CHAPTER - VI
SOCIAL PARTICIPATION: NATURE AND EXTENT

In this chapter, we take a closer look at the nature and extent of the participation of different social groups in the Civil Disobedience Movement. A movement as variegated as the national movement which sought to draw to itself the widest possible popular support has to recognise the inevitability of a differential social response to its various programmes, and had to also provide space for this inevitably differential response. Its successes and its failures in this respect ultimately depended on the extent to which it could incorporate into its practice the urges and aspirations, the strengths and weaknesses, of different sections of the Indian people, while simultaneously engaging them in united and common action.

MUSLIMS

The participation of Muslims in the Civil Disobedience Movement remained weak on the whole. It seems that the appeals of Muslim communal leaders combined with the active Government encouragement of communal dissension to counter the forces of nationalism and the clearly inadequate response of the Congress resulted in restraining the larger part of the Muslim masses from joining hands with others against the British Government.
Even before the movement started in 1930, some of the leading Muslim Congress leaders like M.A. Ansari, T.A.K. Sherwani and Khaliquzzaman had expressed this unhappiness about another round of national struggle without some kind of a communal pact. In the Working Committee meeting on 15 February, 1930, Syed Mahmud asserted that the Muslims as a whole were indifferent to the struggle and also expressed his apprehension that Civil Disobedience would, with official encouragement, rapidly degenerate into Hindu-Muslim riots. Gandhiji and other leaders did recognise this danger but decided to march ahead as, according to them, there was no alternative.  

Thus, while the Congress was aware that the Muslims in general were likely to be somewhat apathetic to the movement, it decided to go ahead nevertheless and try to solve the problem of Muslim participation via active efforts at mobilisation in the course of the struggle.

Efforts were made (particularly in the beginning) by the Muslim Congress leaders and the pro-Congress Muslim leaders of the province to entice their co-religionists into the Congress fold. For example, in Meerut, Basir Ahmed, Hakim Muhammad Mian, Abbas Samad, Rafiq Ahmed, Ghulam Siddiqui, Riyazuddin and Muhammad Asfaq Ilahi issued a printed appeal to the Muslims of India and particularly of Meerut district to take part in the Congress agitation. The appeal stated that the Congress had cast aside the Nehru Report and

declared in favour of complete independence, and that as Muslims could never tolerate a life of servitude, they should unite and support Congress. Basir Ahmed and Pirji Nasir also delivered speeches at Juma Mosque on 24 January 1930, requesting local Muslims to participate in Independence Day celebrations. However, their appeal, as the Government reports suggest, could hardly get any favourable response from the Muslim masses. At Saharanpur, some Muslims held a meeting on 15 March to discuss the methods of inducing Muslims to take part in the Congress movement. They decided to form a Muslim Nationalist Party to carry out the necessary propaganda. As a part of their strategy, they decided to concentrate on the anti-Sarda Act campaign among the Muslims and having thus established an influence over them, bring them into the Congress fold. At the time of the salt satyagraha, Maulana Anwar Shah, the ex-head Mudarris of Deoband addressed a meeting at Muzaffargarh, in support of Civil Disobedience. He declared at the meeting that according to the Prophet, no tax could be levied on air, water and salt and that if any such tax were levied, the Muslims should refuse it even at the cost of their lives. Apart from these individual efforts, the leading Muslim

2. WRPA, Feb. 1, 1930, UPID.
4. Ibid, April 5, 1930.
organisation, Jamait-ul-ulema-i-Hind held a meeting at Amroha and passed a resolution in favour of the Congress programme.\textsuperscript{5}

However, despite all these exhortations and appeals, the "Muslims continued for the most part to hold aloof from the Congress", the UP Government reported in August 1930. It added, "the Aligarh Muslim University and other Muslim educational institutions have so far not been affected by the Congress agitation".\textsuperscript{6} This attitude of Muslims remained the same throughout the first phase of the Movement. Even in the second phase, we do not find any change in this trend. Their poor response becomes amply clear when we look at the list of political prisoners. Till 15 November 1930, out of a total of 4,848 persons convicted in connection with Civil Disobedience in UP, only 108 were Muslims.\textsuperscript{7} In the catalogue of 'freedom fighters' felicitated subsequently by the Government of independent India, there are few names of Muslims who went to jail for civil disobedience during 1930-32, and these too are mostly leaders like T.A.K. Sherwani, Rafi Ahmed Kidwai and Manzar Ali Shokhta. A further scrutiny of the list of Civil Disobedience prisoners in Allahabad between 1930-33 reveals that out of a total of 679 prisoners only 9 were Muslims\textsuperscript{8}, all of whom were jailed during the first phase.

\textsuperscript{5} FR, May I & II, 1930, FN-18/6/1930, Hom.Poll., NAI.
\textsuperscript{6} FR, Aug I, 1930, FN-18/9/1930, Hom.Poll., NAI.
\textsuperscript{7} FN-23/26/1931, Hom.Poll., NAI.
\textsuperscript{8} Swatantrata Sangram Ke Sainik, Allahabad Division.
Nevertheless, the general Muslim apathy towards Congress and the Civil Disobedience Movement does not mean that they were necessarily siding with the Government. Throughout the first phase we find agitation going on amongst the Muslims against the Sarda Act. Marriages in violation of this Act were regularly organised throughout the province. The publication of the Simon Commission Report also created some dissatisfaction among them and meetings were organised at many places to condemn this report. Further, the massacre of unarmed satyagrahis at Peshawar who were mostly Muslims created resentment among the Muslims of this province. Meetings were held at many places to condemn the Peshawar massacre and at some places like Saharanpur, special prayers were offered in the mosque for "the martyrs of Peshawar and for the destruction of the enemies of Islam".

The attitude of the UP Muslims towards the movement conforms to the general all India trend. Nowhere in the country, except in the North West Frontier Province, do we find substantial Muslim participation in Civil Disobedience. In UP, the main objective of the Muslim community was to bargain for some more safeguards from the Government at the Round Table Conferences besides jealously guarding the existing ones. In their effort to achieve these objectives, they considered every increase in the strength and prestige

9. WRPA, July 12, 1930, UPID.
10. Ibid, May 17, 1930.
of the Congress as detrimental to their interests. It was probably the same apprehension that made them react to the Gandhi-Irwin Pact as 'critical and dubious'.\textsuperscript{11} The Pact which had not only greatly increased the status of the Congress but was also considered by the people in general as a victory for the Congress, probably filled in them a kind of suspicion that the Congress would get an influential position in the next session of the Round Table Conference.

A similar attitude was again witnessed after the announcement of the Communal Award in August 1932 and the subsequent beginning of the Harijan uplift movement and the Poona Pact. One of the UP Government reports says that "the Muslims are not enamoured of the attempt to raise the status of the depressed classes".\textsuperscript{12} They were probably unhappy at the prospect of the bridging of the social gap between caste Hindus and untouchables because it suited them politically to keep the two groups divided.\textsuperscript{13} Their reaction to the provisions of Communal Award was similar. The Chief Secretary of UP reported on 5 September 1932 that the "Muslims generally are well satisfied with the award but are afraid that if they express that satisfaction, the result may be that Hindus may receive more in those disputes with which the award has not dealt".\textsuperscript{14} Hence, it is clear that their

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\textsuperscript{11} FR, March 1, 1931, FN-18/3/1931, Hom.Poll., NAI.
\textsuperscript{12} FR, Sept. II, 1932, FN-18/12/1932, Hom.Poll., NAI.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{14} FN-41/4/1932, Hom.Poll., NAI.
\end{flushleft}
intention in this period was to win from the Government as many rewards as they could in return for not siding with the Congress and in this attempt, they considered the Congress (they made it a synonym for Hindus) as their main competitor or rather an enemy.

Anti-Congress sentiment among Muslims was provided direct encouragement by the British administrators who naturally wished to wean away Muslim support from the Congress. Gyanendra Pandey, in his work on The Congress in UP, 1926-34, has quoted many letters of the Governor, Malcolm Hailey, which suggest that the provincial government was directly involved in isolating the Muslims from the movement. Right from the beginning of his tenure in 1928, the Governor set before himself the task of helping landlords and Muslims to express their support to the British. This effort increased at the time of the Civil Disobedience campaign. In 1930, the Nawab of Chhatari, an influential Muslim landlord of Bulandshahar District, Home Member of the Government and the Acting Governor of the Province in 1928 and again in 1933-34 tried, on the Government's behalf, to persuade the Khilafat leader Muhammad Ali to make an announcement against the Civil Disobedience campaign. Efforts were also made to get the Ulema to pronounce against the campaign. Nawab of Chhatari was also responsible for a meeting of the Taushih Jamait-ul-ulema-i-Hind at Kanpur which strongly opposed the current Congress programme. Apart from this, the UP Government went so far as to give financial help to the UP Tanzim Committee, an organisation led by Shaukat Ali and a
number of traditional Muslim leaders, which did much to arouse the Muslim masses to organise and defend themselves.15

At the stage when the Civil Disobedience Movement had attained a remarkable success, the Government went further to win over the Muslims and keep them away from the Congress. Noting that the UP Muslims were extremely agitated by the Sarda Act, the Governor of UP asked the Central Government to amend the law though this request was not accepted, it was made clear to Muslims generally that prosecutions for breaches of the Act were unlikely.16 At the district level, official efforts to secure and maintain Muslim opposition to the Congress were more brazen. Although it was claimed that 'action is being and had already been taken in a quiet way'17, the experience of a Muslim journalist of Kanpur was rather different. He said: "the Collector tried to throw nets around me. He tempted me with everything including title, Honorary Magistracy, and service. A very big Hindu officer of the province ... offered me Rs.150 p.m., besides travelling

15. Gyanendra Pandey, op.cit., pp. 127-28; these facts are from the Hailey Papers, which are available only at the India Office Library, London, and to which I have no access.

16. FN-241/1930, General Administration Department (GAD), UP SA.

17. Ibid, A letter from the Commissioner of Allahabad to the Chief Secretary, UP, dated May 9, 1930.
expenses, for delivering in the villages of Cawnpore district only four speeches against the Congress, every month'. 18

All this helped to create a situation in which Muslim support to the movement became very difficult if not impossible. The situation was further worsened by the series of riots that took place in the early months of 1931 at Benaras, Agra, Mirzapur and Kanpur, thus making the problem unsurmountable.

The first of these riots occurred in Benaras in the first half of February. According to the District Magistrate of Benaras, the release of the members of AICC was regarded by the people in general as a great victory for Congress19 and the activities of the Congress, which had been on the wane, now revived. Picketing of foreign cloth shops was one of the most important of the renewed activities and among the shops picketed in Benaras was that of a well-known Muslim cloth merchant, Aga Muhammad Jan. On 10 February, the picketers prevented some customers from making purchases from that shop which resulted in some arrests by the police. But, that same evening the owner of the shop, Aga Muhammad Jan was shot dead while on his way home and fighting between Hindus and Muslims broke out the following day. 20

18. 'Report of Cawnpore Riots Enquiry Committee', FN-68/1931, AICC, NMML.
After the Gandhi-Irwin Pact, communal rioting broke out from 15 to 17 March in Agra and from 14 to 16 March in Mirzapur. In Agra, one Muslim was killed and several members of both the religious communities were injured, the old quarrel of 'music before mosques' provided the immediate cause. On 15 March, the police intervention saved the situation when Muslims objected to a Holi procession playing music outside a mosque. The next day, a crowd of Hindus attacked a Muslim wedding party and a Muslim crowd retaliated by attacking a Holi procession. Further rioting occurred on 17 March.21

In Mirzapur, a large mob of Hindu villagers massacred seven Muslims in the village Manchi in Robertganj tehsil. A haunch of venison sent by a Muslim zamindar to a Muslim tenant and believed by Hindu villagers to be beef was what caused the outbreak.22 In these riots, we do not find any apparent political motive, but their timing is possibly significant. These riots had immediately followed the Gandhi-Irwin Pact which had greatly boosted the morale of the ordinary Congressmen and their supporters. They were treating this Pact as a victory of the Congress and were projecting among the masses that Congress rai or sharai had come. While on the other hand, the Muslims were not very happy with the Pact and were feeling let down.

22. AI, March 19, 1931.
by the Government. This further increased the tension which had been sustained by Muslim abstention from Civil Disobedience.

The riot at Kanpur in March 1931, which was the worst of all the riots that occurred in UP during this period, indicates the importance of all the above mentioned factors. The recent events at other places affected Kanpur which was a 'difficult' city at any time and one noted for its volatility in 1930. By this time, it had emerged as a major centre of business and industry in north India. It had all the characteristics of an industrial town like high population density, low proportion of women to men and a fair share of goonda element in the society. Another important factor was the presence of social institutions of both the Hindus and Muslims. The Arya Samaj, which was active here since before the formation of the Congress, had a large following and its educational institution, the DAV College, was taking an active interest in militant politics. There was a very strong Congress campaign in Kanpur which had assumed considerable proportions and had begun to get aggressive by the second half of 1930. There were reports of harassment by Congress volunteers of buyers as well as sellers of foreign cloth and intoxicants of any kind. The police judged the movement to be more firmly established here than in any other

UP city and expressed the fear that Congress might 'swamp' the place.24

All this, following hard on the heels of communal propaganda and clashes of the preceding years, affected the Kanpur Muslims at large. "There is no general disposition on the part of the Muslims to give up their attitude of aloofness from the movement", said a report on the city in May 1930. Muslim shopkeepers in Kanpur deeply resented and sometimes openly opposed Congress picketing of their foreign cloth and liquor shops. Muslim Congressmen trying to make speeches in the city were 'hauled down' while Muslim communalists were 'listened to eagerly'.25 In January 1931, Muslim leaders refused to cooperate with Congress leaders in organising a condolence meeting on Muhammad Ali's death, and two separate meetings were held.26 The fairly well attended meeting of Muslims, presided over by Hasrat Molavi, to condole the death of Motilal Nehru in February, cannot be regarded as significant gesture pointing in the other direction. For barring this one instance, Muslims on the whole abstained from the processions, meetings

24. FN-1263/1931, UP Police Dept., UPSA.

25. A letter from Commissioner, Allahabad to the Chief Secretary, UP, May 9, 1930, FN-241/1930,GAP, UPSA, and FR, April I & II, 1930, Hom. Poll., NAI.

26. Ibid.
and above all the massive **hartal** sponsored by the Congress on this occasion.  

The news of the Gandhi-Irwin Pact compounded the feeling of fear and frustration of Kanpur Muslims. On March 24, 1931, news of Bhagat Singh's execution was received in the morning in Kanpur. Congress volunteers went at once to proclaim a **hartal**. There was much excitement especially among students who started breaking windows in shops and offices. Around 2 PM a quarrel arose on Heston Road between some 'Hindu' Congressmen who urged a **hartal** and some Muslim shopkeepers who objected to closing their shops. The quarrel led to a fight and the congregation of a large crowd of Hindus and Muslims on the spot. **Lathis** and brickbats appeared and general rioting broke out, to rage for several days, in different parts of the city.

The direct losses resulting from the riot were severe. The Government estimated the number of killed and injured as 290 and 965 respectively while the Congress put it higher at 400 and 1200. In addition, the latter reported 500 buildings gutted including 23 mosques and 37 temples, for which the damages were worth five lakhs of rupees, the loss of movable property


worth at least Rs.20 lakhs by loot and destruction, and a 'general exodus' and the 'utter dislocation' of business and economic life.29

Besides the loss of property, the effects of this riot were to last very long. Hindus and Muslims showed greater reluctance than ever before to live as neighbours in the same localities.30 And as if to assert with a vengeance a sectarian identity reinforced by common suffering, Muslim festivals were celebrated in the months after the riot with greater fervour than in previous years.31

Muharram ceremonies at the end of May 1931 passed off peacefully everywhere else in UP but brought serious disturbances in Kanpur. Here, four days before the end of the Muharram period, a dispute arose over a signboard strung up across the road outside the office of the local Gandhi Seva Samiti. The question of whether this was a 'new' or a 'traditional' obstruction on the path of the Muharram procession developed into a major conflict and led to police firing, in which 3 to 4 people were killed and several injured.

Even after a month, when the Chehlum was observed, this controversy was unresolved. The question of whether the tazias should in any case be buried aroused heated arguments

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29. Ibid.
31. Pratap, Aug. 7 & 9, 1931.
and agitation among the Muslims. A Young Men's Muslim Association came into being in Kanpur at this time. It was decided that the tazias should not be buried or moved from where they stood and the Association made arrangements to guard them. The curfew ordered in Kanpur at the time of Muharrum disturbances remained in force until the chehlum. This controversy could be solved only in September when the signboard was reluctantly removed by the executive committee of the Gandhi Seva Samiti.32 This was an example of the Communal Tension which had come to characterise normal life in the city.

These developments in 1931 widened the gap between the Hindus and the Muslims to a level that could not be bridged in many years to come. The alienation of Muslims from the Congress appeared to be complete and consequently their participation in the second phase of the movement was negligible. The extent of their alienation from the Congress can be gauged by the results of the elections in February 1937 in which not a single Muslim standing as a Congress candidate was successful in UP. Even one of the most important and senior leaders of the Congress, Rafi Ahmed Kidwai, was defeated by a little known independent candidate.33

32. The Leader, Ai, Pratap, June, July and Sept. 1931, and WRPA, June 6, July 11, 18 & 25, 1931.

STUDENTS:

The students played the most prominent part in the Civil Disobedience Movement in UP. They were, in fact, a major pillar of strength for the Congress movement. Right from the Non-Cooperation days, they had provided unflinching support to the Congress. However, it was during 1928-29 that we witness the emergence of some sort of organisation of youth and students. In 1928, the 'radical' wing of the Congress led by Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhas Bose founded the Independence of India League and the new ideals set up by the League considerably affected the youth, especially the students. Although the League did not last for long, it generated considerable enthusiasm among them and we see a large number of Youth Leagues and Students Associations springing up in UP in 1928-29. The big educational centres of the province like Allahabad, Lucknow, Benaras, Gorakhpur, etc. were prominent in this regard. Even in smaller towns like Mathura, Jhansi, Jaunpur, Mainpuri, Moradabad, etc., youth organisations were formed which were very active and vociferous.34 At the time of the Simon Commission's visit to India, the students were the main supporters of the boycott programme. In Benaras, the students of BHU staged a noisy and successful demonstration at the time of the Commission's

34. FN.G-39/1929, AICC, NMMI; FN-127/1930, UP Education Dept., UPSA and FRs and WRPAs of 1929. The ideas and Objectives of these organisations have been dealt in detail in Chapter No.4.
private visit to the city. In Lucknow, the Government observed that little or nothing would have been achieved by the Congress without the university students and school boys.35

This same spirit continued during the Civil Disobedience campaign, especially in its first phase. Right from the celebration of Independence Day to the signing of the Gandhi-Irwin Pact, their enthusiasm and participation made them the most active class engaged in the movement. Throughout the period, they were at the head of every programme whether it was salt satyagraha or picketing of foreign goods or liquor shops. They were, in fact, the main executors of Congress policies.

The celebration of Independence Day on 26 January 1930, the first and the most important event in the build up to the Civil Disobedience Movement, witnessed a massive participation of students. In Allahabad, for instance, the students of the University hoisted national flags on their hostel buildings quite early in the morning and took out a procession with a national flag and attended the meeting addressed by Jawaharlal Nehru and other leaders.36 Everywhere in the province the students abstained from their schools and colleges and participated in the celebrations. At the time of salt satyagraha students again turned out to

35. Comment on Activities of BHU, FN-127/1930, UP Education Dept., UPSA and FN-130/1929, Hom.Poll. , NAI.
36. The Leader, Jan. 29, 1931.
be the main participants of the movement. Bubbling with enthusiasm, they formed the main constituents of the volunteer corps and more often than not it was their courage and determination that enabled other volunteers to face the police attacks. On 7 April, the day satyagraha started, students of most of the Schools and colleges in the towns of UP observed a strike. In Benaras, for example, students of Dayanand High School boycotted their classes, hoisted the national flag in their campus and marched in a procession to the satyagraha site, to encourage the satyagrahis. Again, when the picketing of foreign cloth shops started in May 1930, they as volunteers of the Congress took an active part in persuading common people to use only swadeshi and boycott foreign cloth. At this point, their education and understanding of nationalist ideology helped them in putting before the masses the economic and political benefits of boycott in a very lucid manner.

Those students who were not taking an active part in the agitation by becoming a volunteer or a member of the Congress also supported the movement in their own way. The most common method of expressing their support was the observation of regular strikes in their schools and colleges and organisation of processions. These were also the most common methods of expressing their protest against the actions of the Government. For instance, the students of Kashi Hindu School, Benaras, ignored the intimidation of the headmaster.

37. Ai, April 9, 1930.
and observed a strike in protest against the arrest of Vallabhbhai Patel in March, 1930.38 Similarly, the arrests of Gandhiji, Jawaharlal Nehru and other important leaders and the police atrocities in Peshawar, Lucknow, Ballia, etc. were protested by them by observing strikes in their institutions. Sometimes they observed strikes on matters concerning their own institutions. In Allahabad, the students of CAV Inter College boycotted classes and picketed their own college on 15 November, 1930 against the dismissal of some of the students from college rolls for taking part in the Congress activities.39 A similar solidarity was shown by the students of Anglo Vernacular School, Meerut, against the suspension of a teacher on the charge of collecting funds for the Congress. Students went on an indefinite strike and took out regular processions with the students of other schools and colleges.40 However, this kind of cooperation between the teachers and students was not a regular feature. In Azamgarh, for example, the students of George High School, Sri Krishna Pathsala and Berbhi High School held a joint meeting and condemned those teachers who had punished students for taking part in the Congress movement.41

Another form of expressing support to the movement and protesting against the Government activities was the

hoisting of national flags upon college and hostel buildings. In July 1930, the President of Allahabad Students Association, Mrs V.L. Pandit, informed all its members about a resolution passed by the executive committee of the Association that every day national flags should be hoisted peacefully in every school ground which should be followed by the singing of national songs. She also informed them that any interference from the school authorities should be reported to her and no compromise could be made at the individual level.42 The very tone of this letter expresses the confidence the Association had about the success of this programme. At some other places also national flags were regularly hoisted over college buildings, which in most cases invited the wrath of the authorities. In Kanpur, for instance, the students of Christ Church College hoisted a national flag on their college building which resulted in the expulsion of six students from the College.43 At Aligarh, the students of Government High School, despite the presence of policemen, succeeded in hoisting a national flag over the school building but in their attempt some of them were severely beaten up by the police and one of them, Rameshwar Yagnik, was arrested.44

In July 1930, the education department of the Government of UP issued a circular to all its affiliated

42. The Leader, July 14, 1930.
43. Ibid, July 31.
44. Chintamani Shukla, Aligarh Janpad Ka Rainaitik Itihas.

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institutions, containing instructions to prevent these institutions from becoming a recruitment ground for the Congress volunteers. Publication of this circular resulted in massive protests from the Congress and the students. Protest meetings were held at many places which decided in favour of intensification of Congress activities in schools and colleges.\[45\] Picketing was done at those institutions by the Congress which tried to implement the instructions of the education department. As part of this, the Universities of Allahabad, Benaras and Lucknow were intensely picketed by the Congress volunteers with the help of students.

Despite these protests, the circular did succeed, to some extent, in restricting their participation in the movement, as the frequency of strikes in educational institutions reduced in the coming months. This might also have been the result of gradual decline in the overall activities of the Congress in the urban areas of UP in these months. However, enthusiasm again revived towards the end of the first phase when Chandra Shekhar Azad was killed in Allahabad in February and Bhagat Singh and his comrades were hanged in March 1931. They planned large scale protest demonstrations but everywhere their attempts were foiled by the Government officials.

In 1932, during the second phase of the movement, the students again came out in considerable numbers to

\[45\] The Leader, July 19, 1930.

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participate in the Congress programmes. However, this time, their participation was nowhere near that of early 1930. The strikes and boycott of classes by students which were so regular in 1930 were rarely heard of in this phase. An official report for the first half of February expressed 'satisfaction' that students had taken a 'small part' in the demonstrations. The officials believed that the 'recollections of 1930' and 'the incoming examinations' were responsible for their reduced participation. Though even after the examinations we do not find any substantial increase in their participation. In March, we find a pamphlet entitled *Vidyarthi Sangh Ki Bulletin* being distributed among the students of different schools of Allahabad which urged the students to come forward and work for the country. But exhortations of this type could no longer revive the enthusiasm of students towards the Congress movement. This becomes clear if we compare the number of students arrested in both the phases. In the first phase, around 1805 young men of the age between 11-21 years were convicted till 30 November 1930. If we take half of them as students still the figure would be substantial. While in March 1932, there were only 53 students out of a total of 2004 prisoners held in five major jails of UP.

47. *WRPA*, March 12, 1932, UPID.

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There could be two reasons for the reduced participation of students in the second phase. Firstly, the strict action taken by the authorities against those students who had participated in the movement in 1930 would be acting as a restraint on others this time around. Even after two years, some of the students who had been removed from the college rolls in 1930 were not given admission in any government or government aided college in the whole province. The headmasters of every government college in the province was sent a list of these students and ordered not to give them admissions within the stipulated time of expulsion.49 In addition to this, the Government of UP had prepared a 'black list' of the most active participants of the campaign and disqualified them from any government job.50 Thus, the fear of rustication from college and disqualification from government jobs (since the Government was the main employer for the educated at that time) would dissuade them from taking part in the movement. Apart from this, the government also threatened its aided institutions that their grants would be stopped if they did not take active measure to prevent students from joining dangerous political or revolutionary organisations.51 So, even the school authorities were forced to adopt a very strict attitude towards politically-minded students to save their grants.

50. FH-4/35/1931, Hom.Poll., NAI.
51. Ibid.
Another reason reduced participation could be the growing disenchantment among some sections of the youth and students with the Congress policies. As early as August 1930, an intelligence officer reported from Benaras that the "members of Youth League are getting restive owing to the little progress made by the non-violent agitations". This feeling was strengthened when Gandhiji refused to make the Pact conditional on the commutation of the death sentences of Bhagat Singh, Rajguru and Sukhdev. It is likely that many sections of students were not happy with the Pact though they did not publicly express their feelings. Moreover, the refusal of the Government officials to allow them to stage protest meetings and strikes against the killing of Chandra Shekhar Azad and the hanging of Bhagat Singh and his comrades further disillusioned them with non-violent policies.

However, this does not mean that students were taking to revolutionary terrorist politics on any significant scale. In fact, from the available evidence it is very difficult to gauge the extent of student involvement in violent activities. Violent or revolutionary activities did take place occasionally in this period and the police made regular arrests in these connections, but it is not very clear from the available reports that whether students were directly involved in it or not. Similarly, revolutionary literature was also being regularly distributed in the province but the source of it had never been very clear to the police.

52. WRPA, Aug. 12, 1930, UPID.
officals though they sometimes blamed the students of local schools and colleges for writing these 'red pamphlets' or threatening letters. Still, sympathy for and support to revolutionary ideas and leaders was widespread. Bhagat Singh and Chandra Shekhar Azad were their natural heroes and their photographs were regularly found by the police in the rooms of college or university hostels during the searches made for revolutionary literature and sometimes for arms and ammunition.

Nevertheless, this kind of apathy towards the movement in its second phase was true only in the case of students of government aided institutions. The students of national institutions, which were not getting any aid from the government, remained active even in the second phase. These educational institutions were started around 1920 under the 'national education' scheme and were working as 'feeders' for the Congress organisations. Throughout the Civil Disobedience Movement the students of these institutions, along with some others like Benaras Hindu University and Prem Mahavidyalay of Mathura, worked devotedly for the expansion of nationalist ideas and remained devout supporters of the movement. At this point a brief review of the activities of these institutions in this period would be appropriate.

The Non-Cooperation Movement had produced a tremendous spurt in the establishment of national educational institutions and by July 1921, there were 137 such institutions in UP. The most important of these was the Kashi Vidyapith which was started in February 1921. Right from the
very beginning, this institution was organised and run by well-known nationalist leaders. Dr Bhagvan Das, a leading Congressmen in the early 1920s, was its chancellor from 1921 to 1940. Several other important Congress leaders like J.B. Kriplani, Narendra Deo, Sampurnanand, Birbal Singh and Yajna Narain Upadhyaya were among its earliest teachers. In 1925, it was extended to include a college, and in its first four years, 42 students passed through this college. The kind of work these students took up is quite interesting to note. 10 of them had gone for national education, 5 had taken to newspaper editing, 5 others had taken up *achutodhar* work, 2 students had devoted themselves to *khadi* work, 7 of them had joined as unpaid Congress workers and 7 others were engaged in other public work. Of the remaining six, at least three combined some public work with their personal vocation. Thus, almost all of them were in a position to influence public opinion.

In general, institutions like the Kashi Vidyapith inculcated a public spirit rarely found among the products of government schools and colleges. It was claimed by the Congressmen that almost all the students and teachers of Kashi Vidyapith participated in the Civil Disobedience Movement. An official report observed in 1930 that "the


55. FN. G-2/1931, *AICC*, NMML.
Kashi Vidyapith, as its prototype in Ahmedabad, has really always been the seminary where students are trained in extremist method of thinking". But perhaps the most revealing comment was made by the Deputy Commissioner of Rae Bareli when the Provincial Government was considering the issuing of a communique declaring students participating in 'subversive' movements as disqualified from future government employment. The nine students then in the Rae Bareli gaol were all from Kashi Vidyapith and the Deputy Commissioner observed that "the students of Kashi Vidyapith are not likely to seek government employment".57

Educational institutions run by the Arya Samaj had also contributed many activists. At many places in UP, the Samaj had established Dayanand Anglo-Vedic schools and colleges as well as more traditional Gurukuls. The most famous or rather 'notorious' of them was DAV College, Kanpur, which was started in 1919. The students of this College were famous for their militant political activities. Out of 13 UP men among the twenty-four accused in the Lahore Conspiracy case in 1929, eight were ex-students of this college.58 Even during the Civil Disobedience campaign, some of the students of this college were engaged in revolutionary activities. For instance, one student of this college, Salig Ram Shukla was

56. Comment on Activities of the BHU, June 14, 1930, FN-127/1930, UP Education Dept., UPSA.
57. FN-241/1930, UP, GAD, UPSA.
58. FN-1504/1934, UP Police Dept., UPSA.
killed in an encounter by the police on 1 December 1930, but before that he had wounded the SP, one head constable and a constable. According to the police, they had gone to arrest him under one of the Ordinances for taking part in political agitation but he started firing and got killed.\textsuperscript{59} Besides them, the Gurukuls were particularly influential with their pronounced Indianness, their denunciation of distinctions based on caste and their provision of free education which attracted many poor students.\textsuperscript{60} Despite the Hindu bias in the education provided here, these institutions did strengthen the Congress movement. The Gurukul Kangdi at Haridwar was particularly noted for its prominence in the early stages of agitation in 1930.\textsuperscript{61}

Another institution which was famous for its nationalist activities was Prem Mahavidyalaya of Brindavan (Mathura). This college was founded by Raja Mahendra Pratap of Mursan and many prominent Congressmen like Acharya Jugal Kishore and Sampurnanand were associated with it. In 1929, the institution provided lectures on citizenship, economics, spinning and carding work, cleanliness and medicine, and organized a tour of villages at least once a week to collect statistics regarding village conditions. Before admission, students had to pledge themselves to at least ten years of

\textsuperscript{59} FN-4/35/1931, Hom.Poll., NAI.

\textsuperscript{60} D. Pandey, \textit{The Arya Samaj and Indian Nationalism, 1875-1929}, New Delhi, 1972.

\textsuperscript{61} WRPA, March 29, 1930, UPID and Aj, Jan. 30, 1930.
village work and needy students were paid a stipend of Rs.15 to Rs.20 per month, and after completion of their course, from Rs.35 to Rs.75 per month for continued public work. In addition to this, the college had a branch of the Hindustani Seva Dal. Naturally, these activities of Prem Mahavidyalaya invited the ire of the Government during the Civil Disobedience Movement. In 1932, the Government as a part of its attack on national institutions seized the cash and securities worth Rs.24,000 of the college and by a special order forced it to close down for some time.62

Besides these, there were some aided institutions also which stood out from the general run by virtue of the education they provided and the results they produced. The most important of them was the Benaras Hindu University (BHU) of Madan Mohan Malviya. One Government report claims that anti-government activities in the University had been most marked since September 25, 1929, when Pt Jawaharlal Nehru addressed the 'university parliament' on 'Independence'. Pt Malviya, the Vice-Chancellor, in his Convocation speech on 12 December 1929 advised the students to be prepared to sacrifice their lives for the country and urged them to take up work in villages. As a result of this, it was observed in September 1930 that, while the students of Allahabad, Lucknow and Agra universities had shown sympathy for the Civil Disobedience Movement, none of these institutions was as enthusiastic as Benaras. Apart from leading the


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agitations in Benaras, the students of BHU were active in other places also. The SP of Dehra Dun reported that the situation in the town had been aggravated by the arrival of 15 students from Benaras, who with the local people had succeeded in getting all the schools and colleges closed or intensively picketed. Even in 1932, when their colleagues in other institutions were not very active, the students of BHU took prominent part in the agitations. The fortnightly report for February 1932, says that "104 students of BHU have left their studies at the behest of Govind Kant Malviya in order to devote themselves to political agitations". Besides these, more than 200 had enlisted themselves with Pt Govind Malviya for Congress work, and it was chiefly because of the activities of the members of the university that in September 1932 Benaras was considered to be the principal centre of the movement in the province. Again when Gandhi's Harijan campaign took over the political stage, some 500 BHU students including 17 women pledged themselves to work for it during their vacations.

Apart from students, some of the professors of BHU were also openly propagating Congress programmes. Two of the professors, Pt. Jagannath Prasad and Achyut Patwardhan were convicted on offences connected with Civil Disobedience. Three others, Professors Sundaram, Parmatama Sharan and Danger Singh, had shown active sympathy with the agitation. One final example should suffice to describe the general atmosphere of the BHU. The SP of Benaras remarked that "this University is nothing but a rendezvous of revolutionaries
where it is not considered safe to take notes of proceedings of a meeting. The atmosphere there is charged with anti-government views. Red turban of the police is just like a red rag to a bull".63

Thus we see that the students responded magnificently to the Congress's call for participation in the movement. Although they did not take a very active part in the movement during the second phase, their support remained with the movement. As one intelligence officer reported from Allahabad in March 1932: "students... have begun to live very simply, and sales of soaps and fancy goods are affected adversely".64 Moreover, even the relative passivity of the general run of the students in the second round of the struggle was amply compensated by the activities of the students of the national educational institutions and BHU who did a lot to propagate the nationalist ideology and generate support for the movement.

BUSINESSMEN:

Another group that extended support to the Congress was that of the businessmen who remained dedicated to the


64. WRPAs, March 5, 1932, UPID.
movement in both the phases. This support came largely from the Hindu business as Muslim businessmen on the whole stayed aloof from the movement. The Hindu businessmen, barring some exceptions, were entirely in favour of the movement.

The most common way of expressing support was to help Congress committees in fund raising. Everywhere in the towns of UP, businessmen were the main suppliers of funds to the Congress. At the national level, too, industrialists and big commercial houses contributed to Congress funds, but while it could be argued with some justice that the larger industrial and commercial houses had much to gain from Swadeshi and could also foresee the benefits of Swaraj. However, the businessmen who were supporters of the Congress in this province were mainly small merchants and petty vendors who neither derived any direct benefit from Swadeshi nor were their businesses big enough for them to calculate that they would prosper in Swaraj. So their financial support to the local congress committees was at the cost of their profits and due to the nationalist sympathies and anti-British feelings that they shared with other urban classes.

When we look at the donations received by the Satyagraha committee of the Kanpur TCC, we find that the businessmen, especially small merchants, were the main contributors. For a period between 24 March 1930 to 24 April 1931, the committee out of its total income of Rs.36,297, received
Rs.34,758 from these merchants. The break up of the donations was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secret donation, monthly donation (from dyers &amp; retailers)</td>
<td>8513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Merchants</td>
<td>6675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewellers (of Chauk &amp; Nayaganj)</td>
<td>5941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grain Merchants</td>
<td>3997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar, Rice &amp; Bardana Merchants</td>
<td>3006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Mills</td>
<td>2467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton Yarn Merchants</td>
<td>2095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron Merchants</td>
<td>1074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothes Brokers Committee</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lime, Coal, Wood &amp; Bisatkhana Merchants</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>34,758</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to this, there were probably some other funds to which other kinds of merchants like cloth dealers (both wholesalers and retailers) etc. might be contributing. One important feature which was seen in this period and is clear from this data also is that secret support was giving way to more open association with the Congress and the movement. This is shown by the formation of a Satyagraha Sahayak Sabha by the businessmen of Kanpur.

65. FN. P-21/1931, AICC, NMML.
city in April 1930. The objective of the Sabha was to start a fund to look after the family members of the imprisoned Congressmen.\textsuperscript{66} In addition, they had also conceded the request of the Congressmen to pay half of the salary to their own employees if they were arrested as Congress volunteers.\textsuperscript{67} This kind of support by the Kanpur businessmen was not at all an isolated example, similar trends were witnessed in other towns as well, especially Agra, Benaras and Allahabad.

It is alleged that in return for such support the Congress sometimes felt obliged to make important concessions and the case of Kanpur boycott movement during the truce period in 1931 is cited as example. It is said that the Kanpur TCC acquiesced in the continued sale of foreign cloth when other strong Congress centres were clamping down on the trade. This concession, it is argued, resulted in the weakening of boycott not only in Kanpur but also at other places in UP.\textsuperscript{68} While there may be some truth in the charge, we have seen earlier that the Secretary of Kanpur TCC had explained that it was due to the lack of volunteers that they could not completely prohibit the sale of foreign cloth.\textsuperscript{69} Besides this, it is also alleged that some of the businessmen who were members of different committees of the Congress

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{66} Ai, April 10 & 16, 1930.
\item \textsuperscript{67} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{68} Gyanendra Pandey, \textit{op.cit.}, p.58.
\item \textsuperscript{69} This aspect has been dealt in detail in the boycott section of Chapter No.4.
\end{itemize}
misused their position and under the cover of donations and other help continued activities which were detrimental to the Congress programme. The example of Lala Lallu Mal Dalal, a member of the Kanpur TCC Executive, is at hand to prove this allegation. Lala Lallu Mal was a working partner in the firm 'Babu Ram & Co' and the Kanpur broker for the firm Messrs Jugal Kishore Baldeo Sahai of Gonda district and in these capacities he had allegedly sold some foreign piece goods. But the Kanpur TCC Secretary argued that most of his sales were of Swadeshi cloth and further pointed to his devotion and contribution to the Congress.

"All the same he is very useful to us in more than one way. He has been the mainstay of our financial resources, since the last eleven years. He has helped us in the establishment of the Congress Khaddar Bhandar and he is a director thereof. He has been contributing handsomely towards the political sufferer's fund. In short, there is no national scheme in which we do not avail of his generous help".

Even if we do not accept the justification offered by the Secretary, Kanpur TCC, the case of Lala Lallu Mal was just one example of this kind that we find in this province in four years. In a movement of this magnitude one or two examples of any type cannot be made the basis for generalisations. The support of the overwhelming majority of

70. See 75.

71. Letters from Secretary, TCC, Kanpur, to Gen. Secretary, AICC, Allahabad, dated July 1 and Sept. 6, 1931, FN. G-139/1931, AICC, NMML.

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businessmen was mainly the result of nationalist and patriotic feelings that had gripped them.

In addition to providing financial help there were various other methods through which business groups supported the movement. One of these was the positive and quick response to the strike or hortal calls of the Congress which were all too frequent. Seldom did the Congressmen faced any kind of resistance in getting their strike calls implemented. Even in 1932 when the Congress activities were made difficult by the strict attitude of the authorities, the businessmen continued their support and were regularly punished for it. The arrest of merchants for complying with the strike calls of the Congress became a common feature during the second phase of the movement. Most of the time they were released only after a formal apology or furnishing surety bonds for good behaviour. Sometimes they had to pay a fine ranging between Rs.25 to 200 for their release.72 At times, for the same offence, merchants were served notices under 'Emergency Powers Ordinance', ordering them to leave the town within a stipulated time but stay within the district. In Kanpur, for instance, Ram Rattan Gupta, Gumru Prasad Kapoor, Buddhu Lal, Lallu Mal, Ratan Singh and some other merchants were ordered to leave the city within four days. They were being punished for supporting the movement. However, such was the confidence the movement had given them that some of them like

Ram Rattan Gupta dared to defy that order and was willing to be convicted.\textsuperscript{73}

The same kind of cooperation and responsiveness was also witnessed in the foreign cloth boycott programme. In fact, the boycott would not have been a success without business support. During the first phase of the movement, when the Congress Committees took up the boycott programme towards the end of April and the beginning of May, most of the merchants dealing in foreign cloth came to terms with them without creating any problems. They not only signed a pledge that they would not sell or indent any fresh stock of foreign cloth but also allowed the Congressmen to put a seal on their existing stock. As a result of this, in most of the towns, the sale of foreign cloth fell considerably by the end of May. Though there were some merchants (few Hindus but mostly Muslims) who did not comply with the Congress's request which resulted in the picketing of their shops by the Congress volunteers. There were some others who broke the seal and started selling foreign cloth surreptitiously but these cases were immediately looked after by the \textit{Bazar} and respective community \textit{panchayats}. In most of the cases these defaulter merchants were fined and when they refused to pay the fine, their shops were picketed by the Congress volunteers. Despite the presence of some dissenters, the boycott was a complete success for, as the newspapers

\textsuperscript{73} \textit{The Leader}, Feb. 12 & 19, \textit{Ai}, Feb. 13, 1932.

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reported, on 27 July, not a single yard of foreign cloth was available in the Kanpur market.\textsuperscript{74}

In addition to this, at some places like Allahabad, businessmen formed a league to promote \textit{swadeshi} and other indigenous products for the growth and development of Indian industries. In a meeting held at the shop of Lala Sanwal Das Khanna in October, 1930, they proposed to issue bulletins periodically to give information to shopkeepers and purchasers about things made in the country so that they may not face any difficulty in getting their requirements without having to go for foreign articles.\textsuperscript{75} However, towards the end of the first phase, it seems, the patience of some of them had given way and we hear of more frequent breaking of Congress seals. Although these cases were taken up by their associations as earnestly as in the beginning, this restlessness did bring the point home to the Congressmen that they were in no position to bear any more financial losses. The businessmen, either individually or their associations, never made any representation to the Congress for any kind of truce or end of struggle. So the theory advanced by Prof. Sumit Sarkar that businessmen acted as a pressure group on Congress to sign the Gandhi-Irwin Pact in March, 1931, at least does not apply in the case of UP.

\textsuperscript{74} The \textit{Leader}, July 30, 1930.

\textsuperscript{75} The \textit{Leader}, Oct. 15, 1930.
During the truce period, the attitude of the businessmen in some of the larger urban centres was not as positive as it had been in the first flush of the Civil Disobedience Movement. In smaller towns or where the Congress was not engaged in rural agitations, the sale of foreign cloth was strictly prevented by the Congress workers, but in the bigger towns success eluded them throughout this period. The businessmen here did sign the pledge of not indenting any fresh stock of foreign cloth, but continued disposing off their existing stock and ignored Congress requests. The Congressmen from these urban centres was too busy in the rural areas to concentrate fully on the boycott. Moreover, under the provisions of the Pact, the Congress had to adopt milder picketing methods which did not at times prove to be very effective. Moreover, as some of businessmen who had wholeheartedly supported the movement in 1930 explained, many of them just wanted to sell off their existing stock to make up some of the losses incurred in the previous year. By signing the pledges they had shown that they did not intend to order any fresh stock.

However, in 1932 again, they extended remarkable support to the programme of boycott of foreign goods. This time round, the Government was very active in trying to make the boycott a failure. The district officials were instructed by the Provincial Government to help businessmen to organise themselves against picketing. Even the Governor of the
Province, Malcolm Hailey, came down to Kanpur on 9 January 1932 to address the businessmen of the city. He too promised all kinds of help to them in continuing their business. But the commitment of businessmen to the movement was so strong that all these efforts could not win them over to the Government's side.

Commenting on this attitude of the UP business community, the Governor wrote to the Viceroy on 10 January 1932: "If it is absolutely certain that we are going to stamp out boycott, it will cooperate, though not very openly, for the Marwari tradesmen is not only very timid, but at heart has all the Hindu feelings in favour of Congress". Business support thus remained constant throughout the second phase, and as a result of this the sale of foreign cloth reduced to a minimum.

Therefore, we can conclude that the support of businessmen was probably one of the more important reasons for the vigour of the Civil Disobedience Movement in the urban centres of UP. Though they were not very 'active' participants of the movement when it came to jail-going, the support they provided to the Congress proved crucial for the success of the movement. This also shows that different social classes and groups contributed to societal movements in ways suited to their social situation, and that movements that aim at including large sections of the people must

76. Letter from Malcolm Hailey to Wellington, Jan. 10, 1932, Hailey papers, as quoted in Gyanendra Pandey, op. cit., p. 58.
accommodate and provide for these differences in response. A movement that expects fiery students and staid business groups to respond must of necessity evolve forms that are capable of garnering the strength of both.

INTELLIGENTSIA:

If we were to adopt a formalist criterion, it would appear that the participation of the intelligentsia in the Civil Disobedience Movement in UP could not touch the level of the Non-Cooperation Movement. This time there were fewer instances of resignations from government offices or giving up of practices by the lawyers for participating in the movement. In fact, we get only two examples of government servants resigning from service for taking part in the movement. One of them was Kashi Prasad Dikshit of Allahabad who had resigned from his post of clerk in the Government Press. He resigned in protest against the order of his superior British officer which barred him from attending office in khadi clothes and Gandhi cap. Another instance was of a CID constable Kunwar Bahadur of Badaun. He resigned from his post to take active part in the Civil Disobedience Movement. Both these resignations took place in the first phase of the movement and there are no reports of resignations in the second phase.

77. FN-14/1931, AICC, NMML.
But resignations from government service cannot be the only criterion for judging their support. While it is true that by resigning from service, government servants could have taken a more active part in the movement, nevertheless even while continuing in service there were many ways through which government servants could express their support. One of the easiest and the most common method was that of boycotting foreign cloth and taking to the use of swadeshi. Although direct evidence on this is not easy to find, given the general political atmosphere, the chances are very high that unobtrusively, and especially at home, families of government servants, along with their neighbours, were adopting swadeshi and avoiding foreign goods. Another method through which they could express their sympathy with the movement was the secret donations to the satyagraha fund. Evidence collected by Gyanendra Pandey suggests that even the wife of Sir K. Jagdish Prasad, then Chief Secretary to the Government of UP, had given money to the Congress fund. Also, a secret fund collection was made by the Congress in the Allahabad Police Lines and a Police Inspector who had gone to arrest an organiser of the 'no-tax' campaign in Allahabad district paid some money to Congress workers.78 These few examples show their growing sympathy towards the Congress movement though service rules and other compulsions did not allow them to come out more openly in support of the movement.

However, these compulsions did not apply to retired government servants and it appears that some of them took an active part in the movement. The Government of India, in an attempt to restrict their participation, sent orders to state governments to withhold pensions of those retired government servants who were very active in the movement. Similar instructions were also sent by the Army department. These government orders only underline the fact that some of the retired officials were participating in the movement.

Teachers of government aided schools and colleges, too, could not come out openly in favour of the movement. But those of District Board schools and other private institutions were very active in the movement. In 1930, when the District Boards decided to place Mahatama Gandhi's photograph and national flags in schools, almost every school carried out these instructions. And this could not have been possible without the active support of the teachers. The fact that, in 1932, the Government of UP doubted the efficacy of employing teachers in counter propaganda measures as most of them were 'definitely disloyal', shows that teachers were on the whole supporters of the movement. The most important contribution of these 'disloyal' teachers was the imparting of nationalist and patriotic ideas among their students. The large participation of students in the


movement attests to their contribution. Besides, some teachers of government schools did actively participate in the movement and resulted in their dismissals. The most remarkable role, however, was played by the teachers of national institutions and some private institutions. We have seen earlier how active the teachers of Kashi Vidyapith, Prem Mahavidyalaya and BHU were. Most of them had not only participated in the movement themselves, but had also encouraged many of their students to take up national work in their vacations and leisure time.

Lawyers were another section of the intelligentsia which clearly supported the movement. But in their case as well the support did not take the form of giving up their profession. We do not hear of any instance when a lawyer had given up his practice for taking an active part in the movement. However, their sympathies were all with the Congress as we regularly come across resolutions of Bar Council meetings which welcomed Congress programmes. The most common way of supporting the movement was through boycott of foreign goods. The lawyers of Allahabad, Lucknow, Aligarh, Azamgarh, Sitapur etc. had decided in their Bar Council meetings to boycott foreign cloth and use only swadeshi.81 The lawyers of Lucknow had even started a Swadeshi League for propagating swadeshi among themselves. Besides this, the

lawyers, at some places, had boycotted the courts in protest against the arrests of Mahatama Gandhi and other important leaders.

The support of this group can also be judged from the activities of numerous municipal and district boards which were controlled by them along with the commercial and landed groups. Most of these boards provided unflinching support to the movement. They flew national flags on their buildings, closed offices and schools to support nationalist demonstrations and promoted the campaign for the boycott of foreign cloth. For instance, the Allahabad Municipal Board had reminded its teachers in April 1930 of the pledge they had taken in 1924 to wear nothing but khadi. In February 1932, when the District Magistrates of Allahabad and Lucknow issued orders under the 'Emergency Powers Ordinance' to Municipal Boards to remove national flags from their offices and other buildings, the executive committees of these Boards passed resolutions criticising these orders.

The change that had come about since the days of Non-Cooperation in the manner in which groups such as lawyers or government servants or even students expressed their support to the national movement has important implications for the understanding of the dynamics of social participation in mass movements. Only a select few could be expected to give up their legal practices, or government jobs or seats in

82. Ibid, April 21, 1930.
83. The Leader, Feb. 21, 1932.
educational institutions, which amounted to giving up their livelihood or prospects of employment. But mass movement cannot be built only on the total commitment of a select few, they require also the support of those who cannot be expected to make total sacrifices.

The experience of the Non-Cooperation Movement had indeed shown that the majority of lawyers and students would inevitably go back to their courts and schools and colleges after some time. In the Civil Disobedience Movement, therefore, we find that the Congress had shifted its emphasis from the boycott of courts and educational institutions and government jobs, which had been its main focus in 1920-22, to other programmes such as the salt satyagraha, boycott of foreign goods, liquor shops, etc., which were more conducive to participation by the mass of the people. Students now went on strike for periods of time rather than leave their schools and colleges, and lawyers supported in way other than the giving up of their practices. It was this continuing flexibility of the movement, its capacity to change its tactics and forms and methods in keeping with its own experience and the changing needs and capacities of its supporters that enabled the national movement to continue to extend its influence over the hearts and minds of the Indian people.

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