CHAPTER IV

WORLD APPEARANCE

According to the Vivartta Theory of Creation - (which we have discussed before) - the whole object world is projected by the mysterious principle known as Maya or Avidva. So this objective world has only illusory existence. It is an illusory appearance - metaphysically unreal. The teachers of the school compare this insentient order of existence with the illusory objects that appear in error and come to exist being superimposed on some real object. This illustration best manifests the character of this phenomenal world. According to this illustration the whole object world has got empirical and pragmatic existence. It is idealised in fact on the canvas of the self and does not therefore exist in reality.

Sankarites deny the degree of truth or reality entertained by the empiricist school. The truth is absolute. It neither has any degree nor has it any mode of existence. The truth or reality involves therefore absolute existence. On empirical consideration the Advaitins entertain indeed the three types of existence as 1) Paramarthika, 2) Vyavaharika, and 3) Pratibhasika, i.e. metaphysical or absolute existence, empirical or pragmatic existence and illusory existence. Brahman or the self involves the first type. The whole objective world along with all our waking experiences involves...
involves the second type. And the illusory objects perceived in error along with the dream experiences involve the third type. These different types of existence have been best enumerated in the Saṃkṣepa Hārīraka.

The existence or being from the metaphysical standpoint implies the self - the absolute truth. And the truth in its absolute sense involves permanent existence which naturally excludes the contradiction (badha). The self excludes contradiction for all the time - past, present and future as it exists always as the witness (saksin) or the basic intelligence transcending the negation and contradiction. The empirical existence is not subject to contradiction in the empirical level, and the illusory existence involves the possibility of contradiction at any moment even in this empirical level. But both the empirical existence and illusory existence are subject to contradiction. But the difference is, empirical existence does not court contradiction until there is the dawn of transcendental knowledge revealing the highest truth. Illusory existence on the other hand courts contradiction even in this empirical phase of our life. So an illusory object is liable to be contradicted even at the very moment it appears. In case of an illusory object contradiction is more natural than that of an empirical object which remains uncontradicted till the dawn of supreme spiritual knowledge revealing the -transcendental-

transcendental truth. So the teachers define these two types of existence as uncontradictable (in case of empirical object) and contradictable (in case of an illusory object presented before us in error or in dream) prior to the dawn of transcendental knowledge. In this way the teachers of the school have differentiated the empirical world presented in our waking state from the illusory objects presented in error or projected in dream. Again in the Sāṃskṛta-Saṅkraka* the empirical existence has been differentiated from the illusory existence in three ways. Firstly, illusory objects court contradiction in the very place and at the very moment where and when it appears. But empirical objects generally do not court contradiction in this manner. Secondly, when the illusory object is contradicted the subject remains uncontradicted. The empirical object, on the other hand, courts contradiction along with the subject. Another distinction is, though illusory objects appear mainly due to 'avidya' still there are other subsidiary causes also which help 'avidya' in its act of projection of the illusory object. But empirical objects appear due to 'avidya' only. In fact, those definitions given before include all these facts mentioned separately. According to our former definition the empirical world remains uncontradicted till the 

*Śrāvastīya-Saṅkraka - Chap. II/31.24,33.
See also Madhusūdana's Saraseshgraha.
dawn of transcendental knowledge. And here lies its
difference from the illusory object perceived in error
or appearing in dream. Now, with the dawn of trans-
cendent knowledge (without which the negation or
contradiction of the empirical facts is not at all
possible), all the relational ideas as subject and
object etc. are equally contradicted as false. But an
illusory object is contradicted when the particular
object which is the basis of the illusory presentation
in error is known. And that particular object involves
empirical existence and belongs to the relational world
of thought. So in this case the subject remains immune
from contradiction. Again, it is implied from the
definition previously noted that the fundamental and
absolute cause of the empirical projection is 'Avidya'
and 'Avidya' alone. 'Avidya' being the fundamental and
absolute cause the empirical world dissolves or courts
contradiction with the dawn of self-consciousness which
'Avidya' screens in our empirical phase of life. So also,
time and space which are the very basis of our concep-
tional thinking are contradicted with the awakening of
transcendental knowledge, as the ultimate reality is
transconceptual being. Thus our former definitions
brief as they are include and imply all those facts
enumerated separately in the Samskara-sara.

-Now-
Now on empirical consideration only the Advaitins entertain those three types of existence. Empirical existence as it seems to us, involves some degree of truth compared with the illusory existence. But from the metaphysical standpoint, the truth cannot but be absolute. Truth or reality has no degree. So the empirical objects which admit contradiction at the end cannot be accepted as real.

Viewed from the metaphysical standpoint Reality is that which possesses existence in its own right and on its own account. The criterion of truth or reality is immunity from contradiction. In other words reality is existent from eternity to eternity beyond time and space and unreachable by the categories of conceptual thought. It is everlasting. Affirmation and negation are entirely irrelevant to it. In fact, logically conceived it is absurd to think that the real is existing in one place and time and not existing in another spatiotemporal context. Reality has existence as part of its nature and thus inalienable from it. Judged by this criterion all finite existences are bound to be labelled as Appearance. Provisional existence is only another name for non-existence. Truth, reality and existence are but different expressions of the same principle and there can be no difference or distinction intrinsic or extrinsic in it. Brahman or the self is thus eternally real or strictly speaking, timelessly real. A real subject to the limitation of time and space according to the views of the realists, is bound to have provisional reality which is a contradiction in terms.
This inescapable conception of reality excludes the possibility of all determinations and differences intrinsic or extrinsic. In the Bhāgavat-Gītā, it is therefore affirmed that the Absolute has no history because it has no origin or no end. It cannot be strictly speaking characterized as ought or nought. Words only convey concepts and concepts are bound by the limiting categories which the human understanding contrives for the understanding of truth. But the categories of thought universal or particular, affirmation or negation are always applicable to finite things. The Upaniṣads therefore declare that Brahman or the truth is beyond the reach of words and concepts. This infinite reality which is the only logically possible reality is accepted by the Advaitins not out of respect for the scriptural authority but because it is entailed by inexorable logical necessity.

This being the only logical concept of reality in the sense of immunity from contradiction the admission of provisional grades of reality such as empirical and apparent is rather dictated by empirical consideration. As a concession to the weakness of human intellect and realistic bias which appears to be inescapable, the reality of this world in its natural order of social life, and the necessity of religious and ethical discipline which is propedetic for the realisation of -ultimate-

ultimate truth have not been brushed aside all on a sudden. Only in the metaphysical plane they are found to be nonexisting, but on this side of transcendental realisation which is final consummation of logical, ethical and religious discipline, the world order has got to be reckoned with. For all pragmatic purposes and to meet the demands of practical reason this empirical world has been accorded a status superior to error in normal course of life. So, it is necessary but not ultimate. The Vedāntists (Advaitins) do not dismiss it as an illusion simply because it has got as much reality and truth as the realists can claim for it. This is called empirical or pragmatic plane of existence. It exists from beginningless time and would continue until the dawn of transcendental knowledge. From the standpoint of the emancipated soul it is as unreal as ordinary cases of illusion. The realists have therefore no cause for alarm when the world is called 'Maya.' Because, what is emphasised by it is not that it has no ultimate reality. But as the empirical world has no ultimate reality, so from the metaphysical standpoint empirical existence and illusory existence are equally false. The Advaitins hold therefore that the empirical objects and the illusory objects are equally projected by 'Avidya' or 'Māya' - the fundamental cause of false and illusory appearances. Thus viewed from the metaphysical standpoint the Vyāvahārika and Pratibhāsika are equally the effects of Avidya. Avidya in cosmic form is the fundamental cause of empirical objects and in psychic form it exists as the fundamental.
fundamental cause of illusory objects appearing in error. So Cosmic Avidya is at the root of the illusory appearances. Speaking properly, therefore, they are different products of Avidya which has different phases of expression. And their distinction is based mainly on this. As they are different products of Avidya so as soon as those phases of Avidya dissolve they cease to exist. Sankara also on this basis differentiates the waking experience from the dream experience. Sankara says that the series of objects presented in dream are contradicted as soon as the individual awakens, but, the empirical world presented in the waking state does not court contradiction in this manner. The fact is, Avidya in cosmic form dissolves when the transcendental knowledge dawns. It remains intact, therefore, as long as we lead the empirical life and remain ignorant of the higher transcendental truth. So the empirical world, though it is equally false does not court contradiction like an illusory object. But Avidya in psychic form involves various phases. Each of those phases dissolves in this very life. All the same, the empirical appearance and the illusory appearance are equally the effects of Avidya and as such the Advaitins hold that because the empirical objects are contradicted ultimately they are equally false like the illusory objects. So metaphysically empirical objects fall short of reality. They are

*Sadhyate hi svapnapalabdhamvastu ................
Naivem jagaritopalabdham vastu stambhadikam....
Sadhyate. (Sariraka-Bhasya - 2/2/29; p 555, Bombay Ed)
are false projections by the same mysterious principle, opposed to knowledge, indefinable in character, and dominated by the teachers as 'maya' or 'avidya.' To imply the falsity of the empirical world Madhusudana says that by Vyavahārika we mean that which is ultimately contradicted. Now, ultimate reality excludes contradiction. So, if the empirical existence is liable to be contradicted it can never be accepted as real. The illusory object — as it can be affirmed according to our practical experiences — is always contradicted either sooner or later. Hence empirical objects belong to the same group with the illusory object inspite of their apparent difference. So viewed properly, the Advaitins admit degrees of falsity, but the truth according to them is absolute.

(b) **EMPIRICAL WORLD AS FALSE**

Thus the empirical world has been declared to be false. A false object appears in error. To the Advaita philosophers there is always the presentation of an object in error just as it is in valid cognition. But the difference is, the object presented and perceived in error is not real from the pragmatic standpoint, whereas in valid cognition the object perceived is real. Now there are different theories of error. The Mīmāṃsaka School for instance entertains the theory known as Akṣavātivāda. According to this theory, there is no presentation of object in error. Error means —

1. Advaitaratnakarākṣaṇam — p.22. Mīmāṃsaka Sāgar
non-apprehension and non-discrimination of the difference underlying the cognitions which may either be two experiences (Prajvakṣa), or one experience and the other memory (Samthi), and which take place or arise at the same time. But the Advaitins condemn this theory of error. Error is not merely the non-apprehension (Akhvāti) as the Mīmāṃsakas hold. But error is misapprehension. Misapprehension implies in general that in place of one object another object is taken. This is error. The inconsistency of the Akhvātivāda has been exposed by the Advaita philosophers. The Advaitins hold that error involves definitely the presentation and cognition of some object because often there is a positive effect on the subject produced by error. In silver illusion for instance often the person in error hastens forward to fetch the silver which is impossible unless there is definite apprehension of silver in that spot. So perceiving a snake in error a man becomes frightened and suffers from its consequent effect. This implies that error is not merely non-apprehension which the Mīmāṃsakas hold. Moreover it can be inferred from the fact that in error we affirm the existence of some object as we do it in valid cognition. Indeed error has always an objective reference as it is the case with valid cognition.

Considering all these facts the Advaitins denounce the Mīmāṃsaka’s.

*Bhāmatī - p.27,28, Brahma-sūtra-Sāṅkara-bhāgyam Bombay Ed.*
Mimamsaka's theory. According to the Advaita Philosophers error involves the combined effect of nonapprehension and misapprehension. At the beginning the individual fails to note the particular object that exists before him and consequently in place of that object he perceives another object which is different from the former one.

Thus error ends in misapprehension. That error is misapprehension and involves the presentation of some object, has been accepted by others. And so far Sankarites agree with them. But the difference arises as soon as they start to analyse the character of the object. To the Advaita Philosophers the object presented and perceived in error can be neither real (sat) nor unreal (asat), i.e. it neither exists in reality nor can it be a fiction. So Sankarites reject at the same time two opposing theories known as 'Satkhvati' and 'Asat-Khavti'.

According to the former theory i.e. 'Satkhvati', the object which we perceive in error is real. It really exists therefore. As the Naiyayikas hold, the object perceived in error exists really in some other place where we have seen it previously. But due to some wrong impression we affirm that it exists at the place where we perceive it in error, though it does not exist at the place at the moment. Ramanuja holds a different view. According to the Vedantic Cosmology the whole material world is the product of five elements as earth, water, fire, air and ether. So the constituent elements of different objects are always the same. They are all products of
common elements but they appear as different products varying in name and form due to the varying process of production. Now the constituent elements being same the silver that appears in error in place of a shell partly exists in elemental form in the shell. So it is real. But in error the fact that silver exists partly in shell remains unperceived. So it is error or misapprehension. Thus according to the Naiyāyikas and the Rāmānujists the object we perceive in error is real (sat) as it really exists in some other place or in the very locus where it is presented. The Advaitins however deny this fact. The object that appears in error cannot be real as it is contradicted afterward. Truth always excludes contradiction. So the object appearing in error does not exist in reality.

Against the Naiyāyika's presumption that the object exists in some other place and so it is real, and the contradiction only shows that the object does not exist in the place where it has been cognised in error, the Advaitins' reply is that contradiction does not imply that the object exists in some other place. Contradiction only involves the denial of the existence of the object where it has been substituted under a wrong impression. Besides, there is inconsistency in the assertion that the object exists in some other place, because in error we

2. Pañcapādikā - p.212,213
Brahmasūtra-Sāṅkara-Bhāṣya, Part I.
Calcutta Sanskrit Series.

2. Pañcapādikā - 245,246,248 - Brahmasūtra-Sāṅkara-Bhāṣya
Part I. Calcutta Sanskrit series.
actually perceive the object (as it is supposed to be); and this is impossible if the object does not exist there where it is presented but exists in some other place. The immediate apprehension implies that the object is immediate. The main point is if the object is real it cannot be contradicted. Contradiction which follows afterwards implies that the object appearing in error is not real. It is something other than real. On this ground the Advaitins reject the 'Satkhvåti'.

But, if the object appearing in error cannot be real (sat), it can neither be unreal (asat). A certain sect of the Buddhists (the Nihilists) entertain the theory known as 'Asatkhyati'. According to this theory, the object which we perceive in error is always unreal (asat) i.e. it does not exist anywhere in any form. So it is nonexistent or asat. But the 'Asatkhyati' is equally untenable because, that which is nonexistent can never appear in any form. Hence that which we perceive - even in error - cannot be an unreal fiction. Moreover, as contradiction (badha) makes it evident that the thing which we perceive in error is not real, so contradiction presupposes that something (which may not be necessarily real) exists there which we have wrongly accepted as real. Indeed contradiction or negation is not possible unless there is something to be contradicted or negated. So the Advaitins hold that all those objects appearing in error cannot be unreal or non-existent.

1. Istaśiddhi - p.47 - Gaekwar's Oriental Series.
Thus from the Advaita standpoint the thing which we perceive in error can neither be real nor unreal. Besides sat-khāti and asat-khāti, there can be a third alternative and that is asat-kacchākhāti. But an object cannot be real and unreal, existing and non-existing both at the same time. This is fallacious indeed. So the Advaitins conclude that the object perceived in error is neither real nor unreal. Contradiction (bāska) implies that it is not real. And appearance implies that it is not unreal.

The real and unreal are mutually opposing ideas. So the same thing cannot be real and unreal both at the same time. But though they are opposing ideas, they are not necessarily the negation of each other. According to the Advaita Philosophers the real excludes the unreal. But the real is not the negation of unreal. So the unreal excludes the real though it is not necessarily the negation of real. Here the fact is - the supreme truth or the being which is ultimately real involves absolute non-relational existence. But the real conceived as the negation of unreal involves relativity. Hence this has been denied by the teachers (Advaita School). Now as the real and unreal are not the negatory of each other though they exclude each other as opposing ideas so the same thing can exclude the real and unreal both at the same time.
Thus rejecting all other theories Sāṃkāratas entertain a new theory on error known as 'anirvacanīya-khvāti'. The word 'anirvacanīya' means indefinable or indescribable. Therefore, the object that appears in error is indefinable or indescribable in character, because it is neither real nor unreal. The fact is that real and unreal, these are the two terms common in usage implying existence and nonexistence respectively. Viewed properly, the character of the object which excludes both the real (sat) and unreal (asat) cannot be defined or described in any way. It is incomprehensible also how such a thing exists or appears at all! So, there are various contentions against this theory of error. But the Advaitins hold that though it is inconceivable to us still the indefinable (anirvacanīya) objects appear in error. This has been pointed out in the Iṣṭasādhi that unless we admit the appearance of an indefinable object, error cannot be substantiated. Therefore an object cognised in error is indefinable. Indeed, nonapprehension simply cannot be called error, because, if error means simply the nonapprehension or absence of knowledge of some particular objects then we are always in error. Because, as we ordinary people, are not omniscient, so there are always some objects which exist beyond our knowledge. If, on the other hand, it means total absence of cognition of all empirical things, then the state of sound sleep when there is no apprehension of object can easily.

1. Iṣṭasādhi - p.47,125, Gaekwad's Oriental Series.
easily be associated with error. So also if the object we perceive in error is real then it should be a perfect cognition which reveals a real object and therefore excludes contradiction. It cannot be called, therefore, error which is different from a valid and perfect cognition. And as the unreal cannot appear at all as it is nonexistent, so in this case also error is not possible. Consequently the indefinable object - the object that excludes both the real and unreal must appear in error. Otherwise there is no possibility of error. Finally, it should be noted that the above analysis leads to the conclusion that not only in the time of direct apprehension (pratyakṣa) in error but in time of indirect apprehension also the object cognized in error is always indefinable in character.

The fundamental cause of such an object as described before is 'avidya' - which is equally indefinable in character. But in ordinary cases of error there are other supplementary causes which stimulate 'avidya' to project the indefinable object before us. Among these supplementary causes the impression of the real object (from empirical standpoint indeed) perceived in some other place is the most important one. So in silver illusion, the impression of silver perceived somewhere in reality is the chief stimulating cause for the appearance of the piece of

1. Kayamkhyātirīti? Netravat khyātyabhavasūtraśc
   anabhupagasāt, atipraṣāṅgōccha - Vivaraṇa, p.166
   See also Tattvadīpana - p. 167
   Brahmasūtra-Sāṅkara-Bhāṣyam - Part I.
   Calcutta Sanskrit Series.

2. Pañcarājakā. p.199. See also Vivaraṇa and Tattvadīpana -p.199
   Brahmasūtra-Sāṅkara-Bhāṣyam - P.I.
   Calcutta Sanskrit Series.
silver which is projected by 'avidyā'. When there is direct apprehension in error, the extreme similarity between the objects in some form - as the brightness of shell and silver, as well as the defects of our visual organ are also enumerated as different causes of the illusory appearance. But they are all supplementary causes. The main fundamental cause is 'avidyā' which itself is indefinable in character.

Thus from the Advaita standpoint, we do actually perceive in error an object; and that object is indefinable in character as it excludes both the real and unreal. The indefinable (anirvacanita) is called mithya or false. The falsity does not imply therefore the unreality or absolute nonexistence presumed by the Buddhist agnostics. Śaṅkarites hold, and this we have already noted, that contradiction does not show that the thing is unreal. As it has been analysed and explained in the Vivarāṇa, contradiction involves only the denial of the real existence superimposed on the object which is not real. The fact is, when we perceive an object in error it appears as real. Now the object perceived in error appears as real because we superimpose reality on it. A real object exists before us which we fail to cognise in error. On this real object we superimpose

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the false object projected by 'avidyā'. Then the false object which resembles some empirical object in name and form, appears to us as real. And we lose sight of the distinction that separates the illusory object from the empirical object. Therefore, when an illusory silver appears in error we think that the piece of silver is real empirically. Now, contradiction (bāda) - which follows after the real object - (the underlying basis 'adhisthāna' of the illusory appearance) is known, involves the denial of the reality superimposed on the illusory object. So after the contradiction we comprehend and we affirm that the object perceived in error can never be real empirically as the empirical object for which we took it, does not exist at all in that place. But even after that we cannot deny the appearance of the illusory object which was actually perceived in error. Therefore we conclude that, what appeared before us in error was an illusory object which cannot be accepted as a real thing though we cannot deny its appearance. Thus contradiction does not imply that the thing is unreal (asat). But contradiction shows at the end that what we have perceived in error is false which excludes both the real and unreal. Therefore, due to this fact, the Advaitins entertain three categories as 1) real, 2) unreal, and, 3) false or sat, asat and mithyā. The real involves permanent existence. As the self involves permanent existence so the self is real. The unreal involves...
non-existence as skyflower etc. which never appears. And
the false involves indefinable character and apparent
existence. The empirical and illusory objects—which
from the metaphysical standpoint, are declared to be
equally false involve equally the indefinable character
and apparent existence. From this standpoint Saṅkara
has condemned the Buddhists for denying the objective
existence of the empirical world. When Saṅkara\(^1\) says
that the series of empirical objects cannot be negated
because they actually exist and appear, he does not mean
that they are real. Nor does he utter anything self-
contradictory. From Saṅkara's standpoint we may not
accept this world as real but we cannot dismiss it as
unreal. If this world is unreal it cannot appear in any
form. So the world is not unreal. But it is false. And
so long as we perceive it, it exists there though it
cannot be real ultimately.

The falsity of the empirical world has been
proved by various means. By illustrating the dream
experience Gaṇḍapāda\(^2\) has proved the falsity of this
empirical appearance. All those objects presented in
dream cannot be real because the reality of those
objects is contradicted as soon as we are awakened.

Many things we perceive in dream—a world of object in

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1. Śāriṅka Ḍhāṣya - 2/2/28, p.547, 548.
2. Brahmaḥṣūtra-Saṅkara-Bhāṣya, Bombay Ed.
fact emerges before us and we enjoy it just as we do in the waking state. But as soon as we awake the dream world appearing so long as real vanishes and we deny its reality. Some of the teachers (like Rāmānuja who condemn the Śaṅkara School for professing the illusory nature of this empirical world by comparing it with the dream experience) hold indeed that the dream experience is real. According to their view, the individual enjoys in his dream according to his karma which has been accomplished previously. So in dream a new world appears before us. And this dream world is as real as this empirical world appearing in our waking state. But the Advaitins hold that the dream world cannot be real, because, so far as our practical experience convinces us, all of us deny the reality of it when we are fully awakened.¹

Now there are two current theories on dream both of which can be found in the Upaniṣads². The objects presented in dream are taken sometimes as memory images and sometimes as false projections. Generally we perceive those objects in our dream which we have met in our waking state. Thus the dream often represents the image of the waking world. But there are instances also which confirm that often we perceive some such objects in our dream which have not really been perceived previously.

1. Bādhyaṇe caite rathādayaḥ svapnadrśtāḥ prabodha—
Sārīraka Bhāṣya—3/2/3, P-692,
Brahmasūtra-Śaṅkara Bhāṣyam, Bombay Ed.

2. .......ādrśtām ca adṛśtām ca āsrutām ca āsrutām ca ....
.........pāvyati—prāṇopaniṣad—4/5, P-408,
Poona Ed.
previously i.e. in our waking state. So new objects also appear in dream. Therefore, as new objects - unperceived before, also appear in dream, so the dream-world which may have in some aspects the resemblance of the waking world is not exactly the image of that world produced out of our memory. Both of these two aspects of dream have been noted in the Upaniṣad.

Now as new things unperceived before appear in dream so ‘Saṅkarites hold that a new world emerges before us and it is projected or idealised by the individual himself.\(^1\) So it is a new creation. If those objects appearing in dream are merely memory images, we cannot explain the appearance of those objects which have never been seen in the practical world. Besides in dream we actually perceive those objects, and that is impossible if they are taken simply as memory images. As we directly perceive them they exist at the spot at that time and are directly presented to our perception. But, while the dream world is projected by the individual, often in most cases, the impression of the objects perceived in the waking state help him to project the new world. ‘Saṅkarites hold that the parallel of it is found in error. In error also the individual with the help of avidyā projects an illusory object. That illusory object resembles some empirical object. Now the previous impression of that empirical

\(^1\) Māṇḍūkya Kārikā - Vaitathya Prakāraṇ, Sl-8.
object helps the projection of that illusory object that resembles it in name and in form. Thus according to the Saṅkaritītes all those objects that appear in error as well as in dream are not really memory images i.e. Smṛti but as Saṅkara says, they are 'Smrtirūpa' i.e. they resemble memory images.

From the Advaita standpoint nothing can be accepted as real unless it excludes contradiction and thus involves permanent existence. We cannot accept a thing as real simply because it appears and we perceive it. The illusory object presented in error appears directly before us, still it is not real. So also the dream world is not real. It seems to be real as long as we are not awakened. Therefore, the dream world only appears in dream and involves the illusory existence and indefinable character. The fundamental cause of the illusory projection in dream is indefinable avidvā - the main fundamental cause of all sorts of illusory projections.

To support their own position the Advaitins mention the Sruti** There is indeed the scriptural text which definitely implies the falsity of the objects appearing in dream. The Upaniṣad asserts that all those objects appearing in dream have no real existence. So they are idealised by the individual. And the objects that appear, being idealised by the Subject, are false because neither they really exist nor are they -non-existing-.

*See Adhyāśabhāsya - Definition of error.
**Na tatra rathā na rathayogā na pāṭhāṇāb bhavanti
Atha rathān, rathayogān pāṭhāṇa śṛjate -
Brhadāraṇyaka - 4/3/101 p-251 Poona Ed.
See also, Māṇḍukya Kārikā - Vāisthāya prakaraṇ - Sl.3
non-existing. Hence considering all these facts the Advaitins conclude that the dreamworld can never be real but it is false. And Gauḍapāda proves that as the dream world cannot be real so this empirical world also cannot be real. Just as the dream world is contradicted by awakening, so the phenomenal world with the diversity and differences that it includes, courts contradiction as soon as the individual enters the state of pure intuition. This has been repeatedly said by the teachers (Advaita school). Judged from this standpoint the whole empirical world has but apparent existence. Indeed, if the dreamworld cannot be real because it courts contradiction by awakening, then our waking world cannot be real as it equally courts contradiction (viewed from the Advaita standpoint indeed) with the dawn of pure transcendental knowledge. And the teachers of the school (Advaita) hold that just as the ऋग्वेद had denied the reality of the objects presented in dream so the ऋग्वेद has denied also the reality of this empirical world.

Again the Advaitins prove that the evolution and destruction of this phenomenon confirms the falsity of this appearance. The fact is, the evolution of this empirical world has been explained in the ऋग्वेद. And in different systems of philosophy the same evolution has been interpreted and explained in various ways.

ways. Now Saṅkarites hold, in whatever way we may interpret evolution, the thing that evolves must be indefinable in character. As the real involves permanent existence so anything which is real cannot originate, because, being permanent the thing exists already. Again that which is unreal equally excludes the possibility of evolution, because, being unreal it can never appear or manifest itself in any way. Therefore, the effect is neither real nor unreal. It is false therefore. Gauḍapāda lays emphasis on this fact and asserts that the evolution is impossible if the world that evolves is taken either as sat (real) or as asat (unreal), or as sadasad (both real and unreal together)¹. In the same manner ultimate destruction of this phenomenon implies its falsity. Because, destruction of it is not possible unless it excludes both the real and unreal. Thus the indefinable character of this empirical world has been established by the teachers (Advaita school).

(c)

WORLD APPEARANCE

While Saṅkarites establish thus the falsity of this phenomenal world, the realists vehemently deny its falsity. The realists assert —

"We cannot deny the reality of this empirical world — as —

¹ Sadasadsadasadadāpi na kimcit vastu jñayate
Māndukya Kārīka - Alātā Stantonkaraṇa, S1.22
as our experience supports its existence. While experience proves that a thing exists and therefore it is real, we cannot prove it to be false by any other means. But though perceptual knowledge has priority to all other forms of valid cognition still in this particular case the Advaitins deny the priority of experience. Indeed, the priority of experience is admitted when it is valid and perfect. Perceptual knowledge is the basis of all other forms of valid cognitions. So experience has priority to all other valid means of proof recognised by us. But if the experience is not valid, if it is erroneous, it courts contradiction at a certain stage; and any other valid means of proof would have superiority to erroneous perception. Our practical experience at least confirms this fact. So, in the present case, the Advaitins hold that perceptual knowledge cannot substantiate the appearance as real, because perception in this case is sheer misapprehension and will be contradicted at a higher and purer stage of experience.

The validity of cognition - as the Advaitins hold, depends on the object it reveals. The cognition to be valid must reveal an object which is previously unknown (anadhigata) and which remains noncontradicted (abādhita) afterwards. The fact is knowledge in its true sense is opposed to ajñāna or avidyā. The function of

Tasmādaṣṭāarthagrāhaka tvaṃ pramāṇāṃ pramāṇam
vācyam - Saruṣaṅgraha, Samkṣepasārāraka - Chap.II/Sl.8.
of consciousness through the mind is essentially meant for removing ignorance. And here is the distinction between a valid cognition and an erroneous apprehension. Valid cognition destroys avidvā whereas in erroneous apprehension avidvā remains intact. Avidvā is the fundamental cause of erroneous apprehension.

And (as the Advaitins hold) the object that appears in error is projected by the creative power inherent in avidvā. So in erroneous apprehension avidvā remains intact. But perfect and valid cognition always arises by destroying the avidvā. So the Advaitins hold that the cognition to be valid must reveal an object which is previously unknown and that implies that prior to the cognition of it we were ignorant about its existence and when the cognition arises, it destroys first of all the thick veil of ignorance which concealed from us the existence of that object. So also the object must exclude contradiction. Contradiction implies as we have seen before - the falsity of the thing that appears. And the apprehension of a false object equally courts contradiction like the false object itself. In fact, when we perceive a false object perception itself is imperfect. We do not accept it as valid, but we take it as error or misapprehension*. And as error or misapprehension its validity is contradicted just as the reality of the illusory object is contradicted afterwards.

*Mithyālambanaṁ māṁ mithyājaññanam...

Pancapadikā p. 199,
Brahmasūtra Sāṅkara Bhāgyam P.I.
Calcutta Sanskrit Series.
Now viewed from the above standpoint the cognition revealing the empirical objects can never be accepted as valid. The Advaitins hold that the empirical object cannot exist unknown.1 The fact is, a thing passes unknown because avidva screens it and thus conceals its existence. But avidva itself is insentient. So it cannot illumine itself. Empirical objects are also of the same character. Therefore, if avidva screens an empirical object, this activity of avidva must remain unknown, as neither the avida nor the object itself has got the capacity to reveal this fact. And in that case there is no possibility at all of the revelation of the object because unless we are conscious at first that some thing exists there unknown, the possibility of knowing that object turns to be a fact which is impossible. The very urge for knowing the object is impossible in this case. Therefore, if avidva screens an insentient object within the empirical fold, there is no possibility of its revelation. And on this ground this has been repeatedly said by the teachers that avidva always envelops the self - the sentient being.2 The self as sentient being involves the self-expression. And while avida envelops it, this activity of avida becomes revealed to us by the inherent expression that the self possesses. Moreover, avida does not envelop an insentient object because the very purpose of such an action does not exist in this case. Avida envelops the self to conceal from us the expression inherent in the self. An insentient object

1. Samkṣepaśārīraka - Chap.-II, Sl.s.16-IS.
Samkṣepaśārīraka - Chap.I SL.309.
on the other hand has no such inherent expression to be checked by concealment. Judged from this standpoint also, an insentient object appearing on the empirical level cannot exist unknown like the self which is screened and concealed by avidya.

In the same manner the realm of object that appears in the plane of thought cannot exist uncontradicted for ever. Our perceptual knowledge fails at any event to confirm that the object that we perceive at present exists for all the time and thus involves permanent existence - which excludes contradiction. Because when we perceive an object the object surely exists there. But we cannot conclude therefrom that the object exists for all the time, past, present and future. Perception reveals only that the object exists at present. The past and future existence cannot be revealed in perception.

As the empirical world can neither have an existence beyond our perception - (so that it may remain unknown at a stage prior to its revelation in perception) - nor can involve the permanent existence which excludes contradiction for all the time, the Advaitins deny the validity of perception as evidence of eternal truth. The perception that reveals the empirical object is not, therefore, valid but it is a case of error or misapprehension. And for that reason, we cannot affirm the reality of the empirical world depending simply on the experience that reveals it. As an erroneous perception it can be easily ousted in the contest by any form of valid cognition - even if it is not a perception.

-Thus-
Thus from the metaphysical standpoint the Advaitins declare that all our experiences in the empirical level should be taken as so many cases of illusions. Now the question arises, if all our experiences in the empirical level are thus to be taken as mere illusions, then the distinction between a valid cognition and an erroneous apprehension which we maintain in this empirical level must cease to exist. But the Advaitins on the other hand maintain that distinction in the empirical level. So how can that be possible? In reply to this, it has been said that, though from the metaphysical standpoint no such distinction can be maintained, yet in the empirical level it is admitted because in our practical life few of us are really conscious of the fact that all our experiences here are nothing but mere illusions. So on empirical considerations only this distinction has been maintained. In dream we often accept some experience as real while we reject others as false though in reality all our experiences at that state belong to the same group as they are equally contradicted afterwards.¹

Moreover, from the empirical standpoint the moderate school of the Advaita Philosophers has tried to explain how the experience of an empirical object can be differentiated as valid from ordinary cases of illusion. Firstly, the empirical object as well as the

1. Abodhataḥ sakalāneva hi satyamithyā- bhūvikṣāmāneva evamivartyaivartyaevam evam svapnapi drṣṭamīdānevaḥ saṃbhūtājñatā " kāle bhavatvākhilānāmāpanātābodhāt.

Samkṣepaśārīraka - Chap.II, Sl.22.
experience that reveals it remain noncontradicted till the dawn of higher spiritual knowledge. So in the empirical level they involve noncontradiction. And as they involve noncontradiction, the experience in the empirical level should be accepted as valid. Secondly, all empirical objects appear because they are superimposed on the absolute existence. And the revelation of the empirical objects means the revelation of this absolute existence, because those insentient objects have no inherent expression or being but they are revealed when the underlying being expresses them by its own light which it involves as sentient being. Now avidva conceals from us this inherent light and self-expression of Being. So the object—which the underlying being reveals by its own inherent expression, remains unknown to us until avidva dissolves and the inherent expression of the being comes out of concealment. Therefore, though avidva does not screen an insentient object, yet the object can remain unknown. And when we perceive an empirical object the cognition arises destroying the avidva which conceals and screens the inherent expression of the being.* So an empirical experience can be taken as valid, as it reveals an object which remains unknown till the ultimate enlightenment arises and destroys the avidva that screens the inherent self-illumination of the underlying being and thus checks the revelation of the object superimposed upon it by the avidva.

*Samksepaśīrśaka - Chap.II/II.21. See also, Madhusudana's Sārasangraha.
But here the question arises - if avidyā dissolves in the above manner how can the empirical object appear at all. Avidyā is said to be the fundamental cause of the empirical appearance. Hence, if avidyā ceases to exist no empirical object can appear. In fact, the dissolution of avidyā means the dissolution of the whole empirical order. But no such consequences arises when an emancipated soul destroys avidyā, because the latter, though one stuff, has an infinite plurality of forms. Metaphysically, avidyā is one absolute entity with indefinable character. The same avidyā - endowed with double functions - screens the reality on the one hand and projects this cosmic appearance on another. Till the dawn of transcendental knowledge that reveals to us the underlying truth, avidyā remains intact, and our empirical life in its different phases continues uncontradicted. The absolutists (like Prakāśānanda) deny the plurality of avidyā. As many different objects that appear in the empirical level can be projected by the same avidyā so these absolutists hold that avidyā exists in a single body. Moreover the experience in the empirical level is also under the spell of avidyā. So when we perceive an empirical object avidyā remains intact. The dissolution of avidyā is not possible in fact till the dawn of transcendental knowledge. Hence, they reject the view supporting the plurality of avidyā. But the moderate teachers entertain the plurality of avidyā. Avidyā has got two phases namely the cosmic and the psychic.

Now avidya in its cosmic phase exists as a single body. But in the psychic phase it evolves the plurality. The moderate teachers hold that the number of avidya is as many as there are experiences in the empirical field. These series of avidyas in the psychic phase have been defined as avasthāpāna. Therefore, the experience in the empirical level can involve the destruction of avidya. Each experiences in fact arises according to this view supplanting or destroying the avidya. But as cosmic avidya remains intact the cosmic order continues as before. And as the psychic phase involves the plurality so avidya in this phase also continues though a particular phase of it may dissolve when we experience a particular object. Or it may be said that avidya does not dissolve when we perceive an empirical object, but it partly withdraws its veil, so that the underlying being becomes partly revealed to express the object that appears superimposed on it.

Thus on empirical considerations the moderate school supports the validity of empirical cognition. But from the metaphysical standpoint they maintain equally with the Absolutists that all our empirical experiences are but different cases of illusions and they must be cancelled as such as soon as the individual passes to the higher level of intuition.

2. Tattvapradipika - Chap-4/P-334, Bombay Ed.
Mūlānāsyaavāstabheda-rajetādyupādamāni ..
Brahmasūtra-Sāṅkara-Dhārayam P-I.
Calcutta Sanskrit Series.
As to the creation or appearance of this phenomenal "world the Advaitins entertain two theories as 1) Srstidrsti and 2) Drstisrsti. And these two theories represent respectively the moderate and extreme forms of Advaitism which developed side by side in the post-Bankara period.

According to the former theory i.e. Srstidrsti, creation is objective and external, though it is not real judged from the metaphysical standpoint. The creation is objective and external because the phenomenal world is not projected by the individual mind which is supposed to be the case when the object perceived is found to be contradicted as in ordinary error and dream. Though, ultimately, this phenomenon is false just like the dream-world, yet no individual mind can project this appearance.

Those who maintain the above viewpoint hold that the will of God is creative and the whole appearance emerges out of it. The theory of līlā affirms from this standpoint the spontaneity of evolution because there is no effort on the part of God, the Creator, for the expression of innumerable forms in the process of evolution. The evolution in fact starts from the very presence of this creative will. But though there is the will of God, yet as it is not consciously exerted to the creation of forms or the expressions of bliss, this spontaneity of creation, though creative process has a place and a meaning in it, is not necessarily a guarantee of its reality.

The main clue to this theory which supports creation from God is in the thesis that in the empirical
level the distinction that separates God and individual should be accepted as a fact though the ultimate truth, viewed in the light of pure intuition, involves absolute identity and as such excludes all such differences as God and individual. Now if one approaches the problem from the above standpoint accepting the distinction which separates God and individual, the most plausible conclusion should be that the creation is not from individual but from God. Let us see how this conclusion has been reached by the above theorists. In the Pañcapādikā the author maintains that the creation of this Universe cannot be attributed to the individual (jīva) because the individual with his limited power and knowledge cannot create this vast cosmic universe. Indeed the finite mind cannot even comprehend in its totality this vast universe with multitudinous forms within it. And that which the finite mind cannot even comprehend in its totality cannot be created by him. Therefore, it has been admitted that this Universe has been created by God who holds infinite power and possesses all-comprehensive knowledge and thus far supersedes the individual both in power and knowledge. This superiority in power and knowledge therefore entitles God to be the creator and sustainer of this finite world. Moreover the creation is attributed to God because the Being in the position of God reveals and energises māyā - the fundamental principle which unfolds this appearance and thus completes the play of differentiation for which it exists.

1. Pañcapādikā - p - 898, 915; Brahmasūtra-Sāhkara-Bhāṣyam - P-II. Calcutta Sāmkrit Series
2) The second theory i.e. Dr̥ṣṭīśr̥ṣṭi embodies just the opposite view because according to this theory creation is subjective or mental.

Now the theory of subjective creation has been entertained by two different groups. In the *Vedānta-Siddhānta-Muktāvali* for instance, Prākāśānanda has established that creation is subjective throughout. Again in the *Bhāmaṭi*, Vācaspati Miśra maintains the same view i.e. he admits that the creation is subjective. But though both of these teachers mentioned above equally profess the subjectivity of creation they arrive at this conclusion from two different standpoints.

The theory of subjective creation maintained by Prākāśānanda is based on the one soul theory (*ekānātyavāda*) which he has entertained in his work*. Now according to the one soul theory the reflected consciousness in *avidyā* is individual himself and not God. That same individual projects this cosmic phenomenon being overpowered by the delusive spell of *avidyā*. Hence the whole material world as well as other individuals who appear in the empirical stage of life are but different projections of the individual subjective will. Hence the whole creation is subjective.

But Vācaspati does not accept the one soul theory. He entertains rather the many soul theory*. Moreover as a pure absolutist Prākāśānanda does not accept the -empirical-
empirical scheme which all the moderate teachers—(Advaita School)—even Saṅkara himself have laid down on empirical consideration. In the empirical scheme God is the supreme head and the distinction between God and individual is a fact which cannot be shelved till the individual passes to the higher level of intuition. Now Vācaspati accepts this empirical scheme. Thus here is another point of difference with Prakāśananda. Hence Vācaspati's conclusion that the creation is subjective rests on a different basis.

As it has been explained in the Bhāmatī (Vācaspati's commentary), creation is subjective because the individual himself is the locus (ādhāra or āsrava) of avidyā¹. The fact is—we have noted it on more than one occasion that avidyā is the fundamental principle underlying the cosmic evolution. And Vācaspati says that the individual himself is the locus and centre of that cosmic energy. So it has been concluded that the individual himself projects this appearance for his own enjoyment with the help of cosmic avidyā. But though the individual himself projects or creates this world for the sake of his own enjoyment, he remains completely unconscious of this whole procedure. And being deluded by his own ignorance he attributes the creatorship of this world to Īśvara² who in reality has nothing to do with it. In Vācaspati's opinion Īśvara exists as the fundamental underlying.

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underlying basis (ādhisthāna) of these projections by the individual and He reveals the whole appearance along with avidvā itself. So in one sense God may be called the supreme cause of evolution, because, ultimately, the whole of this creation realises its character being supported and revealed by God. But the projection proper is made by the individual himself and not by God because the individual exists as the centre and locus of avidvā. That the individual is the locus of avidvā can be inferred from the fact that between God and individual the individual bears all those effects in the form of ignorance etc. which are produced by the darkest spell of avidvā.

Thus in Vācaspāti’s opinion the creation is subjective because the individual himself projects this appearance. But there is one thing which still remains unsolved and that is, if there are many individuals (jīva) which Vācaspāti accepts as he entertains the many soul theory, and if each of those individuals separately projects this appearance for his own enjoyment then how is it that to all of us this phenomenal world appears in the same form as if it is a single whole. In reply to this it can be said that in our practical life it so happens sometimes that more than one person perceives at a time in error the same object though they have separately projected the illusory object appearing in error. In the same manner this phenomenon appears in the same form to all of us though each individual projects it -separately-.
separately with the help of the fragment of cosmic avidya that exists in them. Moreover the expression of empirical forms depends on God. Therefore the phenomenon appears in the same form to all of us because the basis of revelation is Brahman.

The theory of līlā from Vācaspāti's standpoint has also been explained by his followers. We have noted before that to those who maintain the objectivity of creation hold that the creation is from God. Līlā implies the spontaneity of creation which starts at the very presence of the will that belongs to God. From Vācaspāti's standpoint līlā implies the uninterested joy which God enjoys when He witnesses the play of creation and enjoyment which the individual, the reflection of His own being, has started unconsciously. So the author of the Vedānta-Kalpataru says that God enjoys like a person who witnesses the various distortions of his own reflection.

Thus both Vācaspāti and Prakāśānanda hold that the creation is subjective but they hold it from two different standpoints. Due to this fact while Vācaspāti admits the difference which this empirical world involves from the illusory objects that appear both in error and in dream, Prakāśānanda rejects this and compares this phenomenal world with dream bodies and other illusory objects presented in error. From Vācaspāti's standpoint there are many individuals and this appearance is projected separately by all

*Pratibimvagatah paśyanti rjuvakādviśparvāh
Prīmān kriṣṇed yathā Brahma tathā jīvasāsa-vikṣyāḥ.
Vedānta Kalpataru - II/1/33, P-482
Brahmaśūtra Sāṅkara Bhāṣyam. Bombay Ed.
of them. So this empirical world shall continue to exist even if any one of us rises at a certain stage to a higher level of intuition and becomes emancipated or passes to a different phase of experience as it is in dream. The empirical appearance may not appear before that particular individual whether forever or for the time being. But to others it will continue as before. Moreover the existence of this empirical world depends on the total body of avidva which being in as many parts as there are individuals exists in each of those individuals screening their consciousness of the higher reality. So until all those parts which constitute the total body of avidva dissolve this appearance must continue intact. Therefore, though the empirical world is false still we cannot compare it with the illusory bodies which have no stability at all. But as a pure absolutist Prakasananda does not endorse the above view. To Prakasananda there is absolutely no difference between the dream experience and the waking experience. They belong to the same level i.e. they are equally false as in each of those cases the individual idealises the world with the help of avidva.

Thus from the standpoint of Prakasananda this empirical appearance presented in our waking state does not involve a higher grade of existence from the dream bodies. In fact, from this standpoint, dream represents the truth greater than jñagrat (waking state) because the

2. Vedantasiddhantamuktavali - P.45 - 54, Calcutta Ed.
free play of idea and the creative power of the individual are exhibited more clearly in dream. We have noted it already that dream world is not necessarily the reflection of the world that we see. It is, seriously speaking, a new world projected on the canvas of the soul covered in that state of existence. It is necessarily a higher state in the sense that it is not only reflective but it is creative. And creation is not here the projected will of yogic consciousness, but it is the projection of idea. It does not recognise the focus of will as it is in the former case. So, the Upanisad also says that in dream the individual (soul) realises his magnanimity.

Now, if we compare this phenomenon with the dream bodies then these empirical objects are nothing beyond perception. What we perceive in dream does not exist anywhere outside the mind, and it exists so long as we perceive it. Prakāśananda however admits that all these empirical objects are nothing beyond perception¹. But to some of the modern scholars this view of Prakāśananda involves deviation from the original doctrine of māyā which Śaṅkara and his predecessors have propounded on the basis of the Śrutim. This has been taken in fact as a new phase of the later Advaitism which developed

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¹Atrāsadevaḥ svapne mahimāmanubhavati. Prāśnopaniṣad - 4/5.

1. Ātmaneṣvaya jage svātavat vratimātram satattvākam udbhuya sthāsavayā vinayāt mūhurmutah.
Vedanta Siddhanta Muktavali p.39.
Calcutta Edition.
the influence of the Buddhist scepticism. But viewed properly, Prakasanandā's conclusion is the main fundamental thesis of the Advaṅita Philosophy as from the metaphysical or esoteric standpoint there is really no difference between the existences known as Vyayāhārika and Pratibhāṣika respectively. Their distinction has been entertained only on practical consideration. That there is absolutely no distinction between those two types of existence-viewed from the metaphysical standpoint, has been openly admitted by no less a person than Madhusūdana himself¹. And if it is admitted that this empirical world belongs to the same level with the illusory presentation without slightest distinction from the latter, then the most plausible conclusion is that these empirical objects like the illusory objects have no objectivity and therefore they are nothing but subjective contents of perception.

**Ajitavāda**

Besides the theory of subjective creation maintained by Prakasanandā there is Ajitavāda which has been professed by Gauḍapāda². Absolute denial of creation is the main purport of this theory. Naturally, Ajitavāda has been taken by our modern scholars as a deviation from the original doctrine of Maya. But in fact, Ajitavāda is the central theme of the Advaṅita Philosophy.

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1. Advaitasiddhi - p.567; Nirṇayasāgar Ed.
2. Edattaduttasatya yatra kīcchit na jāyate
   Māṇḍukya Karika - Advaita Prakāraṇa, Sl.48.
Since Brahman is the only reality and since with Brahman there is no real touch of māyā which is a false entity, 
jñāti should be the natural and proper conclusion.

The ultimate truth being non-relational existence, the relational idea of cause and effect is itself an illusion. Therefore the whole process of creation is said to be supported by māyā or avidyā— an indefinable mysterious principle opposed to knowledge. Such a creation cannot be accepted as real. We can accept it so long as we remain ignorant of the higher truth under the influence of the same avidyā. So there is no objective creation viewed properly. Again when the supreme intuition dawns the empirical world vanishes along with its fundamental cause. So, ultimately, creation, whether it is subjective or objective, has no meaning or status. The very idea of creation is based on a false notion which makes possible the appearance of this phenomenon which is devoid of real existence.

From the Advaita standpoint there are three stages of comprehension. The first stage involves the practical reason. At this stage one is bound to accept the parināmaśāda, because according to our practical reason all empirical objects are real as they exist and appear before us. Avidyā of course is at the root of this practical reasoning. The second stage involves the working of transcendental reason. Vivartavāda develops at this stage. Sraṇidrati and Drṣṭipratī which we have explained —before—
before represent different phases of this second stage of reasoning. At first, all the empirical forms are denied to be real ultimately, but the individual, still having a realistic bias, maintains their empirical existence and thus ascribes to these forms a higher grade of existence which is different slightly from mere illusory existence of a thing. So empirically Creation is accepted though from the metaphysical standpoint it is denied to be real. Then the second stage follows. At this stage even the empirical existence ascribed to those objects for differentiating them from mere illusory bodies is denied. The whole creation therefore turns to be an illusion. The last stage is alātī. The pure immediate intuition that reveals the truth and destroys all illusions unfolds itself at this stage. As soon as the intuition emerges the individual realises its absolute identity with the Absolute Brahman and avidyā totally dissolves. Hence the duality can have no raison d'être to appear. So the creation is totally denied. All these three stages enumerated above come successively in the life of the individual. The same being, says the author of the Samkṣepa-Sārīraka, passes through all those three stages which come successively in the life of the individual.

*Samkṣepa-Sārīraka - Chap.II/S1s.91-93.*