The British troops landed in Djakarta harbour on September 29, 1945, while Japan had unconditionally surrendered on August 14\(^1\), and the South East Asia Command (SEAC) of the Allies suspended its operations on August 15, although the preparations for an assault on Malaya\(^2\) had been already made and resources moved and mobilised accordingly. The landing of Allied forces in Indonesia could not take place earlier because the entire plan of the SEAC had to be modified. Netherlanders, who looked forward to a speedy re-establishment of colonial authority in the Indies, mourned the delay as it gave the nationalists in Indonesia the much-needed respite to consolidate their authority. They also interpreted it as a cynical betrayal of the interests of a small power associated with big powers whose activities could not be dictated by the former, however compelling its need might be. Hollanders, too anxious to resurrect their colonial authority, overlooked the various causes of delay.

A major cause of the delay was the administrative re-organisation of the South East Asia Command.\(^5\) On July 24 it was decided at Potsdam that the SEAC would be expanded to cover the whole of Indonesia and parts of Indo-China. Initially, Lord Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander, SEAC, had only Sumatra under his care. The expansion had been recommended to relieve General Macarthur of the SWPAC (South West Pacific Area Command) and to enable him to prepare a final assault on Japan. The transfer of areas to the SEAC, however, posed tremendous problems for Mountbatten. He did not have the requisite intelligence services, shipping facilities or the advantages of a properly fortified base. Resources of the SEAC needed diversion from the projected invasion of Malaya that was guiding the SEAC Policy.
before Japan's surrender. The British Pacific Fleet did not assist Lord Mountbatten while the areas under his command enlarged. Intelligence Staff and Files on the new areas were never made available to him. Mountbatten was further worried by the presence of fully-armed large battalions of Japanese soldiers in various parts of South East Asia. They might or might not have received the surrender news. They might decide to ignore the surrender orders and resist allied occupation. Above all, resources available to Lord Mountbatten were totally insufficient for a full-scale occupation although they might have sufficed for war-operations. Responsibilities of full-scale occupation far outweighed the resources at the disposal of SPAC and were thoroughly different from those of invasion only. An invader is not troubled by the difficulties of peace-time demands and national aspirations of local peoples. An occupying power, after the surrender of the enemy, is beset with many such complicated problems.

All these accounted for the delay in the arrival of Allied Forces in Indonesia. To avoid Japanese resistance it was decided that occupation should await the acceptance of final surrender terms by Macarthur in the Tokyo Bay. Occupation had also to depend on the establishment of a base in Singapore that would facilitate the movement of supplies.

Meanwhile the Republic, since the proclamation of August 17, 1945, surged forward. "The effect of the proclamation was tremendous. It was as though our Indonesian people had been electrified. A majority of the Indonesian civil servants, administrators, police and military groups immediately declared their support of the Republic. National strength and Unity reached greater heights than anything we had known before."
The Preparatory Commission for Indonesian Independence set about the task of reconstructing the political machinery of the country. The task was arduous as the debris of centuries of foreign exploitation had to be cleared: "The Dutch occupied Indonesia for three and a half centuries, the Japanese for three and a half years." On August 18, the Preparatory Commission formulated the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. The Constitution proclaimed the faith of Indonesians in popular sovereignty and sought to realise parliamentary democracy. It is important to note that, contrary to the propaganda and misgivings of many Dutch statesmen and writers, fascist principles were not enshrined in the Constitution. On the same day the Preparatory Commission elected Sukarno and Hatta as the President and the Vice-President respectively, who appealed to the people to maintain discipline and order.

On August 19 the Preparatory Commission divided the Republic into 8 provinces and constituted 12 ministries. It took more important steps three days later as it established the foundations of (a) the Indonesian parliament, (b) the party system and (c) the National Army by deciding to create respectively (a) the Central National Committee (Komite Nasional Pusat), (b) the Indonesian National Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia), and (c) the People's Security Board (Badan Kesamamn Rakjat). As regards the formation of the Indonesian Nationalist Party the leaders were in a quandary. Fully armed Japanese were still a menace to the security of the infant Republic. Doubts about the winning of international recognition haunted the leaders. They began to ponder whether parties should exist as instruments of struggle or whether the parliament, strengthened by one political party reflecting the unity of the people, should be the agency to preserve freedom. The government declared on August 31 that the formation of the Indonesian Nationalist Party...
was postponed. This indicated the importance of the parliament as the instrument of nationalist action and also permitted political parties to be used as levers for national interests. The parties would further the aims of national independence by working through the Indonesian Parliament (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat or KNIP) and also by working themselves outside the KNIP.

The Constitution stipulated the formation of a Cabinet to aid the President. The members of the Cabinet will be responsible to the President following the model in the U.S.A. The President himself is answerable to the popular assembly. The President's Cabinet was finally set up on September 4, 1945, while the KNIP had been inaugurated on August 29.

The surrender and the birth of the Republic must have disbalanced many of the Japanese. Many became fatalists and ceased to assert authority. Others refused to accept the authority of nationalists and were involved in skirmishes. Sometimes prolonged clashes between the Republicans and the Japanese resulted in heavy casualties. Some Japanese voluntarily surrendered arms either in order to strengthen Indonesians as against the victorious enemies of Japan or to buy off their security from the attacks of the resistance organisations. The members of resistance groups attacked the Japanese simply to satisfy old grievances or to capture arms necessary for opposing the restitution of the Dutch regime. The Japanese were sometimes easy targets partly because they were tired of dramatic events, caught in sad uncertainties, disappointed with frustrated hopes.

Sukarno directed Indonesians not to obey the Japanese. This precipitated pitched battles between the Japanese and
Indonesians in some places. The Republic wanted to liquidate Japanese authority and the hangovers of the Japanese era. The Preparatory Commission, therefore, disbanded the Hei-ho and the Peta. The Japanese felt humiliated and bewildered; many committed suicide.

Their bewilderment rose as Mountbatten ordered the Japanese Commander to preserve law and peace. Perhaps Mountbatten had no alternative as he did not find any internationally recognised government that could be entrusted with the maintenance of law and order. He might be excused if he had an inadequate understanding of Indonesian politics and the strength of nationalists. He was judicious in not relying upon the gimblogger shadow government formed by Dutch internees on receipt of the surrender news.

Dutch colonialists and their sympathisers complain that the Japanese simply scamped the directive of Mountbatten in the hope of bolstering up the Republic. The complaint is false. Japanese soldiers were not always ready to obey the orders of the newly founded Republic. They did not calmly abdicate their authority. There was widespread fighting between the Republicans and Japanese soldiers. Students often took the lead in these hostilities. That the Japanese were not trifling the orders of the Allied Commander totally could be further illustrated by their cooperative role in guarding and distributing supplies brought by Mercy Ships of the Allies.

The Hollanders had their fill of jubilation as they saw the atom-bombed Japanese surrendering unconditionally. They immediately thought of recolonising the Indies with the same pre-war zeal. Their attitude contained an embarrassing legacy of the period in which they followed a policy of unpitying repression and brutal mistakes.
The Dutchmen affected to believe that they would follow an enlightened policy toward war-ravaged order-thirsty Indonesia. They expected natives to trust their liberal policies\textsuperscript{32} because even before the end of the war and as early as December 6, 1942, Queen Wilhelmina delivered a speech outlining a colonial policy that was vaguely conciliatory. The Queen assured that "after the war it will be possible to reconstruct the kingdom on the solid foundation of complete partnership, which will mean the \textit{consummation}\textsuperscript{33} of all that has been developed \textit{in the past}. \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots I know that the Netherlands more than ever feels its responsibility for the vigorous growth of the Overseas Territories and that the Indonesians recognise in the ever increasing collaboration the best guarantee for the recovery of their peace and happiness." The Queen spoke on behalf of the Netherlands' government-in-exile. Indonesians could not be blamed if they were not enthused by the nobly nebulous utterances of a refugee government that could not defend itself or the colony. A few months earlier the Queen visited the United States and addressed both the Chambers of the Congress on August 6, 1942. There also she asserted\textsuperscript{34} "that with regard to Indonesia her policy aimed at the constant development of democracy and progress." Hollanders looked upon all these as sufficient proofs of their liberal intentions and expected\textsuperscript{35} Indonesians to feel likewise.

The Dutch felt despirited as they saw the infant Republic marching ahead. Indonesia's determination to oppose their return aggrieved them. Indonesians were foolish, they thought, in not depending on the Dutch for creating order\textsuperscript{36} out of the chaos produced by Japanese imperialism. Their disappointment became all the more galling as they did not have the resources\textsuperscript{37} to reconquer Indonesia. They had some troops by which they could begin occupation. But the Allied military authorities could not
Holland felt herself forlorn and stored up her fading hopes by thinking about the Netherlands Indies Civil Affairs (NICA) Agreement.

This NICA Agreement between the British and the Netherlands Governments at first concerned Sumatra (belonging to the SFAC) and shaped by discussions during April 1944 in London and Kandy. The Agreement visualised a phased transfer of authority to the NICA staff after reoccupation. During the first phase the Allied Commander will have supreme responsibility of conducting military operations and restoring law and order. In the second phase with the return of normalcy the NICA officers will have to shoulder all responsibility. But Mountbatten was not informed before August 1945 that he might assume the Agreement tax as accomplished. On September 4 Van Mook and Mountbatten resolved that the NICA Agreement concerning Sumatra would be applicable to the rest of the Netherlands East Indies.

On September 12 Mountbatten accepted the surrender of Japanese forces of the Southern Territories. Mountbatten faced an extremely delicate situation as regards Indonesia. The NICA Agreement had been drawn up in anticipation of enemy resistance and regardless of local nationalist movement. The Netherlands Intelligence Services in Australia could not calculate, or would not admit, the strength of the nationalist forces in Indonesia and the baffling complications of the situation. Mountbatten was placed in a quandary. He could not allow his troops to extinguish a national liberation movement in view of the declared policy of the British government to grant self-government to colonies like India. This feeling became stronger as the Allied Forces in the Netherlands East Indies had a large contingent of Indian soldiers obviously sympathetic to nationalist cause. Besides, employing them to suppress nationalists in
Indonesia would evoke serious protests from India. When, therefore, Rear Admiral Patterson arrived in Java on September 8 with an advance-party he was instructed by the Supreme Allied Commander not to release British soldiers to repress the Republic.

On the other hand, the British government had to avoid estranging the Dutch. The Dutch had to be put on their legs with the help of the British forces. But helping the Dutch might mean undermining the authority of young Republic. The problem became more perplexing as the safe and sane way of undertaking the minimum tasks of relieving internees or restraining the Japanese soldiers lay through negotiations with the Republic. The Republic had sufficient strength to help the British in those tasks. But to solicit help of the nationalists would look like severing ties of friendship with Holland.

All these considerations weighed heavily on the mind of the Supreme Allied Commander as he decided to limit the tasks of the British forces in Indonesia. These tasks included the rescue of allied prisoners of war and internees, concentration and disarming of the Japanese. Preparations for an ultimate transfer of administrative responsibility to the NICA staff were not included, nor was the aim of establishing law and order over the whole of the Netherlands East Indies that would facilitate the former. The British forces would only occupy the strategic areas of Batavia and Surabaya and maintain law and order there. This deflation of aims surely irritated the Dutch and deviated from the NICA Agreement. But there had also been a fundamental change in the conditions of territories not reckoned by the framers of the NICA Agreement. The existence of an assertive national movement constituted the fundamental change and really magnified the responsibilities of Mountbatten rather than a mere addition of half a million square miles to the area of the SEAC.
The curtailment of objectives must have appeared justified to the British troops as they encountered no resistance from the Republicans during their first landings on September 29. It further illustrated the sober authority of Republican leaders and belied the Dutch contention that Republicans were nothing but vengeful terrorists and blood-thirsty extremists. Republicans did not oppose landing because they hoped the British would not put down the freedom movement and batter the free Republic and would merely confine themselves to the twin objectives of disarming the Japanese and rescuing the prisoners of war and internees; Indonesians also wanted to avoid bloodshed and refrained from fighting the British troops. This act of wisdom was repaid as the British authorities did not heed the request of Dutch officers demanding an immediate arrest of Republican leaders.

The NICA officers accompanying the British troops immediately set to wipe out the Republic. Their assiduity overflowed and they began to recruit soldiers from amongst Dutchmen and Eurasians. Very soon they were found attacking the Republican troops with savage ferocity. The latter retaliated, of course, with that youthful energy born of love for freedom. Thus began the long, sad story of continuous deterioration in Dutch-Indonesian relations.

The Dutch could not tolerate their amphibious existence. When Japan was beaten the pre-war masters of the Indies must be saddled with authority. They wanted to get back the reins of authority temporarily usurped by Japan and now snatched by the nationalists. They found themselves legal owners of Indonesia.
yet deprived of lawful authority. Eliminating the Republic, therefore, became their supreme endeavour. So long as the Republic could not be smashed irredeemably the Dutch began to circulate hideous lies about it: (a) There was no nationalism in the Indies which would always welcome back the sagacious colonial rulers, asserted many Hollanders who were unrepentant-ly colonial-minded; (b) They dubbed the Republican leaders as Japanese hirelings hindering a graceful resuscitation of Dutch power; (c) The Republican leaders, immersed in Japanese propaganda, were upholding totalitarianism; (d) Even if recognised, the Republic was direfully incapable of discharging the onerous responsibilities of administration.

The cholerics forgot that (a) Nationalism in the Indies was at least 37 years old, if one would take Budi Utomo as the starting point, leaving aside the various anti-Dutch uprisings throughout the 19th century which undoubtedly derived much of their strength from nationalist fervour; (b) Leaders of the Republic included not only those who worked and feigned cooperation with the Japanese in the interests of the independence movement, but also those plucky underground leaders who kept the flame of nationalism alive under a constant threat of Japanese terror; (c) The Constitution of the newly founded Republic could be branded as totalitarian only by a monstrous application of logic; (d) Even in the turbulent days of Japanese atrocities, Dutch manoeuvrings and British connivance just after the birth of the Republic, its mettlesome followers displayed their administrative capacity which, one can recall, had also been reputedly demonstrated in the Japanese era.

The immense mass upheaval in Indonesia did not appeal to the Dutch who further expected the British officers to dislodge the Republicans. The British could not totally forget the
interests of their wartime ally. At the same time, experiences in Burma and Malaya suggested the unquestionable desirability of recognising popular forces and acting through them. All these spelt contradictions in British policy in Indonesia. On the one hand, the SFAC Notice to the People of Java read: "Troops under the Supreme Command of Admiral the Lord Louis Mountbatten have arrived in your country to accept the surrender of the Japanese forces, on behalf of the United Nations, and to protect the people and maintain Law and Order until such time as the lawful Government of the Netherlands East Indies is once again functioning." The Notice also emphasised that the laws of the Netherlands East Indies would be applied and enforced by the NICA officers. These must have infuriated Republicans who displayed patience and forbearance as they did not launch large-scale hostilities against the small number of British forces immediately on their arrival. For the Notice clearly marked the goal of restoration of the Dutch colonial authority achieved through British bayonets.

On the other hand, General Christison announced: "Our sole job is to rescue prisoners of war and disarm the Japanese. We are not going to interfere with the political position in Java. I have made it clear that we are not going in to put the Dutch back into power. I am going to keep law and order, and I shall expect the political leaders to cooperate with me." This showed that the British concern for placating the Dutch was tempered by a friendly appreciation of the Republic's strength. It showed that the British could comprehend the strength and achievements of the nationalists in Indonesia and would not follow the Notice in every detail.

In spite of this policy of enlightened conciliation a battle between the British and the Indonesians could not be
averted for a long time. In Java the AFNEI occupied Batavia and Semarang. Then as it proceeded to occupy Bandung it met some unsuccessful resistance from the Republicans. Next came the untoward occupation of Surabaya. The British officers did not seek any permission for landing from the local Republican authorities although the latter had pleaded for that. At first troops entered upto 800 meters from the seaside beyond which Indonesians would not allow them to move. Presently they entered the town without any resistance as they gave cloying assurances which they forgot as soon as they were in possession of the town apart from the naval base. Surabaya was not lawless at that time, but the British resolved to make her lawful, first, by arming the sharp-shooting Hollanders and second, by haughtily ordering Indonesians to surrender their arms to the British. The people of Surabaya proved resistive; they ignored the threat of punishment for a refusal to surrender arms. Fierce fighting broke out on October 28. Scenes of devastation were laid throughout the city. The entire British Brigade would have been destroyed but for the intervention of Sukarno who flew to Surabaya and arranged the truce on October 29, 1945. The extremist Indonesians thought it inopportune but the truce was only an index of moderation pervading the whole Indonesian national struggle for self-government.

In spite of the truce fighting did not stop in all quarters. The truce provided for an immediate cease-fire, maintenance of law and order by Indonesians and the establishment of a Contact Bureau for liaison purposes. But neither this nor Sukarno's appeal could stop all hostilities. And on October 30, Brigadier Mallaby was killed while trying to restrain a surging mob who was probably infuriated by mistaking the truce for a surrender. President Sukarno declared: "The incidents that occurred after the landing of the Allied Forces of Surabaya created a serious situation which I regret. I learned to my greatest regret after my return

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*Allied Forces Netherlands East Indies
to Djakarta that fighting has been renewed and that Brigadier Mallaby, whose braveness I witnessed and honoured during the fighting of Surabaya, has become a victim of the disorders. We have ordered to stop fighting, and we shall take appropriate measures to master the situation while I shall keep myself in close cooperation with the Allied Army. But General Christisor decided to adopt a stern attitude and issued the following warning: "Unless the Indonesians responsible for the death of Brigadier Mallaby and the breaking of the truce surrender to my forces I intend to bring the whole weight of sea, land and air forces under my command, with all the weapons of modern warfare, against them until they are crushed. If in this process innocent Indonesians should be killed or wounded the entire responsibility will rest with those Indonesians who have committed the crimes I have mentioned."

Sukarno appealed to world opinion for helping Indonesia out of this blood-bath. He appealed to Attlee and Truman requesting them to reverse the pro-Dutch policy followed by British and Indian troops in Indonesia. He entreated Stalin to aid the suffering peoples of Indonesia. Mr. Nehru in India tried in vain to go to Indonesia - the British Government did not permit his tour. Mr. Zinnah cried for withdrawal of Indian troops. The tense situation, however, did not improve. The Indonesians were impelled towards a Holy War to annihilate the Allies. The Fifth Indian Division could no longer be kept in the sea. With them devastation entered Java. The bloody battle of Surabaya did not end till it took the toll of thousands and the city was minutely occupied. The British Commander's warnings or the Indonesian Governor's attempts failed to avoid the cataclysm. Indonesians fought to death the Sherman tanks sometimes with daggers and sometimes utilising the Japanese training and organisation. Whether organised or not, they could only die or retreat before advancing regiments equipped with the
paraphernalia of modern warfare. The most ferocious encounter took place on November 10. "The tussle between the demon of colonialism and the spirit behind the proclamation of independence came to a head when masses rose in anger at Surabaya on November 10, 1945. The explosion of the mass struggle... astonished the world, causing that November 10 to be recorded in history as 'November 10 that shook the world'. Yet, it cannot be said, therefore, that "from the Indonesian point of view the battle of Surabaya was a complete waste of time, of life, of ammunition, and property." For, this intense fighting indicated the national sentiment animating Indonesians and uniting them towards a conjoint endeavour, however painful the resulting experience might be. It also initiated fresh thinking of the British government on this challenging subject; either there must be a fullfledged war or a new political manoeuvre. Labour leaders were not all for war, nor were all the Dutch. Thus Mr. de Kadt in 'Het Parool' admitted as the only solution "the recognition of independence and an attempt to make an agreement as to cooperation between Holland and Indonesia on that basis. But there were a few Netherlanders to nourish such opinions, and fewer to preach them.

The British, in their confused response to Dutch intentions and nationalist activities, had asked the Japanese to maintain law and order till they would themselves take over. Dutch internees were also shocked as they were to be protected by those who had committed repulsive crimes against them recently. Indonesians were perturbed as they interpreted it as a sign of mistrust and as a prelude to Dutch authorities being installed by the British friends. This suspicion was confirmed when they were employed by the British to fight and suppress the nationalists, e.g., in Bandung, Medan and Semarang.
All this did not augur well for negotiations between nationalists and the British who further outraged Republican sentiments by hoisting the Dutch flag in their headquarters. The red-and-white national flag at that time was flying all over Indonesia and its sanctity seemed to be challenged by the Dutch flag.

A far worse enemy of negotiations was the inflexible attitude of the Dutch who refused to have any truck with the nationalists. They wanted to act as if the world around had not changed, as if nationalism was a fantasy and the Republic was non-existent.

Prospects for negotiations improved as the British General solicited the cooperation of the Republic in the evacuation and transportation of the internees and the Japanese. The Republic warmly responded and became more hopeful when General Christison announced that he would do his best "to ameliorate the position by bringing together for the first time round a conference table the leaders of the Nationalist Movement and the Dutch government representatives." Hysterical Hollanders, reading in every conciliatory move a mark of doom, condemned the British for this hasty act that amounted to "unconsidered recognition". They regretted that the British officers were not satisfied to act only through them. They forgot that "the needs of the military forces, of the prisoners and internees, and the need to distribute food to the people of Indonesia, forced the British to come to administrative arrangements with the Indonesians direct." They vilified every British attempt at negotiation with the Republic as a policy of appeasing foolhardy rebels.

Not all Dutchmen were, however, impermeable to the needs of puissant nationalism. Mr. Van der Plas, the Dutch representative on the staff of Lord Mountbatten, and Dr. Van Mook, the Lieutenant Governor General, wanted to face realities and negotiate with the Republicans. In October they tried to initiate negotiations, but their moves were sternly repudiated by the Hague. The
Netherlands government at that time was following a reactionary policy at home and abroad. It liquidated in Holland the traditional rights of representation and the royal decree of April 12 professed to set up nominated councils all over the country. In Indonesia it treated the nationalist government with cruel indifference and disdainfully ruled out any concessions to nationalists who were simply Japanese stooges.

Even London sometimes appeared to have accepted the intoxicatingly mischievous Dutch propaganda. During his South-East Asian tour the Secretary of State for War Mr. Lawson had stated that Britain was not obliged to help her allies in their struggles against nationalists in the colonies. But Mr. Attlee's statement on October 17 was rashly ill-timed: the independence movement in Indonesia had been 'sponsored by the Japanese for two or three years', he said and echoed Dutch propaganda. Its effect on Republican opinion was easily conceivable and its inequity was slightly mitigated by the noble attempt of 60 Labour M.P.s. who issued a statement on October 25 urging negotiations with Indonesians and reflecting uneasiness over 'military operations calculated to restore the Dutch Empire in Indonesia'. Indonesians were particularly shocked to see Dutch troops being smuggled in by British forces. To them the British seemed to set the seal of approval on the terrorist practices of the Dutch who were quick at the trigger and had an irresistible desire to hit at anything Republican, flag or man. Their suspicion about British intentions grew and was almost confirmed when in Surabaya the British broke their promises and when the raging battle of Surabaya for a time raged to the dust the high hopes of British-Indonesian cooperation.
The Republic's cooperative attitude was sufficiently vindicated when it did not attack the British forces landing in Indonesia, when it eagerly accepted the British request to help them in the evacuation and transportation of prisoners-of-war and internees and the Japanese, when Sukarno ordered all Indonesians to minister to the efforts of the occupation army in restoring law and order. The organ of the Republicans, The Voice of Free Indonesia, expressed a conciliatory - and not an extremist or rebellious - attitude as it underlined the need for Great Power assistance in renouncing colonialism and rebuilding Indonesia. Sukarno's statement in late September was also clearly conciliatory as it invoked the Atlantic Charter in defence of the right of self-determination for Indonesia and eschewed violence.

But this fraternal frame of the Republican mind did not mean even a faint compromise with colonial intrigues propelled by the Dutch. The Constitution of the Republic said in the preamble: "Since independence is the right of every nation, any colonial system in this world is contrary to humanity and justice and must therefore be abolished." The Netherlands government, however, went against the intentions of some far-seeing Dutch officials like Van Mook and declared in a tone of blunt indifference. On October 31 Van Vook met Sukarno at the residence of Christison and issued to the Press the following declaration of policy on November 5: "The Government recognise the legitimate aspirations of the Indonesians towards a national existence, and are convinced that these aspirations can be realised by a process of evolution through the friendly cooperation between Indonesians and Netherlands. Indonesia will be called upon to become a full partner in the kingdom, which will be organised as a Commonwealth consisting of the participating territories."
This Declaration of Policy contained many things perturbing to the ardent nationalists. And Hatta came out with a concrete and scathing condemnation of this evolutionary policy, appealing less to passions and more to factual realities. "And why must Indonesia willy-nilly be made partner of a Commonwealth in which the Dutch tail wag the Indonesian dog? We Indonesians just fail to see why it is incumbent on us to become willing partners of the Dutch Commonwealth. The Dutch are graciously permitting us entry into the basement while we have climbed all the way to the top floor and up to the attic. Indonesia today has achieved her own administration as a result of her own efforts. And what earthly reason is there for Indonesia to return to her former status as a colony of a foreign nation which did practically nothing to defend her from the Japanese? The Dutch should not remain under the delusion that they can thwart Indonesia's desire to remain independent. It should further be noted that the November 5 declaration stood almost totally invalidated by the Hague announcement on November 3 that Van Mook was negotiating with Indonesians against the instructions of the Netherlands Government. Professor Logemann also had announced that in spite of his government's intention to make Indonesia self-governing within the Netherlands Union it was not ready to negotiate with Sukarno. The Republic's foreign minister Subardjo, on the other hand, answered that his government was willing to meet Allied Representatives but refused to have a discussion with the Dutch. Under these circumstances what was needed was a sympathetic but vigorous programme embarked on by the British Cabinet. But Attlee's announcement on October 17 only bore out Dutch propaganda and misunderstanding.
At about the same time Hatta told Pressmen of the dire possibilities of any forced implementation of a colonialistic programme, whether cloaked as a membership in a Dutch Union or not. A few more blood-curdling years, he added, would only be added to world history without any surety of Dutch hegemony over Indonesia.

But Hatta, a hardboiled realist, would not be contented with a negative approach and outlined a scheme which General Christison might profitably follow. The scheme demanded a de facto recognition of the Republic of Sukarno, removal of Dutch forces from the Indonesian soil and prohibition of their further entry, and stressed the acceptance of concentrating and disarming the Japanese and protecting the prisoners-of-war as the twin objectives of AFNFI. Above all, Hatta declared before the Pressmen his earnest desire for a solution reached through the International Court and guaranteed the Republic's adherence to it, even if not thoroughly welcome. But British forces poured in and sometimes the Dutch troops accompanied. And Sukarno complained of an un-neutral attitude on the part of the British.

The British really faced a hard task. For the Dutch Minister for Overseas Territories Professor Logemann and the Dutch Foreign Minister Dr. Van Klaffens accused the British of a pro-Republican attitude. The British had been urging negotiations with the
Sukarno government, which the Dutch government resented. Leftist opinion in Holland too favoured negotiation which the government defied. The Republic, in its Political Manifesto released on November 1, urged cooperation for mutual benefit. If, however, the Manifesto added, the Dutch wanted to re-impose colonialism on Indonesians then "it will result in endless bloodshed and sacrifice of life, for only by force and force alone can the Dutch try to pull down the government which we have set up." The Manifesto put the fundamental question squarely: Have the Hollanders "the vision and the ability to adjust themselves to changed conditions and, through the way of peaceful discussion, secure for themselves and their descendants in this country the predominant place they hold in trade and industry, thereby also making it possible for themselves to live here and earn their livelihood in peace and security?" But this call for peaceful discussion and cooperative intercourse went unheeded.

In the tense atmosphere of British landings and apprehension of a renewal of Dutch stranglehold on Indonesia Sjahrir issued a brochure entitled 'Our Struggle'. This brochure proves that even when fighting foreigners patriots do not always try to conceal the defects and difficulties hindering the national movement even though it might expose the vices of fellow-countrymen. Sjahrir pleaded for strengthening the socio-economic foundations in order to knock the bottom out of Fascism. He deplored the effects on Indonesians of Japanese propaganda extolling Fascism. He condemned racial hatred generated in the process of the national struggle and called a halt as a safeguard against possible foreign intervention.

Sjahrir wanted to eliminate Fascist influences in the Republic. Apologists of Dutch colonialism interpreted it sinisterly as an assault on Sukarno. Sjahrir's plea for racial
toleration was likewise interpreted as a wholesale censure on
Indonesians' attacks against foreign troops and civilians. But
Sjahrir "was attacking not his friend Hatta, or Sukarno, or others
who in agreement with him acted as collaborators of Japan for the
good of the country. His targets were those who copied Japanese
dictatorial methods because they had absorbed Japanese political
thought." Undoubtedly many Indonesians used terrorist methods.
Unsettled times inevitably breed terrorist gangs. But whenever an
Indonesian killed a Dutchman it was not the result of racial fana­
ticism or blind terrorism. Before hurling a verdict on Indonesians
a number of factors has to be remembered. (1) Indonesians did not
kill the Dutch internees they had at their mercy. They did not
adopt a policy of mass slaughter. (2) After the Japanese
surrender the Indonesians did not become revengeful towards Dutch
civilians till the NICA authorities under British protection began
to unleash violence and horror. (3) The warning of Sukarno that
the reentry of Dutch troops might incite attacks and on Dutch
civilians was simply ignored. Once the British warned against
the landing of Dutch troops but later on yielded to Dutch pressure.
(4) Indonesians' appeals to foreign powers for stopping Dutch
and British atrocities bore no fruit; British tanks and planes
vomitted death and devastation. They became naturally more and more
exasperated. Their faith in the professions of big powers regarding
self-determination began to dwindle. They realised sorrowfully that
their military vigilance alone could win the battle for freedom.
Military operations always have a penumbra of terrorism which is
not justified by the needs of securing the objective, but unavoid­
able. If the limited terrorism of isolated Indonesian ruffians not
deriving any support from the Republican government was to be
blamed, that would only focus our attention on the primary factor
that made the Republican military operations inevitable—the
unbending intention of the Dutch to subjugate Indonesia with British
Indonesians became more desperate as they found troops of the ex-enemy state Japan being employed by the British. The British sometimes tried to deny the use of Japanese troops for fighting Indonesians, but even the Dutch Minister Logemann affirmed it.

Sjahrir had issued his pamphlet a few days before he became the Prime Minister of the Indonesian Republic. The Dutch continuously refused to confer with Sukarno whom they fancifully condemned as a Japanese agent. It was really an excuse for the Dutch to delay negotiations. Republicans, therefore, resolve to appoint Sjahrir as the Premier for he had a clear anti-collaborationist record that defied the name-calling zeal of the Dutch. The appointment of Sjahrir might have another additional advantage. For a long time Sjahrir had been leading the underground organisations and in close touch with armed groups which constantly fought foreign troops in defence of the Republic. His Premiership might act as a check on their enthusiasm sometimes overflowing and turning into acts of unnecessary extremism.

Sjahrir became the Premier of the Indonesian Republic on November 15; Sukarno's powers were reduced. Chances of peaceful negotiations with the Dutch appeared to improve. The Netherlands expressed its willingness to confer with Sjahrir but did not take any active step. Troops were pouring in. The grim battle of Surabaya cast a long shadow over probable peace proposals. The British government also displayed an inane apathy toward Republican aspiration. Mr. Bevin issued on November 23 a statement that recognised Dutch sovereignty over Indonesia and England's duty to rehabilitate her ally - it, therefore, irritated Indonesians. The statement urged negotiations between the Netherlands and the Republic and therefore.
hurt the feelings of Hollanders. Mr. Bevin seemed to be unaware that fighting in Indonesia involved many parties other than the nationalists; he served a moral exhortation to Indonesians asking them to stop fighting and 'begin talking'.

In spite of Sjaehrir's appointment the Dutch government did not offer any agreeable proposal to the Republic. British planes hovered over Indonesia sometimes dropping bombs. Dutch troops landed whenever they got the opportunity. The Dutch organised savage attacks on Republicans including civilians. Indonesians too became impassioned and took to vendettas. Indonesians stained their names on November 23 as they mercilessly butchered R.A.F. airmen who had crashlanded in Java. The British forces truculently counterblasted by setting fire to the whole village of Bekasi and committed appalling atrocities in Ambarawa. The Indonesian Minister of Information issued the following statement: "On behalf of the people of Indonesia Mr. Sutan Sjaehrir, Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia, has expressed his regret to the Allied Commander-in-Chief of the Occupation Army in Java, Lieutenant General Sir Philip Christie, for the happenings that took place in Tjakung, Bekasi and Ambarawa that were brought about by misunderstandings between the Occupation troops and the people."

That Sjaehrir was always ready for negotiations and never lacked peaceful intentions was again undoubtedly proved in the Press Conference on December 4, 1945. He stated: "If the Dutch recognise our right to independence then we shall accept Dutch cooperation in the economic and technical spheres. We should even be ready to give them a privileged position in view of their special contacts and their long association with the Indies." He even signified his willingness to adhere to a U.N. decision even if not wholly favourable. To the Dutch in the Hague these were not worth any serious consideration and the Whitehall allowed itself to be swayed by the same attitude. But Sjaehrir was never tired of attempts at conciliation. Thus he built up a Peace Army which escorted the
Allied envoy in moving supplies from Djakarta to Bandung. Safety for the British troops was required and was secured by this Peace Army. A Peace Preservation Corps was also formed to guard trains. The British were satisfied too and proposed that this Peace Army be engaged in disarming the Japanese in Central and East Java, and evacuating them. This British suggestion was wise, reflecting the confidence that could now be reposed in the Republic's ability to enforce peace. Sjahrir gladly announced: "We are prepared to cooperate on a basis of justice to seek the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted by the United Nations to British forces and to maintain the general peace and security of the territories occupied by the Allies."

The Republic clearly indicated its zeal for peaceful negotiations. The ball was fairly on the Netherlands Court. But the Netherlands did not play it properly. On the contrary, in the beginning of December Dutch leaders accompanied British leaders to a conference in Singapore that produced a consensus in favour of stronger measures against the Republic. Sjahrir rightly demanded a clarification of Singapore decisions and pleaded for U.N. intervention. He asserted that the arrival of new troops would only make Indonesians more venomous in their resistance. Any decision to intensify British and Dutch military operations would only result in large-scale conflagration, Sjahrir added. Sjahrir had unmistakably demonstrated his ability to be moderate and cooperative in regard to helping prisoners and internees. Now it was left to the British government to press the Dutch for friendly negotiations. The British pressure, if systematic and not sporadic, would move the Dutch surely as they had to depend on British military might. Mr. Noelbaker, a British M.P., suggested that both the Netherlands and the Republicans appoint representatives with full powers; their negotiating zeal should not be curbed by the possibility of a
later captious repudiation by the governments; for in the past
Van Mook's attempts to confer with Sukarno had been whimsically
censured by the Netherlands government.

The U.S.A., in spite of repeated appeals from the Republic,
did not hold out any promise of mediation. On December 19 the State
Department expressed concern over the developments in the Nether-
lands East Indies. It urged negotiations for a peaceful settlement
and earned the applause of Republican sympathisers. But the announce-
ment indubitably recognised the Netherlands to be the territorial
sovereign in Indonesia and therefore did not contribute to a softening of Dutch attitude. The United States could not boast of a loving concern for nationalist aspirations in Indonesia.

Similarly, the British government, even when trying to facilitate a
peaceful settlement by convening a conference in London in late
December, palpably failed to enter into the feelings of nationalist. The London Conference excluded the Republic whose fate it would discuss; the British statesmen invited the pugnacious Dutch leaders but moodily left out Sjahrrir always pining for cordial negotiations. The legitimate progeny of the London Confer-
ence was an unkind communique with an effete plea of restoration
of law and order preceding any grant of autonomy that could only
lie in the darkness of an uncertain future. The Dutch could
continue in their old trigger-happy mood. And they shot at Shra
Sjahrrir who escaped by sheer luck. The timing of London discussions
and the attempt on Sjahrrir's life almost coincided. Indonesians
thus could not be blamed if they sometimes committed atrocities on
Dutchmen.

Reprobate Hollanders multiplied their heinous assaults on
Indonesians. They went ahead setting Indonesian homes on fire.
Their vile outrages even called for a reprimand by Admiral Helfrich
who forbade reprisals; the order was ineffective. The government at
the Hague too marched in step with the Dutch extremists in Indonesia.
It ordered enquiry into Van Mook's conduct presumably on account of his farsighted initiative for negotiating with the Republic; the hope of amity receded; Sjahrir deplored the enquiry move.

Djakarta became too dangerous a place for Republican leaders on account of aggravated Dutch maraudings. Djakarta brought out too conspicuously the support given by the British to the Dutch. To lessen their pains the Republican leaders transferred the seat of government to Jogjakarta on January 4, 1946. In mid-January Sjahrir revealed a good deal of his political insight as he announced unambiguously that parleying with the Dutch was not likely to lead to a fruitful settlement and preferred U.N. aid. Sjahrir's announcement was just in time to serve a rude reminder to the English and the Dutch that at the ensuing meeting of the U.N. an unsympathetic member might lash out at their joint venture in Indonesia and lay them low before the world public.

Ukraine sent a letter to the U.N. Security Council condemning the use of the British and Japanese forces in Indonesia against the local population. Mr. Manmulisky, the Ukrainian representative, stated before the Security Council that he "considered it inadmissible" that the British troops were used for the suppression of the national movement of the Indonesian people and that Japanese forces were used for participating in these operations against the grievances of the Indonesian nationalists. It urged "the creation by the Council of a special commission for the investigation of the situation on the spot and the establishment of peace." Queerly enough, the Ukrainian representative "did not raise the question of the withdrawal of British troops from Indonesia." Either he hesitated to condemn fully the conduct of the wartime ally Great Britain or he doubted the wisdom of leaving the young Republic
to the tender mercies of the colonial Dutch, or perhaps he had some misgivings about the national movement in Indonesia; lastly, the presence of Japanese troops yet to be disarmed pointed to the necessity of keeping British troops in Indonesia.¹⁴¹

This Russian assault on British policy had the singular effect of compelling the British statesmen to take an unequivocally patronising attitude toward Dutch imperialism. It left them with no opportunity to honour Indonesian aspirations even if shabbily. The British representative unfeignedly stated before the Security Council that the Dutch were the legal sovereign in Indonesia and it was "the definite decision¹⁴² of the Allies to restore the territory taken by the enemy to the sovereign authority." He said that the British were obliged to use Japanese forces "to forestall wholesale assassination throughout the country,"¹⁴³ and alluded to the death of General Mallaby. He could have recollected that (a) the British had ordered the Japanese¹⁴⁴ to maintain law and order long before the Mallaby tragedy; (b) the facts about this tragedy did not enable him to blame Indonesians squarely; (c) it was trumpery to talk of maintaining law and order throughout the country when after months of struggle the British forces could not overwhelm the nationalist opposition and expand beyond a few precariously held cities; even amidst setbacks nationalism seems to acquire new and titanic vigour.

Even in its infancy the U.N. began to be shaken by legal balderdash. The British representative deftly utilised the domestic jurisdiction clause in the U.N. Charter. The appointment of a commission, he said, would violate the Charter by interfering¹⁴⁵ in the internal affairs of the Netherlands. The British representative had backed up Dutch claims with impressive
sincerity. The Dutch representative repeated his arguments and made a virtuous proposal that "he would not stand in the way of having a commission in regard to the question only of conduct of the British troops in Indonesia, but refused to accept a commission which would busy itself with matters within domestic jurisdiction." It is undeniable that Britain's vigorous defense of Dutch imperialism at the U.N. did away with whatever pretensions to caring for Indonesian nationalism existed in Attlee's statement of October 17, 1945, and Bevin's statement of November 23, 1945. At the same time Russia's defense of Indonesian nationalism does not mean an undiluted concern for the rights of exploited peoples. Russia's blistering attack on British policy in Java was simultaneous with an attack on British policy in Greece. This sharp assault on British policy was intended to further Soviet strategic objectives in the Middle East. Since the days of the Czars Russia had always nurtured political ambitions in the Mediterranean. She used force whenever convenient. With the collapse of France after the Second World War she expected Britain to recognize her strategic interests in that region. Britain was too experienced in power-politics to ignore the Russian menace. Hence the Soviet onslaughters. But if Russia could not immediately gain any strategic advantage by her policy in the U.N. she would at least reap a propaganda benefit. She could pose as the champion of the oppressed peoples. At a time when her armies were steadily tightening her colonial grip on East European countries this propaganda would be valuable.

Ukraine's laborious efforts at the Security Council achieved nothing immediate and concrete. Her resolution pleading for a U.N. Commission fell through on February 13. Meanwhile Batavia witnessed important changes in British and Dutch functionaries. The British government appointed Sir B Archibald Clark-Kerr
ex-Ambassador in Moscow, to carry out a peace-mission in Indonesia with a 'fresh mind'. General Christison handed over his charge to General Stopford. The Dutch deputed an intrepid militaryman Lieutenant General Spoor to Indonesia. While the appointment of Clark-Kerr revived hopes of negotiations, the arrival of Spoor could be interpreted as the sign of a gathering storm. Spoor was too much of a devotee of old-fashioned colonial wars to adapt himself to the necessity of restrained negotiations. Republicans were setting the stage well for negotiations. Press reports indicated that Dutch internees in Indonesian camps were sympathetically treated and not used as targets for reprisals against continued Dutch landings. The Dutch government vitiated the atmosphere for negotiations by offering scurvy autonomy for Indonesians within a Netherlands kingdom and also withholding the right of secession. It further expressed the gunnman mentality by continuing to send Dutch soldiers. Neither the anti-Dutch mutiny in the Netherlands Indies Army units nor the desertion of many Moslem members of the British Indian troops unwilling to fight Moslem brothers in Indonesia could deter the Dutch government in its mission of war.

Under the circumstances the Netherlands government offer of February 10, 1946, could only be looked upon as still-born. On that day the Netherlands government issued a statement of policy regarding the Netherlands East Indies containing certain introductory remarks of Dr. Van Mook who asserted: "The statement of policy represents a departure in the relationship between the Netherlands and Indonesia. For the first time in the history of that relationship a definite goal is set for the political development of Indonesia. Recognising the right of determination for the citizens of this country, the proposals embody a clear and workable way towards democratic liberty."
period of transition, necessary to restore the shattered economy of this country and to consummate the work of nation-building, will have to be determined. If it should not suffice, its prolongation will be subject to agreement between the Netherlands and Indonesia or, failing such an agreement, to the decision of an impartial third. At the end of this period of transition, Indonesia shall be completely free to decide its political future. Many details will have to be discussed and filled in; many questions will need an answer; many points will have to be explained. But the general principles are clear. Self-determination and independence need a solid foundation in these strenuous days. My government consider it their first duty to assist the population of Indonesia in repairing, constructing and consolidating that foundation."

The statement of policy reiterated the necessity for a transitional scheme and added: "The Netherlands government, therefore, intend, in consultation with authoritative representatives of Indonesians, elected from a large variety of groups, to draft a structure for the kingdom and for Indonesia, based on democratic partnership. This structure will remain in force for a given period of time, during which it is believed that the conditions which will make possible the making of a free decision (among the Indonesians) will be fulfilled. After that period, the partners shall independently decide upon the continuance of their relations on the basis of a complete and voluntary partnership. Difference of opinion regarding the question whether that period should be further extended before a free decision can be taken, shall be submitted to a procedure of conciliation or, if necessary, of arbitration." 157

On February 26 the Dutch had to amplify some of the proposals and expand some of the suggestions in order to end any 'intentional'
"The promotion of an early membership of the U.N.O. and the express acceptance of article 73 of the Charter of that organisation as the guiding principle for the conduct and the admittance of this country (Indonesia) as a full partner in the kingdom, all point in the same direction while the time of transition will provide the necessity to work along properly planned lines, and to realise its completion within the period prescribed."

The Dutch proposals were forbidding, Sjahrir declared them as unacceptable to Indonesians. His zeal for negotiations, however, did not diminish. He worked with amazing patience even when Dutch reactionism combined with internal revolutionism to upset his government. Tan Malaka, a leader of the 1926 Communist revolts, organised a United Peoples' Front (Persatuan Perjuangan) and plotted to unseat the Sukarno-Hatta-Sjahrir trio. He aimed a double-shot. He wanted to exterminate the Dutch and at the same time pave the way for a communist seizure of power. Tan Malaka and his followers had no faith in the policy of peaceful negotiations. The Communists believed such a policy helped only the Dutch colonialists in consolidating their hold. One could sympathise with them when they condemned the Dutch for their delaying tactics. But when they planned a coup to overturn the existing Republican government, they could only be branded as blustering traitors bent on backstabbing the infant Republic. The projected coup did not materialise as Republican troops acted promptly and imprisoned the PP (Persatuan Perjuangan) stalwarts including Sukarni, Yamin and, of course, Tan Malaka. The PP failed to capture power when Sjahrir resigned and Sukarno offered the Cabinet to the PP. Sukarno and Sjahrir played, one can suppose, a great diplomatic game: they called the PP's bluff. The PP, inspite of its name, could not offer a united front. Leaders failed to sink their differences and
distrust in forming a Cabinet. Sjahrir came back and started negotiations with renewed impulse and reaffirmed parliamentary accord. The PP tried the revolutionary way, and was muzzled.

Armed with a 5-point Presidential mandate Sjahrir got full authority to negotiate with the Dutch. The first point in the 5-point mandate was the most important as it emphasised the Republic's recognition to be the basis of all negotiations. Other points in the mandate related to the reconstruction of the Republic socially, economically, politically and its defence and progress. The Republic was fully ready to discuss with the Dutch. But she confidently demanded full recognition. This was a stumbling block, thought the Dutch, and imported more troops sometimes at the risk of domestic opposition. This was the minimum, insisted the Republic. While fighting between Indonesians and foreign troops continued, the peace initiatives of Sjahrir and Clark-Kerr (he was surely affected by Englishmen's protest against unprofitable and undignified use of British troops in Indonesia) remained the redeeming features.

Landing of Dutch troops never ceased. Sjahrir protested in vain and in vain did he try to pacify the extremist group of his countrymen. Under these circumstances Bandung became a storm centre and the Surabaya affair was about to be repeated. But Major General Hawthorn conferred with the Indonesians, toned down opposition and, to a large extent, foiled the partnership of vengeance and hostilities.

Almost surely negotiations take time but delays are not always congenial for settlement. Just as time heals momentary excitements, sometimes it causes second thoughts churning up doubts and dissatisfactions. At a meeting in the house of Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr sufficient agreement was achieved to despatch three Indonesians, designated by Sjahrir, with Dr. Van Mook and Sir Clark-Kerr to the Hague. Not much was gained as the three men on their return merely announced...
that they were not dissatisfied. The language was obviously diplomatic; but the achievement had not been considerable. General elections in Holland, scheduled for May, 1946, were partly responsible for this as no permanent decision on Indonesia could be taken pending the formation of the new government. The fundamental reason for the failure of these talks (known as the Hoge Veluwe talks after the name of the conference place) was obviously the perennial refusal of Hollanders to reconcile them to transfer of sovereignty. Hollanders remained more uncompromising as many of them resented the British efforts towards making them confer with the Indonesians. It was unfair for the British, they pondered, to undermine the legal authority of the Netherlands. To urge negotiations with the Republic was to extol its virtues and to reduce the value of Dutch colonial claims. To create a facade of negotiations was not to meet legitimate nationalist demands, thought the Republicans on the other side. However, the visit facilitated comparison of thoughts and opinions and created an urge for mutual settlements. Van Mook on his arrival in Batavia expressed hopes for resuming discussions.

Events in Indo-China shaped Dutch ideas considerably. There the Republic of Vietnam had been set up but the Republic was a part of an Indo-Chinese Federation within the confines of the French Empire. Here was a plan, the Dutch imagined, to placate republican sentiments and at the same time to preserve the Empire pride. The Dutch sought to set up a Republic of Indonesia within the Netherlands Commonwealth, Van Mook had sent a representative to Indo-China to study the French experiment. The Minister for Overseas Territories at the Hague issued a statement on May 2 that indicated an approach hitherto absent. It outlined the formation of a Federation of Indonesia comprised of a Republic of Java and other free areas functioning within the kingdom of the Netherlands. Besides, Holland and Indonesia, other parts of the Empire were Curacao & Surinam. For the first time the Dutch authorities
acknowledged the mass support behind the Republic which they were consistently denying previously. "The Government...feels certain that the Republic group which is now governing the Republic, is being regarded as representative of the national aim...."

The word 'Republic' too was used for the first time although it was emphasized that there was "... no reason for the widespread erroneous conclusion that recognition of the Republic means the relinquishment of the rights of the kingdom." The statement urged compatibility with the Policy Statement of February 10 and therefore banned any extravagant connotation of the word 'Republic'.

The Republic's reaction was easily conceivable. Sjahrir declared the proposals were a step backward. 178

The Dutch concept of the Republic did not tally with the Indonesian concept and the Dutch plan did not merit acceptance in Indonesian eyes. Indonesians could not be contented with a Republic that did not include Sumatra. 179 And if the Dutch pointed to disorders in the Republican territory Indonesians would immediately refer to the stationing of Dutch troops inciting that disorder. 180

The Republic was firmly established and steadily progressing and there could be no talk of a frayed partnership within the Dutch Empire instead of an alliance. 180A

Many infatuated Netherlands often believed they were giving too much to the Republicans. They thought they had offered much on February 10 and were adding more on May 2. The offer was below expectations, said Sjahrir. 181 Indonesians felt that the Dutch Plan of Federalism wrapped up inside Imperialism would bury alive the little Republic. For the Dutch "interpreted the term 'federal' to mean equal status with equal voices tuned in key with that of the Netherlands." 182 Even this plan was regarded as too liberal by some parliamentarians in Holland 183 who showered vicious invectives.
Popular patience, though exhausted, did not always run
amuck. And the Dutch could thank themselves as their troops in
larger numbers began to take over control of territories from
the British hands without any major incidents. In order to avoid
an armed encounter between Dutch and Indonesian troops a no
man's land was created near the village of Tanjung inha­
ted by the Chinese. It was here that popular lawlessness could
operate unhampered and spread devastation in Chinese houses.
Sukarno proclaimed the state of emergency. And the same
accusations and counter accusations were repeated. The Dutch
complained of the inability of the Republican Government to
maintain order and Sjahrir held the import of Dutch troops and
the alleged cooperation of the Chinese with the Dutch respon­
sible for disturbances. However, these mutual accusations
could not lessen the pains of the injured or provide any
safeguard against future assaults. But extremists soon committed
another lawless act and on 27th June kidnapped Sjahrir along
with several others. If this act did not expose the weakness of
the Republic in securing law and order, it surely indicated the
strong leftist sentiments within the Republic.

Extremists followed up on July 3 by attempting to coerce
Sukarno into signing a document setting up a Cabinet consisting
of PP leaders. Sjahrir had been kidnapped by the follow­
ers of Tan Malaka, the PP leader. Power motivations in the PP
undoubtedly played a part in this gangsterism; Tan Malaka
wanted to rule the Republic. But there was another no less
fundamental reason behind this extremist outburst. For months
Indonesians had been witnessing the methods and outcome of
peaceful negotiations. These negotiations showed the rock-
ribbed determination of the Dutch not to yield to the Republic.
While negotiations proceeded slowly and fruitlessly, the
Dutch imported troops steadily. Negotiations-weary Indonesians,
had been stock-piling grievances against the Dutch and against the Republican negotiators. Negotiators could not stop the entry of Dutch troops; they could not check the restoration of Dutch authority; one after another Batavia, Surabaya and others were being transferred to the Dutch command. Negotiators appeared to be humbly tolerating the restitution of Dutch colonialism. Unable to hold their patience, extremists struck. But the extremists were not in a dominant position. This was proved by the early release of Sjahrir and his companions by units of the Republican National Army.

It would have been happier if the Great Powers could take some positive steps in resolving the Indonesian deadlock. The U.S.S.R. put the issue before the U.N., but it merely served to embitter East-West relations. The U.S.A. still followed a policy of slovenly isolationism. Indonesians had always looked to the U.S.A. for help. The Voice of Free Indonesia often expressed — and so did the Political Manifesto of the Republic — their lurking expectation of American assistance in the struggle for freedom and afterwards. They were disappointed. Some Englishmen thought that the threat of an early withdrawal of troops by Britain might force the Dutch to be conciliatory. It was also reported that the British were planning a fast withdrawal. But a speedy withdrawal or its threat meant nothing if it was accompanied by an accelerated programme of restoration of Dutch authority. This was precisely what the British appeared to do as they handed over to the Dutch control of different areas.

Among foreign States Australia seemed willing to play a progressive role in the Indonesian conflict. During the Second World War Australians came closer to Indonesians and developed friendly ties. They also felt acutely the need for a strong, free and friendly neighbour without which their defence arrangements might be shattered in the face of a militant power like...
Japan. It was reported in the first week of May that Australia might present the Indonesian issue before the U.N. if suitable actions were not forthcoming.

The Dutch, however, did not sit idle. Their confidence increased as they regained possession of areas donated by the British. As they posed to negotiate and took the low path of invective and propaganda against the Republic they directed the lethal weapon of divide and rule. In the later part of May Van Mook said in a radio broadcast that the Netherlands government was planning to hold a conference of representatives from different parts of the Netherlands East Indies. This broadcast could be regarded as the precursor of an active policy of separatism designed to dismember Indonesian nationalist movement. A month later it was further announced that Van Mook would confer with representatives from territories outside Java and discuss the future status of these territories. The Dutch acted on the assumption that pro-Republican sentiments would not prevail in territories outside Java. They assumed they could get hold of a sufficient number of yeomen to side with the Dutch and weaken nationalists. They overlooked the fact that even outside Java people, especially youngmen, had been fighting desperately against foreign troops. The Dutch did not like to remind themselves that the strength of the puppet leaders would be extremely limited in view of rising nationalist fervour.

On July 14 the South East Asia Command transferred, even though it was not actually exercising it everywhere, authority over all territories excepting Java, Sumatra & Bali islands to the Netherlands government and vested it in the Lieutenant Governor General Van Mook at a ceremony in Macassar. Van Mook acted quite swiftly. On July 16 he opened the conference at Malino. The Republic was sidetracked. Hirelings from territories under Dutch control crowded the conference. Van Mook harped on the stereotyped theme of an Indonesian Federation within the Dutch kingdom. Hirelings in the conference resolved to set up a Federation comprising...
of Java, Sumatra, Borneo and the Great East (i.e., Celebes, Moluccas, Bali, Timur, New Guinea and outer islands). Van Mook claimed that the conference observed democratic precepts as the representatives were elected. They were not. The Dutch might think the conference signalled the declining authority of the Republic. They were wrong. Because the Dutch were humiliated by a cold rejection of their invitation to some popular leaders in territories formally under their control. The Dutch did not care to elicit popular will; they did not pay any heed to proportionality of representation as between European and other communities. They merely wanted to sound a propaganda horn to the outside world and to drive a wedge in the nationalist front.

The Malino Conference created a machinery for consulting popular representatives and designing the political structure—this was the Commission-General for Borneo and the Great East. It also set up an Advisory Council acting for an ad interim parliament consisting of 7 Indonesians and a Dutch Chairman. The delegates resolved to meet again as soon as possible.

Van Mook left no doubt in the minds of Indonesians about his intention to sabotage the Republic as he organised in October another such conference at Pangkalpinang. Nor should he be personally blamed for attempting to throttle Republicans. For in the meantime the Dutch government had set up a Commission-General to reopen negotiations and the members of this Commission attended the conference. The Dutch government at home, though taciturn, approved in this way the political moves of Van Mook. The conference lasted for more than a week and concluded on October 12. The resolutions reiterated the need for Indonesia's partnership with the Netherlands or any other solid link and also agreed with the Malino resolution concerning an Indonesian Federation. One resolution postponed the consideration of detailed constitutional proposals to another...
conference to be held later on at Den Pasar.

Anybody expecting immediate practical results from the Pangkalpinang Conference would be surely disappointed. Nothing important could follow from deliberations at a conference where Java and Sumatra were unrepresented. The Dutch could only pour fourth self-congratulatory pronouncements as when Van Mook said that the conference had ended "in a much more cheerful mood, and with more faith in the future, than that with which it began."

In Djakarta (Batavia for the Dutch) Indonesians celebrated the first anniversary of Independence Day although the Allied authorities had prohibited that, while the USSR news agency shortly reported as a projected major military offensive by the Dutch. Negotiations between the Indonesians and Netherlands were suspended pending the arrival of Lord Killearn, the new British mediator, his predecessor Sir Clark-Kerr having departed for taking up the post of the Ambassador to the U.S.A. Immediately after his arrival at the end of August Lord Killearn began to confer with Van Mook and Sjahri. Prospects for negotiations improved as the Dutch Commission General led by Prof. Schermerhorn reached Djakarta on September 18. Prospects improved also because at that time Dutch officials headed by Koetö were visiting the interior of Republican territories, and they submitted a report favourable to the Republican cause. The report emphasized that (a) the Republic was not a made-in-Japan product, (b) it had not failed to secure mass support, (c) it indubitably possessed an administration that was sound and progressing. For Republican sympathizers, the report was a welcome confirmation of the memorandum submitted by the Indonesian officers in the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration to the Dutch government through Van Mook long before in November, 1945. The Memorandum had stated, inter alia, that there was "normal functioning of public services, public traffic, mines, light and water, provisions, all things -
generally needed to establish social order in the difficult circumstances for the young but vital republic" and "that the 'Indonesia Merdeka' (Independent Indonesia) inspired the whole Indonesian population."

The Republic had further vindicated her strength and efficiency when on July 27 she signed an agreement for supplying 700,000 tons of paddy to India obtaining consumer goods in return. This was "a proof of the falsity of the Dutch imperialists' propaganda which endeavours to depict before the world that Java is facing a food shortage," commented Republicans. Republicans joyfully looked upon the agreement as according de facto recognition to the Republic. They added to it their success in relieving prisoners of war, disarming and transporting the Japanese. They confidently expected that the Commission General would readily appreciate the importance of these facts.

But the Commission General did not extend any immediate recognition to the Republic. Nor did Dutch terrorism subside. Dutch troops were landing in Indonesia in increasing numbers. They intimidated the Indonesians and General Spoor was not in a mood to restrain them. He even said that he acted under impermissable instructions from Van Mook and tried to free himself from the stigma of Dutch savagery. He thereby "completely shattered the effect of the sweet-sounding words which have been painstakingly chosen by Dr. Van Mook in his endeavour to win the Indonesians over to his side."

Thanks go to Lord Killearn who in an unruffled but zealous way tried to bring the parties together. He visited the Republican territory and was castigated by some Dutchmen who looked upon the journey as undermining European prestige.

This attitude did not forebode well of the forthcoming negotiations. Another difficulty in negotiations was the attitude of the Netherlands Minister for Overseas Territories, Mr. Johkmana, who curtailed the powers of the Commission General with the
injunction that the members should move along strict constitutional lines. He conveniently forgot that constitutional rigidities did not always or in crucial cases mould the decisions of the Netherlands government. When the Dutch government fled to London during the war it did not observe constitutional procedures; the despatch of Dutch troops to Indonesia also crossed the bounds of the constitution which had to be amended. The Dutch also spoiled the atmosphere for negotiations by cramping the Republic with a rigorous economic blockade. This not only impoverished the Republic by making an inflow of outflow of goods difficult, but also disbalanced world trade in tropical products. 

However, Lord Killearn assiduously established large-scale contacts with Indonesian and Dutch statesmen and held many exploratory talks that resulted in the formation of a Truce Committee. It held meetings in the house of the British Consul General and passed unanimous resolutions on the conclusion of a truce and its execution. At the same residence the Indonesian and Dutch delegates conferred, under the Chairmanship of Lord Killearn, and unanimously accepted the recommendations of the Truce Committee. The truce was done on October 14, 1946. Lord Killearn felt relieved and held a reception at the Indies Hotel in Djakarta. The truce stipulated that Dutch troops would take over strong-points held by the British army, that neither party should launch any attack beyond certain demarcation lines, that additional Dutch forces would come in to take the place of British forces who would leave by the end of November. Of course, there could not be any enduring settlement, as Sjahrir said to newspapermen, until the problems of clearly demarcating the Republican territory, military agreements, U.N. membership, etc. were solved.

In spite of the truce the Dutch could not renounce a most enduring relic of the colonial past - impatience. Dutch troops that came to Java in ever-increasing numbers often violated the truce. Indonesians complained to the Dutch authorities, they
also retaliated. By the beginning of October there were 47,000 Netherlands troops in Indonesia, according to the report of the Netherlands War Ministry. They could not always be expected to observe restraints. Indonesians too were quick to hit back. Before the war their parties carried on the fight for liberation; now they were "struggling by means of the state." No doubt, some Indonesians acted irresponsibly even after the truce. But "Indonesian irresponsibilities were usually confined to local or junior levels", while on occasion "both Spoor and Pinke were capable of forcible activity which threatened the political discussions..." Indonesians became more confident as the Republican government issued on October 16, 1946, a new paper currency. "The first day that the Republican currency was seen in actual circulation assumed the character of a national holiday."

In spite of alleged truce violations negotiations were not terminated. Meetings were being held under the chairmanship of Lord Killearn which ultimately led to the initialing of a document at Cheribon on November 15 styled as the Linggadjati Agreement as much of the preparatory discussions had been held in Linggadjati, a few miles apart from Cheribon. This Agreement, also known as the Cheribon agreement, was a landmark in Dutch-Indonesian relations, as it recognised the de facto sovereignty of the Republic over Java, Sumatra and Madura. The Agreement was initialled by Sjafrir, Rum, Susanto and Gani on the Indonesian side; by Sehermerhorn, Van Mook, Van Poll and De Boer on the Dutch side.

After the dreadful campaigns in Burma the British soldiers faced a queer situation in Indonesia. In an unknown country they fought for an uncertain cause. Now they could take pride - and especially Lord Killearn - in facilitating the conclusion of a Dutch-Indonesian agreement.

The British troops completely evacuated Indonesia on November 30, 1946.

Donnison was a top member of the Civil Service actively connected with the war. He prepared this authoritative book which is a careful study of public and secret documents illumined by firsthand study and rich insights.

2 For details see the book mentioned in Note 1.

3 For details see Van Mook, SDSFA, pp.182-89

4 Ibid

5 Lord Mountbatten, Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Supreme Allied Commander, S.E. Asia, 1943-45; H.M.S.O., 1951. See especially pp.182-86.

6 Ibid, p.216

7 Ibid, pp.182-89. Mountbatten's acid comments: "In war, no new operations in these areas had been contemplated until after October; now my responsibilities were immediate and urgent, but neither the troops, the shipping, nor the Intelligence I had asked for, were available to me." "Nor were they ever made so;...."

8 "The all-conquering Japanese Empire was defeated. The Japanese C-in-C had admitted it, in a flood of tears. But where were the conquerors of the conquerors? A Great Army, fully equipped, ruling undisturbed over an Empire of a hundred million people, surrendered before an invisible enemy, the strangest capitulation in history..."


10 Ibid

11 See also Donnison, op. cit., p.422.

12 Sjahrir, Out of Exile, p.269

14 The Voice of Free Indonesia, Dummy Number (1945), pp.1-5 and p.23.
15 Ibid, p.23
16 Ibid, pp.6-7
17 Roeslan Abdulgani, 'Parties and Parliament', Indonesian Affairs, October/November/December, 1952, p.9. Also the Voice of Free Indonesia, op.cit., p.25
18 R. Abdulgani, Ibid, p.10
19 Ibid
20 Art. 17, Sec.1. The Voice of Free Indonesia, op.cit., p.4
21 Mohammad Hatta, 'Indonesian Aims and Ideals', The Voice of Free Indonesia, op.cit., p.9
22 Ibid, p.8
23 Roeslan Abdulgani, op.cit., p.10. Also, The Voice of Free Indonesia (hereinafter to be referred to as V.F.I.), op.cit., p.27.
24 Sjahrir, op.cit., p.260
25 "And finally there were those (Japanese) to whose methods the others were sooner or later to rally in practice, who saw an opportunity to wrest political victory from the jaws of military defeat...... Conquered, they still plotted to leave the islands as conquerors. If they themselves could not hold them, they could leave a situation which would make it impossible for the Europeans to hold them either." Westerling, op.cit., p.33.
26 Sjahrir, op.cit., p.259
27 V.F.I., op.cit., p.7
28 The order had been issued on September 6. Westerling perverts the meaning of the order to suggest that Mountbatten "ordered the Japanese to dissolve the Republic immediately" - See op.cit., p.36.

See Donnison, op.cit., p.422, and Van Mook, SDSEA, p.185.
29 Donnison, op.cit., p.418 and p.422.
30 "Then there were the bitter-enders who believed that even if Japan had surrendered, Japanese forces would still hold
out, independently, in territories such as those they held."
Westerling, op.cit., p.23.
31 Mountbatten, Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, op.cit., p.184.
32 As late as June, 1948, Charles Walter, the Dutch Minister
for Colonies during 1925-26 and 1937-41, said: "Though Throughout-
out the world Dutch colonial rule was regarded as the best
on earth. But today that great country has succumbed to
famine, disease, anarchy and rebellion." "Now the country is
ruined. We would have made it the greatest nation in Asia,
greater than Japan because the country is richer and the
people better and more intelligent." See Louis Fischer,
The Story of Indonesia, pp.77-78.
33 Van Mook, SDSEA, pp.180-81.
The 'consumption of all that has been developed in the
past' must have meant to Indonesian nationalists a consumption
of centuries-old system of exploitation.
34 U.N.Document - S/AC.10/Conf.2/SH.3-10 December 1947 -
35 Van Mook, SDSEA, p.183.
36 Ibid, pp.167-68.
37 Donnison, op.cit., p.425.
Van Mook, op.cit., p.179.
38 Donnison, op.cit., p.426.
Van Mook, op.cit., pp.183-84.
39 Donnison, op.cit., p.415.
40 Ibid
41 Ibid, pp.417-18.
42 Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by Mountbatten,
op.cit., p.186.
43 Donnison, op.cit., p.423.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
"The increase in the Supreme Allied Commander's responsibilities was far greater than the mere increase in the area of his command, for Java was much more densely populated than other areas in his charge, and was the home of a well established nationalist movement." Donnison, op.cit., p.422

Sukarno, Indonesian Affairs, October/November, 1951, p.25.


This business of lying, executed by the Netherlands with varying energy, reached its apogee in the books by Professor Gerbrandy ('Indonesia') and Raymond Westerling (Challenge to Terror). Professor Gerbrandy was for a time the Prime Minister of the Netherlands government. Raymond Westerling, always boasting of commando training, had a self-approved mission of tyrannising over and thereby liberating Indonesians. He was serving the Dutch government.

"No wonder that the 19th century for Indonesia was a century full of revolutions for the sake of freedom... from 1825-1830 in mid-Java under leadership of Diponegoro; in 1850 in Central Sumatra by Imam Bonjol, and from 1872-1904 in North Sumatra. All the wars were brought about because the people could no longer endure the extreme poverty amidst the riches of their own country." Indonesia - Impressions of the Fight in defense of Freedom and Democracy in Indonesia (1946) - published by Berita Film Indonesia, Surakarta - Issued by the Ministry of Information - p.7.

This was not only affirmed by Indonesians but also recognised by dispassionate foreign observers.

(a) The Dutch weekly "Uitzicht", Vol.II, No.5 contained an editorial referring to the misconception existing in Holland on the political parties of the Republic. The parties are considered part of the liquidated Japanese heritage. It should be kept in mind that the...
greater part of those parties existed already before 1940."
See the V.F.I., February 1, 1947, p.192.
(b) "The argument that many nationalist leaders worked with
the Japanese is misleading, for collaboration appeared to many
of them the next stage to liberation from their Western
conquerors and these movements do now in fact represent the
national feeling in those countries." The New Statesman &
Nation, October 20, 1945, p.256.
(c) "Responsible Dutch persons here are staunch defenders of
the Indonesians against the accusations of collaboration. The
Dutch as well as the Indonesians deplore the publicity given
Republic in August, 1945, a few days after the war's
to the role of the Japanese in the formation of the end." Robert
Trumbull's despatch from Batavia - N.Y.Times, October 27, 1946,
p.24.
55. The nationalistic attitude is clearly indicated by the following
"There is one thing, however, to which I must draw your atten­
tion so that there may be no misunderstanding about what has
taken place in Indonesia. Please remember that, although the
Japanese were in power at the time we planned and discussed the
form and shape of the Free Indonesian State, we did not in any
way copy Japanese principles or ideas. We deliberately chose
the type of political structure we had advocated and demanded
for the past fifteen years, namely, a republic based on the
sovereignty of the people." Md. Hatta, The V.F.I., Dummy Number
(1945?), p.16.
"The nationalists who worked with the Japanese never for a
minute, in spite of their enforced presence in the totalitarian
camp, forsook the nationalistic ideals which had for years and
years been their guiding lights. This is evidenced by the
constitution they framed for the Republic of Indonesia and,
although it was worked out during the time of the Japanese
occupation, the entire document is entirely democratic in form
and spirit." Political Manifesto of the Government of the Repub­
lic of Indonesia, Djakarta, November 1, 1945.
56 For details see Wolf, The Indonesian Story, 1948, pp.3-14.
Also see Donnison, op.cit., p.424. "While the Mr. Van Der Plas and his staff pushed on with their plans for the establishment of NICA administration as soon as the forces of occupation arrived, realisation grew among the British that the Republican government and the nationalist movement were stronger and more firmly established than had been suspected. The Republican government had by now taken over charge of some at least of the public utility services and was operating them not inefficiently."

57 See the New Statesman & Nation - October 20, 1945 - pp.50-56.
"The war in Burma was brought to an end by the friendly cooperation of S.E.A.C. with the National Liberation Army of General Aung San."
"The picture in the neighbouring country of Malaya similarly reflects the wisdom of S.E.A.C. in recognising the value of cooperation with the popular forces."
"Both General Christie and Lord Louis Mountbatten, fresh from their experience in Burma and Malaya, were friendly to the Nationalists" in Indonesia.

58 The Notice is reproduced in Donnison, op.cit., p.437.
59 That is why Donnison remarks that this Notice "was scarcely appropriate to the situation now developing", op.cit., p.427.

60 Sunday Times, September 30, 1945.
Also see The V.F.I. - December 7, 1946, p.91.


62 This is noted by Donnison also; op.cit., p.428.

63 Ibid

64 KeeTsing's Contemporary Archives, 1946-48, 7809A, N.Y.Times, October 30, 1945, p.4515
What Dorothy Woodman says is worth noting: "Brigadier Mallaby was killed in circumstances which have never yet been officially explained." The Republic of Indonesia, p. 212.

Indonesians often affirm that there were "evidences given by Indonesian as well as British personnel that the death of Mallaby was caused by an Indian soldier, who dropped a hand-grenade too close to the General's motor car." Indonesia—Impressions of the Fight in defense of freedom and democracy—published by Berita Films Indonesia, Surakarta, Issued by the Ministry of Information, p. 16.

N.Y. Times, November 1, 1945, p. 1, C. 3

K.C.A. (Meising's Contemporary Archives), 1946-48, 7809A


N.Y. Times, November 9, 1945, p. 1, C. 2


President Sukarno, Indonesian Affairs, August/September 1952, p. 12.

"The Indonesians often were led into the fighting by Mohamedan religious leaders... and were charging upright into British machine-guns without thought of loss of life." N.Y. Times, November 20, 1945, p. 2, C. 2
"This is not a war," exclaimed a Russian in Surabaya. "This is wholesale slaughter! The number of killed is unknown yet because it was impossible as yet to dig out all the bodies from under the debris of the burned houses." Furthermore, "To every wounded military man there are 4 wounded women and children."

Indonesia (Note 65, para 3), p. 20.

71 David Wehl, The Birth of Indonesia, p. 67
72 Reproduced in The Republic of Indonesia by Dorothy Woodman, p. 215.
73 "For three and a half years they had been in prison at the mercy of the Japanese, often in conditions of great misery and squalor, supported only by their hopes for the great day of liberation. The day had come and all that had happened was custody that they were told to remain in the custody of the Japanese.
Disappointment and bitterness were inevitable", Donnison, op. cit., p. 419.
74 The V.F.I., December 7, 1946, p. 92.
Sjahrir, op. cit., p. 262.
75 The N.S.& N. (New Statesman & Nation), October 20, 1945, p. 236.
76 Van Mook condemns this as a sudden reversal in the policy of 'non-recognition of the revolutionary republic', op. cit., p. 187.
77 Sunday Times, September 30, 1945.
78 See Van Mook, op. cit., p. 211

In this connection one can refer to a strange comment by Professor P.M. Van W. Falthe. He says that after Japan's surrender a chaotic situation developed and Indonesian minds were affected by a regression-mechanism. Indonesians, he says, began to sacrifice logic and reality before dreams and imagination - and they came to believe that Christison had recognised the Republic.

What would be Falthe's comment on Van Mook's reaction? See his book Psychological Aspects of the Indonesian Problem, esp., p. 3.

The Netherlands government refused to understand that (a) collaboration with the Japanese during the Japanese occupation was but a temporary strategy; (b) the Japanese were not all welcoming the proclamation of the Republic; (c) the Japanese fought Republicans even after surrender. As regards (a) the following may be quoted:

"Collaboration assumes a new aspect in a country where the subject race, once its rulers had gone, felt itself entitled to make every post a winning post in its struggle for freedom." Allan Dawes, N.Y. Times, November 18, 1945, P.IV, 5.

As regards (b): "On September the 19th the population of Djakarta held a meeting that had been banned by the Japanese military forces in the city.

Thus of thousands of peoples had already gathered before the appointed hour. The women crowded on the grandstand in the middle of/square. The men and boys stood on the field, under the scorching sun and near to the tanks and machine-guns.

"At exactly 5 o’clock the President and his escort arrived at the entrance of the meeting place. But there they were stopped by the Japanese Kempeitai."

"While the leaders were arguing with the Japs thousand of attendants were still streaming on to the meeting place. And the crowd, already impatient, clamoured for the leaders. Realising the futility of attempting to stop the meeting the Japanese gave way." Indonesia (Note 65, para 3), p.5.
As regards (c): "Our 'Pemuda' ('i.e., youth organisations) formed the spearhead of the action against the Jap Kempeitai Units. Everywhere the password 'Siap' (be prepared) resounded, signifying the peoples' preparedness to bring every sacrifice in defence of their newly proclaimed independence." The V.F.I., January 4, 1947, p.144. See also Sjahir, op.cit., p.261.

And, as regards military activities of Indonesians after the British landing in Surabaya, the New York Times points out: "British circles said there was no proof that the Japanese were masterminding or leading the Indonesians," November 20, 1945, p.2, C.2.

83 Two samples: (a) from a book; (b) from a journal. (a) "With the news of the Japanese surrender, Sukarno went into hiding near Batavia." Westerling, op.cit., p.36. (b) On February 15, 1947 "The former Dutch Minister for overseas territories, Mr. Welter, alleged during a meeting in Amsterdam that the British have supplied the Indonesian Republic with arms and ammunition." The V.F.I., March 1, 1947, p.271.

84 The N.S.& N., October 6, 1945, p.218.

Gerbrandy got irritated as Mr. Lawson expressed his desire to get the British soldiers home which, Gerbrandy dryly remarked, would leave the job of reimposition of Dutch rule in Indonesia unfinished. See his book Indonesia, p.100.

85 Hansard, October 17, 1945, Col.1153.

Westerling is pleased to refer to this statement emphasising British obligations to the sovereign power in Indonesia, i.e., the Dutch. See op.cit., p.74.

86 The N.S. & N., October 27, 1945, p.274.

87 The British brought in "Dutch troops under the excuse that they were part of the South East Asia Command." President Sukarno, Indonesian Affairs, October/November, 1951, p.25.
"You can't imagine a fate, so terrible, as that of the Indonesian civilians in Allied Occupied Zones during the last months of 1945."

"This all happened with the connivance of British authorities."

"The restoration of law and order was carried out in a very partial way. The Indonesians were deprived of all their weapons including kitchen knives, and other household articles were among the arms taken away."

"A favourite attraction of the Dutch was to drive about in military trucks, and shoot indiscriminately at passing unarmed civilians: men, women and children. It was not considered a crime when a Dutch boy got the permission to play with pap's tommygun and he shot dead three or four passing greengrocers," See Indonesia (Note 65, para 3), p.26.

Also see Sjahrir, op.cit., p.262. "Japanese, Eurasian and later especially Ambonese soldiers of the Netherlands colonial army roamed around the city in military vehicles shooting with automatic weapons at practically anything they thought was red-white - that is, Republican - without asking any questions."

89 The N.S. & N., October 6, 1945, p.218.

90 On September 2 at Djakarta Mr. Subardjo, a leading politician before and after the birth of the Republic, "declared that in general a sympathetic accord might be secured from the big international powers. He expressed the opinion that from the part of the United States of America the Indonesian independence has the greatest chance to procure recognition on account of the fact" that the U.S.A. did not wage the war for imperialistic designs. See the V.F.I., Dummy Number (1945), p.29

Dutch circles also had similar thoughts. "... a war that was predominantly waged by in the American forces would be
very unpopular if it resulted in the mere restoration of a colonialism that had been on its way out before Pearl Harbour.

This aspect was stated in the most absolute form by Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles in a speech of May 30, 1942, in which he said: 'As the result of this war we must assure the sovereign equality of the peoples the world over. Our victory must bring in its train liberation for all peoples. The age of imperialism is ended. The right of people for freedom must be recognised'!

Contrast this to Churchill's statement in the House of Commons on June 18, 1940: "We abate nothing of our just demands - Czechs, Poles, Norwegians, Dutch, Belgians, all who have joined their causes to our own, shall be restored."

In Hansard 326 House of Commons Debates, 5.S., Col.60

Van Mook wanted to confer with Sukarno in mid-October & in early November, each time balked by the gruff home government. See N.Y. Times, October 16, p.4/November 2, p.6/November 4, p.37, (1945).

For details see David Wehl, The Birth of Indonesia, p.89.


The N.S. & N. (November 10, 1945, p.310) commented: The declaration "is plainly inspired by pre-Pearl Harbour ideas and shows that the Dutch are still unwilling to face the conscious realities of a politically conscious cabinet in Indonesia of six distinguished men..... The policy outlined in the statement implies the continuation of Dutch tutelage...."

This was also emphasised in the Political Manifesto of the Republic of Indonesia issued on November 1, 1945.

See The N.S. & N., October 27, 1945, p.274. According to this journal Hatta's 'programme suggests a way out of the present crisis'.

Sukarno wrote to Christians: 'Your attitude is far from neutral. It is decidedly pro-Dutch.' See The N.S. & N., October 27, 1945, p.274.

For example, a few days before the Surabaya battle the British invited the Republican Minister Subardjo to a conference where Subardjo could explain the Indonesian situation, N.Y. Times, October 23, p.5, C.1 (1945).

Republicans prayed: 'The Dutch have suffered and are still suffering a great deal by this war. We are sure that they will understand the Indonesians better in their suffering and their struggle for independence. The well-known French-Canadian author Pierre van Paassin in his book 'That day alone' (1941) says in page 219: 'Holland will rise again. But not the Holland of the men of guile and blood. It will be a Holland that has clean hands and a pure heart, a Holland that shall have wiped off the stains of the oppression of the Indonesian people and have freed herself of all imperialistic connections - a truly neutral Holland in a free Europe'. We express the same hope as Pierre van Paassin.'

The V.F.I., Dummy Number, p.13.

For details see N.Y. Times, December 2, 1945, p.35.


Even the editorials of N.Y. Times carried this wrong impression - See the editorial in p.18, November 14, 1945.

Louis Fischer, op.cit., p.86
103 "When the British forces landed they were largely without NIGA staff, which did not arrive in numbers until a fortnight later. The Indonesian administrative authorities offered their cooperation in the rescue of internees, and in such matters as the provision of labour for the unloading of military stores and of food stocks imported for the people of Indonesia," Donnison, op.cit., p.429.

Republicans were eager to help the internees. On August 31 "A Committee for giving due aid and living to exinternees was created at Jogja with Mr.K.R.T.Notonegoro as Chairman." The V.F.I., Dummy Number, p.28.

"The care of APWIs is one of the main responsibilities, resting with the Indonesians immediately after the overthrow of the Japanese administration. These APWIs were then found in Japanese concentration camps, where they had suffered heavily for over three years...." "The task of protecting and safeguarding the APWIs personal safety and security was given to the Republican forces.... How well they have done their job may be confirmed from official reports made by International Red Cross representatives who at any time were in the opportunity to visit those camps." Indonesia, published by Berita Film Indonesia, Issued by the Ministry of Information, p.21.

104 An example of bestial acts performed by Hollanders: "Indonesians who wore the red and white symbol, were branded as extremists, and were forced to swallow their symbols, even though they were made from tin and silver." Indonesia (Note 103), p.27.

The ferocious sentiments of Hollanders will be confirmed by the following passage written by a famous politician in Holland about average Dutchmen in Batavia and also Dutch internees. "In their heart none of these colonial and would-be colonial Dutch approve of Mr. Van Mook's policy, or of the policy of the Government in Holland
or even of the very vague promises made by the Dutch government in exile and in Queen Wilhelmina's speech of December, 1942. All this is only weakness in their view, humanitarian humbug, or, as the jargon used here runs, 'ethical foolishness'........... And the majority of my fellow-prisoners during these years of hardship not only were far more anti-Indonesian than anti-Japanese, but they were resolved that there should be no 'ethical' nonsense about their policy when they came back in government again."


No wonder, then, that after the Japanese surrender "The national struggle turned from the Japanese to the MICA and the Dutch; the MICA became our number-one enemy." Sjahrir, op.cit., p.262.

106 N.Y.Times, October 23, p.5, C.1. (1945)
108 Dutch troops landed in Indonesia whenever possible and infuriated Republicans. It was reported that the Dutch planned to land 20,000 troops before Christmas 1945. See New York Times, November 6, p.5, C.1 (1945).
109 N.Y.Times, 1945, November 26, p.1, C.6
110 N.Y.Times 1945, December 17, p.5, C.2
112 Sjahrir, Out of Exile, p.264.
"The advice then to 'begin talking' might have been directed at Holland." Louis Fischer, The Story of Indonesia, p.90.

Dorothy Woodman's observations on the attitude of the British Foreign Office seem correct: "... either Mr. Bevin was being provided with misleading information by his representative in South-East Asia; or else he was choosing not to take any notice of it. Whichever it was, the Foreign Office continued to act as if it was unaware of the balance of forces in the Republican Government, and remained hostile any to my recognition of the Republic." See The Republic of Indonesia, p.217.


N.Y. Times, December 14, 1945, p.4.

"Indeed, it is amazing how easily certain groups of so-called democratic peoples can alter their opinion. They who were the first to blame the Germans for their beastly actions in Europe, now are showing themselves as devoted pupils of their barbarous Mid European teachers." Indonesia-Impression of the Fight in defense of Freedom and Democracy in Indonesia - published by Berita Film Indonesia, Surakarta, p.29.

Also see p.70.

K.C.A. 1946-48, 7811

K.C.A. 1946-48, 7813

N.Y. Times, December 13, 1945, p.3. In this way Indonesians tried to counteract the impression that "the Indonesians' leaders' control of the country is too slight," remarks Ralph A., Coniston.

Ibid

K.C.A., 1946-48, 7812

N.Y. Times, December 21, 1945, p.5, C.2
That this is not merely an Indonesian or Asian reaction can be proved by the following editorial comment in *N.Y. Times*, December 26, 1945, p. 20. "It (the statement) does not in any way propose the liquidation of the Dutch or any other empire for it specifically acknowledges the Netherlands as the territorial sovereign over the East Indies."

Sjahrir said: There have been discussions in London between the British and the Dutch about Indonesia. Much have been said about these talks. But it must be clear to everybody that we, Indonesians, cannot pay much heed to decisions made about us, but without us." *Indonesia* (Note 103), p. 33.

Some British MPs suggested that Sjahrir should be invited to London, which was a reasonable proposal. But it met with no response." Dorothy Woodman, *The Republic of Indonesia*, p. 220.

"Mr. Attlee should insist on also seeing members of the Indonesian government whose point of view is quite inadequately stated over here." *The N.S. & N.*, December 29, 1945, p. 435.

H.L. Mathews cabled from London: "There is no evidence, however, that either the Netherlands or the British policy has been modified, and it was made clear that home rule for Indonesia was a long way off." *Ibid.*
In December 1945 Van Mook had urged upon the Netherlands Cabinet to recognise the Republic. The Cabinet turned down his request. *N.Y. Times*, December 22, 1945, p.17.

The transfer of the seat of government from Djakarta to Jogjakarta on January 4, 1946, was interpreted by the world as a sign that "Indonesia is not going to surrender." Sukarno, *Indonesian Affairs*, August/September, 1952, p.13.


*Ibid*.

Perhaps it was some such reason that prompted Sjahbin to oppose the withdrawal of British troops just at that moment. See *N.Y. Times*, 1945, January 23, p.9 and January 24, p.20.


See article by J. B. Reston in *N.Y. Times*, January 27, 1945, Section IV, p.5.


See the Statement of Clark-Kerr in Singapore, January 31, 1946.

This is borne out by the militant strategy adopted by Spoor later on in Indonesia, and the very high esteem in which he was held by another terrorist armyman Raymond Wasterling. See Wasterling's book 'Challenge to Terror' for copious references.

157 Ibid.
158 Ibid.

The N.S. & N. commented: "The terms offered to the Sjahrrir government are not satisfactory, even to moderate Indonesian nationalists. The promise that 'the people of Indonesia should be enabled freely to decide their political destiny' is a step forward. But it does not involve recognition of the Sjahrrir government." February 16, 1946, p.113.

161 Westerling, op. cit., p.75. Fischer, op. cit., p.31.
162 N.Y. Times, March 3, 1946, p.36
163 N.Y. Times, March 5, 1946, p.14
164 N.Y. Times, March 6, 1946, p.3.
165 N.Y. Times, March 11, 1946, p.3.
166 For example, see the correspondence page of The N.S. & N., December 22, 1945, pp.425-26.

Professor H.J. Laski had said: "We must be careful not to become the agents of Dutch imperialism in Indonesia..." N.Y. Times, January 13, 1946, Section II, p.11.

167 For Sjahrrir's protests see N.Y. Times, March 10, 1946, p.1; N.Y. Times, March 12, 1946, p.15.
168 N.Y. Times, March 26, 1946, p.18.
170 Ibid

Also see Madjalah Merdeka - Berita Mingguan Untuk Indonesia, p. 18; this book is a pictorial but detailed representation of the various phases and important events of the Indonesian Revolution with commentaries in Indonesian, English and Dutch. The names of the 3 Indonesian delegates are: Dr. Abdul Karim Bin Pringgodigdo, Dr. Sudarsono, Dr. Suwandi.


173 Van Mook, SDSEA, p. 215

174 Van Mook. SDSEA, p. 213

British opinion also sometimes favoured the solution in Indo-China and recommended it to the Dutch. See The N.S. & N., March 16, 1946, p. 186.


176 N.Y. Times, April 2, 1946, p. 2


178 N.Y. Times, May 26, 1946, p. 15

179 N.Y. Times, June 28, 1946, p. 2

180 Republican sentiments were sometimes vulgarised. See Allan Dawes in N.Y.Ti.es, November 16, 1946, Section IV, p. 5 - "The Indonesians admit they cannot guarantee tranquillity anywhere so long as the hated Dutch are in evidence."

180A It was sometimes suggested that "something like the 'Free State' formula which solved the Irish problem might here be useful." The N.S. & N., Dutch Diary, August 17, 1946, p. 113.
It is interesting to note that one of Sjahrir's former students was associated with the kidnappers. Sjahrir, Out of Exile, p. 25.


For a caustic attack on this policy of peaceful negotiations, see D.N. Aidit, A short history of the Communist Party of Indonesia, p. 22.

Some Americans deplored this attitude. Professor Raymond Kennedy of Yale University, author of 'The Ageless Indies' and 'Islands and Peoples of the Indies', said: 'America's stand is the crucial factor which turned the balance against of 'hands off' with the hope that all will turn out Indonesian independence. America has retreated to a policy/well. The provincialism, ignorance and isolation of the American public and American statesman is applying a 'Jim Crow' attitude to the world.' See N.Y. Times, May 5, 1946, p. 26.

Dummy Number, 1945.

Djakarta, November 1, 1945.
"A settlement may of course come through any day if the Dutch are convinced that the British will withdraw unless they accept a reasonable settlement." The N.S. & N., March 16, 1946, p.253.


See The V.F.I., December 7, 1946, pp.31-92.


Ibid.

Also see Indonesia - Impressions of the Fight in defence of Freedom and Democracy in Indonesia - published by Berita Film Indonesia, Surakarta (1946), p.11.


N.Y. Times June 25, 1946, p.9

Take, for instance, Bali. Read the following lines from the V.F.I., November 9, 1946, p.27. "All tricks and intrigues were used to weaken our (Indonesians') action. For the Japanese intention was to surrender the island of Bali to the Dutch. Presently the Japanese provocations were successful. And a battle took place on December 13, 1945, between the peoples' forces, headed by the youth, against the hated Japanese. The fiercest battles took place in Den Pasar and in Tabanan but our forces had not been organised well enough, and so they could finally be repulsed. But this does not imply that our young people surrendered. On the contrary, resistance was being continued, with guerilla warfare."

Balinese also offered stout opposition to the Dutch troops as they landed on March 2, 1946 and were mercilessly tortured. "The most horrible was the case of the socialist youth leader of Gianjar, I Wajan Dipta, who was shot over his grave, and then his head was packed off and taken in procession throughout the town..." Ibid, pp.26-27.

K.C.A., 1946-48, 8010

Ibid.
206 In Southern Borneo "The NICA authorities....failed to induce the leaders of the organisation Serikat Rakjat Indonesia to be sent as representatives to Malino." The Serikat Rakjat Indonesia was a popular nationalist organisation. See The V.F.I., August 3, 1946, p.9

207 The Dutch selected "Indonesians who never before have charged themselves with any duty in which they are responsible to the inhabitants of their respective areas." Ibid.

"To clear the way for the Malino Conference (July 16-24, 1946), the Dutch shamelessly and indiscriminately annihilated all elements opposed to the Dutch colonial aims....Thousands of Indonesian people and youths were killed and jailed as the result of these so-called 'clearing up' actions. Following this the Dutch then appointed their yes-men to attend the Malino Conference...." Merdeka, April 25, 1949. Indo. Inf. Serv., New Delhi.

208 The Dutch nominated 2 representatives from the Chinese and 5 from the Dutchmen in South Celebes, for example, although the number (Note 206) of the Chinese was five times that of the Netherlanders. Ibid.


210 Schiller, op.cit., p.22


212 In visualising the various possible relationships the Dutch might well have noted that the Indonesians could see through their stratagem, if they had conceived any, of creating a new Imperial structure consisting of 4 component parts including Curacao and Surinam and of manipulating the votes of Curacao and Surinam to the disadvantage of Indonesia. See, for comments, Dr. Abu Hanifah, The V.F.I., August 3, 1946, 'The Dutch-Indonesian Question', p.7.


214. "As a consequence of the prohibition of the British military authorities in Djakarta, the ceremony of unveiling the Independence Monument on the 17th of August could not take place before the following day August 18. On this occasion a big demonstration was held by the Indonesian women in Djakarta and..."
this the ceremony could still be carried," Madjalah Merdeka-
Berita Mingguan Untuk Indonesia, p.28.
216 John Coast, Recruit to Revolution, pp.29-30.
217 Published by Perhimpunan Indonesia, London Office; cited
218 Ibid
219 The V.F.I., August 10, 1946, p.3.
220 Speech by Hatta - The V.F.I., August 23, 1946, p.4.
221 Ibid, p.3.
222 The V.F.I., August 23, 1946, p.9.
223 Ibid
224 The V.F.I., September 7, 1946, p.2
225 The V.F.I., September 7, 1946, p.3.
226 Ibid.
229 Ibid, p.8243
230 'The Status of the Republic of Indonesia' by Sastroamidjojo
and Delson; Canberra, the Federal Capital Press, 1949, p.7.
Sastroamidjojo was the then Representative of the Republic of
Indonesia in Australia.
231 Madjalah Merdeka - Berita Mingguan Untuk Indonesia - p.40.
232 Same as in Note 230.
234 Sukarno said: "The aggressiveness of Dutch troops increased
in ratio to their strength,..." See Indonesian Affairs,
October/November, 1951, p.25.
235 N.Y.Times, November 24, p.34.
236 Statement of Sjarifudin, the Defence Minister of the Republi-
- See the V.F.I., August 23, 1946, p.5.
237 Pinke was the Dutch Admiral in Indonesia.
238 John Coast, op.cit, pp.31-32.
239 Madjalal Merdeka - Berita Mingguan Untuk Indonesia, p.46.
240 The V.F.I., November 9, 1946, p.18.
241 Sastroamidjojo and Delson (Note 230).
242 "The Linggadjati draft agreement was hailed by the Indonesian press as a great diplomatic success...." The V.F.I., November 23, 1946, p.60.