CONCLUSION

The present thesis specifically discussed the reason for the sudden emergence of vast literature on Hobbes in the modern period. The reason does not lie in Hobbes's scholarship or in the developments in political philosophy alone. In order to locate the reason one has to go outside Hobbes and even outside political philosophy and look for the developments in the realm of relationship between science and political philosophy. Hence, the broader objective of the thesis is to discuss the consequences of the developments in the relationship between political philosophy and science.

The relationship between philosophy and science is the fundamental concern of modern philosophy. These two disciplines are both autonomous as well as related to one another. That is, though each of them has a specific subject matter which discusses a specific set of issues and problems, yet the developments in one influence the other. For instance, the developments in science in the modern period have not only affected man's understanding of nature, but they also influenced humanistic sciences and political philosophy. The implications of this influence are the backdrop of this thesis. Hobbes's political philosophy is based on Newtonian and Galilean methods of the modern natural sciences. This dependence has posed a problem, namely the predicament of Hobbes's political philosophy when Einstein's
Special theory of Relativity contested its foundations, i.e., Newtonian and Galilean methods.

Beginning with a general introduction about the dependence and autonomy of the disciplines, the thesis discussed the relation between philosophy and science - in the classical as well as modern contexts. Further, the differences between the nature of the developments in science and philosophy were explained. The sudden emergence of Hobbesian literature in the twentieth century, the thesis argued, could be accounted by locating Hobbes as an instance in the relationship between political philosophy and science.

In chapter I, Hobbes as an instance of the relationship between political philosophy and science was discussed. Hobbes used the scientific methods such as the Resolutive-compositive method and the Law of Inertia in his philosophy. Subsequently, the recent developments in science, specifically, Einstein's theory of relativity, contested the Newtonian and Galilean theories. Consequently, the implications of these developments to the political philosophy of Hobbes, was discussed. It is maintained that even though the foundations of Hobbes were contested, still it does not lose its validity, as philosophical theories, unlike theories of science, are not rejected once and for all. At best, they can be criticized. In this context, the thesis discussed and elucidated the context of the alternative foundations provided to Hobbes's political philosophy in twentieth century. There were attempts in the twentieth century where alternative foundations to the political philosophy of Hobbes were sought. The thesis discussed the interpretations of Leo Strauss, A.E.
Taylor, J.H. Warrender and C.B. Macpherson. Chapters II to IV discussed each of these attempts at refounding the political philosophy of Hobbes outside natural sciences.

Chapter II discussed how Strauss's attempt to base Hobbes's political philosophy on self-observation, has disengaged natural science, consequently, making his political philosophy independent of science. Strauss made a distinction between ‘form’ and ‘content’ of the material of the political philosophy. He proved the origin of the material to be pre-scientific i.e., in the early influence of Aristotelianism and Scholasticism of Hobbes. These early influences emphasized the importance of self-observation 'which is discovered by the efforts of self-knowledge and self-examination of every one.' Thus, Strauss argued that not only the method but also the material of the political philosophy of Hobbes is rooted outside scientific theories.

Chapter III discussed Taylor's offering of moral imperative as the basis of the political philosophy of Hobbes. He showed the independent existence of the theory of obligation from the egoistic psychology. This chapter discussed Taylor's rejection of the traditional views on Hobbes. The views state that Hobbes's moral obligation comes from the transference of the rights of the people, and also argues for the existence of the imperativeness of moral laws, in the state-of-nature, in the form of laws of nature that precede the existence of civil society. It is shown that the ethical philosophy of Hobbes proper is logically independent of his egoistic psychology and hence even if the psychology is rejected in toto, Hobbesian theory of obligation does
not lose its relevance. Moreover, it gains consistency. Thus, he disengaged egoistic psychology, which is an extension of scientific theory from political philosophy, and further, based Hobbes on the moral imperative.

Chapter IV discussed Warrender’s interpretation of Hobbes. It is argued that Warrender while piecing out a consistent theory of obligation, offered moral obligation as the basis of Hobbes’s political philosophy. He attempted, 1) to explain what Hobbes meant by obligation and 2) to show that unless men were already obliged to obey the laws-of-nature (which reason teaches them as the commands of God), they could never by valid covenant bind themselves to obey a human ruler. He exposed the view that obligation, as Hobbes understood it, is essentially the same in both civil society and State-of-nature. Warrender based his arguments on three premises. i) The laws-of-nature persist through the state-of-nature into civil society. ii) They are essentially moral laws. Most of these prescribe duties towards society and are morally obligatory because they are commanded and willed by God. iii) The sovereign does not create the moral laws. His role is only to interpret and render fully operative pre-existing moral laws. The thesis argued that Warrender’s attempt to establish the independence of political obligation is an attempt to view Hobbes’s political philosophy independent of science.

C.B. Macpherson’s presentation of the historical interpretation, which bases the philosophy of Hobbes on the possessive quality of market society, was discussed in chapter V. He argued that even before the use of state-of-nature, Hobbes had developed a theory of the necessary relations of men in society. This theory requires
the assumptions of a certain kind of model society, which he calls, possessive market society. This discussion has minimized the importance of scientific method in two respects. One, by highlighting the social postulates of a certain kind of a model society as the foundation of the philosophy of Hobbes. Two, by arguing for a gap between theories of materialism and psychology, which is filled by certain kind of social assumptions. He bridged the gap between materialism and psychology with social assumptions.

Now let us analyze these four modern attempts, which interpreted Hobbes's political philosophy independent of natural science. Here, it must be noted that these four attempts are neither contradictory nor complementary to each other. Each of these has their own standpoint and this work attempted to see an underlying connection among these four.

Though the immediate objective of each of these varies from the other, establishing the independence of political philosophy is the connecting link between them. This establishment of independent nature of Hobbes's political philosophy has two aspects; one, to disprove the argument that science is the basis of political philosophy and two, to argue for the independence of political philosophy. Among the four interpreters discussed in this work, only Strauss developed the argument considering both the aspects. His immediate objective is to reduce the importance of science in Hobbes. He not only rejected the view that Hobbes's political philosophy is based on scientific foundations, but also established the independent nature of political philosophy. He argued that the moral attitude that underlies Hobbes's
political philosophy is independent of the foundation of the modern science. His analysis of distinctions between form and content, naturalistic and anthropological aspects show the dissimilarities between science and political philosophy and independence of each other in Hobbes's philosophy. This argument of Strauss is an unconscious response to the developments in the realm of the relationship between political philosophy and science.

The arguments of Taylor, Warrender and Macpherson aimed at different aspects of Hobbes's philosophy. The purpose of Taylor's argument is to prove that political philosophy is disengaged from and has no logically necessary connection with egoistic psychology in Hobbes. This argument of Taylor disengages not only egoistic psychology but also science (which is the basis of egoistic psychology) from political philosophy. However, while arguing for the independence of political philosophy in Hobbes, Taylor is not conscious of the fact that he is responding to the developments outside political philosophy and he is contributing to wider issue of the impact of the twentieth century developments in science to political philosophy, which is the basic argument of the present thesis.

Warrender's interest in Hobbes is only with regard to the concept of Obligation. He attempted to discover logical structure of the theory of obligation. In making this attempt, he contributed to the main argument of the thesis that Hobbes's political philosophy is independent of the influence of science. It can be argued that this contribution of Warrender is an indirect response to the developments in the relation between political philosophy and science.
Macpherson’s interest in Hobbes is rooted in his search for finding a firm theoretical basis for the modern liberal democratic State, which is grounded in the 17th century individualism. Since individualism as a basic theoretical position starts with Hobbes, Hobbes became the central figure in the discussion on Possessive Individualism. Though Macpherson is consciously attempting to view Hobbes as the initiator of Individualism in the 17th century, his attempt can be viewed as a contribution to the impact of developments in science on political philosophy. The attempt to highlight social postulates and bridging the gap between materialism and psychology with these assumptions minimizes the importance of science in Hobbes. This argument of Macpherson can be viewed as a response to the developments in the realm of relation between philosophy and science.

In this way, the immediate objective of none of the arguments of Taylor, Warrender and Macpherson is a conscious attempt to disengage political philosophy from science. However, their attempts can be viewed, as is the case with the present thesis, as indirect attempts at establishing the independence of political philosophy. Only Strauss is worried about the universal importance of Hobbes’s political philosophy which remains unrecognized if the science is taken to be decisive. Though Taylor is compelling in his arguments and in adducing evidence in support of his thesis, his concern is only with regard to the moral imperativeness of theory of obligation of Hobbes. In the same way Warrender’s consistent formulation is also directed towards theory of obligation of Hobbes. Macpherson’s merit of argumentation is restricted to prove the existence of possessive individualistic
qualities even before the use of state of nature in Hobbes. However, Strauss is not bothered about reframing any one aspect of Hobbes's political philosophy such as Moral imperative, Obligation, Possessive Individualism as it is done by Taylor, Warrender and Macpherson respectively. He is interested in the universal recognition of the whole of the political philosophy of Hobbes.

The above discussion brings us to the conclusion that the attempts of Strauss, Taylor, Warrender and Macpherson either directly or indirectly established the independence of Hobbes's political philosophy from science. These interpreters form a part of the twentieth century literature on Hobbes. As the concern of the present thesis is to account for the sudden increase of Hobbes's literature in the twentieth century, these attempts have to be viewed from a broader perspective of the relationship between political philosophy and science. These twentieth century interpretations are not just alternative interpretations of Hobbes's political philosophy. Rather they are responses to the developments within in the realm of the relation between political philosophy and science, of which they are no conscious. Both science and philosophy, being neither exclusive nor exhaustive fields of study get related to and influenced by each other.¹ As it is stated earlier, Hobbes was

¹ However, neither science nor philosophy should try to be completely against each other, nor should they follow each other blindly. Following Peter Winch, philosophy should not be anti-scientific; if it tries to be so it will succeed only in making itself look ridiculous. However, equally, for the same reasons, philosophy must be on its guard against the ‘extra-scientific pretensions of science’ (1990:2).
influenced by the Galilean and Newtonian theories of science and used them in his philosophy. There were attempts during his time to view Hobbes as a value free scientist basing on his adoption of scientific theories. However, later in the twentieth century the discovery of Special theory of Relativity by Einstein contested the Galilean and Newtonian theories. These developments in science occasioned the emergence of sudden increase of Hobbesian literature in the twentieth century. These twentieth century interpretations are responses to the impact of the developments in the relationship between science and political philosophy. The fate of Hobbes’s political philosophy when the foundations i.e., Newtonian and Galilean theories, were contested by Special theory of Relativity by Einstein, is the problem to which the twentieth century interpretations are the responses. These interpreters argued for the independence of Hobbes’s political philosophy by offering alternative foundations.

From the above discussion, it follows that, it is possible that the developments in one discipline can have implications to the developments in other disciplines. Moreover, it is necessary to have open-mindedness to look outside a discipline to understand such implications. Only then it is possible to understand the non-linear responses like the developments in one discipline having implication on other disciplines. Nevertheless, they have to be careful in ascertaining the firmer grounds of what one is dependent on. Alternatively, even if it is not possible to have firmer grounds, one should know the weakness of one’s own foundations, so that it would not become too much dependent or it would have an alternative to depend on.