sometimes capitulation to the aggressive onslaught of the Partocracy whose rights had been infringed - all this created favourable soil for the totalitarian system to take revenge." Yeltsin favourably used the period immediately after the coup to implicate everyone and so gain approval for his decisions and policies.

Communist Party and the Coup

The leaders of the coup were mainly members of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Moreover, they were also leaders who could command allegiance from the party. This can be inferred from the cautious silence initially maintained by the party and later the slow response against the coup from the party Secretariat. The party leadership pleaded ignorance of the coup plan and condemned all those involved in the attempt. The party noted that the coup jeopardized the development of democracy in the Soviet

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11 Ibid.
Union and pledged allegiance to democracy and renewal of the society. However, since the coup leaders were permanent members of the party the stigma that CPSU led the coup prevailed. In fact, the coup also strongly reinforced the feeling that the role of the Communist Party had been well extended beyond what was assigned. The party seemed no longer indispensable. The coup though staged by a few, depicted the party as unwilling to accept the changed situation. The coup was the response of only a few Communists who could not approve the predicament of the Soviet Union. But it ruined everything both for the Communist Party and the Soviet Union.

But even before the coup was evident, “the inability of the party structures to adapt to reality and to grasp the new status of the CPSU, as well as their attempts to thwart and even wreck the democratic transformation gave rise to disillusionment among the majority of communists.” This was a major cause for the dwindling rolls of the CPSU. Gorbachev, speaking to the USSR Supreme Soviet at its extraordinary session on 26 August, acknowledged that the coup was also a consequence of ‘indecision


and inconsistency', particularly with regard to delay in eliminating
the party's monopolistic position. He also reaffirmed his
commitment to continue the reforms. It was directed out of a
desire to gain support from pro-reform leaders and so retain his
position. The parliament also passed a resolution suspending the
activities of the CPSU throughout the USSR. Gorbachev took the
initiative and resigned from the post of General Secretary of the
CPSU. He also called on other democratic minded communists to
follow suit and work together with those forces interested in the
transformation of the country. The reason for this move was due
to the role that CPSU had played during the coup. Though the
CPSU as such did not lead the coup, Gorbachev preferred to quit.
CPSU had been discredited because its members led the coup,
motivated by the desire to restore the Communist tradition.
Gorbachev chose to leave the Communist Party and be absolved of
any charge of having collaborated with the coup leaders.

Gorbachev's resignation and his call dashed any hope that
the reform-minded party members would have nurtured to stay on

14 "Parliament Wrangles over Blame for Coup", Izvestia, 26 August 1991, in
15 Ibid.
16 "Gorbachev Quits as Head of Dying Party", Izvestia, 26 August 1991, in
and build the party. The institutional strength that the party had enjoyed so far came to an end with this.\(^{17}\) Though the 28\(^{th}\) Party Congress and various plena of the party were held after the constitutional change of Article 6 and when political reforms were being implemented, the resolutions and calls in these forums were still for the CPSU to renew itself to continue giving leadership to the country. However, August 1991 put the final seal on the fact of “the incompatibility of maintaining the CPSU and achieving real political reform in the USSR.”\(^{18}\)

After the coup strong measures were constantly taken against the Communist Party. Even republic leaders did not want to leave any scope for the party or any individual movement to contend for prominence. On 6 November 1991, a decree of the President of RSFSR banned the activity of the CPSU and their organizational structures and all the party’s property was also transferred to Russia.\(^{19}\) The reason for such a decision, besides its involvement in the coup, was the fear that the party might try to stage another

\(^{17}\) Hari Vasudevan, “Russia’s Presidency”, *Economic and Political Weekly* (Mumbai), Special Number, 18 December 1993, p. 2824.


coup and also the fact that there was also no guarantee that smaller
units of the party would not hinder reform. Though the party’s
monopoly in the political system had ended with the dropping of
Article 6, the Communist Party had still continued to hold some
power as the coup had revealed. “The Yanayev Committee’s state
of emergency involved the tacit, if not outright, compliance of
almost every minister of the Union Cabinet and discredited all
institutions especially those concerned with security.”20 The coup
had only made public or visibly evident this clout that the
communists held in the government and administrative structures.
Administrative and government personnel held positions on
account of the fact that they belonged to the Communist Party. As
the reform process progressed, the decline of the Communist Party
and the government and administrative staff’s decreasing influence
happened together. The coup leaders made the best use of the
orientation of the administrators and their steady loyalty to the
party.

The ban on the Communist Party after the coup therefore
was significant. It meant “the end of any centralized bureaucratic

20 Vasudevan, n. 17, p. 2824.
control over the country and the beginning of a new type of Soviet Union which would be devoid of communist rule.”21 This was the opinion in the wake of the ban on the Communist Party following the coup. But things were yet in a state of flux to conclude the beginning of a new scenario in the Soviet Union. It was an undeniable fact that the Communist Party network had held the different republics together in Soviet Union. Even radical reforms failed to eliminate its influence in the Soviet polity. August coup revealed this indisputable fact. But for Russia and the other republics the plan was to appropriate and enhance their scope for independence. It only spelt doom for the survival of Soviet Union.

Russia and the Other Republics in the Aftermath of the Coup

The coup decisively brought the focus on to the republics. It only strengthened the moves that the republics had begun towards independent action. Particularly, Russia became the chief player. The context in which Gorbachev would meet republic leaders was totally changed. With the coup, Gorbachev also lost most of his powers. On 23 August 1991, Gorbachev had a meeting with the deputies of the Russian republic. The equations had now changed

21 Shah, n. 9, p. 7.
and the bargaining power of Yeltsin and Russia was definitely well placed as against Gorbachev and the Soviet Union. At a meeting with the Russian deputies, Yeltsin humiliated Gorbachev and forced him to accept accusations against the CPSU, it was also demanded that Gorbachev approve key positions in state power for Russia in the future Union structure.\textsuperscript{22} Yeltsin made determined efforts to acquire for Russia an unrivalled status among the republics. The greater motivation was to ensure his own stability in leadership and prominence. At an extraordinary session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, several resolutions passed which made amendments in the USSR constitution was a further proof of Yeltsin’s intentions. The power to appoint and remove was curtailed and the law passed earlier which gave additional power to the USSR President was also repealed.\textsuperscript{23} The calculated gains effected by Gorbachev both for Soviet Union and to strengthen his own position were removed.

The coup almost brought about an end to the Soviet system. The republics had played a leading role in defending against the


\textsuperscript{23} "Parliament Wrangles over Blame for Coup" n. 14, p. 6.
coup. Therefore, volition to act now passed from Moscow to the Union republics. The republics made best use of the situation and broke the restrain it had exercised so far. In fact, those which had not so far proclaimed independence now took the final step. The Republics of Ukraine, Belorussia and Moldova not long after the coup, passed resolutions of their independence in the extraordinary sessions of their Supreme Soviets.\footnote{“Three Republics Declare Independence”, *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 27 August 1991, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XLIII, no. 35, 2 October 1991, pp. 12-15.} Thus, one republic after the other declaring independence only undermined Gorbachev’s hold over the Soviet Union. Things quickly moved out of his control. In assuming more powers, Russia also passed a decree - “On Ensuring the Economic Foundation of the Sovereign RSFSR.”\footnote{“Yeltsin Decree Lays Economic Foundation for a Sovereign Russian Republic”, *Pravda*, 23 August 1991, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XLIII, no. 35, 2 October 1991, pp. 22-23.} This was another initiative aimed at seizing the power and the role that USSR held. Russia’s decisions were least reminiscent of the fact that efforts were on to renew the Soviet Union. But instead the republics hastened to consolidate their position. This above decree, in fact, transferred all union level enterprises and organizations situated in the Russian territory to its jurisdiction by 1 January...
1992. The Union’s role was reduced to just coordination rather than issuing commands and directives. Another important administrative function that Soviet Union exercised was transferred to Russia.

In November 1991, the Congress of the Russian SFSR people’s deputies voted to give Yeltsin special powers that he had asked for. Yeltsin’s opinion was that it was required in the transitional period “to build a tough and strong system of administration along vertical lines.” Most of Yeltsin’s moves aimed at reordering the Soviet Public Administration. The special powers, in fact, bestowed him the right make independent decisions on matters of reorganizing structures of the supreme bodies of executive power. It appeared that Yeltsin’s moves were well calculated. Also made available for Yeltsin was the right to suspend activities of the Union and the republics that impede reform, and greater freedom in handling reform. As far as the Union administrative system was concerned, two crucial things happened as a consequence of Yeltsin’s decrees. One was that it

26 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
was divested of the important functions it handled, and, two, branches within it were transferred to jurisdiction under the Russian republic. The Union was not consulted and it was done solely at the initiative of Russia. Immediately after Yeltsin accrued special powers on 15 November 1991, he made another significant move when he signed ten Presidential decrees and government resolutions which dealt with real changeover to a free economy. By these decrees Russia also took control of all financial agencies in its territory, taking over all economic affairs from the Union. Thus, one after the other Yeltsin brought the union agencies under his control, building up Russia as the real power centre.

Gorbachev, in the meantime, unsuccessfully haggled with the republics in unfavourable conditions to come to an agreement on a federation.

Union and the Coup

The Coup disrupted the signing of the Union Treaty on 20 August 1991 as had been planned. In the period after the coup, all of Gorbachev's efforts were directed to somehow preserve the

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Union intact. But this period also revealed that the republics were incapable of adhering to any particular agreement made about the Union Treaty. Every meeting witnessed a different stance from the republics. It made evident the fact that the time had arrived when they could no longer be forced to agree. The different laws passed by the republics in their respective Supreme Soviets had empowered them to make independent decisions. This 'war of laws' left the union administrative structure redundant. The Communist Party, bereft of supreme power, could no longer impart the administrative system the authority that was required to enforce Union directions.

On 23 August 1991, Gorbachev held a conference with the leaders of nine republics to discuss about the immediate steps to be taken to rectify the prevailing situation. This was the first of Gorbachev's efforts after the coup to renew discussion on the Union Treaty. All the participants at the conference were of one accord that signing the Union Treaty was crucial to ease the political, economic and social instability created in the country as a result of the coup. Gorbachev and leaders of eleven republics met

30 "After the Coup: The First Few Days", n. 12, pp. 7-9.
together again on 1 September 1991 and agreed on certain basic premises, "for the purpose of preventing further disintegration of the structures of power and pending the creation of a new political and state system of relations between republics." Since the coup interrupted the signing of the Union Treaty, the changed context demanded that the treaty had to be redrafted. The leaders decided that, though in the new treaty the scope for individual republics to decide their status would be provided, and despite what each republic would decide, an Economic Union definitely had to be concluded. Several councils, formed with representatives of people's deputies from every republic, were entrusted different tasks for the transitional period. This implied once again the transfer of administrative work from the Union Public Administration to the new representative units of the republics.

However, the republics could not stick to the decision of September 1991 and started to drift away from the initial commitment to a Union. It became obvious that the interest to preserve the Union was almost abandoned by the republics. Russia

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32 Ibid.
took the lead in this process. Besides the political instability and uncertainty in the aftermath of coup, the economy was virtually in free fall. Inflation was increasing by 2–3 percent a week. With the economic situation getting worse the republics found it further difficult. Once again State Council meeting was convened and ten republics agreed to sign an Economic Treaty by 15 October 1991 to make a combined effort at solving the economic problems. The idea promoted was that a joint effort was better to tackle the economic situation than going it alone in the new situation. No final decision was made and it was left to the republics to decide. Gorbachev now gave precedence to economic agreement over political one with the hope that a union treaty to keep the republics together in Soviet Union would somehow be concluded. However, this economic union did not come about because of the compulsions of the individual republics. The idea of each republic being separate entities prevailed over that of the republics being part of one whole. The republics did not want to lose out on any gains that they otherwise could achieve. Moreover, the time lapse


between the experience of freedom and the republics' subjection to Soviet Union had made them determined about freedom and this made republics wary of all moves to conclude an Union Treaty.

The number of republics interested in the Union reduced. In November 1991, seven republics reached an accord to form a Confederal Union of Sovereign States. More concessions were made for the republics. It was designed as a loose formation of political union with powers delegated by the republics. The membership was to be at the discretion of the republics. The scope of the Union was further diminished with Yeltsin not being in favour of any real legitimization of power for the head of the Union. But, Gorbachev held out for an elected President and in safeguarding some union offices. It was only an accord on what the leaders envisioned for the Union, the plan was still at a preliminary stage. Time was running out and the transitional period appeared too long. Moreover, the stalemate between Gorbachev and Yeltsin seemed to be affecting the final decision on the Union. On 3 December 1991, Gorbachev appealed to consider the formation of a Union as a remedial measure against the crisis situation and the

disintegration that could ensue. Gorbachev clarified the fact that the appeal was not to revive the old centre but to create an entirely new state and interstate formation. Gorbachev stood totally against breaking up and somehow wanted to preserve the Soviet Union.

Even as discussion proceeded on the type of Union treaty, the leaders of the three republics of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, almost in secret, met in Minsk and signed a pact on 8 December 1991 forming Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and ending USSR. This was an independent move from the leaders of the three republics and was not a consequence of any breakdown in the Union treaty talks. It was a clear message against the Union leadership negating any authority it possessed even after the coup. The end of the USSR meant the cessation of all offices of the Union and the inviolability of these republics territory for the operation of a third state power. The leaders claimed that the basis of the pact was that the drafting of the union treaty had come to an impasse and also due to adverse impact of the policies of the centre.


on the prevailing economic and political crisis. This was not entirely true and the three republics had hurried things up for their own advantage. They also welcomed the other republics to join the Minsk pact. In this context, the Union could either agree for a peaceful transition under the Minsk pact or choose to resist the decision concluded by these three republics. By now, being deprived of most of powers, the Union decided against any confrontation. However, according to Gorbachev, though Minsk pact did contain positive elements yet for the leaders of just three republics to decide the fate of a country such as the USSR was a hurried effort without sufficient discussions. 38

Few days after the Minsk Pact was signed, all the other republics deliberated on the pact and sorted out their differences and coordinated their positions. Eventually on 21 December 1991, eleven republics signed the agreement at Alma-Ata and formed the Commonwealth as equal partners. 39 This placed the seal on the new formation and finally closed the Soviet Union chapter. This was the end and a point of no return. The republics which signed the

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38 Ibid., p. 4.
agreement included Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tashikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kirgizstan, Azerbaidzhan, Armenia and Moldova. The only question left undealt and what was immediately required was the exit of Gorbachev as this formation of the Commonwealth had totally erased the scope of the Union. The Council of the heads of the state and heads of government were formed as supreme coordinating bodies among the Commonwealth and proposals were also welcomed from members on suggestions regarding the abolition of structures of the former USSR by the 30 December 1991. These were, however, just symbolic moves of what had already happened. Power from the union administrative structures had long been realigned. Dismantling these structures was just a formality now.

Gorbachev had no other option left and he resigned as USSR President on 25 December 1991, which cleared up the last fragment of the already dismantled union. The undoing of Soviet Union had its roots in the failure of Gorbachev’s reform efforts:

40 Ibid.
The system fell because the leadership tried simultaneously to dismantle the old practices of command-administration in the economic and political spheres and to construct a democratic multinational federation. Gorbachev's reforms had moved from a "revolution from-above" to a massive, multinational series of revolutions from below.\(^{42}\)

**Public Administration From August 1991 to December 1991**

Gorbachev's faulty plans had their major impact on Public Administration from the beginning of the reforms right through to the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It was not just faulty plans but also the plan sequence that was followed while introducing the reforms. Enough thought was not given to the suitability of the reform in conditions peculiar to the Soviet Union. This was particularly evident in his "drastic action in dismantling the traditional centralized command system had created a vacuum, which was yet to be filled for the simple reason that, as in the part, political reform had followed economic reform. Legitimacy could have been achieved, and confidence in economic relations promoted with a reverse time table."\(^{43}\) While other sectors opened


up with the reforms and incorporated new principles and methods, the political system continued in its traditional ways. As a result, the administrative system became unadaptable to the changes taking place in the society. This hindered the reform process. Thus, what was left as far as Public Administration was concerned was that the already ineffective administrative system was slowly being dismantled in the period after the coup.

Through these years the administration had also opposed reforms. The ouster of the party from exercising power in the state bodies, instead of strengthening the executive power, had left it further weakened. It was in the period from the coup to the disintegration of Soviet Union that the actual impact of the reforms was fully evident on the administrative system. After the coup, events such as the Communist Party being banned and Gorbachev resigning from party leadership, only established that it would never be possible for the party to trace back its path. This had its strong implications for the administrative structure. Power had been intertwined between the party and the bureaucratic system. After the coup, the administrative system lay totally paralyzed. The republics emerged stronger after the coup and took charge of their affairs. This was another major factor which undermined the Union
administrative structure, since it was left with no role to play. Another factor was that Gorbachev could not play a determined role. Though, Gorbachev, through this period, had tried to keep the Union together, the fact that he also simultaneously agreed to the suggestions of reorganization of the Union administrative structures by Russia only worked negatively for Gorbachev. The fact that Yeltsin was directly elected President gave him legitimacy over Gorbachev whose Presidency over USSR was not through universal-franchise. Yeltsin steadily transferred the central administrative bodies under the jurisdiction of the Russian republic. It was not in accumulating structures of administration to gain power but he also reformed and strengthened bodies already under his control to gain leverage.

The republics one after the other after the coup, made declarations of independence. This implied that in the republics, administration was managed by their own structures. Of the union administrative structure, Yeltsin writes in his book that:

All the governmental bodies of the Soviet Union were in suspension and it was obvious that the real power was in the republics above all the Republic of Russia. Neither the Council of Ministers nor Gosplan... nor any of the other all-powerful bodies were making any
real decisions; their functions were merely limited to registering the existing situation. ⁴⁴

There were many other changes and reformulations going on in the country during this stage. The whole period after the coup came under the label of transitional period. On 5 September 1991, Gorbachev announced the USSR Law on bodies of state power and administration during the transitional period. ⁴⁵ This law gave to the USSR Supreme Soviet the supreme power during this period with the right to make decisions ranging from changes in the constitution to domestic and foreign policies. It also gave other powers to various bodies. The law also gave the individual republics greater autonomy. ⁴⁶ But as far as the Union Public Administration was concerned its stability and functioning lay only in the Union Treaty being signed.

Some of Gorbachev's decisions made after the coup could not be seen as a recourse or preventive action against all that had happened during the coup or had caused the coup. In fact, fresh


⁴⁶ Ibid.
appointments to head the administrative posts in the defence and security ministries were the first deputies of the dismissed officials and in foreign affairs the former experienced executive, who were all suspected to have helped the coup. Their appointments were seen as ‘conspiracy of a government system that did not wish to be dismantled’. Such actions did not promote much confidence in the leaders and people alike of the republics in a viable renewed union which would continue to grant them the freedom they had experienced for a short period of time. The signing being put off due to the coup, the republics together looked for other ways to tide over the crisis. Discussions were made on different types of treaties that could be concluded among the republics to form an Union. Of significance for the administrative structure was an economic treaty that was being discussed to be signed by twelve republics. On 1 November 1991, the state council had adopted a decision to abolish 36 all-union ministries and 37 departments by 15 November. Moreover, it also made plans to form the Interstate Economic Committee, an executive body of the council of the

47 Yeltsin, n. 44, p. 108.

heads of the government, and of the states of the economic community. But the efforts failed to reach a conclusion. The republics which began to determine their own future even before the coup and contradictory to the Soviet times, began to make decisions even about the central administrative structure. After the Minsk Pact, Yeltsin acted quickly and transferred to Russia all the administrative structures of USSR. This process had begun even before Gorbachev resigned. In a series of decrees passed by Yeltsin as the President of RSFSR, he integrated the USSR structure of administration into the Russian state structure.49

According to Bialer, in 1985 Soviet Union may have been economically decaying but was politically stable, “disintegration did not at all seem an immediate prospect... the deep changes initiated by perestroika — almost certainly accelerated the demise of communism and the disintegration of the empire. It was as Tocqueville had warned: ‘The most perilous moment for a bad government is when it seeks to mend its ways.’ ”50


50 Bialer, n. 4, p. 170.
In the case of Soviet Union, reforms, rather than correcting the administrative structures of the government, brought it to a standstill, eventually leading to the dismantling of its structure culminating in the very disintegration of the Soviet Union. There was no administrative structure left of the Union and what little had remained was taken over by the new republics, creating a new series of crises.