Belief is sometimes popularly viewed as antithetical to knowledge. If 'knowledge' means 'having justification', then in explaining the primitive man's world, we should better use the expression 'he believed' rather than 'he knew'. In fact, the primitive people were very much dependent upon nature and their world was very much under the influence of diverse types of superstitions. The same tendency remains even now and accordingly there is a propensity to identify beliefs with superstitions. The real picture, however, is different.

2.1 BELIEF AND SUPERSTITION

Let us first distinguish between the concrete and abstract sense of the term 'superstition'. In its concrete sense, it
stands for individual or general belief where the basis is not rational. In its abstract sense, it "signifies the disposition to attribute occurrences to preternatural or occult influences, and to direct conduct with a view to avoiding mischief or obtaining advantages which such influences are supposed to produce." 1

Ordinarily, the prefix 'super' marks that it is an exaggerated belief (to be specific, exaggerated reasonable belief). There are three things to be noted in a superstition - one is an element of belief that something is a potent. In other words, there is a postulation of cause-and-effect relationship between two events or things, without any good reason; the second is some excess in such a belief; and the third is the tendency of the mind to accept promptly some unnatural statements. A superstition, therefore, leaves no room for accepting counter-evidence. For example, a person may have a superstition that walking under a ladder is dangerous. He imagines a causal connection between two facts - walking under a ladder and any kind of forthcoming danger. There is no reason behind this connection, but it is no less strong than any other rational connection. Its strength is marked by the person's avoidance of walking under a ladder.

Let us have a little elaboration of this point. Superstition may be individual or general. The question, however,

1. James Hastings, *The Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. 12, p. 120.
arises: what are the factors responsible for generating these superstitions? I think, the Freudian theory of psychoanalysis is undoubtedly an attempt to tackle this issue. Freud was concerned with the unconscious motivation of chance and faulty actions. Superstition is one of its consequences.

There is an illustration of particular superstition in his book *Psychopathology of Everyday Life*. The example is of a lady who is over ninety years old and who has been Freud's patient for many years. In the prolonged course of treatment Freud has become bored and a time comes when he wants to get relieved of his duty. His boredom is so keen that he feels an urgency to know the limitation of her life span. This monotony persists for long. Then on one day, he wants to visit her and hires a carriage to reach her place. The coachman at the cab who knows her house drives the car, but instead of stopping at the proper place, he stops in front of another house situated in a similar-looking parallel street. Naturally she is not there. Freud points out the mistake and the coachman corrects it.

Freud considers the whole incident as an accident. If the event would be otherwise, i.e., if instead of taking the carriage, Freud walked through the wrong street and reached the wrong house, then, however, he could not consider it to be an accident. He rather had to explain his action as caused by his unconscious wish to know the end of her life. Still he is not superstitious.
This case would be different with a superstitious man. For him, the event of stopping in front of a house where she is absent would seem to be an omen. He would consider it to be portent of the fact that she would die very soon.

An example of general superstition is found in Freud's analysis of religion. He says that the origin of religion is totemism and oedipus complex and the nature of religion is that it is projection and therefore an illusion.

Normally, a totem is an animal or a plant or a natural phenomenon peculiarly related to a whole clan of people. Sometimes a totem is a class of material objects respected superstitiously by every member of a clan. This totem-bond is stronger than our family-bond or blood-bond. The superstitious belief linked with the idea of totem is this: it is the guardian spirit, it sends the clansmen oracles, and, if necessary, it spares them too. The whole clan is under a sacred obligation not to kill or destroy the totem and not to eat its flesh, because otherwise there will be disaster for the whole clan. The totem is killed once a year in a sacramental rite and this ritual is an avowal of their taking into themselves the qualities symbolised by the totem. Corresponding to a totem, there are taboo restrictions, the most important ones are the murder prohibition and the incest prohibition. The violation of the prohibition is not left to the automatic punishment of guilty persons. It is avenged by the whole clan.
Freud uses his psychoanalytic method to explain both the cases of individual and general superstition. The word 'psychoanalysis' is used in three senses: (1) It is first used by Freud as a special method of medical treatment for the cure of certain nervous disorders. (2) It is a special technique for investigating deeper layers of the mind. (3) It is used to describe the special province of knowledge called unconscious mental level. Here psychoanalysis is called 'science of the unconscious'.

In both the cases, the particular man and the whole clan are aware of their mental contingencies. The physical event is considered to be a mark of an external chance and as a portent for future. Thus a superstitious man has two main characteristics by which he differs from other rational man: (1) the superstitious man projects the motive to the outside, as different from ordinary man who projects it in the mind; (2) the superstitious man explains a future disaster by an event, while the ordinary man explains it with reference to his thought.

In the case of particular superstition as mentioned before, Freud himself does not believe in any sort of influence by the physical events on his mind, i.e., he does not believe in the power of the event to predict the future. But he admits that something in his mental life finds an expression in this apparently unwanted event. To quote Freud,
"I believe in outer (real) chance, but not in inner (psychic) accidents."²

In case of the general belief, psychoanalysis reveals that superstitious belief refers to Oedipus complex.³ The social construction of primitive tribes is that there is a single male leader, violent and jealous, who is regarded as the father of the people, and he is the sole possessor of all the female members of the tribe. One day the other deprived young men jointly murder their father. But after committing the murder they become full of repentance. So they take up the totem symbol which is thought as possessing all the qualities of their dead father. Thus the fear of facing the consequences of their evil deed results in imagining the totem as the new form of their father. The ambivalence, i.e., a mixture of two attributes, love for their dead father and fear of his strength to present a formidable obstacle is also present in case of the totem. The totem, i.e., the dead father becomes stronger than the living one.

Freud's conclusion is this: the conscious ignorance and the unconscious knowledge of the motivation of mind is one of the roots of superstition. The unconscious knowledge of the motivation is not robbed of all capacity to express itself. So it is displaced to the outer world by the person himself. Similarly, many mythological theories, if not all, of the

² S. Freud, Psychopathology of Everyday Life, p. 63.
³ cf. S. Freud, Totem and Taboo.
world are the results of such projection or displacement.

In case of nervous persons, it has been found that among repressed impulses, those which are hostile and cruel, find an outlet in superstition. To be specific, in many cases people possess earnest wishes about evil things to occur in others' life, but they have to repress these wishes both for maintaining their social image and for the fear of moral condemnation. But because of the knowledge of such private wishes, they feel the threatening of evil from their own psyche and so take recourse to some superstitious beliefs. Freud has successfully shown that there is no rational basis to think that such and such events portend or foreshadow such and such evil happenings.

Apart from the moral and social obligations, there are other psychic conditions which cause a particular thought to seek a disguise in a different form for its expression. Repression is a conscious capacity which has many indistinct elements, e.g., a tendency to avoid some unwanted tedious consequences, irrelevancy of a particular thought in the context of intended issue etc. When the motivation and these causes are less harmful, we have simple cases like speech-blinders, but when it is more harmful, the way of thought, displacement also becomes more complex.

What is peculiar to superstition is that here self-ascription is not so easy as other-ascription. Nobody acknowledges himself to be superstitious though he knows what is
superstition and when his fellowmen become superstitious. Superstition however is not mysticism, because unlike a superstitious man, a mystic may not entertain any dogmatic account regarding a thing.

It is now time to see how far the relation between superstition and belief is accepted. First of all, unlike superstition, belief does not involve a necessary postulation of a causal relation. Secondly, beliefs in some cases may involve some exaggeration no doubt, still belief is not necessarily an exaggeration. Thirdly, belief is not a repressed wish expressed in a distracted form. In the last place, some philosophers mean by 'belief' a disposition or tendency, but it is not a tendency to accept any sort of unnatural statement. There is a place for rationality in belief.

It is, therefore, held that belief has a cognitive element in it. Let us see its relation to another notion which is not altogether irrational like superstition and where the cognitive element has a scope of occur. This notion is the notion of doubt.

2.2 BELIEF AND DOUBT

Primarily, doubt points to some sort of vacillation or indecision and accordingly it is posed as something opposed to belief. But doubt is not identical with disbelief either, because the latter is not a state of irresolution as the former.
The word 'doubt' has its Latin origin 'dubito'. It is similar to the old Latin 'dubo' which is derived from 'duo' ('two'), so 'to doubt' means 'to have different lines of thought in the same mind'.

Doubt can be analysed in different spheres. Let us undertake a small survey of its psychological and logical analysis.

Psychological analysis shows that doubt is a state when the mind suffers from indecision. Here the situation offers equally strong ways to reach the same goal. The result is a state of suspension and bafflement. We may refer to three such occasions. (1) We may have two equally strong incompatible predicates to be applied to the same object. (2) There may be incompatible sentences to describe the same fact. (3) We may have two incompatible attitudes towards the same object.

This state of indecision may be of two types. Either the incompatibles are applied simultaneously or there is a temporal gap between the application. In both cases, the mind is at a loss to make a final decision.

We can also analyse doubt from logical point of view. In traditional two-valued logic, a particular proposition P can have either of the truth-values—truth and falsity. But later on logicians find it difficult to retain the Principle of Bivalence (i.e., a sentence is either true or false) in the context of logical status of certain sentences, e.g., the

future-contingent sentences. So the necessity of admitting a third truth-value intermediate between truth and falsity is needed. This third truth-value may be termed as indefinite, or indeterminate or doubtful. A proposition $p$ can be said to be doubtful when we want to say that $p$ can be logically false. There is no question of somebody's thinking of the falsity of $p$. It means that not-$p$ is possible. We can give the definition of doubtfulness with the help of modal operators. '$M_p$' means 'p is possible', '$N_p$' means 'not-$p$', and '$K_{pq}$' means 'p and q'. There are two definitions of the sentence 'p is doubtful'.

First of all 'p is doubtful' means that not-$p$ is possible, so $p$ is doubtful $=_{df} MN_p$. Secondly, the sentence may also mean both $p$ and not-$p$ are logically possible. So $p$ is doubtful $=_{df} K_{MPMN_p}$.

Both the definitions indicate that to doubt $p$ is to entertain the possibility of either $p$ or its negation or both.

It emerges from our discussion that those who accept the psychological analysis of doubt, view it as an inclination or attitude of the mind. This view is found in the writings of ancient Greek thinkers. Those who give stress on its logical analysis, sometimes use it as a philosophical method, e.g., in Descartes' theory we have an example of methodological doubt.

There is also a third way of looking at the concept of doubt. All beliefs are not blind or thoughtless. What is essen-
tial to them and what distinguishes them from other blind or
dogmatic beliefs is the presence of doubt in them. In other
words, doubt may be viewed as an element of belief. For example,
the existentialist thinker Kierkegaard considers doubt as a
necessary factor of faith or belief, i.e., it is doubt that
counts for the authenticity of faith. This view is very much opposed to the view we have started with, i.e., doubt is opposed to belief.

Whether doubt stands in the relation to belief is an issue which we can discuss with reference to the different uses of the verb 'to doubt' as shown by Prof. S. Bhattacharyya. To say that a sentence is doubtful is to mean either (i) that the speaker actually doubts it, or (ii) that he can doubt it, or (iii) that though he does neither actually doubt it nor can doubt it, still either the denial of the sentence is not, impossible or both the sentence and its denial is possible.

There are, however, certain similarities between doubt and belief. Firstly, the Principle of Bivalence holds good in both the contexts, i.e., both doubt and belief are either true or false. We should however, remember that a doubt becomes logically true not by virtue of any felt incompatibility, but by virtue of a real one: A doubt is false only when one of the incompatible alternatives does not exist, or that it is proved to be not really incompatible. To show the falsity of

a doubt is not to resolve it. It is only a logical doubt that can be resolved in this way.

Secondly, another similarity between the two is that psychological and pathological conditions play an important role in shaping our beliefs and doubts.

In spite of these similarities doubt cannot be same as belief. Though both doubt and belief are expressed in an assertion or denial, a belief—assertion or a belief-denial can be made without using the phrase 'X believes' but a doubt-assertion cannot be made without using the phrases like 'X doubts...'. 'Probably...'. The main reason, however, is that belief is not a state of indecision. To believe something is to accept something as true. If there is some sort of doubt in belief, then that stage of inertness is not a happy situation. There is a need for transition and this transition is expedited by faith.

2.3 BELIEF AND FAITH

In many cases, specially in religious sphere, the words 'faith' and 'belief' are used synonymously. Etymologically the latin word 'fides' means both faith and belief. We can refer to the classic Lutheran dogmatic treatises which speaks of the three elements of faith—notitia (knowledge), assensus (assent) and fiducia (trust). Among these three, the element

of fiducia is treated as the main element of faith and the others are subordinate to it.

There is an attempt to define faith solely in terms of volition and to differentiate it from belief which is taken to be cognitive or intellectual. This attempt can be countered by saying that faith also has connection with cognitive element, because the object of faith is claimed to be metaphysically real. In faith, there may be a preceding stage of doubt. Faith is that which counteracts doubt. Just as we understand the reality of our waking life by negating our dream-experience, so also faith is understood by negating doubt. Faith is related to belief, because faith in p implies belief that p.

No faith can be an isolated phenomenon, but must be an element in a system of beliefs. This point may be made clear with reference to Louis Pasteur. Pasteur, on the one hand, was a devout Catholic, on the other, he solved the problem of fermentation by the theory of germs. Pasteur admitted only scientifically determined truth, and still he had a strong belief that he would meet one of his child-patients in the other world. This faith is not an isolated phenomenon, it gets meaning only being connected with some other beliefs, such as the holiness of God, the trust in religious books, etc.

7. This example is taken from Neal W. Klausner and Paul G. Kuntz, *Philosophy: The Study of Alternative Beliefs*, p. 25.
2.4 BELIEF AND KNOWLEDGE

It is commonly held that there is a similarity between knowledge and belief. The similarity is shown ordinarily in the way Prof. Woozley has shown it. It is said that in both the assertions 'I know that p' and 'I believe that p', the occurrences of the words 'know' and 'believe' are not necessary occurrences. The purpose of these sentences can be served by mere utterance of 'p'. In contrast to this, sentences expressing doubt necessarily include the phrase '...doubt/doubts that...'.

The point is, this is no similarity at all. Real similarity lies elsewhere. The defect in this said-similarity can be shown very easily. Firstly, if utterance of 'p' served both the purposes of the sentences 'I know that p' and 'I believe that p', then both sentences would be same in meaning. But this is absurd. Secondly, there are many kinds of sentences - assertoric, necessary, problematic, etc. The assertoric sentence 'I doubt that p' may very well assume a problematic form 'Perhaps p', without affecting its meaning.

In fact, 'Perhaps p' is an elliptical expression of 'Perhaps p or not-p' (not-p means anything other than p). But 'I believe that p' or 'I know that p' is concerned only with the truth of 'p' and not its falsity. The point of similarity therefore between knowledge and belief which as well as distinguishes them from doubt is this; the doubt about the truth of p is the same as the doubt about the
falsity of p, but knowledge or belief about the truth of p is quite different from the knowledge or belief about the falsity of p.

The similarity that strikes provokes us to discuss the actual relation between knowledge and belief. The primary relation found between them is evident in the definition of knowledge where belief is said to be a condition of knowledge. The common form of the standard analysis of the concept 'knowledge' is this:

A knows that p if and only if (a) p is true, (Truth-condition), (b) A believes that p, (Belief condition), and (c) A has adequate evidence for p (Evidence-condition).

This third condition can be further analysed as:

(i) A must be right about the evidence, and
(ii) A must be right about the relation of the evidence to the conclusion.

From the definition, it emerges that there are, to use, the terminology of A.C. Danto, three aspects of knowledge - semantical, psychological and doxastic. It is with the second, i.e., the psychological aspect that we are concerned in this chapter.

Attempts have been made to explain the relation between knowledge and belief of which some seem to be of utmost importance. These are as follows:

1. It is the relation of entailment.
2. It is the relation of incompatibility.
3. It is the relation of denial of entailment.
Of these, '1' has two forms, hence there are virtually four views that are to be discussed here. Before entering into the details of them, it is necessary to have a cursory view of the inter-relations of these theories and in this connection to spell out the misconception rooted in Armstrong's analysis of knowledge-belief relation.

To know the inter-relations of 1, 2 and 3, let me give the symbolic representation of the assertions respectively of 1, 2 and 3 in the following way:

1. Kap → Bap
2. ~ (Kap & Bap), i.e., (Kap → ~Bap)
3. ~ (Kap → Bap)

That '1' and '3' stand in sharp distinction is quite evident here. The relation between '1' and '2' will be clear when we come to know the relation between '2' and '3'. The relation between '2' and '3' is such that there is a one-way relation, i.e., '3' → '2' but not vice versa. Those who accept '2' have to accept '3' as its precondition but in no cases, '2' is the precondition of '3'.

Armstrong distinguishes between the theory of entailment and its denial in the following way.

Assertion of the Belief-condition : (Kap → Bap)
in a strong form : (Kap → Cap)
in a weak form : ~ (Kap → Cap)

Denial of the Belief-condition : \(~(\text{Kap} \rightarrow \text{Bap})\)
   in a weak form : \(~(\text{Kap} \rightarrow \sim \text{Bap})\)
   in a strong form : \((\text{Kap} \rightarrow \sim \text{Bap})\)

Now, regarding the strong and weak forms of the assertion of Belief-condition, there is no difficulty. But the confusion centres round the weak-denial of Belief-condition. The symbolic representation of the weak-denial theory is just the negation of the symbolic representation of the strong-denial theory and it sounds contradictory for both belonging to the same camp. In fact, it permits the weak-denial theory to yield a conclusion like '\(\text{Kap} \rightarrow \text{Bap}\)', i.e., the assertion of Belief-condition which is the supposed opponent camp. The derivation can be easily shown in this way:

1. \(~(\text{Kap} \rightarrow \sim \text{Bap})\) / : \(\text{Kap} \rightarrow \text{Bap}\)
   2. \(~(\sim \text{Kap} \lor \sim \text{Bap})\) 1. Impl.
   3. \(~\sim\text{Kap} \lor \sim\text{Bap}\) 2. DeM.
   4. \(\sim\text{Kap} \lor \sim\text{Bap}\) 3. D. N.
   5. \(\sim\text{Kap} \lor \sim\text{Bap}\) 4. Com.
   6. \(\text{Bap} \lor \sim\text{Kap}\) 5. Simp.
   7. \(\sim\text{Kap} \lor \text{Bap}\) 6. Add.
   8. \(\sim\text{Kap} \lor \text{Bap}\) 7. Com.
   9. \(\sim \text{Kap} \lor \text{Bap}\) 8. Impl.

In fact, such a symbolic form of weak-denial theory
\([\text{i.e., } \sim(\text{Kap} \rightarrow \sim\text{Bap})]\) is not the intended form of Armstrong's statement of weak-denial theory. To quote Armstrong, "According
to the weak-denial, although it is possible to know something but not believe it; knowledge does not entail the absence of belief: \( \sim (\text{Kap} \rightarrow \sim \text{Bap}) \)." So it appears that \( \sim (\text{Kap} \rightarrow \sim \text{Bap}) \) is one conjunct, the other conjunct being expressed with the help of a modal operator "M": \( M(\text{Kap} \sim \text{Bap}) \) so the perfect symbolic form of Armstrong's intended weak-denial theory should be of the form:

\[
M (\text{Kap} \sim \text{Bap}). \sim (\text{Kap} \rightarrow \sim \text{Bap})
\]

In showing the inefficiency of the weak-denial theory, Armstrong surveys the first conjunct unaccompanied by the modal operator as the assertion of the theory.\(^9\) So the rejection seems to be imperfect. In this paper I also show it's inefficiency in the same way without facing the difficulty of Armstrong because the proposed assertion of the weak-denial theory is really the assertion "(Kap \sim \text{Bap})."

I shall, however, follow Armstrong in distinguishing strong and weak-form of the assertion of Belief-condition. The strong-form upholds that the entailment between knowledge and belief is mediated through certainty and the weak-form denies such mediation. This means:

\[
\text{Kap} \rightarrow \text{Bap} \quad \text{(Entailment Theory)}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Kap} & \rightarrow \text{Cap} \\
(\text{Strong-form})
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\sim (\text{Kap} \rightarrow \text{Cap}) \\
(\text{Weak-form})
\end{align*}
\]

The word 'certainty' here is to be understood as

\(^9\) Ibid., p.143.

'absolute certainty' having no degrees The word 'certain' is used as a psychological word, being synonymous with the expressions 'being sure of', 'being confident of', 'having evidence' as it is used by different thinkers. Accordingly, I shall use the expressions interchangeably in connection with the writings of those thinkers.

THE THEORY OF INCOMPATIBILITY

The view that appears to be unfit at the outset is the theory of incompatibility, i.e. '2'. There are three forms of incompatibility:

A) Incompatibility in terms of mental-states

B) Incompatibility in relation to objects

C) Incompatibility in respect of statements.

Prof. A.C. Danto calls them the Subject-theory, the Object-theory and the Socio-linguistic theory respectively. I shall accept this terminology for convenience.

(A) The Subject-Theory:

The theory finds support in the writings of Cook-Wilson, Prof. Price and Prof. Prichard. All of them are of the opinion that knowledge and belief are alternative mental-states—one is infallible, the other is fallible respectively. According to Cook-Wilson, these two mutually exclusive mental-states

10. J. Cook-Wilson, "The Relation of Knowing to Thinking" in A. Phillips Griffiths, Knowledge and Belief, p. 18.
are alternative to each other. Knowledge represents fact, hence there is no question of mistake in it. The available evidence in a knowledge-situation is recognized as sufficient evidence. This recognition is already present in knowledge itself. So the feeling of confidence is total, there is no question of degrees of confidence. Belief, on the other hand, is not apprehension of fact, hence it is a fallible mental state. The evidence available here is recognized as insufficient. All other enquiries are made on the presupposition of knowledge which baffles all definition.

Prof. Price is of the opinion that knowledge and belief are distinct from each other, the former being ultimate and not further analysable. He cites an example where Mr. A knows that he himself is puzzled, and Mr. B believes that Mr. A is puzzled. Both of them have something directly present in their consciousness; in case of Mr. A, it is his puzzlement, in case of Mr. B it is his coming across Mr. A's behaviour. The difference is this: if Mr. A is not actually puzzled, he cannot know that mental-state. Hence, in case of knowledge, the direct presentation of the mental-state of puzzlement to the consciousness is a mark of actual puzzlement, but in case of belief, it is not a necessary mark. Price concludes that it is impossible to know and to believe the same thing at the same time.

Prof. Price rejects any attempt to overlook the incompatibility between knowledge and belief by identifying them as judgemental. According to Price, knowledge may be judgmental, but in belief-context judgement is not a cognitive act. In this context, judgement has an element of emotional attitude. So the belief-statement has double function of expressing the emotion and signifying the fact.

According to H.A. Prichard, there is a subjective difference between knowledge and belief which are alternative mental-states. The first thing he says is that the said difference is not one of degree, but of kind. It is like red colour and blue colour, i.e., not like genus and species. Secondly, the difference is such that knowledge is neither true nor false, but beliefs are either true or false, but never necessarily true.

Thirdly, when we know something we are certain of it and vice versa. And when we believe something we are uncertain of it and vice versa. No increase in the feeling of conviction can convert belief into knowledge. Fourthly, in a knowledge-situation we feel certain of it through reflection and we identify a case as a case of knowledge by reflection only. It is neither confidence nor any extra characteristic the presence of which produce certainty or knowledge (a state of certainty is a state of knowledge). Knowledge displays itself. Fifthly, it is the reflection which is all-important here. Reflection paves the way to identify a case as that of
knowledge or belief, because, according to Prichard, they are transparent mental-states. This is definitely a point of similarity between them, a peculiar similarity that shows their difference more prominently. To quote Prichard, "We must recognize that whenever we know something we either do, or at least can, by reflecting, directly know that we are knowing it, and that, whenever we believe something, we similarly either do, or can directly know that we are believing it and not knowing it."¹²

The immediate question is: What is their relation? Or, what is the element responsible for their being epistemic notions? Prichard's answer is: (i) believing presupposes knowing in the sense that this knowing is about something other than what we believe in a particular context, and (ii) believing is a state we 'sometimes' reach in the endeavour to attain knowledge.

The subject-theory has been severely criticized by A.J.Ayer, and A.C.Danto though they have their individual differences in different aspects. According to Danto, incompatibility in respect of mental-states is a result of the view that knowledge and belief are alternative concepts having common grammatical structure.¹³ Both Ayer and Danto give importance to correspondence theory of truth and so they deny that

¹² H.A.Prichard, Knowledge and Perception, p.86
¹³ A.C.Danto, Analytical Philosophy of Knowledge, p.75.
knowledge is a 'mental-state' which is infallible. In fact, mental-state has no truth-producing character. Danto says that 'a state of knowledge' is a mistaken phrase. Ayer denies any genuine difference between knowledge and belief. knowledge is rather a kind of belief.

Special criticism has been made by Danto against the concept and role of reflection in Prichard's theory. Danto points out that if reflection means just 'inward glance' then the truth-condition of a proposition is to be determined solely by the psychological conditions. It implies that a man can utter a sentence 'I know that p' even if p is a false proposition or even if the man does not have enough objective evidence for p. The reason is, it is the single game of personal reflection accessible to that person only. But undoubtedly, reflection is not a dependable evidence. The important implication is that mere play of reflection cannot distinguish between cases of knowledge and cases of belief. Therefore, knowledge should be in terms of certainty. Knowledge is that where we are certain of it.

But Danto says that there is a dangerous confusion between certainty and its feeling. Knowledge cannot be a mental-state accompanied by a feeling of certainty. The reason is, "...the feeling of certainty is notoriously compatible with the falsity of that in which one is confident." In fact, Prichard's theory and in general Subject-theory rests heavily on the assumption that knowing is identical with knowing that one...
knows, and this assumption is not to be examined in this paper in fear of diversion from our original issue. We remain satisfied here with these criticisms of subject-theory which are found in Ayer and Danto. Danto calls any quest for infallible state of knowledge as a futile quest. Belief is a mental-state and its ascription is based on the sufficient observation of the behaviour of the believer. But knowledge is not a mental-state and mere observation of behaviour is not enough for its ascription. The correspondence theory of truth gives importance to the objective facts which explain the certainty of knowledge.

In fact, both Cook-Wilson and Prichard consider knowledge as a mental-state which is never directed to a false proposition and this is what is meant by infallibility of knowledge. Reality contains true propositions which are revealed in knowledge. The infallibility is a characterisation of a mental-state which is objective in nature. We cannot accept Danto's attempt to dementalise the concept of knowledge. But this does not mean that the subject-theory is correct, because it is also very difficult to accept a category-difference between knowledge and belief.

It is wrong to suppose that with these criticisms, we have rejected the incompatibility-thesis. There is another attempt that makes use of the concept of incompatibility without giving stress on any mentalistic concept. And this is the Object-theory.
The best version of this theory is that of Plato. In his *Republic* Plato upholds that knowledge and belief are distinct mental faculties incompatible with each other. Knowledge is infallible and belief fallible. Objects of knowledge are the eternal immutable truths while objects of belief are mistakable contingent truths. All the factual truths we suppose to have about this contingent world can only be believed, and cannot be known.

Now, the presupposition behind this division of objects is the demand that what is known cannot be false. Denial of necessary truth results in self-contradiction. This character makes the necessary truths objects of knowledge.

Now, this presupposition implies that there is no question of further revision and correction in the field of knowledge. If some proposition, once known as true, is found to be false, then it is a proposition which was never a necessary truth. This contention, however, is contestable.

First of all, from pragmatic point of view, it is nothing abnormal to 'know' contingent propositions expressing contingent truths. A similar remark is made by Prof. Woozley who denies the distinction between knowledge and belief as a
difference between apriori and empirical truths.\(^{15}\)

Now impossibility of being false is considered to be the
criterion of apriori truths. Though Plato has not given the
criterion, but his theory is expected to admit that the nega-
tions of eternal truths are impossible in the ideal world.
(According to Plato, the empirical world of becoming, as com-
bination of being and non-being is self-contradictory and
hence impossible). Prof. Woolezley has shown that impossibility
of being false is a property not only of apriori truths, but
also of certain empirical propositions, though the sense of
possibility is not the same in two cases. An example of an
empirical proposition which is impossible to be false is
'Prof. B.K. Motilal is dead'. Woolezley, however, offers to use
the word 'know' in a second sense in the context of such empi-
rical propositions. But the fact remains that knowledge cannot
be distinguished from belief in respect of their objects.

15. Plato calls the eternal truths 'apriori'. There are two
sense of apriori - temporal and logical. Temporal apriori
means apriori even before our birth. Plato accepts this,
because he says that necessary truths are innate at the
time of birth. The soul has complete knowledge prior to
its association with the body. Only when it is associated
with the body, it forgets all knowledge which are remem-
bered later on. Logically prior knowledge means some
truths which are not derived from sense-experience. Plato
admits necessary eternal truths as apriori in both the
sences of apriori.
Secondly, there is no rational justification to make two distinct mutually exclusive set of propositions as objects of knowledge and belief. In fact, one and the same proposition may be either object of belief to one person and object of knowledge to another at the same time or object of both belief and knowledge to the same person at different times.

In the third place, Prof. Danto says that this theory is based on the relational concept of knowledge and belief. Knowledge is the relation between the individual knower and something recognized as object known. The main strength of the theory is that it does not make knowledge-belief distinction as a difference in relation to same object. Because in that case, belief cannot be properly explained. So difference in objects is to be postulated. Danto admits that what is intuitive in Object-theory is that it treats knowledge as irreducibly relational. But this relational theory cannot capture the complete relation between knowledge and belief. Danto comments that both Subject-theory and Object-theory are based on a misunderstanding that knowledge and belief are alternative concepts sharing parallel grammar. Actually, they are not alternatives at all.

Prof. Armstrong says that Plato's line of thought regarding the said relation is supported by linguistic arguments. When a man says that he knows that p, it does not imply

that he believes that p, not because the latter is superfluous, but because it seems to be meaningless to withdraw a claim after making it.

Prof. Armstrong rejects that it confuses what is misleading for a man to utter in a situation with what he says when he believes that to be false. We can say this much that it is misleading for the person to know and believe p at the same time, but in no ways, it means that while knowing p, he believes that p is false.

Armstrong gives a proof against the Object-theory that knowledge excludes belief. The proof depends on an assumption that one state-of-affair can be the object of different cognitive attitudes - knowledge, certainty, belief, etc. This assumption however, cannot be accepted by Plato. But Armstrong says that this assumption is very much certain, hence the proof can falsify the theory.

It is commonly held that certainty entails belief, i.e., 'Cap→Bap,' its opposite is not rationally justified. There is also a one-way relation between certainty and knowledge in the sense that though the latter implies the former, the former does not. Now, it may well happen that a man is certain of p and also knows p, i.e., 'Cap & Kap.' In this situation, if knowledge excludes belief, then we have to say 'Cap & Kap & ~Bap.' Thus in the same sentence we have 'Cap & ~Bap' which contradicts the common-sense view 'Cap→Bap.' The proof can be demonstrated as follows:
There is another island in incompatibilism which is yet to be explored. It is not knowledge and belief but the knowledge-sentences and belief-sentences which are alternatives to each other because they are incompatible performances. Prof. Dando calls it the socio-linguistic theory of early Austin.

(C) Socio-Linguistic Theory:

This theory is found in the writings of early Austin which he has rejected later on. According to this theory, "...with 'I know', I give my words, whereas with 'I believe' I refrain from giving my word."¹⁹ It means that in belief there is no guarantee of truth, it is merely a description of mental state. Knowledge, on the other hand, has performative use. If I say

¹⁹: J.L. Austin, "Other Minds", in *Philosophical Papers*, p. 67.
that the sentence containing 'I think' is an assertion about myself then I commit the descriptive fallacy. Austin suggests an analogy between 'I know' and 'I promise' because in both cases we use words in the right place with right qualifications.

This theory has been criticised by many philosophers, especially by A.C. Danto and R.M. Chisholm. None of them accept the belief-knowledge distinction as the distinction between descriptive and performative uses respectively. According to Chisholm, no utterances are purely descriptive or purely performatory. Every sentence has double function of describing something and performing something at the same time.

According to A.C. Danto, Austin's view never says that 'I believe that p' is not descriptive. It is rather both descriptive and performative. Danto also points out that 'I know that p' should also be descriptive because, in knowledge-context, the relation between 'I know that p' and 'p' is a necessary relation. Any discussion of knowledge must be in accordance with the said relation such that the falsity of 'p' implies falsity of 'I know that p', and the truth of the latter leads to the truth of the former.

Danto says that, according to Austin, a sentence is descriptive means it should admit of truth-values. Danto comments that in this sense 'I promise' is purely prescriptive, because it does not admit any sensible assignment of truth-values. Hence the analogy between 'to know' and 'to promise' is not a perfect one. Danto offers the following reasons against the analogy.
In the first place, violating a promise cannot falsify the utterance 'I promise'. But if a proposition p is found to be false, then the utterance 'I know that p' also becomes false. In that situation, I am criticised for giving a wrong guarantee. Austin however is of the opinion that in the previous utterance 'I know that p' the performance was unjustified. He denies the so-called relation between 'I know that p' and 'p' as sketched by Danto. According to Austin, the truth of the latter cannot be derived from the truth of the former, hence falsity of the latter can have no influence on the former. So the analogy is restored.

But there are other difficulties also. Austin is concerned with the verb 'to promise' as it occurs in the first person and in the present tense. Any past or future utterance of promise only asserts that the expression 'I promise that ...' was or will be made by the person concerned. So the performative force of promising is relevant only in the present context. But this is not so in case of knowledge. Besides, while knowledge in transitive, promise is not.

Secondly, a promise refers to a particular span of time within which any repetition of the promise-utterance is simply redundant. It is not fresh promise and not a new fact to be stated, and it adds no extra strength to the already-made promise. So it is more reasonable to say within that period, 'I am under such and such obligations'. But in case of knowledge, repetition of the utterance 'I know' is a fresh assertion, it
is the reporting of a fact that adds a force to the previous utterance.

Thirdly, that knowledge-assertion does not mean giving of words like promise-assertion is clear from various examples. The expression 'I know' can be used to express impatience, sorrow, sympathy, etc. where the descriptive meaning of 'I know' is the same. For example, when Mr. X says to Mr. B 'I no longer want your help' and Mr. B says to Mr. X 'I know you donot', the using of the verb 'to know' in the latter sentence is mere acknowledgement of the fact stated in the former, it is no question of giving of words.

In the fourth place, promising implies performance of promissory action, but knowledge does not necessarily imply performance of any action, it even does not always imply that every time of knowing p is a time of knowing that knowing p.

In the last place, Austin says that knowledge is not descriptive because it does not speak of any subjective condition of the person concerned, and also because there is no such thing as knowledge. But nobody accepts this position, because it will falsify the assertion 'I know'. Austin himself also suggests that 'I know that p' can be uttered only when I believe that p and I am right. It does not make 'I know' non-descriptive.

Danto's conclusion therefore is that there is no proper analogy between 'I know' and 'I promise'. In fact 'I know' as well as 'I believe' may be performative and descriptive.
Jonathan Harrison also criticises Austin's view. First of all, by 'descriptive fallacy', Austin means the fallacy to suppose that the function of some words viz. 'to know' is to make a statement that expresses truth or falsehood while those words have some other functions. Harrison rejects such an explanation of 'descriptive fallacy'. The expression 'I know that' expresses a statement. In fact, 'descriptive fallacy' is to suppose that putting 'I know' in front of any sentence alters the truth-value of what is being said. Adding 'I know' to 'The bull is going to charge' does not alter the truth-value of what is asserted in the sentence.

Secondly, Austin considers 'I know' as non-descriptive in the same way as 'I promise'. In both the cases, there is no scope of mere description or assertion, there is knowing or promising respectively. But, as Harrison points out, "though someone saying 'I promise' in the appropriate circumstances, is promising, not claiming to promise; someone saying 'I know' is simply claiming to know, not knowing'.

Thirdly, Austin points out one difference between 'I know' and 'I promise', viz. non-performance of a promise cannot make the promise false, but falsity of something supposed to be an object of knowledge makes the knowledge false. But there is another sense of 'I promise' where such difference between 'I promise' and 'I know' does not exist. It is the case where

20. This has also been shown by Prof. Urmson in his article "Parenthetical Verbs", Mind, 1952.
the utterer of 'I promise' did not fully intend to do what he promised, or promised what was beyond his power. Here it is true that the utterer actually did not promise. Harrison comments that there is only one sense of 'promise', viz., to say 'I promise' in the appropriate situation, there is no possibility of saying that I did not promise. In fact, to promise is simply to say 'I promise' but to know is to serve many conditions than to say 'I know'. So the difference exists.

Fourthly, as Austin says, both knowing and promising involve giving of words. Harrison shows that to say to my friend 'I know that p' when I believe that my friend is already aware of p, what I say is not to assure him of p, but to give him the factual information that I also know p. In case of my friend's not being aware of p, it may seem to be giving my words, but, as Harrison says, there is no incompatibility between giving my words and making a statement about myself.

In the last place, Harrison says that to say 'I know that p' is not necessarily giving the words. It rather states a fact about the utterer himself, viz., in case of sentence 'I know that the gun is not loaded'. The effect of saying this may be different, viz., to provoke somebody to handle the gun as wanted by the utterer. But the first and foremost matter is stating a fact.

Harrison says that such a metaphor between 'I know' and 'I promise' is the result of an important discovery that language has other uses than stating a fact or describing things.
But it is unwise to deny the descriptive nature of 'I know' only on the basis of over-estimation of such discovery.

What is implied in this section is that knowledge is not incompatible with belief. It therefore seems plausible that the relation of entailment is the proper relation. First comes the strong-assertion theory of entailment.

THE THEORY OF ENTAILMENT

The exponents of strong-assertion theory claim that knowledge entails being sure. It is held by A.J. Ayer, N. Malcolm and Wootzley. Ayer refers to three conditions of knowledge: A knows that p means:

(i) p is true, (ii) A is sure of p, and (iii) A has the right to be sure. The second condition says that unless A is sure of p, he cannot reasonably be said to know p. In belief-context, 'being sure' is not a necessary condition. One can have belief even in the absence of surety, though there is no harm in having both. There is no inconsistency in any object of previous belief to become false. But it cannot be so in the case of knowledge. It is self-contradictory to say that A knows that p, but A is not sure of it. Scholastic philosophers say that having knowledge means exclusion of all prudent fear of error. So Ayer says that knowledge implies both being sure and having the right to be sure.

22. 'Sure' means 'absolute certainty'.
23. In fact, beliefs have degrees here. I refer to those belief-contexts where belief is not firm, i.e., 'being sure' is absent. Hence 'being sure' is not a necessary condition.
The self-contradictoriness of such an utterance has been questioned by many philosophers, some of them call it paradoxical rather than self-contradictory. But though the utterance is paradoxical, it may be a 'fact' that one is not sure of what one knows.

Various philosophical analysis has been made regarding the phrase 'right to be sure'. R.M. Chisholm distinguishes between two senses of the phrase. So he calls the concept ambiguous. In the first sense, 'right to be sure' means 'right to terminate inquiry' and to disregard any future evidence that goes against the proposition about which we have that right. It has been suggested by John Dewey. But Dewey also, later on, when many cases of apparent knowledge become falsified, comes to conclude that we really know very little thing if we 'know' at all. Actually termination of any inquiry means the knower has to close his mind which is not reasonable. In this sense, therefore, "it would be a mistake to say both that knowledge confers this right and that reasonable men do know most of the things they think they know."  

There is another sense of the phrase, which sense is relevant in the context of application of probability. Probability is a relation between different propositions and it varies in accordance with the relation of the propositions to other propositions. We have the right to use a proposition known to be.

26. Probability is or ought to be the very guide of life according to Bishop Buller. Prof. Chisholm refers to it in his book *Theory of Knowledge*, pp. 117-118.
true along with our stock of knowledge in calculating probabilities. Now we have the 'right to be sure' that in calculating probabilities of other proposition, the degree of our reliance on that proposition has direct influence on the degree of reasonableness of our decisions.

According to N. Malcolm, 'being confident' is a necessary condition of knowing. In case of knowledge-assignment also, presence of confidence plays a vital role. If I myself know that p and if Mr. A lacks confidence that p is true, then I cannot say that Mr. A knows that p is true. It is this feeling of confidence that distinguishes between strong and weak senses of knowledge.

Prof. Woozley rejects27 the idea that 'being sure of it' is a necessary condition of knowing. He says that this is a result of wrong identification of a man's claiming to know something, and the man's being justified in claiming to know it. It is true that normally a man cannot claim to know something unless he is sure, still his claim to know may be true in spite of his not feeling sure of it. But a man cannot have been justified in making a knowledge-claim unless he feels sure of it. Hence, 'being sure' is a necessary condition neither of knowledge nor of knowledge-claim but of justified knowledge-claim.

In case of an ordinary sentence 'I think that it is snowing, although it isn't' is not logically self contradictory.

27. Cf. A. D. Woozley "Knowing and Not-knowing" in A Phillips Griffiths, Knowledge and Belief.
it is also not always false, but it is 'epistemologically absurd', i.e., it cannot be justifiably made. Similarly, in case of the sentence 'I know but I am not sure of it' is epistemologically absurd. The question is not of my claim to be true or not, it rather is concerned with my justifying or having reasons for making the claim.

To make his thesis strong, Woozley cites examples both of 'knowing how' and 'knowing that'.

(1) In case of 'knowing how', let us imagine a situation that Mr. A does not claim that he knows p. But Mr. B claims that Mr. A knows it and Mr. B gives explanation in his support. Hence it is the feeling of absence of surity that hinders Mr. A from making knowledge-claim, but it neither falsifies Mr. A's having knowledge of it, nor it falsifies Mr. B's claim that Mr. A knows it.

(2) Similarly in the case of 'knowing that' also Mr. B can show that Mr. A's statement 'I do not know that p' is false.

It should be noted that knowledge here is not direct knowledge, it is rather inferential knowledge that is discussed by Woozley. Woozley says that if a man does not feel sure of p,

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28. This absence of surity may be caused by forgetfulness, or disinterest in the topic or any other sort. But it is not, the question of forgetting or other event that I resist myself from making belief-claim. If knowledge of p and knowledge of knowledge of p are dispositional in nature then it follows that I may not know that I know that p. To be specific knowledge-claim may be hindered, because I cannot be aware of all my dispositions.
he may have good reason for denying any sort of knowledge of p, but his feeling of unsurity cannot provide enough reason for ascription of knowledge to him.

In fact, our practical experience says that in many cases, knowledge-ascription is based on certain performances, i.e., doing right things or giving right answers etc. For example, in many cases of viva-voce examination, candidates are recorded to know such and such things only on the basis of correct answers they give though they are not sure of them. This could not happen if 'being sure' is a necessary condition of knowledge. It means that in cases of correct answers, knowledge of p is inconsistent with belief about the falsity of p.

Actually, in the viva-voce examination, the examiners may be somewhat influenced by the apparent confidence of the candidates. That is why, normally confidence is treated as better sign of knowledge because knowledge is normally accompanied by confidence and lack of confidence is treated as the better sign of absence of knowledge. But the picture is otherwise if we scrutinize the situation, in case of a valid inference of q from p, it is not sufficient to know that 'if p and q' and 'p', but that both 'if p then q' and 'p' are true.

There is a possible refutation of Woozley's view of which Woozley himself was aware but could not answer it because

29. However, Prof. Woozley's view that a situation of \( \text{Kap} \land \text{Ba-p} \) is impossible has been criticised by Prof. Armstrong and I shall discuss it in connection with the discussion of Entailment-denial Theory.
Max Black's book was published very shortly before WoOzley's book. We can however see that it is not an appropriate refutation of WoOzley.

Max Black says that the assertion 'p but I do not believe that p' is a dishonest assertion, because there is inconsistency between the two parts of the sentence. Such an assertion is pointless. It goes against the rules of language and rules of communication. But this criticism cannot properly be aimed to WoOzley's view, because WoOzley has called this assertion as 'epistemologically absurd'. Contextually it may be said that the question of paradoxical nature of the said sentence is a question that is to be considered later on in the light of Prof. Hintikka's comment on Moore's Paradox.

Hence confidence or being sure is not a necessary condition of knowing i.e., '¬(Kap→Cap)'. As we have seen that 'Cap→Bap', it may appear that 'Kap→¬Bap', but we have already found it to be false. So it is necessary to see whether the assertion '¬(Kap→Bap)' is true, i.e. whether '3' is true.

**THE ENTAILMENT-DENIAL THEORY**

The claim of Entailment-denial theory is '¬(Kap→Bap)'. The possibility therefore remains that there are cases of knowledge without belief, i.e. 'Kap & ¬Bap'. Prof. Armstrong cites an example to discuss the issue. The example is that of a woman who appears to know that her explorer husband has perished.
Her knowledge is based on strong proof and she verbally acknowledges that. Still she may continue to behave strongly, i.e., not like that of a widow, but that of a woman whose husband is alive. It means that she is loyal to reality as she acknowledges her knowledge of it, yet she admits that she cannot believe it. This fact of knowing that p and not believing that p is a case of interest in the present context.

Armstrong denies that this example is an example of 'Kap & ~Bap'. He says that the phrase 'she does not believe it' is ambiguous and has two meanings. The phrase may mean either

(i) that 'It is not the case that she believes it', i.e., ~Bap', or
(ii) that 'she believes it is not the case', i.e., 'Ba~P'.

These two alternatives may hold at the same time, but there is no relation of entailment between the two, so that we can reduce one to the other. It is a fact that if 'Ba~P' holds, generally '~Bap' also holds. But 'Ba~p' is consistent with 'Bap' also. We may just 'believe' both that it is not the case that Srabani will be going, and that Srabani will be going.

The philosophers accepting weak-denial theory will speak in favour of 'Kap & ~Bap' in this case. But for one who maintains that Kap→Bap, the situation is this:

2. Kap → Bap         assump.
3. Kap               1, Simp
4. Bap               2,3 M.P.
5. Kap & Ba~p & Bap  1,4 Conj.
Hence, one has to symbolise the situation as 'Kap & Ba¬p & Bap'.

There are, therefore, two interpretations of the situation:

(a) 'Kap & ¬Bap' (supporters of Entailment-denial theory, who deny that Kap→Bap).

(b) 'Kap & Ba¬p & Bap' (the view Armstrong is going to establish).

Now, if we can reject (b), then the game will be in favour of the weak-denial theory. We shall show that (a) cannot be retained.

It may seem that the situation is complicated by bringing 'Kap', because the alternative answers have the presuppositions, i.e., either 'Kap→Bap' or '¬(Kap→Bap)'. To make the whole situation presupposition-free, let us imagine that in this example, though the evidences for her husband's death seem satisfactory to the woman, they are not really satisfactory. So, we cannot say 'Kap', we have to say that she believes that her husband is dead, i.e. 'Bap'. Now we cannot say that her other unusual behaviour implies that it is not the case that she believes that her husband is dead, i.e., '¬Bap'. (The reason is, 'Bap and ¬Bap' is not a rational conjunction and it is not a reasonable answer). So we have to say that this is case of 'Bap & Ba¬p'. So the previous case should also be correctly interpreted as 'Kap & Ba¬p & Bap'.

Armstrong refers to a similar line of thought in the writing of Mr. Colin Radford. Radford's example is that of...
a Canadian who believes himself to be ignorant of English history. But when he was asked about the date of death of Queen Elizabeth, his answer came out right that it was 1603. He recognised his answer to be a mere guess, but he gradually remembered that he was taught the date previously. So it is an act of memory. So there is no difficulty in ascribing knowledge to him. At the same time it is false that he believed that Queen Elizabeth died in 1603, i.e., it is a case 'Kap & ~Bap'.

Armstrong accepts that it is a case of knowledge, i.e., 'Kap'. The question is: Is it a case of ' ~Bap' at the same time? or, Is it a case of 'Ba ~p'? In order to settle the issue, Armstrong cites two cases and later on a third one.

The first case is of a man who was previously taught about the date of death of Queen Elizabeth but who is now ignorant of English History. The second and third are two case of two men both presently ignorant of English History and both having a wrong teaching of the aforesaid date. All the three are asked about the date. The first one gives a correct guess which is the result of memory of correct teaching. The difference between second and third men is that while the second gives an incorrect guess as a result of his correct memory of incorrect teaching, the third man gives correct guess due to his incorrect memory of incorrect teaching. That the second is a case of unconscious false belief is more or less accepted by all, especially by Radford. But the first case, which is virtually the case of Radford's example, is not unanimously accepted as a case of knowledge, not even as a case of uncon-
scious knowledge. Their reason is, the first man fails to recognise his own utterance to be the manifestation of knowledge.\textsuperscript{31} The problem thus cannot be settled only by referring to first two cases.

The third is the case of unconscious true belief. Putting Radford's example to this third case, we can say that the Canadian believes that Elizabeth died in 1603 (Bap), and at the same time, he repudiates his guess at conscious level. So, in a sense, Canadian believes that it is not the case that Elizabeth died in 1603 (Ba¬p). So it is a case of 'Bap & Ba¬p'. Thus Radford's example also is an example of 'Bap & Ba¬p'. And this concludes the discussion of the claim of Weak-Denial of the Belief-condition which is rejected. (3) thus can be shown to be false. We are therefore left with the remaining alternative of Weak-assertion theory, it means that though knowledge does not entail certainty, knowledge entails belief, i.e., '¬(Kap→Cap)' and 'Kap→Bap'.

2.5 REFLECTION ON THE KNOWLEDGE-BELIEF RELATION

That knowledge entails belief is supported by many philosophers. We shall make a reference to Keith Lehrer and Woozley. According to Keith Lehrer, knowledge is impossible without knowledge of

\textsuperscript{31} In order to call a case, a case of knowledge, importance is given on the fact of recognising the case as a case of knowledge. It is a common assumption that if A knows that p, then it entails that he knows that he knows that p, i.e., 'Kap→KaKap'.
knowledge. So knowledge is impossible without belief. If whenever a person knows that p, he knows that he knows that p, the when he knows that p, he also believes that p.

Woozley defines knowledge in this way:

'A knows that p' means -

1) p is true

2) A is sure that p is true

3) A has evidence for p

4) A is right about the evidence

5) A is right about the relation of the evidence to the conclusion.

Woozley says that there is no difference of objects in the relation between knowledge and belief. An object regarding which we previously had belief because of such and such evidences may later on become an object of knowledge when the evidence becomes conclusive. In other words, it may be the case that the available evidence regarding a proposition may be insufficient to make it a case of knowledge. And in that case, the person concerned may be aware of the fact that the evidences make the proposition only probable. Examples of such cases are found in cases when one has irrational beliefs or when one remains suspicious about the truth of a true proposition, or when a man, in spite of all conclusive evidences that his friend is dead, cannot really believe it.

To quote Woozley, "...belief, when it is confirmed, becomes knowledge". He also admits that though normally knowledge cannot become belief, but there is a possibility of relapsing of knowledge into belief due to forgetfulness or losing of evidence.

So there is a close relation between the two. According to Woozley, knowledge is the limiting case of belief. It is to be noted that a reverse view is found in Prichard, as we have seen, when he says that believing is just a stage where we sometimes reach in the endeavour to have knowledge.

Woozley's conclusion thus is this: dispositional account of knowledge or belief is not the full picture of them. They are partly dispositional states of mind. The difference why one is called knowledge and the other belief is due to either the truth or falsity of their object, or the sureness of the person concerned, or the presence of conclusive or inconclusive evidence influencing his attitude. These factors when combined together, yield eight different situations of which only one is a case of knowledge and the rest are cases of belief, opinion, acceptance, etc. We can demonstrate the table as follows:

33. ibid p.179.
2.6 SOME OBJECTIONS

There are some possible objections to the thesis of Entailment. One such attempt is found in Ryle's theory. He rejects the claim that knowledge is a species of belief, because he rejects the theory of entailment altogether. According to Gilbert Ryle, the verbs 'to know' and 'to believe' are dispositional and distinct from each other - 'to know' is a capacity verb while 'to believe' is a tendency verb. So knowledge cannot entail belief. The question that arises in the context of knowledge is: How do you know? While the question arising in the context of belief is: Why do you believe?

Ryle's objection against the entailment theory applies only to a certain type of believing. In some cases of belief, where evidence is inconclusive, viz., when I say I believe
that my friend suffers from jaundice it may be at the same time true that I can also say 'I do not know that my friend suffers from jaundice'. But in a wider sense, belief is very closely related to knowledge. In fact this believing is not a mere trust and faith, i.e., irrational belief. In case of rational belief, we can easily say that when I know that \( p \), I entertain \( p \) and I am disposed to assert that \( p \).

Ryle's theory being rejected, I am not willing to say that 'knowledge entails belief' and that 'knowledge is a species of belief'. A well-knit compromise is available in Chisholm's theory. While he accepts the former, he rejects the latter.

Chisholm points out that the adverbs 'firmly', 'reluctantly', 'hesitantly' are applicable in cases of belief, but not in cases of knowledge. Like Ryle, Chisholm also accepts Prof. Austin's distinction between 'how-questions' and 'why-questions' - the former found in knowledge-context the latter in belief-context. All these imply that knowledge is not a species of belief. But it is also at the same time true that knowledge entails belief. To quote Prof. Chisholm: "The relation of knowing to believing... is not that of falcon to bird or of airedale to dog; it is more that of arriving to travelling. Arriving entails travelling - a man
cannot arrive unless he has travelled - but arriving is not a species of travelling."

So we have seen that among the four alternative relations between knowledge and belief, the weak-form of entailment stands the test of screening. Let us bring all the relative concepts in a few words.

2.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS

If we return to our main issue regarding the relation between belief and other related concepts, we can say that no knowledge can be said to be completely certain. It may hurt the sentiment of those who are in favour of infallibility of knowledge. Here we should guard against a popular mistake that it is the question of deductive knowledge only, infallibility being supposed to be the property of deductive knowledge only. The fact is, even inductive knowledge also claims for infallibility regarding the probability of propositions.

It is not wise to remain content with the logical positivists' definition of knowledge which says that in knowledge, for example, if man has two features - animality and rationality, then man is a species of animal. Similarly, if knowledge has different features one of which is belief, then knowledge is a species of belief.

34. R.M. Chisholm, Perceiving: A Philosophical Study, pp.16-18. Chisholm's view however is severely criticised. His analogy is a bad one because we do not get 'arriving' from the sumtotal of travelling and other conditions but Chisholm says that knowledge is acquired through the sumtotal of belief and other conditions. Secondly, if, something is the result of some conditions taken together, then that thing is a species of any of the conditions. For example, if man has two features - animality and rationality, then man is a species of animal. Similarly, if knowledge has different features one of which is belief, then knowledge is a species of belief.
our mental search terminates. This fact that doubtfulness is in knowledge is supported by a twentieth-century philosopher, B. Russell in his book 'Human Knowledge'. Russell says that excepting mathematical and logical knowledge "all knowledge is in some degree doubtful, and we cannot say what degree of doubtfulness makes it cease to be knowledge, any more than we can say how much loss of hair makes a man bald."  

Russell's line of thought is empiricist. Hume, for the first time, referred to knowledge as strong belief. It means that he finds no enough ground to call a mental state a state of knowledge in the sense of certain knowledge. Following Hume, we can distinguish between strong and weak senses of belief. All the picture depends on the strength of evidence. If the evidence fulfils almost all our enquiries about a thing, we incline to call it a case of knowledge. Such example is found in the case of geo-centric theory. It seemed to satisfy all the people wanted to know about the universe. But it turned out to be false in the following days.

One may say that it is just diverting the question of admittance of knowledge proper. It is a fact that science starts with hypotheses and the conclusions reached in scientific researches are in many occasions amenable to further criticisms. But to question the authenticity of knowledge only on the basis of this fact is virtually to question the validity

of inductive knowledge as a whole. It seems that the division of belief into strong and weak sense at the cost of denying knowledge altogether depends heavily on the presupposition that inductive knowledge is not proper knowledge. But it is a fact that we depend on it. Hence such a presupposition cannot be accepted.

This charge can also be met in this way. What we call knowledge can be preserved as knowledge only for pragmatic interest. It should be said: X can know p until further revision. Even when I am in pain, what I claim is my being in pain, not the knowledge of the pain. Contextually we may refer to J. Austin's "Other Minds", where he says that the phrase 'I know' speaks of the highest possible cognitive claim and it functions as the phrase 'I promise'.

So, in knowledge context, we can say two things. We can say either that what is known cannot be falsified, or, from another perspective, we can say that if it is falsified, it is not knowledge proper. It is better to accept the latter way of thinking.

I think, the best way to pay respect to the sentiment of those accepting infallibility of knowledge, is to use the name 'tentative knowledge' instead of 'certain knowledge'. The idea of tentative knowledge however cannot be accepted.

universally. We cannot add the word 'tentative' and at the same time retain the universality of knowledge proper. In fact, what we call tentative knowledge is just a knowledge-claim which becomes knowledge proper when the claim is justified, and which ceases to be a case of knowledge if the claim is turned down.

At this stage, however, it will be wrong to resolve the question of relation among knowledge, belief, doubt, etc., the term 'knowledge' being a misnomer. If we stick to the point that there is an element of doubt in knowledge, even then knowledge is the best thing we can achieve. It cannot be superceded by anything. In certain cases, we may have stronger evidences and we may become more sure of the fact, but it is controversial whether we shall call the cases as cases of knowledge having justified truth-claim. In this context, the relation among doubt, faith and belief also becomes clear. A knowledge-claim excludes the possibility of doubt. But no fact can be completely indubitable. Importance of doubt lies in the fact that different creative enquiries, both philosophical and scientific stem from the stage of doubt.

So, doubt is there, but this doubt is to be transcended. In religious context, it is superceded by faith. We have seen earlier that doubt is a state of indecision. Belief on the other hand, includes a feeling of surity and thus sounds somewhat contradictory to doubt. But as we have defended the weak-entailment theory regarding the relation between knowledge
and belief, and as doubt plays a role in knowledge, so the inevitable conclusion is that there is an indirect relation between doubt and belief. This belief, in certain context when the supporting evidence increases, becomes stronger and can be called knowledge from the point of view of our practical life.