Chapter Four
Lion in Power (1947-53)
Shaikh Abdullah as the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir

When the British left Indian subcontinent the inhabitants of the princely states were left at the mercy of their rulers and the independent states that succeeded the colonial state. The Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir soon became the battlefield between India and Pakistan and a region of world interest. As discussed in the previous chapter when the Maharaja sought military help from India against ‘invaders’ he was asked to accede his State to India and also to take Shaikh Abdullah in the administration and “made [him] responsible for it along with the Prime Minister.” Consequently, on October 26, 1947 the Maharaja asked Shaikh Abdullah “once his fiercest enemy.” to form an Interim Government and he was nominated as the Head of Emergency Administration by Maharaja ‘without precisely defining his powers and demarcating’ them from those of his Prime Minister, Mehar Chand Mahajan. Thus, Shaikh Abdullah who had asked Maharaja to quit Kashmir in 1946 joined his Government. In spite of the fact that the Maharaja had a de jure prime Minister in the form of Mahajan, Shaikh Abdullah agreed to be the Head of Emergency Administration. But Shaikh soon found it difficult to work with the coalition of the Maharaja and Mahajan. “All Hindu communalists of the Jammu region joined hands with him (Maharaja) to block every effort of Shaikh Abdullah to give the State an efficient administration during the trying times of war on the one hand, and economic recession on the other.” Maharaja did not trust Shaikh Abdullah. Every action of Shaikh was checkmated and he found himself ‘hemmed in on all sides.’ So, it was difficult for Shaikh to work as the Head of the Emergency Administration as

1 Zutshi, op.cit., p. 326.
5 There were compulsions for India to rely on Shaikh for he was the popular leader of Kashmir and “key factor in winning the plebiscite for India”, Balraj Puri, Jammu And Kashmir, Triumph And Tragedy Of Indian Federalisation, New Delhi, 1981, p. 74.
6 R. N. Kaul, Shaikh Mohammad Abdullah- A Political Phoenix, New Delhi, 1985, p. 49
7 Ibid.
8 Mehar Chand Mahajan, op. cit., p.164.
9 Kaul, op. cit., p. 50.
long as the Maharaja–Mahajan coalition was there.\textsuperscript{10} Shaikh refused to work with Mahajan and demanded his removal. Also because of the growing influence of Jammu Hindu communalists, New Delhi found it necessary, to relieve Mahajan as continuation of him would “make Shaikh Abdullah suspect the secular nature of democratic India.”\textsuperscript{11} Nehru on December 1, 1947, pleaded with the Maharaja, “if there is going to be plebiscite, then obviously we have to work in such a way as to gain the goodwill of the majority of the population of the State, which means chiefly the Muslims...the only person who can effectively deal with the situation is Shaikh Abdullah.”\textsuperscript{12} The National Conference also in a campaign demanded the removal of Mahajan “who draws [ew] Rs 6000 per month without doing anything.”\textsuperscript{13} In the given circumstances, India State had no option but to relieve Mahajan and to appoint Shaikh Abdullah as the Prime Minister.\textsuperscript{14} The appointment of Shaikh Abdullah as the Prime Minister was thought by India to “strengthen the hands of India in the Security Council where the accession of Kashmir was pending.”\textsuperscript{15} In March 1948, the Maharaja was forced to ‘end the Emergency Administration and nominate Shaikh Abdullah Prime Minister of Kashmir.\textsuperscript{16} After the removal of Mahajan a meeting was arranged between the Maharaja and Shaikh through V. P. Menon by Patel “in regard to the formation of the ministry and the terms and conditions of their services.”\textsuperscript{17} By a royal proclamation a ‘popular ministry’ was installed and “Shaikh Abdullah was sworn

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., p. 51.
\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{12} Durga Das, \textit{Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, 1945-50}, Vol. 1, Ahmabad, 1971, pp. 236-7. Because to Nehru Kashmir was Shaikh and Shaikh was Kashmir. In a letter to Shaikh on April, 25 1952, Nehru wrote, “for me the people of Kashmir were basically represented by you.” \textit{Selected Works Of Jawaharlal Nehru A Project Of Teen Morti New Delhi, Vol. 18}, p. 388. However, in contrast to Nehru’s claim, Shaikh was no doubt the popular leader of Vale, but by ‘no means representative of Jammu and Kashmir.’ A. G. Noorani, ‘Kashmir: Blunders Of The Past,’ \textit{Frontline}, December 29, 2006, p. 81. He had never commanded the support of Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs of the Jammu Chitralekha Zutshi, op. cit., p.312. Then, regarding the accession, the majority of valley people favoured Pakistan. Vice president of India Dr Radhakrishnan and Indira Gandhi who visited Kashmir during this period reported that majority favoured Pakistan. See Indira Gandhi’s letter to Nehru from Srinagar on May 14, 1948, \textit{Two Alone, Two Together} ed. Sonia Gandhi; Penguin; p. 417. S. Radhakrishnan after his visit to Kashmir told President Rajendra Prasad that “even Shaikh Abdullah thought we would lose in a plebiscite.” Rajendra Prasad conveyed that to Nehru on July 14, 1953: “in case of an overall plebiscite, India might not only lose the whole of Jammu and Kashmir, but would also have to face the problem of exodus and rehabilitation of the Hindu population of the State.” \textit{Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru}, Vol. 23, p. 288 fn.
\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Khidmat, (Urdu) Srinagar}, 18 October, 1947.
\textsuperscript{14} See correspondence between Patel and Ayyanger, Maharaja and Mahajan, \textit{Sardar Patel’s Correspondence}, op. cit., pp.133-144.
\textsuperscript{15} M. C. Mahajan, op. cit., p. 170.
\textsuperscript{16} Josef Korbel, op. cit., p. 204.
\textsuperscript{17} Puri, op. cit., p. 84.
in as Prime Minister of the State on 17 March at Jammu.” 18 For the first time
during the 102 years of Dogra rule, a Kashmiri Muslim was appointed the Prime
Minister of the Muslim majority State.19 With the removal of Mahajan, Shaikh
Abdullah became the “undisputed head, with the title of Prime Minister (not
Chief Minister as would be case in an ordinary Indian State) of a “popular”
Interim Government amidst considerable publicity within the State.”20 The first
Nationalist Cabinet consisted of eight members; (1) Shaikh Mohammad Abdullah,
Prime Minister; and ministers (2) Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, Deputy Prime
Minister (3) Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq, Development (4) Mirza Afzal Beg,
Revenue (5) Sham Lal Saraf, Civil Supplies and Local Self-Government (6)
Girdhari Lal Dogra, Finance (7) Sardar Budh Singh, Health and (8) Pir
Mohammad Khan, Education.21

However, the efforts of New Delhi to bring the two-erstwhile opponents
together on a common platform failed. The Maharaja-Shaikh collaboration did
not work. Both considered themselves the real rulers and did not like to work as a
subordinate of one another. Both had grievances against each other and
complained to their respective patrons in Delhi, Patel and Nehru respectively,
about this.22 Shaikh Abdullah launched a “vilification campaign” against the
Maharaja23 and said that his struggle with the Maharaja was still going on,
because the latter was anxious to “rule and was not prepared merely to reign.” On
March 1, 1949, speaking at Baramulla, he declared that “the primary issue before
us is that of complete freedom from autocratic rule.”24 Shaikh Abdullah’s
speeches forced Indian leadership in Delhi to persuade the Maharaja to abdicate
in favour of his son, Karan Singh as the regent of the State.25 The Maharaja was

18 Puri, op. cit., p. 84; Kaul, op. cit., p. 53; Following the Maharaja’s proclamation of forming Interim
19 Bazaz, op. cit., p. 409.
21 Bazaz, Freedom, op. cit., P. 409; A. Lamb, op. cit., p. 211(fis.)
22 Maharaja was backed by Patel in New Delhi and Shaikh by Nehru, Puri Triumph, op. cit., p. 86.
23 Satish Vashishth, Shaikh Abdullah Then and Now, Delhi, 1968, p. 69.
25 Puri, Triumph, op. cit., p. 83. Also, Nehru did not want the Maharaja to be present in Kashmir at this
crucial time because there were charges against him of organising massacre of Muslims in Jammu.”
Mir Qasim, My Life And Times, Delhi, 1992, p. 40. In a letter to Sardar Patel, Nehru wrote that the
Maharaja’s presence is a constant irritant to various elements as well as to Shaikh Abdullah’s party
something drastic happening was needed to end this deadlock. There were repeated references of
autocratic rule of the Maharaja in the Security Council, which was hurting India at the International
level. Patel’s Correspondence, op. cit., Patel, pp. 137-8, 164, 175.
persuaded by Sardar Patel “to abdicate in national interest.” Hari Singh decided to leave the State for a temporary period “for reasons of health.” On 20 June, 1949, in a proclamation, Hari Singh announced that “all powers and functions, whether legislative, executive, or judicial which are exercisable by me in relation to the State and its Government—shall during the period of my absence from the State be exercisable by Yuvraj Shri Karan Singh Ji Bahadur.” On 20th June 1949, the Maharaja left the State for Bombay never to return. Having the Maharaja enforced to live in an exile in Bombay, Shaikh Abdullah was now in total control of the State and ‘the Kashmiri people had every right to expect that their popular leader would live up to his promises.’ As has been discussed in detail in first chapter that the nature of the Dogra State was feudal and autocratic; and tenants (who formed the majority of the population) suffered greatly, during the Dogra rule due to heavy taxation, indebtedness etc.

From the very inception of the struggle against the Dogra rule, Shaikh had raised their issues and had gained overwhelming support of theirs’. Now it was Shaikh’s turn to give some relief to them by implementing the economic reforms laid out in the Naya Kashmir Manifesto in 1944. So one of the first tasks of the new regime was to declare a moratorium of one year on all debts—a gesture most appreciated by the debt ridden peasantry and artisans of Kashmir. In just one decision the quantum of debts was brought down by eight percent, from 11.1 million to Rs 2.4 million. The rights of peasants in mortgaged property were reinstated; the tenant was now protected from ejection and his share of the crop increased from half to two thirds. Another important measure of economic reform adopted by Shaikh Abdullah was the abolishment of jagirdari in 1948

26 Mir Qasim, op. cit., p. 40.
29 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, op. cit., p. 204.
30 Times of India, May 17, 1948.
and thereby, at one stroke, eliminated absentee landlordism in the State. A Land Reform Committee was set up by the Government in 1949, for the reorganisation of agriculture in Kashmir. However, the greatest measure adopted by Shaikh Abdullah was land to teller, which had been a cardinal plank in all National Conference Pronouncements over the years. A committee was set up in April 1949 to prepare a plan for the transfer of land to the teller. More than a year of 'exhaustive study, on July 13, 1950, the "Kashmir Government introduced the most sweeping agrarian reform (Abolition of Big Landed Estates Act) undertaken in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent since the partition."

In pursuance of the fundamental plan for the economic reconstruction of the State, envisaged in 'Naya Kashmir Manifesto' in 1944, the Government enacted the 'Big Landed Estates Abolition Act', 2007,(1950). According to this act, the “right of ownership held by a proprietor in land owing more than 182 kanals (excluding orchards, fuel and fodder reserves and uncultivable waste land) shall extinguish and ceases to vest in him and shall henceforth vest in tillers of such land to the extent of their actual possession, provided that no tiller shall, with the land so transferred and that which he already owns, posses more than 160 kanals.” The landlord was allowed to keep not more than 160 kanals (20 acres) of agricultural land, 8 kanals (1 acre) of land for residential use or vegetable gardening, 4 kanals (0.5 acre) as residential site, and 10 kanals (1.25 acres) of orchards—altogether 182 kanals (22.75 acres). In addition, it was stipulated that the landlord must work on his land; otherwise it would be expropriated for redistribution or collective farming. There was also an interesting provision “for the confiscation of the property of "enemy agents” being largely defined as persons who had expressed a desire for Kashmir to join

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32 Times of India, May 17 1948. The scheme for the abolition of jagirdari system had been prepared and to send to Karan Singh, the regent for his approval. Since the regent appeared to be against the abolition of the system, instead, the scheme was forwarded to the Secretary, Kashmir Affairs, Government of India, Vishnu Sahay. But the Government of India did not approve it. The reply from Delhi came unexpected to Shaikh and he in an emotional speech at Lal Chowk in Srinagar announced the abolition of the jagirdari system, without receiving the consent of the regent and New Delhi. Karan Singh, op. cit., pp. 120-21.
34 Korbel, op. cit., p. 208.
Pakistan. Almost 4½ million kanals (563,500) were to be transferred to the tillers and the tillers to whom lands were being transferred in proprietary right were not required to pay (anything) by way of compensation.

The agricultural and social structure of Kashmir got drastically changed by the land reform laws. The feudal system was abolished, landlordism disappeared, and thousands of peasants living before in virtual slavery became landholders. According to Kashmir Governmental sources, by the end of March 1953, 188,775 acres of land were transferred to 153,399 tillers, and by April 1953, collective farms were established on 87,500 acres of land. This extra ordinary Land Reform had far-reaching "social and economic implications." Quoting the Kashmir Governmental sources Hindustan Times wrote that approximately 700,000 cultivars, mostly Muslims in Kashmir Valley including 250,000 Hindu untouchables in Jammu province acquired land at the expense of 10,000 landlords. However, the land reform was not free from lacunae. The landlords had been given the right to choose the area they wanted to retain. This gave a landlord the tool to extort money from his tenant on the threat that he would choose to keep his tenant’s portion of land with him. The landlords, on receiving the information that more than 182 kanals land would be taken away from them, broke the joint family system and distributed the land among the family members (male adults) to the ceilings of 22.75 acres. They also converted their cereal lands into orchards. The landless peasants received considerably less than the average, because many local officials and National Conference functionaries were given more and better land, sometimes even above the maximum of 20 acres. Moreover, the implementation of the land reforms had been left to the whims of the corrupt bureaucracy. It was a revolutionary programme, which had

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38 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, op. cit., p. 209.
40 Hindustan Times, 10 June 1953.
41 Mir Qasim, op. cit., p. 45.
43 Korbel, National Conference, op. cit., p. 284. This is also corroborated by Daniel Thorner who visited Kashmir in 1953. He says, "It [Land Reforms] has distinctly benefited those individuals who, at the village level, were already the more important and substantial people. It has done the least for petty tenants and landless labourers, these two categories being the largest in the country side." Daniel Thorner, 'The Kashmir Land Reforms: Some Personal Impression,' The Economic Weekly, September 12, 1953.
fallen a prey to large-scale corruption.\textsuperscript{44} No doubt, there were many shortcomings but nevertheless it was a revolutionary and progressive measure. Nowhere in India was the land reform enforcement so effective as it was in Kashmir.\textsuperscript{45} Denial Thorner, an agrarian historian and economist, who visited Kashmir in 1953, has made a brief remark, which may be relevantly quoted: Despite “defects in implementation, many tillers have become landowners and some land has even gone to the landless. The peasantry of the Valley were not long ago fearful and submissive. No one who has spent time with Kashmiri villagers’ will say the same today.”\textsuperscript{46} The transformation of rural Kashmir had far-reaching political consequences’ in Kashmir. Empowered peasant families regarded Shaikh Abdullah, the main agent of this transformation as a messiah.\textsuperscript{47} He became popular as Bub (father), though not in Jammu, among the people who for first time after hundred years became owners of land. Even though Shaikh’s Government proved to be corrupt and autocratic, but his ‘personal stature’ remained largely undiminished and peasantry of Kashmir remained loyal to him.\textsuperscript{48} But New Delhi was not happy with the land reforms, particularly Sardar Patel who never trusted Shaikh Abdullah. In one of his correspondence Patel feared the possibility of ‘discontentment’ among the minority community, since most of these jagirdars were non-Muslims.\textsuperscript{49} During the Dgra rule the majority of landlords and moneylenders were Hindus, and axe naturally fell on them.\textsuperscript{50} New Delhi tried its best to persuade Shaikh to ‘reconsider the decision on land reforms “or at least, to go slow with its implementation.”’ But Shaikh Abdullah tactically replied to New Delhi that “the tillers who had got land through...land reforms would vote for India (if a referendum was held) and also it was the commitment made by National Conference with the tillers during its struggle against the Dogra

\textsuperscript{44} Mir Qasim, op. cit., p. 45.
\textsuperscript{46} Daniel Thorner, The Agrarian Prospect In India, Bombay, 1976, p. 50.
\textsuperscript{47} Sumantra Bose, Kashmir Roots Of Conflict, Paths To Peace, New Delhi, 2003, p. 28.
\textsuperscript{49} Patel’s Correspondence, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 182.
State. Afzal Beg, the revenue minister warned, “those who create hindrances in application of these reforms stand in the way of our accession to India.”

The Hindu organisations started anti land reform campaign, drawing sympathetic responses from across India. Abdullah was pressurised but he did not yield, “leading to the first of many conflicts over his imposition of what amounted to one man rule.” The *Hindu* in its editorial wrote, “It should be clear that they (Kashmir government) have been influenced not by economic or social considerations, but by political factors, particularly the desire to impress the agricultural poor in the part of Kashmir which is under Pakistan.”

However, in the political field National Conference’s rule under Shaikh Abdullah proved to be the continuation of the autocratic Dogra rule and the “fortunes of Kashmir went into a regressive and conservative slide.” When Shaikh Abdullah became the Chief Administrator, the other leaders of National Conference became administrators and emergence officers of different areas and zones. The administration was reduced to a handmaid of National Conference, and its office holders became virtually masters of public fate. This period was popularly known as “halqa president raj” (the rule of local presidents of National Conference), and no dissent voice was tolerated. Listening to Radio Pakistan was prohibited in Kashmir; and any person even doubted of listening to it was arrested along with the radio set. Khwaja Sannullah Bhatt, the eyewitness, laments the National Government, which was expected to be a democratic rule, thus: “Those who fought for twenty years against injustice, oppression and undemocratic style of administration imposed by Dogra Rule, the very people, after having gained power, did not hesitate in suppressing with heavy hand and voice that was raised against their misdeeds.” Thus, the dictatorship of National

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51 Mir Qasim, op. cit., p. 44.
52 *Struggle*, Bombay, 29 July 1950.
58 S. Bhatt, op. cit., p. 49, P.N. Bazaz, *Freedom Struggle*, op. cit., p. 418. There were two Government-owned radio stations in the State, the radio sets had been under the control of the local organization of the National Conference, all tuned to Radio Kashmir, fixed and sealed” Korbek, National Conference Administration, op. cit., p. 287.
59 S. Bhatt, op. cit., p. 49. The same view has been expressed by P. N. Bazaz regarding the Shaikh Abdullah’s rule, see P. N. Bazaz, *Kashmir In Crucible*, Srinagar, 2005, p. 63.
Conference was completely established. Shaikh Abdullah celebrated and hailed ‘azadi’ after four centuries of foreign rule. However, he did not bother about freedom of the people. Shaikh Abdullah started political revenge against his opponents who did not share the same view as that of Shaikh Abdullah and National Conference particularly regarding accession. They were picked up one by one, thrown in jails, and banished from Kashmir. Among these, Aga Showkat Ali, the General Secretary of the Muslim Conference, Maulana Mohammad Noorudin, Khawja Ghulam Nabi Gilkar, Maulvi Mohammad Abdullah Shopyani, Maulvi Abdul Rahim, Khawaja Abdul Gani, Pandit Prem Nath Bazaz, and his colleagues, Khawja Abdul Salam Yatu- the President of Kissan Mazdoor Conference and his colleagues were arrested. Later on all these leaders, excepting Pandit Prem Nath Bazaz and a few of his colleagues, were taken to Jammu wherefrom they were pushed into Pakistan through Suchetgarh border. An ordinance entitled ‘Enemy Agents Ordinance’ was promulgated to arrest and summary trial those suspected of pro-Pakistan leanings. The ‘Preventive Detention Act and Defence of India Rules “vehemently denounced as lawless laws by the National Conference Leaders” during the Dogra rule were promulgated “and freely used to indiscriminately imprison opponents on the charge of opposing the Government and not falling in line with the views of National Conference.” Ironically, the party that had demanded and fought for the social and political rights of the Kashmiri people “became their greatest repressor,” and subverted and retarded the democratic development in Kashmir. Shaikh Abdullah repeatedly asserted that his Government was committed to rule in accordance with the ‘New Kashmir Manifesto;’ but like many other “twentieth-century third world” movements”, it was “clearly based on a Jacobin conception of popular sovereignty, augmented by a generous dollop of Bolshevism-ideas inspired by the Soviet Model- in the social economic parts of programme.”; this type of “conception tends to be in tension with liberal-

60 S. Bhatt, op. cit., p. 47.
61 P. N. Bazaz, Kashmir In Crucible, op. cit., p. 64.
62 Due to the pressure from Delhi, Prem Nath Bazaz and his colleagues, Jagan Nath Sthu, Pitambarar Nath Dhar and Shyam Lal Yecha, were released from jails, but were exiled from the State and as a result of this action they got settled in Delhi, Sannullah Bhat, op. cit., pp 47-8; Muhammad Yusuf Sura, Kashmiris Fight For Freedom, Vol. 2, Lahore, 1978, p. 1189.
63 P. N. Bazaz, Kashmir in Crucible, op. cit., p. 64.
64 C. Zutshi, op. cit., p. 313.
65 S Bose, Roots, op. cit., p. 27.
democratic norms of political pluralism, accountability of those in power, and
tolerance of dissent and opposition.”66 Sumantra Bose has summed up the reign
of Shaikh Abdullah between 1948 and 1953: “As head of this (NC) Government,
Abdullah—with Nehru and New Delhi’s essential support—ran IJK as a party-state
fiefdom of the NC, and the Lion of Kashmir’s founding contribution to the
entrenchment and perpetuation of anti-democratic politics in IJK is beyond
dispute.”67 Josef Korbal who was a member of the United Nations Commission
for India and Pakistan observed, “The National Conference enjoys effective and
exclusive political control over every sector of life.”68

In March 1949, the Statesman, a prominent Indian newspaper, which
supported Shaikh Abdullah’s policy observed, “there are signs of establishment of
a police state—futile notices in restaurants forbidding political conversations when
everybody talks politics; more ‘public safety’ prisoners than are healthy.”69 Sir
Owen Dixon, the United Nations representative, some eighteen months later
observed during his mission “the State Government was exercising wide powers
of arbitrary arrest.”70 The Nationalist Government also suppressed the press and
muzzled the newspapers and periodicals that did not fall in line with the
Government policy. Even the Nationalist papers of India that were critical of the
Nationalist Government’s policies were banned in the State.71 Shaikh was fully
backed by Nehru. Balraj Puri a Jammu based political activist recalls that he met
Nehru in Delhi and complained him against the NC atrocities. Nehru although
disapproved these practices but added, “our entire Kashmir policy revolves
around the personality of Shaikh Abdullah. We cannot afford to oppose him.”72
Ironically Shaikh Abdullah claimed that the Government was building “new
Kashmir” according to the Naya Kashmir Manifesto; however, in practice it was
against the manifesto. For example, the Manifesto says in article 3 and 4 that
there will be “complete freedom of expression, freedom of press, freedom of

66 Ibid., pp. 26-7.
67 Ibid., p. 46.
68 J. Korbel, National Conference Administration, op. cit., P. 287.
69 The Statesman (Calcutta), March 1, 1949.
70 Sir Owen Dixon’s Report to The Security Council, s/1791, September 15, 1950, p.24, cited in Korbel,
National Conference Administration of Kashmir, op. cit., 287.
12 December.
association and freedom of movement and travel” which was in nowhere.  

Because of the blockage of natural routes of trade, there was “acute shortage of basic commodities like kerosene and salt in the Valley. The entire distribution of these commodities was kept in the hands of National Conference office bearers.” who distributed it among their own kiths and kens. Consequently the common masses had to face hardships The situation has been aptly recorded by the leading Kashmiri poet Mahjoor, in the following sarcastic composition:

“Noonas Gauos National Waanus  
Thoupham Gode Ral Hindustanus Seeth,  
Zoojan Wandha Hindustanus,  
Dil Chum Pakistanus Seeth”

“I went to a National shop to purchase salt. The shopkeeper asked me that without pledging support for accession to India, I cannot get salt. I replied “I do not hate India, (I would sacrifice very being for India), but my heart goes to Pakistan.”

Although Shaikh Abdullah’s strategy of ‘political mobilization ‘was populist but was undemocratic. The working of N.C. Government “belied its socialist and democratic ideology.” It was not that system envisaged in Naya Kashmir Manifesto and for which Kashmiri had fought and sacrificed their lives. Mahjoor who had supported Shaikh and NC against the Dogra rule through his poetry, became critical of his policies. In an out class sarcastic poem entitled ‘Azzadi” (Freedom) he laments thus:

Poverty and starvation,  
Repression and lawlessness,-  
It is with these happy blessings  
That she has come to us.  
Freedom, being of heavenly birth,
Can’t move from door to door;  
You’ll find her camping in the homes  
Of a chosen few alone…….  
There is morning in every house;  
But in sequestered bowers  
Our rulers, like bridegrooms,  
Are in dalliance with freedom.  
Nabir Shaikh knows what freedom means,  
For his wife was whisked away.  
He went on complaining until  
She bore Freedom in a new home!  
They searched her armpits seven times  
To see if she was hiding rice;  
In a basket covered with a shawl  
The peasant’s wife brought Freedom home.  
There’s restlessness in every heart,  
But no one dare speak out-  
Afraid that with their free expression  
Freedom may be annoyed.

During this period, Shaikh Abdullah in his speeches and statements praised India and favoured accession and criticised Pakistan. In a press conference in New Delhi on 7 March 1948, Shaikh said: “We have decided to work and die for India. We made our decision not in October last, but in 1944, when we resisted the advances of Mr. Jinnah. Our refusal was categorical. Ever since the National Conference had attempted to keep the State clear of the pernicious Two-Nation Theory while fighting the world’s worst autocracy (Pakistan)”78 Speaking at the annual session of the National Conference in Srinagar, in October 1948, Shaikh Abdullah while praising India and Nehru is reported to have recited the famous couplet of Ameer-i- Khusrao:

Mann Too Shudam, Too Mann Shudi-,

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Mann Tann Shudam Too Ja ‘n Shudi-
Ta Kas Na Goyad Baad Azien,
Mann Degaram Too Deegari.79

“I have merged myself in thee, and thou hast merged thyself in me, verily, I am thy body and thou art my soul, let no one sayeth henceforth, that we are two different beings.”

The reason put forward by Shaikh in support of accession to India was ‘ideological affinity of NC with Congress-’secularism.’ “We the people of Jammu and Kashmir have thrown our lot with the Indian people not in the heat of passion or a moment of despair but by our deliberate choice. The union of our people has been fused by the community of ideals and common suffering in the cause of freedom. India is pledged to the principle of secular democracy and we are also in pursuit of the same objective.”80 Speaking on May 2, 1950, on the anniversary of Radio Kashmir he said, “There is nothing common between the Pakistani ideology and our political faith.”81 From 1947 to 1951 in his public statements, Shaikh harped on the accession with India and criticised the idea of an independent Kashmir.82 Now it was imperative for India to establish some kind of constitutional relations with Kashmir and to decide, after the accession to India the future position of Kashmir in the Indian Constitution.83 Two developments of crucial importance ‘to the legal position of Kashmir in the Indian Union, took place in 1949. ‘One was the admission of Kashmir’s representatives to the Constituent Assembly. The other was the adoption of the Constitution, including its present article 370, by the Constituent Assembly with the participation of those representatives.”84 The Indian Constituent Assembly, on 27 May decided to fill up ‘four seats allotted to Kashmir on the basis of nominations by the Head of the State in consultation with the Cabinet, and four Kashmiri representatives, including Shaikh Abdullah, took their seats in the Constitution

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80 Ab. Jabbar, op. cit., p. 22
81 Ibid. p. 32
82 He also disapproved plebiscite and instead demanded that Pakistan might be punished because she was aggressor. For these statements see, Ab. Jabbar, op. cit., pp. 18-35.
84 A. G. Noorani, Kashmir Question, Bombay, 1964. p. 44.
As expected Pakistan protested against the Indian decision to admit Kashmir's four representatives to the Constituent Assembly. India in its reply held that, "while the constitution of India which inter alia provided for the relation of acceding states to the Government of India was under consideration it would have been unfair to the Government of Jammu and Kashmir to deny them the opportunity of participating in the discussion of that constitution. Such participation was not intended to, and does not, in fact, alter the Government of India's determination to abide, in the matter of accession, by the freely declared will of the people of Jammu and Kashmir."  

Thus, India made it clear to the world that the accession (although) "was legal and valid but was provisional and conditional on a free plebiscite being taken."  

Although the article 1 of the Indian constitution declared Kashmir, an integral part of Indian Union but it was given a special position (by means of "temporary provisions with respect to the State of Jammu and Kashmir") by article 370. The Indian Constituent Assembly adopted article 370 on 17th October 1949. It was put forth in the Assembly as article 306A to arrange the constitutional relations between India and Kashmir. Through article 370, the powers of Parliament to make laws for Kashmir were limited to:-

1. Those matters in the union list and the concurrent list which, in consultation with the Government of the State, are declared by the President to correspond to matters specified in the Instrument of Accession governing the accession of the State to the dominion of India as the matters with respect to which the dominion legislature may make laws for that State; and

2. Such other matters in the said lists as, with the concurrence of the Government of the State, the President may by order specify.

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83 Sisir Gupta, *Kashmir, A Study In Indo-Pakistan Relations*, New Delhi, 1966; p. 365. The four members from Kashmir were, Sheik Mohammad Abdullah, Mirza Mohammad Afzal Beg, Maulana Mohammad Sayed Masoodi, and Shri Moti Ram Bagda.


85 Ibid., pp. 45-46.

86 Lamb, *Disputed Legacy*, op. cit., p.190. Article 370 was drafted by Gopalaswami Ayyanger.


88 The future relations of Kashmir with India were to be governed by article 370 which was clearly based on the Instrument of Accession A. S. Anand, op. cit., p. 100

In the response of a question (by Hasrat Mohani) regarding the necessity and compulsion of the art 370, Mr Gopalaswami Ayyangar, in his detailed exposition of article 370 *inter alia* replied that "the discrimination is due to the special conditions of Kashmir. That particular State is not yet ripe for this kind of integration. It is the hope of everybody here that in due course even Jammu and Kashmir will become ripe for the same sort of integration as has taken place in the case of other states. At present, it is not possible to achieve that integration.....There are various reasons why this is not possible now. We are entangled with the United Nations in regard to Jammu and Kashmir and it is not possible to say now we shall be free from this entanglement. That can take place only when the Kashmir problem is satisfactorily settled. Again, the Government of India have committed themselves to the people of Kashmir in certain respects. They have committed themselves to the position that an opportunity would be given to the people of the State to decide for themselves whether they will remain with the republic or wish to go out of it. We are also committed to ascertaining this will of the people by means of a plebiscite provided that peaceful and normal conditions are restored and the impartiality of the plebiscite could be guaranteed. We have also agreed that the will of the people, through the instrument of a Constituent Assembly, will determine the constitution of the State as well as the sphere of Union jurisdiction over the State." Shaikh Abdullah was disillusioned for the article was being described as a 'temporary provision' to mollify the protagonists of integration and his "ironclad guarantees of autonomy" were not accepted." Not satisfied with the move, Shaikh Abdullah wrote to Gopalaswami to put the article in order or to be ready for repercussions: "—I and my colleagues have been extremely pained by the manner in which the thing has been done, and, after careful consideration of the matter, we have arrived at the conclusion that it is not possible for us to let the matter rest here. As I am genuinely anxious that no unpleasant situation should arise, I would request you to see if even now something could be done to rectify the position. In case I fail to hear from you within a reasonable time, I regret to say that no course is left open for us but to render our

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92 Ibid., pp. 66-67, stress mine. A. G. Noorani affirms that 'article 370 was not intended to and did not rule out a plebiscite, and also the constituent assembly, which Gopalaswami mentioned was meant only to give a representative government to Kashmir and was not intended, likewise, to be an alternative to plebiscite, A. G. Noorani, *Kashmir Question*, op. cit., p. 47.

resignation from the Constituent Assembly." Thus, article 370 from the very outset of its adoption, has been a matter of controversy. Shaikh Abdullah favoured accession but with autonomy. He demanded special status consonant with the act of accession, because he was afraid that the cultural glory of Kashmir would not be secure if they did not have the full freedom for their cultural prosperity in every respect. Kashmir being the only Muslim majority province in the Indian Union necessitated political-constitutional safeguards within the Indian political system. The Indian Constitution came into force from January 26, 1950 and on the same day, the President of India (according to art. 370) promulgated the constitution (applicable to Jammu and Kashmir) order, 1950, specifying in two different schedules the powers of the Union and the applicability of the constitution, which confirmed strictly to the Instrument of Accession.

After participating a number of times in the Security Council from Indian side Shaikh felt that "there was no resolution of Kashmir problem by the UNO," therefore he stated preparing ground to convene the Constituent Assembly. The General Council of National Conference in its resolution of October, 1950 recommended for "convening a Constituent Assembly based upon adult suffrage---for the purpose of determining the future shape and affiliation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir." and also to give the State "a Constitution worthy of the traditions of [its] 'freedom struggle and in accordance with the principles of 'New Kashmir.'" Predictably Pakistan raised 'a protest with the Security Council against this policy, which according to Pakistan prejudiced the final determination of whether Kashmir would join India or Pakistan. The Security council passed a resolution on March, 30, 1951, "reminding the Governments and authorities concerned of the principle embodied in the Security Council Resolutions of 21 April 1948, 3 June 1948 and 14

94 Shaikh Abdullah's letter to Gopalaswami Ayyangar (the main architect of the article 370) on 17 October 1949, Sardar Patel's correspondence 1945-50, op. cit., p. 306.
96 Prakash Chandra 'The National Question in Kashmir,' Social Scientist, Vol. 13, No. 6 (Jun., 1985), (pp. 35-56) p. 49.
98 S. Abdullah, op. cit., p. 533.
100 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, op. cit., p. 219.
March 1950, and United Nations Commission For India And Pakistan Resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, that the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accordance with the will of the people, expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations." The resolution further warned that "the convening of a Constituent Assembly as recommended by the General Council of the 'All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference,' and any action that Assembly might attempt to take to determine the future shape and affiliation of the entire State, or any part thereof, would not constitute a disposition of the State in accordance with the above principles." Shaikh Abdullah was, nonetheless, not discouraged by the Security Council resolution. He was fully backed by Nehru. Addressing the political workers of National Conference, on April 2, 1951 at Srinagar, Nehru declared that the proposed Constituent Assembly would give a democratic basis to Jammu and Kashmir. He further added that it was an internal matter of Kashmir to decide for herself.

Karan Singh as the regent of the State issued a proclamation convoking a Constituent Assembly on the basis of free elections by all citizens of the State over 21 years of age by means of a direct and secret ballot. The proposed Constituent Assembly comprised of forty-three members from Kashmir Valley, thirty from Jammu region, and two from Ladakh. Twenty-five additional seats were reserved for Pakistan Administered Kashmir, (which were never filled), making a nominal total of one hundred. The elections were held in September. The manner in which, lashes out Sumantra Bose, "this election was conducted made a mockery of any pretence of a democratic process, and set a grim precedent for future "free and fair

101 Dasgupta, op. cit., pp. 406-407; A. G. Noorani, Kashmir Question, op cit., pp. 52-3; P. L. Lakhapal, Essentials Notes and Documents On Kashmir, Delhi, 1958, pp. 230-31; Micheal Brecher, Struggle op. cit., p. 119. In response, Nehru assured the Security Council that "the Kashmir Constituent Assembly, so far as we are concerned, does not come in the way of a decision by the Security Council; that stands completely." Lord Birdwood, Two Nations And Kashmir, op. cit., p.158. Later on in a press conference in New Delhi, on June 21, 1952, Nehru made it clear that "the Kashmir Government had every right to have a Constituent Assembly to frame the internal constitution but so far as we were concerned we would not be bound by their decision on the question before the Security Council." Times of India, 22 June, 1952. Lord Birdwood believes that Nehru "wished to avoid a clash as between a Security Council decision and the will of the Kashmir Assembly." Lord Birdwood, Two Nations, op. cit., p. 159.

102 Times of India, April 3, 1951.


elections" in IJK (Indian Administered Kashmir).105 In Kashmir Valley opposition parties were not allowed to organise an election campaign.106 The National Conference of Shaikh Abdullah ‘won’ all 75 seats uncontested. The slogan of Shaikh and his National Conference was –One Leader (Abdullah), One Party (NC) and One Programme (Naya Kashmir).107 Therefore, there was no question of any “opposing NC” particularly in Valley, which was the epicentre of Abdullah’s rule and where “Abdullah was running a virtual Party- State.”108 According to Josef Korbel, “in Kashmir Valley and Ladakh the elections, if they can so called, were fairly simple—forty-three candidates were “elected unopposed” one week before the election date, the two independent candidates who had dared to contest the elections withdrew “under pressure” later.109 Thirteen candidates of the Praja Parishad, the main opposition in Jammu were arbitrarily ‘disqualified’ and their nomination papers were rejected on the ground that they were not properly presented. In protest, the Parishad announced a boycott of the elections, 3 days before the election in Jammu.110 The two other non N.C candidates dropped out also.

Thus, Shaikh’s NC got all 75 seats, before the polling began.111 The results naturally failed to carry conviction abroad. The London Times on September 7, 1951, in an editorial, entitled “No Fair Vote” and called its results as “farcical.”112 Pakistan severely criticised the elections a “fraud” and a “farce.”113 Ironically Nehru again backed Shaikh Abdullah and stated that he was “sure that the way people had voted showed clearly that they were with the National Conference and with India.”114 The ‘massive victory’ of the NC made Nehru more optimistic than ever about the result of a plebiscite in the State, excluding Azad Kashmir.115 Although Nehru would disapprove this type of ‘democracy’ in India but in Kashmir, he had to approve it as he considered it a good sign for India. He saw a good opportunity in the Constituent

105 Sumanta Bose, op. cit., p. 55.
108 Ibid., p. 31.
110 Parishad had decided to contest on 28 seats.
113 Siser Gupta, op. cit., p. 366.
114 The Hindu (Madras), October 13, 1951.
Assembly (elections) which would reinforce the Indian argument that Shaikh Abdullah and his National Conference “really did represent the will of the people the State of Jammu and Kashmir” and “the elections — could be presented to world opinion as a substitute for a plebiscite” in favour of India. As discussed earlier the political mantras envisaged in the ‘Naya Kashmir Manifesto’ of NC was, “One Leader, (Abdullah), One Party (NC) and One Programme (Naya Kashmir), so there was no space for an opposing party. It is true that NC was the only party in the Valley but in Jammu and Ladakh the party had neither the ‘requisite organisational network nor the ideological equipment to represent their aspirations. If ‘free elections had been tolerated, Praja Parishad would have won few seats. But NC was not willing to risk to allow Parishad to function as “a small opposition group in the house.” If Shaikh Abdullah had believed that by keeping away the Parishad, he would be able to strengthen his grip over the State including Jammu, he was soon to be disillusioned. The Parishad started a vigorous campaign (it will be discussed in detail shortly) against Shaikh and his rule and demanded full integration of the State with the Indian Union, in conform to other states. Consequently the Parishad agitation proved to be “extremely disruptive” for the fragile political order of Kashmir.

The Constituent Assembly met first on 31 October 195, (the task of constitution making was completed on 17 November 1956, the day which Shaikh Abdullah called a “day of destiny. A day which comes only once in the life of a nation.”

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117 As stated earlier Balraj Puri begged Nehru that some opposition might be allowed in Kashmir which was an important part of democracy. But Nehru refused. “Our entire Kashmir policy,” said Nehru “revolves around the personality of Shaikh Abdullah. We cannot afford to oppose him,” Balraj Puri, ‘Azadi, Autonomy And Self Rule vs. Freedom, Mainstream, Vol. XLVII, No. 52, December 12, 2009.
118 S. Bose, Roots, op. cit., p. 56.
119 No opposition was allowed to operate in the Valley. The opponents had either been imprisoned or sent to Pakistan. Those who remained had gone underground.
120 B. Puri, Kashmir Insurgency, op. cit., p. 48.
121 S. Bose, Roots, op. cit., p. 57.
122 Ibid.
123 M. J. Akbar, Kashmir Behind the Vale, p. 140.
Constituent Assembly also functioned as the Legislature of the State during this period.\textsuperscript{124} Shaikh Abdullah in his inaugural speech in the Constituent Assembly enumerated the tasks of the Constituent Assembly as fourfold:\textsuperscript{125}

(1) To devise a Constitution for the future governance of the country
(2) The future of the Royal Dynasty
(3) To deal with the problem of landowner's demand for compensation.
(4) To declare its reasoned conclusion regarding accession.\textsuperscript{126}

Regarding the constitution Shaikh Abdullah wanted the Assembly to be guided by "the highest principles of democratic constitution of the world"; based on the "principles of equality, liberty and social justice, which are an integral feature of all progressive constitution". He further added that the rule of law "as understood in the democratic countries of the world should be the cornerstone of our political structure." it included all those rights and obligations, already embodied in New Kashmir Manifesto, to be precise.\textsuperscript{127} Concerning the future of the Royal Dynasty, Shaikh made it clear that "this dynasty can no longer exercise authority, on the basis of an old discredit treaty" and "in supreme fulfilment of the peoples' aspirations, it follows that a constitutional Head of the State will have to be chosen to exercise the functions which this Assembly may choose to entrust him." Shutting the door in the face of Hari Singh, he declared that Hari Singh was not competent to be the first constitutional Head of the State," because "he was incapable to adjust himself to changed conditions and his antiquated views on vital problems constitute positive disqualifications for him to hold the high office of a democratic head of the State."\textsuperscript{128} With regard to landowners demand for compensation, Shaikh categorically declared, "the abolition of landlordism is -an accomplished fact and there is no going back on the decision already taken."\textsuperscript{129}

\textsuperscript{124} Sisar Gupta, op. cit., p. 366.
\textsuperscript{125} \textit{Inaugural address of Shaikh Abdullah in Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly on 5th November 1951.} For full text see \textit{Report of the State Autonomy Committee,} Srinagar, op. cit., pp. 159-199.
\textsuperscript{126} Later on Nehru in a press conference in Delhi told that it was the intention of the Constituent Assembly to pass a resolution whereby to confirm the accession. "We asked them not to do it so as not be embarrassed before the UN." Therefore, Nehru advised Kashmiri leaders not to pass that resolution. \textit{Hindustan Times.} 21 June, 1952.
\textsuperscript{127} \textit{Report of State Autonomy,} op. cit.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{129} Ibid.
Regarding the most crucial and fragile issue of accession, which had [has] made Kashmir a world interest, Shaikh’s speech needs to be discussed in detail. Although Shaikh put before the Assembly three options, accession to India, accession to Pakistan and an independent Kashmir, but he himself favoured Kashmir’s accession with India; which he believed had safeguarded the autonomy of the State; “we are proud to have our bonds with India, the goodwill of whose people and Government is available to us in unstinted[ing] and abundant measure." He added that in India “with the exception of the items grouped under defence, foreign affairs and communication----- we have complete freedom to frame our constitution in manner we like.” Defending his decision of approving the accession with India in 1947, Shaikh stated, “The real character of a state is revealed in its constitution. The Indian Constitution has set before the country the goal of secular democracy based upon justice freedom and equality for all without distinction. This is the bedrock of modern democracy. Further, “the Indian constitution has amply and finally repudiated the concept of a religious state which is a throwback to medievalism, by guaranteeing the equality of rights of all citizens irrespective of their religion, colour, caste and class.” The national movement in our State, naturally, gravitates towards these principles of secular democracy.” Economically too, he believed Kashmir’s future was bright in India. “India being more highly industrialized than Pakistan, can give us equipment, technical services and materials. She can help us too in marketing.” In addition, he justified accession with India, as Kashmir’s presence in India would help in stabilizing the “communal harmony of India” and thus was good for Indian Muslims.\textsuperscript{130}

He vehemently not only rejected accession with Pakistan but even the claim of Pakistan being a Muslim State. “This claim of being a Muslim State is of course only a camouflage. --- [it] is a feudal state."\textsuperscript{131}

Regarding the independence option Shaikh, although did not reject it altogether but wanted “the good will of all—neighbours” and guarantee in protecting Kashmir in future from any invasion; without which it was a utopian idea.\textsuperscript{132}

\textsuperscript{130} ibid.
\textsuperscript{131} ibid.
\textsuperscript{132} ibid.
From this, it becomes clear that Shaikh was more inclined towards India, because as he himself said, “There is no danger of a revival of feudalism and autocracy. Moreover, during last four years, the Government of India has never tried to interfere in our internal autonomy. This experience has strengthened our confidence in them as a democratic state.”133 Thus, so long as India was there to maintain the status quo, Shaikh had no problem with India but when India tried (as the later events revealed) to intervene in Kashmir’s internal autonomy Shaikh cried for third option independence and demanded plebiscite. Fissures started appearing when India tried to “sought closer federal integration of Kashmir, a position not acceptable” to Shaikh and his N.C.134 In fact, India viewed the terms of article 370 (which granted special status to Kashmir) as a temporary provision.135

As discussed earlier Gopalaswamy while introducing the draft had expressed hope that “in due course, even Jammu and Kashmir will become ripe for the same sort of integration as has taken place in the case of other states.” In the meantime Gopalaswami Ayyengar in order to bring financial integration of the State with the Union attempted to extend the jurisdiction of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India to Kashmir.136 Mir Qasim accuses India for her dual policy in regard to Kashmir, “on the one hand, it was trying to apply more and more provisions of the Indian Constitution to the State despite Shaikh’s resentment, while on the other hand it took the stand that in spite of the Constituent Assembly’s ratification, the question of accession would be finally decided by the UNO.” The Union attitude persuaded Shaikh to go slow with this question.137 India had her own reservation about the Kashmir Constituent Assembly. India believed that the Instrument of Accession could not become an adequate basis for framing a constitution; there were many questions like jurisdiction of Supreme Court, right of Election Commission in the State, National Flag, which needed to be clarified before the decision.138 Shaikh saw in these moves a hidden threat to the State autonomy. His attitude toward plebiscite softened. From 1949, he made many speeches and statements in which he “hinted at

133 Ibid.
137 Mir Qasim, op. cit., p. 54.
138 S. Abdullah, Aatishi Chinar, op. cit., p. 539.
the advantages” of an independent Kashmir. These statements marked the divergence of approaches between Nehru and Shaikh and for the first time the two friends started drifting away since they had met first in 1930s. The situation was further compounded by the agitation of Praja Parishad demanding complete integration of the State with the Indian union. Praja Parishad was formed in November 1947, and was led by Prem Nath Dogra and Balraj Madhok. It had a substantial following in the Hindu-dominated areas of Jammu. They believed in ‘unitary form of government for the whole country ‘and did not like Kashmir to be treated ‘in a distinct and special manner.’

The Parishad was whole heartedly supported by Bharatiya Jana Sangh, the Hindu Mahasabha and the Ram Rajaya Parishad. They demanded complete abrogation of article 370 and *ek pradhan, ek nishan and ek vidhan* (one flag, one premier and one constitution) “became the battle cry of the Parishad.” It was a direct attack on Shaikh Abdullah’s title of “Prime Minister”, on the State Flag [NC’s Party Flag was adopted in late 1949 as the State Flag], and above all, on the Constitution-making mandate of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly. Thus, the issue- Jammu and Kashmir’s complete integration with the Indian Union and the abrogation of article 370 became the “corner stone of the Parishad’s political platform.” Strangely enough, it was actually against the dangers and fears of such communalist forces that Kashmir was granted special status. Shaikh had endorsed accession to India “in the belief that Gandhian secularism, combined with Nehru’s socialism and the promise of special status, would satisfy the aspirations of his people.” Now, Gandhi was dead (he was killed by Hindu communalists) and Indian secularism and Kashmir’s special statuses were under attack. This was the phase when, in against the rampant

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139 S. Gopal, op. cit., p. 118.
141 Summit Ganguly, op. cit., p. 95.
143 Ibid., p. 98.
146 Prakash Chandra, op. cit., p. 50.
147 Ajit bhattachajee, *Tragic Hero of Kashmir*, op. cit., p. 122. There was growing influence of Hindu communalists within the congress who had full support of Patel. They surrounded Nehru. It was because of the Hindu communalists influence that Rajendra Prasad became President, although Nehru’s choice was Rajagopalachari. Similarly, Prushottam Das Tendon, to whom Nehru had accused of being communal, was elected President of the Congress, with full assistance of Patel. In an unprecedented indictment Nehru released a statement on 12 September, 1951 saying, “communal
communalism within the congress, some of Nehru’s closest comrades like Rafi Ahmad Kidwai left the Congress. Moreover, the foundation of Bharatiya Jana Sangh in September 1951 “gave new life to the hindutva force” and increased the apprehensions of Shaikh Abdullah. In a letter to Nehru, Shaikh’s apprehensions are clear and message straightforward: “[T]here are powerful influences at work in India who do not see eye to eye with you regarding your ideal of making the Union a truly secular state and your Kashmir policy. …while I feel I can willingly go down and sacrifice myself for you, I am afraid as custodian of the destinies of 40lacs of Kashmiris, I cannot barter away their cherished rights and privileges. I have several times stated that we acceded to India because we saw there two bright stars of hope and aspiration, namely, Gandhiji and yourself, and despite our having so many affinities with Pakistan we did not join it, because we thought our programme will not fit with their policy. If, however, we are driven to the conclusion that we cannot build our State on our own lines, suited to our genius, what answer can I give to my people and how am I to face them.”

Shaikh began to ponder, “What will happen to Kashmir after Nehru.” Before that tragedy could come, Shaikh began to rethink. Shaikh’s frustration can be seen in the speeches he gave in which he criticised Indian communalism and proclaimed that the accession was limited and provisional and, he would relook the accession with India. The climax of his anger against India was seen in his “combative “speech which he gave at Ranbir Singhpura in Jammu only four miles away from Pakistan on 10 April. 1952. Lashing out at Hindu communalists, he described arguments in favour of full application of the Indian Constitution to Kashmir as “unrealistic, childish and savouring of lunacy”. Expressing his fears on behalf of Kashmiris regarding the growing communalism in India, Shaikh said, “Many Kashmiris are not sure what will happen to them and their position if, for instance, something happens to Mr Nehru—what will happen to Kashmir if there is a resurgence of communalism in India and how under that circumstance we are to convince the Muslims of Kashmir that India does not intend to swallow up Kashmir.” Warning those who demanded complete

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152 Shaikh Abdullah to Nehru, 10 July 1950, cited in S. Gopal, op. cit., p. 119.
integration Sheik said that they were “fanning the fires of conflict—they may finally destroy the union of Kashmir with India.” ---We have acceded to India in Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications and not in other subjects, because we wanted some kind of autonomy for ourselves in internal matters.” In conclusion, of the speech he said, “Shaikh Abdullah does not fear anyone in this world. He will not bow down before India or Pakistan or the USA or any other nation.” His provocative speech was reported widely not only in India but also in the USA and Pakistan. Indians were “disquieted by the firm assertions of sovereignty by Shaikh Abdullah, for Kashmir.” However, the worrying factor for India was the prominence, which Pakistani press gave to Shaikh’s provocative speech. Pakistan was jubilant over the changing attitude of Shaikh.

The speech in which Shaikh made no distinction between India and Pakistan and “encouraged criticism of India abroad at a time when the Security Council was considering the Kashmir problem”, disheartened Nehru. Speaking at a mammoth Jallianwala Bagh Day meeting, Nehru said that he was not very happy over that speech and he did not like the tone and manner of that speech. “Shaikh Sahib would excuse me for saying so,” he added. Nehru also expressed his unhappiness in a letter to Shaikh Abdullah on 23 April 1952, “I have not the wish or heart to argue about this or any other matter with you. I have felt deeply about Kashmir, because it represented to me many things and many principles. It always has been an axiom with me, quite apart from constitutional position and the like, that the people of Kashmir must decide their own fate. For me the people of Kashmir were basically represented by you. If you feel as you do, then the link that has bound us together necessarily weakens and I have little heart left to discuss these matters.” Shaikh Abdullah realised that he had “crossed his limits.” To assuage the disturbed feelings in India, Shaikh made amends using the press scapegoat that he had not been quoted

152 Hindustan Times, 12 April, 1952. His speech at RanbirSinghPura showed the extent of gulf that had developed between him and his colleagues in Delhi. S Gopal, op. cit., p. 119.
154 Mohan Shaha Mehta, Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan in his letter to R K Nehru, Commissioner Secretary Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, Ministry of External Affairs, (Kashmir Branch) ‘India’s attitude to Shaikh Abdullah’s speech.’ File no. M/52/1911/107/ NAI.
155 S. Gopal, op. cit., p. 120.
156 Hindustan Times, 14 April, 1952.
157 Nehru’s letter to Shaikh Abdullah, 25 April 1952. Cite in S. Gopal, op. cit., p. 120.
accurately. Shaikh said that the views to which he had given expression and had been made to appear to be his own views while the fact was that he was merely referring to sentiments and feelings which enemies of the State had tried to exploit and which he was trying to fight. Also on 18th April 1952, addressing a mammoth gathering at Hazaratbal in Srinagar, he said that Pakistan should not be excessively happy over his Ranmirsinghpura speech because they will ultimately have to face disappointment.

Shaikh’s speech, which was given wide publicity in the West and Pakistan, was embarrassing India at international level. To overcome the deadlock and ambiguities in the constitutional relationship between India and Kashmir and to “calm the first crisis of Kashmir-India relations,” Nehru invited Shaikh Abdullah to Delhi. Shaikh welcomed the invitation and sent a delegation headed by Mirza Afzal Beg and including D. P. Dhar and Mir Qasim. They arrived Delhi on 17 June and immediately started discussion with Jawaharlal Nehru. After a month on 17 July, Shaikh along with Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, G. M. Sadiq and Maulana Masoodi also joined in the talks. Jawaharlal Nehru, Gopalaswami Ayyanger, and Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai represented Indian side. The result of these negotiations was ‘Delhi Agreement’ signed on 24 July 1952, which Shaikh Abdullah in his memoirs describes as an ‘important milestone’ in Kashmir’s constitutional relations with the Indian Union. The contents of the Agreement were reported to India’s Parliament by Nehru on 24 July 1952, and to Kashmir Constituent Assembly by Shaikh Abdullah on 11 August.

Delhi Agreement preserved the special status of Kashmir given under article 370. Shaikh seemed satisfied with the Agreement, as he made it clear that his aim had been to preserve ‘maximum autonomy for the local organs of State power, while discharging obligations as a unit of the [Indian] Union.” The main features of Delhi Agreement, as reported by Nehru in the Parliament, were as under:

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159 Official Version of Shaikh’s Speech, which he sent to New Delhi, Hindustan Times, 14, April 1952.
160 Hindustan Times, 19 April 1952.
162 Ibid.
163 S. Abdullah, op. cit., p. 541.
164 Ibid.
(1) **Residuary Powers.** Residuary powers would vest in the State in case of Kashmir, although in regard to all other states it would vest in the Union. More powers could be transferred to the Union by the people of Kashmir.

(2) **Citizenship.** The residents of the State would be the citizens of India. "It was further agreed that the State Legislature shall have power to define and regulate the rights and privileges of the permanent residents of the State, more especially in regard to acquisition of immovable property, appointments to services and like matters"

(3) **Fundamental Rights.** The decisions regarding land compensation would be protected and weather a chapter on separate Fundamental Rights should be included in the Kashmir constitution would be decided

(4) **Supreme Court.** The Supreme Court jurisdiction was recognised in regard to such Fundamental Rights as would be agreed to by the State, as also regarding disputes mentioned in article 131 of the Indian constitution. It would be the final court of appeal. But detailed examination of this would be necessary and it was agreed that we should have time to consider it further.

(5) **State Flag.** The new State Flag was no rival to the National Flag, but its continuance was necessary for historical and other reasons. The Union Flag would occupy the supremely distinctive place in the State.

(6) **President of India** powers to grant reprieve and commute death sentences would belong to the President of the Union.

(7) **Headship of State.** Following principles were agreed upon:

(a) The head of the State shall be the person recognised by the President of Union on the recommendations of the Legislature of the State.

(b) He shall hold office during the pleasure of the President;

(c) He may, by writing under his hand address to the President, resign his office;

(d) He shall hold office for five years; and

(e) He shall continue to hold office till his successor was elected.

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167 On 7 June 1952, the Constituent Assembly passed a resolution moved by the Prime Minister adopting as the National Flag of the State a 2:3 rectangular flag, "red in colour with three equidistant vertical stripes of equal width next to the staff and a white plough in the middle," after deleting the word "National" before Flag on the basis of an amendment by Mir Qasim. Sisir Gupta, op. cit., p. 372 fn.
(8) Financial Integration. The necessity of some financial arrangement was
seen, but a detailed and objective examination was considered necessary.

(9) Emergency Powers. On the application of article 352 of the Indian
constitution opinions differed but it was ultimately agreed upon that
central intervention in regard to internal disturbances could come only at
the request or with the concurrence of the Government of the State. The
Government of India did not press of the application of article 365 or
article 360.  

Superficially, "the Delhi Agreement appeared to be a victory" for Shaikh
Abdullah whose demand of autonomy was confirmed. In his speech to the Kashmir
Constituent Assembly on 11 August 1952, Shaikh on the one hand praised India-
Kashmir relations and seemed satisfied with the Agreement; but in the same breath
warned that "any suggestions of altering arbitrarily this basis of our relationship with
India would not only constitute a breach of the spirit and letter of the constitution, but
it may invite serious consequences for a harmonious association of our State with
India." 

The acceptance of NC’s demand for the end of the dynastic Dogra Rule was “a
striking victory for the National Conference." Early in June 1952, Shaikh Abdullah
as chairman of the Basic Principles Committee of the State Constituent Assembly,
announced the intention to abolish the hereditary Dogra Rule. The Constituent
Assembly of Kashmir on 12 November 1952 "formally adopted an amendment to the
Constituent Assembly replacing the Maharaja Ruler-ship by the function of an
‘Elected Head of State, Sadar-i- Riyasat.’" This act", writes Josef Korbel, "brought to
fulfilment the abolition of the hereditary rule of the hated Dogras, a tyranny which
had cursed the State of Jammu and Kashmir since 1846." But, Shaikh had to accept
a compromise. Nehru succeeded in persuading Shaikh to agree the appointment of

168 Article 356 of the Indian constitution empowers the President of India to assume the governance of
a State and article 360 deals with financial emergencies.
169 Bose, Roots, op. cit., p. 62.
171 Ajit Bhattacharjea, Tragic Hero, op. cit., p. 163.
172 Lord Birdwood, op. cit., pp. 251-52.
twenty one year old son of Hari Singh, Yuvraj Karan Singh as the first Sadar-i-Riyasat of Jammu and Kashmir.\footnote{174}

So, in that way the Dogra rule continued. P. N. Bazaz criticizes Nehru for violating the Delhi Agreement by nominating Karan Singh as the Head of the State without the consent of the people of Jammu and Kashmir.\footnote{175} Karan Singh was reluctant to take over as the Head of the State.\footnote{176} However, he was persuaded by Nehru to take over as the Head of the State. Karan Singh recalls that in a meeting in Delhi with Nehru, the latter “repeated some of the perplexity that he was beginning to feel in dealing with Shaikh Abdullah, and said that this made it all the more important that I should be on the scene to be able to help if some problems arose in the future.”\footnote{177} In a letter, Nehru wrote to Karan Singh that a “great responsibility” was upon him, “for you have not merely to follow an established convention but rather to help in making conventions for the future.”\footnote{178} Karan Singsg was ‘elected’ the first Sadar-i-Riyasat of Jammu and Kashmir on 14 November 1952.\footnote{179} Karan Singh, who was supposed to be the Head of State acting on Cabinet, took “an active interest in State Politics.”\footnote{180} Adhering to the advice of Nehru of making new conventions Karan Singh took full revenge of his father when he dismissed Shaikh Abdullah as Prime Minister within a year.

Although Delhi Agreement satisfied, for time being, Shaikh and his NC but it intensified the anger of those who wanted complete integration of the State with the Union. After the Delhi Agreement, the Praja Parishad agitation became aggressive. The Parishad leaders opposed the nomenclature, “Sadar-i-Riyasat and Prime Minister, State Flag, State Constitution (making in) criticised Shaikh and demanded complete

\footnote{174} Ajit Bhattacharjea, Tragic hero of Kashmir, op. cit., pp. 163-4.
\footnote{175} Bazaz, Freedom, op. cit., p. 588.
\footnote{176} His father Hari Singh and Dogras of Jammu were not in the favour of what they called as ‘nominal head’ while the power was in the hands of Shaikh. They pressurised Karan Singh not to accept the post. See, Karan Singh, Autobiography, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 2006, pp. 133, 34 and 137, New York Times, reported that he was threatened with family disinheriance if he accepted Shaikh’s offer. New York Times, 19 August, 1952.
\footnote{177} Karan Singh, op. cit., p. 145.
\footnote{178} Ibid.
\footnote{179} Karan Singh was not happy with the time limit as he considered that he had the hereditary right to be there. He personally met Nehru and later on wrote to him that he “would be very happier if no time limit is imposed.” Karan Singh to Nehru, August 3, 1952. Cited in Noorani Frontline, Dec. 29 2006, p. 84.
\footnote{180} A. G. Noorani, ‘Kashmir: Blunders of the Past,’ Frontline, Dec. 29, 2006, (pp. 81-88) p. 84; Times of India, November 15, 1952.
merger of the State with the Indian Union. They proclaimed, "Our way is not with Kashmir. The Shaikh is not acceptable to us. We cannot tolerate Jammu and Ladakh going to the winds." They coined a slogan:

_Ek Desh Mein Do Vidhan; Ek Desh Mein Do Pradhan; Nahin Challengay, Nahin Challengay_

(Two Constitutions in one country; Two Flags in one country, Two Heads of State in on country, are unacceptable.)

The Jammu Hindus feared that they henceforth would be subjected to the same 'imperialistic treatment' which they had meted out to Kashmiri Muslims up to 1947. They therefore demanded the complete merger of the State with the Indian Union. They paraded the streets of Jammu with the portraits of Rajendra Prasad (President of India), and with tri colour Flag of India and replaced the State Flag with Indian Flag "when and where possible." The Parishad in its eight point programme in September, 1952, demanded, the abrogation of article 370, full integration of the State into Indian Union, full application of Indian Constitution, complete jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, removal of custom barriers between Kashmir and India, fresh elections to the Constituent Assembly, investigation by an imperial tribunal into the charges of corruption of the State administration and integration of Jammu and Ladakh with the Indian Union, if not of the whole State. Economically they represented Maharaja's loyal group of landlords who suffered greatly due to Land Reforms Act. They feared that they would not be secure in Muslim majority State with autonomous position and least Central interference.

182 Balraj Puri, Jammu: A Clue to Kashmir Tangle, Delhi, 1966, p. 93. The Parishad also received support from the "spiritual and political leader of Ladakh's Tibetan Buddhists, who disliked the meteoric ascendancy of the new Kashmiri Muslim ruling elite and practically feared the implications of its land reform policies for the Buddhist clergy's immense private landholdings in Ladakh." S. Bose, Roots, op. cit., p. 57. Mr. Chhewang Rinzin, President, Buddhist Association Ladakh in a memorandum submitted to Prime Minister criticised "the administrators from Kashmir" and demanded separation of Buddhist area of Ladakh from Kashmir. B. Puri, Triumph, op. cit., pp. 96-97. Head Lama, Koshak Bakula challenged" legality of State Government's jurisdiction over his region" and threatened that "longings for a political union with Tibet would become pronounced if Ladakh's entity within India was not respected." Amrit Bazaar Patrika, Calcutta, 18 March, 1952.
183 Madhok Balraj, Kashmir Centre of New Alignments, Delhi, 1963, p. 124.
185 Lord Birdwood, op. cit., p. 255.
from India actively supported the Praja Parishad. Jan Sangh, the Akali Dal, the Hindu Mahasabha and the RSS joined hands with Praja Parishad to spread an agitation from Jammu into the Punjab and up to Delhi and beyond, on three issues of Kashmir, refugees from East Bengal and the banning of cow-slaughter.\footnote{S Gopal, op. cit., p. 122. Sikh Akali and even some members of the Indian Parliament also supported them. J Korbel, \textit{Danger}, op. cit., p. 225.}

All that they had in common was hatred against Muslims and Nehru.\footnote{M. J. Akbar, op. cit., p. 143.} Besides the demand of the abrogation of the article 370, they also desired to change the demography of Jammu and Kashmir. Master Tara Singh, top Akali leader from Punjab in league with the Praja Parishad Movement, pleaded that "the population in the Kashmir Valley be balanced by settling the Pak (Hindu) refugees."\footnote{P S Verma, op. cit., p. 41.} Speaking at Lucknow, Tara Singh said, "Kashmir belonged to Pakistan. It is a Muslim State. But I claim it in lieu of the property that the refugees have left in West Pakistan." So according to him the Muslims of Kashmir should be driven to their home country Pakistan, "to which (they) really belong."\footnote{\textit{Nehru- Mukharjee-Abdullah Correspondence}, Nehru Memorial Library, Tinnurmi, New Delhi, pp. 65 and 47.} Shyam Prasad Mukharjee in a letter to Shaikh Abdullah on February 13, 1953 wrote, "Consciously or unconsciously you are creating a new sovereignty for Jammu and Kashmir State. India has been torn into two by the two- nation theory. You are now developing a three-nation theory, the third being Kashmiri nation. These are dangerous symptoms...."\footnote{He launched the Jana Sangh in 1951. Its programme included no special privileges to minorities and full integration of Kashmir into the Indian Union. M J Akbar, op. cit., pp. 142-43.} Forgetting that it was the Praja Parishad agitation supported by Hindu communalists of India, which actually created a political situation whereby the Muslims of Kashmir began to feel that their entity was in danger; and began to think in "isolating Kashmir Valley from the rest of India."\footnote{Mukharjee's letter to Shaikh Abdullah on Feb. 13, 1953, \textit{Nehru-Mukharjee-Abdullah Correspondence}, p. 165.}

The Praja Parishad agitation supported by Indian communalists proved thesis of Two Nation Theory of Mr Jinnah and an "anti-thesis of what the freedom struggle in the State had "animated and stood for between 1939 and 1947."\footnote{Puri, \textit{Triumph}, op. cit., p. 107.} The response of the State Government to the Parishad agitation was not different from the earliest

\footnote{P. S Verma, op. cit., pp. 44, and p. 45.}
Dogra regime (before 1947). The State Government came heavily on the agitators-suppressed by police action and mass arrest of organizers. However, Shaikh was surprised ‘when the imprisoned agitators were released through interventions by some Central Ministers.’ Gopalaswamy Ayyengar was sent to Jammu by the Union Government “to put pressure on “Shaikh to release the Parishad agitators. Ironically there were hundreds of Kashmiri Muslims in jails at that time but neither the Indian press raised any voice for their release nor did the Indian Government advised the Kashmir Government for that. Unexpectedly, even socialist Jayaprakash Narayan and Acharya Kriplani supported the agitation. These events and developments shaked the basis of nationalist traits in Kashmir and forced Shaikh to rethink about accession to India. Nehru was deeply concerned with the new communal wave, which had exposed the secular character of India. On 7 August 1952, he in a speech stressed on mutually- accommodative relationship with Kashmir, “Our strongest bonds with Kashmir are not those that are retained by our army or even by our constitution, to which so much reference has been made, but those of love and affection and understanding, and they are stronger than the constitution or laws or armies.”

To make aware the nation about the real picture and the impending threat of communalism, Nehru wrote regularly to state Chief Ministers. In December 1952, he wrote, “The people at the back of these agitations belong to communal organizations like the Hindu Mahasabha, the Jana Sangh, the RSS and the Ram Rajya Parishad. Appropriately, Master Tara Singh and his Akali Dal have lined up them.” Nehru was quick to realise that Kashmir was only a cloak and the real objectives much broader. On 27 January 1953, he wrote, “it is clear that the objective of these organizations is not confined to Jammu and that they are aiming at bigger quarry. Their dislike of the Government of India and the secular policy that it pursues is so great that, in order to injure it, they are prepared even to harm our relationship with Jammu and Kashmir State.” Sadar-i- Riyasat, needless to say, was having pro- Parishad bearings. He

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195 S. Bose, op. cit., p. 58.
196 P. S. Verma, op. cit., p. 43.
198 Prakash Chandra, ‘National Question In Kashmir,’ pp. 35-56, p. 50,
199 Jawaharlal’s Speeches (1949-54), pp. 107-125.
noted (his inner feelings) that the abolition of Dogra Rule “has upset them (Jammu Hindus) immensely... they feel that this step will break the only link which bound them to Kashmir, and that unless it is followed by complete accession to India their position will be even more precarious than it has been for the last five years.”\textsuperscript{203} Nehru was also in favour of merger of the State with the Union, but he considered the course of action of the communalists dangerous. “In the name of close association with India, they are acting in a manner which might imperil that very association.”\textsuperscript{204} But Nehru failed to provide effective support to Shaikh at this critical juncture. All he did was advice to Shaikh not to be confused.\textsuperscript{205} S. Gopal, the biographer of Nehru laments that a man who “could face Pakistan and the United Nations and even the prospect of war” was “trapped” between Shaikh and communalists. S Gopal believes that “the best approach in these circumstances seemed to be to suppress firmly the activities of the Hindu communalists which were little short of treason, thereby giving Abdullah time to recover his nerve.”\textsuperscript{206} Nehru indeed “ordered the prompt arrest of all those who participated in the agitation in Delhi and Punjab, directed Pant to prevent the movement of volunteers from the up into these areas, and asked Katju to consider the banning of Jan Sangh. Nehru’s hand, however, was weakened by the persistent inefficiency of the Home Ministry. Katju was unwilling to act on his Prime Minister’s Suggestion.”\textsuperscript{207} “Nehru (also) failed,” writes S. Gopal “in his major thrust of seeking to isolate the communal nucleus of the agitation by establishing that Shaikh Abdullah’s administration was secular, broad-minded and national.”\textsuperscript{208}

The clamour of the Hindu communists and the explicit weak position of Nehru “justified Abdullah’s fears.” According to Shaikh, “it was a gradual victory of right-wingers, reactionaries and petty men, the reactionary elements had ample access to Delhi not to Nehru’s court but certainly elsewhere. Sardar Patel and several others had no faith in me. Nehru first resisted the campaign of vilification against me, but

\textsuperscript{203} See Correspondence Between Nehru and Karan Singh. He also proposed Trifurcation State. Jammu to be merged with Himachal Pradesh; Ladakh to become Union territory. His interview with the \textit{Times (London)} 14 November 1965, cited in Noorani, \textit{Frontline} Dec. 29 2006, pp. 84-5.


\textsuperscript{205} See for example Nehru’s letters to Abdullah, 1, 5 and 30 January 1953. Also his letter to Azad, 1 march 1953.

\textsuperscript{206} S. Gopal, op. cit., p. 125.

\textsuperscript{207} Ibid. pp. 125-127. Kailas Nath Katju, the Home Minister of India and some officials in the Home Ministry were sympathetic to communal organizations” who wanted to see Shaikh Abdullah dismissed. Selected Works, Vol. 22, pp. 170-72; M. J Akbar, \textit{India The Siege Within}, New Delhi, 1996, p. 247.

\textsuperscript{208} S. Gopal, op. cit., p. 123.
ultimately he succumbed." Shaikh was confused and disillusioned. Nehru in a letter to Maulana Azad wrote, "I fear that Shaikh Sahib's mind is so utterly confused that he does not know what to do. All kinds of pressures are being brought to bear on him and he is getting more and more into a tangle. There is nobody with him who can really help him very much, because he does not trust anyone fully, and yet every one influences him ... my fear is that Shaikh Sahib, in his present state of mind, is likely to do something or take some step, which might make things worse. The fact is that he has so many pulls in different directions that he just cannot make up his mind." By April 1952, Shaikh appeared to be looking for a compromise solution to the crisis. On April 17 1952, in a broadcast from Radio Kashmir, Srinagar, Shaikh Abdullah said, "We have decided to give autonomy to the different cultural units of the State as will be provided in the constitution that is being drawn up. This will remove all the fears of domination of one unit over the other and will make for the voluntary union and consolidation of the people of the State." A plan was prepared to establish five autonomous regions: the Valley, Jammu, Gilgit, Ladakh and a region consisting of the districts of Mirpur, Rajaouri, Poonch, and Muzaffarabad. (Gilgit, Mirpur and Muzaffarabad formed part of Pakistan Administered Kashmir). The Valley and Jammu would each have a separate legislature and a council of ministers for local affairs. Ladakh would be ruled centrally with an elected advisory district council.

However, the "Jammu integrationists" were not reconciled and the "proposed reform" failed. They were rather 'encouraged by the happenings in indie.' The Hindu communalist parties started a 'nation-wide campaign of satyagraha' for the complete merger of the State with the Union. The leaders of Jan Sangh even appealed to their followers 'to organise militant groups, jathas, and to'

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211 S. Bose, Roots, op. cit., p. 62.
213 The Hindu (Madras), April 27,1953. The States' name would be "Autonomous Federated Unit of the Republic of India. Idea taken from the Soviet Union Federalism, Das Gupta, op. cit., p. 204.
214 V. Bushan, op. cit., p.186.
215 Korbel, Danger, op. cit., p. 232. The Muslim majority areas of Jammu, -Doda, Kishtwar and Bhaderwah of mainly Kashmiri —speakers refused to 'be part of an autonomous Hindu-majority Jammu region and declared their "unbreakable identity with the Valley. S. Bose, Roots, op. cit., p. 64.
216 Ibid.
March to Jammu".\textsuperscript{217} This created a sharp reaction and uncertainty in Kashmir.\textsuperscript{218} Nehru also admitted that the apprehensions of Kashmiris were genuine. In a letter to B. C. Roy, he wrote; "The inhabitants of Kashmir, and they are 90% Muslims, saw the communal face of India and were frightened by it. Their desire for remaining with India weakened and in fact, many thought that they would be suppressed in many ways if they were completely merged with India. It was difficult to face this growing feeling in minds and hearts of people."\textsuperscript{219} Shaikh Abdullah became disillusioned due to the Hindu agitation politics.\textsuperscript{220} Provoked by the agitation politics of Parishad, who wanted 'total elimination' of autonomy of Kashmir, Shaikh publicly "resurrected the idea of full independence as one possible option, among several, for the future of Jammu and Kashmir."\textsuperscript{221} Not only Shaikh but most of the Kashmiri leaders started emphasizing that they had acceded to India in respect of defence, foreign affairs and communications' and nothing else.\textsuperscript{222} As noted earlier Shaikh was more annoyed when with the central interference Jammu agitators were released. Consequently, by May 1953, Shaikh switched 'from compromise to confrontation.'\textsuperscript{223}

In May 1953, he issued an ordinance forbidding, under imprisonment, any person to enter the State without special permit and issued a ban on public meetings.\textsuperscript{224} Under this strained political situation, a special session of the Working Committee of the National Conference was called at Srinagar in May 1953 under the president-ship of Shaikh Abdullah.\textsuperscript{225} The working committee after a prolonged discussion came to the conclusion that it was impossible to have internal stability in the State so long as its future was uncertain.' It accordingly appointed a committee consisting of eight members to explore avenues of an honourable settlement of the

\textsuperscript{217} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{220} P. S. Verma, op. cit., p. 43. To counter the propaganda of the Hindu communalists, in the Valley 'an opposition group, Kashmir Awami Conference, was allowed to come into existence within the ranks of the National Conference. Workers stricken by unemployment and hunger and pro Pakistani elements became active and 'for a short while to demonstrate in large numbers' -- Korbel, \textit{Danger}, op. cit., p. 233.
\textsuperscript{221} S. Bose, \textit{The Challenge in Kashmir}, op. cit., p. 32.
\textsuperscript{222} P. S. Verma, op. cit., p. 43.
\textsuperscript{223} S. Bose, \textit{Roots}, op. cit., p. 64.
\textsuperscript{224} Korbel, \textit{Danger}, op. cit., p. 232.
\textsuperscript{225} \textit{Shaikh Abdullah -Sadiq Correspondence}, Shaikh's letter to Sadiq, 26 September, 1956. For details see Ab. Jabbar, op. cit., pp. 235-287.
The Subcommittee, at its final session, held on 9 June 1953 adopted the following proposals as possible alternatives for an honourable and peaceful solution of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan:

(a) Overall plebiscite with conditions as detailed in the minutes of the meeting dated 4th June 1953 (plebiscite for the whole State to decide whether the State would join to India or Pakistan or remain independent)

(b) Independence of the whole State.

(c) Independence of the whole State with joint control of foreign affairs.

(d) Dixon plan with independence for the plebiscite area. (Shaikh had rejected it at that time)

The existence of the Working Committee had alarmed the Indians. Sensing the drifting attitude of Shaikh, Nehru in order to patch up the differences flew to Srinagar in May 1953. Shaikh in his memoirs recalls that he was surprised by ‘Nehru’s U-turn’ when he “suggested me to summon the Constituent Assembly to ratify the accession.” It was difficult for Shaikh to accept Nehru’s suggestion “given the Kashmiris’ growing disenchantment with Shaikh as well as with Nehru.”

Nehru who was in ashmir from may 23 to 25, was fully informed about the deliberations. Nehru was not happy with these proceedings. In his letter to Azad, dated June 11, 1953 he wrote, “I am afraid Shaikh Abdullah will give us a good deal of trouble. He is acting very irresponsibly. I hope your visit will check him.” Maulana Azad who visited Kashmir in June 1953 was apprised of the proceedings. These visits of Nehru and Azad, failed to convince Shaikh to come to Delhi for

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226 Eight members were Shaikh Abdullah, Maulana Masoodi, Mirza Afzal Beg, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, G. M. Sadiq, Sardar Budhisingh, Pandit Girdarilal Dogra and Pandit Shamlal Saraf, Shaikh Sadiq Correspondence, op. cit.
227 Ibid.
230 S. Abdullah, op. cit., p. 545.
231 *SWJN*, VOL. 19, PP. 322-330. Shaikh sensed well that finalization of accession would be followed by the end of autonomy, which was proved later on. In an interview with Shabistan Urdu magazine he feared that Kashmiri Muslims would be ‘lost in the vastness of India’ ‘Shaikh Abdullah Speaks’, The Shama Group, *The Testament of Shaikh Abdullah*, op. cit., p. 40.
Meanwhile S. M. Mukharjee, on 8 May, 1953 decided to go to Jammu without a permit to “see things for himself behind the iron curtain.”

Instead of preventing Mukharjee to take this action, which was due to intensify the agitation, the Government of India “placed the onus on Abdullah’s Government.” Incredibly, the local officials in the Punjab travelled with Mukharjee and facilitated his crossing of the State frontier. On 11th May when he crossed the State frontier, he was arrested and was placed in confinement “in a comfortable bungalow” in Srinagar. His sudden death on 23 June due to heart attack plunged in the whole of north India into anger against Nehru and Shaikh Abdullah.

The demand of complete merger of the State and the removal of Shaikh Abdullah gained momentum. This only widened the gap between Shaikh and New Delhi. Addressing the National Conference workers in Srinagar on 10 July, Shaikh Abdullah said that Kashmir would have to guard its internal autonomy at all costs; justice had not been done to the Muslim majority in Kashmir and he himself was not trusted, “a time will, therefore, come when I will bid them good-bye.” Shaikh was disillusioned with not only the growing influence of communists in India but also the ambiguous attitude of the Indian Government regarding autonomy. In a long letter to Maulana Azad on July 16, 1953, Shaikh complained, “even after the Delhi Agreement responsible spokesmen of the Government of India declared that their ultimate objective was to secure the complete merger of the State with India and that they waited for appropriate time and conditions to bring that about. These statements reveal that the Delhi Agreement could not provide a basis to finalise the relationship between India and Kashmir, but that it [Delhi Agreement] provided temporary arrangements to finalise accession. The only difference between the Government of

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234 Shaikh refused to come to Delhi on the ground that “he was too busy to come to Delhi to discuss the question of Kashmir; though he respected Nehru personally, there were occasions in human affairs when the interests of the country had to take precedence over personal relationship.” B. N. Kaul, The Untold Story, p. 139. While as Nehru wanted clarification of the relationship of Kashmir with India before the finalisation of Kashmir constitution, Shaikh wanted finalisation of constitutional relation and ironclad assurance of autonomy. A. G. Noorani, ‘How and Why Neuru and Abdullah Fell Out’, Economic and Politically Weekly, Vol. 34, No. 5, (Jan. 30-Feb. 5, 1999), pp. 268-72.
235 Lord Birdwood op. cit., p. 255. Nobody could enter Kashmir without a permit, a restriction imposed by Union Ministry of Defence after 1947 ‘tribal invasion’ as Kashmir had been described a “war zone” Mir Qasim op. cit., p. 63
237 Lord Birdwood, op. cit., p. 256.
238 V. Bushan, op. cit., p. 188, S. Gopal, op. cit., p. 129.
239 SWJ, Vol. 23 p. 294 fn.
India and different elements in the country [read Jan Sangh] on the issue is whether to bring about the merger of the State with India now or after some time.\textsuperscript{240} Maulana Azad in his reply gave explicit assurance to Shaikh that Kashmir’s special position would be safeguarded. “What I am telling you now is as a personal friend. There is only one-way of safeguarding the future well-being of the people of Kashmir and that is the way we laid down in 1949 and which you had then accepted. Hold steadfastly to this way and be assured that you will never have to regret it.”\textsuperscript{241}

But in the given political situation and past promises by India (and also the position of Azad in India when even Nehru was not able to hold) Shaikh realised that these “assurances came with a good deal of mental reservation.”\textsuperscript{242} Shaikh had come to the conclusion that there could be no solution of Kashmir “without an India-Pakistan accord.”\textsuperscript{243} Shaikh Abdullah, on July 30, told a crowd of peasants that the future of Kashmir was dependent upon the goodwill of both neighbours India and Pakistan and therefore Kashmir should not “merge” with either country.\textsuperscript{244}

The mention of Pakistan by Shaikh pained Nehru\textsuperscript{245} and he asked Shaikh to come to Delhi ‘to sort out the mutual difference’ but he refused and instead sent Bakshi and Beg to Delhi. Shaikh’s refusal to come Delhi angered Nehru and he started giving importance and preference to Bakshi. It was here that Bakshi played the game. While as Beg returned to Srinagar, Bakshi stayed in Delhi to “work out modus operandi for the removal of Shaikh Abdullah from power and his arrest.”\textsuperscript{246} New Delhi succeeded in winning Bakshi and encouraging dissension within NC.\textsuperscript{247} Many of the colleagues of Shaikh within the National Conference “showed more pro-Indian inclinations than Abdullah” and did not approve the changing attitude of

\textsuperscript{241} Azad to Abdullah, 9 July 1953 cited in S. Gopal, op. cit., p.131.
\textsuperscript{242} Abdullah to Nehru see Noorani, ‘How and Why Nehru and Abdullah Fell Out,’ Economic And Political Weekly, January 30, 1999, pp.268-72, p.271, Shaikh Abdullah declined Nehru’s invitations to come Delhi and even stated “it will not serve any useful purpose to carry on a long correspondence.” Nehru to Bakshi, July, 24, 1953, SWJN, Vol. 23, pp. 293-95.
\textsuperscript{243} Noorani, Kashmir: Blunders of The Past, op. cit, p. 87.
\textsuperscript{245} Nehru had ruled out parleys with Pakistan on anything except the status quo.A. G. Noorani, Kashmir: Blunder of the Past, p. 87.
\textsuperscript{246} Balraj Puri, in ‘Kashmir and Rest of India, First Emotional Rupture,’ Economic And Political Weekly, Vol. 38. No. 49 (Dec. 6-12, 2003), pp. 5143-5145. Bakshi was “motivated primarily by personal ambition” to gain power. Bose, Roots, p. 65.
Shaikh.248 The result was a major rift within the top NC leadership. Consequently, the Cabinet got divided into two factions—Shaikh Abdullah and Afzal Beg ‘pro-Independent group,’ and Bakshi, Shyamal Saraf and Giridarilal Dogra ‘pro-Indian group’. G M. Sadiq and D. P. Dhar the communists joined the Bakshi group. Out of the three dissident ministers two were Hindus and their “allegiance to India appears to have been the deciding factor.”249

The two factions openly clashed with each other and criticized each other in public meetings. In a speech at Ganderbal on 31 July, Shaikh declared that the accession to India had been forced upon Kashmir because India refused to assist against ‘invaders’ without the accession.250 But Bakshi quickly responded that “Kashmiris would defend at the cost of their lives the State’s accession to India and a special position to Jammu and Kashmir in the Indian constitution.”251 Bakshi also tried to show his loyalty to India through his correspondence to Nehru by criticizing Shaikh’s confrontation at a time when Sheik’s relations with Nehru were strained. He also asked for central support. In a letter to Nehru on 17 July, 1953 Bakshi alleged that Shaikh’s activities had led to factionalism in the NC and the State Government and administration had collapsed on all levels.” Then he asked what he really wanted, “this development has got to be arrested somewhere and that too very quickly.”252 Consequently, on July 31, Nehru took the fateful step. “On 31 July,” recalls, B. N. Mullik, “Mehra [D. W. Mehra, Mullik’s deputy] and I met Prime Minister.... He came to the point that there was no other alternative but to remove Shaikh Abdullah and install Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed in his place... he warned that we must be prepare for the worst, because the Shaikh undoubtedly had a large following in the Valley.” 253

248 Korbel, op. cit., p. 234.
249 Bose, Roots, op. cit., p. 65. Sadar-i-Reyasat also was sympathetic to Bakshi Group. Earlier on June 10, 1953, he had sent a message to Nehru which read: “I was shocked and astounded to gather from a private meeting with Shaikh Abdullah last week that he seems to have decided to go back upon the solemn agreements which he has concluded with India and upon his clear commitments. This cannot be allowed, as it will make our position absolutely impossible and be a grave blow to our national interests and naturally to our international position also....I have requested Dr Katju to arrange for the Government of India intelligence service here to keep in close touch with me, as that will greatly help me in correctly appraising this unstable and most unpredictable situation.” Noorani, Frontline, 29 Dec, 2006, p. 86.
251 The Hindustan Times, July 27, 1953.
253 B. N. Mullik, My Years With Nehru, Delhi, 1971, p. 42.
Meanwhile in early August 1953 Shaikh Abdullah decided to call a meeting of the Working Committee of the General Council of the National Conference on 24 August and 26 August, 1953 to “endorse his new line” and also to apprise the public about the whole situation on 21 August, 1953 on the Id Day. On 7 August, three members of the cabinet led by Bakshi submitted a memorandum to Sadar-i- Riyasat, in which they accused Abdullah “of making arbitrary decisions, of being responsible for deterioration in the administration, despotism, inefficiency and wanton wastage of public resources. In the conclusion of the memorandum, he was informed that the cabinet had lost the confidence of the people. The same day Shaikh had told the members of the NC that the accession to India in 1947 had been due to “force of circumstances” and the communalist demand of merger of the State had “shaken the foundations of Indo-Kashmir relations.” Thus Shaikh’s position, politically, had become untenable which “precipitated a political crisis in the State.” Sadar-i Riyasat suggested an emergency meeting of the cabinet. However, Shaikh “sure of his unshakable leadership” did not heed his suggestion and went to Gulmarg. On 9 August in a “Shakespearean styled drama” the Sadar-i- Riyasat, took full revenge of his father. He dismissed Shaikh Abdullah and nominated Bakshi as Prime Minister. Shaikh was arrested under the ‘Public Security Act,’ a law, which Shaikh had frequently used against his opponents. He would spend next twenty-two years in prison until 1975’ barring brief spells of release. On 9-10 August, Shaikh’s most trusted lieutenant Mirza Afzal Beg along with 33 other National Conference leaders was arrested under the Public Security Act. The news of Shaikh’s dismissal and arrest spread like wild fire. Massive protests swept the whole Valley including Doda in Jammu Division. At all district headquarters, police force had been deployed and they had to open fire against the demonstrators at several places resulting the death of

254 V. Bushan, op. cit., p.190.
255 *Times of India*, Bombay, August 10, 1953.
257 Korbel, op. cit., p. 239.
258 He was charged with indulging in acts of disruption, corruption, nepotism, maladministration and establishing foreign contacts of a kind dangerous to the peace and prosperity of the state, *SHJN*, Vol. 23, p. 310, fn.
259 Bose, Roots, op. cit., p. 66.
260 Saraf, op. cit., p. 1214.
scores of people. Supporters of Shaikh Abdullah including top officers, legislators and ministers were detained. Complete hartal was observed in Valley for eleven days.261

In Pakistan, surprisingly, demonstrations were held against the arrest of Shaikh. Shaikh was no longer Pakistan’s quisling but was now India’s.262 Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad the new Prime Minister in his first statement said that ‘Kashmir had indissoluble links with India and charged Shaikh Abdullah and some of his colleagues with working for an independent State with the “connivance and support of interested foreign powers.”263 Nehru on 10 August 1953 justified Shaikh’s arrest, although in moderate extreme, that Shaikh’s activities had created “a serious situation—and there was a progressive tendency towards disruption. The Government of India were naturally gravely concerned at these developments... ...it is a matter of deep regret to me that Shaikh Abdullah, an old comrade of 20 years, should have come into conflict with our other comrades in Kashmir and that it should have been considered necessary by the ‘Kashmir Government’ to place him in detention for the time being.”264 Indira Gandhi was not happy with Shaikh’s dismissal and arrest. In a letter to her father, Nehru, she wrote, “I was dreading such a thing since your letter265 .... I am filled with a terrible and deeply penetrating sadness. I suppose one has to do some things for the greater good but it is like cutting a part of one-self.” 266

Now the question arises why Shaikh, who had all praise for accession with India and Indian secular democratic setup in his inaugural speech in the Constituent Assembly in 1951, started drifting away from India and his trusted friend Nehru. The root of the differences between Shaikh and Nehru was their differences on ‘long-term perspective of the Kashmir autonomy. Nehru considered the autonomy ‘as a

261 S. Bhat, op. cit., pp. 54-55; for detailed account see Mir Qasim, op. cit., pp.68-70; and Saraf, op. cit., pp.113-115.
262 C. Thomas, op. cit., p. 219.
263 SWJN, Vol. 23, P316. fn.
265 Nehru had written to Indira Gandhi on August 2, “Tomorrow parliament begins at eight a.m...But my real headache is Kashmir where Shaikh Sahib has turned many somersaults and is bitter against India and me. The situation there is explosive and anything may happen.” SWJN, VOL. 23, P. 311.
266 Ibid.
temporary arrangement intended to smoothing the regions transition from independent country to province.\textsuperscript{267}

On August 28, 1952, in Sonamarg (Kashmir) Nehru asked Shaikh to finalise the accession, as according to Nehru both Pakistan and UN were impotent to prevent that.\textsuperscript{268} Shaikh, however, regarded the special status permanent ‘not open to revision with the passage of time’.\textsuperscript{269} In a conversation with Norman D Palmer, in September 1952, Shaikh said, “Kashmir could not hope to be independent and escape outside pressures. Therefore, it had to identify itself with a more powerful political unit.” Shaikh however, insisted that the accession with India was provisional as there in 1947 was no other practicable alternative and it (the accession to India) had been an act of necessity. The eventual future of the State was therefore to be determined by its people.\textsuperscript{270} Y. D. Gundevia argues that “it was an about face on the part of the Government of India, with the Home Ministry winning all along line- and Jawaharlal Nehru gradually succumbing to “right wing pressures” that Shaikh started rethinking about accession.”\textsuperscript{271} Shaikh was never trusted by Home Ministry of India (Patel) and from the very beginning intelligence officers had been posted in Srinagar “nominally to watch out for Pakistani activities in the State, but actually to spy on Shaikh Abdullah.”\textsuperscript{272}

\textsuperscript{267} Nehru being the protagonist of Indian secularism ‘could not afford to make a permanent exception of Jammu and Kashmir from the process of national integration, purely on religious grounds’. Prem Mahadevan, REAS, August 2009, p. 10, see also B. N. Mulliek, p. 29-30.

\textsuperscript{268} SWJN, Vol. 19; p. 322.

\textsuperscript{269} Shaikh Abdullah considered the accession as “provisional” and limited. Ayesha Jalal, Kashmir Scars: A Terrible Beauty Is Torn, The New Republic, July 23, 1990, pp. 17-20. Although Shaikh Continuously justified accession “in the ringing rhetoric of ideological and programmatic affinity” but he privately nourished the idea of a sovereign Kashmir; considering association with India “in far more contingent terms, as a strategic necessity given the circumstances and the alignment of political forces in 1947.” Bose, Roots, op. cit., pp. 59-60. The Constituent Assembly, Shaikh believed, would “guarantee that the State of Jammu and Kashmir would never become just another Indian state. A suitable constitution would ensure that the “temporary” special status indicated in article 370, of the Indian Constitution would, in fact, be permanent; and it would not preclude the possibility of, one day, full independence. This is what he understood by the word “accession” and it explains many of the apparent contradictions in his public statements over the years.” A Lamb, Kashmir a Disputed, op. cit., p. 193.


\textsuperscript{271} Y. D. Gundevia, op. cit., p. 110.

\textsuperscript{272} Ibid., p. 111. The Intelligence Bureau under B. N. Mullik had been active in Kashmir immediately after the accession. B N Mullik who headed the IB in Kashmir, records that Patel did not trust Shaikh Abdullah and favoured Maharaja. He records that Patel apprehended that Shaikh Abdullah would ultimately let down India and Jawaharlal Nehru and would come out in his real colours; his antipathy to the Maharaja was not really an antipathy to a ruler as such, but to the Dogras in general and with the Dogras he identified the rest of the majority community (Hindus) in India.” B. N
In his capacity Shaikh did everything to win over the people to his way of thinking-accession to India; but he failed. He failed because Maharaja and his friends in Delhi, Sardar Patel, B. N. Mullik and the communalists did everything to weaken his hands; their opposition the autonomy "strengthened separatism." Needless to say the Praja Parishad Agitation made Shaikh Abdullah jittery. Conversely, the more the Parishad intensified its agitation, the more strident Abdullah’s position became on accession to India. Shaikh found the ground slipping away from under his feet. His popularity was at stake and anti-Shaikh and anti-India feeling among the Valley people increased rapidly. Shaikh was not unaware of it. In order the regain the popularity, he revived the idea of an independent Kashmir. A report in London’s Sunday Observer in May 1949 attracted notice in New Delhi. Shaikh was quoted to have said: “Accession to either side cannot bring peace. We want to live in friendship with both dominions [India and Pakistan]. Perhaps a middle path between them with economic cooperation with each other will be the only way to do it. However, an independent Kashmir must be guaranteed not only by India and Pakistan, but also by Great Britain, the US and the UN. He met world leaders and tried to sell the idea of independence and “enlist their support.”

On 29 September 1950, Shaikh met US ambassador to India, Loy Henderson, who cabled the State Department on his two secret meetings. Inter alia it added: “in discussion [of the] future of Kashmir, Abdullah was vigorous in restating that in his opinion it should be independent; that an overwhelming majority of the population desired their independence; that he had reason to believe that some Azad Kashmir leaders desired independence and would be willing to cooperate with leaders of National Conference if there was reasonable chance such cooperation would lead to independence. Kashmir people could not understand why UN consistently ignored

Mullik because of his anti-Shaikh approach and activities was promoted as the Director of IB by Patel “over the heads of nearly thirty of [his] seniors in the cadre.” B. N. Mullik, op. cit., p. 16

273 A. G. Noorani, 'Brought To Heel,' op. cit.

274 N. A. Naqsh, op. cit., p. 101. As Shaikh Abdullah himself confessed, "the Parishad agitation literally poured cold water on the efforts of the National Conference to rally Muslim support for India all these years." The draft of Abdullah’s undelivered speech scheduled for 21 August 1953. Mridula Sarabhai released the draft in 1956. For the draft see Ab Jabbar, op. cit., pp. 288-96.

275 Ghulam Ahmad, M Y Years With Shaikh Abdullah, Srinagar, 2008, p.112. Also, see Rajender Prasad’s letter to Nehru on 14 July, 1953. As discussed earlier. Dr Rajendra Prasad: Correspondence and Selected Documents, Volume 16, p. 90. Ghulam Mohiuddin Karra an important leader of NC left NC and openly came out in favour of Pakistan. B. N. Mullik, op. cit., p. 39.

276 Cited in A Bhattacharjea, Tragic, op. cit., p. 150.

277 Ghulam Ahmad, op. cit., p. 112.
independence as possible solution for Kashmir. Kashmir people had language and cultural background of their own." It is said that Shaik had assured Loy Henderson that not to bother about the communists around him, "they are mere show boys whom I can kick out any time I like." But the most controversial meeting of Shaik was with Adlai Stevenson, the US Democrat Party President candidate in Srinagar in 1953. Shaikh had meeting with him from May 1 to 3. In an interview to the Manchester Guardian, he said, "the best status for Kashmir could be independence from both India and Pakistan." His visit was followed by the visit of Dulles, the US Secretary of State to India and Pakistan on May 3 1953. He also talked of Kashmir's independence. Shaikh was accused of intriguing with US for independence. Shaikh in his memoirs denies any charges of intrigue but admits meeting and discussion on Kashmir issue. As he puts it, "I invited him on lunch--- and apprised him about the Kashmir issue. ---when he reached Delhi somebody (correspondent) asked him if he had met (Shaik). In his garrulous manner, he said, of course three times. This was enough for the press, and particularly for the left to raise hell." India began to suspect that Shaik with the help of America wanted an independent Kashmir. This was a bad news for Nehru and was embarrassing India at international level. The demand for the removal of Shaikh rose as the rumours of conspiracies spread. It became politically difficult for Nehru to support his old friend Abdullah when the latter started talking of independence, which embarrassed India. Thus Shaikh Abdullah who was considered by India as 'indispensable at the time of accession' in 1947; was replaced with a more pliable leader' Bakshi of N.C. in 1953 by using its military and other resources.

How could India justify the dismissal and arrest of Shaik? There was no 'convincing "democratic" justification for the dismissal and arrest of Shaik Abdullah. Nehru himself had time and again assured world that the future of Kashmir

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279 B. Puri, 'Kashmir and the Rest of India,' op. cit., p. 5144.
282 Christopher Thomas, op. cit., p. 216.
would be determined by its people through plebiscite. Ironically in the same month i.e. August (1953), when Shaikh was removed for raising plebiscite demand, Nehru had agreed with the Pakistan Government "to set up a joint India-Pakistani committee of civilian and military experts to hold preliminary discussions on organizing a Kashmir plebiscite." Although removal of Shaikh 'brought the Government of India a few years of relative calm in its relations with Kashmir but at the same time it shook 'the basic structure of the Indian position in the State of Jammu and Kashmir from which it would never fully recover.' The dismissal and arrest of Shaikh was both a personal blow and a setback to national and international policy 'of Nehru.'

Shaikh Abdullah took over as the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir at a time when there were many forces pulling in different directions and the future of Kashmir was unsettled and uncertain. Nevertheless, he did commendable work in the socio-economic field of the State. His land to tiller reform without the compensation to the landlords was no less than a miracle. The simple village people could now afford to drink the milk from their own cows and eggs of their fowls. Mr Eric Tyndale Biscoe who was closely associated with Kashmir since 1931 sums up that "nowhere else in the world has one man made such a peaceful revolution during this generation." For the first time, a Prime Minister was seen touring villages on foot or horseback; moving among the people, speaking to them in their language. Under Shaikh Abdullah, the State got its first university; 35 per cent of the budget was allocated for education. He got abolished the hereditary ruler-ship of the Dogras and made the office elective. However, in the political field Shaikh's period

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285 Bose, Roots, op. cit., pp. 66-7  
286 Lamb, Kashmir a disputed legacy, op. cit., p. 199.  
287 S. Gopal, op. cit., p. 133. As we have seen that to Nehru, Shaikh was the representative of the people of the State and it was because of his endorsement to the accession that India considered accession legal; but Shaikhi's deposition and arrest put a question mark on that. "If Shaikh Abdullah were a false prophet, as the coup of 8-9 August 1953 suggested, then it could well be that Nehru had seriously misinterpreted the will of the inhabitants of Jammu, Ladakh and the Vale of Kashmir," Lamb, Kashmir a disputed legacy op. cit., pp. 199-200.  
288 Saraf, op. cit., p. 1216.  
290 Saraf, op. cit., p. 1216.  
291 on November 1, 1948, the State got its first university in the form of Jammu and Kashmir University, M. Brecher, Struggle, op. cit., p. 154.  
292 Shaikh Abdullah showed special interest in education and he himself took over the portfolio of education. Thus for the first time in the history of Kashmir, a separate ministry of education came into being. Shaikh Abdullah is said to have told the reorganization committee in his inaugural address that "land to the tillers and education for everyone were two basic needs which brooked no delay for fulfilment." M. Brecher, op. cit., pp. 153-55.
proved to be the continuation of the autocratic Dogra rule. He ruled as a dictator and did not allow democracy to flourish in the State for which he was fully backed by Nehru.