"'I can't believe that!' said Alice.
'Can't you?' The Queen said in a pitying tone.
'Try again: draw a long breath, and shut your eyes'.
Alice laughed. 'There's no use trying', she said: 'One can't believe impossible things'.
'I dare say you haven't had much practice', said the Queen.
'When I was your age I always did it for half an hour a day. Why, sometimes I've believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast!"\(^1\)

Ordinarily 'believing' is understood in connection with something which seems to be the case. Even Alice can understand this, and so she refused to bear the Queen's

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\(^1\) Lewis Carroll, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*, p. 197
order to believe something which is impossible. Even in the wonderland Alice is aware of the impossibility. Let us see, what is the structure of such belief in our world of rational thinking.

Study of belief in philosophy is generally concentrated on the discussion about religious or moral belief. But Bernard Williams\(^2\) discusses belief as being neither the conviction of an ideological (i.e. as being religious) character, nor the conviction of a practical character (i.e. as being moral in nature). He is concerned with what he calls straightforward factual beliefs (i.e., the belief that the sun is shining, that there is a flower-vase on the table, etc.). In this context, he also brings out the relation between belief, decision and will.

1.1 FEATURES OF BELIEF

In a sense, the word 'believe' stands both for the mental state of the believer as well as for the object of belief. I shall refer to Prof. Williams' discussion of belief as a psychological state of the believer. He speaks of five characteristics of belief, though, as he admits, there are problems in accepting them as real characteristics of belief.

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The first feature is that beliefs aim at truth. 'Aiming at truth' means three things:

(i) As different from other psychological states or dispositions, beliefs enjoy the faculty of having truth-claim. In case of the former, viz., a particular habit, the question of habit being true or false is irrelevant. But a belief is true or false by virtue of the truth-value of its objective content.

(ii) The falsity of the objective content of a belief results in abandoning the belief altogether. So to believe something is to believe it to be true.

(iii) To believe something to be true is virtually the same as asserting that thing to be true. It means, in belief context, truth-ascrition is the same as truth-assertion. This aspect very closely draws our attention to Moore's famous paradox that 'I believe that p, but p is not true'. This sentence is paradoxical because of this third sense of 'aiming at truth'. To say that I believe that p is to assert that p is true, and it is paradoxical to withdraw the truth-claim of p at the same time. Some philosophers however, point out that it is not a formal self-contradiction and the sentence ceases to be a paradox if it is not in the first person (i.e., the sentence 'Sraboni believes that it is raining but it is not raining' is a perfectly consistent sentence). We shall discuss later whether this sentence is a paradox only in virtue of its being in the first person.
In fact, in relation to truth, the concept of belief can be identified as a public concept. This point has been mentioned by A.P. Griffiths. "It is only this tenuous connexion which reaches out from the unanalysable private state of mind to the public world".

2. The second characteristic of belief is that an assertion is the most direct and elementary expression of a belief. This assertion normally does not contain any reference to the believing mental state. It only refers to the object of the belief. For example, if I express my belief that today is very cold, I only say 'today is very cold', not that 'I believe that today is very cold'. In fact, the latter sentence, when said to another man, expresses a less degree of confidence than the former one, it is more a personal remark than a general statement.

This faculty of belief being expressed in linguistic assertion may make the ascription of belief reserved for human beings only, who can use language. But the fact is that we can make a sensible reference of belief to the animals having no linguistic faculty. We may have a hesitation to use the verb 'to believe' in case of lower animals like amoebas, but the use is most natural in cases of sophisticated animals like dogs. In that case the second feature of belief no longer remains as a real feature of belief.

But the question remains whether ascription of belief to animals in the same way as to human beings is right or not. When a rat is shown something that looks like the mask of a cat, the rat looks terrified and runs away. We should not say that it has the concept of a 'cat'. Similarly, the master of a particular dog may be the Prime Minister of India. We find that when a particular person enters the house, the dog pricks up his ears at the very sound of the footsteps, and we say that the dog takes the person entering the house for his master. But it is equally absurd to say either that the dog believes that his master returns home, or that it believes that the Prime Minister of India returns home. At most we can say that a dog's behaviour is "conditioned by situations which essentially involve somebody's being its master". But it is not the case with somebody's being the Prime Minister of India.

What we want to say is that, though ascription of belief to non-language-using animals is not the same as its ascription to language-using creatures, still there is no contradiction in maintaining both that belief is expressed in assertion and also that animals show signs of having beliefs.

3. The second feature shows that the capacity to have a belief cannot be determined by the capacity to express it. This leads to the third characteristic that the assertion

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3. B. Williams, Problems Of The Self, p.139.
of something, viz., $p$ is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of having the belief that $p$. We have a lot of unexpressed beliefs which show that the assertion of $p$ is not a necessary condition of having the belief that $p$. It is not the sufficient condition either, because assertions can be insincere. This shows that our assent in the use of verbs like 'I agree', 'I will do', etc. does not always reflect our actual will or intention. So acceptance is considered as a mere speech-act. In this sense, beliefs are not acceptances.

What it implies is that beliefs are psychological states and they may or may not be correctly represented by our overt assertions. To be specific, beliefs can be adequately acquired irrespective of corresponding overt assertions. Statements of intentions or promises also can be similarly insincere.

4. The fourth characteristic is that evidence is the basis of factual beliefs. A particular belief is supported by some evidential propositions which are believed. One factual belief $p$ is causally connected with another factual belief $q$ which serves as an evidence. The relation between $p$ and $q$ may be either rational or irrational. In both cases, our belief that $p$ is causally connected with our belief that $q$ (i.e., the evidential proposition). The difference is that in the former case, the causal connection is due to logical association, in the latter case, it is due to some other
illogical association. This latter variety of causal connection is called pure. So causal connection in belief-context is not of one type.

Williams admits that the notion of causality is very vague in the context of the study of human psyche. But this notion is very importantly used in explaining different aspects of our psyche. For example, in explaining memory, we need the concept of causality. To have a memory of any event of my childhood, the necessary conditions are the event, my direct experience of it in the past and my present knowledge of that direct experience. Memory is explained only if my present knowledge is causally connected with my direct experience in the past. It may be the case that there is no such causal connection, viz., my present knowledge about my past experience may be due to what my mother has said a few days ago, but then I cannot 'have a memory' of the past event.

There is an attempt to study the relation of causality in belief-context in a different way. It says that when I believe that \( p \) because I believe that \( q \), the relation between the two is both rational and causal. There are, therefore, two relations of different category which synchronise miraculously.

This view, as Williams puts it, is based on the theory of 'metaphysical double vision' (as Wisdom calls it), i.e., "the mistake of taking the same facts twice over and, then
finding the relation between them mysterious". Williams says that there are not two different relations. The relation is one and the same. It is not the case that the relation is primarily rational and then causal also. In fact, to be rational is to have a type of causal relation such that if the causal relation is not there, we cease to be rational creatures.

There are some objections against the introduction of causal relation between two beliefs, but the difficulties disappear if we accept evidential connection in place of causal one. Some may still argue that in having a belief on the strength of another belief in the context of a rational thought, it is not the causal connection that matters.

There is however a serious objection against the fourth characteristic of belief. This fact of belief's being based on other evidential propositions cannot go on for ever. And the fittest candidate to appear as counter-example is perceptual belief, i.e., belief which is acquired directly by the use of our senses around the environment.

As distinct from animals, human beings are members of a speech-community and so they have endless interlocked beliefs in a common background. That common background enables us to understand how to acquire a belief from the environment, and to use the terms correctly that will des-

4. ibid., p.143.
crite the environment as well as will express beliefs. It is possible because human beings enjoy the facility of language and through language we reach not only our thought about reality, but reality itself. This fact is revealed in Prof. Davidson's remark: "One way of pursuing metaphysics is therefore to study the general structure of our language".

The condition of having a common background of environment is described by Prof. Williams thus: "We share concepts which simultaneously enable us to express our beliefs about our environment, to describe that environment, and to describe other people's perception of the environment." So these cases of beliefs have no causal relation to other basic beliefs and hence no question of evidence arises. But the question of evidence is quite relevant in all general cases of belief excepting perceptual beliefs. So beliefs have a causal context.

5. The last feature is rather a feature of the notion of belief rather than of belief itself. Prof. E. Williams says that project, belief and action of a man go together.

Reference to a man's belief is in many ways necessitated in order to account for his action. But it is possible only when his project is also known. It means that any of the trio just mentioned, can be inferred only on the basis of

5. D. Davidson, 'The Method of Truth in Metaphysics' in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, p. 199
the knowledge of the other two. So we may reformulate the fifth feature of belief by saying that beliefs serve as an explanation of actions of a person, provided his projects are known. For example, seeing a man who takes sleeping pills at night, I may infer that he believes the drug to be safe provided he does not have a project to commit suicide by consuming that drug.

After discussion about the five characteristics of belief, Prof. B. Williams proceeds to show that mere presence of majority of these features does not guarantee belief. Otherwise, the task of belief ascription would be very easy. Prof. Williams gives a counter-example by referring to a machine which, in some sense, is characterised by the first, second and fourth feature of belief so far discussed. Prof. Williams omits the third and fifth characteristics perhaps because, it is debatable if not impossible for a machine to have these features. He shows that despite of the three features being there, the machine cannot be said to have beliefs.

To explain. The machine may express something that claims to be true, i.e., truth-value assessment may be possible in the context of what it expresses. Again, this machine may, either with the help of speech-synthesiser or by any other means, produce message that express propositions. So, in a sense, it makes assertions. It may show the power of distinguishing between propositions asserted and
propositions just held, i.e., it may use two symbols for these two types of propositions. Thirdly, the assertions resulting from particular states of the machine ('states' here means things that the machine comes out with) have causal connection with some other assertions which serve as evidence.

Williams remarks that still the machine cannot be said to have beliefs. The states of the machine may at best be called B-states. The B-states show imperfectness to be called proper belief-states. The imperfectness consists in the absence of any psyche in the machine so that it cannot willingly make insincere assertions. There is a direct mechanical route from its states to what it expresses. Any defect in the expression is necessarily treated as mechanical defect.

In fact, the term 'assertion' is used in a human-context normally in this way: I assert something whenever I decide to say something that either represents or does not represent my beliefs. To be specific, to make an assertion is to have the capacity to make sincere or insincere assertions. But the machine's inability to make insincere assertions proves that it is unable to make sincere assertions either. In case of a machine, to quote William's words, assertion just means "bringing out something in an assertoric mode, without putting qualifications around it". So the machine cannot have beliefs. Mere presence of the

7. Williams, op. cit., p.146.
features of belief in a particular thing cannot assure that there is actual belief.

There B-states, however, can be true, the environment itself may render its truth and accordingly these are as if our states of knowing. Thus, though the B-states are quite far away from belief-states of human beings, the true B-states are very much close to human knowledge. This view is a violation of the age-old notion of knowledge to be something more than mere belief, though not in the sense of excluding belief. Knowledge is rather defined as a case where the truth-claim of belief is justified.

Williams remarks that this mistaken view is the result of study of a particular situation. When somebody asserts that p is true, and we know that p is true, we ask the question: 'Does he know that p'? It means that we are not concerned with the truth condition of p, but rather we are to enquire about his credentials and find out the justification of his belief-claim regarding p.

Prof. Williams points out that the proper question in the study of the nature of knowledge should be: 'Who knows whether p'? It is clear in a case where a detective comes to know who is the real culprit in a murder-case. When his wife discovers it, she says to herself 'My husband has found out'. It means that the detective has acquired the knowledge as a result of a number of inter-
connected informations that are gathered directly from the
facts themselves. So knowledge is not something which
necessarily includes belief.

Now, we can classify B-states into three groups. Some
B-states are false, some are accidentally or by chance true
B-states and some others are non-accidentally true B-states.
The last variety is called knowledge. Belief cannot be
equated with either the first or the second variety. Belief
needs the human will which is able to decide how to assert
what we believe or what we do not believe. It is this
ability of decision, a quality of the will that distinguishes belief from B-state. Belief is related to decision to
say.

In this context Prof. Williams discusses the Humean
concept of belief as a passive phenomenon. Hume's account
also makes room for the relation between belief and deci-
sion. But Hume says that belief is a contingent fact. Our
will is such that something happens to respond to the will
and some others do not. As a result we can decide something
and cannot decide some other thing. Belief falls into the
first category. Williams deviates from Hume in rejecting
belief as a contingent fact that I can bring about.

Williams points out that this will has some limitations,
e.g., one cannot be sorry at will. Just as 'to be sorry'

8. It is here important to note that, when knowledge is
defined as justified true belief, then it does not
mean that knowledge is the result of having belief
first and then the belief being justified. Knowledge
is acquired directly from facts and we directly get
justified true belief.
is not a contingent fact to be brought about at our will and cannot depend merely on the will, similarly to believe something is also not a contingent fact and so not dependent merely on the will. There is nothing to be called belief at will. Prof. Williams offers two reasons in support of his opinion:

(A) First of all, one of the features of belief is that it aims at truth. If it is possible to have a belief at will, then it is also possible to acquire it irrespective of its truth-claim. But in that case, it no longer remains a belief, because a belief is something that purports to represent reality. It implies that we cannot acquire a belief at will irrespective of its truth-claim.

(B) Secondly, the necessary condition of an empirical belief is the connection between the situation, the believer's perceptions and what he believes. This demand cannot be fulfilled, if belief is something which is produced at will. The reason is, the will has no command over the environment as well as the believers' perceptions.

There are, however, some counter-examples in respect of the first reason where we have beliefs unconnected with truth. The causal factors active in producing such beliefs are hypnotism, drugs, etc. There is therefore the possibility to adopt these means in order to acquire a belief what we want to believe at will. If this adoption is justified, then belief can very well be said to be acquired at
will and hence belief will be a contingent fact in Humean sense.

In solving this problem, Prof. Williams distinguishes between two senses of the notion of 'wanting to believe' something. There are 'truth-centred motives' and 'non-truth-centred motives'. 'Truth-centred motive' is that where a man wants to believe something in the sense that he wants to see his belief to come true. For example, a man whose friend is dead, very much wants to believe that his friend is alive. For this purpose, the methods of hypnotism or taking drugs will be obviously incoherent. The reason is, what the man wants is not only to have a belief that his friend is alive, but he wants the actual states-of-affairs being changed in the way he wishes it to be, and this is something which is beyond the power of hypnotism or drug.

There are other non-truth-centred motives which are not so incoherent in nature. That man whose friend is dead may feel his friend's absence as intolerable. As a result he may take recourse to hypnotism etc., because he thinks that these methods will help him to believe that his friend is alive and save him from the deep sorrow for that time. Here, the man does not want the real world to be changed, because he knows that this change is impossible, still he adopts those means in order to be away from his miserable-ness. But Williams comments that though, unlike the previous one, it is not incoherent, it is something deeply irrational.
and hence incorrect. Our rationality tells us that a temporary forgetting is not a permanent solution, because the man will feel more miserable when the hypnotic trance or the effect of drug is over.

Williams refers to some questions, the answers of which may throw some light in solving this problem.

First of all, we have to know the relation between the two projects - one is of trying to believe something because it is comfortable (here belief is determined by comfortability of the situation) and the other of trying to forget something because it is uncomfortable. Our question is whether these two projects are the same or not. If not, then one must be easier. Then the question is: what makes it easier? Williams suggests that though there is no incoherence in forgetting what is uncomfortable, still it is impossible to have a belief about something because it is comfortable. Here 'comfortable' means which is untrue, but which is a favourable situation. There is an asymmetry in the relation between a belief and the truth-value status of what is believed. It is a fact that every truth cannot be object of a man's belief, but it is the normal claim that each of his belief ought to be true.

Secondly, a further objection to the project of believing something which is false is that this process of running away from the actual state-of-affairs seems to be
never-ending. For example, in order to get rid of the miserable belief that his friend is dead, the man has to believe not merely the simple fact that his friend is alive, he also has to believe many other imaginary situations (i.e., his friend will come to his house on the next day, his friend is going abroad day after the next day, etc.) which can save him from that intolerable belief. In this process he has to guard against believer's every possible situation that will lead him to the misery. Gradually, he may have to deny the entire reality, because, the actual death of his friend has an impact on the total reality in some way or other. But to deny the world is nothing but self-deception.

So, we should say that belief is a psychological state which necessitates will to decide, but belief is not connected with will in the same sense that we can have beliefs at will.

1.2 THEORIES REGARDING THE NATURE OF BELIEF

We have so far seen what are the features of belief. Different thinkers, in different ages, disagree regarding the specification of essential features of belief and accordingly there are different opinions regarding the nature of belief.

The definition of belief is found in F.P. Ramsey's 'General Propositions and Causality', in this way: belief
is "a map of neighbouring space by which we steer". There
are two characteristics of belief:
(i) it is a map.
(ii) it is something by which we steer.

Ramsey's comparison between belief and map is very
much like Wittgenstein's comparison between sentences and
pictures.

The view of belief as map has certain features:
1. The belief-map has as its central reference point the
believer's present self.
2. The belief-map has errors, lapses, fantasies, etc.
3. It is not a fixed area, there is continuous addition
of new territories and continuous taking away of old ones.
   But nothing is external. So it is a map within his mind.
   But this belief-map is not 'completely' the same as a
   world-map. There is a distinction between ordinary map and
   the map-reader's interpretation of the map. But beliefs
   'are' our interpretation of reality. But like maps, beliefs
   have an intrinsic power of representation. Both of them
   carry their interpretation of reality within themselves.

Beliefs are different from mere entertaining. The
difference is that beliefs are action-guiding, i.e.,
beliefs are those by which we steer, while entertaining is
not necessarily so.

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9. F.P. Ramsey "General Propositions and Causality", The
Foundations of Mathematics, 1931. It is also quoted
in D.M. Armstrong, Belief, Truth and Knowledge, p.3.
Ramsey's account of belief as map successfully explains cases of particular beliefs, but general beliefs or beliefs in the truth of unrestricted universally quantified propositions cannot be considered as maps of reality so simply. In fact, they are dispositions to extend the original belief-map according to certain rules. They are habits of inference which dispose us to move from a belief about some particular matter of fact to a further belief about some other particular matter of fact. We shall consider four important theories of the nature of belief:

(A) The phenomenological theory of belief;

(B) The dispositional theory of belief;

(C) The belief-state theory;

(D) The belief-act theory.

Let us discuss one after another.

(A) THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL THEORY OF BELIEF

This view brands belief as conscious occurrence or in Humean terminology "lively idea"10. In the language of Prof. Ginsberg, belief in Hume's philosophy is a PPE.

PPE or phenomenologically presented entity11 is a member

11. M. Ginsberg, Mind and Belief. The term 'phenomenology' here is not used in the sense of phenomenological method in Husserl's philosophy.
belonging to our phenomenological field. Sensations, pains, aches, the taste of salt, etc., the sight of green crops in the field, the smell of perfume, audible and visible words, etc. are examples of PPEs. Prof. Ginsberg also has mentioned the name of B. Russell in this context. But let us set aside the distinction between believing and belief as is shown by Russell, and let us concentrate on Hume's theory of belief.

Hume, an empiricist, analyses the concept of belief in the context of the Uniformity of Nature which lies beyond the sphere of reason. There are certain propositions which are excluded from the region of belief. These propositions can be said to be 'empirical propositions that do not go beyond what is actually present to sense'. Among these, there are analytical propositions, synthetic propositions based on immediate empirical data, introspectively evident propositions and propositions describing a present sense-impression or a present impression of reflection.

Propositions or statements, which are not actually present to the sense are also of several types:

i) empirical statements which are not sensibly evident,
   e.g., on hearing some distinct loud conversation, I believe that there are some persons outside the room where I am sitting;

ii) simple past tense empirical statements, e.g., I believe that there was a thunder-storm yesterday;

13. Analytical propositions are excluded from the realm of belief only if we accept that knowledge is different from belief or opinion.
iii) indefinite past statements, e.g., after the excavation of an ancient city, I may believe something about the culture of the inhabitants of that city; and iv) synthetic future-tense statements, e.g., 'The sun will rise tomorrow'. We believe this proposition not merely for the following day, but for every morning to come.

Now, human mind has the authority over its stock of ideas in such a way that it enjoys complete freedom in combining the ideas in its own way. This complete freedom often makes room for imagination. This play of imagination often yields fictitious ideas also. As the same type of play is found in belief-context (i.e., in the sense of combining different ideas of the mind), it is important to distinguish between belief and fiction and also between belief and incredulity. (The word 'incredulity' here covers the cases of disbelief and mere entertaining.) Otherwise, it is possible to believe anything at will as is found in case of fictions. But we cannot do so in belief-context, because beliefs have some kind of truth-claim.

The difference however does not lie in the ideas, because the same statement can be believed by Mr. A and disagreed by Mr. B at the same time. And these two persons contradict each other in this point because they understand by that statement the same thing, i.e., they entertain the same idea. The point of entertaining the same idea needs clarification.
First of all, to believe something is not to add some new idea to the ideas of our mind. The reason is, if belief is a matter of mind's activity only, then the mind can have any belief at its own will. But it cannot happen so. To take Prof. Price's example "when you look through the window and see rain falling heavily, you cannot help believing that the streets outside are wet".  

Secondly, if for the sake of argument, we say that believing is adding some new idea, then there is the question of specifying it. One may say that it is the idea of existence. But Hume denies any such idea of existence in the sense in which there is an idea of a cat. It reminds us of Kant's criticism of the ontological argument for the existence of God, where Kant remarked that existence is not a real predicate. The reason is, when we think of God and when we believe God to be existent, our idea of Him neither increases nor diminishes.

Hume's conclusion therefore is that the difference between belief and incredulity lies in the manner of conceiving. Believing in an empirical statement then is a manner of conceiving. The difference that is noted when we come to believe a statement from merely entertaining it is that, the idea becomes more lively or vivacious. Hume uses a number of adjectives to explain this manner and he himself admits that an exact definition of belief baffles all our  

To quote Hume, "I confess that it is impossible to explain perfectly this feeling or manner of conception." So it is expected that we should take into account all of them together in discussing belief. According to Hume, "An idea assented to feels different from a fictitious idea that the fancy alone presents to us; and this different feeling I endeavour to explain by calling it a superior force or vivacity or solidity or firmness or steadiness." Belief is therefore more than a single idea, it differs from a fictitious idea because it has a force and so has a superior influence on our passions and imagination than those of fictitious ideas. The feeling of the idea means here the reflection of the idea.

This point can be made clear by reference to some examples given by Hume. The first one is a case of revival of memory. One may not remember a past event even when one gets a long description of that event. But, the description of a little detail may rouse the whole memory of that event. In Hume's language, "without any other alteration, beside that of the feeling, they become immediately ideas of the memory and are assented to".

The other example is that of reading a book by two persons from two different perspectives. One who reads it as a romantic story just enters into the details in so far

16. ibid., p. 629 (Appendix).
17. ibid., p. 629.
18. ibid., pp. 627-8 (Appendix).
as the details contribute in developing the romantic atmosphere. But one who reads the book as a 'true history' is more concerned with the details. The detailed descriptions not merely act on his mind, i.e., his imagination, but he can also deduce many other propositions from that description. This is definitely an illustration of belief's weighing more in our thoughts. So, Hume's conclusion is that we should make use of words that express something near this feeling of vivacity. "But", as Hume observes, "its true and proper name is belief, which is a term that everyone sufficiently understands in common life." 19

Here we come to the central point of Hume's thesis that an idea becomes forceful, i.e., it is transformed to an idea which is believed by being related to some present sense-impression. This relation arises from past experience of constant conjunction. The impressions of flame and heat are constantly conjoined in my previous experiences and so, when I see a flame, I obviously think of heat. The perception of flame not only makes me think of or remember heat, it rather has a force which it transfers to the idea of heat. This vivacity of the sense-impression of flame leads to the idea of heat which idea has some forcefulness thereby constituting belief. This is the Humean analysis of belief in brief. Hume's version is found in these lines:

"All belief of matter of fact or real existence is derived merely from some object, present to the memory or..."

19. ibid., p. 628.
senses, and a customary conjunction between that and some other object. Or, in other words; having found, in many instances, that any two kinds of objects—flame and heat, snow and cold—have always been conjoined together; if flame, or snow be presented anew to the senses, the mind is carried by custom to expect heat or cold, and to believe that such a quality does exist, and will discover itself upon a nearer approach. It is to be noted that the "two kinds of objects ..." referred to by Hume are not objects in the ordinary sense. Hume does not accept empirical objects. What is meant here is 'two kinds of ideas'. Believing is very much near to perceiving, because like the latter, the former also makes us feel the reality as there is an actual sense-impression present in belief.

Thus, on the basis of the experience of constant conjunction between two things or events, i.e., flame and heat, we proceed from the perception of one event to the belief of another. Causal inference therefore can be defined in terms of belief. We can show it in the following:

Perception of constant conjunction between two things or events

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impression of reflection, i.e., the mind's passing from perceiving one event to believing the other

↓

Causal inference

Thus, the particular idea, to be promoted to the rank of belief, has to acquire a vivacity or force by being related to a present impression. So far we have seen that there is a relation of constant conjunction. There are also other relations of resemblance and of contiguity. But Hume’s comment in this respect is that the relations of resemblance and contiguity may make belief easier but the credit of producing belief goes only to the relation of constant conjunction. We can cite an example here to show that the relation of resemblance can make a belief easier, and its absence may make a belief almost impossible, though it is not actually so. If we go to a village in mid-summer, we cannot believe that it is the same village-river that we saw in the last rainy season. The reason is, the picture of the river in summer and that in rainy season are so much different from each other that it seems almost impossible to believe in the sameness of that river.

Hume’s conclusion therefore is, as Prof. Price observes, “...in so far as the forcefulness or vivacity of an idea depends upon mere resemblances or contiguity, or anything else which is other than constant conjunction, to that extent the belief is subnormal; or silly or superstitious or pathological”\(^\text{21}\). Prof. Price however suggests to bring the cases of co-existence and contiguity also in Hume’s analysis in this way. According to him, this concept of

constant conjunction can be extended, without any deviation from Humean spirit, to cover the cases of constancy of co-existence and constancy of succession. And as contiguity is nothing but a kind of co-existence, it also is covered by constant conjunction.

Difficulty in Hume's Theory

Hume's equation between belief and PPE is questioned by Ginsberg\textsuperscript{22}. First of all, Hume's theory overlooks the possibility of unconscious beliefs. An unconscious belief is that which the person really possessing it denies honestly that he has it. The existence of unconscious belief is proved by post-hypnotic suggestion. The subject under hypnotic trance is given orders by the hypnotist and when the trance is over, the subject continues to carry the order in his unconscious level of kind. He publicly obeys the order and gives separate reasons for it without admitting his obeyance. Thus he actually possesses the belief though it is not his PPE.

Secondly, if belief is identical with PPE, then, the duration of a belief is controlled by the duration of that PPE, in the field of consciousness. This has a two-fold implication. A person can have few beliefs at a given time, because, he cannot have at a given time an indefinitely large number of thoughts, and secondly, one ceases to have

\textsuperscript{22} Ginsberg, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 4.
a particular belief as soon as one stops thinking about the proposition believed. An example of this second implication is found in the case of a devout theist who claims to have belief in God even in deep dreamless sleep, i.e., even at the time he has no thoughts at all.

Thirdly, PPEs are not necessarily correct. Ginsberg admits that there is at least a rare possibility of misdescription of PPE.

There are however certain other difficulties in this thesis. The difficulty of Hume's analysis at the outset is that it is too narrow. Even in its extended form it cannot provide for all sorts of beliefs. There are general empirical beliefs, viz., 'All men are mortal', or 'The water expands when it freezes', 'Most Bengalees are fond of hilsa fish', etc. What is lacking here is not the manner of conceiving, but the fact of being related to a present impression. Hume's analysis only applies to beliefs about particular matters of fact, i.e., to believe that there is fire in the hill on the perception of smoke there.

The point is that this fact of being related is not at all necessary for having a certain belief. We can very well believe that all men are mortal, though we are not now seeing the death of a person. On the contrary, while having the belief that all men are mortal, we may, at that time, hear a famous music or look at the sky. It implies that sense - impressions at the time of believing are totally irrelevant for having a belief.
In order to avoid the difficulties, some supporters of Hume take recourse to the denial of all general beliefs. F.P. Ramsey in his essay, "General Propositions and Causality"\textsuperscript{23} says that what we call general beliefs are actually habits of singular belief. We believe a person to be mortal when we actually perceive him and it happens in case of all perceptions. Thus there remains the fact of being related to a present sense-impression.

This leads to the second difficulty in Hume's theory. Here we find a hint of dispositional theory of belief, because the term 'disposition' includes 'habits' also. Hume adds that belief is "that act of mind which renders realities more present to us than fictious, causes them to weigh more in the thought, and gives them a superior influence on the passions and imagination,"\textsuperscript{24} and further that belief "makes them (ideas) appear of greater importance, infixes them in the mind; and renders them the governing principles of all our actions."\textsuperscript{25}

This analysis can very well be fitted in Hume's philosophy since he treats induction as matter of habit or custom, but this analysis suffers from various difficulties.

First of all, general beliefs cannot be equated with habits, otherwise we cannot explain the logical relation of compatibility or incompatibility between two general

\textsuperscript{23} Ramsey, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 237-255.
\textsuperscript{24} Hume, \textit{A Treatise of Human Nature}, p. 629.
\textsuperscript{25} \textit{ibid.}, p. 629.
beliefs. The question of inconsistency is relevant in the context of general beliefs, but it is quite irrelevant in the context of individual habits. To be specific, the question of truth and falsity arises in the context of inductive generalizations, but the sphere of habit does not entertain such a question.

Secondly, both inductive generalizations and other empirical statements are on the same level so far as our belief is concerned.

In the third place, this analysis tackles the problems of general beliefs and singular beliefs in two different ways. The first one is accounted for by dispositional theory while the latter by the occurrence analysis. But this half-way house is not a healthy position for a sound philosophical theory of belief.

Thus, it can be said that so far as particular beliefs are concerned, Hume's analysis is correct, while general beliefs fall outside the scope since they lack the requirement of being related to a present impression. In fact, in believing that the hill has fire because smoke is emitting from the hill, we need not remember our past experience of constant conjunction between smoke and fire. On the contrary, we jump over to a specific belief immediately from our perception of a specific event. This automatic belief is called by Prof. Price as sign-cognition. We, however, cannot agree with him on this point, because to know
that perceived smoke is a sign of the unperceived fire, we have to remember first of all the constant conjunction between smoke and fire.

There are other cases where entertainment of a particular belief must be preceded by a long-time consideration of alternatives, viz., when a diagnosis is made by a doctor.

We may come to the question as to whether Hume's analysis of belief is really a dispositional analysis or a traditional occurrence theory. Since Hume explains belief to be a steady or vivacious idea related to a present experience, he seems to be a supporter of traditional occurrence theory. It is also clear from the comment of Antony Flew. He says, "The reference to 'a present object' is also significant...

It suggests that Hume is thinking of belief always in terms of occurrences and never at all of dispositions: as if it would make English to say, in the continuous present, 'I am believing p', and as if 'He believes p' must always be only a report of current events". 26

The point to note here is that, as Prof. Price observes, if the literal meaning of the terms 'strong', 'forceful', 'firm' are considered, they are dispositional words.

Prof. Price comments, "If we call something 'firm' or 'steady', that means literally that it has the capacity of resisting disturbing agencies of one sort or another. The word 'solid' too is usually a causal property word, equivalent to some-

thing like, 'capable of resisting penetration (or deformation) '". The term 'forcefulness' indicates that to have a certain belief is to have a tendency to be affected in doing an action. Hume makes metaphorical uses of these terms and his aim is to point out an introspectible ('introspectible' here is used as a matter of reflection) felt quality (a sign of occurrence theory), but there is an indirect emphasis on the effects that produce the ideas constituting belief as distinct from ideas that do not constitute belief.

So, though Hume accept the traditional view, there is a hint of dispositional account in his theory, and it becomes more evident in his discussion of half-belief. There is also a hint of identifying belief with acts. In the example of a book read by two different persons, Hume explains belief as an act of the mind. It is this act which draws a distinction between the reality and fiction by presenting to us reality more vividly. So the nature of belief is very vague in Hume's philosophy.

Another difficulty is this. According to Hume, belief is the necessary result of placing the mind in some sort of circumstances. These circumstances may be unavoidable when we feel the passion of love or hatred after receiving benefits or injuries respectively. Hume calls these operations as species of natural instincts, which do not allow reason:

to play any role here. Commenting on this point, Antony Flew says, "...in so far as belief really is necessary and unavoi-
dable we can neither criticize other for the irrationality
of their convictions nor retain any confidence about the
rationality of our own. It is unfair to rebuke anyone for
a fault which it is not within his power to correct." 28

The most pertinent criticism in Hume's theory is that
of psychological overtone. Its implications are two-fold.

In the first place, if belief consists in the manner
of conceiving and in the feeling to the mind, then any
knowledge regarding anybody's belief must depend "on the
basis of their testimony to the occurrence on the appropriate
occasions of a logically private belief modification." 29

This criticism however can be met by saying that we
need not enter into one's private life to have a knowledge
about his beliefs. But there is a severe objection that if
the criterion of belief is the occurrence of a specific
feeling, then, in order to teach the meaning of the word
'belief', that feeling should be described without reference
to belief. In fact, Hume was quite aware of this difficulty
and so he says that the only able candidate for this 'feeling'
is nothing but belief itself.

28. Flew. op. cit., p.98.
29. ibid., p.101.
Secondly, if believing consists in the manner of conceiving, then in this context, the causal laws become subjective, and hence the question is: What would be the status of science and inductive laws? Kant answers this question by maintaining that the category of causality springs from the very nature of understanding. But according to Hume, inductive inferences can be reduced to certain sort of observation and imagination. Prof. Walsh's words are worth-quoting here, "The agreement of Kant and Hume over causality is at least as striking as their differences. For Hume, despite his radically empiricist approach, does not deny that the causal principle is valid throughout the sphere of sense experience; while Kant, for all his rationalist upbringing is just as anxious as Hume to argue that the necessity of the causal relation cannot be logical. Kant, it is true, bases causality on the understanding while Hume grounds it in the imagination". 30 Prof. Copleston also remarks that Hume's treatment of belief suffers a confusion between logic and psychology, for he gives a psychological answer to the logical question about the grounds of belief 31.

The merit of Hume's theory is that, Hume, for the first time, gives priority to the understanding of the phenomenological aspect of belief. Hume admits that a fixed terminology is lacking in the belief-context. As a result he has

30. W.H. Walsh, Reason and Experience, p. 149.
to use a number of expressions to define belief, viz., 'force', 'solidity', etc.

We should also be careful in understanding Hume's definition of belief as 'lively idea'. Idea is either a mental image or a concept (it means 'abstract idea'), or a proposition. One may have vivid image of something without believing it and also that one may entertain certain belief without having vivid image of it. What Hume says is that, though the concept of belief is not necessarily that of a mental image, still every genuine concept must ultimately be explained in terms of some images.

Thus, Hume's account of belief is to be studied in a specific way, keeping in mind such presuppositions.

(B) DISPOSITIONAL ACCOUNT OF BELIEF

The second theory of belief as disposition has two versions. According to one, belief is something of which disposition to act is an aspect. The other version, identifies beliefs with dispositions. The first version is found in the expositions of Prof. Braithwait and Prof. Price, the second one is the Rylean analysis of belief. It is to be noted that the dispositional account of belief which is considered here, ignores the mentalistic version of
The first view is that disposition to act is one element of belief. The other element, that is the first element, is, in the terminology of Prof. Ginsberg, PPE, i.e., a phenomenologically presented entity. We are familiar with this concept in Hume's theory. PPEs are the members of phenomenological field. The phenomenological field is our entire consciousness. So PPEs are members of our consciousness. To make this point clear we can quote Prof. Ginsberg: "We would give as examples of PPEs: sensations, twitches, pains, cramps, aches, the taste of sugar or salt, ... particular tokens of bits of languages such as words, both audible (e.g., as spoken by others), and visible."\(^3\)

So it is clear that R.B. Braithwait's account of belief has two parts such that "a belief in p contains in entertaining p and being disposed to act appropriately to p's being true"\(^4\) Prof. Braithwait distinguishes actual belief....

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32. Timothy L.S. Sprigge, Facts, Words and Beliefs, pp. 171-172.

Prof. Sprigge distinguishes between the mentalistic and behaviouristic version of the dispositional account of belief. The mentalistic version is that belief is a disposition to perform certain mental act which are propositional. The behaviourist version considers belief as a disposition to do things which are not propositional.


from the disposition to believe and considers the former
to be both entertaining the proposition of being and
having a disposition to act as if the proposition were
true. The first part is subjective or phenomenological.
It is the second part which is objective or behaviouristic
in nature. According to Braithwait, it constitutes the
differentiation of actual belief from actual entertainment.
He considers it to be a hypothetical proposition about
one's present and future physical behaviour which be known
not directly, but only on inductive grounds.

According to Prof. Braithwait, the statement 'I have
a disposition to act as if p were true' means to assert
relationship between four things:

(1) my present and future actions, (2) the external
circumstances originating the actions, (3) the relevant
internal circumstances of my body and my mind, which I
will call my 'needs', and (4) the proposition itself.

Prof. Braithwait however makes us aware of a
psychological criticism that if the appropriateness of an
action is to be defined only in terms of belief then it
involves a sort of circularity. This criticism, he himself
reflects, is invalid because the appropriateness of an
action consists in its satisfying the needs of the situa-
tion and the satisfaction of needs is something with which
no element of belief is connected. 35

35. In fact, there are two types of vicious circularity in
logic. One is to infer a proposition from premises
including itself. Other is to analyse a term in terms
of itself. None has occurred here.
Without indulging into a deeper analysis of what is actually meant by entertaining a belief (having a thought about 'p', the object of belief) as to whether one is having a belief only at the time of entertaining it or at other times also, we may say that having a belief does not require considering it at the time prior to or at the time when one is to have a belief. Prof. Ginsberg has given, in this context, the example of a woman who finds herself depressed in her home town of Detroit. But she is quite happy with her husband in her new home in New York City where she meets many friends. We may very well ascribe to her the belief that it is better for her and her husband to live in New York City. The point is that, this sort of ascription is possible even when she never questions whether her belief is true or whether she has that belief at all.

The dispositional aspect of having a belief in Braithwait's analysis offers two versions. The expression 'acting appropriately to the belief's being true' either means acting as if the belief were true or means acting as if the believer knew the belief as true.

To understand the claim of the first alternative we may take an example. A man believes that he is the heir to his paternal uncle's huge property. He also believes that if he announces his claim publicly, or comes

36. This discussion is made by Prof. Ginsberg in Mind and Belief, p.9.
forward to take the responsibility, he will be murdered by his another paternal uncle. Now we have to make another set of presuppositions, viz., he is satisfied in his present situation, he loves living and is not very brave. What all these imply is that he has a particular belief without having a disposition to act as if his belief were true.

One may say that this analysis of belief gets its value when we analyse all of one's beliefs. But it will not serve the purpose in case of unconnected individual beliefs which are important in our present discussion.

There is also another difficulty. It is not the disposition to act that represents a particular belief. On the other hand, it is not merely a particular belief that prompts a particular disposition. A disposition, on the contrary, is determined by one's beliefs, wants, personality, traits, intentions, etc. So the first interpretation of Braithwait's analysis fails.

The second possible interpretation of having some belief is having a disposition to act as if one 'knew' the belief as true. But to have a knowledge about something is to already have a belief because knowledge entails belief. We should remember that the relation between knowledge and belief in terms of entailment is assumed here. Whether, it is tenable is a different question. According to Prof. Ginsberg, "in this light
we can say that belief is a more purely psychological notion than is knowledge which is partially a truth-evaluative notion (evaluates in terms of truth-value)." Prof. Chisholm is also of the same opinion.

Prof. Braithwait's claim may also have an implication such that one believes that p only if one is disposed to act as if one believed that p. It however fares no better because it is falsified by the previous example of a man's belief about himself being the heir of his rich paternal uncle, while he has no disposition to act as if he has that belief in question.

Prof. Braithwait's analysis being inadequate, it is necessary to refer to Prof. Price's presentation regarding belief, which is very much akin to the second part of Braithwait's analysis.

Prof. Price also distinguishes between coming to or ceasing to believe a proposition and the belief itself. According to him, while the former are mental occurrences, or happenings, the latter is not a mental act. He says "a belief... is something which we have or possess for a period, long or short, not something which happens to us, or something which we 'mentally do', as the phrase 'mental act' might suggest. In this respect (it would be said) belief is like knowledge. Both 'know' and 'believe' are dispositional words..."38 A dispositional statement

37. Ginsberg, op. cit., pp.11-12
38. Price, op. cit., p.244.
is equivalent to a series of conditional statements, where a period of time is definitely mentioned.

Now, belief may be defined as disposition to act as if the proposition were true. Prof. Price refers in this connection to Prof. Braithwaite's analysis of belief. But the former tries to give a pure or unmixed Acting-as-if Analysis of belief. His formulation as presented by Prof. Price, is as follows: "believing a proposition consists just in being disposed to act as if the proposition were true, where the proposition is one which is actually entertained sometimes by the person who is disposed to act on it." 39

It however seems that a person who acts as if a proposition p were true, actually has to 'believe' that the question 'Is p true or false?' is relevant to him in that situation. Once this is true, the Acting-as-if Analysis suffers from circularity because, 'belief that p' is defined as 'acting-as if p were true', and latter again is defined in terms of the former.

To avoid this difficulty, Price gives a new formulation of the Acting-as-if Analysis as follows: "When we say that a person believes a proposition p we mean (1) (1) that p is a member of his stock of premises, (2) he is disposed to use it as a premise in his practical reasoning or practical inferences, inferences whose

conclusions, if put into words, would be of the form 'let me therefore do x' as, opposed to 'therefore q is true'\(^{40}\).

He may not be able to draw a practical conclusion from any one of these premisses alone. And in Price's opinion, this is more or less the correct account of Acting-as-if Analysis.

What follows is that fact that in Price's analysis, we cannot definitely indicate the set of dispositions representing a particular belief. So the whole analysis depends very much on the analysis of disposition in a belief. This analysis is found in the writings of Ryle. He considers mind in the Cartesian sense as a ghost in the machine. In order to dissolve this myth, he says that beliefs are not knowledge, the former being tendencies, the latter capacity. As he identifies dispositions with beliefs, he is committed to the identification of disposition with tendencies.

Nature of Disposition

Dispositions, to be specific, is possessed by any object which also has its other intrinsic properties and nature. Terms like 'temperature', 'soluble', 'brittle', are examples of disposition-terms. A disposition-term is a term that signifies the tendency to react in a determinate way under specified circumstances, e.g., solubility is a tendency to dissolve when the object is put into water.

a man's having temperature means he has a tendency to be registered on a particular point in the heat-measuring instrument, etc. Disposition thus signifies possibilities of reaction and not an actual action and as such cannot be object of observation.

Now, in order to understand that a disposition is a sort of tendency, our next task is to see what is an occurrence, what is an episode, and also to distinguish between capacity and tendency.

An occurrence is a happening taking place. Occurrences are generally discrete and partial, i.e., there is no sense of completeness in them. Occurrences are not generally related to other events.

An episode, on the other hand, is any event or series of events complete in itself, but forming part of a larger one. We call something episodic if it is of the nature of an episode. In an episode there is a hint of past event which is complete in itself. The nature of episode is that it can be related to various aspects of any relevant subject under discussion.

Capacity is the potential ability to undertake something and it has got a fixed ability. A capacity is not necessarily manifested or expressed, but there remains always the chance to express it as having a predetermined limit. For example, in case of a water-tank, having capacity to contain five-thousand gallons of water, it may
be observed that the tank may at times run empty, sometimes partly filled, but it is never filled beyond five-thousand gallons of water. This fixedness of capacity however has a certainty. To take the same example, the tank surely has the power to contain five thousand gallons of water. The capacity verb is to be equally applied in case of human beings also. For example, the proposition 'Tom can do the sum' means that Tom may not attempt to do this sum at a particular time, but he is able to do this sum certainly if he so attempts. There is however a limit to his ability beyond which he may fail to do it. But the important point is that his capacity involves certainty up to a particular limit.

Tendency is a propensity or inclination to undertake something. It is a sort of will, and is an immediate step just before the actual attempt of action. As soon as we brand tendency as a will, tendency-term is used irrespective of any measure because there is no fixed limit to willing, and also there is no surity either up to that fixed limit.

From the above discussion it appears that neither capacity nor tendency is an occurrence, because the former do not state any actual event. For the same reason they are not episodes either, for all episodes are occurrences. On the other hand, the relation between episodes and occurrences is a close relation. The reason is, both of them report
facts, and episodes have an additional character of reporting facts which have already taken place. All episodes are occurrences. But there are points of differences also. First of all, not all occurrences are episodes because there are present and future occurrences which do not report facts that have taken place. Secondly, occurrences, unlike episodes, are not necessarily related to other, preferably larger, events. In the third place, an occurrence is discrete and partial event, while an episode is a complete event.

Capacity and tendency resemble each other in a sense. Both of them stand for some 'would-be-happening' and 'could-be-happening'. So capacity-stating or tendency-stating sentences are different from indicative sentences which report facts and which are either true or false. But it is not enough ground to put them in the same category.

First of all, while capacity involves a fixed limit, tendency, being a sort of will, knows no particular limit. For example, the water-tank having the capacity to contain five-thousand gallons of water, is certainly able to contain that quantity of water. But, if we say, that the tank has the tendency to contain five-thousand gallons of water, then we cannot say that it is never filled beyond that quantity of water. In the second place, while capacity implies certainty though upto a limit, tendency does not allow it. In case of water-tank having capacity to contain
five thousand gallons of water, it is said that it contains exactly that quantity of water but there is no such exactness if we ascribe the tank a tendency to contain it. We may consider the case of human being also in this context. 'Mr. X has a tendency for gardening' means that Mr. X is fond of trees and is willing to nurture them. But it does not necessarily mean that he possesses a garden of a definite area with a certain number of plants. It only implies that if he gets an opportunity to nurture plants, he will try to manifest his hobby of gardening. But there is no surety that he will actually be able to form a garden. There is also no fixed limit to his tendency in this respect.

Prof. Ryle also admits that there is a difference between the two. In case of capacity-verb, there is no certainty that something will not be the case, while in a tendency-stating sentence, there is more possibility of something to be the case. So a man cannot have any capacity if he has no prior tendency regarding it, but he can easily possess a particular tendency without having the capacity to do it. It is in this connection that Prof. Ryle makes a distinction between knowledge as a capacity-verb and belief as a tendency-verb. The reason is, to have knowledge of 'p' for example, is to have already a belief of 'p', but to believe 'p' it is not at all necessary - rather impossible also - to know 'p'.

Now, the question is: In which category do dispositional terms belong? A disposition is not an actual event, and so it is not at all an occurrence. Dispositions are not episodes either, because all episodes are occurrences and no dispositions are occurrences.

There is however a similarity between disposition and capacity, a similarity which tendency also shares with capacity. The point is, both dispositions and capacities stand for possibilities of happenings and these possibilities cannot be accommodated in the world of happenings, i.e., the actual world. Here, dispositional and capacity-stating sentences differ from indicative sentences in the sense that the former do not point to any factual event, but the latter do and so the latter is either true or false.

This similarity however cannot be pressed too far, capacity always involves a limit and there is a particular pattern as to how the capacity is to be manifested. But there is no limit or fixed pattern of expressing a particular disposition.

The claim of tendency to be a disposition fares better than the claims of capacity, episode or occurrence in this respect. In disposition and tendency, there is no particular pattern of manifestation or a particular limit, but there is more or less the same possibility of event to take place. Both are expressed in counterfactual conditional
sentences. Unlike indicative sentences, there is no question of truth or falsity in these cases. Hence, it is more rational to identify disposition with tendency or inclination. We set aside the issue of counter-factual conditional at this moment with just a cursory remark that a counter-factual conditional is a sort of if-then statement where the antecedent is false but its falsity is not clearly stated, but only hinted. It expresses some 'necessary connection' between the antecedent and the consequent independent of their truth-value.

These dispositional terms are unlike other ordinary terms like 'white' and it becomes clear in Hempel's translatability criterion of cognitive significance where he accommodates these terms in empiricist language by means of reduction sentences. We are however concerned with the comparison of dispositions with beliefs.

Justifying the Claims of the Dispositional Account

Prof. Armstrong remarks that the comparison at the root of the dispositional account "shows promise of illuminating the nature of belief." \(^{42}\) In case of a physical disposition, viz. brittleness of glass, there is no need for an actual manifestation of the breaking of the glass. In like-manner, we can distinguish between a belief and its manifestation.

But this identification does not correctly describe the nature of belief. The difference between belief and disposition is evident in the fact that disposition is stated in a counter-factual hypothetical. Moreover, unlike quality, a disposition is not attributable, whereas a belief can very well be attributed to a man. Let us have a look to the four-fold distinction between belief and disposition, as shown by Prof. Armstrong.

In the first place, unlike the concept of belief, the concept of disposition involves the notion of an initiating cause. The cause plays the role of an ignition-key as it were, just before the manifestation of the disposition. The manifestation of a belief, on the other hand, may be accompanied by an initiating cause, but the latter is not the cause of the former.

It reminds us of Chomsky's comment on the stimulus-independent nature of our speech-acts. There is no external stimulus responsible for our making a grammatically meaningful sentence. The manifestations of belief are similarly stimulus independent. Exceptional cases are general beliefs which are formed by several particular beliefs. These particular beliefs cause certain manifestations of disposition.

43. To quote Prof. Price, "A dispositional statement is equivalent to a series of conditional statements (not just one conditional statement, but a series of them). And at least some of these conditional statements have unfilled if-clauses; they are what logicians call counter-factual conditionals." Price, op. cit., p. 249.

44. Armstrong, op. cit., pp. 16-21
tion as well as certain further belief, viz. A's coming to believe that some portion of stuff is arsenic causes the manifestation of A's disposition that arsenic is poisonous, it also helps A to have a further belief that this stuff is poisonous.

Secondly, a particular disposition can be manifested in only one sort of way, while a belief is manifested in many ways. Ryle however rejects this distinction by branding belief as multi-track disposition as different from ordinary disposition which is single-track. But Ryle's point is not tenable. Understanding the word 'brittle' means understanding of its manifestation, viz. breaking when struck, but not vice versa. It means, understanding of the expression 'breaking when struck' may be possible without any reference to the notion of brittleness.

On the other hand, in case of belief, its manifestations are introduced only by reference to that belief. In fact, beliefs are the actual states of the believer in the sense that manifestations of belief is possible only if the believer is in a state and in suitable circumstances. In case of unmanifested beliefs, the state is causally inactive. In respect of general beliefs however, the said

45. It is important to note here that this comment made by Armstrong is a result of his own conclusion that belief is a state. But we shall see the wrongness of this theory later on.
point of difference is inactive, because Armstrong regards general beliefs as plausibly dispositions.

In the third place, states involved in belief necessarily have certain internal structure. Believing is different from the proposition believed, but there is a correspondence between the two in the sense that the internal structure of the state of believing reflects the structure of the proposition. The notion of internal structure of a proposition or an object is easily understandable. There is also easy explanation of the structure of a state. The state of molecules of a certain brittle piece of glass being bonded in a particular fashion is a state. Now the molecules here are arranged in a certain order and this is the structure of that state. In this respect, general beliefs can also be distinguished from dispositions.

Prof. Armstrong is of the opinion that between belief and disposition there is only a difference in the degree of theoretical commitment. In fact dispositions are states, but there is no question of structural sameness, but in case of belief-states, there is a correspondence.

Armstrong refers to a fourth point of distinction which, in his language, is 'superficial' in nature. It is said that attribution of disposition is always based on evidence. So it is always indirect or inferential in nature, because the attribution depends on the manifestation...
of disposition. The picture is same in case of attribution of belief to others. But in case of attribution of belief to oneself, the manifestation of belief plays a secondary role in determining the attribution, because there is a direct access to oneself.

Armstrong is against the notion that we have a logically incorrigible knowledge of our own belief-states. It is true that all knowledge are not evidential, there must be a terminus, i.e. perceptual or non-inferential knowledge, and this knowledge may be knowledge of our present mental states. But they are not the only thing known directly. Disposition of brittleness can also be known directly through the tactual sense-organ which is in contact with pieces of glass.

Prof. Ginsberg also rejects Rylean reduction of beliefs to dispositional tendencies.

The primary difference is that belief and disposition are not invariably concomitant with each other. One can have a belief without having any tendency with which the belief is associateable, and that one can have the said tendency without having the belief. The instance of the first case is found when a man tries to fool others into thinking that the man does not have a particular belief while actually he has it. The instance of the second case is popular in case of cheating others by posing to show the

tendencies while having the absence of that belief. So such identification (in Ginsberg's language, 'reduction') of belief-ascription and tendency-ascription is inadequate.

In fact, Ryle's defect is that, he fails to understand that to have a disposition is not to have necessarily a belief, but it is rather to have other personality traits, viz., wants etc. Even a dispositional account, more sophisticated than Ryle's, is proved to be inadequate to explain belief, because such an account is conceptually unacceptable. This conceptual unacceptability becomes evident from a study of the logical structure of such an account. To explain, we can say that to have a particular belief is to have a set of belief-claims or tendency-claims. Now, a belief may be connected with indefinite number of tendencies. We, therefore, can easily think of a case where belief is attributed to a person, but at least one of the correlated tendencies is absent in him. In that case, the dispositional account will become incorrect. So a specification of the set of necessary tendencies to be associated with a belief can avoid this defect. But none of the tendencies supposed to be associated with belief can be dispensed with. Moreover, to explain belief-ascription, it is necessary to attribute different wants, characteristic traits whereas many of the dispositional tendencies can be dispensed with.

It is thus clear that belief is not identical with physical disposition. But the case of mental disposition
is different. That I have knowledge of English must be manifested at one time or other, otherwise the very possibility of my having a mental disposition is questionable. Similarly, as Prof. Armstrong has pointed out, "unspoken thoughts, mental images or inward motions of assent are prima facie possible manifestations of A's belief that p". What it implies is that beliefs are better compared to mental disposition rather than to physical one. It is this internal manifestation which is termed as states and we get the third theory of beliefs as states.

(C) BELIEF AS A STATE

The question 'Is belief a state?' can be answered from two perspectives, (1) by showing whether belief shares the essential features of a state and/or (2) by showing the relation between belief and disposition on the one hand (which we have seen before) and between disposition and state on the other. Prof. Armstrong refers to the view that believing means to be in a continuing state. In case of acquired beliefs, this view holds that the mind of the believer is imprinted or stamped in a specific way. This reminds us of Plato's analogy of an imprint on a block of wax in the Theaetetus.

Armstrong refers to certain features of state. Firstly, a state is a non-relational property of the object. Secondly, it is not true that each and every non-relational property defines a state. In the third place, an object may have both relational and non-relational features. In speaking of an object we have to choose a particular point of view as to whether the relational or the non-relational properties of the object are to be considered. If the object is studied as a combination of relational properties, the concept of a state is absent there. If only the non-relational properties are taken into consideration, then also there is no guarantee that the object is in a state, because we have already seen that all non-relational properties do not define a state. So state is an accidental or changeable feature of an object. This last feature clearly marks a distinction between belief and state, because unlike state, belief is not an accidental feature of the mind.

But this distinction is not adequate. In Armstrong's view, this account of state is too broad, because it includes running as a state. Running cannot be a state, it can at least be called a process. But state does not involve a process. This charge of too-wideness can be met by saying there is a state viz., 'being in an agitated state' which is as well as a process too. But it is easily understandable that there is a subtle difference between agitation and being in an agitated state. The former is a
process as distinguished from the latter which is a state. This state may cause the former, but the state itself is not a process. We have already seen that the classes of belief and disposition are mutually exclusive. The task remains to explain the relation between disposition and state. Prof. Armstrong gives an argument in this respect which has seven steps:

1. The fact that a supposed true contingent proposition is found to be false implies that there is some change in the world.

2. If a predicate 'F' is not applicable to an object 'a' upto a certain time 't', but is applicable to it later on, then it must be the case that 'a' has changed in some way at t.

3. The same is true for a dispositional predicate too.

4. This change in the object must be a change in the non-relational properties of the disposed object.

5. A disposition entails that the disposed object is in a certain state.

6. The nature of such a state is determined by the scientists.

7. It is linguistically proper to identify the disposition with the state of the disposed object.

The steps are not very clear as they appear. So a few words are needed to show whether they confront certain objections and whether they are steps proper.

Regarding the first step, there is nothing special to say except that, for every true contingent proposition, there is some fact in the world that makes it true. It does not mean that for every different true contingent proposition, there is something that makes the proposition true.

There is an objection to the second step. A man who is not a hundred years old up to the time \( t \)', becomes so at \( t \). But there is no question of his changing by that time. This objection can be met by saying that man's relation to his birth-date is a relational property which has changed in the present case. The change in the relational property is virtually a change in the object itself. Hence the said man has changed at the time \( t \).

The third step is a repetition of the second step only with a specification of the property as dispositional.

In favour of the fourth step it can be said that a disposition entails whether there is or is not a non-relational property. In any causal sequence the effect depends upon three things, nature of cause, nature of circumstances it operates in, and the nature of the thing on which the cause acts. Now, a disposition is something which is retained by the disposed object in the absence both of a cause and circumstances. The presence or absence of these two are the relational properties of the thing. So presence of disposition in a thing means the thing has non-relational property.
We have seen that all states of an object are non-relational in nature but not the reverse. The reverse however is to be proved in order to establish the fifth step. It means that the presence or absence of non-relational properties of a disposed thing may be said to be a state of the object. It can be proved by showing that a non-relational property viz., a disposition satisfies two conditions of state. The conditions are as follows:

1. If an object is in a state, it is always intelligible that it may cease to be in that state while remaining the same object. It implies that the property 'being in a state' is relative to some prior classification of the thing.

2. A state may involve a process, but it does never entail the existence of a process.

Now, a disposition satisfies the first condition. It is possible to suppose that a brittle thing ceases to be brittle without affecting its nature (i.e., being a glass). A disposition also satisfies the second condition in this following way. Dispositional concepts cannot specify all the properties constituting the dispositional nature of the thing. So mere dispositional nature cannot prove that the thing is undergoing such and such processes. Thus both the conditions are fulfilled and it is proved that all non-relational properties of a disposed object may be said to be the states of that object.
Understanding of the sixth step may be hindered by the possibility of an infinite regress. A disposition in the object means that the object is in some state and to speak of a state is virtually to speak of a disposition. This possibility can be overcome by pointing out either that there are some ultimate properties of the disposed object which do not involve any element of dispositionality, or that there are ultimate potentialities that depend not on non-dispositional properties.

The seventh step is criticised by Rogers Squires⁵⁰ who says that in case of an unmanifested disposition, the inactive state should have a disposition to bring about the manifestation. This new disposition is identified with another state and if this disposition again is unmanifested, the same process continues ad infinitum.

Prof. Armstrong answers that dispositions are ordinarily applicable to things. The state, either active or inactive, is a species of property and hence is not the proper candidate for disposition-attribute. The unmanifested disposition is identified with inactive state and this state may have a disposition necessary for manifestation, but this is not a new disposition which is again identified with a new state. The point is that, if there is a regress, it is virtuous rather than vicious. Armstrong however

comments that the proved identification between disposition and the state is quite compatible with the possibility of verbal distinction between the disposition and the state. The nature of this state however remains unknown, they are only known from their effects.

Prof. Armstrong therefore concludes that as general beliefs are dispositions and dispositions are states, so beliefs also are states of which we may be conscious or may not. Beliefs may be the contents of consciousness but it is false to say that they are necessarily so. That causally inactive or unmanifested beliefs are not contents of consciousness is very obvious and so also causally active belief-states. Evidence for the latter is found when a particular belief causally influence our physical actions but we are not conscious of it. It is also clear in some cases where, from the failure of an action we become conscious of the falsity of our belief that causes the action. It is true that when a belief becomes a content of consciousness, it is accompanied by a sort of giving inner assent to the proposition believed. But the fact of giving inner assent is in no way a necessary condition for a belief to be before our mind. Our outward performances may be imaginative or we may have belief which is independent of such performance.

This conclusion that belief is a state definitely does not mean that it is a physical state. Now, whether belief
is a mental state is a question that is answered negatively by some thinkers because they also deny that knowledge is a mental state. The whole issue depends heavily on the relation between knowledge and belief. We shall come to this point in the next chapter in details, but it is enough for the present to say that there is a relation between the two.

It is sometimes held that knowledge does not entail belief. But it is also true that we are not familiar to say that knowledge entails absence of belief. In fact, it appears from the conditions of knowledge as shown by Prof. A.J. Ayer (we shall come to it later on) that belief is a necessary condition of knowledge, though it is not the sufficient one. Thus, there being a relation between knowledge and belief, a survey of the view that knowledge is a mental state is also a survey of the case of belief.

The meaning of the expression 'knowledge is a state of mind' may be understood in two ways:

(a) The knower must be in some unique and peculiar mental state.
(b) The knower must be in some mental state which is not unique in knowing.

Regarding the first alternative, we can say that knowledge always involves fulfilment of some conditions, viz. normality of our mental and bodily conditions and also of

51. This discussion is made by Prof. A.P. Griffiths in the Introductory Chapter of the book Knowledge and Belief.
atmosphere etc. But knowledge-attribution may be unaccompanied by the attribution of an unique mental state.

There is another serious objection. It is said that if I know that \( p \) is true then \( p \) is true. If knowing means to be in a unique mental state, then the mental state guarantees the truth of \( p \). But truth is an objective property that cannot be determined subjectively by mental state. No mental state can determine the truth of the proposition 'Pterodactyl is extinct'. Mental state may be there when what is known is not true. So mental state is not unique to knowledge. Those who accept knowledge as a unique mental state, hold that it is only the immediate experience that is known, because it is the only case which is necessarily accompanied by such a mental state. But any satisfactory theory of knowledge must account for the cases of knowledge of contingent facts.

The second alternative is that knowledge is a mental state though not unique in nature. Now, this mental state is not of awareness, because we can ascribe knowledge even to a person who is asleep. We cannot even say that it is the thought of something that occurred once. The reason is, I may know many things though I have not thought of them throughout my life. We cannot also say that it is an understanding, because it will question the nature of capabilities of this understanding. So knowledge is not a mental state and so is belief. We shall pass over to the remaining
view that belief is an act.

(D) BELIEF AS AN ACT

Prof. Ginsberg refers\(^5\) to some views that hold that beliefs are acts. We can mention the names of William James, C.A. Mace who characterise beliefs as psychic acts. Beliefs when based on concrete ground are sometimes called conviction. Ginsberg refers to Sándor Ferenczi who distinguishes between relief and conviction, the former being an act of repression, the later an impartial passing of judgement. Both are acts, hence beliefs are said to be acts. Beside the names referred to by Ginsberg, we can also name Hume and Stebbing for contributing to this view. We have seen that in the example of a book red by two people as mentioned by Hume, there is an explanation of belief being acts. Hume said that a belief is an act of the mind, which renders realities more present to us than fictions. Prof. Stebbing considers propositions as the objects of belief. These propositions are related both to the thinker asserting them, and to the facts that make them true or false. The relation of the thinker to proposition is that of judging, believing, doubting, which are acts of consciousness.

Prof. Ginsberg observes that though there are many philosophers in support of this view, none of them is ade-

\(^5\) M. Ginsberg, 'Mind and Belief', p.16.
quate enough to correctly represent beliefs as acts.

First of all, in one opinion, all acts are intentional but there is no question of intentionality or its absence in the sphere of belief.

Secondly, acts are sometimes identified with things that we can do. Acts here are used as nouns, but 'believing' cannot be so used.

In the third place, we can also understand an act by its characteristics. But beliefs can be shown to involve none of them. Both in case of mental or physical acts, we may use words like 'slowly', 'carefully', etc. but they are inapplicable to belief. The question of completion or postponement is relevant in the context of an act, but not so in the context of belief.

We have already seen the defect of Hume's theory. It will not be irrelevant to mention here that by accepting belief as an act of mind that makes reality more present to us, Hume connects belief with reality. The reason is, we believe what we take to be real. But it is wrong to suppose that when we have an idea strong enough to convince us of the reality, we believe it. Prof. Needham\(^5\) points out the case of dream which, in his opinion, is not considered by Hume. In dream-objects also, the force or vivacity of the impressions are complete, but it does not follow

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that we believe them. The point is when we judge them as
dreams, we do not necessarily believe them. So beliefs are
not acts of any kind. The question therefore remains—what
is belief? Attempt has been made not to answer it, but to
dissolve the question itself. We shall pass over to see
whether this attempt fares better in tackling the issue.

1.3 BELIEF AS A GRAMMATICALLY MISLEADING WORD

Attempt shows that belief is neither a disposition nor a
description, the verb 'to believe' is rather a grammatically
misleading word. When I say 'I believe that p', I want to
communicate the degree of confidence I have in the claim
that p. But the use of the word 'believe' is a wrong choice
for expressing my degree of confidence about p. It is
argued that this task is better done by the use of words
'probably', 'with some likelihood', etc., though all these
imply that my evidence for p is non-conclusive. But this
claim cannot be accepted. There are two concepts of proba-
bility. Probability may be understood as a relation between
propositions and it is the logical theory of probability,
which has nothing to do with belief. But concept of proba-
bility may be treated in a different way. It may be said
that probability is a rational degree of measurement of
belief and here probability is the strength of belief.
To be specific, 'probably p', in this sense, expresses how strongly p is believed. In this situation, it is meaningless to say that in order to express the degree of confidence we should take recourse to the expression 'probably p' rather than 'I believe that p', because both of them are in the same status in expressing the degree of confidence.

However, we can say in the present context that the verbs 'to believe', 'to deduce' etc. are called 'parenthetical' and they are to be treated in a way different from the way of treating other verbs such as 'to hesitate', 'to doubt' etc. The parenthetical verbs in some cases are not descriptive or reportive; they only indicate degree of confidence of the maker of the statement.

Prof. Urmson however does not totally reject the dispositional account of belief. This becomes clear when we become familiar with the concept of parenthetical verbs. Urmson says that in some rare cases, the verb 'to believe' is used dispositionally, provided that it is not used in the first person present tense. For example, I say, 'Sraboni believes that it is raining'. In fact, Sraboni has not considered the event at all, but she behaves in a way of actually saying 'I believe that it is raining'. Except this case, the verb 'to believe' is used parenthetically.

Actually, the verb 'to believe' is primarily said to be a psychological description. Philosophers reject this claim
and take recourse to the dispositional account of belief. Urmson beautifully explains the transition in this way.

"...if the verb does not describe an occurrence it must describe a tendency to occurrences".54

The traditionalist does not accept this account because he interprets belief as behaviour. But this attempt is replaced by a stronger claim—that belief has a non-descriptive parenthetical use.

Parenthetical verbs have a truth-claim. When I say, 'I believe that p', I imply the claim that both the whole statement as well as p itself is true, though this truth-claim is not very strong. The reason is, it can be very well countered by saying 'it is not the case that p'.

Secondly, to say 'I believe that p' implies that it is reasonable for me to believe that p.

The adverb corresponding to the verb 'to believe' is 'probably'. Like the former, the latter also implies both truth-claims and rationality-claim i.e., reasonableness.

We can sum up the characteristics of parenthetical verbs, as shown by Urmson:—

Firstly, these verbs occur only in the present perfect, and never in continuous tense. Secondly, they are not psychologically descriptive. Thirdly, their function is very much like that of certain adverbs that help the hearer to

understand a statement without emotional, social, logical overtone.

Fourthly, there is an implied claim for truth and reasonableness of the statements under consideration.

We now mention Urmson's account of parenthetical verbs in this way: "A verb which, in the first person present, can be used, ..., followed by 'that' and an indicative clause, or else can be inserted at the middle or end of the indicative sentence, is a parenthetical verb." They are called parenthetical because they have grammatical feature. For example:

I suppose that your car is very old.
Your car, is, I suppose, very old.
Your car is very old, I suppose.

We may return to our original discussion about belief. We know that the parenthetical use of the verb 'to believe' has a truth-claim regarding the belief-sentence as well as regarding the object of belief.

Now, the problem is: Why, in some cases, where our belief-attribution is based on the observation of behaviour, thoughts, etc. this claim of truth cannot be preserved?

Prof. Ginsberg points out that both ego-uses and non-ego uses of this parenthetic verb give two different types of reply to this question. They refer both to the truth of the belief as well as to the truth of having the belief in.

question. For example, some may say, 'I believe that he will return to Calcutta tomorrow'. This saying may be countered in two ways: (1) He will not return to Calcutta tomorrow; (2) you do not believe that he will return to Calcutta tomorrow. The two responses have their relevant field of application. The latter case is called a B-stating case, while the former is a T-stating case. We, however, remember that these two cases may merge together in some cases, i.e., they are not essentially mutually exclusive.

Now, in order to proceed in this discussion Ginsberg makes a reference to the theory of communication. Some information is communicated only when we observe certain phenomenon, e.g., I may have the information that a glass of beer does not have a foamy head when I look at that glass. Now this phenomenon that is understood as being correctly described in some explicit way, i.e., a phenomenon under a description is called a D-phenomenon. One phenomenon may amount to an indefinitely large number of D-phenomena. A particular phenomenon is an instance of some D-phenomenon that gives us an information that the given phenomenon is a certain D-phenomenon. This information give rise to a belief.

To be specific, an individual possesses some assumptions which are called background assumptions (Ab). With these assumptions in mind, if the individual observes certain
D-phenomenon (Dp), then he can be said to have acquired some information, (Sad) derivable from Ab and Dp taken collectively and not singly. Sp is the set of all statements derived from Ab and Dp, i.e., Sp is what is communicated to that individual by that phenomenon. Phenomenon however means happening, occurring, action, behaviour, etc.

This notion of communication has nothing to do with the notion of personal intention. This intention finds an outlet in different types of bodily behaviour or verbal expression when we converse with each other. For example, if Sraboni blushes, then I know that she is embarrassed. This intention is expressed in a natural way though there is no endeavour in the communication to express such an intention.

Ginsberg then is concerned with the concept of derivability of Sad from Ab and Dp. He defines derivability in this way: "X is derivable assuming Y if and only if Y provides reasonable grounds for accepting X." Y's providing reasonable grounds can be understood in any of the following three ways:

1. X can be deduced from Y, or
2. Y provides conclusive (non-entailing) grounds for X, or
3. Y provides some (but not conclusive) grounds for X.

Here we must note that he distinguishes between derivability and deducibility because he defines the former in

terms of the latter. The third point speaks of an intuitive notion. In fact, it is the weakest claim among the three.

This notion of communication however covers both the cases of verbal and non-verbal communications. Non-verbal means not only bodily behaviour or action, but means which are other than action, i.e., having clammy hands, having a flushed face etc.

Let us now return to our original problem. Ginsberg shows that when one says 'I believe that $p$' the verb is used parenthetically, i.e., one is expressing one's degree of confidence without any ambiguity in the verb 'to believe'. When we see that a particular person says 'I believe that $p$' instead of saying 'I doubt that $p$', it is clear that he has got some sort of confidence in holding $p$. It is also expressed in his intonation, which intonation cannot be expressed in writing the sentence 'I believe that $p$'.

We can set aside the possibility of writing in this context and give stress on the point that somebody with a certain intonation and stress on certain syllables can communicate his degree of confidence in $p$ by uttering the sentence. In fact, degree of confidence is the function of that intonation and stress on certain syllables. Hence the verb 'to believe' does not remain ambiguous.

The next question is concerned with the cases of T-stating. To make the point clear the question is: how the truth-claim of the verb 'to believe' as a parenthetical
verb is to be maintained in spite of the fact that we sometimes say in the before-mentioned context 'p is not true'?

There are some solutions posed as the explanations of this question. Ginsberg however rejects all of them. Firstly he rejects the claim that the verb 'to believe' is ambiguous and so is used in different meanings in B-stating and T-stating cases. Ginsberg says that there is no such ambiguity. The verb 'to believe' is neither like the word 'division' which has dual-meaning, such as army unit and mathematical procedure, nor like the word 'brother' having dual senses such as male sibling, and very considerate friend.

Another suggestions is that, cases of B-stating uses 'to believe' in literal sense. Ginsberg's comment is that this suggestion demands that we should determine clearly which one is the literal and which one is the non-literal sense of 'to believe' in different occasions. Both the suggestions fail because an analysis of Philosophy of Language can show that they are wrong.

Ginsberg cites an example: One may say 'I am sorry for having done this'. This may be understood as a report in some contexts, and as an apology in some other. So, while in the former case, it is appropriate to say 'You are not sorry at all', in the latter 'Oh, don't apologize. It's nothing'. Now, Ginsberg observes that it is not a matter of ambiguity or literal use of the word 'sorry', it is
rather the circumstances that determine what reply is relevant. The point in our context is that the word 'believe' is used in the same meaning in all the contexts. What accounts for the difference in reply in belief contexts, viz. in some cases, the claim believed and in some other the person's having believed is that there are four factors influencing this difference.

They are: (1) the present topic of discussion, (2) the present interest of the group, (3) the statements being questioned at the time, if any, and (4) the questions being asked at the time, if any. Though these four factors are not the only factors, still they are necessary to account for the said difference.

So believe-claims can be used parenthetically and there are cases of B-states and T-states without ambiguity of the word 'believe' or without introducing multiplicity of senses of the word 'believe'.

1.4 BELIEF-- A THEORETICAL CONSTRUCT

We have so far seen that belief is neither a PPE, nor a disposition, nor a state nor an act. It is not also a grammatically misleading expression. Then what is it? Before coming to the conclusion, there is another important point mentioned by Prof. Ginsberg57.

It is supposed that PPEs are identified with 'being in one's consciousness'. It then follows that no non-PPEs are mental. It directly contradicts the accepted view that tendencies and certain functions, viz. remembering are not present to one consciousness, but they are mental. This leads to the conclusion that mind cannot be unconditionally equated with consciousness, i.e., 'mental' cannot be easily equated with 'phenomenal'. The most prominent proof against this equation is found in Freud's theory of unconscious level of mind. In fact, in recent psychology it is not demanded that an individual has the most privileged access to his own mind. It has been found that a psychiatrist or a psychologist is the better judge of his mental condition, in the same way that a physicist is a better judge of his bodily conditions. So belief may well be something in the mind though it may not be present in consciousness.

Contextually we may refer to Prof. Armstrong because he also says that belief is a mental state of which we may be conscious or may not. Prof. Ginsberg comes to conclude that the term 'belief' is a theoretical construct in a common sense theory just as the term 'want' though there are great differences between 'belief' and 'want'. I shall not refer to the differences for fear of deviation from the central issue. To quote Prof. Ginsberg "Theoretical constructs are 'terms' which appear in the hypotheses of some theory. They express'
concepts ('theoretical concepts'), such as those of mass and electron bonding (in physics and physical chemistry, respectively), which are used in the statement of some theory, such as chemistry, socio-economics, etc.\^58

These constructs refer to non-observable entities. The terms 'function', 'ego strength' are theoretical constructs. Hempel compared a theory to a net, in which at every knot, there is some theoretical construct. Hypotheses and definitions are represented by nodes connected by strings. There are many types of anchoring strings which are interpretations of the theory, i.e., they relate the theory with what is observable. Now, this task of theoretical constructs is performed by beliefs and wants. To quote Ginsberg: "The strings uniting them are hypotheses about the behaviour of MPs and definitions of some of the theoretical constructs in terms of others.\^59"

The term 'belief' thus baffles a simple definition. The word only means what it does because of the theoretical hypotheses in which it appears and because of the facts that the theory holds to be explained.

\^58. Ginsberg, op. cit., p. 22
\^59. ibid., p. 25.
We shall return to the question of truth-claim of belief as stated earlier.

MOORE'S PROBLEM

It is evident from the discussion about the nature of belief that beliefs generally have truth-claims. So the sentence 'I believe that not-P'; has a truth-claim as much as the sentence 'I believe that P' also has a truth-claim. The difficulty arises when we consider a conjunctive sentence such as:

(A) "p, but I do not believe that p".

It means that one of the parts of the whole sentence is claiming a truth, while the other part is denying it. As it is a conjunctive sentence, it appears to be claiming a truth and at the same time withdrawing the claim. The result is that it has become paradoxical in nature.

Generally a paradox can be solved in two ways: firstly, by changing the basic logic of the system in which the said sentence is considered to be a paradox, and secondly, by saying that there are differences in types. In discussing

60. cf. J. Hintikka, Knowledge and Belief.

61. p. 3 of the present paper.
the paradoxical nature of (A) which is very often connected with Moore's problem. Prof. Hintikka does not follow any of these two courses. His line of argument is this. Ordinarily a logical paradox is a self-defeating sentence for anyone to utter. But an epistemically indefensible sentence is not self-defeating for anyone to 'utter'. While the former cannot be thought at all, the latter can be thought, but it is self-defeating for anyone to believe it. In short, Hintikka does not consider Moore's paradox as inconsistent or absurd, he says that belief in it is indefensible.

Distinction Between a Paradox and a Self-Contradiction

The main distinction between a paradox and a logical self-contradiction is that the latter is absurd even in utterance, but the former can be supposed without being absurd. That the former is possible means that it is not self-contradiction because self-contradiction is always impossible.

Secondly, in some contexts, a paradoxical sentence remains a perfectly matured sentence while a logical self-contradiction cannot remain so. A paradox, which is structurally different from a self-contradiction, enjoys these advantages: 1) the absurdity of the paradoxical sentence (A) can be removed by a change of person. For example, if the 'I' in (A) is replaced by the name of a person different
from the speaker, the resulting sentence 'p, but Mr. X does not believe that p' is quite meaningful and in some contexts true also.

(ii) A change of tense also saves (A) from being paradoxical. For example, 'She was at College but I did not believe it' is a perfect sentence. The tense is changed in belief-context. In fact, when I utter it, I am concerned not with whether she was at college, but rather with my belief about her presence at college.

(iii) (A) does not remain paradoxical if it is preceded by a prefix, viz., 'suppose'. 'Suppose that this medicine is good, but I do not believe it'.

But none of these features are shared by a self-contradictory sentence. Here, I discuss the cases of paradoxical sentences in the context of truth-claims of belief. The possibilities of self-contradictory sentences in the same context will be discussed in the sixth chapter.

The Absurdity of a Paradox

The difference between a paradox and a self-contradiction shows that their absurdity is not due to violation of the same principle. It is a fact that none of them is absurd by themselves. But while the utterance of a logical self-contradiction violates the rule of logical consistency,
the utterance of (A) violates the "general presumption that the speaker believes or at least can conceivably be- believe what he says." This presumption can be expressed thus:

(c) "I believe that the case is as follows:
    p but I donot believe that p."

It means that the absurdity of (A) is due to the unbelievability of (A), i.e., it is due to indefensibility of (c). Symbolic representation of C is:

(c") "Ba (p& \sim Bap)"

It is time to be acquainted with Hintikka's concept of defensibility and indefensibility.

The Notion of Consistency in Hintikka

In the context of knowledge and belief, Hintikka's discussion about defensibility is preceded by the discussion about consistency. It is due to the difficulty in accepting the notion of consistency in the sphere of knowledge and belief that Hintikka uses the term 'defensibility' in its

So let us have a glance at Hintikka's notion of consistency.

According to Hintikka, in a particular discourse, if it is consistent of a man to say that he knows that \( p \) is the case, then it must be possible that \( p \) really is the case and this fact does not affect his knowledge of any other particular in that discourse. It is formulated as a law called A-PKK:

\[(A\cdot PKK)\] - If a set \( \lambda \) of sentences is consistent and if "\( \text{Kap}_1 \varepsilon \lambda \), "\( \text{Kap}_2 \varepsilon \lambda \)\ldots, "\( \text{Kap}_k \varepsilon \lambda \), "\( \text{Paq} \varepsilon \lambda \), then the set \{"\( \text{Kap}_1 \), "\( \text{Kap}_2 \), \ldots, "\( \text{Kap}_k \), q\} is also consistent.\(^63\)

There may be a question as to whether the person called 'a' is really in a position to know different propositions viz., \( p_1 \), \( p_2 \) or whether \( p_1 \), \( p_2 \), etc. are really true. So it is better to weaken our claim as follows:

\[(A\cdot PK)\] - If a set \( \lambda \) of sentences is consistent and if "\( \text{Kap}_1 \varepsilon \lambda \), "\( \text{Kap}_2 \varepsilon \lambda \)\ldots, "\( \text{Kap}_k \varepsilon \lambda \), "\( \text{Paq} \varepsilon \lambda \),

then the set \{"\( p_1 \), "\( p_2 \), \ldots, "\( p_k \), q\} is also consistent.

So \( (A\cdot PKK)\) is inapplicable to those sceptical cases where the capacity of 'a' to have a knowledge of \( p_1 \), \( p_2 \), etc. is in question. But Hintikka comments that the normal purpose of our communication is vitiated by those types of criticism. In fact, the primary sense of the verb 'to know' means the sense where the speaker himself is in a position to give proofs of the justification of his knowledge-claims.

\(^{63}\) ibid., p.17.
So this primary sense of knowledge admits the rule (A-PKK*). This primary sense of knowledge is to be understood irrespective of any change of person. In case of the sentence 'a knows that p', what is required is the prior knowledge of the assumption that the person called 'a' knows that he is referred to by the term 'a'.

Hintikka proceeds to give a list of consistency rules in respect of knowledge in this way:

(A.K) - If \( \lambda \) is consistent and if "Kap" \( \varepsilon \lambda \), then
\[
\lambda + \{p\} \text{ is also consistent.}
\]

(A.K) - If \( \lambda \) is consistent and if "p & q" \( \varepsilon \lambda \), then
\[
\{\lambda + p, q\} \text{ is also consistent.}
\]

(A.v) - If \( \lambda \) is consistent and if "p v q" \( \varepsilon \lambda \), then
\[
\lambda + \{p\} \text{ or } \lambda + \{q\} \text{ is consistent (or both are).}
\]

(A.¬) - If "p" \( \varepsilon \lambda \) and "¬p" \( \varepsilon \lambda \), then \( \lambda \) is inconsistent.

(A.¬) - If "¬(p&q)" \( \varepsilon \lambda \) and if \( \lambda \) is consistent, then so is the set obtained from \( \lambda \) by replacing "¬(p&q)" by "(¬p¬q)".

(A.¬) - If "¬(pvq)" \( \varepsilon \lambda \) and if \( \lambda \) is consistent, then so is the set obtained from \( \lambda \) by replacing "¬(pvq)" by "(¬p¬q)".

(A.¬) - If "¬p" \( \varepsilon \lambda \) and if \( \lambda \) is consistent, then so is the set obtained from \( \lambda \) by replacing "¬¬p" by "p". 64

64. ibid, pp. 22-23.
In the sphere of belief also, there are consistency rules. Some consistency rules holding for knowledge also hold in belief also. The rule A-PK* assumes the form A-CB* here ('K' is replaced by 'B', 'P' is replaced by 'C' in belief context):

(A-CB*): If a set \( \lambda \) of sentences is consistent and if

\[
\text{"Bap}_1\epsilon \lambda, \text{"Bap}_2\epsilon \lambda, \ldots, \text{"Bap}_k\epsilon \lambda, \text{"Caq}\epsilon \lambda, \text{"Bap}^\epsilon \lambda_{\text{ek}}, \text{"Caq}^\epsilon \lambda_{\text{ek}}, \text{"Bap}^\epsilon \lambda_{\text{ek}} ^\text{uek}, \text{"Caq}^\epsilon \lambda_{\text{ek}} ^\text{uek}
\]

then the set \( \{ p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_k, q \} \) is also consistent.

There is no such rule (A-B) corresponding to the rule (A-K), because belief-claim is not justified. Prof. Hintikka comments that the analogue of (A-PKK*), i.e., (A-CBB*) is valid here. This rule says: in a particular discourse where I have many beliefs, if it is compatible to believe that \( p \), then \( p \) must be the case without vitiating any of my beliefs. My beliefs are consistent means that it must be possible that all of them are true together.

Here we should remember that the rule (A-CBB*), like the rule (A-PKK*) is based on a presupposition that, in the sentence "a believes that \( p \)", the person referred to by 'a' believes that he is referred to by it. The rule A-C-BB* is as follows:

(A-CBB*): If a set \( \lambda \) of sentences is consistent, and if

\[
\text{"Bap}_1\epsilon \lambda, \text{"Bap}_2\epsilon \lambda, \text{"Bap}_k\epsilon \lambda, \text{"Caq}\epsilon \lambda, \text{"Bap}^\epsilon \lambda_{\text{ek}}, \text{"Caq}^\epsilon \lambda_{\text{ek}}, \text{"Bap}^\epsilon \lambda_{\text{ek}} ^\text{uek}, \text{"Caq}^\epsilon \lambda_{\text{ek}} ^\text{uek}
\]

then the set \( \{ "\text{Bap}_1", "\text{Bap}_2", \ldots, "\text{Bap}_k", q \} \) is also consistent.

In some cases, viz., in case of other propositional attitudes, the rule (A-CBB*) suffers from the defect of
over-coverage in the sense that it makes some sentences inconsistent while those sentences are not really so. For example, a boy expresses his homesickness and also overcomes it by saying, 'I wish I were at home, but I wish that I did not wish it.' This sentence is not at all inconsistent, but it is proved to be so by the rules (A.CBB*), (A.K) and (A.¬).

So we have to say that (A.CBB*) is inapplicable to some senses of belief, viz., where 'belief means 'it seems',' etc.

In fact, the failure of (A.P KK*) and (A.C BB*) in some senses of knowledge and belief makes it clear that there is a difference between the primary senses of knowledge and belief and other senses of knowledge and belief, viz., 'I am paying attention to the fact', 'it seems to me' respectively. In the primary sense, 'I know' entails that 'I know that I know', 'I believe' entails that 'I believe that I believe'. But 'it seems to me' does not mean that 'it seems to me that it seems to me'. We should remember that such entailment of the primary uses is found more in case of particular human being and not to human beings taken collectively.

There are two other rules (A.¬K) and (A.¬P) which are as follows:

(A.¬K) - If λ is consistent and if "¬ Kap" ∈ λ then

λ+{("Pa¬P")} is also consistent.
(A. \sim P) - If $\lambda$ is consistent and if $\sim P \in \lambda$ then $\lambda \cup \{ "K \sim P" \}$ is also consistent.

These rules are important in respect of connecting knowledge of $p$ and possibility of $p$ being the case. There is however a genuine problem regarding them.

The rule (A. \sim K) says that when I consistently say that I do not know whether $P$, then it means that $p$ fails to be the case for all that I know. It may however happen that $p$ is actually the case, but it is my failure to see $P$ to be the case that makes me saying 'I do not know whether $p$'.

To make the point clear, this rule makes it inconsistent to say 'I do not know whether $p$' if $P$ is something that logically follows from what I know, viz., $q$. But it may be my defect of not perceiving the logical connection between $q$ and $P$ that is responsible for my utterance, 'I do not know whether $p$'. Hintikka says that we may know some axioms of a sophisticated mathematical theory though we may not know some of its distant consequences. In that case, we may say 'we do not know whether there are such and such theses' (which are really distant consequences of those axioms).

What it implies is that if we want to include the rules (A. \sim K) and (A. \sim P), then we have to review the notion of consistency. A set of sentences cannot by them­selves be inconsistent. In addition to it, we have seen that it is,
humanly possible to question the truth of something which is logically implied by what is already known. But it does not make the belief of the person inconsistent. What we can do is to show the person that what he says he does not know is something that follows from what he knows. A good example of such a case is found in the working of Ross and Lynton who have shown that Quine's premises of the set theory were inconsistent. But in spite of this inconsistency, Quine believed in the premises. It does not mean that his belief was non-existent.

So, if we understand consistency in the sense of immunity to such criticism, we can at best change our vocabulary and say, it is indefensible for the person to say that he does not know whether P, because P is something already implied by what he knows. Similarly, instead of calling a statement 'valid', we should say it is self-sustaining. Now, we can refer to the acceptability of the rules (A-\sim K) and (A-\sim P). The rule (A-\sim K) does not say that if \lambda is consistent, and if \sim Kape \lambda, then it is impossible that Pape \lambda. What it says is that, under the condition that \lambda is consistent and \sim Kape \lambda, it may be possible that Pape \lambda but in that case we say that the set 1{Pap} is indefensible. The reason is, if I deny knowing that p, then it is generally expected that I cannot be in such a position unless it really is possible for all that I know, that P is not the case. In this sense, the rules (A-\sim K) and (A-\sim P) can be correctly accepted. Prof. Hintikka comments, "...the rules (A-\sim K) and
(A→P), are not concerned with the truth of statements at all, they merely tell us that certain adjunctions always preserve the defensibility of sets of sentences.  

What Prof. Hintikka says is that, the indefensibility of a sentence is due to failure on the part of the person making the sentence, who is ignorant of the far-reaching effects of what he knows. That is, what he says goes against what actually follows from his prior knowledge. So it is very risky to positively accuse somebody of making indefensible sentence, because, an indefensible sentence is never a product of a conscious or active mind. Some other person may make that person aware of the consequences of what he knows. He himself also can become aware of it. It is to be noted that the expression 'what he knows' does not mean 'what he is aware of'. It includes everything for which he has enough justification.

Somebody may argue that this notion presupposes the notion of analytic-synthetic distinction. Since this latter notion is vague, the former also should be so. But Prof. Hintikka denies this claim because, according to him, the notion of indefensibility is very much intuitive and precise like the rules.

Limitations: In fact, applicability of this notion depends on the condition that people actually know such and such things and they are aware of the consequences of what

65 ibid., p.32.
they know to such and such extent. It is true that there is no logical reason that says that as because $q$ follows obviously from $p$, so the person who knows that $p$ should know that $q$. But it is just most unlikely to say that in such a case the person does not know $q$. It is so much unlikely that in such a case where the man being asked whether he knows that $q$ denies it, we go to that extent of saying that he does not understand the question. This expectation however depends on a condition that the consequence viz., $q$ is not very remote. Just as, an application can be shown step by step by means of argument, similarly, the indefensibility of a sentence can be shown by a piece of reasoning. Though we have said that the rules (A-~K) and (A-~P) are applicable here, there are a number of results that can be demonstrated without use of these rules.

There are other limitations of this theory. Firstly, this is not directly applicable to the truth or falsity of the actual world. Here the world means the world where all of us have such and such knowledge and all of us are aware of the consequences of our knowledge. If a sentence is true in at least one such world, then it is called defensible, and if it is true in all such worlds then it is called self-sustaining. They are applicable to the truth or falsity of statements of the actual world to the extent the actual world in nearer to the possible worlds.
Secondly, the rule of indefensibility is a rule not in the sense of being unavoidable. It only says that if \( q \) is entailed by \( p \), then any knowledge of \( q \) is acquired with that of \( p \). But it does not mean that one should know \( q \) if he knows both \( p \) and \( p \) entails \( q \). This point is supported by logic also. Logical truths are not forced on it, they are necessary not in the sense of being unavoidable. Logic tells us that given such and such premises, we ought to draw such and such consequences. But we may not do what we ought to do. Then we are to be blamed for our failure. So logic gives us permissible, not obligatory rules.

In fact, the whole discussion is applicable to the notion of belief in the sense of opinion. In case of belief, there is an element of commitment. For example if I am a theist, I am committed to the view that there is God, hence there is no question of permissibility. The theists ignore any evidence to the contrary. In the case of knowledge, any knowledge of \( p \) and that of \( q \) entailed by \( p \), ought to lead to the knowledge of \( q \). Its opposite is however impossible. Belief, in the sense of involving a commitment is similar to knowledge in this respect. But the picture is different in case of belief in the sense of an opinion. We can show the difference in the following way:
(1) Belief having commitment  (2) Belief as opinion
Bap
    Ba(p\neg q)
    \therefore Ba\neg q (It is impossible)
Bap
    Ba(p\land q)
    \therefore (Ba\neg q) (It is possible, but indefensible)

It is in the sense of belief as opinion that Moore's paradox can be explained as indefensible.

Prof. Hintikka refers to an alternative interpretation of "Kap" as "It follows from what a knows that p". In this sense, it may be easy to show that \neg Kap and Pa\neg p mean the same thing, but this formulation leads us to have a standard of logical consequences. This is not what is done in this discussion, because here we first of all want to have some criterion of logical consistency and defensibility and then we want to define by it, the criterion of logical consequences. Secondly, this formulation makes the use of the verb 'to know' 'to believe' a bit more problematic than the previous one. So we can stick to Hintikka's original notion of defensibility, and follow his proofs for the indefensibility of C.\textsuperscript{66}

The Status of the Sentence 'p and I believe that p'

So far we have seen that the sentence 'p, but I do not believe that p' is a paradoxical sentence. But such a conjunctive sentence having one conjunct asserting a proposition

\textsuperscript{66} Hintikka, op. cit., pp.69-71.
and having the other conjunct that contains an epistemical element in it is something peculiar. Prof. S. Bhattacharyya has shown that even the sentence 'p and I believe that p' cannot be correctly uttered, because to say that 'p is the case' is to say that 'I have justification in claiming p,' while the other conjunct merely makes a understatement by making a mere claim alone. It has an affinity to the case of Cartesian Cogito. The sentence 'I am unconscious' states a fact which makes not only the utterance of this sentence, but utterances of all sentences by the speaker absurd. Similarly, to say 'p' is to say something regarding which I have justification, and to add to it a mere belief-claim either positively or negatively is to withdraw the justification of the first conjunct.

Thus, we can show the indefensibility of paradoxical sentences. Now, from the fact that a paradoxical sentence can become a natural sentence by changing the person, it appears that the strength of its paradoxical nature is due to the appearance of first-person singular pronouns in the sentence. We shall now see whether this view can be maintained.

The Relevance of Personal Pronouns in a Paradox

Let us omit the occurrence of such a first-person pronoun in the sentence (A). We may thus write a new sentence:
"p, but a does not believe that p."

Now, it is quite natural that the speaker, as distinct from the person 'a' believes what he says. That is, in the light of defensibility, we can say that it is defensible for the speaker to say:

(B) "I believe that the case is as follows:
   p but a does not believe that p".

This sentence may be symbolically expressed as

(B*)"Bb(p&Bap)".

This (B*) is quite defensible while (C*) is not. From the defensibility of (B*), it may appear that absurdity of (A) is due to the presence of first-person singular pronoun.

On close scrutiny, we however find (C*) which is the symbolic form of (A) in the sense of (C) generalizes the paradoxical sentence. This generalization shows that the paradox remains a paradox even though it is freed from the impact of personal pronouns. What is expressed by (C*) is this:

(D) "a believes that the case is as follows:
   p but a does not believe that p",

Here the term 'a' may stand for any person whatsoever. What is expressed by (D) can be otherwise communicated by showing to the person referred to by 'a' that his beliefs are contradictory. It is very obvious therefore to show the indefensibility of (D). All the instances of C* where 'a' is uniformly substituted by any name, therefore, can be
shown to make \((C^*)\) indefensible. While \((A)\) can be shown to be defensible by changing the tense, its generalised form \((C^*)\) cannot be so shown by changing the tense. For example, the sentence "She was at College, but I donot believe it" may be defensible, but it is paradoxical to say "I believed it the time that she was at college, but that I did not believe that she was at college.

Possibility of Generalization of Doxastically Indefensible Sentence

Here we are concerned with notion of generalization of such a paradox \((A)\). In order to understand further implications of such epistemically indefensible sentences, it is necessary to be acquainted with the notion of epistemical or doxastic defensibility.

Let us assume that a person who refers to himself as 'a' utters a finite number of declarative sentences, viz. \(p_1, p_2, p_3, \ldots, p_k\) on one and the same occasion. To quote Prof. Hintikka, "...we shall call the set \(\{p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_k\}\) doxastically indefensible for the person referred to by this term to utter if and only if the sentence "\(\text{Ba}(p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_k)\)" is indefensible simpliciter."\(^{67}\)

The generalized form of \((A)\) therefore can be expressed in this way: the absurdity of \(A\) is due to the fact that its utterance is doxastically indefensible for the speaker.

\(^{67}\) ibid., p. 71.
An alternative definition of doxastic indefensibility is hinted here. The new definition says that a set of sentences is doxastically indefensible for the person referred to by 'a' to utter if and only if the set obtained by adding to its members the further sentence "Ba(p_1 p_2 \ldots p_k)" is indefensible simpliciter. But though the definition is helpful in showing the doxastic indefensibility of sets of sentences directly, it makes more complicated the ways of showing the doxastic indefensibility of some other sentences or sets of sentences. So Hintikka prefers the former definition.

So it is found that doxastic indefensible statements are self-defeating. Hintikka is very much conscious about using the term 'statements' here. The reason is, normally to make a statement is to believe possibly what is stated. In that sense, some utterances of doxastically indefensible sentences are no longer qualified as statements because they cannot be believed. So he advises to use the term 'putative statements'. However, for the sake of simplicity we shall omit the term 'putative'.

We may however return to our original issue that doxastically indefensible sentences can be true when they are uttered by some other speaker, viz., in case of (B). The important point is that, the speaker himself cannot consistently believe in doxastically indefensible sentences. To be specific, the absurdity of such statements depends heavily on the condition that the speaker is aware of the self-defeating
character of such statements.

There may be several possibilities of being unaware of
the self-defeating character of such sentences. First of all,
the complicated nature of a particular doxastically indefen-
sible statement may hide its self-defeating nature from the
speaker. As a result, the statement may not appear to be
absurd for him.

Secondly, the speaker, under any particular situation,
viz., after a prolonged illness or after a brain-injury, or
under hypnotic trance etc., may fail to believe that he is
the person for whom the utterance of a sentence is doxasti-
cally indefensible.

In fact, the basic assumption of such statement, in
Hintikka's treatment, totally excludes the second possibility.

What comes out of these considerations is that the gene-
ralization allows the speaker to refer to himself by terms
other than the first-person singular pronoun 'I', without
disturbing the self-defeating nature of such sentences.
This may sound unusual. But we should remember that whatever
impact it throws on ordinary discourse is insignificant here.
What is important is this: an analysis of Moore's problem
shows that it can be generalized with the help of the notion
of doxastic indefensibility. This is defined without making
any reference to the peculiarities of first-person singular
pronouns. So Moore's problematic sentence shown in (A) is
shown to be absurd irrespective of the use of personal pronoun
in it.
Now, if we can dispense with personal pronoun in this context, then we need not speak about doxastically indefensible sentences. A sentence is something that is constituted of forms of words; and a statement is that which is expressed through it. If no such personal pronoun is needed, then we can dispense with sentences also. Hintikka's discussion of doxastic indefensibility is not centred round sentences, it rather depends on the speaker or writer, and on his way of referring to himself. So doxastic indefensibility is defined primarily of statements and then derivatively or secondarily of sentences where the personal pronouns occur. It means that (A) is absurd not because of the occurrence of personal pronoun.

The sentences (A) and (B) are not categorically different. There is a general parallelism between sentences having personal pronouns and sentences having names of persons. Both the sentences serve the same purpose if the use of the pronoun and that of the name is the same. In this sense both (A) and (B) may describe possible states of affairs, it may very well happen that p is true although I do not believe it. So the linguistic status of (A) is not something different which makes it doxastically indefensible. (A) is absurd because of the fact that it is unbelievable, i.e., it is indefensible to believe it.

We can conclude the discussion by saying that a logical self-contradiction is self-defeating for all persons under
all circumstances. On the other hand, an epistemically or
doxastically indefensible sentence is self-defeating in some
cases. Its utterance may quite well serve our purpose of
communication if we are concerned with a mere possibility,
or if we are merely contemplating on it. And in that sense,
it is not indefensible. The absurdity of these sentences
therefore is manifested only when their utterances are
believed. It means the absurdity is a result of certain per-
formance, i.e., the character of the absurdity of the doxas-
tically indefensible sentences is performatory.