Indonesian leaders could look upon the initialising of the Cheribon Agreement as a diplomatic victory. But, while praising the diplomatic ability of negotiators, it would be unfair not to emphasise the role of the Republican troops and revolutionary young men whose constant vigilance and heroic self-sacrifice forced the Dutch to negotiate. After the Japanese surrender, the Hollanders had intended to reconquer Indonesia as quickly as possible. They duped themselves with the comforting belief that the Republic was not the representative of Indonesian nationalism. They did not recognise the Republic and blamed the British who urged negotiations. The and their troops were aggressive; but the strength Dutch were determined to wipe out the Republic or the Dutch forces was too insufficient; the Republican troops and revolutionary youths proved themselves too powerful.

The T.K.R. (Peoples' Security Army) was the Republic's official army, formed by a decree of October 5, 1945. Its name was slightly changed into "Peoples' Safety Army" on January 4, 1946. It was further announced on January 25 that the Peoples' Safety Army would be replaced by the 'Indonesian Republican Army' (T.R.I.). The T.R.I. led the struggle against foreign troops after the fall of Japan. "Apart from the T.R.I. there were also operating a great many fighting organisations formed by the people, whose objectives generally were to strengthen the defence of the state, side by side with the T.R.I. Youth naturally formed the core of these organisations. The following were the more important among these armed youth forces: the Pesindo (Socialist youth), the B.P.R.I. (Revolutionary Army of the Republic of Indonesia), the Berisan Benteng (Army of the Black Buffalo), the Lasjkar Buruh (Workers' Army) the K.R.I.S. (Force of the People of Indonesia from Sulawesi) and the P.I.M. (Indonesian Youth from the Moluccas). The
existence of these organisations disproved the Dutch contention that nationalist agitation was confined to Java. The Dutch propaganda that the activities of these youth groups were entirely uncoordinated and always irresponsible was also a travesty of truth. "In order to ensure that the course of these organisations would not deviate from the original path of defending Indonesia's freedom, a Bureau was instituted in the Ministry of Defence, bearing the name of JIEH 'Bureau for Fighting Organisations' (Biro Perdjuangan). This body was given the task of coordinating the various fighting bodies one with another."8

Fierce clashes with the Republican forces had left the Dutch disconsolately aware of the Republic's strength and their vexatious inability to oust the Republic immediately. They condescended to negotiate — till perhaps they could accumulate sufficient power to harry the Republic. It was not simply the negotiating zeal and moderation of the Republican leaders that could produce a Linggadjati Agreement. The indomitable courage and unyielding resistance of the T.R.I. and the militant youth corps compelled the Dutch to look for a respite. That this estimate of Dutch motives and actions is not inaccurate can be proved by the sinisterly dogmatic interpretation of the Agreement favoured by the Netherlands and by the persistently bellicose behaviour9 of Dutch troops.

The essential features of the Linggadjati Agreement10 are contained in Articles 1, 2, 6, 8 and 12. According to Article 1,10A "The Netherlands Government recognises the government of the Republic of Indonesia as exercising de facto authority over Java, Madura11 and Sumatra. The areas occupied by Allied or Netherlands forces shall be included gradually, through cooperation, in the Republican territory." By
Article 2\textsuperscript{12} the Republican and the Netherlands government pledged to "cooperate in the rapid formation of a sovereign, democratic state on a \textit{federal} base, to be called the United States of Indonesia."

Article 6 would set up a Netherlands-Indonesian Union\textsuperscript{13} "to promote the joint interests of the Netherlands and Indonesia." The Union consisted "on the one hand of the kingdom of the Netherlands comprising the Netherlands, Surinam and Curacao, and on the other hand the United States of Indonesia." Article 8\textsuperscript{14} placed the King (or the Queen) at the head of the Union.

Article 12\textsuperscript{15} assured that the union and the U.S.I. (United States of Indonesia) would come into being before January 1, 1949.

Immediately after the initialling of the Agreement the Republican Ministry of Information issued an explanatory note\textsuperscript{15} stressing the sovereignty of the Republic. The note declared that the Agreement paved the way for peaceful negotiations; but it did not impair the sovereignty of the Republic; the proposed Dutch-Indonesian Union would not have the status of a super-parliament or a super-cabinet.\textsuperscript{17} This interpretation of the Agreement was quite justified for, as Hatta had stated, "Our people can hardly live again as a colonized people. No people is willing to abandon in such a way the rights which they have acquired."\textsuperscript{18}

But the Dutch were execrably apathetic to the Republic's achievements and aspirations. The Netherlands Government and its troops in Indonesia vied with each other in heating troubled waters to a boiling point. The signing of the Agreement was imfortunately delayed.

The Commission General submitted an explanatory Memorandum to the Netherlands government which stated with shocking clarity that the Dutch government would retain their sovereignty over Indonesia till the formation of the Union.\textsuperscript{19} This mercenary
interpretation of the Linggadjati Agreement was upheld by Minister Jonkman whose speech to the Dutch Parliament on December 10, 1946, oozed out a cavalier disregard for Indonesian nationalism. He said that the king of the Netherlands "shall continue to be entrusted with the supreme role" as the Head of the union.

Jonkman treated the personality of the Republic with withering scorn as he emphasised that the Agreement was not a treaty to be ratified by the Dutch Parliament. His empire-mindedness was divulged as he referred to Queen's December 6 promise as the ultimate goal. His insincerity was uncovered as he endorsed the notorious policy of divide and rule by recognising the Malino areas; Jonkman lashed the Republic as he commented acridly that Indonesian nationalism had multifarious forms. The Malino make-believe was one of those forms.

Imbued with this Malino spirit Van Mook went ahead with his plans of puppet states in complete disregard of the Linggadjati terms. Article 2 of the Agreement prescribed that the Dutch and the Republican governments should cooperate in the establishment of a federal U.S.I. But Van Mook ignored the Republic, organised a conference at Den Pasar on the Malino model and set up the state of East Indonesia on December 18, 1946. This flagrant unilateral act showed that the Dutch were not prepared to implement the Linggadjati Agreement. Indonesians too were not ready to submit to Dutch machinations; many of them declined the Dutch invitation and refused to send any delegate to the conference. Indonesians further noted that the Dutch had no respect for freedom of expression; Dr. Hovens, the Chairman of the Den Pasar Conference, bluntly ordered four Indonesian journalists to walk out. The Republican government always encouraged Dutch journalists to inspect its system of administration. On the other hand, the Dutch did not allow Indonesian journalists to visit territories occupied by them. With sweeping intolerance they seemed willing to write off the Linggadjati values: goodwill and cooperation.

Many Dutch politicians on the home soil wrathfully assailed
the Linggadjati Agreement. Some of them like De Bruyn strongly advocated the maintenance of rigid empire discipline; Logemann repented, perhaps the Netherlands lacked the power to kill the Republic; Lieutenant General Roell irately recommended an undercover war. Gerbrandy, an ex-prime-minister, still rapped out the reeky thesis of a Japanese-sponsored Republic.

Dutch troops in Indonesia sedulously reciprocated the wishes of Dutch statesmen who could not attune their minds to decision by discussion. Pinke did not relax the naval blockade; Spoor tightened up the army offensive. Bogor was arrantly assaulted by the Dutch who liquidated the Republican administration in that city. This faithless attack shocked the Republic and her Commander-in-Chief, Sudirman, spoke against it in terms naturally mordant. The Dutch mischievously interpreted Sudirman's speech as a war-cry and expressed apprehension. But the general had only "passed the advice to his men to tighten their vigilance and to be better prepared for the worse." The Defence Minister, Dr. Sjarifuddin, said in his radio-speech on January 4, 1947: "The Bogor incident points out that the Dutch policy is not conciliatory, but a policy based on force and violence. This is indeed the desire of General Sudirman to unify all available energies of the people, realising that the Hollanders are attempting to undermine the sovereignty of the Indonesians."

The Dutch did not stop at Bogor. They ravaged other Republican territories, notably Palembang. Their ruthless bombardment in Palembang in early January resulted in heavy casualties especially among the Chinese. The Chinese Consul estimated Chinese casualties at 2050 killed, 1000 wounded, 600 missing, and 900 homeless. Antara reports said, the total material loss was about 5 million Straits dollars. The Dutch military operations and provocative actions seemed to come in an endless string while the Agreement lay unsigned.
Indonesians, drearily conscious of darker possibilities, complained that the Dutch were only "utilising both the Truce and the Linggadjati draft agreement as an instrument for the strengthening of their position, both politically and militarily, in order to be able to crush the Republic and to restore their rule in this country."37 They became hardened in their suspicions about the ultimate outcome of the Linggadjati accord especially as the prescription in the Commission General's Memorandum38 prescribed "that the sincerity of the intentions of the governments should not be made dubious by irresponsible action of individuals, either military or civilian, in the daily relations in Indonesia and in the Netherlands" was daily violated by Dutchmen in Indonesia. Indonesians felt that the Dutch legislature did not reject the draft mainly because it might ruin Holland's international prestige,39 and also because the statesmen hoped to manipulate adroitly the vague provisions of the Agreement and to execute ceaseless military manœuvrings.

The provisions of the Linggadjati Agreement were often vague and uncertain; they were bound to be so. The Linggadjati Agreement was not drawn up as an impeccable legal document; it was significant not simply as a legal document but as a 'political' document.40 Indistinct provisions inspired mischievous interpretations; they generated acute misgivings in the minds of Republicans, especially concerning Articles 8 and 14.41 Many Republicans feared that Article 8 sought to re-impose Dutch political sovereignty, and Article 14, by asking the Republic to recognize "the claims of all non-Indonesians to the restoration of their rights and restitution of their goals," would perpetuate economic exploitation by the Dutch. These fears seemed justified as the Commission General and Minister Jonkman perniciously interpreted the Agreement to mean Dutch sovereignty in the interim.
period and the monarch's supremacy in the Union. Thus it is difficult to see how, as Wolf maintains, "from a purely political point of view the Netherlands seemed to have made the greater concessions" in the Linggadjati deal. The Dutch viewed formal agreements as a means of throwing a sop to the national aspirations of millions of Indonesians while preserving the essential privileges of a few Dutchmen. They ought to have understood that the equation could not work out in the long run.

It was quite expected, therefore, that many Republicans would oppose the Agreement. The KNIP, i.e., the Republic's Parliament, could not meet as it was awaiting a reorganisation and expansion of its membership. The Republican Government called a meeting on January 14, 1947 where political leaders were invited to discuss the pros and cons of the Draft Agreement. Many leaders frankly expressed their apprehensions as regards Articles 8 and 14. Those who supported the Draft Agreement mainly argued that it provided a 'minimum base' for furthering national aims. The government while accepting the Agreement did not maintain that it guaranteed the fulfilment of all objectives; the Agreement was just a step forward. Sjarifuddin said: "Our revolution will not be realised in one single stroke! We shall reach our socialist goal, but for the present we are facing the national phase of the revolution! We need concentrate our efforts and our vital enterprises, organise our labour and farmer unions, in order to realise an Indonesia that is strong enough to meet the imperialism of foreign powers!" For all these tasks the Republic needed a 'breathing space' which, argued Sjarifuddin, was provided by the Agreement and justified its acceptance.

The KNIP met at Maleang, after reorganisation, to discuss the policy of the Sjahrir government. On March 5 it approved
the government policy in general and the Linggadjati Agreement in particular. Many Dutch journalists, representing the most reputed Dutch journals in Holland and Indonesia, attended the KNIP Conference at Malang. They had the opportunity to visit the interior of the Republic. They were never treated in an undignified manner. They were not looked upon as suspected foreigners. Republicans did not spy on them or check and censure their papers. They were free to form their own impressions about the young struggling Republic which were written into a manifesto they issued later on. This manifesto is to be considered one of the most important documents in studying the eclipse of Dutch colonialism in Indonesia. The manifesto proclaimed that (1) "the Republican idea is not merely felt by a thin stratum in society but by all shifts of the people as well"; (2) "this Republic is not based on race-discrimination or hatred against the whites, but that it is tolerant"; (3) it carries out a policy of peace and democracy.

The KNIP’s approval of the Agreement did not mean that the Republican government accepted the Dutch interpretations of the Agreement. The Dutch felt more and more self-righteous in their chauvinistic interpretations as they increased the strength of their troops in Indonesia. But Indonesians could not be browbeaten. The Republican Delegation sternly objected in its six letters to the Commission General dated February 14, 1947 and March 15, 1947, to the treacherous modifications of the Draft Agreement. The Dutch had to yield. The Commission General, in its letter of March 24, 1947, declared that it could sign the Agreement even though the Republic did not accept the Dutch interpretations. Next day the Linggadjati Agreement was signed.

For the Dutch the signature was not very important. It did not mean any vital change in their ignominiously aggressive policies. Their actions remained stereotyped. They increased their
troops strength, while the Republic reduced its armed forces in accordance with Article 16 of the Linggadjati Agreement. The Dutch forces went on invading Republican territories. They occupied Modjokerto, a Republican territory. They seized vessels in the Republic’s territorial waters. One important case of unlawful seizure was that of the American Steamship 'Martin Behrman'. The protests of Mr. Ryan, the supervisor of the ship, were unavailing. Mr. Ryan stated that "the Dutch Naval Warship, the destroyer 'Kortenaer' committed a most serious breach of international law by making a naval raid in time of peace into the Indonesian-controlled territorial waters and port of Cheribon and seizing there by force the American steamship 'Martin Behrman' which was lying peacefully at anchor and then by force compelling her and her crew and cargo to proceed from Cheribon and later enter the Dutch-controlled port of Batavia while accompanied at all times by the Dutch destroyer which had threatened to sink her if she attempted to escape while on the enforced voyage from Cheribon to Batavia."  

Hollander rendered the Agreement a pathetic little paper edifice by the policy of creating a number of separatist states. On may 4, 1947, they hatched up the state of West Java exploiting a few conspiratorial leaders and encouraging the growth of the regional Sundanese language in that area. "Actually the whole movement was a farce", comments Charles Wolf, "from start to finish. In the first place, the two top leaders chosen for the movement were the most impossible selections imaginable. Soeria Kartalegawa, the President, had been widely regarded as a never-dowell and Raden Mas Koestomo, the Prime Minister, had been released from a mental institution in Buitenzorg only a few months before the proclamation of independence!" Hollander utilised the puppet Sundanese Peoples' Party which "had no contact whatsoever with the Sundanese..."
people as such, since the organisation had never ventured outside the Dutch-held cities of Bandoeng and Buitenzorg. Indonesian nationalists rightly held the movement as a kind of blackmail "reminiscent of the methods used by fascist minorities which spearheaded projected annexation as the period prior to the outbreak of second world war had so many instances to show." The political record of Surya Kartalegawa was a virulent mixture of opportunism and atrocity. Before the Japanese invasion he "attended the Dutch interest more devoutly than the Dutch themselves." During the Japanese occupation he turned into a tyrannical enemy of all Hollanders. Surya Kartalegawa and the Sundanese Peoples' party were simply pursuing selfish objectives devoid of any nationalist aim.

Kartalegawa and other Dutch agents could not claim that they were voicing the nationalist aspirations of a group of people inhabiting a particular area and bound together by the Sundanese language. For the people were pertinaciously opposing Dutch machinations. When the Republican President Dr. Sukarno visited the districts of the Sundanese people he was warmly welcomed. When the puppet state of West Java was proclaimed the Sundanese people organised mass meetings to pass resolutions professing loyalty to the Republic.

In other territories also people gallantly fought Holland's separatist stratagems. In the absence of popular support separatism was converted into crude terrorism. Celebes was the worst victim of Dutch terrorism. In Celebes the Dutch employed Raymond Westerling to pacify the people revolting against the Dutch. Westerling had the peculiar mental make-up of a blood-thirsty savage. He carried out sanguinary services with breath-taking ruthlessness. But peoples' all-conquering passion for freedom rose up again and again to thwart Dutch nostrums. The people in Minado, Northern Celebes set up a Congress of Republican Political Parties to fight the Dutch menace in a
concerted way. It recognised only the Republican government as the
legitimate authority over the whole of Indonesia without being
afraid of the methods of terror, plunder and rape used by the
Dutch. President Sukawati, the head of the puppet government,
remained silent; he toured Holland while the whole of Celebes
was groaning under Dutch brutality. Antara reported on May 2,
1947, that in Makassar alone during December, 1946 - March, 1947,
the Dutch summarily executed about 40,000 persons who were suspec
ted of pro-Republican sympathies.

Reports of heroic struggles of the people outside the
Republic filled Republicans with anxiety, admiration and also
additional confidence. Sjarir declared before the KNIP that
for him there did not exist any such thing as a Malino Territory
but only one entity, Indonesia, over a part of which the Republic
had yet to establish its authority and oust Hollanders permanently.

The Dutch did not take any lessons from popular reactions
which made heresies of cherished dogmas about colonialism. They
would not face facts and acknowledge the strength of the Republic.
The realm of possibilities was for the Dutch a frightening place.
They blindly proceeded to set up the puppet States of West
Borneo and East Borneo on May 12 and May 17 respectively.
An obvious parallel to the role of Kartalegawa in West Java was that
of Sultan Hamid in Borneo. Sultan Hamid energetically assisted the
Dutch in forming the puppet State of West Borneo. He had "indeed
many reasons to be grateful to the Dutch and feel greatly attached
to them". For, "before the war he served as a lieutenant in the
Dutch army. Soon after the Dutch returned to Indonesia he was
promoted lieutenant colonel by General Spoor. A short time after-
wards followed his appointment as Sultan of Pontianak". The strength
of those fragile states was little more than growing portions of
Dutch military power which could be scraped off from their overall
commitments in Indonesia. Dutch troops never stopped pouring in.
Reports from Amsterdam indicated that on April 25, 2000 Dutch marines
boarded 'Booissevain' on the way to Indonesia, and on May 2 'Indrapoera' would start with another 1200.

Meanwhile the Republican government gained confidence as it began to receive political recognition and moral support from the outside world and could reasonably expect more in future. Abdul Munim, a representative of the Arab League, visited the Republic and told Sukarno that the States of the Arab League would recognise the Republican government. Indonesians heartily interpreted this as a genuine expression of Arab goodwill towards them.

The Republic became buoyant as she was invited to participate in the Asian Relations Conference meeting in New Delhi from March 23 to April 2. Republicans were elated particularly because for the first time they would be sending delegates to an international conference. Indonesians were glad that they were not being guided or accompanied by foreign advisers at the Conference. The greatest significance of the Republic's participation, emphasised by Abu Hanifah, the leader of the Indonesian delegation was "that the Indonesian people cannot easily be kept in an isolated position as before." Abu Hanifah declared that Indonesians loved peace and wanted peace also with the Dutch; but, the Dutch must recognise their independence.

The Asian Relations Conference symbolised the growth of common consciousness and solidarity among Asians and their bold determination to play a prominent role in world affairs. They wanted, it was apparent, to end the state of quiescence to which they were consigned by their former imperialist masters. They discussed at the conference various common problems and thereby developed mutual understanding that could inspire active cooperation. But the Conference was not conceived in a spirit of narrowness and did not constitute a flamboyant challenge of Asians to
the rest of the world. "Asia stretches her hand out in friendship to Europe and America as well as to our suffering brethren in Africa." Asia sought to answer the past European conquests by delivering a message of love and truth and thereby completely subjugating the West.

This conference provided, indeed, a grand forum for the expression of noble thoughts of international collaboration. But it did not assure any positive action against the perpetuation of colonialism in some Asian countries who were struggling desperately. It did not even pass a vague resolution promising concerted action by Asian States to prevent the suppression of national freedom in Asia. An Indonesian delegate rightly pointed out that mere expressions of sympathy were ineffective and that the conference should produce something of concrete assistance to freedom fighters. An Indian delegate frankly declared that only moral support could be offered to countries like Indonesia or Vietnam; otherwise, he was afraid, the areas of conflict would widen. Under those circumstances Nehru was quaintly ambitious when he declared that Asians must also help Africans to take a rightful place in the community of nations.

Abu Hanifah found an ally in the leader of the Vietnam delegation, Tran Van Luan, and published a joint statement urging collective action by Asian States to save the people of Asia from falling a prey to imperialism. This statement was not surely to achieve anything and only perhaps focussed attention on the failure of about 250 delegates coming from 30 countries to evolve any formula for collective action. Indonesia delegates, however, could return home with one salubrious memory: the plenary conference unanimously adopted a Report on National Movement for Freedom in Asia which contained a suggestion that the Republic of Indonesia should be immediately recognised by other Asian States. Then minds of Asian statesmen snuggly flew on the plane of harmless generalities and aspirations: "Let us
therefore put all our energies into the task of making this conference as the beginning of mutual endeavour on the part of the Asians for a better world in which the granting of political, social and economic justice to all will lead to a "One Asia" which will in time expand into "One World." 91

While the Asian Relations Conference was in session and promising recognition of the Republic by other States, Britain extended de facto recognition to her and undeniably raised her status in world opinion. The life of struggling Republicans was by its very nature one of deep mortification, but they had their compensations as they received foreign recognition. On April 17 the U.S.A. granted de facto recognition to the Indonesian Republic of Java, Sumatra and Madura.93

But the Dutch failed to convert the breathing space afforded by the Linggadjati Agreement into a political initiative. They only extended the sterile rapacity of their archaic policies. As already noted, Dutch troops crossed the demarcation line established by the truce agreement and suddenly invaded Medjokerto9 which indisputably belonged to the Republic. In Bogor, the Dutch gradually destroyed the Republic's apparatus of civil administration functioning before and during the British occupation. The Dutch pledged to respect the de facto authority of the Republic in civil affairs after the departure of the British95 They violated the pledge deliberately and augmented the distrust of their intentions prevalent among Republicans. Events like these only demonstrated, said Sjahri in his official comment, that "reduction of the Dutch forces in Indonesia was still essential for the practical implementation of the Linggadjati Agreement.96

Hollander always believed that if troops and armaments could be brought to Indonesia in sufficient quantity they could "impose a solution by force. After uninterrupted import of troops
and a successful blockade the belief became a certainty. Many eminent politicians in Holland as also the right-wing newspapers screamed threats of war. The government of Holland at that time was a Catholic-Labour coalition. The Catholic group always agitated for war to weed out all complications in Indonesia. The Labour group was less aggressive and some leaders like Schermerhorn, an ex-Prime Minister and an author of the Lingadji Agreement, wanted to avoid war. The Labour government in Britain could perhaps use some influence on the Labour leaders of Holland and arrest the drift towards war, especially because Britain had helped the Dutch to return to Indonesia and also strengthened them by keeping large stocks of armaments. Yet the extent of that influence was surely limited because the rank and file of the Dutch Labour Party became war-minded and won over persons like Schermerhorn. War came nearer when the Dutch Prime Minister Beel and the Minister for Overseas Territories Jonkman came to Djakarta and conferred with Van Mook, the Commission General; Van Mook accepted the view that the situation called for forceful methods. "It was in fact a pre-war conference," Beel decided that "military action might be necessary."

The Republic's military machine was reorganized on May 6 when a presidential decree unified the official armed forces and irregular fighting groups into one national army. But the Dutch army was far stronger with its highly mechanized and better trained units. Dutchmen confidently began to prepare a pretext for starting large-scale hostilities. It, therefore, caused no surprise to the Republican government when the Dutch Commission General handed over an ultimatum on May 27, 1947, broaching the alternatives of unreserved acceptance of enforcement of those Dutch demands. It only made the long-anticipated dangers more imminent. The memorandum of May 27 had the little-
concealed aim of securing Holland's political and economic dominance over the whole of Indonesia until January 1, 1949, when Indonesians would be granted independence. An interim government, the memorandum said, would rule Indonesia till that date, and the Dutch would control that interim government. During this interim period the final decision-making authority would be vested in the hands of a representative of the Dutch crown. This interim government, a slightly overhauled version of the old colonial government — and not the Republic — would determine the foreign economic and political relations of Indonesia. Furthermore, a joint Dutch-Indonesian gendarmerie, made up of an equal number of Dutch and Indonesian soldiers, was to maintain law and order in Indonesia including the Republican territory. The memorandum, of course, contemplated the termination of Dutch sovereignty on January 1; but this temporary domination definitely contained the alarming possibility of a permanent conquest.

Even if this was not the real aim, the provisions of the memorandum were sufficiently pernicious to the Republicans who were flippantly ordered to abandon all they had gained after years of harrowing struggle. It thus included many items which the Indonesians had "refused to accept at the time of the signing of the Linggadjati Agreement. What was supposed to have been cancelled proved to have come back in another guise." The whole tone of the 10000-worded document was high-handed and pointed to the possible penalty of war for non-compliance.

It could not be deemed unnatural if the Republic rejected the memorandum, Sjahrir, the realist, could sense the coming of war. Sjahrir, the moderate, wanted to continue negotiations although the Dutch were set against that. He tried to avoid war even if temporarily. Sjahrir knew how to carry on negotiations in the face of the opponents' impossible demands, without jettisoning his vital interests. In his Note of June 8 to the Dutch he accepted the plan of interim government in principle but
suggested modifications in the Dutch plan. For example, he refused to grant supreme power to the representative of the Dutch crown and rejected the proposal of a joint Dutch-Indonesian gendarmerie. Sjahrir made a show of appeasing the Dutch and won congratulations from a section of the press in Holland. But the Note of June 3 firmly challenged the rancorous surmises about the Republic contained in the memorandum of May 27. The memorandum repeatedly professed the idea that the Republican regime was devoid of law and order, peace and prosperity. The Republican Note expressed astonishment "since visitors to Republican territory, not few in number, including also Netherlanders in official and unofficial capacities, were able to witness themselves with their own eyes the prosperity and peacefulness prevailing in the Republican territory. Against this there are many signs in the territory occupied by the Netherlanders that point to the inadequacy of the guarantees for the manifestation of the truly democratic principles, as for example, the arrest of leaders, the detention of people with inadequate warrants, the searching of journalists". The Note protested against the constant crossing of demarcation lines by the Dutch and the separatist movements sponsored by them. It also recognised the establishment of Republican authority in areas partly or fully occupied or controlled by the Netherlands Army as the natural consequence of the formation of an interim government.

But Sjahrir's conciliatory mood could not make any breach in the wall of Dutch indifference and hostility. The Commission General sent a letter to him stating with blustering frankness that its plan for an interim government was to be accepted as final and leaving no room for further negotiations. Sjahrir was forced to make unbelievable concessions with the drooping hope of postponing conflict. In his Note of June 20 to the
Commission General and also in his Radio Speech of the preceding
day he agreed to grant de jure special powers to the representa­
tive of the Dutch crown in the interim government in accordance
with the May 27 memorandum. On June 21 the Commission General
sent another letter in which it expressed satisfaction over
Sjahrir's letter of June 20. But Sjahrir's latest move caused
a cabinet crisis. The letter of June 20 had to be drafted hastily
and in an atmosphere of extreme urgency. Sjahrir did not have
the opportunity to consult all his colleagues excepting a few.
They turned against him and condemned his policy of
concessions which, they could argue, made a doubtful virtue out
of an imposed necessity. But this argument was not the real
explanation of their withdrawal of support from Sjahrir's policy.
At least two of them, Abdulmajid and Sjarifuddin, at first
accepted his policy and immediately afterwards turned into bitter
antagonists. The real reason of opposing Sjahrir seems to be
political opportunism and jealousy of his colleagues who grabbed
a chance to unseat him; Sjahrir resigned on June 27. This view
will be upheld by the fact that the next cabinet, headed by
Sjarifuddin, did not repudiate Sjahrir's concessions. It should
also be emphasised here that Sjahrir was never a blind appeaser
and conceded a special position to the representative of the
Dutch crown only initially. He declared pointedly that "during
the first period of the setting up of the interim government the
representative of the Crown occupies a position which is de
jure and formally in accordance with what was proposed in the
Commission General's note. In its further development, however,
we expect the interim government to approach nearer to what we
have pictured out in our counternote, to be dissolved finally
into the sovereign government of the United States of Indonesia."

Soon after Sjahrir's resignation his opponents realised
their mistakes, upheld his policy and urged him to come back to
the cabinet as the Prime Minister. President Sukarno also made
the same request. Sjahrir declined. In his opinion "it had already become clear there was a likelihood of war. I did my best to avert this catastrophe, and resigned only when it appeared to be unavoidable." He was right. The cabinet crisis almost launched with the attempt of the Dutch to launch a colonial war in Indonesia averted only by the last minute intervention by the U.S.A. Lieutenant General Spoor, the Commander of Dutch land-forces in Indonesia, issued an Order that the Dutch troops must attack the Republic on June 30, provided no different instructions were issued on June 28. Republicans fortunately got the news in the afternoon of June 28. The Republic's Ministry of Information immediately referred the matter to Van Mook and demanded an official statement. Van Mook pleaded ignorance and at first refused to contradict the news officially. Later on he agreed and Radio Batavia officially repudiated the news of an armed Dutch action. William Foote, the United States Consul, was working promptly and decisively at this critical moment. On the same day, i.e., June 28, he handed over an aide memoire of the State Department to the Republican government. Possibly the resignation of Sjahrir was interpreted by the Dutch as the termination of all negotiations and, according to many Republicans, it was this aide memoire which stopped the Dutch military action and enabled Sjahrir's successors to carry on further negotiations. Sukarno sent a message to the State Department expressing his gratitude.

The State Department Note stressed "to the Indonesian Republic the sufferings likely to result from a further deadlock." It stated that economic rehabilitation in Indonesia had to await political stability which could be earned by the formation of an interim government 'on a basis of mutual benefits for both sides'. The Note tactfully talked about the possibility of U.S. aid flowing to Indonesia after the establishment of the interim
government. The Note was impolitic in one respect; it was an exhortation to the Republic but not so directly to the Netherlands government. "The American Note was regarded as having been sent to the wrong address; American pressure was needed most where the desire for war was strongest - in the Hague." Of course, the State Department could defend itself that it upheld the principle of mutual benefits and did not ignore Indonesia's needs and sentiments. Indonesians too felt flattered as the State Department explicitly recognised their importance as a factor in world stability, both economic and political.

The U.S. aide memoire forced the Dutch to keep the door partly open. But they never conceived of negotiations of negotiations as anything less than an unconditional acceptance of all their demands. This became apparent as Sjarifuddin, who succeeded Sjahrir as the Republican Premier, offered far-reaching concessions and was utterly disappointed. In a Note of July 8 the Republican government informed the Dutch that it agreed to have a representative of the Dutch crown, wielding de jure supremacy, in the interim government; to refrain from conducting foreign relations independently during the interim period; to recognise the rights of foreigners to plantations. In trying to conciliate the Dutch the Republic almost capitulated. Yet the Dutch were not satisfied. They adamantly stuck to the demand of a joint Dutch-Indonesian constabulary and issued a preposterous ultimatum that the Republic should once again order a cease-fire, hinting thereby that the Republic had all the time been violating the truce agreement. It was impossible for the Republic to fulfil these demands. Nor was it unnatural for the Republic to believe that their satisfaction would prompt the creation of others. She even went so far as to permit the interim government to assume control over those areas where her policemen might fail to maintain order. But the Dutch were unyielding; war seemed inevitable. Republicans' apprehensions were being justified by current developments. On the Dutch side military preparations were intensive and...
stepped up; in Holland many newspapers prescribed war as the only way out of the Indonesian impasse. On July 20, 1947, Beel, Premier of Holland, ordered the first military action to blow up the Republic.

Holland offered two excuses for the commencement of the colonial war. The Dutch-occupied territories in Indonesia were facing a food crisis which could only be met by forceful methods, for the Republic was eminently successful in blocking supplies of food-grains to those territories. This accusation was true, but irrelevant in the sense that the Republic, possessing the food-producing areas, could not be expected to feed Dutch soldiers who were determined to crush herself. Secondly, the Dutch benevolently wanted to restore law and order in the Republican territory which, they complained, was plunged in chaos and disorder on account of an inefficient administration. This accusation was false. The Republic was steadily progressing in enforcing control over her territory despite severe political and economic handicaps.

The mechanised columns of the Dutch infantry, aided by a death-spitting air-force, quickly advanced far inside the Republican territory. The Republicans accepted the challenge. "Let us take position in every wood, house, ditch or river. Conquer every inch of ground that has fallen into the enemy's hands," said Sukarno. The Republicans fought resolutely. Their troops lacked modern equipment, yet they faced Dutch motorised units fearlessly.

Holland forgot that she could retain Indonesian goodwill if she had renounced force although that would entail speedy withdrawal. She ought to have taken this risk, since the risks of war are always greater.
FIRST MILITARY ACTION

ADDITIONAL NOTES

1. "All those who have taken part in the deliberations should be congratulated on the outcome of their laborious enterprise," The V.F.I., Nov. 23, 1946, p. 50.

2. Ibid, p. 61.


5. Ibid

6. Ibid


8. Republican Review (Note 6).

9. One instance: "In the Djakarta daily 'Berita Indonesia' (6 Dec. '46) Prawoto Soemodilogo discusses the notorious incident at Krandji Station, where Dutch troops had humiliated Indonesian officials." The V.F.I., Dec. 7, 1946, p. 93.

   Ibid, p. 82. "Unfortunately there occurred incidents recently in which high-ranking Indonesian officials have been subjected to undue treatment that was tantamount to outright indignity. The news of such happenings travel fast and is by no means conducive to the improvement of the atmosphere which we all desire."

10. For the Text see the V.F.I., Nov. 23, 1946 and Sastroamidjojo and Delson, op. cit.

10A. Sastroamidjojo and Reaz Delson, op. cit, p. 31.


13. Ibid, p. 32.

14. Ibid.
Mr. Hamid Algadrie comments in The V.F.I., Dec. 28, 1946, p. 116: "... articles 6 and 8 on one side and articles 2 and 1 on the other form the cardinal points of the entire Draft. The remaining articles are but the consequence or accents upon the two main principles."

Radio-speech of Hatta, the Vice-President of the Republic, on the occasion of the first anniversary of the Republic. See The V.F.I., August 23, 1946, p. 3.

Sastroamidjojo and Delson, op. cit., pp. 16-17.

Indonesians felt that Jonkman's interpretation "reduced the political significance of the agreement to less than minimal demands of the Republic;" they were aggrieved as "Minister Jonkman, contrary to explicit provisions in the preamble to the Agreement, claimed it was not a treaty which needs ratification." The V.F.I., December 28, 1946, p. 116.

Note 20, p. 36, 38.


(1) The S.K.I. (Sarekat Kerakjatan Indonesia), a popular organisation in Borneo, refused to send any delegate, see The V.F.I., January 4, 1947, p. 139.

(2) The popular organisation in North Moluccas, the Persatuan Indonesia Ternate, also refused, and "pledged to stand squarely by the Republican government." See the V.F.I., December 7, 1946, p. 96.

Jonkman's care for misrepresenting Indonesian nationalism is understandable, but it seems ridiculous that a foreign observer like David Wezi should make up his mind on utterly
insufficient evidence and conclude that the majority of Indonesians welcomed a return to prewar colonial rule mainly because this was fatuously argued out in a letter written by one Mas Slamet to the Netherlands queen. See The Birth of Indonesia, London, Allen & Unwin, 1948, p.100.


It may be pointed out that at the Pangkalpinang Conference "an Arab' representative while speaking his free views in favour of the Republican government was asked by the Chairman to stop his speech." Ibid, p.130.

27. Ibid, p.129.

28. Ibid.


30. See his book 'Indonesia' for innumerable references. Also see the V.F.I., February 1, 1947, p.190.

31. "Whilst Dutch politicians play... delaying tactics, the Dutch military... plan a series of operations with 'limited objectives', according to General Spoor, 'to eliminate resistance without stirring up trouble over a wide area'. He has 100,000 men and vast quantities of British supplies left over after the withdrawal of British troops last November." The N.S. & N., March 8, 1946, p.146.


33. Ibid.

34. Ibid, p.155.

35. The V.F.I., January 18, 1947, p.185.

36. Ibid.


38. Ibid, p.118.

39. Ibid, p.117.

40. The V.F.I., January 4, 1947, p.139.
42. See Notes 19, 20, 21 in this Chapter and the text thereto.
43. The Indonesian Story, p.44.
44. Even Van Hook admitted in more sober moments that "doubtful interpretations of the agreement" put forward by the Netherlands "torpedoed the whole thing." See Louis Fischer, The Story of Indonesia, p.96.
46. Ibid
49. The V.F.I., March 15, 1947, p.283. Incidentally, this was the birthday of Prime Minister Sjahrir.
50. It should be noted that on their return to Dutch-occupied territory from Malang these journalists were treated in a way which the Dutch daily 'Nieuwsblad' condemned as a 'downright outrage' and 'a most violent contrast with our experiences in the Republic, which have been of the most pleasant nature'. Ibid, pp.304-6.
52. "By the use of artificial interpretations, after the initialling of the draft agreement, they tried to retract commitments they had made. And the more troops they sent to Indonesia, the more just they found their own interpretation...." Sjahrir, Out of Exile, p.285.
53. Santrocamidjojo and Delsen, op. cit., pp.16, 42.
54. Ibid, pp.16, 43

"Governor Van Hook noted that soon after the initialling of the Linggadjati text, Indonesian armed bands and army troops commenced going home; a sense of relaxation spread over the Republican territory." Louis Fischer, op. cit., p.97.
Also see 'The N.S. & N.', May 24, 1947, p.367.


57. "Many traders suffered total losses, and sometimes the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Singapore would buy the two centre pages of a Malayan newspaper and there advertise their grievances in huge type, denouncing the utter illegality of these seizures, and arguing that they amounted to unashamed piracy." John Coast, op. cit., p.38.


60. Charles Wolf, op. cit., p.108. The remarks of Wolf are quoted extensively primarily because they are coming from an expert having no particular bias in favour of Republicans.

61. Ibid, Wolf.


63. Ibid, p.404.

64. In the book 'Indonesia under the Japanese heel' Elias says that during the Japanese occupation Kartalegawa "had turned into a fierce enemy of Europeans. He immediately set out dismissing European personnel including those in the surrounding estates. In all possible ways he tried to humiliate the Dutch women in particular." Quoted in The V.F.I., May 10, 1947, p.404.
65 Ibid
66 Ibid
Also see The V.F.I., March 15, 1947, p. 294
68 The book 'Challenge to Terror' as a whole is a testimony, especially pp. 12, 19, 31.
Read, for example, in pp. 31-32 about the end of the second world war: "While the world was joyfully celebrating the end of hostilities, I was plunged into gloom. My thirst for adventure had not been sated. The taste I had had of war was only sufficient to stimulate my craving for excitement. And now it was definitely too late. Hostilities were over, peace had come, the world settled down to a quiet, tranquil, humdrum existence again, welcome no doubt to most of its inhabitants, but intensely boring to a nature like mine, which demanded excitement, activity, danger."
69 Perhaps later on the Netherlands government was startled by its own savagery and condemned Westerling. Westerling grumbles: "... it has been convenient for the Dutch government - which has not, however, had the good faith to publish the various official, military, judicial and parliamentary reports on the pacification of the Celebes - to make of me ...... a scapegoat for the abuses and excesses committed by all those who operated under its authority." See Challenge to Terror, p. 123.
70 The V.F.I., February 1, 1947, p. 190.
71 Stated by a member of the KNIL while it was in session - See The V.F.I., March 15, 1947, p. 294.

"Most resistance leaders who were not killed were jailed. Over one-fourth of the Indonesian aristocratic rulers of southwest Celebes (including the most important of them) were removed by the Dutch and replaced by more amenable individuals. The remainder were thus convinced that retention of their
positions depended upon their supporting Dutch policy."
Kahin, NRI, p.145.
72. The V.F.I., March 15, 1947, p.294
73 The V.F.I., May 10, 1947, p.406
74 The V.F.I., February 1, 1947, p.190
75 The V.F.I., March 15, 1947, p.294
76 B.Ahmad, op. cit., p.20

As usual, people opposed the Dutch move. "Wherever possible all over Borneo associations were founded with the one aim of a speedy inclusion into the Republic."
76A The V.F.I., May 24, 1947, p.437
76B Ibid
78 Facts on File, 1947, p.90
79 The V.F.I., March 22, 1947, p.308
80 Ibid
82 Ibid, p.49
83 Inaugural Address by Nehru.
84 Ibid
85 Ibid.

"In the first flush of independence the pendulum may swing towards an Asiatic nationalism, and Nehru, in an extremely fine opening speech, was careful to emphasize the need for a peaceful resurgent Asia, very backward and with appalling-ly low standards of life, to play its part in a World Federation." The N.S. & N. April 5, 1947, p.226.
It is a startling fact that Japan, with the recent ineradicable record of atrocities in Asia, was spared bitter invective at the Conference. "A significant feature of the Conference was that 90 per cent of the delegates, in reply to questions, showed that they bore no 'cultural, scientific or economic malice' toward Japan." The N.S. & N., April 5, 1947, p.226.

Statement by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons, March 31, 1947 - House of Commons Deb., 5th Ser., Vol.435, Col.1657.

The V.F.I., May 31, 1947, p.463. "And this de facto authority the Dutch undertook to respect, when they took over control from the British Forces, by the acceptance by the Commission General of the Resolution drafted by the Joint Civil Affairs Commission in which the Republic agreed with handing over of control from Allied to Dutch officials, pending a final political solution, on the understanding that the status quo in civil affairs, as per October 04, 1946, would be respected pending such a solution."
Het Parool said: "Now that Indonesia has replied to our Note in a spirit of goodwill, and clearly with the purpose of making a contribution to the final agreement, the Netherlands ought to reject outright every thought of the alternative of bloodshed." Cited in Woodman, op. cit., p.233.

It should be mentioned here that the Dutch wanted to offer equal representation to the Republic and the puppet-States of East Indonesia and West Borneo. The Dutch agents in those States clamoured for equality, forgetting that "the aim of the Republic is to raise both East Indonesia and West Borneo from their present position of an autonomous part of the Netherlands kingdom to the height of her own status as a free country. They do not realise that in demanding equal representation with the Republic in the interim government they actually make an attempt to degrade the Republic to their own status." The V.F.I., June 28, 1947, p.516.

Ibid. This issue contains the Texts of the letter from the Indonesian delegation dated June 20 and the letter from the Commission General dated June 21, 1947.
Woodman inaccurately puts the date as June 10, op. cit., p. 234

"In retirement, Mr. Sjahrir can have the satisfaction of knowing that his ideas have prevailed even if his premiership did not." *N.Y. Times*, Ed., July 9, 1947, p. 22.

The *V.F.I.*, June 21, 1947, p. 518

Sjahrir, *Out of Exile*, p. 265

It is correct to say that "the Dutch troops, over-confident and arrogant because they somewhat foolishly imagined that a mechanized drive to Jogja would kill Indonesian nationalism, were straining at the leash." *Coast*, op. cit., p. 48

The *V.F.I.*, July 5, 1947, p. 530

"The denial by the Dutch Information Service and by the Military Information Service did not mean of course that there had been no such order to make an attack on the Republic." *Ibid*.

"The aide memoire came at the right moment. It brought a relief in the political and military tension. It is generally believed that it was this American note that averted an armed conflict in Indonesia." *Ibid*.

Text of the aide memoire. Italics mine.

"The American Note offering economic aid to an interim government had the effect of curbing the enthusiasm of the Dutch military and naval authorities to fight against the Indonesian Republic..." *The N.Y. & N.*, July 12, 1947, p. 22.

Woodman, op. cit., p. 234. Van Mook is not correct when he says that the 'United States government presented a note to both parties urging acceptance of the draft proposals' (i.e., those in the May 27 Note). *Van Mook, SDSEA*, p. 242.

The *V.F.I.*, July 12, 1947, p. 544.

*N.Y. Times*, July 9, 1947.
121 This was readily admitted by all impartial foreign critics: "On the two points which are now the most important at issue - a cease-fire order and creation of a joint constabulary - the Republicans would seem to have the weight of logic on their side." N.Y. Times, July 18, 1947, p.16.

122 More and more we have the impression that the Dutch are now in fact dictating their conditions to the Indonesian Republic. In case the Republic should not be prepared to accept the conditions integrally the Dutch are going to resort to violence since they know that they are militarily very strong at the present moment and may expect to defeat the Republic in a very short space of time." The V.F.I., July 12, 1947, p.545.

Mark Van Mook's cryptic observation: "The republic expected a clash; the Dutch could no longer see how it was to be avoided." op. cit., p.242.

123 "Several Dutch papers in the Netherlands recommended an operation to overthrow the Republic." The V.F.I., July 12, 1947, p.549.

124 Van Mook writes in a spirit of malicious misrepresentation: "The clinical method had failed; a surgical operation was necessary to save the patient from the cancer of lawlessness and terrorism." op. cit., p.243.

125 Radio Address of Van Mook on August 20, 1947.

126 Kahin too holds a similar view. "At the time the Dutch launched their attack the Republic's control over its territory was greater both as to extent and effectiveness than it had ever been before; likewise its control over and the discipline and integration of its armed units were greater than they had ever been." op.cit., p.212.

127 Radio Address on July 24, 1947.

128 Republican Review, November 1, 1949, p.40. Published by the Ministry of Information, Republic of Indonesia.