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TREATISES, DIGESTS AND RESTATMENTS


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WORKS OF PUBLICISTS


END NOTES ON CHAPTER I
“Just as you can’t, in logic, hold my catches, win my races, eat my meals, frown my frown or dream my dreams, so you can’t have my twinges or after-images” Gylbert Ryle, Concept Of Mind, Hutchinson (1949) p 209.

A question might arise that do we know our minds by observing our bodily behavior? The answer is definitely in the negative. As far as Cartesians are concerned, I-ness is extremely primitive to ourselves, which Descartes holds as clear and distinct knowledge, beyond the scope of all doubts. We do not need any evidence to ensure our own existence.


It is very important to remember that the formulation of analogical inference regarding the other minds presupposes a necessary connection between the bodily behavior and mental states without which the argument falls flat on its face. Whether such a causal relation can be established is, however, debatable.


Supra, n. iii.

Ibid.


But if a computer has a body and face similar to a human being, and programmed with language and behavior, then it is logical for the analogical inductionists to conclude that they possess mental states and processes as well. Analogical inductionists are, therefore, igniting the skeptical doubts instead of keeping them at rest.

Supra, n. viii.

Ibid.

But if it is a weak induction is it not the intrinsic weakness of any inductive inference? Does every such inference not have to face this inductive leap?

END NOTES ON CHAPTER II

Two propositions that are formulated differently may have the same meaning. For example, the sentence “Today at one o’clock, the temperature of such-and-such a location in the physics laboratory was 23.4 degree Centigrade.” Has the same meaning as the sentence “Today at one o’clock, at such-and-such a location in the laboratory the temperature was 19.44 degree Reaumer” as conditions of verification for both the sentences are the same. Therefore, they bear the same meaning.


Ibid.

Hempel, however, does not claim that concepts like feeling, willing, intention etc. do not exist but what he claims is that these notions in their legitimate use appear only as physicalistic statements.
Hempel holds that belief statements can also be reformulated as a set of ‘if…then’ statements. For example, the statement ‘Sam believes that it is going to rain’ can be reduced to a set of ‘if…then’ statements as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>If</th>
<th>Then</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sam leaves home</td>
<td>Sam takes an umbrella</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sam’s windows are open</td>
<td>Sam closes the windows</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

And so on.

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END NOTES ON CHAPTER III

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“‘To suppose that the question “How do I know that Tom is angry?” is meant to mean “How do I introspect Tom’s feelings?” (because as we know, that’s the sort of thing knowing is or ought to be), is simply barking our way up the wrong gum tree.” J. L. Austin, Other Minds, Aristotelian Society Supplementary, vol. XX (1946), Final Note 3.

As Wittgenstein said in Tractatus that an eye looking out at the world will not see itself unless the eye could see itself looking at itself, like in a pool of water.

As we all know, Kant holds that certain categories of thought such as causality and temporality are such frameworks.


First he intended to utter the sentence and that utterance was the condition of satisfaction of this part of his complex intention. But, second, because he not only intended to utter the sentence but meant it, that is he meant that it is raining, the utterance acquired conditions of satisfaction of its own. The utterance will be satisfied if and only if it is raining” (pp. 141-142) A foreigner who learns the German language, if utters the words ‘es regnet’ repeatedly just for practicing his pronunciation, but does not mean anything, then this utterance differs from the earlier example of Firedrich, who means that it is raining. What makes the difference is, according to Searle, the condition of satisfaction of the two intentions, namely, saying and meaning.

Both the liar and the truth-teller make a commitment to tell the truth. The difference is that the liar is not keeping his commitment. So, the meaning intention amounts to the intention that when I say, “es regnet”, in addition to the condition of satisfaction of my intention to produce that utterance, the utterance itself now has the conditions of satisfaction. When I say something and mean it, I am committed to the truth of what I say. And this is so whether I am sincere or insincere.”

END NOTES ON CHAPTER IV

The private language may refer to a language which
i) only one person does use and understand;
ii) only one person can use and understand; or
iii) it can refer to a language in which terms refer to ‘private objects’ like sensations that only one person is and can be aware of.

For details, see generally, Don Locke, Myself And Others, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1968) p. 72. As it seems the first two are not very different because both of them are parasitic to some language or the other. Both of them jointly refer to the third one, which is the real crux of the issue. A private language is one that can be understood by one person only, for whom it exists, and from whose private experience and sensations it is derived. (Philosophical Investigations, section 243).


If a lion could talk, could we understand him? Would he have not been a different lion?


“...What do I mean when I say that the teacher judges that, for certain cases, the pupil must give the ‘right’ answer? I mean that the teacher judges that the child has given the same answer that he himself would give...” Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein On Rules And Private Languages, London (1982).

Supra, n. ii, p. 223.

But whether the socio-cultural milieu needs to be kept as a mere backdrop is a debatable issue.

A sensation, emotion or thought is definitely private in the second sense but that does not make them e-private or epistemically private in nature.


Supra, n ii, section 293.

Ibid.


Ibid. p. 66.


Supra, n. i pp 106-108.