SECOND MILITARY ACTION

The Linggadjati Wedlock did not last long. The Agreement was buried firstly under an avalanche of obstructive interpretations and finally under a ruthless military operation. The Dutch threw aside all legalistic hypocrisy, to which they resorted to after the signing of the Agreement, and took opportunity to make war upon recalcitrant Indonesians. However, the all-out Dutch attack against the Republic served one important purpose — it turned the Indonesian issue from being a somewhat isolated issue to a burning international problem. The Dutch armies marched steadily into the interior of the Republican territory and began to capture major cities. But, they could not achieve their military goal, namely, the destruction of the Republican troops. The reason was the latter's adoption of the tactics of a prolonged guerrilla warfare. This was the only tactical alternative for the Republicans whose military organisation was much inferior to that of the Dutch and who were ill-equipped in heavy ammunitions. As a corollary the scorched-earth policy was also adopted which harassed the Dutch considerably. India expressed keen indignation of the Dutch aggression especially as it was directed against one of her continent-mates long oppressed by colonial dominance. Nehru said on July 24: "No European country, whatever it may be, has any business to set its army in Asia against the people of Asia. When it does so, Asia will not tolerate it." He further said on July 23 that India would raise the Indonesian issue in the United Nations deliberations. As for the attitude of Great Britain and the USA, both had recognised the Republic of Indonesia after the Linggadjati Agreement had been signed. Both the governments decried Holland's bellicosity but would not take any concrete steps towards terminating the conflict. They were only moved to offer good offices perhaps to pacify world opinion and especially Asian opinion. The British foreign office on July 21 expressed the "keenest disappointment" at the "breakdown of .... ceaseless efforts during the past 18 months to promote a
peaceful settlement of the exceptionally difficult situation which had persisted in Java and Sumatra since the Japanese surrender...." It further stated that "His Majesty's Government have made it plain to the Netherlands Government that they would always be ready to place at the disposal of the parties their good offices." It is also interesting to note that "the action of his Majesty's Government throughout has been taken in full consultation with the U.S. Government" which in its turn held out a similar offer on July 31, 1947. Diplomatic attempts at negotiations served the Dutch very well in their aggressive moves which could be pursued uninterruptedly. Negotiations take time even to start - for more to ripen - and meanwhile Dutch colonial ambitions might wellnigh be fulfilled. It was, therefore, with a spirit of suspicious welcome that Indonesians took these offers and were more willing to place it trust on the U.N. They did not accept these offers because these might merely prolong the state of crisis while giving a theoretical protection to the aggrieved; it was better to rely on positive U.N. action which, they believed at that moment having no direct experience, could promptly check warfare. U.N. action should also have been deemed preferable by England and the U.S.A. since a third party is very often unjustifiably criticized and vilified by a dissatisfied disputant - they could avoid such situations as confronted the British troops in Indonesia after the Japanese surrender. Instead of accepting the unenviable position of a mediator they could prefer acting as agent of the U.N. in preserving world peace.

A firm initiative came from India and Australia who, on July 30, laid the dispute before the United Nations. India resorted to Article 34 of the U.N. Charter and argued that international peace and security was threatened in Indonesia
and as such urgent U.N. action was needed. Australia invoked the more important Article 33 as peace had been already broken and pressed the Security Council for ending hostilities and starting arbitration according to the terms of the Linggadjati Agreement. It is to be noted that Article 39 belonged to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter dealing with U.N. action regarding threats to or breaches of the peace and acts of aggression, whereas Article 34 forms a part of the Chapter VI dealing with the peaceful settlement of disputes. Australia proposed a strongly worded resolution which failed to muster the majority support of the Security Council. On August 1, the Security Council accepted the U.S.-sponsored resolution calling upon the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia "to cease hostilities forthwith, and to settle their disputes by arbitration or other peaceful means."

The resolution by arbitration was thus asked also asked both the parties to inform the Security Council of the progress in peaceful settlement.

Holland's performance at the Security Council showed a characteristic burst of intrinsigence and a mind fixed too firmly in the past. In his vague and enigmatic way her representative was trying to prove that a war is not a war. On July 21 the Netherlands representative to the United Nations addressed a letter to the Secretary-General stating that his government had no alternative but to resort to force in order to restore peace and order which the Republican government had failed to maintain. World reactions to the undeclared Dutch war shocked the Netherlands. Arabs of the Middle East immediately cabled protests to the Dutch and the U.N. In Singapore many organizations established a Committee to set up a volunteer fighting force against Hollander. Then, ultimately, India and Australia brought the matter before the Security Council. Holland decided to obstruct the proceedings. And she had to swallow a number of
rebuffs since world opinion swayed against her. Her representative, Van Kleffens, reiterated before the Council the archaic argument that the Republic was not a state and that the Security Council had no jurisdiction over Holland's internal affairs. This argument was patently invalid. For in Article 1 of the Linggadjati Agreement the Netherlands government unequivocally "recognize the Government of the Republic of Indonesia as exercising de facto authority over Java, Madura, and Sumatra." The Preamble to the Agreement also clearly refers to the Government of the Republic of Indonesia. Van Kleffens put forth the unadroit argument that the Linggadjati Agreement conferred a sovereign status on the projected United States of Indonesia. But this was a talk of the future and could not nullify the recognition extended to the Republic by Article 3. The Republic would retain her sovereignty and in future she would join the United States of Indonesia till the formation of which she could not surrender her authority to a non-existent state. This view is strengthened by Article 15 of the Linggadjati Agreement which required the Netherlands government "to reform the Government of the Indies in such a way that the composition and procedure shall conform as closely as possible to the recognition of the Republic of Indonesia." The Security Council did not uphold the Dutch plea of domestic jurisdiction. The resolution of August 1 expressly mentioned the 'Republic of Indonesia' and rejected thereby the Dutch assertion that the war in Indonesia was a purely internal problem. The Council further rebuffed the Dutch when it refused to adopt the Belgium-proposed resolution seeking an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice as to whether the Council was competent to exercise jurisdiction over the Indonesian question; the Council thereby revealed itself to be politically conscious and not too fastidious about legal conundrums. The Dutch were also snubbed when the Security
Council permitted Sjahrir, a representative of the Republic, to participate in the discussions of the Council but turned down a proposal to invite delegates from Dutch-monitored States of East Indonesia and Borneo. In anguish they behaved irresponsibly and held up the transmission of the Security Council decision (of August 1) to the Republican government for many hours.\(^14\) The Dutch hoped to create a wrong impression among foreigners about the Republic's readiness to abide by the Council's decision. They also tried to prevent the Republic from being invited to the November Conference of the Economic and Social Council, and failed.\(^15\)

The role of the custodians of peace and security, i.e., members of the Security Council, was often discouraging and dishonourable. Belgium, Britain and France supported Holland's colonial ambitions with contemptible consistency.\(^16\) They overtly sympathised with Holland's contention that the Republic was not a State; they opposed the decision to allow a Republican representative to participate in the discussions of the Security Council; they demanded that representatives of certain Dutch puppet States in Indonesia (this time the U.S.A. joined them) be invited to participate in the discussions of the Security Council.\(^17\) From the standpoint of a struggling Indonesian nationalist, Soviet Union appeared to play a laudably impartial role — even if less due to her innate attachment to nationalist aspirations in view of the imperialist treachery in East Europe and more due to cold war motivations. She punctiliously measured up the requirements of the Republic and shaped her proposals accordingly. She proposed at the Security Council that the Dutch and the Republicans should be asked to withdraw to positions held by them before the military action.\(^18\) The proposal was not accepted, but Soviet Union gained Indonesian goodwill. Soviet Union also proposed that the Council should set up a commission to supervise the cease-fire order and
was supported by the U.S.A. This proposal was defeated on account of the French veto. And the U.S.S.R. remained the noble champion of the Republican cause. Her insights into the sentiments and necessities of the Republic were clearly recognizable when the line adopted by Sjahrir on August 14 almost coincided with that of the Soviet proposal. On that day Sjahrir gave before the Security Council a telling account of Indonesian freedom movement and proposed that the Dutch should withdraw to positions in conformity with the truce of October 14, 1946; he also suggested that the Council should appoint a commission to oversee compliance with its cease-fire order.

Australia's attitude thoroughly annoyed the Dutch. Australia proposed that the Council should set up a 3-member arbitration committee. This proposal was decisively defeated; excepting Colombia and Syria, no state (not even the U.S.S.R.) supported it. The U.S.A. commendably averted deadlocks more than once, but her attitude was not always scrupulous or straightforward, especially in terms of the Republic's expectations. Republican leaders looked upon the U.S.A. as the home of liberty and were always enthused by the character and achievements of U.S. statesmen like Abraham Lincoln. Then, when the Dutch launched the military operation Sukarno addressed a stirring appeal to Indonesians to fight for freedom and he quoted Lincoln as on many other occasions. Indonesians were disappointed as the U.S.A. did not advocate any prompt Council action to stop the Dutch who were advancing steadily and consolidating gains accruing from military superiority, in spite of the cease-fire order. However, the U.S.A. deserved praise for sponsoring the August 1 resolution; Indonesians surely thanked the U.S.A. as they saw Britain, Belgium and France abstaining when that resolution...
was voted. They, of course, had the right to abstain; but the Asian sentiment was outraged. If, then, an Asian, especially an Indonesian, called them lackeys of Dutch imperialists, he would not be totally unjustified.

The Security Council, still in its infancy, had to deal with a situation unusually delicate. It could make up for its lack of experience if it was not torn by intense rivalries and jealousies; that was not to be. The action of the Council was prompt but inadequate; the resolution of August 1 was timely but toothless; Dutch troops continued to thrust far into the Republic's territory. The Council did not have the will to employ enforcement measures; the Dutch knew it and had good courage to ignore the resolution of the Security Council. The Council could not act more effectively if it accepted Sjahrir's insistent recommendations; Sjahrir recommended to the Council that the Dutch troops must retreat to the positions occupied prior to the military action, that the Council should send a Commission to supervise the observance of the cease-fire resolution, that the Council should directly undertake the arbitration of the dispute. It only issued a simple cease-fire call; and the Dutch perversely attacked this as an encouragement to the lawless among Indonesians and as discouraging to moderates willing to cooperate with Holland. It was not the U.S. intervention but the Dutch military action which dashed the hopes of moderates and seemed to vindicate the belief of extremists among Indonesians that the craving for cooperation was only prolonging the nauseous period of Dutch mastery.

On August 25 the Security Council perambulated a few steps forward as it adopted two resolutions, China and Australia sponsored the first resolution setting up a Commission consisting of those career consuls at Batavia who represented states having seats in the Security Council at that time; this Consular Commission would report the implementation of the cease-fire order. The
second resolution, sponsored by the United States, formed a Committee of Good Offices consisting of three members; each contending party was to select one member; the two members, so selected, would choose the third member. The Republic chose an Australian; the Netherlands chose a Belgian; the Australian and the Belgian chose an American. The Security Council, then, could realize that an immediate step, other than a mere cease-fire resolution, was essential in order to stop fighting. It had to expedite matters; it decided wisely to make use of the local Consuls, i.e., the men on the spot. At the same time, the Council tried to reach the long-range goal of conciliation by despatching a subsidiary Committee to the area of conflict, i.e., the Committee of Good Offices. The Consular Commission made no delay in proceeding with the work. The Committee of Good Offices did not arrive in Djakarta till at the end of October, 1947.

The Consular Commission began to submit its reports to the Security Council from the beginning of October, 1947. Between October 3 and October 31, the Security Council held discussions on them, especially on the particularized Report by the Consular Commission at Batavia to the Security Council, dated October 28, 1947. This Report is an illuminating document on the attitudes and behaviour of the Dutch, on the state of the Republican-administered territories. It confirmed the allegations of Republicans against the Dutch, although persons who drafted the report were clever enough not to expressly hold the Dutch to be the guilty party. But what they wrote was sufficient to reveal Dutch atrocities. The report, furthermore, apprised sceptics of the strength of the Republican administration. The Commission noted that the whole situation was clouded by mutual mistrust which made itself felt even in official declarations. Their past experience, declared the Republicans officially, taught them that, unless a third neutral party continuously controlled the implementation of the cease-fire agreement, there was no guarantee that the Dutch
troops would not unilaterally violate the same. The Commission pinpointed the most prominent reason for the failure of the cease-fire arrangement: it was the disagreement on the (everexpanding) area of Dutch-controlled territories. In fact, the Dutch behaved as if the U.N. did not exist and they unhesitatingly ignored the U.N. debates and deliberations. They followed their own plans and realized their major military objectives. Furthermore, they drew up an imaginary line, designated as the Van Mook Line, connecting conjectured points reached by the advancing Dutch armies; this line often ran through and included big chunks of territories under the Republican sway. The Republic rejected this line and the Commission never accepted it; the Commission upheld the Republican contention that in places the notorious Van Mook Line went much ahead of the Dutch-controlled points. Besides, as the Commission noted, the Dutch executed protracted mopping up operations. "The subsequent fanning out by the Dutch forces and their establishment of small posts in areas which they had not previously occupied, but which they claimed to control, was considered by the Republicans to be a breach of the cease-fire agreement," the Commission reported. The Republic, therefore, found safety in assailing those Dutch ports.

The same Report also contained a review of the general administration of Republican territories. While as a result of the military action food prospects in Dutch territories brightened up, the Republicans went on suffering shortages. Economic adversities as of the tight blockade imposed by the Netherland for a prolonged period. Yet, the Report categorically stated, the general standard of civil services and public administration was nowhere below expectation especially in view of unending hostilities and threats. In spite of an emergency situation, the Commission commented, the Republican government did not betray any lack of interest in education and social services, not to speak of agricultural activities. From these remarks of the Consular Commission we are entitled
to conclude that the charges of maladministration directed by Van Mook against the Republic were prompted for a realistic survey. The Commission also attested the strength of the Indonesian national movement as it observed, with respect to Indonesians officering the Dutch administration in Dutch areas, that "practically all the officials spoken to stated that they were nationalist at heart and wanted a free and independent Indonesia and to be able to fly their own flag." It completely belied the favourite story given by the Dutch that Indonesians in Dutch-controlled territories stood against the Republic. The Commission vouched for the dignity of the Indonesian struggle as it gave an unqualified support to the view that a nationalist and not a communist upheaval underlay the whole movement. The Commission honoured the nationalists who, it said, manifested in the course of their struggle strong anti-Dutch but pro-U.N. sentiments.

The Dutch, however, had little faith in the world organisation and had no fear in violating its cease-fire resolution. Van Mook went even so far as to assert publicly that the Dutch should obliterate Republican authority. Mr. Pillai, the Indian delegate to the United Nations, justifiably remarked that "the Security Council's resolution calling for the cessation of hostilities was obeyed by the one side and disregarded or circumvented by the other." Not unnaturally, therefore, Republicans clamoured ceaselessly for the removal of Dutch forces to positions held by them before the military drive. With this aim Soviet Union and Poland tactfully introduced proposals in the Security Council, which were quickly defeated, the opposition coming as usual from Belgium, Britain, France and the U.S.A. The typical case was the defeat of the Soviet-sponsored resolution of October 31 advocating withdrawal of Dutch troops to positions occupied before the military action; Australia, Colombia and Poland were in favour of it; Belgium, Britain,
France, and the U.S.A. were against it; others abstained. \(^35\)

Once again the U.S.A. broke the impasse created by Dutch militancy in Indonesia and inaction of the Security Council as the resolution sponsored by her was adopted on November 1, 1947. This resolution called upon the Netherlands and the Republic "forthwith to consult with each other, either directly or through the Committee of Good Offices, as to the means to be employed to give effect to the cease-fire resolution." The resolution also said "that the use of the armed forces of either party by hostile action to extend its control over territory not occupied by it on August 4, 1947, is inconsistent with the Council Resolution of August 1." Poland opposed the resolution, while Soviet Union abstained; their support would not have harmed the Republican cause; but they were as much embroiled in the game of power politics as Britain or France and could not take a less prejudiced view. The resolution, however, was weak in so far as it bypassed the issue of the Van Mook Line and its root, the military action. The resolution requested the Consular Commission as also the Committee of Good Offices to assist in the execution of cease-fire agreements; it assigned to the Committee of Good Offices the all-important duty of trying to reach a stable political equilibrium in Indonesia. The Council's limp attempt predictably left the Dutch unperturbed; they went ahead with their plans of military aggrandisement. They even crossed the Van Mook Line\(^38\) and overran other Republican areas.

The formal session of the Committee of Good Offices did not open till December 8, 1947, on board the U.S.S. 'Renville' lying at Batavia. The tenacious endeavours of the Committee compose an unbroken record of Dutch obstinacies, the Republican helplessness and the extremely limited capacity of the U.N. to quicken colonial emancipation. The Committee could not
crack the glacial indifference of the Dutch. The first two plans framed by the Committee proved acceptable to the Republic, but the Dutch accepted the first only in part and the second as only a working paper. The insincerity and intransigence of the Dutch once again paid them a high dividend. The Committee reformulated its proposals primarily to meet Dutch desires. These proposals, submitted on December 26, were embodied in the Christmas Draft Message. Twelve principles, believed to facilitate a permanent political decision, were enumerated along with proposals for a truce. The Republic accepted the proposals and all the principles. But, as usual, Holland’s aggressive self-confidence spurred her to create tensions, exploit weaknesses, and gain victories. The Netherlands presented a set of twelve principles which drastically modified those offered by the Committee. The crumbling shibboleth of colonialism was once again expressed in those proposals embodying totally unsubstantial, if unsurprising, concessions. The Dutch counter-proposals did nowhere mention the Republic by name. Nor did they provide for the Republic’s representation in the interim government pending the transfer of sovereignty. They were silent on the evacuation of Dutch troops from Republican areas occupied by the military action, and the restoration, there, of the Republican authority. Furthermore, the Dutch counter-proposals refrained from relying on international institutions or requesting the Committee of Good Offices to resolve differences between the parties during the interim period. They included a provision for free elections to determine the political loyalties of the people, but unless the U.N. superintended the free elections — and this was not provided for — these would be controlled by the Dutch and would not amount to self-determination by the people.

What was most deplorable in the Dutch counter-proposals was that they contained the brazen warning that the Dutch would resume liberty of action if the Republic failed to accept them unconditionally. No less shocking to the suffering colonial people was the capitulation of the U.N.; it could not curb Holland’s
blustering activities. Van Mook unilaterally proclaimed the inauguration of another puppet state, Fast Sumatra, on December 29, 1947 - this territory had been wrested away from the Republic; the U.N. could not resist. The Dutch, incited by military advantages gained during the preceding months, issued another ultimatum on January 9: they wrote to the Committee of Good Offices that unless the Republic unconditionally accepted their counter-proposals within three days, they would regain freedom of action. The Committee of Good Offices tried to get out of the muddle. Its American member, Dr. Graham, worked hard to amend the Dutch counter-proposals and coax the parties to accept them as amended. He formulated six additional principles which the Committee accepted. These gave the Republic the status of a state within the projected United States of Indonesia and a fair representation; these guaranteed continued U.N. participation in the Indonesian issue, whether for assisting a party (and the other party could not have the right to object to that) or supervising a plebiscite. These additional principles made the Dutch counter-proposals less unpalatable and Graham's pertinacious pleadings persuaded Republicans to swallow them. More onerous was the task of getting Holland to subscribe to them. Holland ultimately accepted the additional principles, but that was the victory of the U.S. State Department and not really of the U.N. Graham informed Marshall, the U.S. Secretary of State, that the Dutch must be restrained, or else the Indonesian problem could not be solved peacefully. Marshall's steady advocacy of the six principles bent Dutch attitude; the Dutch finally accepted them. The Renville Agreement was signed on board the U.S.S. Renville on January 17 and January 19, 1948. It comprised a truce agreement, twelve principles as the basis for political discussions, six additional principles for negotiations towards a political settlement. The Van Mook Line was
accepted as the basis of the truce - this was a complete victory for the Dutch and a token of the U.K.'s weakness. The twelve principles were:

1. That the assistance of the Committee of Good Offices be continued in the working out and signing of an agreement for the settlement of the political dispute in the islands of Java, Sumatra and Madura, based upon the principles underlying the Linggadjati Agreement.

2. It is understood that neither party has the right to prevent the free expression of popular movements looking toward political organizations which are in accord with the principles of the Linggadjati Agreement. It is further understood that each party will guarantee the freedom of assembly, speech and publication at all times provided that this guarantee is not construed so as to include the advocacy of violence or reprisals.

3. It is understood that decisions concerning changes in administration of territory should be made only with the full and free consent of the population of those territories and at a time when the security and freedom from coercion of such population will have been ensured.

4. That on the signing of the political agreement provisions be made for the gradual reduction of the armed forces of both parties.

5. That as soon as practicable after the signing of the truce agreement, economic activity, trade, transportation and communications be restored through the co-operation of both parties, taking into consideration the interest of all the constituent parts of Indonesia.

6. That provision be made for a suitable period of not less than six months not more than one year after the signing of the agreement, during which time uncoerced and free discussion and consideration of vital issues will proceed. At the end of this...
period, free elections will be held for self-determination by
the people of their political relationship to the Republic and
to the United States of Indonesia.

7. That a constitutional convention be chosen according to
democratic procedure to draft a constitution for the United
States of Indonesia.

8. It is understood that if, after signing the agreement
referred to in item 1, either party should ask the United
Nations to provide an agency to observe conditions at any time
up to the point at which sovereignty is transferred from the
Government of the Netherlands to the Government of the United
States of Indonesia, the other party will take this request
in serious consideration.

The following four principles are taken from the Lingga-
jati Agreement:

9. Independence for the Indonesian peoples.

10. Co-operation between the peoples of the Netherlands and
Indonesia.

11. A sovereign state on a federal basis under a constitution
which will be arrived at by democratic processes.

12. A union between the United States of Indonesia and other
parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands under the King of the
Netherlands.

The six additional principles were:

1. Sovereignty throughout the Netherlands Indies is and shall
remain with the Kingdom of the Netherlands until after a stated
interval the Kingdom of the Netherlands transfers its sovereign-
ty to the United States of Indonesia. Prior to the termination
of such stated interval, the Kingdom of the Netherlands may
confer appropriate rights, duties and responsibilities on a
provisional federal Government of the Territories of the future
United States of Indonesia. The United States of Indonesia, when
created, will be a sovereign and independent state of equal
partnership with the Kingdom of the Netherlands in a Netherlands-Indonesian Union at the head of which shall be the King of the Netherlands. The status of the Republic of Indonesia will be that of a state within the United States of Indonesia.

2. In any provisional federal government created prior to the ratification of the constitution of the future United States of Indonesia, all states will be offered fair representation.

3. Prior to the dissolution of the Committee of Good Offices, either party may request that the services of the Committee will be continued to assist in adjusting differences between the parties which relate to the political agreement and which may arise during the interim period. The other party will interpose no objection to such a request; this request would be brought to the attention of the Security Council of the United Nations by the Government of the Netherlands.

4. Within a period of not less than six months or more than one year from the signing of this agreement, a plebiscite will be held to determine whether the populations of the various territories of Java, Madura and Sumatra wish their territory to form part of the Republic of Indonesia or of another state within the United States of Indonesia; such plebiscite to be conducted under observation by the Committee of Good Offices should either party, in accordance with the procedure set forth in paragraph 3 above, request the services of the Committee in the capacity. The parties may agree that another method for ascertaining the will of the populations may be employed in place of a plebiscite.

5. Following the delineation of the states in accordance with the procedure set forth in paragraph 4 above, a constitutional convention will be convened, through democratic procedures, to draft a constitution for the United States of Indonesia. The representation of the various states in the convention will be in proportion to their populations.

6. Should any state decide not to ratify the constitution and
desire in accordance with the principles of Articles 3 and 4 of the Linggadjati Agreement, to negotiate a special relationship with the United States of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, neither party will object."

The Renville Agreement endorsed the Van Mook Line and squeezed the Republican territory into a skeleton; and the U.N. agent, the Committee of Good Offices, was a party to this disintegration. The view that 'Renville saved the Republic' is not at all convincing. True, the Republic was facing overwhelming economic difficulties and could not afford any delay in ending the political stalemate. But the Renville Agreement was based on the Van Mook Line which deprived the Republic of rich food-surplus areas and left to her food-deficit areas. Nor did it terminate the naval blockade which was strangulating the Republic. Hence, it cannot be argued that "Diplomacy on the 'Renville' had robbed Holland of the fruits of her military victory." On the contrary, the Renville Agreement legalised Holland's robbery and the resultant economic crisis in the Republic. The Renville Agreement, it may be argued, saved the Republic further military disasters. To this it may be replied that a military truce was not then unsuitable to Holland's strategy. She perhaps decided to have a respite and consolidate her gains; she would later on resort to a military action, if necessary, and actually did so in December, 1943. Meanwhile, she could ignore the Agreement, stage unfree elections in territories overrun by her and accelerate the formation of a puppet United States of Indonesia; as a matter of fact, she began to do so immediately after the signing of the Renville Agreement.

Sjahriar thought 'that the Renville Agreement had been a bad defeat for the Republic'. Many Republicans were likewise pessimistic; their dissatisfaction with the Renville terms hardened into an opposition to the then Premier Sjarifuddin and produced a cabinet crisis. Sjarifuddin departed; Dr. Md. Hatta became the
next Premier of the Republic. It cannot be denied, however, that the Republican government had accepted the Renville terms simply because it was in a desperate situation. It was afraid of a renewed military campaign by the Dutch, and it was plainly told by the Committee of Good Offices that the Security Council would not be able to provide any effective help in such a contingency. The impotence of the U.N. was shockingly clear. Instead of asserting that the Republic was rescued from a military menace by the Renville Agreement, one could more accurately say that the Republic was blackmailed—and that despite the participation of the U.N. The Republican government, while yielding to Graham’s pressure, was also probably lured by the hope of more resolute U.S. assistance in future in solving the fundamental political problem. Another thought impelling the Republican government to sign the Renville Agreement was that the free plebiscites would work out in its favour.

As to the drafting of the Agreement, although cent per cent clarity could not be ensured because of the shortage of time in the face of a Dutch ultimatum, vagueness surely remained a big loophole through which conflicting interpretations made their way. It could be very well anticipated that the Dutch would exploit this vagueness and harass the Republic.

The Republic’s compromising gestures and eagerness for a timely settlement had been sufficiently revealed in the acceptance of the Renville Agreement. These were also revealed in the execution of the same. As a result of the acceptance of the Van Mook Line evacuation of troops became the burden of solely the Republicans as many advanced Dutch points had behind them Republican military formations. About 25,000 members of the Republican Army had to be evacuated from these ‘pockets’. They moved out in perfect order.
But the paths toward a permanent political settlement concerned proved less easy to explore as these mattered not simply the Republicans but the Dutch as well. The Dutch preferred to delay the settlement as that way lay the financial ruin of the Republic and the possibility of propping up a federal govt. with Dutch patronage so that the Republic would be politically more and more isolated and infirm under the severe impact of all-round separatist movements. That is why as regards the exercise of sovereignty during the interim period the Dutch contention was that the "Indonesian provisional federal government should, under the supreme authority of the Netherlands, be organised step by step and receive its powers only gradually". The Republicans could forecast the ill-wind and refused to be bound by such a proposal. The Linggadjati Agreement had long ago accorded de facto recognition to the Republic which was determined to transfer, during the interim period, the jurisdiction over such function as foreign affairs and defence, not to the Netherlands but to a federal United States of Indonesia. Otherwise she would be drawn to Dutch confines step by step - past steps towards self-government would be undone. Another difficulty of implementing the Renville Agreement centred round financial difficulties but was related to the fundamental question of ad interim sovereignty as well. The Truce Agreement in Article 6 stipulated that 'trade and intercourse between all areas should be permitted as far as possible; such restriction as may be necessary will be agreed upon by the parties with the assistance of the Committee and its representatives if required'. But increase of trade was not appreciable as the provision was not accepted in practice. The economic condition of the Republic became critical owing to acute shortages. The Dutch blockade grew tighter and left no means of alleviation. The Good Offices Committee in its Report of July 22, 1948, referred to foreign occupation and post-war dislocation as the origin.
of the economic blizzard blowing over the Republic but held the Netherlands immediately responsible for failing to implement the Agreement and thereby mitigate the economic hardships of the Republic. The Dutch replied that they had to impose harsh trade regulations only in order to check illicit traffic; they claimed sovereignty in the interim period and consequently the liberty to control trade. The Committee was powerless to resist the mendacious move of the Dutch.

On July 29, the Security Council adopted the Chinese resolution. This too could not solve the vexed question of sovereignty. The Resolution (UN Document S/382) simply instructed both parties to punctiliously abide by the provisions of the Truce Agreement and to head towards the indicated political goal as swiftly as possible. It failed to console the Republic as it also failed to check the Dutch in their colonial ambitions which were intensified with the retreat of the Republic revealed in her bowing down to the Dutch proposals in the Renville negotiation. The same reason which prompted the Republic to accept it underlay the continuing Dutch insincerity and intran- sigence - the fear of a resurgence of the Dutch colonial war banking on the not-very-hidden imperialist sympathies of some leading states. While the Republic had submitted to a drastic reduction of political boundaries and economic resources, the Dutch claimed still more and demanded full ad interim sovereignty. The Dutch could refer to the first of the six additional principles in the Renville Agreement and try to justify their claim. But that would be a perverse interpretation of the Renville Agreement. The Republic and the Netherlands, two sovereign entities, concluded only the Truce Agreement on board the Renville. They also agreed to twelve principles and six additional principles; but - and this is most important - these were only principles to
arrive at a political agreement; these did not constitute a 
finally agreed pact. "In other words, the Republic of Indonesia 
has come to an understanding with the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
to conclude an agreement with the latter to be based on the 
concept of sovereignty of the Netherlands over Indonesia pending 
the establishment of the United States of Indonesia, but before 
the conclusion of the agreement the status of the Republic, may, 
the status of both parties do not in any way change. With regard 
to this, Prof. Graham hit the nail on the head when at the time 
of the signing of the Renville Agreement he said that the 
Republic remained as it had been before: 'You are what you are!' The Dutch hampered negotiations in other ways too. While Hatta, 
on being appointed the Prime Minister, began to pursue a joint 
programme of economic reconstruction and political 
resettlement via the Renville Agreement, the Netherlands 
government 
made a noticeable delay even over appointment of representa-
tives and thereby postponed discussions and negotiations. Add to 
all these the separatist activities, which, championed by Van Mook, were never at an ebb; and the willingness 
of the Dutch to be faithful to the spirit of the U.N. Charter 
becomes an impossibility. Van Mook busied himself in establishing 
a provisional federal govt. with himself at its head. He even 
issued a decree with such intentions as early as March 10, 1948. 
The Republic could not be blamed if she grew sceptical 
of Dutch intentions. And the Dutch were not a whit justified in 
their calculated assaults on the defenceless Republic.

The Republic complained against increasing Dutch 
separatist activities to the Security Council. The outcome was 
the usual passage of a harmless resolution, on February 28, 
moved by China, exhorting the Good Offices Committee to pay 
serious attention to the political developments in Western Java 
and Madura and report to the Council thereon at quick intervals.
But as before the Dutch acted as if there was no U.N. to submit to, no Agreement to abide by. They were determined to destroy the Republic which could be allowed to exist only as a minor part of a Dutch Empire wearing the garb of a Commonwealth. With all energy they began to sponsor an interim federal govt. Thus on January 21, a few days after the signature of the Renville Agreement, Van Mook announced the formation of a state of Madura with Tjakranigrat as the President. This Tjakranigrat came of the ancient ruling family of the island and remained a feudal aristocrat. He was previously appointed the Republic's Resident in Madura and resigned when the Dutch army occupied it. Later it was found out that he made a deal with the Dutch whereby he would be the chief executive of Madura and pledged cooperation with the Dutch Commissioner for Administration ('Recomba'). He then proceeded to help the Dutch Commissioner in conducting a plebiscite inside Madura although a state of siege and war had been declared which debarred the exercise of civil rights. That it was a mockery of a plebiscite was also proved by its being a public one. Although the Dutch wanted to justify their formation of the state by a reference to the democratic procedure of plebiscite, its usefulness was vitiated by its unilateral character, the Republic remaining out of the picture. This was also in violation of the terms of the Renville Agreement as the Committee of Good Offices was not the supervisor and as "freedom of assembly, speech and publication," was not allowed. Further, as the Committee stated while legally the governmental organisation of Madura had been changed from a Residency to a 'Free Madura State' in practice no administrative changes have so far been made.

Van Mook's next target was West Java. A separatist movement had been launched there in March, 1947, with the support of a puppet organisation, the Sundanese People's Party, although
popular support behind it was lacking. Further steps were taken in October, 1947, when the Dutch Administrative Commissioner (Recomba) convened the First West Java Conference. Forty-five Dutch-nominated Indonesian delegatees met in Bandung to decide the way in which West Java could participate now in the central administration and in the establishment of the United States of Indonesia. The Conference then adopted a resolution for setting up a Contact Commission to request the authorities to call a Second West Java Conference.... in order to bring about the establishment of a provisional governing organization of West Java on a democratic basis. The Second West Java Conference took place in December, 1947, attended as usual by the Dutch-nominated delegates, one hundred and fifty-four in number, of whom 42 belonged to communities other than the Indonesian. It adopted a resolution for convening the Third West Java Conference that would set up a representative assembly looking toward a provisional government for the state of West Java. These convocations were contrary to the provisions of the Renville Agreement. But a Dutch decree of February 26 recognised the Third Conference, convened between February 23 and March 5, to be the provisional West Java government. The Republic lodged formal protests to the Dutch authorities, and in a letter, dated March 15, to the Good Offices Committee, the Republican Government referred to Van Mook's letter, dated February 12, 1948, stating that the formation of the provisional federal government was eventually to evolve from the political negotiations between the government of the Republic of Indonesia and the government of the Netherlands. These protests evoked no satisfactory response from either the Dutch or the Security Council or the leading powers. Yet matters for the Netherlands were not all too encouraging as they could not build up any general following in the areas they controlled and over which
they continued to impose a state of war and siege. They had to countenance a strong plebiscite Movement in Western Java sponsored by Republicans and launched on February 1, 1948. Dr. Kusuma Atmaja, the leader of the anti-separatist movement, was requested to form the first cabinet of the puppet West Java state. He refused, as the Dutch formed the state in distinct violation of the Renville Agreement.

The Dutch employed all the powers of the press, police and radio to put down the Plebiscite Movement. They contended that such a movement could not start prior to the conclusion of a final agreement between them and the Republic and they did what was forbidden by the Renville Agreement: suppression of freedom of speech and assembly. The leaders of the Plebiscite Movement could not legally call any meeting, nor could the pro-Republican political parties.

That the Dutch could not succeed in estranging the people from the Republic was reflected in the proceedings of the Third West Java Conference even though of the 100 delegates to this conference 47 were directly appointed by the Dutch and "owing to the disruptions of administration and communication, it had proved impossible to hold elections in many areas," which increased the number of appointed delegates still more. Yet a strong pro-Republican front was built up amongst the delegates and it passionately asserted itself forcing a resolution that not only sought to convert the Conference into a "Provisional Representative Body" of the "Provisional Government" but also provided that "the status of West Java" would be "determined by a plebiscite" according to the terms of the Renville Agreement. However, next day, February 25, the Chairman took steps to adopt a mutilated resolution without the plebiscite clause by disallowing discussions on it. And on the following day the Netherlands Government hastened to approve the resolution that transformed the Third West Java Conference into a Provisional Assembly of
provisional government. The Netherlands government acknowledged finally the birth of a new state, the state of West Java.

In Sumatra too Dr. Van Mook succeeded in installing an administrative organisation needed for a new state. It was largely manned by aristocrats and retired Dutch civilians. The former took this opportunity of enjoying a new lease of life unthinkable under the democratic regime of the Republic. An emergency ordinance was a handy weapon for proclamation of new states when popular sentiments did not permit any show of democratic procedures. This was utilised in East Sumatra and East Java to increase the number of puppet regimes in Indonesia.

A few common features are noticeable in the formation of such states. The atmosphere of liberty was lacking. Untrammelled exercise of basic civil liberties was ruled out by the imposition of a state of war and siege by Dutch authorities who also policed private as well as public meetings. At the same time nowhere did the people take any initiative in setting up new administrations. The Dutch sponsored them and took care to maintain democratic pretensions, but the thin disguise over authoritarian methods could not endure. People coming from Dutch-occupied areas affirmed that in these states real power was concentrated in the hands of the Recomba, the Dutch Commissioner. Lastly, the Dutch always tried to select members of the feudal aristocracy as popular representatives forming the new governments. The days of privilege granted by the Dutch, however temporary, were welcome to them especially as the Republic would not have brooked these privileges.

The Dutch now addressed themselves to the greater task of organising an Interim Federal Government. Hatta expressed the Republic's willingness to join such a government and transfer some important powers to it. This offer of cooperation was undiplomatically rejected by Van Mook on the ground that such an
offer could not be accepted pending a final agreement between the Republic and the Netherlands. Van Mook began to sponsor a non-Republican Interim Federal Indonesian Government to which later on the Republic might be admitted, if at all, as a fossilised fragment. The Republic was treated with the deadliest weapon, i.e., indifference. On March 9, Van Mook declared the formation of this government consisting of a hierarchy of Dutch civil servants assisted by Indonesians could not view with equanimity the Dutch contention bereft of pro-Republican sentiments; and one/that this was an advance towards self-government. The Republican government issued a statement deploring that the structure and function of Van Mook's Provisional Federal Government did not in the least correspond to the Provisional Federal Government which the Renville Agreement had in view. It further said that the newly established government was nothing but a reformed Netherlands Indies Government.

The Dutch plan could be viewed in all its dangerous potentialities with the convocation of the federal conference between May 27 and July 17, 1945, at Bandung, where Van Mook inaugurated the Conference and affirmed: "It did not seem possible to continue waiting for the moment when the Republic would join us: the problems we have to deal with are too urgent and of too great importance to all of us to postpone this conference any longer." This seemed to confirm Republican suspicions regarding the unilateral Dutch plan of forming a federated Indonesia outweighing the Republic's authority. The Republican fears were also rooted in the Dutch contention that "they consider a federation without the Republic in no way an impossibility", and that "the further expansion of the federation goes on." The Conference continued to sit, in spite of Republican protests, and was attended by Dutch-nominated delegates representing 18 non-Republican states.
They were present there "initiated, inspired, abetted" by the Dutch Government, said the Filipino delegate to the Security Council. The Good Offices Committee received protests from the Republic, but it could only report to the Security Council on the new situation and could not itself take, or persuade the Security Council to take, any steps to avert the latent dangers. The Security Council too did not bend to take any action on the report. It was too much interest-ridden for that. And it was only due to the pressure of American and Australian members in the Good Offices Committee that the Belgian member's insistence on shunning any adverse report on Dutch policy could be over-ridden and the Security Council had glimpses of Dutch manoeuvrings through the Committee's report. 79

This Federal Conference, however, did not mean an unblemished triumph for the Dutch. The people in the Dutch-occupied territory strongly expressed their disapproval through their political parties commanding the support of more than 90% of the people in the occupied area. The Republic's influence was markedly felt in the proceedings of the Conference. The Dutch wanted Mr. Hilmen Djayadinigrat to be the Chairman of the Conference; he was defeated by Mr. Adil Puradiredja, the candidate sponsored by the pro-Republican groups. The Conference unanimously decided upon the use of the Indonesian language in the proceedings; this was another symbol of the pro-Republican sympathies of the delegates. The Dutch were also worried by the opposition, firmly voiced in the Conference, to their manoeuvre to set up a United States of Indonesia without the Republic. Mr. A. Z. Abidin, a representative from Borneo, warned cautioned others: "We must remember that the Dutch-Republic..."
negotiations have come to a deadlock. Therefore the regional representatives must be careful and go as close as possible to the aim of the Republican struggle which constitutes the vanguard in the present revolution."

The situation that arose was more than a deadlock and threatened a rupture in Dutch-Indonesian relations. The spell of misunderstanding could only be broken by a bold initiative either from the Security Council or its agent the Committee of Good Offices. Dissensions paralysed the Security Council and the Committee too faced difficulties because of the pro-Dutch affiliations of its Belgian member. It now fell upon the American and Australian members of the Committee, Mr. C. Dubois and Mr. T. Critchley, to take a useful step, and they rose equal to the occasion by submitting a secret working paper, reasonable and practicable. These compromise proposals of June 10, 1948, known as the Dubois-Critchley Plan, "envision a general election throughout Indonesia to elect representatives to a Constitutional Assembly and setting up of a joint commission of technical experts to delineate the future member states. The number of the delegates to the Constituent Assembly from each electoral district will be in proportion to the population of the district such as one delegate for half a million inhabitants. The election will be free and uncoerced as stated in the Renville Agreement. and assurance is made immediately to try those who abuse those principles. The election will be in the form of secret ballot under the observation of the Committee of Good Offices. The Constituent Assembly will also convene a
Provisional Parliament. The Provisional Parliament will form a responsible Provisional Federal Government which in its turn will appoint Premier who will select his cabinet. The Constituent Assembly will draft a constitution for the United States of Indonesia. 84

As in many previous instances the Netherlands failed to strike a spirit of compromise and rejected the plan outright on the framed-up excuse of the leakage of the confidential draft to pressmen. The charge was palpably false. A foreign correspondent in Batavia made it clear to Kahin, 85 the leakage was the work of the Dutch authorities meant to misconstrue their real attitude. The Republic accepted the plan and wanted to follow it as the basis for a more comprehensive settlement; the Netherlands checkmated their intentions. The Republic was prepared to start with the Dubois-Critchley plan; but the Dutch sternly set their face against it. There was a deadlock again which the Security Council did not endeavour to end in spite of repeated notices from the Good Offices Committee regarding its inability to control the dangerous turn of events. There was simply a debate on July 1 in which even the modest Chinese proposal for examining the Dubois-Critchley Plan was thrown down, the U.S.A. opposing it and thereby disillusioning the Indonesians of any U.S. guarantee behind the implementation of the Renville Agreement. The Indonesians ruefully remember that the objective reports of the Committee of Good Offices acquainted the Security Council with how the Dutch were unilaterally setting up puppet regimes in clear violation of the Renville Agreement. "Yet the Security Council did not dare to introduce any measures to check the Dutch in their transgressions." Indonesians had a feeling that the Security Council was failing them. 88

The signing of a truce agreement, of course, only a beginning and always holds mixed potentialities. Much more important and much more difficult are the negotiations toward a lasting political...
political settlement. But the Dutch did not take the truce seriously, and they conducted negotiations in an uncompromising fashion only to gain time for fragmentizing and encircling the Republic politically and immobilizing it financially. They moved troops in such a way as to achieve some military objectives quickly in case they start a military offensive. They completely disregarded the Renville principles as they barbarously massacred the people in Macassar because of the people's pro-Republican sympathies. There "the entire population was confined, several thousands at a time, in an enclosed compound and then shot because the people refused to, or could not, identify Republicans among them who were opposed to Dutch rule. Republicans, moreover, dreaded the early renewal of a military action as they scanned Dutch press reports."

After the failure of the Dubois-Critchley Plan the Good Offices Committee made another attempt. That was another retreat, a higher concession to Dutch demands. Mr. Merle Cochran, the American member of the Committee and the successor of Dubois, submitted oral confidential proposals to the two parties. These proposals were substantially similar to the Dubois-Critchley proposals; but the Cochran proposals were more satisfying to the Dutch as under these proposals elections would follow and not precede the formation of an interim government. Besides, the Dutch were placated by the provision that the constituent states of the proposed federation would have independent militias and that the Netherlands High Commissioner would have the power to veto legislation. The Republic accepted the proposals with some reservations; but the Dutch demands were too high-strung to allow further talks; the proposals died even before these could crystallize into a formal plan.

Indonesians derived quite a few lessons from these after-
growths of the Renville Agreement. The supine acquiescence of the Security Council in the misdeeds of the Dutch made them alarmed; the neglectful policy of the U.S.A. kept them despairing. But there were many Indonesians who would be bold and attempt a surgical operation in search of the mirage of a lasting compromise. They were the Communists who profited from the all-round economic degradation of the people and the political humiliation of the Republican government. They were considerably strengthened when the ex-Premier Sjarifuddin joined them openly; he even claimed that he had been a secret member of the Communist Party of Indonesia for a long time and also when he had been the Premier of the Republic. The return of Musso from the U.S.S.R. after years of exile was another decisive event. Musso was a leader of the Communist Party in the 1920's, one of the ring-leaders of the abortive Communist insurrection of 1926. The Communists had a wily leader in the veteran Musso. At the party conference of August 1948 Musso sponsored a resolution entitled 'The New Road for the Republic of Indonesia', which was adopted. This resolution accorded top priority to armed struggle as the Dutch colonialists were ceaselessly increasing their strength. It unambiguously rejected the Lingadjati and the Renville Agreements.

The Communist Party found it easy to condemn the U.S.A. who was often undiscriminately pro-Dutch and to praise the U.S.S.R. who was more alert in nursing Asian nationalism in the Security Council. The attempts of the U.S.A. to solve the Indonesian problem were often improvident; the wordy support that the U.S.S.R. gave to Indonesian nationalism was practically futile but consistently soothing. In the new world of South East Asia Soviet diplomacy was definitely shaping better. It was clear to everybody that the U.S.A. was the only State who could...
effectively influence Holland to mend her ways. Holland had to spend $1,000,000 per day to maintain the military and naval blockade in the Indies; she was poor primarily because of this imprudence; and the Communists could declare, the USA was lending huge sums to Holland, thereby enabling her to carry on the imperialist gamble. The USA might plead that she was not directly responsible for Holland's militarism in Indonesia. Nobody could deny that; at the same time everybody could affirm that the U.S.A. enjoyed a unique position because of which she would be held guilty even if she was totally inactive on certain matters. There was no doubt that the USA could surely have stopped the Dutch by making an all-out official move and that she had not done it. The USA was worried about the Communist menace in Indonesia, but she did not have the diplomatic vision to forestall it. The Dutch used American-made bombs and bullets in Indonesia; this was the strongest argument of the Communists. As the score for the USA went low in Indonesian eyes, that for the USSR went high automatically, though not always logically. The USSR, too, did not lose sight of her business in Indonesia. She actively fomented a revolution in Indonesia as part of the over-all strategy of insurrection in Asia. That strategy was firmly enunciated and adopted at the historic Calcutta conference of Communist leaders held in February, 1948. This strategy, it should be noted, was not simply the product of the Asian situation. It had a European background; the Marshall Plan evidently closed the door to Soviet expansionism in Western Europe; Soviet Union, therefore, became more active in Asia. The Moscow-directed Calcutta resolution was the signal for Communist uprisings which exploded in Burma, Malaya and Indonesia in the same year (and in India in 1949).

Indonesian Communists were stirred to believe that in the final struggle against Dutch imperialists the Soviet Union would
come to their rescue by undoing the plots of Anglo-American imperialists. Before that, they should make no delay in ousting the Anglo-US hirelings like Sukarno and Hatta and seize power. They struck at the distressed Republican government on September 18, 1948, and captured Medium which was long known to be the 'red city', a communist stronghold. The Republican government acted firmly and promptly in the face of the double disaster of Dutch blockade and civil war and in an unpromising atmosphere of doubts and dissatisfaction. The government troops staged sure-footed movements. Sukarno and Hatta lost no time in enlightening the people on the vile conspiracy tormenting the young Republic. Sukarno appealed to the people that they would have to choose between Musso and his Communist Party, who would frustrate the formation of a free Indonesia, and Sukarno-Hatta who were working for a free Indonesia not dominated by any foreign state. Hatta argued that "Musso once before destroyed our national movement when he incited a rebellion against the Dutch in 1926 without proper and adequate preparation. We must stop Musso from destroying for a second time our hopes for a free Indonesia."

It may be affirmed that the Indonesian Communists got a fertile soil for planting revolutionary ideas primarily because of Dutch obstinacy that produced a prolonged stalemate and aggravated the misery of the people. After the outbreak of the rebellion the Dutch behaved with deplorable malevolence. At first they offered assistance to the Republic; the Republic tactfully rejected the offer; the Dutch were irritated. So/Dutch began to propagate that the Republic was unable to chastise the rebels. This was contradicted by the success of the government troops. Next, the Dutch announced that the Republican government itself had arranged the coup as a stage show in order to deceive the world and hide its own communist leanings. However, these propaganda stunts expired as the communist insurrection began to fade.
The government broke the back of the rebellion within a month even though the last batch of insurgents was arrested in December. It appeared that the rebels were not very well-organised as the onslaughts of Republican troops saw them quickly melting away in the hills and jungles.

With the outbreak of the Medium Coup the point was reached when the Republican government had to demonstrate firmly that it was a government and meant to govern, or it had to get out. The result was patently disastrous for the Communist movement in Indonesia - many top-flight Communist leaders like Musso and Sjarifuddin were dead. The failure of the revolt "destroyed most of the fruits of three decades of difficult and dangerous bering from within by the Indonesian comrades." Correspondingly, the Republic gained prestige and confidence as she convincingly proved her military capacity and administrative efficiency. Without outside help she humbled the Communist pride. The people could repose greater faith in the Republic. Indonesia's nationalist aspirations were matched by the requisite administrative ability.

Formerly, the vacillating U.S. policy of pleasing Indonesians without alienating Holland disgusted the Republic. But the Moscow-manoeuvred insurrection showed that the U.S.S.R. could go much further than the U.S.A. in striking at the Republic. As the insurrection erupted, Moscow radio bemed that the Medium revolt "was a popular uprising against the government of the Fascist Japanese Quislings, Sukarno and Hatta." The Republic felt she had to fear more from the U.S.S.R. than from the U.S.A. At the same time the U.S.A. could note that the Republic was not, as the Dutch would have them believe, a tottering regime headed by incompetent fanatics. She was also cured of the illusion, carefully cultivated by the Dutch, that the Republic's leaders were Communist extremists deserving Anglo-American apathy. "There is reason to believe, therefore, that the ease with which the Republic put down the revolt has disappointed none more than the Dutch authorities." It could be anticipated that the U.S. policy towards Indonesia would be
reoriented. The U.S.A. would perhaps no longer lean strongly towards the Dutch. She would not rely on a rebellious colony controlled by the Dutch. She would prefer a free Indonesia functioning as the eastern flank of a South Asia anti-Communist arc.

The Dutch were disappointed more as they contrasted the ability of the Republic to crush the Madiuja Putsch to their own failure to check widespread revolt in territories occupied by harassed by popular resistance movements inspired by them. The Dutch were constantly/pro-Republican sentiments. Clashes between the local people and the Dutch soldiers were continuously straining the Dutch administration; casualties were high; Dutch officers were sometimes murdered by the people. The people were so much animated by the pro-Republican spirit that in Modjokerto they defied the Dutch ban on the use of Republican currency; they refused to use Dutch currency in a Dutch-controlled territory; the Dutch must have thought the Republic was winning a battle without even directly participating in it. The people in Dutch-occupied territories were antagonized as the Dutch insolently violated the Renville Agreement and suppressed freedom of speech and expression. They bravely celebrated the 3rd Anniversary of the Republic in spite of Dutch prohibition, while they boycotted Queen Wilhelmina's birthday and Queen Juliana's Coronation ceremonies. The most serious challenge to Dutch authority came from the Dutch Darul Islam movement in the Dutch-sponsored West Java State (Negara Paundan). This movement, supported by Moslem religious teachers, aimed at the establishment of a Moslem State; the movement was backed up by an army that often menaced Dutch military strongholds. This army could easily take to guerilla activities and Dutch military operations against it repeatedly failed. Republicans were afraid the continued tension in the Dutch territories and the mounting frustration of the Dutch might provoke them "to destroy the Republic, the symbol and the inspiration of the people's fight for total freedom in the Dutch-occupied territory."

That the Dutch would ultimately use force was clear from what Vag-Mook stated to a Pakistan Times correspondent in July, 1948; the
Dutch were getting constant appeals from the people in Republican territories to come to their help, said Van Book; obviously he was trying to catch hold of the familiar imperialist excuse and justify armed intervention in the Republican territory. The Dutch did not rely on negotiations as the most important instrument for achieving their objective. But they did not completely break off negotiations with the Republic as they had to mark time for renewing the military offensive. They were also beguiling world public opinion that they stood for peaceful negotiations. The U.N., working (rather unsteadily) to wake up a sleeper from sweet dreams to cruel reality, could expect little gratitude from Hollanders. Hollanders did not pin their faith in the Committee of Good Offices. They doubted its impartiality. Van Mook even told a Straits Times correspondent that the U.N. was one of the chief impediments to the formation of a well-organized Indonesia.

Dr. Beel, too, who succeeded Van Mook as the Governor of the Netherlands East Indies, had no reverence for the Committee. The Committee was bypassed by the Dutch who started direct negotiations with the Republic. The Dutch pretended that the Committee did not exist; the Committee had to act and show that it was not a disembodied ghost; but it stood motionless. It was haughtily announced by the Dutch on December 11, 1948, that at that stage negotiations under the guardianship of the Committee were futile. Dr. Hatta wanted to break the imbroglio. On December 13, he solicited Mr. Cochran's help in reopening negotiations and put forward a number of proposals. Mr. Cochran transmitted those proposals to the Dutch. In these Hatta went a humiliating distance to meet the Dutch - it was one more page in the long story of never-ending concessions offered by the Republic. Hatta conceded that the Netherlands High Representative for the Crown (or the High Commissioner) would have a veto power over acts of the interim federal government; he was also prepared to grant emergency powers to the High Representative in a state of war, siege or insecurity. He even gave the High Representative the right to decide when
extraordinary powers were to be exercised, and only requested that "certain standards be laid down to govern the High Representative's decision" to exercise emergency powers or the veto power.

These were far-reaching concessions—a pitiable surrender and a sign of the progressive deterioration in the bargaining power of the Republic. But the Dutch remained roisteringly adamant—they insisted that Republican proposals must exactly chime with their own economic necessities and political prejudices. The Dutch replied to Hatta's note on December 17; they demanded that the Republic must agree to enjoy the same status as other puppet territories in the contemplated federation, to grant unlimited powers to the Netherlands High Representative, to allow the Dutch troops to move anywhere in the country. The Dutch reply gruffly demanded a quick answer from the Republic—within eighteen hours. The Republic naturally could not satisfy an eighteen-hour ultimatum. The Dutch had sent the reply to Mr. Cochran who could not but admit that his position and the obligations it implied, did not entitle him to "press Dr. Hatta to reply summarily to the conditions imposed by your telegram because it calls for a non-negotiated blanket assent which would preclude the possibility of bonafide negotiations rather than effect their resumption". On December 13, Hollanders terminated the Renville Truce Agreement and restored freedom of action formally (informally this was done long ago). They communicated their decision to Mr. Cochran who was then in Djakarta; other members of the Good Offices Committee were at that time in the Republican territory, Kaliurang. Mr. Cochran received the news at 11:30 p.m.; the Republican delegate in Djakarta got it at 11:45 p.m. Neither he nor Mr. Cochran could communicate it to the Republican government or the other members of the Committee since Jogjakarta lay isolated; the Dutch had boorishly destroyed all communication links. The Dutch did not let the Republican government know their fateful decision till they bombed Jogjakarta airfield on December 19.
After the termination of the first military action the Dutch fell into a state of cannibal despair, as apparent from their arrogant utterances inside or outside the U.N. Now they impatiently pushed forward.

The second Dutch Military Action had begun. Dutch troops marched upon and captured the Republican capital. They storm simultaneously key-points in Java and Sumatra. It was a sudden attack and an all-out attack. The Dutch planes, using rocket-fires, steadily bombed Republican cities and streets. Mobile forces and para-troops combined to ravage republican territories and hamstring all lines of communication. They atrophied all organised resistance—especially because the Republic was caught unprepared. The Republicans could not anticipate, with the formation of an international federation still under consideration and the Good Offices Committee still on the soil of Indonesia, such an avalanche attack. In a few days the Dutch tore away main cities from the Republic and seized centres of communication. Arrests followed—Indonesian representatives at Djakarta were arrested; so were national leaders like Sukarno, Sjahrir, Hatta & Salim. Nehru's plane was scheduled to take Sukarno on a goodwill trip to India on the same day when he was arrested in his Presidential Palace. The whole Republic was in convulsions. "With unheard-of treachery, the Dutch launched a sneak attack."127

The Dutch military action stifled the Republican government and terrorised its people. It defied the U.N. decision and violated the Truce Agreement. It shocked the conscience of the outside world. But the Security Council remained almost idle. The Dutch took a perfectly well-timed shot for the Christmas holidays intervened to disable the U.N. The Republican appeal could not induce the Security Council to review the Indonesian issue. The American representative to the Security Council quickly responded to Republican feelings. On December 20, 1948, he pleaded for an emergency meeting of the Security Council to discuss the Indonesian question.
On December 22 the U.S.A., Syria and Colombia laid down a draft resolution before the Security Council urging upon the parties "to cease hostilities forthwith; and immediately to withdraw their armed forces to their respective sides of the demilitarised zones" as provided for in the Roville Truce Agreement. The Resolution could not secure the required majority for many States opposed it on different grounds. Argentina and China disapproved of the provision concerning withdrawal of troops; Soviet Russia and Ukraine condemned the resolution as too weak; but France and Belgium fanatically asserted that the Security Council had no jurisdiction in the issue. The U.S.S.R. moved a fresh resolution parts of which were acceptable to many members. It sought to issue certain specific directions to the Security Council and also to set up a Commission of the Security Council. But this also failed to secure the required majority. On the same day, i.e. on December 24, the USA, Syria and Colombia submitted another proposal that was carried. This Security Council Resolution called upon the parties "(a) to cease hostilities forthwith; and (b) immediately to release the President and other political prisoners arrested since December 18." The Resolution further instructed "the Committee of Good Offices to report to the Security Council fully and urgently." But the Dutch turned their back upon the Resolution and did not slow down the pace of their advances into the Republican territory. In some areas, for example in Java, military operations, as stated by the Netherlands representative on December 27, were practically at an end. This representative complacently announced to the Security Council on the same day that the Netherlands Government was giving "serious attention" to the U.N. resolution. It was clear that the Security Council must resort to further moves if the Dutch were to be restrained. It adopted two resolutions on December 28 — one Chinese and
SECOND MILITARY ACTION (ADDITIONAL NOTES)

1. "The pact of Linggadjati! The Dutch signed that pact. They signed that pact with their pen. But they did not sign that pact with their heart. Again and again, they made and brought forward their own interpretation, which deviates from the text and from the minutes of the discussion about the articles of the agreement itself." Sukarno's Independence Day Speech, 1948.

2 Sukarno said: "It was just that rupture of Linggadjati, that infringement of the internationally accepted Agreement, that in one breath, placed the Indonesian question right in the middle of the international political forum." Republican Review, September 1, 1949, p.28.


The New York Times conjectured editorially that Dutch military operations might produce revolutionary developments. The people of South East Asia might try to set up a South East Asia Federation in order to free themselves from colonialism, July 26, 1947, p. 12.

The New Statesman and Nation could guess: "Very properly, the British Government has again offered its services as a mediator; but it is most unlikely that the offer will be accepted." July 26, 1947, p.61.

3 The Hindu, July 29, 1947.

4 Documents, RIIA (Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1947-48, p.746.


6 Coast observes: "...Indonesia's whole case was that this was an international problem that must properly be referred to the United Nations." Recruit to Revolution, p. 51.

7 Indonesian leaders never rejected the offers brusquely. Thus, on August 7, Premier Sjarifuddin, in a Note to the U.S. Government, expressed reluctance to accept sole U.S. good offices urging the U.S.A. to try to set up a U.N. Arbitration Commission. See Facts on File, 1947, p.245. John Coast is mistaken when he says that Sjahrrir rejected the offer; Sjahrrir was not the Premier at that time. Coast, op. cit., p.51.

8 The Hindu, July 31, 1947.

This is also the view of experts who are not Indonesians or Asians. "The European colonial powers (Britain, France and Belgium) tended to support the Dutch view, although the British made several attempts to mediate." J.C. Campbell and the Research Staff - The United States in World Affairs - 1947-48. Published for the Council of Foreign Relations by Harper & Bros. 1948, p.223.

"It was an unreasonable proposal", comments the New Statesman & Nation, "these states i.e., East Indonesia and Borneo do not officially come into existence according to the Linggadjati Agreement, until the United States of Indonesia is formed, and meanwhile the Dutch and the Indonesians are equal partners in the Agreement." August 23, 1947, p.142.

Van Mook, therefore, is disregarding facts as he says: As for the United States and the United Kingdom, both were certainly influenced by the desire to ward off Soviet accusations and to avoid every semblance of critical opposition concerning the demands of Asiatic nationalism." SDSEA, p.253. Italics mine.

"The impression that he i.e., Sjahriy made on the Security Council was tremendous and, fortunately for Indonesia, enduring." Coast, op.cit., p.51.
"Sjahrir, modest, disarming, eloquent, was the first Indonesian to address a world audience...... His speech was the highlight of the Security Council. His intellectual brilliance and political insight provided a sharply focused picture of a complex situation." Woodman, op.cit., pp.238-239.

All these undoubtedly disprove the Dutch contention that the Republic was led by a gang of self-seeking extremists.

21 The "greatest grievance" of Dutchmen "was against the attitude of Australia," says Van Mook, SDSEA, p.252.

22 Sukarno's radio speech on July 24, 1947.

23 Kahin rightly emphasises this fact (it is not a false accusation made by Republicans): "The Dutch halted their drive on the Republican capital of Jogjakarta, but they did not cease forward operations. Their spearheads advanced laterally to encircle large islands of by-passed Republican forces and then converge inwards on them to obliterate them, an activity euphemistically referred to by the Dutch as 'mopping up operations'. In addition, in a number of critical areas Dutch forces continued to advance further forward into what remained of Republican-controlled territory." NRI, p.216.

22A According to H.S.Bloch, this is one of the many cases to prove the insistence of the Security Council "that all possibilities of prevention must first be exhausted" before the employment of enforcement measures. Annual Review of United Nations Affairs, 1949, p.162.

24 Van Mook, 'Indonesia and the Problem of South East Asia,' Foreign Affairs, July 1949.


26 U.N.,Doc.S/526 II

27 W.M.Jordan has nicely analysed the need for Committees and Commissions set up by the Security Council: Annual Review of United Nations Affairs, pp.126-27


29 Ibid, p.4
31 SDSFA, pp.238-40
34 Report of the Security Council, October 27, 1947
35 Official Records of the Security Council, 2nd year, no.102
38 Ibid
38 Kahin, op.cit., p.220. Kahin adduces the most convincing
evidence as to how far the Dutch were carrying out the cease­
fine order. He quotes the despatch of U.P.correspondent Arnold
Beckmann who wrote that the Dutch were openly violating the
Security Council's cease-fire resolution; Arnold Beckmann
and some other correspondents were at that time touring
Indonesia. Ibid.
39 'Statement of Senator Graham on the Indonesian Situation',
Congressional Record - U.S.Senate, April 5, 1949, p.3922.
40 Wolf, op.cit., p.187.
41 Statement of Senator Graham, op.cit., p.3922
42 U.N.Doc.S/649
43 Fischer, op.cit., pp.104-5.
44 Sastroamidjojo and Delson, op.cit., pp.45-56; RIIA Documents
46 Fischer, op.cit., p.106
47 Prime Minister Sjarifuddin's memorandum to the Security
48 Fischer, op.cit., p.106
49 Coast, op.cit., p.90

The Editorial Comment in the New York Times, January 16,
1948, was: "...we believe the judgment of history will be
that the Republicans made more concessions to their legitimate
aspirations for independence than did the Dutch in their
desire to hold on to a rich colony...."
The following comment was made by Hon. L.H. Smith in the U.S. House of Representatives on June 18, 1948: "The main reason why the Republic of Indonesia agreed to the disadvantageous terms of the truce and the Renville Agreement was because the Indonesians looked to the U.N., and specifically to the U.S.A. (which is one of the nations represented on the Committee of Good Offices), to assist in the achievement of a political settlement between the Republic and the Netherlands." Merdeka - No. 38, July 15, 1948 - published by Indonesian Information Service, New Delhi.


RIIA (i.e., Royal Institute of International Affairs) Documents for 1947-48, p. 752.


U.N. Doc.S/833

Prof. Dr. Supomo, 'Dutch sovereignty in Indonesia', Merdeka, July 25, 1948, p. 6.


U.N. Doc.S/786


Wolf, op. cit., p. 109

U.N. Doc.S/729

Ibid

Ibid

U.N. Doc.S/787
69 Ibid
70 Ibid
71 Ibid
73 The New York Times, February 16, 1948
74 The New York Times, March 10, 1948
75 Merdeka, March 22, 1948, p.4 - Indonesian Information Service, New Delhi.
76 Ibid
77 U.N. Doc. S/842
78 Ibid
79 Ibid
80 Merdeka, July 25, 1942, p.3 - Indonesian Information Service, New Delhi.
81 Ibid
82 Ibid, pp.3-4
83 "Graham's successor in Indonesia, Coert Dubois, joined with his fellow committee man from Australia, Thomas Critchley, in genuine attempts to give the U.N. the full truth of the Indonesian situation and to encourage amicable settlement between the disputants." Christian Century, October 13, 1948.
84 Merdeka, July 5, 1948, pp.2-3 - Indonesian Information Service, New Delhi.
85 Kahin, op.cit., p.249
87 Merdeka, July 5, 1948, p.3 - Indonesian Information Service, New Delhi.
88 Ibid
L.E. Smith of Wisconsin made the following remark in the U.S. House of Representatives on June 18, 1948: "Latest reports from Indonesia indicate that the outlook for a quick settlement is not hopeful and neutral observers attribute the difficulties to the recalcitrance of the Dutch." Cited in Merdeka, July 15, 1948, Indonesian Information Service, New Delhi.


Ibid, p.2

"According to De Waarheid of July 2, the Dutch troops in Indonesia have been supplied with new weapons, and the medical section are preparing for military action. UPA's report (July 16) from The Hague said, 'A new Dutch offensive in Indonesia is imminent according to Dutch press reports which say Dutch troops are ready to resume hostilities in Indonesia while military equipment and the Navy are being prepared.'" De Waarheid of the same date quoted the then Dutch Minister of Home Affairs, Mr. Witterman, who said: "... the latest developments in Indonesia have increased the fear that a day will come when a renewal of military action will become necessary." Merdeka, July 25, 1948, p.5 - Indo. Inf. Service, New Delhi.

Some aspects of the staggering economic problem may be indicated: "The threat of renewed fighting is keeping workers unsettled and production down. Investors are slow to spend money to repair properties damaged during the Japanese occupation or during last year's fighting between the Dutch and the Republican Army." News Bulletin, No.35, October 4, 1948, p.3 - Indo. Inf. Service, New Delhi.

1. One of the main problems facing the Republic is the food problem. The food supply in the Republic before the
Military action was sufficient. The 1947 crop was estimated at 6.5 million tons of paddy as compared with 5.2 millions the year before. But it is still less than the pre-war production of 8.8 million tons.

"2. The second problem is the supply of clothing. Conditions are very bad in so far as that only a maximum of 10% of the total requirement can be met by domestic production."


"Dr. Ali (Sastroamidjojo) is my authority for saying that Sjarifuddin was a secret member of the Communist party during his six months' term as prime minister and defence minister. He had this information from Sjarifuddin himself."

Fischer, op.cit., p.108.


D.L.Schorr, Ibid: "From the moment of Musso's arrival events moved fast...."

D.N.Aidit, 'A short history of the Communist Party of Indonesia', p.27.

Ibid, p.28

Ibid, p.30

"....step by step in its struggle for independence Indonesia had encountered a hostile, or at best unhelpful attitude on the part of the United States Government." Christian Century, October 13, 1948.


Washington Post commented: "....the conviction grew that Marshall Plan aid to the Netherlands meant the United States was anxious to see the Dutch retain economic and political control of the Indies to safeguard Holland's future," Cited in Merdeka, Ibid, p.8.
"The hard reality of the situation, however, is that Jaiffe's success is impotent to act until Washington changes its policy. So long as the United States continues to support colonial powers in their suppression of the freedom of indigenous peoples, there is little that the U.N. can do." Christian Century, October 13, 1948.

"... an Associated Press despatch from Batavia on September 19 quoted John Coast, British adviser to the Republic's Foreign Office, as saying that Sjarifuddin told him at the time he went over to the Communists: '... I do not think the Americans have any intention of supporting a joint solution (of the Dutch-Indonesian controversy). The Russians are our only hope.' The same despatch quoted Mr. Coast as saying that the upsurge of communism in Indonesia is the result of popular disillusionment with United States policy toward the Republic." Cited in News Bulletin, No.98, October 31, 1948 - Indonesian Information Service, New Delhi.

Radio Speech of September 19, 1948.


San Francisco Chronicle, September 2, 1948, expressed the same opinion - "...Dutch obstinacy forced the Communists to the decision." Cited in News Bulletin, No.93, September 27, 1948, p.4 - Indonesian Information Service, New Delhi.


Ibid

As a matter of fact, the Dutch sometimes hindered the efforts of the Republic to quell the rebellion. "On October 6 about 50 insurgents with full equipment crossed the status quo line north of Magelang, thus escaping from the pursuing Republican troops. The Republican commander's request to the Dutch to hand over the insurgents was bluntly turned..."
"Although the Communists were obviously preparing some type of anti-Government action later on, the Madiun Putsch of September 1948 was an indisciplined local insurrection by a local Communist hot-head rather than a centrally planned operation. Almost all of the Communist leaders were on tour preparing for a party Congress set for October and not in Madiun when it broke." Andrew Roth, Indian News Chronicle, December 27, 1949.


This was reported by a member of the Secretariat of the U.N. Committee of Good Offices - Kahin, NRI, p.294.

Ibid, p.4: "Other reports reveal that the number of incidents in the Dutch occupied territories of Banjumas, Central Java, have been on the increase. Reports of clashes between the local populace and Dutch soldiers have been constant, especially at Tjilatjap, the big port on the South Coast of Java."


Merdeka, September 15, 1948, p.3 - Indonesian Information Service, New Delhi.
"In their repudiation of the Renville Truce Agreement, the Netherlands have thus not fulfilled the requirements of Article 10 of the Truce Agreement." "... no notice of the repudiation of the Truce Agreement has reached the Government of the Republic of Indonesia in Jogjakarta." Report of the Committee of Good Offices dated 19.12.48 - Press Release SC/820 - U.N., Department of Public Information, Press & Publications Bureau, Lake Success, New York - December 20, 1948.

A cable from the Committee of Good Offices, Ibid.

B. A. Uban, an Indonesian diplomat, rightly concluded that for the Netherlands "all negotiations conducted and agreements concluded were only factors for gaining time to organise a military offensive, a political strangulation, or economic strangulation as the case may be." 'The Indonesian Question Reviewed', United Asia, December 1948.

The New York Times (Editorial, December 20, 1948) spoke strangely, justifying as well as condemning the Dutch action: "If the present campaign is finally successful, the Indonesian Republic is to be incorporated into the new state. Since such a solution has always been considered
by impartial observers as the best for all concerned, and since the pledges are made by a government which stands in the forefront among democracies, there is no reason to question its good faith or deny sympathetic consideration for its motives and explanations. But that cannot diminish the shock and regret that will be felt everywhere over the fact that the Netherlands Government has unilaterally abrogated all previous agreements and has taken recourse to the arbitrament of arms to impose its own solution on the nationally most conscious part of Indonesia."

127 Said Sumitro, Indonesian Minister of Foreign Trade and Finance. He also said: "The fact that the Dutch were able to capture Republican leaders was due to the fact that our government believed that negotiations were still going on." New York Times, December 20, 1948.

128 U.N.Doc. S/1142

129 U.N.Doc.S/1148

130 Royal Institute for International Affairs, Documents for 1947-48, p.754.

131 Ibid

"There is a lesson for the United States in the tragic happenings in progress now in Indonesia. The present United States support of the Republic of Indonesia in the Security Council comes eighteen months too late. Had the United States taken a similar stand at the time of the first Dutch police action against the Republic in July, 1947, there might now be peace in the Indies instead of war." New York Times, Editorial, December 31, 1948.


133 Ibid

134 U.N.Doc.S/1162

The Dutch expressed a mock surprise over the report of the Committee of Good Offices to the Security Council, dated December 19, 1948. They submitted a memorandum on December 21 taking issue with some of the conclusions contained in the report of the Committee. The memorandum denied the contention of the Committee that the formation by the Dutch of an interim federal government without the participation of the Republic "would complicate negotiated settlement and might create serious unrest in Indonesia", and that this would increase the possibility of large-scale hostilities. The opening days of the year 1949 saw the Dutch enthusiastically concluding their military operations which had begun on December 19, 1948. But this violent enterprise did not end the confusion in Indonesia, nor could it lead to a permanent settlement commendable to the Netherlands. From the beginning of the new year, attempts were made at different levels to settle the Indonesian issue: India tried to bring the pressure of Asian opinion to bear upon it; the Indonesian nationalists combined the tactics of guerrilla warfare with the strategy of noncooperation; the Dutch for a time continued to negotiate with non-Republican elements and would not abandon the fixed path; and there was the Security Council to resume its interminable debates and discussions.

Pandit Nehru declared his intention to convene an Afro-Asian Conference on the Indonesian situation and issued invitations to different countries. Ultimately 20 States participated in the Conference, Turkey being the only State which declined the invitation. These were: India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Nepal, Siam, Philippines, Nationalist China, Persia, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt, Abyssinia, Australia, New Zealand and Indonesia. Of course, some of them hesitated to send representatives and decided to despatch observers only. - Nationalist China, Nepal, New Zealand and Siam.
The Conference took place at Delhi from January 20 to January 23 and recorded the "conviction of the countries taking part that certain principles of freedom and self-determination must now decide the relations between Eastern and Western countries." While the Conference stressed the immediate restoration of conditions prior to the Dutch military action, it never lost sight of the ultimate aim of total elimination of colonialism. Some even thought of sanctions by the Asian countries against the Dutch under certain circumstances. The Conference condemned the role of the Dutch in Indonesia as repugnant to the principles of the U.N. Charter, as superseding the claims of Indonesian nationalism and endangering world peace. It made some recommendations to the Security Council. These included: (a) The Republican leaders should be released immediately and unconditionally; (b) The Netherlands should withdraw troops from the Residency of Jogjakarta immediately and from all other territories of the Republic by March 15, 1949; (c) All territories under the authority of the Republican government prior to the Second Dutch Military Action should be restored to it; (d) The Dutch should withdraw the economic blockade; (e) An interim government consisting of representatives from Republican and non-Republican territories should be established before March 15, 1949; (f) Elections to an all-Indonesia Constituent Assembly must be arranged before October 1, 1949; (g) Transfer of Power over the whole of Indonesia must take place at a date not later than January 1, 1950.

It is true that this "was an issue on which Asian unity could be taken for granted." For "none of the Asian Conference countries was dependent either on the Dutch or on Dutch interests in Indonesia and all of them could oppose the Netherlands without fear of adverse consequences political or economic for themselves..." But it is not correct to state, as the writer does, that...
opposing the Dutch would not evoke the antipathy of the big powers like the U.S.A., Russia and Britain - because the USA and the UK, at least, were linked up with Holland by the common objective of a crusade against Communism. Yet the Conference ended without providing for any strong action by Asian countries against a possible repetition of the Dutch aggressive moves.

The Security Council might or might not accept the recommendations of the Conference. It might or might not enforce them even after acceptance. No joint action was envisaged by the Conference in these eventualities. Thus, the expectation that there might be created 'a new focus of power in the world' did not materialise. At the same time the Conference was a warning to the Netherlands - "a serious affair" according to the official Socialist paper Het Wrije Volk. In spite of all limitations it must be recognised that the Conference tended to swing western opinion to the view that "'Asia for the Asiatists' is a sound principle. If we believe in democracy for ourselves we must believe it for others". Lastly, it was a personal triumph for Mr. Nehru, India's Prime Minister, and it was even held that the U.S.A. should "enter into intimate consultation" with him on the Indonesian situation. The Soviet Union, feeding Asian sentiments at the U.N. so energetically, lost her restraint on this occasion. Radio Moscow attacked the Conference on Indonesia as 'an Anglo-American scheme to aid Western domination'. The Union would placate Asian opinion only so long as it suspicion of Western diplomats, that the Soviet/did not have the dangerous potentiality of forming a centre of power independent of Soviet control, was confirmed.

Meanwhile, the Republican resistance to the Dutch offensive, never quite weak, was growing. The Republican Army, mechanically much inferior to the opponent, was tactful not to offer any frontal resistance. It relied on a protracted guerilla warfare combining it with a scorched earth policy. The Dutch had rejoiced too soon over the occupation of Jokjakarta; the
the Republican troops withdrew to the mountains but returned to the lost capital every night. The Dutch army was too small to occupy vast areas; they felt flattered by the fact that they gained control of the main cities; but the large territories outside those cities were under the Republic’s authority. The first shock of the groveling attack had been terrible; and then the morale of the Republican troops made the difference between defeat and survival. As time passed it was revealed that the Republic’s military machine had been much improved since the first military action. The military administration and the territorial commands were already unified (they had not been so unified during the first military action). By means of a persistent guerilla warfare the Republican soldiers tried to retain control over an entire area while they did not mind losing control over single cities; they had, of course, to resist the temptation of defending such important cities as Jokjakarta; but their strategy was paying; the Dutch-held cities were like so many pockets in areas controlled by the Republic.

Not to speak of tanks, planes and motorised units with which the Dutch army was heavily equipped, even the minimum arms required for the guerillas could not be supplied by the Republic; sometimes homemade grenades were the only weapons of most of the guerillas. Republicans, in order to obtain arms and ammunition, organised successful raids on Dutch supplies. The Republican troops had also to face the pressing problems of food and clothing. These could be solved and guerilla operations carried on primarily because of a very real unity between the troops and the people. The successful story of Republican guerilla warfare was thus largely one of successful cooperation between the army and the people. In fact, the army was only a part of the gigantic battle waged by the people of Indonesia. Their heroic resistance was the uninhibited response of the entire nation to a challenge suited to bring out the best in it. Village women organised special kitchens for army units stationed in one area. Often the villagers
paid a part of their taxes in foodgrains which they set apart for army consumption. The people did not lose their morale even though their leaders had been imprisoned. In many cities occupied by the Dutch the people arranged to collect rates and taxes payable to the Republican government and passed them on to the Republican officials just outside the city. They sometimes refused to accept anything except the Republican currency and the Dutch were on the rocks. Dutch administration in occupied cities was paralysed by sustained non-cooperation of the people including the civil officers. The exemplary conduct of the Sultan of Jogjakarta, splendidly lonely in his remote palace, stimulated the popular morale. He plainly refused the headship of a special territory organised by the Dutch; he also refused to confer with the enemies of the Republic.

Impatient and indignant, the Dutch troops resorted to terrorist tactics. Indiscriminate bombing and strafing killed scores of non-combatants. At night they raided the houses of innocent civilians; they would sometimes disguise themselves as Indonesians in order to loot and murder; they also utilised gangsters among Indonesians for oppressing the helpless public. But it was impossible to subdue popular spirit by these brutal methods; and the Dutch would learn it only from their failure. Public sentiments were aroused more as popular leaders and intellectuals like Dr. Santoso and Mr. Hendromartono were killed by Dutch terrorists. The lightning success of the Dutch at the beginning of the military action and the quick occupation of Jogjakarta was rather misleading; the Republic was much greater than Jogjakarta and much more than a group of people; the Republic personified the ideal of freedom of all Indonesians. The nationalist machine, badly damaged by the Second Military Action, seemed to move by secret springs and with mysterious efficiency. No amount of military force or propaganda could destroy it. On January 1, 1949, General Spoor announced that he would be able
to crush the guerillas within approximately three months. It rang hollow in the face of growing Republican resistance. New recruits continuously increased the strength of the guerillas. The guerillas constantly received whole-hearted cooperation from the people in Dutch-occupied areas; at the same time the people non-cooperated with Dutch administrators and sabotaged their plans. Consequently, there was no peace and tranquillity in areas occupied by the Dutch; the Dutch failed to maintain law and order and their troops became lawless looters; still they clasped the pathetically false argument that they were protecting the Republic against lawlessness. The savage despairing barbarities of the Dutch after the second military action forever debased the Dutch.

The Queen of the Netherlands tried to justify the second military action (in a broadcast speech) as a check on lawlessness. Her loyal representative in the Security Council, Dr. Van Royen, used the hackneyed argument of Republican lawlessness when, on January 7, the Council reopened discussion on the Indonesian situation. Van Royen also placed a time-table for the transfer of power in Indonesia. Perhaps this was more due to the dismal realisation by the Dutch that they had underrated the Republic's strength and less to a desire for creating a favourable world opinion. Van Royen said (a) that the transfer of sovereignty would be effected in 1950; (b) but elections would be held 4 to 6 months earlier; and (c) within a month, i.e., within February, 1949, the interim federal government would be established. Whatever good impression was created by this plan vanished as soon as the members of the Council came to know the inhuman condition of the imprisoned Republican leaders from a report of the Committee of Good Offices, dated January 17, 1949. The pitiable condition of the interned Republicans was one compelling reason why the Security Council shortly moved to take a stiffer stand. There were others too. In 1949 there was a change in the composition of the Security Council. Three of the non-permanent members,
Belgium, Colombia, Syria, gave way to Norway, Egypt and Cuba. Clearly it was a loss to Holland as Belgium had to depart. It was again to the world organisation as there would be less obstruction to its taking a strong step. A third factor inducing the Security Council to take a firm attitude was the strong recommendations of the Afro-Asian Conference on Indonesia held at Delhi. The U.S., Cuban, Chinese and Norwegian representatives in the Security Council moved a synoptic resolution on January 21, 1949; this was passed on January, 28. It called for (a) the immediate and unconditional release of the political prisoners taken by the Dutch since December 17, 1948; (b) the discontinuance of military operations on the part of the Dutch and of guerrilla warfare on the part of the Republic; (c) the reinstatement of the Republican Government in Jogjakarta; (d) the opening of negotiations between the two parties on the basis of the Linggadjati and Renville Agreements and the Cochran proposals of September, 1948, with a view to (i) the formation of an interim federal government by March 15, 1949, (ii) holding elections to a Constituent Assembly by October 1, 1949, (iii) the transfer of sovereignty by July 1, 1950. To the Republicans "the most doleful feature of the resolution is that the Dutch are not going to respect it." This was natural as the Netherlands Foreign Minister, Mr. Stikker, had already condemned the proposed resolution as an unnecessary outside interference based on a misconception of the South East Asian situation; it would actually hinder the settlement of the issue, said Mr. Stikker. The Dutch reaction hovered between lukewarmness and direct opposition. Their representative in the Security Council pointed out prosaically that the Netherlands would carry out the Council's resolution only so far as it did not contradict her exclusive responsibility 'for the maintenance of real freedom and order in Indonesia'. The U.N., however, ought to have acted more vigorously to close the confidence gap
that separated it from the smaller nations. It was perhaps too much to expect, in view of the past performance, that the Security Council would prescribe definite means for enforcing its resolution. But the resolution did not even fulfill a minimum requirement, i.e., the evacuation of Dutch troops from Republican areas overrun after the second military action. Of course, the Security Council did something more than passing this resolution. It took the significant step of setting up the United Nations Commission for Indonesia (briefly, UNCI), which replaced the Committee of Good Offices and was vested with greater powers. Membership remained the same as in the Committee of Good Offices - the old members, Australia, Belgium and the United States, were still there. There was a welcome change in the process of decision-making; decisions could be reached by majority agreements; deadlocks would be easier to avoid as unanimity was no longer required. It was a step forward, said Hatta. This Commission was to assist in "the earliest possible restoration of the civil administration of the Republic." It would help in the negotiations between the parties and the implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council. It was empowered to issue recommendations to the Republic, the Netherlands, and also the Security Council.

It was fatuous to think that the Dutch policy would evolve at a short notice into a less belligerent one. Yet, with deepening pique, Holland sensed the futility of relying on force alone. Her military position began to deteriorate and by the end of January, 1949, the military initiative was wrested by the Republican army. The miraculous leadership of Nasution in Java and Hidajat in Sumatra enabled Republicans to launch a mighty counter-offensive. She had to open negotiations lest her bargaining power should dwindle further due to a military disaster. On February 26, the Netherlands government signified its intention not only to
facilitate the transfer of sovereignty but also to shorten the
time-limits prescribed by the Security Council for that purpose. The
Netherlands government expected the inauguration of the United
States of Indonesia much earlier than July 1, 1950, i.e., the date
stipulated in the Security Council resolution of January 28. It
declared that a Round Table Conference would be held at the Hague
on March 12 to consider the ways and means for the earliest
possible transfer of sovereignty. The Conference would deal with
the establishment of a Netherlands-Indonesian Union, arrangements
for the intervening period, and the formation of an interim
federal government. This plan, known as Beel's plan, further
envisaged that the Hague Conference would be able to conclude its
work by May 1 so that the final transfer of sovereignty could be
accomplished by July 1, 1949. A careful analysis shows Beel's
plan to be a part of the tactics of planned bewilderment: Holland
staged menacing troop movements while speaking of negotiations;
she talked of negotiations which were to be conducted in such
a way as to make the proposals unacceptable to the Republic.
According to Beel's plan, the Conference would not be held under
the auspices of the UNCI; the UNCI would be admitted to the
Conference as an observer or advisor; Republicans disliked this
attempt to evade the Security Council's resolution. Beel's plan
stored all initiative for a solution solely in the hands of the
Netherlands, and nothing in the hands of the Republic or the
UNCI. All proposals made by participants must be compatible with
the responsibility of the Netherlands in Indonesia; Republicans
noted the sinister implication of the word 'responsibility'.
Since the federal government, set up through the Hague Conference,
would not have the needed administrative capability, Beel's plan
envisaged the retention of Dutch troops in Indonesia for helping
the new government. Republicans rejected Beel's plan. They
condemned it as 'the latest Dutch plan to restore Dutch colonia-

digm in Indonesia'. The UNCI opposed the Dutch proposals as they
sought to override the Security Council's instructions of January 28.41

The troubles of the Dutch might have been less if they were content to let them die down. Instead they continued feuding. They thought they could go ahead with their plan of a papery Indonesian federation even without the support of the Republic. The Netherlands government announced on March 1 that it would hold the proposed Hague Conference even if the Republic refused to attend.42 The Netherlands government relied on the support of the puppet States; it soon came to know the real sentiments of those States. The Netherlands government had set up the Federal Convention or the Federal Consultative Body (the BFO) at the Bandung Conference of the federalists in 1948; it sought to utilise this BFO, a machinery of consultations among the federalist leaders, as an instrument to bypass the Republic and the U.N.; it was soon aware of the challenge hurled from that quarter. The challenge was not unexpected.43 Dutch administration in the puppet territories was a strange mixture of regimentation, brutality, and neglect, combining lip-service and lofty mottoes with inefficient bureaucracy and shrugging apathy. Popular resistance to Dutch authority was always strong. In place of a stable popular government the Dutch got a chaos in the puppet States that officially called itself nationalist and pro-Dutch. Many leaders of these Dutch-sponsored governments were genuine Republicans, concealing their intentions till they found it insufferable or till a favourable opportunity turned up. The governments of the two most influential Dutch-sponsored States, East Indonesia and Pasundan, resigned in protest against the second military action.44 The barrier between the so-called Federalists and Republicans was never impassable; it existed only because of Dutch meddling and began
to collapse as soon as Dutch military superiority became doubtful. The increasing momentum of the Republic's military success assured the Federalists that no longer the Dutch were the giver and the Republic a mere receiver. They gathered courage and began to publicise their pro-Republican sentiments. The BFO ceased to be a Dutch stooge and demanded full internal and external sovereignty for the Indonesian nation. The Dutch were shocked as this demand coincided with that of the Republic. On March 3, the BFO passed a resolution calling for (i) a cease-fire order, (ii) the restoration of the Republican government in Jogjakarta, and (iii) the recognition of the UNCI's authority in the Indonesian-Dutch dispute. The Dutch were downcast to find that they had failed to pull the puppet States out of their natural orbit. They were dismayed to find the horse they had ridden, i.e., the BFO, turning into a full-size tiger. This stimulated their interest in a negotiated settlement. Previously they found that loud professions about peaceful intentions were paying provided these were not being acted upon. Now they were forced to think of a change in tactics.

The U.N. had not the capacity to order outright intervention, nor could it afford quiescence, except by totally alienating Asian opinion. The U.N. ought, therefore, to have got negotiations going quickly. But it appeared that the U.N. had come to grips with the problem on a superficial plane. It did not even dig deeply into its own resources for strength. The U.S. representative in the Security Council demanded a thorough implementation of the Council's injunctions of January 28, 1949. But he could not achieve much except soothing Republican sentiments. The Canadian representative proposed that the UNCI should assist the parties in reaching an agreement on the implementation of the Council's January 28 resolution without prejudice to the rights, positions and claims of the parties, and an agreement on the time and conditions for holding a Conference at the Hague. The resolution was passed on March 23.
in the eyes of Indonesians it watered down the resolution of January 28. For the January 28 resolution made the restoration of the Republican government in Jogjakarta unconditional, whereas the March 23 resolution unfairly made it conditional on the preservation of the rights and claims of the parties. Republicans wondered why the Council did not specifically order the cessation of military operations and why it accorded a strangely soft treatment to the Dutch. On March 26, the UNCI requested the two parties to reopen negotiations. Preparatory discussions, the Committee pointed out, would be held in Djakarta. The Netherlands and the Republic agreed. But the Republic rightly insisted that discussions at the outset should be limited to the restoration of the Republican government in Jogjakarta. The UNCI's request did not weigh much; if the Dutch decided to try limited conciliation that was more due to the Republic's military ability and also to decisive diplomatic pressure from the U.S.A. The U.S.A. increasingly realised that the Republic looked upon her as an ally of imperialistic Netherlands. To a Republican, the execution of Dutch military programmes appeared impossible but for the huge economic aid flowing from the U.S.A. The Netherlands and thereby seemed to sustain the Netherlands' war efforts against the Republic. But the U.S.A. wanted to win over Republicans as she did not like to be portrayed as a champion of imperialism in South East Asia. The U.S.A. was also influenced by another vital consideration. To weaken the Republic in Indonesia by continuously placating the Dutch would be to strengthen the forces of Communism in Indonesia. Republican leaders were to be brought without delay to the effective centres of power as otherwise in their absence Communist leaders and sympathisers might mobilise public opinion in their favour. On April 6 the U.S. Senate passed a resolution according to which "aid to Holland would cease if the U.N.Security Council voted sanctions against her - an intimation to The Hague that the Truman Administration
might suggest such sanctions." Holland took the hint.

In pursuance of the Security Council's directive of March 23, 1949, the UNCI invited the Republican and the Dutch delegate to meet together in Djakarta; on April 14, the first meeting under the auspices of the UNCI was held. Discussions continued for about three weeks during which disagreements duly appeared and, as in many previous stages of negotiations, these were resolved primarily at the expense of the Republic. On May 7, Mr. Rum, the Republic's foreign minister, reached an agreement with Mr. Van Royen, the Dutch representative. The Dutch were satisfied to receive the personal assurances of Sukarno and Hatta regarding (a) the cessation of guerilla activities, (b) cooperation in the preservation of peace and order, (c) participation in a Round Table Conference at the Netherlands capital, and (d) the acceptance of these terms by other members of the Republican government; in return, according to this Rum-Van Royen Agreement, the Dutch pledged (a) to restore Republican rule in Jogjakarta, (b) to set free all political prisoners confined by them since December 17, 1948, unconditionally and instantaneously, and (c) not to organise any States in the Republic-governed territories as they stood before December 19, 1948. Holland took to negotiations primarily because the two assumptions behind the second military action were disproved: the assumptions were that the nationalist revolt was small enough to be crushed by such action and that other powers and the U.N. would remain inactive. But Holland did not offer substantial concessions to the Republic. The Rum-Van Royen accord was simply a compromise and valuable only because it was a compromise although devoid of any other merit. For the Republicans felt rebuffed in many important ways. (1) The Republican territories occupied by the Dutch after the first military action of 1947 remained unaffected. They were not returned to the Republican government. There was no guarantee
that a U.N.-directed plebiscite would be held to determine their future position. But these areas would be represented in an All-Indonesian Federation including the Republic. Instead of thriving within the Republic they would, under Dutch instigation, serve to corrode the authority of the Republic. (2) Even the areas belonging to the Republic prior to the second military action were not restored to the Republican government. Only Jogjakarta would return to Republican control.52 (3) Not to speak of the Republican territories' population prior to first military action, their population before the second military action was not less than 40% of the whole of Indonesia. Yet, as the May 7 Agreement laid down, the Republic would have only one-third of representation in an All-Indonesian organisation.53 This would assure a comfortable majority to Dutch-controlled territories.

Rightly did the Washington Post Comment magnify that "the new agreement leaves almost every important question unanswered."54 On many previous occasions chances of peace in Indonesia were ruined because the Dutch found out some cowardly alibi for aggression. Republicans were naturally skeptical; their mood of hopefulness was based perhaps on nothing more substantial than a long sigh of relief; they accepted the agreement with the mental reservation that they would bring into play a merciless guerilla warfare if the agreement turned out to be another subterfuge employed by the Netherlands.55 However, many Hollanders had a strange belief that Van Royen failed to extract anything from Rum and that Van Royen gave way on all fronts.56 According to them, "the guiding motive" of the Dutch "was that something might be saved from the wreck if friendship with the Rum Indonesian Republic could be bought, since, anyway, the Republic would soon be in control not only in Java but also in other parts of the archipelago."57 But the Dutch could not relinquish the habit of violating agreements. Only four days after the signing of the Rum-Van Royen accord, on May 11, Dr. Beel
recognised the so-called Provisional Council of Representatives of Tapanuli. This was an attempt to split up Republican territories - a flagrant violation of the May 7 accord. Dr. Beel soon resigned (as also General Spoor) in protest against the Rums-Van Royen Agreement. He was one of those Hollanders who preferred an expensive stalemate to a prudent capitulation, who did not realise that Holland would only lead herself to approve surrender later on due to sheer exhaustion if she did not immediately give independence to Indonesia. Dr. Beel was succeeded by Dr. A.H.T. Lovink, who declared in a conciliatory fashion: "It is both the end of the old order and the beginning of the new." The sudden death on May 25, (due to a heart attack) of General Spoor, noted for his tough reactionism, was also welcomed by Republicans.

The Dutch troops began to vacate Jogjakarta on June 24 and by June 30 the withdrawal was completed. There were no major incidents. The Republican troops triumphantly took charge of Jogjakarta; Republican leaders exultantly entered the city on July 6, 1949. Dr. Rum and Dr. Van Royen announced, in a joint statement issued on July 30, 1949, that a cease-fire agreement had been reached between the Republicans and the Netherlanders. The agreement was signed on August 1.

The so-called federal areas were in ferment. The federalists had already realised that the Dutch had lost the battle for colonies. They were ready to rectify the mistake of bypassing the Republic. They made a cool appraisal of the situation, and brought into play a youthful capacity to face an enigmatic future. Once they had betrayed the Republic and sided with the Dutch; now they proceeded to parley with Republican leaders in Inter-Indonesian Conferences, held at Jogjakarta and Djakarta, from July 19 to July 22 and again from July 30 to August 2. The significance of these conferences, in the words of President Sukarno, was "that the attempt of the colonial power to arouse divisions in the ranks of the Indonesians was frustrated by the revival of the
spirit of unity among Indonesians from all parts of the motherland. Delegates from the Republic, East Indonesia, East Borneo, South East Borneo, West Borneo, Greater Dajak, Bandjar, East Sumatra, South Sumatra, Palembang, Bangka, Billiton, West Java, Central Java, East Java and Madura. The BFQ comprised all these territories except the Republican. Participants realised the vital necessity of working out a good understanding among themselves before meeting the Dutch delegates at the forthcoming Hague Conference. The Conference discussed the fundamental principles of the transfer of real, complete and unconditional sovereignty to the Indonesian people. It hammered out agreement on many important points. It was agreed that the sovereign federal State representing the Indonesian nation would have a republican form of government; Indonesian would be the official language, Indonesia Raja the national anthem; the national flag would be the red-and-white flag. The President of this forthcoming sovereign State was to be elected by representatives of the Republic and the BFQ. He was to act together with representatives of the member States in appointing three members of the Cabinet. The future Indonesian Parliament would consist of two Chambers, a peoples' representative body and a senate. The Conference decided that the Republic's army (the T.N.I) would act as the nucleus of the new national army. Principles of economic policy for the national State were also agreed upon. Cultural matters too were discussed; all units of the new federal State would be entitled to improve and foster their own culture, while Indonesian national culture was defined to be based upon religion, humanity and democracy. One important result of these Conferences was the formation of a preparatory Committee consisting of representatives from the Republic and the BFQ; the Committee's function was to coordinate and implement, before, during and after the Round Table Conference at the Hague, the tasks emerging out of the decisions of the Inter-Indonesian Conferences.
Dr. Hatta, the leader of the Republican delegation, said at the opening session of these Conferences in Jogjakarta that the Conferences constituted a landmark in Indonesia as they heralded the return of nationwide unity; Sultan Hamid, the leader of the EFO delegation, expressed his profound satisfaction that the gulf between the Republic and other areas of Indonesia was bridged. So, the Dutch pro policy of separatism did not succeed in freezing the non-Republican territories into a pro-Dutch mould. This produced a greater sense of urgency required to conquer the pride and prejudice of Dutch colonials. The Dutch accepted the unconditional transfer of sovereignty as a consequence that could not be avoided, as pointed out by Hatta, the Chairman of the Republican delegation, in his address at the official opening of the Round Table Conference on August 23, 1949, at the Hague. Indonesians, however, were not too sure of the results of the Conference. Sjarhir thought that the Republican leaders had overhastily departed for the Hague as they had not had sufficient time for preparation; he felt that details should have been discussed in Indonesia; he was also afraid that international pressure at the Hague Conference might work against the Republic. More confident was H.A. Salim, the Republic's Minister for Foreign Affairs. He said that the Conference would not see Indonesians as a dependent nation; it was the battleground of two equal, independent countries; he was not afraid of a deadlock as Indonesians were accustomed to it and could bear the consequences bravely; this was demonstrated by post-Linggadjati and post-Renville experiences. Dr. A.K. Gani, an ex-Vice-Premier of the Republic, struck a more militant note and expressed the most vital point: if the RTC (Round Table Conference) failed, the last decision would rest with the military strength of Indonesians. Pressmen asked the Republic's Defence Minister Sultan Hamengku Buwono: "What if the RTC should fail?" "Then we will fight," was the reply.
There was a danger that the Conference would jog on for so long a time - baffled by controversies old and new - that the Indonesian situation might go beyond control; for the prolonged imminence of a solution might give birth to intolerance. The air remained heavy with diplomatic cliches. Two issues, in particular, were brakes on the wheels of the Conference and seemed to threaten the Conference with a dismal failure: the size of the debt to be taken over by the United States of Indonesia and the fate of West Irian (Indonesian name for the Dutch New Guinea). It is admitted that Mr. Cochran, the American member of the UNCI, worked at this moment with great initiative and diplomatic adroitness, as he pushed himself to the centre of things. He "combined diplomatic skill with the aura of American loans. He was able to lay down the actual line of compromise between the conflicting Dutch and Indonesian claims." Finally, the Indonesia accepted 4,300,000,000 guilders of Dutch debts, the original Dutch demand being 6,400,000,000 guilders. The imposition was heavy; it was definitely unfair, especially if one recalls the amount of debt the Dutch had to incur for the purpose of militarising Indonesia. It proved once again that the world is still a place in which a great power can accomplish things denied to its lesser comrades. On West Irian the following compromise formula was adopted: negotiations between the Dutch and Indonesians would determine its fate at the end of one year, during which period sovereignty over West Irian would be vested in the hands of the Dutch.

The Draft Constitution of the United States of Indonesia was initialled at the Hague on October 28. It described the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RUSI for short) as independent and sovereign, "a democratic State of federal structure, governed by justice." The Government, together with the House of Representatives and the Senate, would exercise the sovereign authority of the RUSI. The President and the Ministers
constituted the Government, the President being the Head of the State. The President, in agreement with the delegates of the participant territories, was to appoint a Committee of three for the purpose of forming a Cabinet. The Senate represented the participant territories, each of them having two members in the Senate. The House of Representatives represented the Indonesian people as a whole; the Republic got one-third of seats in the House; special provisions were made to have the Chinese, European and Arabian minority groups represented by 9, 6 and 3 members respectively. The federation was composed of participant and non-participant territories. The participant territories were divided into two types: Negaras, e.g., the Negara Republik Indonesia (the State of the Republic of Indonesia), 7 in total, and 9 autonomous constitutional units; e.g., Bangka; other territories of Indonesia, e.g., minor isles, did not have the status and rights of participant territories. The Constitution contained a section on fundamental human rights and freedoms. It guaranteed equal treatment and equal protection of the law to everybody, as also equal protection of person and property. Everyone was granted freedom of thought, opinion and expression, conscience and religion, etc. A Constituent Assembly, made up of double the number of members of the House of Representatives and the Senate, would enact as soon as possible the Constitution of the HUSI, which would replace this provisional (Draft) Constitution.

The Round Table Conference wound up on November 2 when the Hague observed the ceremony of the formal acceptance of a settlement. The Hague Agreement, a dirge on Dutch dominance in the Indies, was born.

The Agreement placed the last date for transfer of sovereignty at December 30, 1949; the kingdom of the Netherlands was accordingly to transfer sovereignty to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (HUSI) fully, immediately and unconditionally.
The RUSI's sovereignty would extend to all the areas - excepting West Irian - which formerly constituted the Netherlands East Indies. The Republic, as a unit of the federal RUSI, would possess the areas under its control prior to the second military action. But Indonesians would not look upon the RUSI's sovereignty as an outright gift from the Dutch; as Hatta asserted, Indonesians knew they had a sovereign State even before the RIC met.88

The Hague Agreement sought to regulate the relations between the Netherlands and the RUSI. It provided for the establishment of a Netherlands-Indonesian Union aiming at the promotion of the common interests of the Partners through cooperation in realms of defence and foreign relations, primarily and in financial and cultural matters, as far as required.89 The two Partners would cooperate "on the basis of free will and equality in status with equal rights" without prejudicing "the status of each of the two Partners as an independent and sovereign State."90 The RUSI and the Netherlands undertook to respect the principles of democracy, and of the independence of the judiciary, in their systems of government, and also to recognise fundamental human rights.91 The principal organs of this Union were: (1) a ministerial conference composed of three Dutch and three RUSI Cabinet ministers deciding by a unanimity of votes, its decisions requiring the ratification by the parliaments of the two parts of the Union;92 (2) a permanent union secretariat headed by two secretariats-general; (3) a Court of arbitration composed of three Indonesian and three Dutch judges. The six judges were appointed for ten years. They could reach decisions by a bare majority. All legal disputes arising out of the Union Statute or agreements between the two parties or joint regulations accepted by them were to be settled by this Union Court of Arbitration. If the judges were equally divided in their opinion in any case the Court was to adopt, for a re-examination of the case, an additional member who may be the
President of the International Court of Justice, or an international authority acceptable to both the countries, or a person belonging to a different nationality. But the primary instrument of cooperation as between the two Partners was the Conferences of ministers meeting at least twice annually. These were expected to clarify matters not touched by the Hague Agreement. These would enable the Indonesians and the Dutch to consult on matters of common interest.

The Hague Agreement envisaged economic cooperation between the two Partners. According to Hatta "economic cooperation could be planned in such a way that reconstruction in Indonesia would be coordinated with the establishment of new Netherlands industries to meet Indonesia's need for materials and equipment." The RUSI retained final and complete authority over matters of economic and financial policy. It could expropriate, nationalise, liquidate, compulsorily cede or transfer rights "exclusively for the public benefit, in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law" and against indemnities to be determined by agreement or judicial decision. But the RUSI would not renounce all economic arrangements inherited from the Netherlands East Indies government. Thus she was ready to recognise and restore "the rights, concessions and licenses properly granted under the law of the Netherlands Indies and still valid on the date of transfer of sovereignty," and also admitted the possibility of "an extension, a renewal, or the granting of rights, concessions and licenses" subject to necessities of public interest. The RUSI agreed to accord the most-favoured-nation treatment to Holland; but this did not mean much, for nationals of other States would have equal rights to trade with and participate in the economic activity and industrial development of Indonesia. While the RUSI promised not to subject Dutch interests to any discrimination she reserved the right to enact rules "necessary for the protection of national interests."
Holland gained one important concession, though temporary; the KUSI agreed to honour the trade arrangements binding upon the old Netherlands East Indies administration which had been manipulated by the Dutch to serve their interests rather than the interests of Indonesians - but these agreements were to be changed soon and changes were to be enforced in October, 1950. It may be concluded, therefore, that Holland could not retain an economic stranglehold over the former colony, despite the assumption of a debt burden by the KUSI. Holland maintained some economic privileges, which could at any time be liquidated as contravening public interests, and some concessions waiting for an early termination.

As regards foreign relations, the Partners agreed to aim at coordination and consultation whenever possible; but each Partner would conduct her own foreign relations and determine her own foreign policy. The Partners decided to exchange High Commissioners; they agreed to have common diplomatic representation abroad whenever necessary as also in international negotiations. In the field of defence, similarly, each Partner resolved to bear full responsibility so far as her own territory was concerned; one of the Partners, only if she was so requested, would come to the assistance of another; they would consult with one another in the case of a threat of aggression to either or both of them; they would exchange military missions. It was explicitly stated that this agreement on defence matters "shall not prejudice the rights and obligations of the Partners under the Charter of the United Nations or under international arrangements based thereon."

At the RTC the agreement on cultural relations was reached most quickly. J.H. Van Marseveen, the leader of the Dutch delegation and Overseas Territories Minister, remarked that this would explode the thesis that East and West could never achieve mutual understanding. The purpose of the agreement was to promote cultural...
relations between the two Partners "based on complete freedom, volition and reciprocity"; the Netherlands and the RUSI would each appoint seven persons and set up a joint Committee of fourteen members entrusted with the task of promoting cultural relations. 105

On December 27, 1949, Hatta received the instrument of transfer of sovereignty from the Queen Juliana; the Netherlands finally transferred sovereignty over the old Netherlands East Indies excluding West Irian to the RUSI. The Hague Agreement, churned up by more than two months of wrangling, meant an end to three centuries of Dutch rule. It also terminated the combats rending the Republic with varying fury since the defeat of Japan in the Second World War. The establishment of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union should leave no doubt about the actuality of the transfer of sovereignty. 106 It is true that many Indonesians had misgivings about the Hague Agreement. These arose out of an insufficiency of information 107 and a sense of being left out of crucial negotiations which took place thousands of miles away in the Dutch capital. The control exercised by the Netherlands over news circulation and the inefficiency of Indonesian newspapers combined to confuse the people in Indonesia. 108 The Netherlands-RUSI Union, however, was a wasted Union. It had no real powers. The Queen of Holland was to act as the head of the Union. But the head of the Union would only represent "the spirit of voluntary and lasting cooperation" 109 between the two Partners. The position of the head of the Union illustrated the strength of the Union. The head was powerless; so was the Union. The Union had one salient feature: its harmless novelty. 110 The transfer of sovereignty was a matter of substance.

The significance of the Hague Agreement was multifold; according to Mr. R. Harremans, the Belgian member of the UNMI, it meant "the end of the conflict, the solution of the problem,
the birth of a nation, and the foundation of a Union. Mr. W. Austin, head of the U.S. delegation to the U.N., said that the Agreement was "a tribute to the spirit of the United Nations which inspired the parties, as well as the United Nations Commission which assisted in reaching this successful result." But the Security Council failed to pass a resolution welcoming the transfer of sovereignty owing to the Soviet veto of December 12, 1949. The Soviet Union questioned as to whether the transfer of sovereignty was real or it covertly perpetuated Dutch control under American patronage. The Indonesian Communist Party toed the Moscow line and outlined its policy as absolute rejection of any agreement, i.e., the Hague Agreement, that served the imperialist interests of the U.S.A., England or the Netherlands; it circulated pamphlets threatening that the Army of the Party could establish its control over a large part of the Republican Army in East and West Java; the pamphlets declared that a Soviet People's Republic should be established in Indonesia.

THE ARGUMENT

Now it is the responsibility of the enquirer to pinpoint the most important determinant of Indonesia's independence. It is always safe to provide an omnibus explanation soothing diverse sensibilities. Indonesians achieved freedom — it may be argued — because of powerful nationalist resistance, U.N. mediation, the pressure of liberal world opinion, and a belated return to sanity on the part of the Dutch. This explanation, too broad to be meaningful, seems especially to be uncharitable so far as the role of Indonesian freedom-fighters is concerned. It is disgracefully inaccurate as it does not place the role of the U.N., of the big powers, and of the Netherlands in their proper perspective. Correspondingly, it fails to highlight the unbending strength of the nationalists.
While the U.N. was dedicated to negotiations, the Dutch were dedicated to the use of force. The Dutch did not realise that a policy of military pressures was antiquated in the age of nationalist upheavals calling for subtle tactics and long-term negotiations. Indonesians might regretfully remind themselves that the strength of the Dutch was negligible when they began to reoccupy Indonesia in 1946 under British protection. Indonesians did not fight it out at that time and relied on enlightened world opinion.\textsuperscript{117} They placed their trust on the Western powers who could influence Dutch policies. But with the lapse of time the Dutch interest in negotiated settlement vanished because of their growing consciousness of superiority in military strength. Indonesians became the victim of the first military action. They placed their faith in the U.N. and were soon disillusioned; through the years of bitter struggle the U.N. did not do much to end this feeling of disillusionment. Indonesia’s faith in the U.N. imposed upon it a moral obligation which it could not fulfil. The U.N. was engaged in a prolonged trial of strength — or, more accurately, of intentions — with the Dutch colonialists. It must be credited, of course, with occasional lapses into candour, as when it condemned Dutch behaviour. But the Dutch attitude to the U.N. was one of nonchalant irreverence and arrogant disobedience. This attitude was prominent even after the conclusion of the Hague Agreement as Dr. Van Royen told the Security Council clearly that it had no jurisdiction in the Dutch-Indonesian discord.\textsuperscript{118} And the U.N. did little but to make some face-saving gestures; it did not take any effective step to check Dutch intransigence; it was not strong enough to face the reality and, therefore, was temporising all the time. It may be cogently argued that the U.N. would not have been able to render any assistance\textsuperscript{119} — it was a little bit — in the Indonesian issue but for the ability of the Republic to survive the cruel military actions. This failure — and it would be unfair to call it anything else — seems all the less excusable as the problem
of checking the Netherlands, a small power, was not intractable. One could not blame the Indonesians if they thought it inaccurate to express thanks for having had the U.N. support in a major crisis and improvident to seek it in the next one.

The U.N. was a worried unskilled mediator. The Western powers were vacillating. Their obsession with cold war considerations added to their indecision and made them look irresponsible. They were attempting to have it both ways: to acquiesce in Dutch adventures in order to ensure Holland's fidelity to an anti-USSR bloc and also to profess adherence to the U.N. principles for satisfying Asians. The Netherlands suffered from a malignant combination of amnesia and old-world ambitions; vanity corroded her political judgment. The Western powers, especially the U.S.A., could assert and monitor her decisions for a graceful dismantling of the colonial fortress. But their anti-USSR strategy in Europe crippled their anti-colonialist stand strategy in Asia. They did not promptly save the Dutch from their folly and their own prestige among Asians. The Netherlands perfidiously painted the Republican government as Communist and thereby sought to avoid Western intervention in favor of the Republic. But the Madiun revolt exposed the nature of Dutch allegation. The Dutch treated the bogey of communism as an ace of trumps which could be played to defeat nationalism with Western support.

It turned out to be a three or four of clubs. The West could not remain idle after the Madiun coup. The choice was not between a Dutch Indonesia or a nationalist Indonesia, but between a Communist Indonesia and a nationalist Indonesia; the fundamental assumption that a pro-Western government could be maintained by force had to be abandoned. The wise and overdue step of a Western warning (in the form of a U.S. threat to withdraw economic aid from Holland) came rather late. That it was not too late to be useful was simply due to the Republic's gigantic
fighting ability that decisively switched the balance of power against Dutch troops in Indonesia. So it can never be said that this belated U.S. move saved the Republic; perhaps it roused Holland from the opium dreams of the past. However the West could not cure herself of misgivings about the new Asian State; this lingering suspicion, expressed through diplomatic pressure exerted by the UNCI at the Round Table Conference, worked in favour of Holland. Holland retained her hold over West Irian and the right to use the naval base at Surabaya; this was deemed valuable by the West in view of future military necessity; the Western powers felt it would be easier to use West Irian or Surabaya for military operations if the Dutch retained control over them. Perhaps the necessity of this move appeared more pressing to the Western powers because of the victory of Communists in China.

The physical control exercised by the Dutch in Indonesia since the Japanese invasion was largely fictitious, and not simply precarious. But they played skilfully on the themes of inefficiency and disintegration of the Republic; they also became the slave of these bluffs, failing to think out a rational policy. They did not realise that if the people in proving their loyalty to the Republic could defy shooting and oppression, that was as decisive as a genuine military defeat. They talked of peace, and peace meant a world where there would be no resistance to their threats and bullying. The strategy of Holland, after coming back to the Indies at the end of the second world war, was to create a long period of intermittent crisis in which the threat and use of force would be increasingly important and the Republic would be slowly buried under periodic convulsions. Throughout the Indonesian archipelago the machinery of nationalist agitation was grinding into motion. The Dutch were applying old-model policies to the new world of the post-war era. Instead of taking a calculated risk by conciliation they were out to hew away the slender
bridges of negotiations. From the outset they were bent on having a showdown with the Republic and the tortuous negotiations were merely a smokescreen behind which they waited for an opportunity to attack. The first military action was not an act of sudden indiscretion, or instinctive reaction to provocations, but a premeditated assault. The Dutch were not prepared to pay for the friendship of Indonesians in the only currency which this latter valued: due appreciation of their nationalist aspirations.

Exchanges on transfer of power went on rumbling. But the Dutch started preparing the second military action with the last one still around. They went on hoping impertinently that the Republic could be strangled. Whether the Dutch liked it or not, the real issue was not whether they could maintain their positions of special privilege, but how cheaply they could cut their losses. They considered matters from the standpoint of mistaken prestige and not of commonsense. But the military illusions on which the Dutch policy rested were finally shattered by years of conflict. During the second military action the Dutch were compelled to alter the obsolete image of the strength of Indonesian nationalism; they were facing a military fiasco in Indonesia. They at last perceived that they had underrated the Republic's fighting strength. Their built-in superiority complex, which had proved to be a liability, was undermined.

It must never be supposed that the transfer of sovereignty was due to a change of heart in the Dutch. The transfer of sovereignty was not a product of Dutch generosity, but of nationalist endurance. The Netherlands was forced to suspend further military operations as these were rendered unprofitable by the Republic's military victories. She was fighting for a frenzy, but she could not pay an unlimited price for that. It is now-a-days fashionable to argue that empires are unprofitable and hence outdated. This argument cannot conceal the fact that the unprofitableness of an empire is primarily due to the nationalist upsurge which makes
military adventures more and more costly and risky. Empire-builders grumble - and this is surely no humanist reaction - that empires are obsolete only when the expenses of subduing nationalists exceed the returns, making some allowance for the prestige value of a colony. There was a time when Holland could maintain her Indonesian possessions with only 40,000 troops; in 1949 she could not accomplish it with 1,45,000 troops.

The spirit in which independence is professed to be granted is as important as the fact of independence. Holland had a last chance. She could convert defeat into a moral victory by an astutely sympathetic handling of negotiations in the RTC. In this way she could survive in Indonesian esteem the sickeningly interminable war, with its conspiracies, ferocity and perennial fanaticism. She lost this chance by inept altercations over the debt problem and the West Irian issue where the West favoured her through the UNCI. If after the transfer of sovereignty, Holland and the West could not retain Indonesian goodwill, they had only themselves to blame. If the conflict had not lasted for years, Holland's position would have been much better. Holland's misguided militant tactics cost her men, money and prestige which she could ill afford. By refusing, for years, to cede anything, Holland was about to end by losing everything.
3. A Dutch military spokesman said: "We are sure that the Republican Army is breaking up, dissolving, falling apart for lack of cohesion." David Anderson, New York Times, December 27, 1948.

The Dutch "had in mind an immediate and decisive victory and another fait accompli to be presented to the world". Merdeka, February 10, 1949, p.17 - Indonesian Information Service, New Delhi.
7. Merdeka (February 10, 1949) has extravagant hopes: "That is to say if the Conference's recommendations are rejected or not fully accepted by the Security Council or not implemented in Indonesia by the Dutch, the 22x 19 governments are at liberty to seek another means to realize their recommendations in a joint action," pp.3-4; Indonesian Information Service, New Delhi.
9. Ibid.
"The T.N.I., obeying orders to make no frontal attack, but to resort to guerilla tactics, retreated to the villages, from where it continued to struggle against the invaders."

"Events proved that the Republican Armed Forces were much better prepared to withstand the 'emergency than they had been at the time of the first Dutch attack in 1947." Republican Review, September 1, 1949, p.41 - published by the Ministry of Information, Republic of Indonesia.

This was stated by Dr. Sjafruddin Prawitanegara, Head of the Republican Emergency Government. Merdeka, February 25, 1949, p.14 - published by Indonesian Information Service, New Delhi.

Republican Review, September 1, 1949, p.42.

Ibid


'Het Parool', March 15, 1949, scoffed at this assertion which was falsified by facts.

"The Dutch having failed to face the Republican army, have intensified their terrorising activities against the people undiscriminately. Burning and looting of the people's properties and killing of and intimidating the innocent population, are the general characteristic of the Dutch daily activities in Java, Madura, and Sumatra." News Bulletin

This is attested by Kahin: "By late January the 145,000 Netherlands troops in Indonesia were actually more on the defensive than on the offensive." NRI, p.391.

"At the outset the Dutch seemed to be successful to make the BFO a mere stooge. But due to the constant pressure of the people and the national parties in B.F.O.'s territories and the growing influence of the pro-Republican group in the body itself, the attitude of the members of the B.F.O. towards the Indonesian question becomes gradually more


46A Official Records of the Security Council, 4th year, No.19

46B Ibid, Nos.20 and 21.


48 The Hindu, April 17, 1949

48A This is what Soemitro, the Representative of the Republic of Indonesia to the U.S.A. in 1949, writes: "The Dutch have spent in the past two years about one million dollars a day to maintain their army in Indonesia, for that purpose the Dutch have diverted the aid which they received under the Marshall Plan. But for the help that the Dutch have received under lend-lease programme and under the Marshall Plan, they would never have been able to maintain such a big array for the purpose of waging a colonial war against freedom-loving people." United Asia, January-February, 1949, p.431.

49 Louis Fischer, op.cit., p.127

"The U.S. has indicated latterly that the Netherlands may be left out of military aid if she does not settle with Indonesia and has been told further that in no event must the arms supplied for European defence be reexported for action in colonial areas." The Hindu, April 17, 1949.

According to Gerbrandy, the Netherlands government ought to have foreseen this consequence of the second military action "that Marshall Aid for the Netherlands would be suspended". Indonesia, p.164.
Moscow travestied the agreement and Pravda looked upon it as the result of the U.S. policy of "suppressing the resistance of the Indonesian people in order to turn Indonesia into a base against the national liberation movement of the peoples of Asia." This was surely a cold war move, not one designed to end tension.


This did not mean that Republicans accepted it as permanent. Sukarno said: "We all know that the Rum-Van Royen Statement does not bring about the immediate return to authority of the Republican government of the whole area encompassed by the Renville status quo lines. We understand that. But it must not be forgotten that the area of the Republic is not limited by demarcation lines laid down in the Renville documents. No! The area of the Republic, according to article 1 of the Linggadjati Agreement, covers the whole of Java, Madura and Sumatra, together with all surrounding islands." Republican Review, September 1, 1949, p.19 - Ministry of Information, the Republic of Indonesia.

"... if they see that the present accord is another Dutch manoeuvre, they will continue to carry on the relentless guerrilla warfare against the Dutch..." Merdeka, June 10, 1949, p.3 - Indonesian Information Service, New Delhi.
57 If this is the confession of the ex-Premier, a staunch colonialist, one can easily see the mainspring of Indonesian freedom. Ibid, pp. 166-67.


Comment by the Indonesian weekly SIKAP: "It is in complete accordance with the rules of politics. Dr. Beel was the exponent and instrument of a Dutch policy that was all out for a solution of the Indonesian issue by force rather than by negotiation. This Dutch policy was aimed at the destruction of the Republic of Indonesia and the elimination of the Republic as a political entity. This policy failed and was nullified and superseded by the Rüm-Van Royen agreement." Quoted in News Bulletin, June 25, 1949, p.1 - Indonesian Information Service, New Delhi.

60 Merdeka, June 10, 1949, p.3 - Indonesian Information Service, New Delhi.

61 Ibid, pp.3-4.


64 U.N. Doc.S/1372, Appendix VIII


66 An authentic account is available in: Republican Review, September 1, 1949, pp.22-25, published by the Ministry of Information, the Republic of Indonesia.

67 Ibid


The main feature of the ceremony was the passing of a long resolution summarising the results of the Conference, contained in a bulky document of several hundred pages outlining the different agreements." The Hindu, November 3, 1949.

Chapter I, Section II, Article 2.
Chapter III, Sections III, Articles 88-100.
Chapter I, Section I, Article 1.
Chapter III, Section II, Article 80, paras 1-2.
Chapter I, Section I, Article 1, para 1.
Chapter III, Section I, Articles 68-69.
Chapter V, Articles 186-187.
96 Ibid, Section A, Article 1.
97 Ibid, Article 4.
98 Ibid, Article 11
99 Ibid, Section C, Articles 21-22.
100 Hague Agreement: Agreement concerning Foreign Relations, Article 2.
101 Ibid, Articles 1 and 4.
102 Hague Agreement: Agreement on cooperation in the field of defence, Articles 1,3,7,8.
103 Ibid, Article 15.
104 The Hindu, November 3, 1949.
105 Hague Agreement: Agreement concerning cultural relations, Articles 1-3.
106 "The agreement now reached at the Hague means, in effect, that Indonesia is to be completely independent." Maurice Zinkin, The Manchester Guardian, November 4, 1949.
108 The Hindu, December 17, 1949.
109 Hague Agreement: Union Statute, Articles 5-6.
110 "... the political structures that have been worked out are frankly experimental in character and somewhat different from any that have been tried hitherto." The New York Times, December 27, 1949.
111 The Hindu, November 3, 1949.
112 The Hindu, November 4, 1949
113 U.N.Doc.8/1431
114 "The Soviets, furious that they have not been permitted to father" the RUSI, "snarl that it is not really legitimate and predict that it will not be able to walk by itself." Andrew Roth, Indian News Chronicle, December 27, 1949.
115 The Hindu, November 7, 1949.
116 Such explanations are the usual ones appearing in books and newspapers; e.g., the editorial in The Tribune, November 5, 1949, and the view of Louis Fischer, op.cit., pp.128-29.
This was also the editorial estimate of the New York Times, December 31, 1948.


Trygve Lie, the U.N. Secretary General, issued a statement saying that the UNCI "has given valuable assistance in helping to bring about the agreement reached at the Hague". The Hindu, November 8, 1949.

"The U.S. and Great Britain have perhaps belatedly come to realise that their interests in Asia can better be served by encouraging the nationalist movement in these countries rather than by identifying themselves with the status quo and consequently being suspected of sympathising with outmoded colonialism." Merdeka, June 22, 1949, p.3 - The Republic of Indonesia Office, New York.

Woodrow Wyatt had the unwarranted belief that there took place 'a marked change of heart in the Dutch'. The Statesman, August 15, 1949.