In this work an attempt has been made to study the various aspects of belief. They are the nature of belief, the relation between belief on the one hand and knowledge, faith, doubt, on the other, the object of belief, ascription of belief, evidence of belief, rationality of belief. The common feature they share is that none of them offers one single view regarding belief. It is therefore necessary to study different opinions on various interconnected topics and to see whether a particular view gets more or less general acceptance. In the present context, it is of primary importance to explain the connection of the problems selected for discussion in this work.

The first problem is that of nature of belief. This problem cannot be tackled in isolation. It requires discussion of the relation between belief on the one hand and knowledge, doubt, faith on the other. Then a further question is raised whether belief can be regarded as a relation. Hence the question of object of belief is inevitable. Belief-sentences may be analysed as sentences of belief-ascription. So this problem comes after that of object of belief. This ascription is possible on the basis of evidence. It is therefore important to discuss the problem of evidence in this context. Lastly it is no less important to bring the issue of the possibility of belief in self-contradiction and that of rationality of belief in general. Before going
into the details of this work, it is necessary to emphasize an important point about the aim of this work. As in this work only some (important) problems concerning belief have been discussed, no comprehensive theory of belief covering all aspects could be attempted. Such a general theory of belief is beyond the scope of the present work. The whole work is divided into the following chapters.

Chapter 1 is concerned with the problem of the nature of belief. Belief is commonly assumed to be an inner mental state, directly accessible to introspection and distinct from, though causally related to, the believer's behaviour. Some may identify belief in a proposition with its entertainment together with a dispositional readiness to act as if the proposition were true. There is also another tendency to treat belief as an attitude.

Chapter 2 deals with the problem of the relation between belief as an attitude on the one hand and other attitudes like faith, doubt, knowledge on the other. The difference between belief and knowledge is not so clear as the difference between belief and faith, doubt etc. But it should not provoke us to view them as completely isolated from one another.

Chapter 3 focuses on the pertinent question: What is the proper object of belief? It may be sentence, or proposition or object. In this context, the views of Quine, Russell, Ayer and others are discussed.

Chapters 4 and 5 stress on the 'when' and 'how' questions respectively regarding belief-ascription. To be specific, chapter 4 is occupied with the dichotomy of avowal or behaviour
as the evidence of belief. Behaviour sometimes seems to be the right candidate. This behaviour may be verbal or non-verbal. There is also the question whether behaviour in general or uniqueness of behaviour is to count as evidence for belief.

A more fundamental problem is the 'how' question which is discussed in chapter 5. It is the problem of the way of belief-ascription. Self-ascription of belief appears to be much easier than other-ascription, because belief is accessible to one's introspection. But we shall see that both are to be explained in the same way.

It is a fact that evidence is essential for belief. But a wildly dogmatic or superstitious belief 'maintained in the teeth of all the evidence' is still a belief, however unreasonable it may be. There may also be inconsistent beliefs. Once we admit the possibility of these beliefs, the question of rationality of belief seems to lose its significance.

In chapter 6 we shall see the relevance of this question to the main topic by introducing the question of justification.

Finally in chapter 7, an attempt has been made to show what is revealed from the whole discussion.