CHAPTER 4

WITTGENSTEIN: HIS VIEWS

Wittgenstein had deep insights into the subterranean workings of philosophy which he did not elaborate. (He was like the Delphic oracle "who neither utters nor conceals his meaning but shows it by a sign" •) Philosophy presented itself in different ways to him, some of which were inconsistent with each other. The inconsistencies are of no great importance, however, since Wittgenstein did not develop a system unlike P.H. Bradley, he did not attempt to set out a metaphysical system in which the inconsistencies would be bound to reappear. (Crucial to Bradley's system was the claim that time is unreal, "a contradictory appearance" • It should have prevented his remarking that: "I will, in the next chapter, reinforce and repeat this conclusion...") Wittgenstein's early views on the nature of philosophy appear also to be inconsistent with the remarks he makes in his later works such as the Blue Book and the Philosophical Investigations. But all embody perceptions which make it useful to examine separately each of his views as they are expressed in the course of his philosophical odyssey.

To begin with, his views in the Tractatus which as we see, differ from each other and taken together are
inconsistent

(a) Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical. Consequently, we cannot give any answer to question of this kind, but can only establish that they are nonsensical...

And it is not surprising that the deepest problems are in fact not problems at all. (T.4.003)

(b) Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. Philosophy does not result in "philosophical propositions", but rather in clarification of propositions. (T.4112)

(c) The totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science (or the whole corpus of the natural science*) (T.411)

Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences. The word 'philosophy' must mean something whose place is above or below the natural sciences, not beside them. (T.4.111)

(d) All philosophy is a critique of language"... (T.4.0031)

These remarks may be summed up in the following way to bring out the inconsistencies between them.

(1). Philosophical sentences are nonsensical.
(2). There are no "philosophical propositions".
(3) Philosophical propositions are not truths.
(4) Some philosophical propositions are true, others false.

We shall comment on these in turn.

View (1) is not surprising, for Wittgenstein was the founder of post-Humean positivism. As is well-known, positivists considered metaphysical utterances to be simply nonsensical, devoid of literal significance, and therefore should be clearly recognized as such. We have already given a critique of the principle of verifiability as formulated by the positivists, but this should not prevent us from recognizing their merit. In the Preface to Logical Positivism (ed. by A.J. Ayer) Ayer says:

• "the originality of the logical positivist lay in their making the impossibility of metaphysics depend not upon the nature of what could be known but upon the nature of what could be said. Their charge against the metaphysician was that he breaks the rules which any utterance must satisfy if it is to be literally significant.

The influence of positivism in turning attention of
philosophers to language, is to be found not only in the *Tractatus,* but also in later work. Here we see that Wittgenstein had not freed himself from the shortcomings of logical *positivism.* He says, "the results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another piece of plain *nonsense...*" and also, "my aim 1st to teach you to pass *from* a piece of disguised *nonsense* to something that is patent *nonsense."

The remarks he makes in (b), in part to the effect that the *task* of philosophy is elucidation, lead to view (2) namely, that there are no *philosophical propositions.* The history of philosophy presents the appearance of a parade of theories supported or refuted by *arguments.* What Wittgenstein wants to hold about this is *indicated* by the final clause, in *Philosophy is* not a body of doctrine, but an activity*¹* The following sentence characterizes the *activity,* as ha *sees it,* namely, as elucidation or *clarification,* what are taken to be "philosophical propositions" are really pieces of *analysis.* This *Wittgensteinian position* will be more fully discussed *later.* The question which forces itself upon us here 1st how could Wittgenstein take both positions (1) and (2) namely, *philosophical propositions are nonsensical* and *there are no philosophical propositions?*
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He makes another striking remark about philosophical propositions in (c) that the body of truth coincides with the propositions of natural science. We see that the view (3) that philosophical propositions are not truths, follows from (c)* and (c) is a glaring untruth; for a non-scientific statement such as "I am reading" would have to be counted as false. To elaborate for a moment according to this thesis any non-scientific proposition would not only have to be false, but necessarily false. For it could never under any circumstances, find its way into the body of truths. (Nor is this thesis a scientific proposition*)

There is yet another view (4)* that some philosophical propositions are true, others false, which is clearly inconsistent with (1)* (2) and (3). If a philosophical proposition is true or false* that means it has a truth-value. But if a sentence occurring in a philosophical work is nonsensical, then it expresses nothing and hence nothing that has a truth-value. Still another important view to be found in the Tractatus is:

My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way/ anyone who understands them eventually recognises them as nonsensical. when he has used them — as steps to climb up beyond them. (He must so to speak, throw away the
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ladder after he has climbed it**) He
must transcend these propositions,
and then he will see the world aright.

The paradoxical consequence of this claim, is conjunc-
tion with (1)* is that nonsensical elucidations are a
means of seeing the world aright. How could philoso-
phical propositions, if they were nonsensical, be the
means to seeing the world aright? F.P. Ramsey, in com-
menting on Wittgenstein in his The Foundations of Math-
ematics, says:

the chief proposition of philosophy
is that philosophy is nonsense. And
we must then take seriously that it
is nonsense, and not pretend* as
Wittgenstein does* that it is impor-
tant nonsense.

In a way* it seems to us that Wittgenstein wanted to
retain views which are inconsistent with each other.

II

We now come to an important observation which
Wittgenstein held steadfastly from the Blue Book period
on through his later works. This is that "philosophical
problems are of course not empirical." His attack on
philosopher's treatment of their problems is unequivocal.
The following are examples of the recurrent theme that
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what philosophers advance as a theory does not concern a matter of facts "Philosophic problems", he said, are attacked as scientific problems are, and are treated perfectly hopelessly, as if we had to find something new. The problems do not appear to concern questions about language but rather questions of facts of which we do not yet know enough. Also, "the essence of philosophy is not to depend on experience." The characteristic of a metaphysical question is that we express an unclarity about the grammar of words in the form of a scientific question." The first rule of procedure is to "to destroy the outward similarity between a metaphysical proposition and an exponential one."

Actually the view that philosophical propositions are not empirical, is plainly incompatible with the view (4), that some philosophical propositions are true, others false, as we have seen in section (I). The point Wittgenstein seems to be stressing is that, philosophers have made pronouncements which give the appearance of resulting from empirical procedures, because they take as a guide the methods of science. Ha himself says:

"philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are..."
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irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosophers into complete darkness.

Again, to be more specific, he says: "There is no common-sense answer to a philosophical problem." This comment was directed against Moore, who took certain philosophical thesis, e.g., "Time is unreal", as implying the falsity of factual, common-sense statements, such as "I read my notes before going to the class."

And Moore used an apparently empirical procedure to prove, for instance, that two human hands exist. How? By holding up my two hands, and saying as I make a certain gesture with my right hand: "Here is one hand" and adding as I make a gesture with the left "and here is another". Moore's "proof of an external world" appears to proceed in the same way the man in the street would proceed in proving that he had coins in his purse: by exhibiting an object of the kind in question. Another example this time taken from classical philosophy, will illustrate Wittgenstein's claim that philosophical statements often pantomime statements of fact. Heraclitus maintained that everything constantly flows or changes, that nothing remains the
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same. Here Heraclitus seems to make a false empirical claim. To anticipate what we shall argue for later, his words create an illusion that they express a theory about things. We see Wittgenstein attacking those philosophers who (he thinks) wrongly treat philosophical questions like scientific ones and whose answers appear to be supported by the use of empirical methods such as observation, and experimentation. Besides this, a philosophical proposition and an experiential proposition are often expressed in the same words thus strengthening the impression that philosophical propositions are empirical. For example, the words "I alone exist" when uttered by the lone survivor of a holocaust, and by a solipsist, and the words "I can't know how he feels" uttered by a sceptic and by a person who is baffled by an enigmatic person.

III

From Wittgenstein's emphatic denial that philosophical statements are empirical, it is natural to infer that he takes the alternative position that philosophical propositions are a priori. In fact he says:

... it is the essence of philosophy
not to depend on experience and this is what is meant by saying that philosophy is a priori.\textsuperscript{18}

Further,

every philosophical problem typically contains one particular word or its equivalent, the word "must" or "cannot" and the "must" and "cannot" are the "must" and "cannot" of logic.\textsuperscript{19}

E.g., the philosopher who says "there must be a mental act when one understands a word", indicates by the use of "must" that he is citing an entailment of the concept understands. As has already been seen, an important fact about a priori propositions is that empirical evidence cannot either refute them or support them. Moreover, as we have seen in section I, the method of concept analysis, which Wittgenstein calls 'elucidations' or 'clarifications', employed to obtain a necessary truth. E.g., the correct analysis of the concept brother yields a necessary truth. Such a "logical clarification of thoughts"\textsuperscript{21} is unlike the chemical analysis of a piece of matter, done in a laboratory. The work of the chemist might be called discovery-analysis, in which the notion of a substance lacking the reported constituents is
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non-contradictory. By contrast, concept analysis comes
down to anal/sis of the meaning of an expression. It
has been carried on in antiquity and continued into the
work of present day philosophers - from Parmenides
and zeno to Russell, Moore and more recent philosophers.

It will be useful to examine briefly some samples
of 'concept analysis' as practiced throughout the history
of philosophy.

Leibniz seems to have had the idea that what might
be called decomposition analysis could show that appa-
rently extended objects consist of non-extended ultimate
constituents. He maintained that things are really a
collection of non-extended sentient entities by perfor-
moving an analysis on the concept of matter or extended
body. Consider his argument for holding that the struc-
ture of matter is monadic.

Suppose that a bit of matter occupies a space.
Space is divisible into sub spaces, which are external
to each other. Consequently anything which occupies
space will consist of parts each of which occupies a com-
ponent space. There are three possibilities with
regard to the divisibility of a bit of matter ( & )

(1) & is extended and further divisible.
or (2) & is extended but not further divisible.
or (3) \( \Phi \) is not extended.

(1) must be rejected on the grounds that we have not reached an ultimate part of \( \Phi \).

(2). This alternative also must be rejected because it implies a contradiction: the space \( \Phi \) occupied will consist of individual sub-spaces. And this implies that the part of matter occupying space will consist of parts external to each other, each occupying a sub-space. Each of these parts will in turn have parts which occupy a sub-space. We thus arrive at the contradiction of the hypothesis that \( \Phi \) is extended but not further divisible. Leibniz meant by "not further divisible", not in principle further divisible.

(3). Only the third alternative that does not have extension, is acceptable to Leibniz if no extended particle, however small, is to count as an ultimate component of matter. From this it follows that the ultimate atoms are immaterial, what F.H. Bradley would call a "psychic center".

To make his discovery, it must be pointed out that Leibniz never left the domain of concepts. Here the concept to be analysed was the concept of a.
material substance. The important thing to note is that Leibniz's "clarification" was more than just clarification. It led to the discovery of the ultimate constituents of matter.

It was G.E. Moore who in our time brought philosophers to focus on the technique of analysis. Like the famous character in Moliere's drama who discovered he was speaking prose, philosophers over the centuries may not have been aware that the method they employed in dealing with a problem was analysis.

Moore set the example and made explicit the procedures by which philosophers should deal with a question. He criticized philosophers for attempting to answer questions, without first discovering precisely what question it is which [they] desire to answer. Clarification of the question means working out what it entails. Moore's example of concept analysis, a brother is a male sibling, became the paradigm for the school of analysts. The concept brother entails being male and being a sibling. Its analysis does not include properties which things answering to the concept may have such as loyalty. Subject and predicate are connected by logical necessity. The denial of a
correct analysis is a logical impossibility. Although in the course of the argument from Leibniz for the monadic constitution of matter, instances of concept analysis occur, yet his conclusion might be described as a discovery, and the argument "discovery-analysis". For being material and not being constituted of spiritual atoms is not a logical impossibility.

Wittgenstein's later work strongly supports the view that concept analysis cannot yield what the analytic thinkers hoped for. 'Analysis' was no longer the main philosophical method for him, though he admitted that difficulties are sometimes removed by it.24

IV

It seems that Wittgenstein's great concern in both the early and later periods has been the "master problem", what are the nature, task and methods of philosophy? How are its problems to be understood? His examination of language was his means of understanding philosophy, therefore he says "philosophy is a 'critique of language'": As early as the Tractatus, he says:

this book deals with the problems of philosophy, and shows, I believe, that the reason why these problems
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are posed is that the logic of our

language is misunderstood.

"Understanding the logic of our language", this is a phrase which we must be clear about if we are to appreciate the attention Wittgenstein gives, especially in his post-Tractatus writings, to the contrast between the use of language by a philosopher and by the man in the street.

Sometimes what Wittgenstein says in a few sentences refers to such diverse tasks that one is uncertain of the direction his work came to take. For example, he said in his Philosophical Investigations:

Philosophy (as he does it) may in no way interfere with the actual use of language/ it can in the end only describe it...It leaves everything as it is.

The first sentence makes the point which he elaborates in another place, that the examination of actual usage is not intended to reform it. But that his work "can in the end only describe (actual usage)"? This latter assertion cannot put forward a central aim, for as he himself points out, his task and that of a linguist are utterly different. He said:
The important difference is in the aims for which the study of grammar are pursued by the linguist and the philosopher. One obvious difference is that the linguist is concerned with history, and with literary qualities, neither of which is of concern to us. Moreover we construct languages of our own so as to solve certain puzzles which the grammarian is not interested in, e.g., puzzles arising from the expression, "Time flows". Our object is to get rid of puzzles. The grammarian has no interest in these, his aims and the philosopher's are different.

It is when he says that philosophy as he does it "leaves everything as it is" that we have a hint at the aim which governs so much of his later works "to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday usage".

As we have seen already the conventionalist equates a necessary proposition with a factual proposition about the use of words. That is, a necessary proposition is verbal - and not necessary! Likewise Wittgenstein, in using the words 'rule of grammar' to characterize an a priori proposition, implies that an
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* _priori proposition is verbal. This comes out clearly in his assertion that "the statement that there must be a cause [where the 'must' is a logical must ] shows that we have got a rule of language." His own peculiar use of the phrase "grammar of a statement" and "grammar of a term" connects up with his characterizing necessary propositions as grammatical, and also, more generally, with his investigation of any expression which figures in philosophical puzzles. For example, one way of determining the "grammar of a statement" is by ascertaining what type of verification in relevant to it. He says:

the differing grammars of *Z have tooth ache' and 'He has tooth ache' show up in the fact that the statements have different verifications and also in the fact that it is sensible to ask, in the latter case, 'How do I know this?' but not in the former. 4

As for "the grammar of term", it is clear that when he urges us to examine the "grammar of such words as 'God', 'soul', 'mind', 'concrete', 'abstract'" he is asking us to investigate the use of these words with the aim of circumventing a philosophic puzzle. He says:
we might feel that a complete logical analysis would give the complete grammar of a word. But there is no such thing as a completed grammar... Logical analysis is an antidote. Its importance is to stop the muddle someone makes on reflecting on words.

Wittgenstein as we see here, is using the word "grammar" in an unusual way. This causes considerable mystification, which is removed in part by replacing "rule of grammar" by "rule of usage". This in no way modifies his conventionalism. He allows that "we shall have to justify calling our comments on such a sentence [as 'time flows'] grammar." This ha leaves undone. He contents himself with pointing out the

difference in the aims for which the study of grammar are pursued by the linguist and the philosopher... Moreover, we construct languages of our own so as to solve certain puzzles which the grammarian is not interested in... we have indicated a way of explaining the word... we have left the realm of what is generally called grammar. Our object is to get rid of certain puzzles. The grammarian has no interest in these/ his aims and philosopher's are different.
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Wittgenstein's explanation of the difference between his and the grammarian's use of the word "grammar" does not justify his use of it rather than some other word. He admits that he is using it in an uncustomary way, but continues to use it.

Wittgenstein's conventionalism carries over to philosophical statements since these are presented as though they are necessary truths. Accordingly, Wittgenstein charges philosophers who advance paradoxical "theories" as making mistakes about usage. His own task is clear.

Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one. Such an investigation sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away. Misunderstandings concerning the use of words, caused, among other things, by certain analogies between the form of expression in different regions of language.

"[The philosopher's]" questions he says, "refers to words; so I have to talk about words." The questions arise because philosophers are caught in verbal tangles or knots from which one can escape by the semantic therapy of "bringing words back from their metaphysical
to their everyday usage, or as he says in a different place: "shew the fly the way out of the fly-bottle."

The misunderstandings that he has in mind are of two different kinds. One is the mistake he thinks philosophers make of supposing the import of their statements as factual — factual in the way scientific statements are factual. The other is a factual mistake about usage, a verbal mistake. At one period in Wittgenstein's development, he appeared to think that philosophical controversies could be settled by recourse to usage, in other words, untiring verbal knots will settle a philosophical argument. "What we are destroying", he said, "is nothing but houses of cards, and we are clearing up the ground of language on which they stand." It is here that Wittgenstein draws our attention to how words are actually used in the language. He explains however, that:

we are interested in language only insofar as it gives us trouble. I only describe the actual use of a word if this is necessary to remove some trouble we want to get rid of. Sometimes I describe its use if you have forgotten it.

One thing which has to be noted is that Wittgenstein's
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intent ion was not to reform language, or in some way change actual usage, as might appear to be the case. He said:

This may make it look as if we saw it as our task to reform language. Such a reform for particular practical purposes, an improvement in our terminology designed to prevent misunderstandings in practice, is perfectly possible. But these are not the cases we have to do with.

The cases we have to do with are those resulting from verbal tangled.

Two examples to which Wittgenstein gave a great deal of attention were (1) the problem of universals and (2) the problem of our knowledge of other minds. (1) The Platonic doctrine of universals, that the meanings of general words are abstract objects. This doctrine contrasts the objects grasped by the mind in understanding general words with the changing and passing phenomena perceived by our senses. In addition to such things as tables, and white sheets of paper, it is held that there are the utterly different objects, tableness and whiteness. To quote Russell:
If we believe that there is such a
universal as [whiteness], we shall
say that things are white because
they have the quality of whiteness
... If we wish to avoid the univer-
sals whiteness and triangularity,
we shall chose some particular
patch of white or some particular
triangle, and say that anything
is white or a triangle if it has
the right sort of resemblance to
our chosen particular. But then,
the resemblance required will have
to be a universal. since there
are many white things, the resem-
bance must hold between many pairs
of particular white things; and
this is the characteristic of a
universal.

Russell, at one time maintained that not only are
there universals but also that we have acquaintance with
them. He says t

In addition to our acquaintance with
particular existing things, we also
have acquaintance with what we call
universals, that is to say, general
ideas, such as whiteness, diversity,
brotherhood and so on.

The idea that the meanings of general words are common
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properties is one which seems to account for the difference between e.g., 'John' and 'man'. In the case of proper names, knowing the bearer of the name does not enable us to go on to further applications. The word applies to one object, whereas knowing a general term enables one to go on to new applications. Russell states clearly the Platonic view as follows:

Let us consider, say* such a notion as justice. If we ask ourselves what justice is, it is natural to proceed by considering this, that and the other just act, with a view to discovering what they have in common. They roust all, in some sense, partake of a common nature* which will be found in whatever is just and in nothing else. This common nature, in virtue of which they are all just* will be justice itself* the pure essence the admixture of which with facts of ordinary life produces the multiplicity of just acts. Similarly with any other word which may be applicable to common facts* such as 'whiteness' for example. The word will be applicable to a number of particular things because they all participate in a common nature or essence* 49
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It is at this point that Wittgenstein uses his therapy in dealing at length with what he considers to be the puzzlement of the philosophers. He says:

... you think of the meaning as a thing of the same kind as the word, though also different from the word. Here the word, there the meaning.

One important source of puzzlement is our feeling that we ought to be able to point to something that is the meaning of a word. He remarks:

The questions, "what is length?", "what is meaning?", "what is the number one?" etc., produce in us a mental cramp. we feel that we can't point to anything in reply to them and yet ought to point to something.
(We are up against one of the great sources of philosophical bewilderments a substantive makes us look for a thing that corresponds to it).

Perhaps the most salient feature of the Platonic position about the meaning of a general word is that the word applies to particular things in virtue of their possessing a property in common. In Plato's behalf it can be argued that the existence of similar things implies the existence of a point of similarity, a common property.
It can also be argued that the possible existence of dinosaurs implies the actual existence of the property of being a dinosaur. Further, when we say 4 is an even number, this implies that there is an even number and this in turn implies that there is a number—a number being an abstract entity referred to by a numeral, where each numeral names one and only one object. Since a numeral does not name concrete, particular entities, it must name something abstract.

To continue with reasons which a Platonist philosopher might give for the view that in addition to words and their denotations, i.e. their concrete applications to things, there are entities of a different kind, and these exist whether or not they are given names by an apprehending mind. Consider the fact that a million years ago it was true to say that no language exists. This obviously implies that a million years ago there was a proposition not expressed in words. A similar argument shows us that the meaning of abstract words exist independently of the words that stand for them, since it makes perfectly good sense to say that a million years ago there were white ivory tusks, and hence that whiteness existed prior to being given a name. This is offered as proof that
Platonic Universals exist unnamed, since a non-verbal proposition consists of Platonic entities.

Another argument in support of the view that Universals can exist unnamed is the following: At any given time there is a finite number of symbols (numerals) but an infinite number of numbers. So the numbers outstrip the numerals. This is to say they exist unnamed. Euclid’s proof that there is an infinity of primes proves that there is an infinity of numbers that have no names.

As is well known, there are philosophers who deny both the existence of unnamed universals and the existence of any abstract entities in addition to general names. Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations, seems to argue that it is false that general words stand for a common property possessed by the individuals to which the word applies. He states that one has only to examine these individuals to see that there is often nothing which they all have in common; in other words they do not share in a common essence. He makes the point in the following way:

Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games." I mean board-
games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic-games, and so on. What is common to them all? Don't say: "There must be something common, or they would not be called 'games'"—but look and see whether there is anything common to all. For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that.

Locke also seems to be attacking the Platonic claim (Republic X, Sec. 596) that "wherever a number of individuals have a common name we may assume them also to have a corresponding idea or form." Alice Ambrose in her essay Sic et Non, has raised the question whether Wittgenstein was "holding the Platonic theory to be false" or that he was holding that the Platonist's words do not express anything either true or false.

That we sometimes call general words "general names" is a way of minimizing the difference between general words and proper names. There are analogies without doubt, but there are dissimilarities or disanalogies as well. To remark on one difference in connection with a proper name it is correct usage to say "Here the
name, there the object named." But with a general name this is not possible. Not only naming the meaning of a general word through Platonic spectacles as being abstract entities, there is no way of pointing to an entity which would permit us to say "here the word, there the meaning". As Wittgenstein clearly remarks

... we are more inclined to say that these things looking different are really the same than to say that these things though looking the same are really different.

A case in point is the two phrases, "understanding words" and "imagining something". These look alike and if we compare them with "writing words" and "lifting something", we should say that both denote mental states. But if we are asked to describe the mental state accompanying grasping the meaning of a word, we often can cite nothing which would be called "mental". This shows according to Wittgenstein, that the presence of a mental process is not a necessary condition of understanding words, i.e., is not part of the definition of "understanding", and thus is not a criterion for the application of that word. By contrast, a condition for understanding a word which suggests no idea of an accompanying mental process is being able to
use the word. And this is very different from the conscious process of imagining something.

The question 'what is the meaning of a word?' has prompted very different answers. Platonists asserted that in addition to the things general words apply to, there are abstract entities named by them, and that there are their meanings. J.S. Mill distinguished between the connotation of a word and its denotation. Its connotation is its meaning; its denotation is the thing to which it applies. Parenthetically, it should be pointed out that nominalists deny that anything more than words and their application exists. There are no abstract entities which are connotations of words. So to speak, they use Occam's razor, the maxim that entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily, in this case to eliminate abstract entities.

Wittgenstein suggests putting a question which will shed light on "What is the meaning of a word?", namely "What is an explanation of the meaning of a word?" whatever the explanation explains will be the meaning. Asking this question will cure you of the temptation to look about you for some object which you might call "the meaning": For what the explanation does is to give
the use of the word. And the noun phrase "use of a word", unlike the phrase "meaning of a word", does not tempt one to expect an ostensive definition of it. He gives as a general directive, "Don't ask for the meaning of a word; ask for its use". One might call this directive "avoidance therapy" - avoidance of the trap which Platonists fall into because of "prejudices in favour of a certain form of expression". Noun and noun phrases, unlike "perhaps" and "not", appear to have similar roles in language, namely, to refer. "The number 2", for example, is taken by Platonists to refer to an ideal object. This claim, Wittgenstein says:

...is evidently supposed to assert something about the meaning* and so about the use* of [*2*]. And it means, of course* that this use is in a certain respect similar to that of a sign that has an object* and that it does not stand for any object.

we turn now to another problem with which Wittgenstein concerned himself. This problem is posed *in* the sceptic's claim (2) that we can have no knowledge of other minds. About this claim Wittgenstein in the Blue Book remarks*: "There is a temptation for me to say that
only my own experience is real: 'I know that I see, hear, feel pains, etc., but not that anyone else does. I can't know this, because I am I, and they are they.' As F. H. Bradley put it, "since all my faculties are totally confined to my garden, I cannot tell if the roses next door are in flower." Alice Ambrose on behalf of the sceptic argues:

I can never know that you mean by "pain" what I mean by it. When you say you are in pain I can only infer from your behaviour that you attach the same meaning to your words as I do. To know what I mean I would need to enter into your mind and experience your ... [seeing of the color data and your] feeling of pain. This I could do only by being you... If I were identical with you, there would be no more to wonder about your thoughts. Two minds cannot be one and still be two.  

Again, to quote waiter T. Staces

I cannot experience anything except my own experience. I can see a red, but I can never see
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yours. I can feel my emotion, but not your. Even if your anger infects me, so that I feel it in sympathy with you, it is yet, in so far as I feel it, my anger, not your.62

The above quoted arguments lead to a consequence which ends in solipsism. That is, the sceptic's claim that "I can't really know what is going on in another's mind" or "I cannot know whether he is in pain" leads finally to the claim that "only my pain is real".

This can be easily seen from the following argument. "I can't really know that another has pain" implies the impossibility of believing that another person has a pain. "Believing that another person has a pain" implies the theoretical possibility of knowing it. If there is no theoretical possibility of knowing it, then there is no theoretical possibility of believing it." Wittgenstein might put it in this way: "We do not know what it is like to be absolutely certain that someone else is in pain" implies "we have no idea of what it would be like to believe that someone else is in pain." And this in turn implies that we have only idea of our own sensations, (present, past or future) but we are limited to the knowledge of our own
And this implies that we have no idea of what it would be like for there to be another person. So "I alone am real" is what might be called a priori solipsism. Not only can I not have your pain, I don't have any idea of someone else's pain and hence I don't have any idea of there being anyone else, I can't look in someone's garden because of a physical wall, but here I can't look into someone else's mind because of a logical wall.

What Wittgenstein wants to point out is that a philosopher imagines himself to be expressing matter of fact, that is, to be stating what really is the case. He seems to himself and other philosophers to be stating the actual limits of our knowledge. His mistake lies in the construction he places on what he is doing, not in his undertaking of the actual use of terminology. He is mistaken about what he does with conventions of usage. But the "theory" he presents has the appearance of stating a matter of fact at the same time. And this is an important feature in the development of Wittgenstein's views on the nature of philosopher's statements. He holds that these statements are
not the result of a mis take about ordinary usage. Instead, they conceal his dissatisfaction with it. Parallel comments apply to the solipsist's contention that only his own experience is real. He says:

The man who says "only my pain is real", doesn't mean to say that he has found out by the common criteria - the criteria, i.e., which give our words their common meaning - that the others who said they had pains were cheating. But what he rebels against is the use of this expression in connection with these criteria. That is, he objects to using this word in the particular way in which it is commonly used. On the other hand, he is not aware that he is objecting to a convention. He sees a way of dividing the country different from the one used on the ordinary map. He feels tempted, say, to use the name "Devonshire" not for the county with its conventional boundary, but for a region differently bounded. He could express this by saying: "Isn't it absurd to make this a county, to draw the boundaries here?" But what he says is: "The real Devonshire is this". We could answer: "What you want is only a new notation, and by a new notation no facts of geography are changed". It is true, however, that we
may be *irresistibly* attracted or repelled by a *notation*. (we *easily* forget how much a *notation*, a *form of expression* may *mean to us*, and that changing it isn't always as easy as it often is in mathematics or in the sciences. A change of clothes or of names may mean very little and it may mean a great deal.)

The above remarks indicate an emerging view about a philosopher (*skeptic*) who says, "I cannot *know* whether he has pain" or 'only my pain is real'. He is objecting to the conventional use of 'has a pain', Not only *this*, he is (1) not aware that he is objecting to a *convention*. (2) The notation he wishes is one which stresses a difference more *strongly*, makes it more obvious* than ordinary language does* or one which in a particular case uses more closely similar forms of expression than our ordinary *language*. (3) But this does not have as a consequence* a reform of ordinary *usage*. (4) The *consequences* are wholly "academic". The phrase "knows that another has *pain*" is deleted only in pretence as part of a language game* without expectation of any practical *result."