OBJECT OF BELIEF

"Socrates - And if he thinks, he thinks something, doesn't he?
Theaetetus - Necessarily.
Socrates - And when he thinks something, he thinks a thing that is?
Theaetetus - Clearly.
Socrates - But surely to think nothing is the same as not to think at all."

This is the conversation between Socrates and Theaetetus in Plato's book 'Theaetetus'. The same line of comment is available in Malebranche and also in Blake.

1. Plato, Theaetetus (189A), London, William Heinemann, 1921, p.175.
2. Paul Gochet refers to the two comments made by Malebranche and Blake in Outline of a Nominalist Theory of Propositions, p.88.
The comments of different thinkers show that any discussion of belief virtually leads to the discussion of object of belief. A reference to phenomenological analysis is more helpful in introducing the discussion of the object of belief.

In the discussion of phenomenology, Husserl speaks of the phenomenological method of epoché, the method of bracketing and there he admits that an act of consciousness necessarily points to its object upon which the act is done. Similarly, in the act of believing, there must be an object.

The most appropriate approach, I think, can be made in this respect, with reference to Russell's theory of truth. He lays down three conditions to be fulfilled by any successful theory of truth.3

First of all, any theory of truth, to be adequate, must take falsehood into account. Secondly, in a world of mere matter, the introduction of truth and falsehood is meaningless. There may be facts, but facts are neither true nor false. The material world has no truth or falsity, it is belief or statement that contains truth or falsity. But truth and falsity are not subjective. This leads to the third point that, though truth and falsity are properties of belief, the truth of belief depends on something beyond belief.

To make the third point clear, we may take an example. I believe that Mahatma Gandhi was assassinated. Now, what I believe is true not because of any private quality of

3. B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, p. 70
belief itself, but because of the event of assassination. Similarly, if I believe that Mahatma Gandhi died of heart attack, I believe falsely because of the same event of assassination.

This third point of Russell's theory of truth is the correspondence theory of truth. Thus, truth of my belief depends on the correspondence between what I believe and the respective fact.

We may now enter into our main discussion. The second point mentioned by Russell helps us to reach a more or less self-evident proposition that belief is that which is either true or false. As we are familiar with the transition from second to third point, the inevitable question arising in this context is: In the act of believing, what is the bearer of truth and falsity? The answer depends on the choice between the referent theory of truth and the predicative theory of truth. According to the referent theory, truth-value is the referent of a sentence. It is in the extra-linguistic world. On the other hand, predicative theory of truth speaks of truth and falsity as the adjectives or predicates applicable to propositions or sentences.

3.1 THE REFERENT THEORY OF TRUTH

Frege is an advocate of the first theory. He distinguishes between the sense and reference of a sentence. According to
Frege points out that in ordinary language, truth is affirmed of pictures and sentences that are visible and audible, as well as of ideas and thoughts which are non-visible and inaudible. Ordinarily, truth is defined as correspondence which is a common sharable property of these entities. Frege rejects this theory because correspondence is a relation and truth, to be a correspondence, is also a relation obtaining between the two relata. But truth is not a relational property. If one does not know that a picture is intended to represent the Victoria Memorial, then one cannot know with what to compare the picture to determine its truth. Truth is non-relational in the sense that it is not relative to or with respect to this or that context or situation.

Similarly, idea and reality are of completely different nature, hence a perfect coincidence between them is impossible. We may define the fact of corresponding with reality as that of corresponding to certain laid-down respects, but we have to repeat the procedure in order to know the truth of those conditions and so on. We may have recourse to definition of the truth of an idea through some characteristics. But this also fares no better, because those characteristics are to be stated and the truth of that statement again is to be defined by another statement stating another charac-
teristics and so on. In Frege's terminology, therefore, the concept of truth is unique and indefinable. Some of his posthu­mosly published writings show that the meaning of both sentences 'Sugar is sweet' and 'Sugar is sweet' is true' are same. So the truth-predicate is doubly vacuous.

In his famous article entitled 'Der Gedanke' (Proposition' or 'Thought') Frege distinguishes between sense and reference in order to solve the philosophical problem of correctly ana­lysing informative identity statements, viz., 'The morning star is the evening star'. Thought is the sense or logical content of a sentence. The logical content of a sentence is that part expressed by the sentence which is relevant for the question of truth and falsity. So every sentence does not contain a thought. The question of truth-falsity arises in the context of indicative sentence, i.e., the sentence 'in which we communicate or assert something.'

Therefore, sense is the mode of presentation of the object. Sense of an expression may serve as an item of information about, a description of or a means of picking out the referent. It provides us with a criterion of identification for the object referred to by this means. Where we have different singular referring expressions, i.e., proper names, each of which has its own sense, we have different criteria of identification for the same object. The reference of a sentence, on the other hand, is assimilated with the truth-value of a sentence.
Now Frege shows that thoughts are neither material objects nor ideas. That thoughts are not material objects is clear from the fact that the latter are amenable to ordinary perception. Perception here stands for outer and not internal perception. They also have spatio-temporal location which thoughts lack. Idea includes all mental contents and activities excepting decision. Thought is not an idea, because, unlike an idea, thought is not the content of consciousness. It is obvious from the fact that the thought expressed by one person in the Pythagorean theorem can be recognized by other persons. It could not be the case if thought belongs to the consciousness of that person only. Thoughts are objective and publicly available while ideas are private.

Secondly, if thoughts are ideas, then the words 'true', 'false' that arise in the context of thoughts are meaningless, because the question of truth and falsity is meaningless in respect of ideas. But this possibility destroys the foundation of all scientific enquiry. The most interesting point to note here is that someone who upholds the thesis that thoughts are private ideas could not even dispute the opinion of his opponent who says that thought is not an idea. The reason is, what the former recognizes to be true is, on his own view, the content of his own consciousness and does not concern others. So the attempt to identify thoughts with ideas frustrates its own ambition.
Prof. Woozley says that a thought is not even a mental state. A mental state arises in a temporal order. For example, it does not make sense to ask a man, 'Where does exist your desire to buy a new Maruti car?' Mental states however occur in a particular time.

The question remains - What is the ontological status of propositions? Prof. Woozley says that "it has being, but it is outside space and time. It is a queer substantial entity..." So any specification of the status of a proposition baffles all attempt at analysis.

Frege, however, is of the opinion that thought must be accommodated in a third realm. Frege, like Moore, says that thoughts are only apprehended. Apprehending them is not creating them, but it is just coming to stand in a certain relation to the mind-independent thoughts. And here it differs totally from seeing a thing and having an idea. Thoughts therefore belong to the realm of senses.

Frege's view is similar to that of Prof. Woozley because both of them find a similarity between thoughts and ideas of Plato. Frege, however, has refused to call thoughts something real, because everything considered to be real occurs in space and time. That thoughts are not existent can be shown in the following argument:

5. Gottlob Frege - The Thought, A Logical Inquiry (Trans. by A.M. and Marcelle Quinton) in P.F. Strawson's Philosophical Logic; also in Mind, Vol. 65 (1956), pp. 289-311.
1. Nothing non-spatial and timeless is existent
2. Thought is non-spatial and timeless.
   \[\therefore\] Thought is not existent.

That the second premise is true is obvious to us. The thought that we express in the Pythagorean theorem is timelessly true, independently of whether anyone knows it to be true or not. So thinking is a case of discovering something that is already there rather than of constructing something for ourselves.

That the first premise is true becomes clear from the fact that the existent is that which is actual. In a word, the real is that which is causally connected with another thing. It reminds us of the Buddhistic principle: "Arthaka\'yaka\'ritvam Sat." This principle runs as follows: to be real is to be effective. Now, it is obvious that to be effective is to be in space and time. And consequently, these two premises yield the conclusion that to be real is to be in space and time. So the aforesaid argument for the theory that thoughts are not real is proved.

This does not mean that according to Frege, thoughts are unreal entities. Thoughts do not lack being. They are objective. Thought is real but not in the sense in which a material thing is real. A material object is real in an actual sense, thought is real in an objective non-actual sense.

In Fregean analysis, a sentence is a linguistic entity. The question is: What is the ontological status of its sense?
and reference? According to him, both are extra-linguistic, and as we have seen, he upholds that beside the mental and the physical world, there is a third world to accommodate the extra-linguistic abstract entity, i.e., the sense of a sentence. Frege explains the truth of a belief by an appeal to the transition from sense to reference. But the ontological status of sense and reference being unclear, the theory of belief also suffers from the same defect.

Frege’s reflection of the correspondence theory of truth is not accepted by the later thinkers. Prof. Dummett says that there may be a regress in the correspondence theory of truth, but it is not vicious. It is a fact that when we accept p to be true, then without involving into self-contradiction we cannot doubt the statement that p is true, and also the statement that the statement that p is true is true etc. The thought being the same in all these cases, we cannot say that to know p to be true we must know the statement 'p is true' to be true.

It is also easy to say that the above steps are not logically distinct from each other. But a real regress is vicious when its steps are distinct from each other making them different. If in spite of this difficulty one defends Frege by saying that the steps are distinct but equivalent, viz., to know p to be true, we have to know the truth of the statement 'p is true', both being equivalent to each other; then it is equal to saying that to know 'p' we have a prior knowledge of
'p (qv ~q)' because they are equivalents. But nobody will accept that a complex thought should precede a simpler one.

In fact, if the correspondence theory is interpreted in this way, i.e., truth of p is defined in terms of correspondence of the statement to the fact, then we cannot reach the fact without a prior knowledge of the truth-condition of the sentence. Frege's solution in this respect is that thought is a true fact and thought being the truth-bearer, fact also becomes a truth-bearer. Hence, there is no need of correspondence theory.

There is also another alternative interpretation of correspondence theory that is found in Moore's analysis. Here, what makes a sentence true is the fact which is asserted by the sentence. So, if a sentence is true, we shall notice a fact there. In this case we have correspondence between fact and a sentence. Both the facts that p and that p is true are the same here, and hence no question of infinite regress arises here.

This interpretation is very much like the interpretation of Naiyāyikas. They explain truth and falsehood in terms of correspondence between words and things. There is neither propositions nor facts. 'Tadvati Tat-prakārakatva' explains that to know the truth of the statement 'the flower-vase is on the floor', we require a perceptual knowledge of the flower-vase on the floor.
3.2 THE PREDICATIVE THEORY OF TRUTH

It is better then to turn to the predicative theory of truth. Let us first analyse the phrase 'Object of belief'.

The phrase 'Object of belief' may be interpreted in three different ways. It may mean either (1) what we believe about, or (2) what we believe, or (3) what we believe about it. We may take a concrete example, 'I believe that rose is red'. In the first sense, object of belief is rose, according to the second sense it is the proposition that rose is red and in the third sense the object of belief is that it is red. In a sense, as Prof. Prior views it, (2) is very much like (3), because to believe in the redness of rose is to believe that the rose is red. It is important to note here that according to (1), objects of belief are sometimes real and sometimes abstract. For example, in this context, what I believe about is a rose and hence not abstract. But when we think about a colour or a number, then the object is abstract. On the other hand, in the second sense, the object of belief is a proposition and hence it is always abstract.

FACT IS THE OBJECT OF BELIEF

Sometimes fact is considered to be the object of belief. The accusative or knowledge is a fact. Accordingly the accusative

7. The claim of (1) to be object of belief is found in A.N. Prior's Object of Thought, Part II and A.J. Ayer's Foundations of Knowledge, p. 103-104.
of belief should also be a fact. Prof. Woozley however shows that while knowledge has fact as its accusative, belief cannot have the same. The reason is, the latter is taken to cover both cases of true and false belief and nobody dares to point to a fact that corresponds to a false belief.

In fact, even true beliefs cannot have facts for their accusatives. The reasons advanced for this remark are as follows. 8

In the first place, if belief has fact as its accusative, then it is difficult to distinguish between knowledge and belief. But there is evidently a distinction between knowledge and belief even when the fact is the same. The distinction is that the belief happens to be true. So, even if it is true we cannot say what the fact is. But when we have true knowledge, we can say what the fact is.

Prof. Woozley remarks that this argument is not very strong because it is not merely a difference of fact that sufficiently accounts for the difference between knowledge and belief. Rather, it is the difference in the manner of conceiving that counts much in this context. The strength of the argument however is that it makes it clear that a fact may be the object of a true belief, but it cannot be recognized to be a fact, because then it will make the true belief a piece of knowledge.

More difficulty arises in connection with the conception of time. The second argument raises the problem of believing

the future. My present belief that tomorrow will be a sunny day cannot have a corresponding fact just now. The belief will be true when on the next day, we shall see sun shining the clear sky.

The third argument is a similar one that speaks of believing the past. For example 'I believe that Rabindranath Tagore got the Nobel Prize in 1913'. Here, I do not have the fact corresponding to my belief, because the fact belongs to a distant past when I was not born.

Prof. Woozley, however, gives no credit to these arguments, because they confuse facts with events. Events have a temporal context, while facts cannot have it. The question of happening or occurring arises in the context of an event and not in that of a fact, because we cannot have sensation of fact.

In the fourth place, objects of true belief and that of false belief must have category-sameness (i.e., they are of the same sort). Their difference lies in what makes the belief true in some cases and false in others. It is the correspondence or non-correspondence of our content of belief with the fact that makes one belief true and other false respectively. Therefore, it is clear that both true and false belief have the same object, but they are different in their corresponding relation to the fact. There is a distinction between what we believe and what makes our beliefs true or false.

One thing, therefore, is clear that object of belief -
either true or false—is not a fact. So we conclude that if it is not a fact—that is reserved for the object of knowledge—then it may be proposition which is the object of belief. Hence it is the correspondence between the proposition and the fact that accounts for the truth or falsity of a belief.

According to Prof. Ryle, in the second sense of 'object of belief' we can accept that propositions are the objects of belief. That (2) is the proper interpretation of object of belief is evident when Prof. Woozley says "belief is always belief that." To say 'I believe Mr. X' is an elliptical way of saying 'I believe what Mr. X says'. Here 'believing that' is to be understood in the same way as 'knowing that'.

Before entering into its detail, it is necessary to be acquainted with the notion of proposition.

PROPOSITION IS THE OBJECT OF BELIEF

Ordinarily proposition is defined in this way: (i) it is the meaning of sentences, and (ii) it is the bearer of truth-value. Sentences are classified into meaningful and meaningless sentences. It is the meaningful sentence that expresses a proposition. The question 'Are there propositions?' is the question of the ontological status of propositions that Frege tries to answer. Now that question is to be framed as: Do sentences have meaning? The answer is that, sentences except—

It is now necessary to distinguish propositions from sentences, facts and events.

A sentence is a form of words arranged according to the grammatical and syntactical rules of the language to which the sentence belongs. The proposition, on the other hand is not made in a particular language. It is the meaning of a sentence. For example, 'I think, therefore, I am', 'Cogito ergo sum' and 'Je pense, donc je suis' are three different sentences in different languages, but they all express the same proposition.

Again, the same proposition in different contexts or to different people bear different meanings. For example, the sentence 'It is hot today', when uttered in mid-summer expresses the speaker's feeling of discomfort and his refusal to make any outdoor programme. It is the same sentence uttered in the winter season, that speaks of pleasant atmosphere and the speaker's eagerness to make programme. To a child, the sentence 'the prices of such and such commodities will rise on the 25th day of July' is an ordinary sentence like another one such as 'today is Thursday'. But it is of great meaning to the child's father.

The second feature of a proposition is evident in Aristotle's semantic definition of proposition in terms of truth and falsity. The definition says that it is a necessary condition of proposition that it has the characteristics of truth and falsity.
Following Aristotle, many philosophers admit proposition as the vehicle of truth and falsity. For example, W.E. Johnson says that truth and falsity can be significantly predicated to a proposition. His reason is, proposition is not merely the verbal expression of the judgement, because the set of predicates applicable to propositions is not identical with that applicable to verbal expressions. While truth and falsity are predicated of propositions, obscurity, ambiguousness are characteristics of verbal expressions. 10

R. Eaton says that the attributes truth, falsity, impossibility, etc. are applicable to propositions, and not to sentences, facts or judgements. So propositions are different from the other three. When we say: It is true that 'salt is soluble', the truth is neither attributed to the quoted sentence having a grammatical form, nor attributed to the component words. The sentence may be in English, but the proposition is not. 11

That a proposition is not made in a particular language is echoed in the writing of William Kneale also. He says that propositions transcend linguistic particularity and hence are the appropriate vehicle of truth or falsity. 12

A proposition is distinct from an event, because the latter is a happening having a temporal and spatial relation with the

object-world. On the other hand, a proposition is not an occurrence. An event is not a fact and a proposition is also different from fact.

There is a trend to equate facts with true propositions. Prof. Prior remarks\(^{13}\), that this equality can be maintained in so far as both facts and true propositions are viewed as 'logical constructions'. A logical construction is that which is not real, but we construct them to know something. They are incomplete symbols. They, by themselves, denote nothing. They can be defined only contextually. For example, in the sentence 'the present king of India is wise', we have a definite description 'the present king of India' which denotes nothing. It means that there is at least and at most one person who is the present King of India and who is wise. That the definite descriptive phrase is to be analysed in this way is shown by Russell in his explanation of the meaningful falsity of a sentence. The definite description is normally assumed to play the role of proper name. But this is definitely an error. A logically proper name is meaningless unless there is some single object designated by it. But definite descriptions, unlike proper names, have no meaning in isolation, yet sentences containing them may have a perfectly good meaning.

In this example, the definite description has no meaning in isolation. The whole sentence has for its meaning the three propositions expressed by these three sentences:

\(^{13}\) A.D. Prior, Objects of Thought, p.5.
(1) There is a King of India; and

(2) There is not more than one King of India; and

(3) There is nothing who is a King of India and is not wise.

In this analysis, the descriptive phrase entirely disappears because it is not a real constituent of the sentence at all. The original sentence is meaningful. But the first sentence of the analysis is a false sentence. The analysis being a conjunctive sentence, is itself false. This is how the meaningful falsity of the original sentence can be shown.

A proposition thus, as a logical construction, is just a way of speaking. The proposition 'The day is hot' is false if that the day is not hot (i.e., a fact). But if we mean by a proposition something propounded by man, then fact is not equal to true proposition. The reason is, the fact remained there in the distant past even if nobody thought or said about it. Like the fact, the truth of the proposition 'The Sun rises in the east' does not depend on any particular mind, but the proposition itself is to be made or known by a particular human being. Proposition, interpreted in this sense, is not equal to fact. Generally propositions are interpreted in this sense, hence facts cannot be equated with true propositions.

Early Moore

In the early writings of Moore we find a support of propo-

sitions as the objects of belief. An analysis in this respect shows that:

(1) Different mental acts may have the same object.

(2) In case of two acts of apprehension, viz., a belief that $3+2 = 5$ and a belief that $5+2 = 7$ what are apprehended are not the same, but two acts are generically similar.

(3) Beliefs are sharable.

All these lead to the concept of proposition. In the early Moore, we find a division of all the contents of the Universe into two classes - propositions and things. The propositions in this sense 'are'. A proposition is not meant to be mere collection of words. It is that which is expressed by the systematic collection of words.

There are certain characteristics of a proposition. First of all, we can entertain three kinds of mental acts in respect of apprehending a proposition. We may either believe or disbelieve or merely understand a proposition. In the third case we merely apprehend it, in the first two cases, we apprehend it and at the same time, have specific attitudes.

Secondly, apprehending a proposition is a mental act which is independent of any written or uttered sentence. Thirdly, a proposition is commonly expressed not by any collection of words, but by a whole sentence. In the fourth place, truth and falsity are attributes of propositions. Some thinkers are of the opinion that only acts of belief are either true or false and propositions being different from
acts of belief do not have the attributes viz., truth and falsity. To avoid this error, we must distinguish between acts of belief and the proposition believed. When we say two people entertain the same belief, what we mean is not that their acts of belief are same, we mean that they entertain the same proposition.

Now, a true belief has some peculiar relation to one and only one fact, while another belief has the same kind of relation to a different object. And this accounts successfully for the difference between two different true beliefs and that between two different false beliefs. We can distinguish between true and false belief by saying that in case of the former, the object of belief, i.e., the proposition 'is' and has an additional unanalysable property of truth. Belief is the belief in a proposition, and truth of the proposition is a fact which has a relation to that particular belief. No other facts except this one can have that relation to the belief. The relation that the particular fact has is that this particular fact is the truth of the particular proposition in which we have a belief.

To take an example, if my sister believes that I am hungry, then my hunger is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the truth of her belief, similarly absence of my hunger is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for the falsity of her belief. In other words, truth of her belief is dependent or conditioned by a correspondence between her belief and the believed fact in the Universe. Truth therefore,
is defined in terms of correspondence. Moore himself however does not insist on the word 'correspondence', what he intends to show is that there is a relation between the proposition on the one hand and the fact in the Universe, on the other.

In this context Moore criticises two different theories, one of the Pragmatists and other of F. H. Bradley. Pragmatists give stress on the workability of a true belief. This workability is however defined differently in different context of pragmatism, sometimes as useful, sometimes as leading to some kind of satisfaction. We can however understand it as one leading to some kind of satisfactory effects which are different in different places.

But this account is rejected on the ground that leading to satisfactory effects has nothing to do with corresponding to a fact in the Universe. My sister's belief that I am hungry may lead to satisfactory effects even when her belief does not correspond to the respective fact, i.e., when I am not hungry.

Bradley's theory of truth claims that each and every belief must be both partially true and partially false. In a word, this theory contradicts the claim that a belief is wholly true or wholly false.

An ordinary criticism against Bradley's theory is this: When my sister believes that I am hungry and the fact is that I am hungry, nobody will call her belief to be partially true or partially false without bringing sanity into question. Prof. Moore shows that to say that every belief is partially
false necessarily leads to saying that every belief is wholly false in the same sense.

The explanation is this. A particular belief expressed in a particular sentence may include several different beliefs. To take Moore's example, I may believe that the colour of a dress which I saw in a picture this afternoon is maroon. Here I may be believing two different things. One is that the colour I believe is identical with the one I am now thinking of. Secondly, I may believe that the colour I am thinking of is what others call 'maroon'. In both cases of believing there are possibilities to be right or wrong. Now the whole belief is that the colour I saw this afternoon is the one I am now thinking of and that the name of this colour is 'maroon'. We have already said that one of its parts may be partially false. As there is no such complex fact corresponding to the whole belief, the whole belief is false. One may say that it cannot be wholly false, because one part of it is not false. But, that part, being a belief, is also partially false, because this theory claims that every belief is partially false. It therefore follows, that the use of the term 'false' in the ordinary sense leads to the conclusion that all beliefs are wholly false. If, however, Bradley chooses a different sense in speaking of truth and falsity, then it cannot contradict our ordinary view that many of our beliefs are wholly true, because we use the concepts in the ordinary sense. Hence Bradley's thesis cannot be accepted.
Stebbing's View

That proposition is the object of belief is advocated by Prof. Stebbing also. She says that the unit of logical thinking is proposition. So, "a proposition is anything that is believed, disbelieved, doubted or supposed". The verbal expression of a proposition is a sentence.

Propositions are constituents of a process of reflective thinking. Proposition itself can be analysed into constituent parts which are the terms of a proposition. Propositions are related to the thinker who asserts them on the one hand and to the facts that make them true or false on the other. The relation of the thinker to proposition is that of judging, believing, doubting which are acts of consciousness.

A fact is not an event because it does not occur at a particular time, though some facts have reference to a particular time. Each fact is constituted of two or more constituents. Charles I is unfortunate is a fact which consists of a thing, viz. Charles I and a quality of being unfortunate. That Charles I was defeated at the battle of Naseby is a fact with regard to Charles I and battle of Naseby. If I now judge that Charles I was defeated at the battle of Naseby it is another fact. But the proposition judged is the same.

Now facts simply are, they are neither true nor false. Only propositions can be true or false, and their truth or

15. S. Stebbing, A modern introduction of logic, p. 33.
falsity depends on their relation to facts. 16

Advantages of the Theory

The proposed theory of proposition as the object of belief has some important advantages.

First of all, the proposition is mind-dependent, yet its character of being true or false is independent of any particular mind. The proposition is objective in the sense that whenever anybody knows it, he knows a true proposition. Insofar as the truth value of a proposition need not depend on a particular mind, the proposition accounts successfully for an objective truth which is also independent of any particular mind.

Secondly, this theory serves one of the most vital functions of a language, i.e., communication. No discussion between two persons is possible unless they agree or disagree to the same issue. I say to my friend 'tomorrow is a holiday' and we go on making our programme for tomorrow. This is all possible because we entertain the same proposition expressed by the said sentence. As because this theory defines proposition as the meaning of sentence, possibility of communication by means of language is very well assured by this theory.

16. It is important to note that this remark of Stebbing differs from what I will say later that propositions are not primary bearers of truth and falsity.
A corollary of this second point is that propositions are sharable. It does not of course imply that two persons have identical acts of apprehending a proposition.

It leads to the third point that a proposition breaks the barrier of language. It reminds us of the remark of Prof. Strawson in the context of logical and linguistic statements. A logical statement is made by the use of a sentence obtaining a word of logical appraisal for the purpose of bringing out logical relationship between two or more sentences. Anybody makes a logical statement when he utters this sentence: 'Any statement to the effect that Mr. X is over six feet tall is inconsistent with any statement to the effect that Mr. X is under six feet tall.'

A linguistic statement, on the other hand, is made by a sentence formed by the use of a linguistic rule explaining the use of words or expressions. A linguistic statement has reference to a corresponding linguistic rule of definition.

Now a linguistic statement made in English language may be translated into French. The meaning of two linguistic sentences, one in English and another in French are different because each has the rules of its own language. But if the logical statement in English is translated into French, it has no reference to a particular language. So they express the same meaning. Thus logical statements cut across the barriers of languages which linguistic statements are not supposed to do. 17

Like those logical statements, propositions in the present sense cannot be branded as English or French. It is the sentence which is in English or in French. We have said the propositions are not personal. Similarly, they have no temporal context. If on the 31st of December 1989, I say 'tomorrow is the 1st day of January 1990' and if on the next day I say 'Today is the 1st day of January 1990', I assert the same proposition by the two sentences, the difference lies in two occasions of thought in two different times.

Propositions are also neutral in respect of attitudes. Mental states viz. wondering, doubting, believing, knowing of different persons may occur in the context of same proposition. Even those mental states of a single person also may occur in the context of a single proposition. For example, I may say 'The result of M.A. Exam this year will be published tomorrow.' Now I am doubtful about it on the day before the publication of the said result. I only believe it even in the morning of the day of publication. In the evening of that day when it is actually published, I become fully certain about it.

Finally, we often have disputes in our conversation. Now, neither a mind nor a fact is incompatible with another mind or another fact respectively. We disagree with each other regarding proposition. Incompatibility arises in the context of a proposition. Attitudes however are sometimes incompatible with each other, but this incompatibility is of a different sort. To say that my attitude is incompatible with that of
Mr. X is to say that what I believe is incompatible with what Mr. X believes, i.e., both of us cannot be right at the same time. So incompatibility of attitudes is virtually that of the objects of attitudes, i.e., the propositions.

Thus it appears that if this theory of proposition is adopted, then it fully accounts for a successfully theory of belief by admitting that there are propositions between our minds and the objective fact outside the world.

Having a conception of proposition, let us see whether the theory of proposition is successful in advocating propositions as objects of belief. Let me start with D. Davidson’s view.

Comments on the Theory

D. Davidson rejects the idea that proposition as the meaning of a sentence is the object of belief. Davidson’s theory is an antidote to the age-old convention that sentences have meaning and belief that p (here ‘p’ is a sentence) depends on the knowledge of the meaning of p. According to Davidson, knowledge of the meaning of a sentence is not sufficient for linguistic understanding. It is the knowledge of the truth-condition of a sentence that is sufficient for this purpose.

We may take Davidson’s example of a belief that it’s midnight. Ordinarily, this belief is justified by combining meaning and truth of the sentence ‘It’s midnight’. Using the symbol S for the sentence, we can lay down the justificatory element of the belief as follows:
(1) If a sentence S is true, and if S means that £*, then jd *

Davidson comments that omission of the element of meaning in this context can hardly affect the justificatory element of the belief. Though here meaning, in Davidson's terminology "suffices in the present case to account for the justificatory element, but perhaps such knowledge is not necessary". 

Davidson therefore replaces (1) by (1*) :

(1*) The words 'It's midnight' are true in English ('when uttered to me) iff it is midnight at the time of utterance.

Here is no reference to meaning. It is important to note here that Ernest Lepore explains Davidson's attempt to do away with meaning as an attempt which is based on the law of persimony. Briefly speaking, his point of reasoning is this: If we can account for understanding by appealing both to truth and meaning and at the same time by appealing to truth alone, the law of persimony insists us to accept the second. But Ernest Lepore does not mention that the left side of the biconditional in (1*) is not identical with the sentence 'S is true'. In the biconditional, there is temporal element present and this element is lacking in any of the antecedents of (1). Lepore, however, refers to Jerry Katz who argues that in some cases mere knowledge of truth-condition is not sufficient for linguistic understanding and so meaning is not superfluous. So a case of belief is to be explained in terms of both truth and meaning of the sentence in question.

18. Ernest Lepore, Truth and Interpretation, p.3.
The question however centres round the claim of proposition to be the object of knowledge. We may start with the view that this theory acts as an hypothesis very much like the one on which the scientists rely in proceeding investigation.

It is a fact that scientific investigation starts with one or more hypotheses. In the course of investigation, if the scientists get some results not at par with observed facts, then they reject the hypothesis in question. If there are more than one hypothesis, the process of elimination is to be pursued, i.e. every hypothesis is to be worked upon until the correct one yields the desired result.

Now, if this theory of proposition acts as hypothesis, the question is whether it is the only one or one among other possible hypotheses. If it successfully explains the relation of believing, then it is to be established. But in that case, as Prof. Woolsey says, many philosophers should have accepted it, while it is not the case.

The only alternative is that it is one of the many hypotheses. But there are some difficulties. First of all, the theory cannot be verified in this way, because there is no further set of possible facts to be deduced from it.

To explain the second point, we can cite an example from science. There is a fact of solidification of water at freezing point. If a scientist explains this fact by saying that water turns to ice at that point, then he is actually...
providing no explanation which has got any reasonable basis. It is just like playing the same tune in two different instruments. Just like that, this theory of substantial propositions provide no real account for the object of belief. It is just suggesting the name of proposition to be an able candidate in this respect.

In the third place, if to believe something is to have a proposition before the mind to be believed, then the number of propositions cannot remain finite. This can be shown thus: It is not that there are propositions for every actual belief, but also for every possible belief, and also for every possible false belief. Men may have more or less similar beliefs with a very slight difference. According to this theory, each man has a separate proposition even for that slight variation in belief. There are also vague propositions for vague beliefs. It may also happen that in the course of a conversation between two people, they have the same belief with a slight variation. The variation is not necessarily to affect the essential part of their conversation. Hence they should have two different propositions before their minds. There is also another variety of logically impossible propositions corresponding to logically impossible beliefs. The admittance of such inconceivable propositions is to be explained only at the cost of sanity.

The notion of proposition as the meaning of sentence and the bearer of truth-value is not accepted by all. It is better to refer to Quine's reflection on this topic.
Quine's View of Proposition

Quine is very much opposed to the common view that in between language and reality, i.e. in between sentences and objective world, there are some other intangible entities, namely, meaning of sentence and fact. Accordingly, truth is also defined in terms of correspondence between meaning of sentence or proposition on the one hand and fact on the other. Quine objects that discussion about propositions is pressed so far that propositions do not remain as mere manner of speaking, they are rather esteemed as the bearer of truth and falsity and as a connecting link between language and reality. Propositions are considered to be the objects of knowledge and belief in the sense of 'knowing in' and 'believing in' respectively. Propositions are those which stand in the logical relation of implication. Quine rejects proposition both as the meaning of sentence and as the bearer of truth-value.

Quine's point of attack is different from other types of attack against this view. Some may adopt the view that the hypothesis of proposition is redundant from the perspective of philosophical parsimony, i.e., they hold that sentences and objective world are enough to account for our knowledge. Another type of attack may be the rejection of any intangible entity like proposition within our field of cognition. Quine's point is different. He says that admission of proposition is virtually admission of a 'certain relation' of synonymy or
equivalence between sentences themselves. In fact, synonymy is commonly understood in the context of single expressions. Two words or expressions are synonymous if they stand for the same object, i.e., if they mean the same object. Accordingly, in the context of sentences, synonymy is defined in this way: two different sentences are said to be synonymous if they have the same meaning, i.e., if they express the same proposition. But Quine opines that this concept of synonymy is unclear in both the contexts. Hence propositions cannot be admitted.

(1) Propositions are Meaning of Sentences

Let us first consider Quine's rejection of proposition as sentence-meaning. This rejection consists of two steps. In the primary step, Quine shows that the concept of sameness of meaning is far from being clear and secondly, even if for the sake of argument, we overlook the vagueness of this concept, still then the claim of proposition to be meaning of a sentence is "one manifestation of a widespread myth of meaning". Quine says in the same spirit, "It is as if there were a gallery of ideas, and each idea were tagged with the expression that means it, each proposition, in particular, with an appropriate sentence."

Regarding the primary step, Quine proceeds by saying that it is very much vague to say that sentences are alike in meaning. At the outset, enough measure should be taken to guard

20. ibid., p. 8.
against any sort of equation between meaning and specific tone of a sentence. The reason is, in restating someone’s utterance in indirect quotation, there is every chance of distortion of meaning, e.g., we may substitute a derogatory word for a neutral word, though we can maintain the sameness of reference. But in so far as objective information of a sentence is concerned, there is no such chance of distortion, because the presence of value-predicates is irrelevant to the objective information.

Hence, sameness of meaning, i.e., sameness of proposition is understood in the sense of sameness of objective information. So the introduction and acceptance of proposition necessitates a prior introduction of objective information. But Quine says that clarity of this notion is maintained only relative to a field that allows a pre-assigned matrix of alternatives. Let us take his own example of a half-tone picture where the objective information is the number of black points. Two paintings differing in colour, or shape or position may give the same information. It can also be successfully supplied by verbal specification. In a half-tone picture there are only black and white dots, hence two verbal specifications one giving the number of black dots and another of white dots may give the same information from a positive and a negative aspect respectively.

In particle physics, objective information can also be specified if we can give the set of possible worlds. Here, two
sentences express same proposition if they are true in all
the same possible worlds. Mathematical propositions are extreme
cases, i.e., they are true in all possible worlds.

But regarding ordinary empirical sentences, no such
matrix can be possibly given. We do not know which aspect is
to be studied in order to have the sameness of objective
information. We may know that a given sentence is true in the
actual world, but as we do not know how to compose the
possible worlds for that sentence, so we cannot say in which
possible world, this sentence is true.

Another attempt to explain the sameness of objective
information is found in the verification theory of meaning by
C.S. Peirce. He equates meaning of a sentence with the infor-
mation conveyed by it. The information is dependent on
experience because the truth of a sentence leads to such and
such experience while falsity of a sentence leads to some
other experience. But the concept of experience is studied
differently from different perspectives. For example, it can
be studied from the physiological or psychological, i.e.,
introspective aspect. So the concept of information again
remains vague.

It also becomes clear if we consider the cases of scien-
tific experiments. There are observation-sentences. If one
observation-sentence is false, it is not false in isolation.
It affects the whole theory in which it operates. Now, when a
theory is confronted with evidence against it, one way to
save the whole theory is to reject that hypothesis of it which is false. But it is difficult to determine what is to be accepted and what is not. Hence it implies that objective information cannot be specified.

In the second step of his criticism, Quine speaks of the problem of individuation of sentences. The problem is virtually the problem of defining cognitive equivalence of sentences. Quine points out that this latter problem cannot be tackled unless we define the concept of synonymy. But this concept of synonymy is not clear.

We may distinguish among four methods for determining synonymy, but none of them is acceptable. They are as follows:

The method of determining synonymy is either
1. by definition; or,
2. by analyticity; or,
3. by interchangeability salva veritate; or,
4. by interchangeability salva analyticitatem.

1. According to the first method two expressions, e.g., 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' are synonymous if one is defined by another. There are different types of definitions such as lexical, explicative, and stipulative or explicitly conventional definition.

The lexical definition is that which is provided in a dictionary. Quine finds a circularity in this suggestion. The lexicographer is a report-maker, his reports are based upon the knowledge that the two expressions are synonymously.

used in ordinary usage. So the dictionary is determined by a pre-existing synonymy.

The second suggestion involves the term 'explication' popularised by Carnap. It is a sort of philosophical definition in the sense that it is an attempted improvement upon the antecedent usage of a term for the sake of diminishing the vagueness of the antecedent usage. This modification is explication. For example, the term 'widow', was previously defined as a woman whose husband is dead. But due to some legal difficulties in the case of remarriage or in the case of polyandric society, the sharper definition of the term is 'a woman who does not belong to polyandric society and whose husband is dead and who is not remarried'. Explicative definition is used by scientists, philosophers mainly for the purpose of clarity and precision.

This definition does not depend on any pre-existing synonymy. But Quine views that the refined definition is not a total cancellation of the antecedent usage. Accordingly, it is partly determined by a pre-existing synonymy between the definiendum and the definiens.

The third type is stipulative definition which is explicitly conventional. It introduces new technical terms with the clear-cut assignment of meaning to it, and it is its weakness. Stipulative definition is relevant only to technical terms, but it is totally useless in the context of non-technical terms like 'bachelor' which has an antecedent usage.
So, definitional account cannot be an effective method of determining synonymy.

2. The second method appeals to analyticity. If we accept Fregean definition in this context, we find analytic truth to be defined thus: an analytic truth is either a logical truth or reducible to a logical truth by putting synonym for synonym. To make the definition clear, we can distinguish between two types of analytic statements:

   (A) All unmarried men are unmarried.
   (B) All bachelors are unmarried.

No. (A) is a logical truth, i.e., it remains true under any interpretation of its extra-logical expressions. In other words, a logical truth is a true statement in which either no descriptive constants occur or if they occur, they occur only vacuously. There is no difficulty with these statements. But No. (B) is true only upon the standard interpretation of the expressions 'bachelor' and 'unmarried'. It therefore introduces the notion of synonymy. Hence it is not a proper method of determining synonymy.

3. One may appeal to the third method of defining synonymy in terms of interchangeability. The suggestion is that the synonymity of two linguistic forms consists simply in their interchangeability in all contexts without change of truth-value. This is interchangeability, in Leibnitz's phrase, salva veritate. Following Frege, Benson Mates assumes that the meaning of a declarative sentence is a function of the
meanings of the words which compose the sentence. Furthermore, two declarative sentences having the same meaning will necessarily have the same truth-value. It follows from these two assumptions that the replacement of a word in a sentence by another word synonymous with it cannot change the meaning of that sentence and hence cannot change its truth-value.

Quine says that this is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for determining cognitive synonymy. That it is not a necessary condition is evident from the fact that there are some synonymous expressions which are not interchangeable salva veritate. For example, the sentence "'The Brothers Karamazov' is Dostoyevsky's greatest novel" is a true statement. But if we replace the expressions 'brothers' by its synonymous expression 'male siblings', then the sentence will be "'The Male Siblings Karamazov' is Dostoyevsky's greatest novel" which is not true. Thus, here, putting synonymous terms makes a change in the truth-value.

These difficulties can presumably be set aside by saying that two synonymous expressions are interchangeable salva veritate in all contexts except within a word. In the given example, 'Brothers Karamazov' is one unit of expression in which the term 'Brothers' is a part, and hence cannot be replaced by its synonymous word. Quine points out that even this reformulation is not adequate since it cannot provide us with an absolute, precise, objective context-free definition of 'word'.
Quine further says that it is not again a sufficient condition for determining cognitive synonymy. Nelson Goodman argues that since there may always be some occurrence in which the two expressions are not interchangeable salva veritate, no two expressions are identical in meaning. Quine himself recognizes something of this and points out that this criterion is useless unless it is relativised to a certain language. In this connection, Quine draws a distinction between intensional and extensional language.

An extensional language is that which does not contain any non-truth-functional operators. On the other hand, language containing non-truth-functional operators is intensional language. 'I believe that the table is brown' is a sentence in intensional language. Now, there are certain expressions which are interchangeable in extensional language, but not in intensional language, e.g., the two expressions 'creature with a heart' and 'creature with kidneys'. If we take two sentences, 'All men are creatures with a heart' and 'All men are creatures with kidneys', we see that they belong to extensional language and contain expressions that are interchangeable salva veritate in this language. In this case, both of them are true.

Now, if the interchangeability salva veritate criterion is to have any relevance to the philosophical use of the notion of synonymy, it must be applied to a non-extensional language that contains modal operators such as 'necessary'.
'possible', etc. But the two expressions in the given example are not interchangeable salva veritate in an intensional language. For example, there are two sentences:
1. Necessarily all creatures with a heart are creatures with a heart.
2. Necessarily all creatures with a heart are creatures with kidneys.

These two sentences should have the same truth-value according to the criterion, but while the first sentence is true, the second is not true because we cannot verify truth regarding all creatures with a heart. The first sentence is speaking of the necessity of a statement containing necessity, and it is true. But the second sentence speaks of the necessity of a statement which is an empirical generalisation.

There is another difficulty. The attempt to verify synonymy on the basis of interchangeability salva veritate is even more glaringly circular in a non-extensional language than it is in an extensional language. To be specific, the truth of the second statement which is non-trivial and modal, is established as depending on the determination that the two expressions are synonymous. And again, to determine synonymy by the interchangeability criterion is to involve a circularity.

It may be said that the most serious problem connected with the interchangeability criterion is that the requirement is apparently too strong. It is even doubtful that paradigmatic synonymous pairs like 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' can
pass the test. For example, for any man named Jones, the following sentence may be true:

Jones wants to know whether a bachelor is an unmarried man.

But replacement of synonym for synonym in this context yields a statement which is no doubt false:

Jones wants to know whether a bachelor is a bachelor.

Thus, interchangeability salva veritate cannot be a sufficient condition for cognitive synonymy. Eventually, this point reminds us of the fact that Prof. Strawson makes similar point in distinguishing a proper name viz. Scott and a definite description, viz., 'the author of Waverley'. Hence, interchangeability salva veritate is not an effective method of determining synonymy.

4. Regarding the fourth method, i.e., interchangeability salva analyticitate, it can be said that the concept of synonymy is used to explain the concept of analyticity. But if, according to this method, the latter is needed to clarify the former, then it involves the fallacy of circularity. In fact, this method can be rejected more or less in the same way as the second method.

(ii) Propositions are Bearers of Truth-value

Quine's next step is to reject the concept of proposition as the bearer of truth-value. This supposition of proposition being the bearer of truth-value is supported by the fact of directness. For example, when a German says 'Der Schnee ist
Wei's the sentence is true firstly because what he says means that snow is white and secondly, snow is white. If we admit proposition, we can dispense with the first point because we can say that the proposition that snow is white is true by virtue of the second point that snow is white. It has the advantage that we pass over the differences of language and differences of formulation within a language. The most cogent reason in favour of their argument is that it is not language, but reality that accounts for truth or falsity. But it does not mean that between reality and sentence that belongs to a language, there is a third thing as the meaning of sentence, i.e., proposition. There is a direct correspondence between sentence and reality. It is due to reality that a sentence is true or false.

Quine refers to Tarski in this context. Tarski says that the necessary and sufficient cause of the truth of a sentence 'S is P' is the real event of S being P. This, however, in Quine's opinion, is a complete picture of truth of a single sentence. This does not misunderstand the role of reality. Though in general we attribute truth to a sentence we have to make a distinction between the mentioning of a sentence and the sentence itself and we must remember that the application of truth-predicate is relevant in connection with the former. This fact reminds us that through language, we want to reach reality which is more important. To understand Quine's comment, it will not be quite irrelevant to think of Prof. Davidson's
argument against the code-theory of language. According to Davidson, through language we reach not only our thought about reality, but reality itself. His comment runs thus: "In sharing a language, in whatever sense this is required for communication, we share a picture of the world that must, in its large features, be true. It follows that in making manifest the large features of our language, we must manifest the large feature of reality. One way of pursuing metaphysics is therefore to study the general structure of our language."\(^2^2\)

So it is clear that in the discussion of truth, it is neither the sentence nor the meaning of a sentence that gets priority. Sentences come to the forefront when we seek generality. Quine distinguishes two cases of generalization. First is the case where, from sentences 'Mr. A is mortal', 'Mr. B is mortal' we generalize 'All men or mortal'. The other is the case when the sentences we generalize on are: 'Mr. A is mortal or Mr. A is not mortal', 'The sky is blue or the sky is not blue' etc. and we generalize, "Every sentence of the form 'p or not p' is true." In both cases of generalization we speak about objects, viz. Mr. A or Mr. B, etc. The difference is the difference of relation between the instances of generalization. In the former case, the different instances are different in names, but in the second case of generality, the double occurrences of 'p' are not generalization on names. 'p' is used for sentence clauses. It is only a schematic letter for sentences. So here we talk about sentences, and not about the reality.

\(^2^2\) D. Davidson, "The method of truth in metaphysics" in Enquiries into Truth of Interpretation, p. 199.
Some thinkers may say that in the second generalization, sentences are names of propositions. Quine gives a two-fold criticism of this attempt. Firstly, in approaching to the problem of synonymy, the claim of proposition has already been rejected. Secondly, even the fact of generalization does not necessitate introduction of proposition where truth is attributed to sentences. We have also seen that the most important thing in respect of truth and falsity is that we are brought near to reality. Quine refers to Tarski's famous example:

'Snow is white' is true ⇔ Snow is white.

The left-hand side of the equivalence is a sentence whose subject is the name of a sentence that contains a name 'snow'. The application of truth-predicate rather disquotes the phrase 'snow is white' and we come to talk about not the name, but the object snow. In the case of a single sentence, its affirmation does not need any application of truth-predicate, it is directly connected with reality. But in case of a generalization the application of truth-predicate is necessary.

The reference to reality however does not hinder the attempt to call a sentence true. We have already seen Quine's distinction between sentence and its mention. Quine refers to some restriction necessary to understand the role of sentence as being bearer of truth or falsity. To quote Quine, "What are best seen as primarily true or false are not sentences, but events of utterance". 23 We can also make a derivative

23 Quine, op. cit., p.13.
use of truth or falsity in case of inscription. We can so much distinguish between true and false utterance of a sentence as we distinguish between its true and false inscription.

The fact of utterance seems to lose its importance in the context of sentences such as found in Arithmetic and Laws of Physics which are eternally true. It means those sentences are true or false independent of their utterances. Quine gives two arguments in favour of utterances. Firstly, to do justice to the equality claim of utterance of sentences, it is better to entertain Prof. Peirce's comment in this context. He says that utterances and inscriptions are tokens of any kind of linguistic expression including sentences and the linguistic expressions are types of those utterances. Hence using Fregean terminology of truth or falsity as truth-values we can say that neither ordinary empirical sentences nor eternal sentences have truth-value, it is their tokens that have so. While tokens of ordinary sentences do not have all the same truth-value, those of eternal sentences have the same truth-value.

Secondly, we remember that the concept of eternity of sentences, may be relativised to a particular linguistic community following some sort of semantic change in that community. But this does not arise in case of tokens of sentences, because it is concerned only with the events of utterances, i.e., the spatio-temporal reference of the utterance.
Because of these two reasons it is better for the eternal sentences themselves and the tokens of ordinary sentences to be the bearer of truth-value.

Tarski's View on Truth as the Predicate of Propositions

Tarski claims that any definition of truth requires a prior distinction between object-language and metalanguage. The object-language contains sentences which are the vehicles of truth and falsity, the metalanguage contains the predicates 'truth' and 'falsity' among others. It implies that the definition of truth for sentences of the metalanguage, in its turn, is to be found in a metalanguage.

Tarski rejects two claims:

(1) The predicate 'true' transcends particular language, and
(2) 'true' is predicated of propositions rather than of sentences.

In order to show the falsity of these two claims, Tarski holds that the concept of truth is a relative concept. To be clear, truth is relative to the levels of language and levels of language are levels of one definite language meaning thereby that truth is also relative to a particular language. Once we admit that the predicate 'true' is incomplete, we are obliged to say that it is a predicate of sentences rather than of

propositions. We must however be conscious about the fact that this predicate is never assimilable to other adjectives of sentences, such as 'obscure', 'ungrammatical', etc.

Tarski distinguishes between natural or colloquial language and formalized language by saying that the former has no levels. Then from what we have said it follows that Tarski's definition of truth is good for formalized language. It does not mean that natural language is incoherent. The defect of a natural language is that, the concept of sentence is not clear. In so far as the mere forms of sentences are concerned, we cannot distinguish between declarative and non-declarative sentences. Prof. Gochet refers to Ch. Perelman who says in 'Logique, language et communication' (1958), "formal logic cannot by itself decide when one is confronted by an assertion." That the concept of sentence is not clear can be shown by an example: 'You shall not tell lies'. Mere form of this sentence is not enough to decide whether it is an indicative or imperative sentence.

This does not mean that Tarski is concerned only with formalized language. To quote Karl Popper, "the view that his theory is applicable only to formalized languages is, I think, mistaken. It is applicable to any consistent - more or less - 'natural language'." 26

But the fact, however, remains that this ambiguity of natural language is responsible for the problem of liar-paradox.

25. Gochet refers to this comment in Outline of a Nominalist Theory of Propositions', p. 48.
i.e., antinomy of the liar in the natural language. Prof. Gochet says, "by virtue of its homogeneity and universality, it places expressions of the object language and those of the metalanguage on the same level." 27

The Problem of Liar-Paradox

We know that the sentence 'this sentence is false' is outside the truth-falsity dichotomy. It appears to be a counter-example to the nominalist who is in favour of bivalence, i.e. who says that every sentence is either true or false.

Bar-Hillel attempts to remove this counter-example by making a distinction between sentence and statement. This distinction is also required in order to give account of performatives. If we follow Prof. Austin's line of thinking, we should say that, to utter a declarative sentence 'From now on this street shall be called Udaysankar Sarani', is not to make a statement, but is to accomplish an action by means of language. But there are other declarative sentences that contain indexical expressions such as 'I am now thirsty'. Now it is a type-sentence and has its truth-value only contextually. So by itself it has no permanent truth-value. It however expresses a statement. There are lots of such declarative sentences which express statements but have their truth-values contextually. The sentence 'I am thirsty', uttered by

27. Gochet, op. cit., p. 49.
two persons make two different statements, whereas sentences 'I am thirsty' and 'you are thirsty' uttered by two different persons may make one and the same statement.

So the declarative sentence of the second type is not a sentence having grammatical form similar to that of the first type which is the subject of truth or falsity. In fact, the declarative sentence of the second type has neither logical nor grammatical form, so they are incapable of functioning as terms in logical relation.

Thus, without trying to formalize natural language, he solves the problem of paradox in natural language only by employing notion of statement. We should note that he contradicts nominalism not like other opponents of nominalism by admitting that some sentences are not bivalent or that only propositions possess the property of being true or false. He contradicts nominalism by introducing the concept of statements. The point is that the sentence 'This sentence is false' is not said to be an exception to other declarative sentences, but it is a kind of declarative sentence that does not succeed in expressing a statement.

Bar-Hillel's theory has some unwanted consequence such as it raises the controversy between realists and nominalists concerning the ontological status of propositions. The nominalists do not accept the notions of statements and propositions. Prof. Quine also criticises Strawson for drawing a distinction between sentence and statement. Prof. Lemmon says that

statements and propositions are neither linguistic entities as to belong to language, nor spatio-temporal objects as to belong to space and time. So their ontological status is very peculiar. Prof. Mates also affirms that the drawback of a statement is that it does not exist.

This defect is a real defect of Bar-Hillel's theory because it admits that there are propositions, but speaks nothing about the ontological status of propositions. But it is not sufficient reason to discard the theory unless we answer the following two questions:

1. Are there reasons different from that of Bar-Hillel that successfully introduce the distinction between statements and sentences?

2. Is it possible to maintain the theory and at the same time maintain that truth and falsity are properties of sentences?

An affirmative answer to the first question is found in Cartwright's argument in defence of realistic concept of propositions. Cartwright gives an argument in favour of the distinction between sentence and statement. Let 'I am hungry' be a sentence uttered by two different persons A and B. There are three premises, third of which is considered by Cartwright as an additional premise that helps to yield the conclusion. The argument is as follows:

1. The sentence uttered by A is identical with the sentence uttered by B.

2. The statement made by A is not identical with the statement made by B.

3. If the sentence uttered by A is identical with the statement made by A, then the sentence uttered by B is identical with the statement made by B.

\[ \therefore \] The sentence uttered by A is not identical with the statement made by A.

The validity of this argument can be shown by the method of reductio ad absurdum:

Symbols taken:

\( P(A) \) and \( P(B) \) = Sentences uttered by A and B respectively.

\( E(A) \) and \( E(B) \) = Statements made by A and B respectively.

Using the symbols we have three premises:

1. \( P(A) = P(B) \)

2. \( E(A) \neq E(B) \)

3. \( [P(A) = E(A)] \supset [P(B) = E(B)] \)

\[ \therefore P(A) \neq E(A) \]

4. \( P(A) = E(A) \)

\[ \sim \text{Con.} \]

5. \( P(B) = E(B) \)

\[ 3,4, \text{ M.P.} \]

6. \( P(A) = E(B) \)

\[ 1,5, \text{ id int.} \]

7. \( E(A) = E(B) \)

\[ 4,6, \text{ id int.} \]

8. \( [E(A) = E(B)] \cdot [E(A) \neq E(B)] \)

\[ 7,2, \text{ Conj.} \]

Prof. Gochet however thinks that, though the argument is valid, it is not sufficient to prove the independent existence.
of the statements.

Prof. Stroll holds that this argument is not only insufficient, but it is also begging the question. He points out that the strength of the argument is that a given thing is not identical with both of two other things different from each other. But the whole point is based upon the assumption that statements are entities in their own right. If the statements are not assumed to be entities, then no one thing fails to be identical with both of two other things different from each other. So, the whole argument depends on an assumption which it wants to prove.

Prof. Gochet says that Stroll's argument is also not valid, because it requires some presupposition, i.e., identity and difference are the relations ascribed to entities and things only. In other words, inferential rules of identity in logic is applicable only to names denoting entities which have things as value. But this presupposition is wrong. One can construct an ontologically neutral logic of identity where the variables have no referential interpretation, but only substitutional interpretation.

Stroll, however, objects and speaks of a conceptualist idea that a statement is inseparable from and even identical with a sentence in some respects, though different in others. An analogy is found between the action of taking and that of stealing which are at once same and different from each other. We have seen earlier that statements and sentences are
different. The inseparableness between them is proved by the fact that description of a statement is not independent of the description of a sentence expressing it.

Stroll's argument is rejected by Cartwright, because it may lead us to draw a false conclusion. One such argument is as follows:

We cannot designate number 4 without using a numeral.

:\ No. 4 has no existence independent of the numeral.

The conclusion is evidently false, because existence of a number does not depend on the operation of counting. But Stroll's premise cannot be rejected, viz., we cannot deny the fact that having an access to statements requires having a prior access to sentences. This premise yields an important conclusion that sentences are the primary vehicles of truth and falsity. Once it is true, we can say that in natural language, truth and falsity are attributed to sentences.

Robin and Susan Haack construct arguments in the favour of this conclusion. According to them, statements are the results of utterances. So statements cannot be prior to speech-acts. It means the predicates 'truth' and 'falsity' are applied primitively to sentences. Statement only has its derivative application. Let us consider two occurrences of a sentence 'It is hot today'. Before knowing whether the two occurrences express the same statement, it is necessary to know whether they have same truth-conditions. The predicate 'X has the same

truth-condition as $Y'$ is a dyadic predicate. We can say therefore that in the case of a dyadic predicate, the identification of statement with reference to its truth-conditions depends on the prior identification of the sentence expressing the statement. The whole thing is true also in the case of a monadic predicate viz. 'X is true'.

That truth and falsity are primarily applied to sentences are shown and we get answer to the second question mentioned earlier. But it does not reject the claim of Bar-Hillel in meeting the liar-Paradox in natural language.

In Robin and Susan Haack's writing we find a reconciliation between the Bar-Hillel's theory of propositions and the present conclusion that truth and falsity are primarily applied to sentences. They say that this latter conclusion never implies that all sentences are primary bearer of truth and falsity.

Sentences are the Objects of Belief

This semantic theory of truth helps the nominalists in not applying the predicates 'truth' and 'falsity' to statements and also not accepting another kind of obscure metaphysical entity 'facts'.

Prof. Gochet refers to the theory of truth as correspondence between proposition and fact. A false proposition does not correspond to anything. Both Russell and Wittgenstein speak
of the fact as having the status of independent logical entity (atomic facts). Gochet wants to say that the sentence 'Mr. X is tall' is true not because of Mr. X being tall, but because of the fact that Mr. X is tall.

Prof. Gochet does not accept the notion of fact as an admissible one. But rejection of fact does not lead to idealism. Rejection of fact implies that we can explain true and false sentences, without referring to fact, but only by referring to objective reality. The advantage is that, while in the case of correspondence with fact, distinct fact is associated with distinct true proposition, and hence differing from man to man, in the case of corresponding to reality, the explanation of a true sentence is uniformly same for all.

Tarski's theory is in accord with the correspondence theory of truth which is contained in the semantic theory itself. Sometimes a realist element is found in Tarski where there is no sign of correspondence theory. The element is the material condition of adequacy which is preliminary to any definition of truth. It is this: 'S' is true if and only if S. Truth is predicated of linguistic entities; viz. 'S'-sentences, but we look at the world. Secondly, a worldly object viz. S is the necessary and sufficient condition for 'S' to be true. The meaning of 'S' is subordinate to the existence of people, but its truth is independent of them.
D. Davidson shows\textsuperscript{32} that it is the concept of satisfaction that makes Tarski's semantic definition of truth a theory of correspondence. According to Tarski, a sentence is true if and only if it is satisfied by all sequences\textsuperscript{33}. Satisfaction is a relation between expressions and sequences of objects with a limiting case of a sequence with one member. The relata of this relation are the satisfiers. They are sequences of objects. These sequences are ordered (viz. like \{\ldots\}) as different from sets of objects (viz. like \{\ldots\}).

To know what satisfies a sentence, we have to start with simplest sentential function that admits individual variables. There is the assumption that the variables are indexed and there is also the assumption that the objects in the sequence are ordered. We assign the object in the first place to the first variable, the object in the second place to the second variable and so on and so forth. This ordering is necessary to ensure that to each distinct variable in a sentence, one and only one member is assigned. This however includes the possibility that the same object can occur at more than one place in a sequence.

It is clear that satisfaction of a given sentence by a given sequence depends upon the variables in the sentence. It implies that if a sentence is satisfied by one sequence, then it is satisfied by all.


In case of an existentially quantified sentence $A$, S satisfies $A$ with respect to $v_k \neq S'$ satisfies $A$,
where $S'$ is similar to $S$ except perhaps in the $k$-th term.

In case of a universally quantified sentence $A$, S satisfies $A$ with respect to $v_k \neq $ All sequences $S'$ satisfy $A$,
where all sequences $S'$ are similar to $S$ except perhaps in the $k$-th term.

In fact what is achieved by correspondence according to the traditional theorists, is achieved by satisfaction.
Davidson says that this satisfaction establishes a relation between reality and language.

Prof. Quine also explains Tarski's definition when he says, "The definition of truth in terms of satisfaction is easy indeed: satisfaction by all sequence."\(^{34}\) So one term of the relation of correspondence need not be fact though the exponents of correspondence theory of truth believe that facts are between true sentences and reality. In Tarski, the relata is the set of all sequences, i.e., entire domain of individuals and n-tuples of individuals. In the case of false sentence, it is the empty set.

From the discussion, it is clear that according to Tarski, sentence is the primary unit of communication and truth is ascribed to this first unit of learning and communication.

Summing up the whole analysis, we can say that the question of object of belief is relevant only if belief is viewed

\(^{34}\) Quine, *op. cit.*, p. 38.
as a relational concept. Sometimes believing is considered as a relation between mind and proposition, some other times it is a relation between mind and fact. Both the interpretations presuppose that believing is a dyadic relation. There is also another attempt that explains the relation as a multiple relation and this last view is found in B. Russell's theory.

3.3 RUSSELL'S THEORY OF BELIEF-RELATION

Russell's discussion of truth and falsehood leads to the discussion of belief-relation and its truth or falsity. According to him, the world contains facts as well as beliefs which have reference to the facts. It is by virtue of the presence or absence of the fact of the Sun's shining that the same proposition expressed by the sentence 'The Sun is shining' is true or false respectively. To say that a certain thing has a certain property or to say that a certain thing has relation with some other thing is to express facts. The facts are mind-independent and in this sense they are said to belong to the extra-linguistic and extra-mental world.

The duality of truth and falsehood appears in the context of propositions. Like Frege, Russell holds that a proposition is expressed only in an indicative sentence. A proposition, according to him, "is just a symbol. It is a complex symbol in the sense that it has parts which are also symbols." 35 A propo-

sition corresponds to a fact in the sense that by virtue of the fact the proposition is made true.

The distinction thus between fact and proposition is that unlike the latter, the former does not have the duality of truth and falsehood.

Russell's analysis of proposition and fact makes some points clear. First of all, propositions consist of symbols and understanding of the whole proposition depends on the understanding of the symbols. Secondly, the meaning of the symbol is the component of fact. These components account for the truth or falsity of the proposition. We accept it with a reservation that the words like 'not', 'or' are parts of propositions but they do not correspond to any fact.

We now enter into Russell's view regarding belief. The question posed by Russell is: What is the form of the fact which occurs when a person has a belief? Common answer is that, belief is a relation to the proposition expressing the belief. Russell's treatment in this context involves his rejection of Pragmatists' and Behaviourists' attitudes of belief.

Belief, as understood by Russell is not one that is entertained by the Behaviourists or by the Pragmatists. According to the behaviourists, when a man behaves in such and such a way, then we explain his behaviour by saying, 'he believes that...'. According to James and Dewey, to believe a proposition means to act in a certain way. The truth of a
belief means bodily behaviour has led to expected result meaning thereby that the belief vanishes in the final analysis, i.e., believing is not one phenomenon.

They accept a thing to be the object of belief. Russell rejects this view first of all because there are many cases of belief which do not have direct object. Secondly, in the case of false belief, the belief is to be explained as a relation to what is non-existent and this explanation is not at all rational. In fact, this reduction theory of belief (i.e., belief reduced to bodily behaviour) makes the belief-relation a causal one which is totally wrong.

To escape from this pragmatic attitude, there is a tendency to admit proposition. The defect of Pragmatism shows that facts never can be true or false. So proposition is the able candidate to have the properties 'true' and 'false'.

One such attempt is found in Meinong. In his analysis, the description 'the present king of India' that appears to be the subject-term of a sentence 'the present king of India is wise' refers to nothing existent. So, in order to make the sentence meaningful Meinong accommodates the referent of the descriptive phrase in the world of subsistent entities, which are non-spatial and a-temporal known only by the intellect.

This conclusion is not accepted by Russell. The postulation of a world of strange entities, to which the present king of India belongs, offends, Russell says, against the feeling for reality.
Russell's conclusion therefore is that, as the cases of true and false beliefs are to be tackled in the same way and as it leads to acceptance of subsistent entities, so the possible way out is to consider belief not as a dyadic relation, but as a multi-type relation. There is no single object of belief. Belief has different logical form in respect of the nature of what is believed.

The verb 'to believe' is a propositional verb because it has the form of relating an object to a proposition. Russell's theory is that corresponding to every fact, there are two propositions - one affirmative and the other negative - one of which is verified by that fact. So the relation between proposition and fact is many-one and that between name and the object is one-one. This sort of many-one relation explains the priority of the true and here Russell's theory is better than those of his contemporary logicians.

The first point to note is that it explains the relation of believing in a new way, much different from the classical conception of belief as a dyadic relation. Classical interpretation is that the verb 'to believe' must be flanked by two terms and hence it is a relation between two items.

According to Russell, it is not a relation of the mind to a single object. Let us take an example of a false-belief: 'Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio'. If belief is a relation to a single object, viz., Desdemona's love for Cassio, then we cannot explain it as a relation of believing.
because there is no such single object as Desdemona's love for Cassio.

There are some relations that involve three, four or more terms. For example, "New York is between London and Edinburgh" is a sentence expressing a relation among three terms. Similarly, the relation of believing, in order to include cases of false beliefs is a relation of several terms.

Russell cites an example to show the multiple relation of believing. In the sentence 'Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio', believing is a relation of four terms, viz., Othello, Desdemona, loving and Cassio. So it is a multiple-relation. Believing is not a relation that Othello has separately to the other three. Rather the relation is knitting together into one complex whole Othello, Desdemona, loving and Cassio.

There are two vital characteristics of this relation. Firstly, in this relation there is a subject, believing mind, i.e., Othello's mind and the object, i.e., the other terms, Desdemona etc. This subject and object are the constituents of the relation of believing.

Secondly, there is a sense or direction, as Russell calls it, in the relation. The objects are in a certain order that contribute to the understanding of the relation. The sentences 'Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio' and 'Othello believes that Cassio loves Desdemona' apparently express the same relation between same four terms, but actually the objects
of the relation are not the same. The relation of loving is not symmetrical. In fact, in any sort of relation excepting that of identity, this factor of order is very important.

Now, these four terms are united in a complex whole. The relation of loving is not the uniting relation. It is, to quote Russell, "one of the objects - it is a brick in the structure, not the cement." The unifying relation is that of believing. If the belief is true, there is a complex unity 'Desdemona's love for Cassio' which is the object of belief; if the belief is false, there is no such complex unity. Thus the truth of the belief depends on its correspondence with the complex unity in the outside world. The order in the object must corroborate with the order of believing.

Russell however comments that there should be no misunderstanding of the fact that truth and falsehood are extrinsic properties of belief, but the condition of its truth and falsehood does not depend on any mind.

Comments on Russell's Theory

There are two different types of explanation of proposition in Russell's theory (1) A fact makes a proposition true or false. (2) A proposition is a symbol.

Now, ordinarily a symbol is a linguistic entity. If proposition is a symbol, then there should not be any difference between a proposition and a sentence both being linguistic

entities. But Russell distinguishes between the two.

Russell's theory has been criticized by many critics but we only refer to the criticism made by A.D. Woozley. He says that there are two complexes in Russell's theory – one is the belief-complex, other is the fact-complex. To take Russell's example, fact-complex is symbolized as D^C (Desdemona loves Cassio) and the belief-complex of O^D^C (Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio).

Russell gives stress on the order D^C which should be the same in both the complexes. The order is important because the relation of loving is not symmetrical. Hence if the fact-complex is C^D then there would be no correspondence because C^D expresses a proposition that is completely different from the proposition expressed in the complex D^C. According to Russell, there must be a correspondence between these two complexes in order to make the belief true.

Now, Woozley shows that there are great differences between these two complexes and hence it is doubtful whether any correspondence is possible between them. The differences are as follows. 37

i) In O^D^C, there are four terms (O D L C) and one relation 'b'. In D^C there are two terms D, C and one relation 'l'.

ii) In O^D^C, 'l' is a term, but in D^C, it is a relation.

iii) In O^D^C, the order of D^C is determined by 'b'; in D^C the order of D^C is determined by 'l'.

37. A.D. Woozley, Theory of Knowledge, p.123.
The difficulty is that the fact-complex $D_1C$ appears in both the complexes in one as a part and in the other as a whole and hence it is difficult to see any correspondence between them. Woozley however defends Russell by saying that the latter may mean that this correspondence allows the difference of presenting the believing mind in the believing-complex and makes it absent in the fact-complex. This defence may avoid the first point of difference between two complexes but there remains other two differences. The difficulty is that '1' performs different roles in the two complexes and hence there is no correspondence between $D_1C$ in belief-complex and that in fact-complex.

Before we pass on to Woozley's comment in defence of Russell's theory, it is necessary to make a comment on this last remark. Regarding the second point of difference, it seems difficult to share Prof. Woozley's view. He flatly interprets Russell as assigning double-role to '1' in the sense that while '1' is a term in belief complex, it is a relation in fact-complex. But Russell clearly restates his theory as follows: "If we take such a belief as 'Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio', we will call Desdemona and Cassio the object-terms, and loving the object-relation. If there is a complex unity 'Desdemona's love for Cassio', consisting of the object-terms related by the object-relation in the same order as they have in the belief, then this complex unity is called the fact corresponding to the belief."
Thus belief is true when there is a corresponding fact, and it is false when there is no corresponding fact." 38

Returning to Woozley's treatment of Russell's theory, we find that Woozley shows the probable defence of Russell's theory in the following way. The whole process of belief can be split up into two phases. One is entertainment of the relation '1' that combines two terms D and C. Then in the light of evidence we go on to assert or deny the proposition entertained, i.e. we have $O_{D,C}$.

This theory has the advantage of maintaining the account of truth-falsity of a proposition. The occurrence and unity of the proposition depends on the mind, but, given certain relation and certain terms, the mind cannot produce unities according to its own choice. There are certain limited possibilities of uniting the terms. Consequently, mind has to work within that limit.

Hence Russell concludes that proposition is not object of belief. Truth of a belief does not depend on the relation between belief and proposition. On the other hand, it is fact that makes belief true, i.e., it depends on the correspondence between belief-complex and fact-complex. It is because of the defect of Russell's theory that we are led to a different treatment of belief.

38. Russell, op. cit., p. 75.
3.4 LATER MOORE - BELIEF IS NOT A RELATION

We have seen that in his early writings Moore thinks proposition to be the able candidate for the object of belief. But in his later writings we find a totally different treatment of the concept of belief. Prof. Gochet aptly shows this transition by bringing the theory of Brentano in between the two.

One thing is clear that in case of a true belief, we can easily say that a fact is the object of belief. But the difficulty arises in the context of a false belief. There are two alternatives to solve the problem. We may either assign a degenerate object in the case of a false belief or reject the idea that belief is a relation and has an object.

Prof. Brentano accepts the first alternative. A false belief has an intentional object, and this object has no real ontological existence, but only psychological one.39

Brentano's theory is defective because, though it successfully distinguishes between true and false beliefs, it is unsuccessful in pointing out their similarities. But it is a fact that both true and false beliefs are cases of belief. Moore however rejects Brentano's theory. He attacks the theory from a pole just opposite to one which we have just said, i.e., he shows that Brentano is unsuccessful in drawing the distinction between true and false beliefs. It is as follows:

To believe that lions are mammals and tigers are mammals, we have the same kind of relation to two different objects. So, in the case of true beliefs, if belief is viewed as a relation, we have difference in objects of belief. In the case of false beliefs also we should follow the same procedure. For example, two beliefs such that centaurs are mammals and horned rabbits are mammals, we should have same type of relation, not to different facts, but to different propositions. The difficulty of same treatment is that in all the cases there are propositions which are objective in nature.

This objectivity not only hinders any attempt to distinguish between true and false beliefs, it leads us to view belief from an altogether different perspective. To make it clear, if in the case of true belief, the object of belief is the fact that is, in the false belief, it is that which is not. It means, in the first place, that a relation which has an object that is not, is not a relation at all, i.e., false belief is not a relation. Secondly, as this theory does not distinguish between true and false belief, the same is true of true belief also, i.e., it is also not a relation. Moore's solution therefore is that belief in general does not involve any relation. Accordingly it has no object.

Moore's solution has the advantage of explaining both resemblance and difference between true and false beliefs. They are of the same category because none of them is a relation. They are distinct because, to quote Gochet,
"true beliefs are behaviouristic properties of the believer that, generally, have a greater chance of having favourable consequences for him than do false beliefs". 40

Moore's Defect

Moore's theory is incomplete, because it gives no account of resemblance between true belief and knowledge. He considers belief not as a relation. But in this sense, it has no connection with knowledge which is a relation. This difficulty can be avoided only if knowledge is defined as a property of the knowing mind. But Moore cannot accept this sort of idealism. This difficulty can be set aside in another way. There are some thinkers who deny any sort of resemblance between knowledge and belief. It is said that though 'p' may be the object of both knowledge and belief, it does not mean that there is a common quality. R. Robinson puts Cook Wilson's view in this way: "Belief is not knowledge and the man who knows does not believe at all what he knows; he knows it." 41

In fact, though there are arguments, it is very difficult to admit that there is no relation between true belief and knowledge. And, if Moore's theory cannot establish such a relation, then its acceptance remains doubtful. We can however make a compromise between Moore's theory and the demand

40: Gochet, op. cit., p. 91
for maintaining a relation between true belief and knowledge in this way: true belief and knowledge are different in respect of their difference in epistemological status, but they may have the same logical structure.

Prof. Gale gives a revised version of Moore and Wilson's theory, which version attempts to explain false belief without admitting proposition as its object. Though Gale's solution has defects, still it shows a way to construct a satisfactory solution to the problem.

Prof. Gale distinguishes between cognitive and propositional verbs. When we ascribe knowledge to a person, we use cognitive verbs, when we ascribe belief to him, we use propositional verbs. The object of knowledge is real and that of belief is not so. The reality of the object is expressed through cognitive verbs. So, though they have the same grammatical syntax, their logical syntax is different. The propositional verbs are such that they do not really refer to anything as their accusatives.

Prof. Gochet's reflection shows that Gale's demonstration expresses that there is no fact answering to a belief, but he concludes that there is no existence of a proposition answering to a belief. Gochet says that Gale wants to explain false belief. But he answers a different question as to how 'A believes p' can be true without 'p' being true. Gale draws an analogy to serve the purpose in the following way:

42 cf. Gochet, op. cit.
'A wins the race' implies 'A crossed the finish line'. 'A is a competitor' does not imply 'A is victorious'. Similarly, 'A knows that p' implies 'p' 'A believes that p' does not imply 'p'.

Gale commits the same mistake made by Moore and Wilson. Gale just distinguishes between belief and knowledge, but does not explain their similarity. In fact, his appeal to the distinction between two types of syntax is defective.

The Syntax

We may take another example: 'A is an inventor' implies (3x) (x is a discovery by A) 'A is researcher' does not imply (3x) (x is a discovery by A).

But this example does not serve our purpose of picturing a similar distinction between knowledge and belief. The reason is, the verbs 'to invent', 'to search' are of a type different from the verbs 'to know' or 'to believe'. The latter verbs allow the direct attribution of predicates 'true', 'false' while the former verbs do not. So it is better to say that there are more than two types of verbs, cognitive verbs (to know), propositional verbs (to believe) and intentional verbs (to search, to invent, etc.).

This theory is not tenable. In this interpretation, 'A believes p' does not exclude the possibility that (3x)
(x is believed by A), though there is no relation of implication between the two. In fact, Gale's theory is dependent on the exclusion of this possibility.

Secondly, Gale's comparison is not right because there is a difference in syntax between the intentional and cognitive and propositional verbs.

One thing is however clear. The difference between the cases of research or discovery and that of knowledge or belief is more evident by the phenomenological use of two different terms for their objects. While the word 'Objekt' is used in case of research or discovery, the word reserved for the object of knowledge or belief is 'Objektive', the latter bears the element of truth or falsity. It means that objects of knowledge and belief are of the same category without equivocation. For example,

'Peter knows today certain things he only believed yesterday' is to be formulated as

'((3p) (Peter knows p today and Peter only believed p, yesterday))'.

It reminds us of Prof. Ayer's treatment of the concept of knowledge. He lays down three conditions to be fulfilled in order to be called knowledge:

'I know p' means (1) p is believed by me, and

(2) p is true, and

(3) I must have enough justification to believe that p.
So, here we can have two mental activities, i.e., knowledge and belief regarding the same object. It has certain advantages. Firstly, the same object can be the object of belief, that of knowledge and the bearer of truth-value. Secondly, we have an explanation of the difficulty of substitution of materially or logically equivalent sentences within belief-contexts. Thirdly, it is at par with the nominalist thesis that the clause 'that p' is a nominalisation of a sentence. The question however remains whether belief is a relation or not.

Ayer's View

The view of later Moore regarding belief is shared by Prof. Ayer also. Prof. Ayer\textsuperscript{43} enquires into the question: what is the meaning of a symbol, i.e., of a word or a sentence? This question is however of an entirely different character. Ayer's opinion is, this question arises out of the assumption that 'meaning' is a relation. If it is a relation, then there must be at least two relata, i.e., a symbol bears the meaning-relation to something. And the puzzle is to discover the nature of that thing.

Now, accepting the concept of meaning as a relation, we can have a preliminary answer to the previous question that, empirical fact is the meaning of a sentence. Ayer, however, deviates from the common use of the term 'fact' as distinct.

\textsuperscript{43} cf. A.J. Ayer, \textit{Foundations of Empirical Knowledge}
from the term 'event'. On the other hand, he allows empirical facts to be actually observed. There are two types of sentences, one directly signifies empirical fact, the other indirectly signifies, i.e., it is capable of being reduced to observation-sentences.

But this answer is not tenable. The point is that some sentences are used to express what is empirically false. We cannot deny that these are meaningful sentences, but to be meaningful they do not mean any empirical fact. For example, if there is no flower-vase on my table, then the sentence 'There is a flower-vase on my table' is meaningfully false, but it does not mean any observable empirical fact, such as the observable absence of flower-vase on my table.

Secondly, the meaning of a sentence is independent of the truth-falsity of what it is used to express. The sentence 'There is a flower-vase on my table' has a meaning. If there is really a flower-vase on the table, the sentence is true, if there is no such, the sentence is false. But the meaning remains the same irrespective of its truth or falsity.

What these arguments yield are the two following conclusions: (1) Empirical fact cannot be the meaning of a false sentence. (2) Meaning of a sentence, either true or false, is the same.

These two points taken together necessarily lead to the conclusion that empirical facts are not the meaning of true sentences either.
The next answer to the question is that propositions, which are in Ayer's language 'would-be-facts', are the meaning of sentences. Ayer's reflection in this context is that introduction of proposition is just a verbal solution, not a real one.

According to Ayer, to accept proposition as one of the relata of the meaning-relation of sentences, we have to specify the exact nature of proposition. Propositions are normally defined as the meaning of sentences. Unlike physical objects, they are not amenable to the senses. Some thinkers insist that they enjoy objective reality though not in the sense of an ordinary physical object. But what is the nature of this special objective non-empirical reality is not clear.

For the empiricists, this problem intensifies. They cannot say that propositions are empirical entities, so they do not accept this view and define meaning of symbols entirely in terms of their relation to other symbols. It is a sort of formalism.

They deny the possibility of expressing a proposition that refers to empirical fact. They only speak of formation and transformation rules as discussed by Prof. Carnap. Formation rules determine the specific combination of signs to constitute proper sentences, transformation rules prescribe the ways of legitimate derivation of these sentences from one another. These rules are formal, and do not refer to sentences.

or to meaning of words or symbols. Sentences expressing apriori and empirical propositions are differentiated in the form of the symbols they contain or in the nature of the formal relations they bear to other sentences.

Prof. Ayer attacks this formalism in this way. Firstly, he says that mere acquaintance with the formation and transformation rules is not enough to understand a language, especially to understand its manner of communicating propositions about matters of fact. The rules are unable to specify the proper situation of legitimate use of single sentence. So long as this specification is not possible, the language is not a proper language, instead it is a mere formal calculus. To be a language proper, it must shake off formalism and contain some expressions related with actual observation. Ostensive definition is one such expression. Ayer rejects Carnap's view that these definitions are mere translation of words, i.e., their function is to lay down transformation rules. For example, we may have an ostensive definition of the word 'elephant': 'elephant' = animal of the same kind as the animal in this or that position in space-time. 45 Ayer shows that this definition is mistaken because, mere spatio-temporal description may indicate the context of ostensive definition but it is not a substitute for that context. These definitions are rather expressions of observation-sentences.

But in this context, observation-sentences are the sentences which are also bound by some sort of transformation

rules. The theory excludes the possibility of metaphysics by saying that every proposition is either analytic or empirically verifiable, and metaphysical propositions are neither of them. But the phrase 'empirically verifiable' is misleading, because there is no admission for actual observation.

We may accept this notion of observation-sentences. And once we accept this we must also accept this criterion of truth of propositions as the logical compatibility with other propositions. In so far as the possibility of observable facts is ruled out this is clearly an arbitrary procedure.

Here we also face the problem of two internally self-consistent but mutually exclusive sets of propositions. We cannot say that the priority is to be given to the set that is prescribed by the scientists of the era, because both sets being internally self-consistent, have the equal strong claim to be accepted. Only solution left is to go beyond formalism, i.e., to relate the propositions to empirical facts. But this is something the theorist rejects. Hence formalism cannot be accepted.

So we have neither fact nor proposition to be the proper meaning of sentences. Ayer's conclusion is that the problem of finding the relata of the meaning-relation is a pseudo-problem. Meaning is erroneously understood to be a relation. In case of particular symbol, its meaning may be defined as the explanation of the method of its use. But the general cases cannot be treated in the same way.
Ayer makes a similar remark in the context of the question: What are the objects of believing, knowing, doubting, etc? The first answer is that it is a fact. But it is not correct. We can believe or doubt what is false, but a false belief cannot have a fact as its object, it rather has the absence of fact.

The next answer is that propositions are the objects of believing, knowing etc., but it also fares no better because the nature of proposition is not clear. The point is that, like 'meaning', 'believing' also is not a relation in the sense in which 'loving' or 'killing' are relations. Hence 'believing' does not require any real object at all. There is no one thing that people believe. Object of a particular case of belief can be shown by the actual example, but believing in general has no object. Similarly, all instances of knowledge do not have a common object that can be said to be 'the' object of knowledge in general.

Ayer, however, admits that the use of word 'proposition' as sentence-meaning is advantageous. To quote Ayer, "...we often wish to make statements which apply not merely to a given indicative sentence, but also to any other sentence, whether of the same or of a different language, that has the same meaning; and our use of the word proposition enables us to do this concisely." We also speak of proposition to be true or false. So far as that which is true can be known and that which is capable of being true or false can be believed.

propositions can be viewed as objects of belief.

Proposition is also required in case of indirect reference. For example, we may take a sentence: 'He asserted two propositions which you probably believe but I doubt'. This sentence uses the word 'propositions' and it is more convenient than another expression of the same sentence that does not use the word: 'Two of his assertions are probable, beliefs of yours, but doubts of mine'.

But Ayer's conclusion is that believing or meaning are not real relations. It is only for convenience that we use the term 'proposition' as sentence-meaning.

That meaning is not a relation is shown by Ayer in this way. He refers to Russellean analysis of meaning as a causal relation. For example, I say 'There is a cat' and if somebody asks the reason of my so saying, I answer, 'because I see a cat'. To quote Russell, "The word 'because' must be taken as expressing a relation which is, at least partly, that of cause and effect."47 Another attempt is one accepted by Wittgenstein who conceives of meaning as the relation of structural identity. Wittgenstein says "...what the picture must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it after its manner - rightly or falsely - is the form of representation."48

Ayer denies both these explanations though these appear to contain some truth. The reason is, they are unable to explain

48. L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus, Propositions - 2.170, 4.01.
meaningful falsity of a symbol. Secondly, utterance cannot be causally connected with the effects of perception, because utterance may be otherwise influenced, viz., under the hypnotic trance. Similarly, a symbol may take the form of a picture, a sentence need not. The formalists have enough guard against these unwarranted theories but their mistake lies in giving stress on the formal rules. Language must include both formal and non-formal rules that connect symbols with actually observed states-of-affairs. The misunderstanding of the nature of meaning as a relation has its impact on the corresponding theory of truth. Literal use of the word 'correspondence' allures us to think of resemblance.

After the whole discussion, it sounds better to share Ayer's conclusion: believing is not a relation. What we believe may be epirical proposition provided they are directly verifiable, i.e., they are connected with some observation of external world.