Not unoften myths and mystical prophecies leave a profound impression on peoples in this materialistic era even on matters of vital moment. The 14th century Javanese King Djojobojo passed on his prediction to the 20th century Indonesians that after centuries of domination by a white race they would be liberated by a yellow race whose physical features and geographical whereabouts he could foretell with equal magical might. This was a possible reason why the Japanese invasion, when it came, did not take Indonesians unawares, nor was the thought of the Japanese occupation wholly unwelcome. These liberators, it was further predicted, would come from the North, be of yellow skin and small height and would reign for less than a year.

Japan borrowed and learnt the scientific techniques of the West with incredible speed and efficiency. She also successfully copied the Western States such as England, France or Germany in the game of power politics. A junior member of the club of imperialist powers, Japan practised the trade of imperialism with an astonishing assiduity and a dizzying rapidity that left the Western powers awe-stricken. She marched upon China in 1894, Russia in 1904, Korea in 1910, Manchuria in 1931, and again China in 1937. The outbreak of the second world war provided Japan with a hand-tailored opportunity to realise the goal of a Japanese-led Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere comprising China, Manchuria, Thailand, Malaya, Indo-China, Netherlands East Indies, etc. The term 'Co-Prosperity Sphere' supplied a philanthropic embroidery to what was indubitably a plan of political dominance and economic exploitation by Japan. Europe's intensifying crisis was Japan's priceless blessing. In July 1940 the Japanese Cabinet boldly formulated the creation of a New Order in Greater East Asia as a fundamental tenet of foreign policy.
The vulnerability of the Netherlands East Indies (the N.E.I.) to foreign attacks becomes readily apparent at the outbreak of a world war — for at such times communications with the Netherlands are closed. The first world war did not pose any serious danger for the N.E.I. as Japan was no enemy of the U.K. and the U.S.A. But during the second world war, with Japan casting covetous looks at her and Hitler aiming at the Netherlands, the position of the N.E.I. became extremely insecure. The collapse of Holland and the fall of France left the N.E.I. at the mercy of Japan. But Japan did not immediately swoop down upon the N.E.I. as she eagerly awaited the defeat of England. The fall of England would enable Japan to avoid British opposition to her imperialist venture; she could easily occupy a suitable military base like Singapore. This would also expectedly make Hitler magnanimous enough to allow Japan a free hand in the N.E.I. Besides, Japan looked upon the N.E.I. as the dearest treasure in Greater East Asia and wanted to grab the natural resources without any loss. A direct military attack might provoke a scorched-earth policy; the vast oil-fields could be easily set on fire. Hence Japan cleverly tried the weapon of economic penetration coupled with political pressure. On August 27, 1940, the Japanese government appointed Ichiro Kobayashi as special envoy to the Netherlands East Indies where he arrived on September 12, 1940. Kobayashi threw out a feeler for cooperation between the N.E.I. and Japan. The Dutch diplomats were skilled enough not to yield to such a mischievously vague overture. They also scaled down the sweeping demands of Japan with regard to oil supplies. Kobayashi was frustrated and went back to Japan. The Japanese government appointed another special envoy, K. Yoshizawa, who arrived in the N.E.I. on December 28, 1940. While Yoshizawa carried on negotiations astutely the Japanese press screamed threats and spoiled Yoshizawa's attempts at economic infiltration.
The Dutch did not accept his extravagant demands for extensive Japanese participation in the economic life of the N.F.I.

Japan surely tried to avoid a war with Britain and the U.S.A. But Hitler could not beat Britain. She herself could not drag the N.F.I. into the Co-Prosperity Sphere by means of diplomatic pressures. The European war drew out, its uncertainties increased. The long twilight in the China War had already exasperated Japan. Smarting under the double spur of economic greed and political ambition, obsessed with a military pride, she could not wait indefinitely. Japan decided for war and directed a lightning attack on Pearl Harbour. This fateful assault paralysed the U.S. Navy, left the whole of South East Asia defenceless, and led Japan from victory to victory. She captured Hongkong and Singapore, she conquered Malaya. The attack on the N.F.I. was staged on February 14, 1942, and met fumbling opposition that steadily dwindled to surrender. As a result, "within eight days the Centre of Dutch rule built up with such energy during three centuries, collapsed to the bewilderment of the Javanese and the arrogant surprise of their new conqueror."

The foremost reaction of Indonesians to Dutch defeat was, of course, the undermining of Dutch prestige in their eyes. This failing feeling became strengthened as some Indonesians surmised a repetition of the Vichy French business in Indo-China on their own soil—the Dutch surrender might be followed by another period of Dutch rule under Japanese patronage. Another important reaction was the belief that Indonesians, if militarily trained and equipped, might have dealt the same blow to the Dutch as the Japanese had done. These feelings drew further support from the lack of courage that the Dutch C-in-C. had displayed in depriving himself of the British and American military assistance immediately available against the aggressors. Many Indonesians seemed also to share a joy of success as the Japanese had been victorious at the expense of the Dutch oppressors.
As regards the reaction to Japan's entry the attitude initially was one of easy acceptance resulting from a multitude of factors. There was the Djokoboko myth always flashing in popular memory. Besides, perhaps Indonesians thought that a change-over from Dutch to Japanese overlordship might not be worse. Above all, the Japanese were clever enough to placate their sentiments and they permitted the flying of the Indonesian national flag accompanied by the singing of the national song. This appeal was absent in the Dutchmen's approach. And many people were quick in hailing the Japanese. They had not yet tasted the fruits of Japanese occupation and were not capable of sober assessment. Of course, even at the beginning of the Japanese rule there were many Indonesians who would have preferred the Dutch having democratic faiths, however overshadowed, to the Japanese professing fascist beliefs, however obscure. There were others again who would welcome neither the Dutchmen nor the Japanese and would build a resurrected Indonesia on the retirement of the Netherlands and Japan. They deplored the popular fervour about Japan's success and predicted a transformation in popular attitude once the Japanese settled down as conquerors.

The Japanese revivified the already favourable popular sentiments by granting freedom of the Press. Indonesians had a sense of uplift as they were permitted to print daily papers in their own language. The Japanese set up a civil administrative body (the Hodohan), a military administrative body (Kenetsu Han) and a semi-official body to provide assistance to the Indonesian national press (the Djawa Shinbunkai). This sense was reinforced as the Indonesian officials all got promotion to two or three degrees higher jobs formerly held by Dutchmen shortly sent to internment camps. The Japanese did not know the native languages; they did not know how without Indonesians even in
the highest offices. The Japanese extended the favour to Indonesians as a matter of expediency; to Indonesians it came as the fulfilment of long-cherished expectations. Of course on the top of all these was the Japanese military administration and paragraph 2 of the Military Lawbook laid down that the Commander of the Army of Dai Nippon holds the highest powers of military government and also all powers which previously were held by the Governor General. Yet, as S.M. Gandasubrata writes: "The self-respect which in Dutch colonial time was not visible among our people now grew little by little". For, not only as regards administrative matters but also as regards educational and military affairs the invidious distinction between the rulers and the ruled based on the supposed inferiority of the latter was done away with. "Holland for centuries had held the opinion that the Javanese could not become satisfactory soldiers. Japan was willing to invite the Javanese people to oppose the Allied attack with her...... and so helped the formation of an Indonesian armed force immensely valuable in later national struggles.

Elated by the early success attending their first contact with Indonesians the Japanese puffed themselves with the fond thought of shooting out their exploiting machinery without having to concede materially anything to Indonesia's nationalist aspirations. To that end they started the Triple A Movement in April, 1942. The three A's stood for three ways in which Japan would associate herself with Asia as a unit; that is, as a Leader, Protector and as the Light of Asia. "The 'Triple A's Movement' was an undisguised attempt to achieve a greater Japan. For this purpose, the Indonesians had to be educated and indoctrinated as good Asiatics according to the Japanese understanding of the term. This meant that the Indonesians must be educated as good Japanese. They must learn the Japanese language, manners and customs, and they must also acquire a Japanese soul. It did not take long to disillusion the Indonesians of Japanese sincerity and the Japanese of Indonesian sympathy. The Indonesians could look through
Japan's talk of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere. Their real policy could not for long be hidden under richly worded propaganda pieces. Under their very eyes the Indonesians found transhipment of various goods to Japan who did not reciprocate. Indonesians were forced to sell exportable crops at fixed prices. The extortionate agricultural policy of the Japanese produced alarming famines. The Japanese sometimes irrationally dictated the adoption of their agricultural practices which might not be suited to the soil or climate in Indonesia. Coprosperity was seen to mean only the prosperity for Japan with the covering cooperation of the subjugated land. Furthermore, Indonesians resented the Japanese intervention in schooling and the outrageous policy of pushing the Japanese language as a part of the curriculum above the primary stage. Teachers were trained in Jakarta where they would learn the Japanese language, Japanese drills. They were recruited from different schools where they had been working. On completion of the training they would go back to their institutions and give those courses to the students. Surpassing all these came the intolerableness of personal behaviour — often a Japanese would slap an Indonesian taking advantage of the power of the state behind him.

Soon the Japanese were to take cognisance of the growing Indonesian antipathy sometimes causing violent anti-Japanese outbreaks in different parts of the archipelago. Insults and injuries heaped upon Indonesians by the Japanese in their daily personal intercourse inflamed Indonesians. Their growing discontent sometimes erupted. The Japanese ordered the students to shave their heads. It was an act of irreparable stupidity. Students rebelled. Japanese war-lords asked villagers to work long hours and produce food for their troops. But they did not bother whether the overworked villagers were starving. The Japanese talked of Asian solidarity but practised discrimination.
In hotels and shops many of which were reserved for the Japanese only. Their attitude to the women was also shocking. They would throw Indonesian women into the troubles of hard labour or the ignominy of providing carnal pleasures. All these provoked popular uprisings. But these also nourished national self-consciousness and hardened the Indonesians in their determination to wipe out foreign domination.

In another significant way the Japanese further bolstered up the Indonesian national cause. They released the Indonesian leaders imprisoned or exiled by the Dutch authorities, the most notable of them being Sukarno, Hatta and Sjahrir. The Japanese wanted to enlist their services in the anti-Western propaganda drive. But these national heroes were not to be disabused of their ingrained ideas regarding the Japanese fascism, its content and context. Contacts were established between these three leaders resulting in an agreed decision to conduct the national movement in two channels, legal and non-legal, above the ground and underground. Sjahrir took charge of the underground movement while Sukarno and Hatta would work through the conquerors and utilise legal machineries in their favour, e.g., manipulating the services of the radio station. It is only expected that this dual role would evoke attacks from interested quarters branding Sukarno and Hatta as quislings. But Sjahrir notes Sukarno regarded the Japanese as "pure fascists and felt that we must use the most subtle methods to go round them, such as making an appearance of collaboration." While Japan would seek to gain her popularity through Sukarno’s popularity, Sukarno would try to wrest concessions to nationalism. Similarly, Hatta "always regarded himself as a democrat and a nationalist who had been prevailed upon to accept a position by force majeure. Using this position, he tried to do what he could for our cause." This political strategy of a two-layer
movement was unavoidable because the Japanese summarily suspend-
ed the normal functioning of independent political parties. Besides, Hatta and Sukarno could help the underground organisa-
tions financially and secure to their leaders easy cross-
country communications by virtue of the high legal position
they were enjoying. And Sjahrir acknowledges the faithful
services of Hatta who always maintained links with the under-
ground movement. He also received our reports
and warned us when he heard something was brewing on the
Japanese side. I heard from him everything that took place
among the Japanese and among the collaborating Indonesians."

The Japanese sought to restore by propaganda what it
lost in practical politics. The Japanese wanted to deceive
Indonesians into believing that they were eager to resurrect
Indonesia politically as also economically. They were ruling
as absolute dictators. But they posed to be champions of
Indonesia's freedom. Ever before their Indies campaign the
Tokyo radio-station would pour out 'Indonesia Raya' (the
Indonesian national anthem) and also talks and commentaries
glorifying Japan and vilifying the Western Powers. After the
conquest of Indonesia Japan smothered the political freedom
of Indonesians. Even the right to discuss the activities and
orders of the military government was forbidden. But the
Japanese pretended to foster nationalism and encourage nation-
alist activities. They organised a mammoth political association,
the Putera (Pusat Tenaga Rakjat or the Centre of the Working
Strength of the People).

The Chairman of the Putera, Sukarno, and his subordinate
compatriots, had to spread the gospel of Japan's New Order. The
Putera was later on converted into the Hokokai (the Centre
of Peoples' Service) where the control of the military rulers
was made more manifest and firm. "... it is difficult to give
the name political party to these two organisations, because
the prerequisite of the presence of certain aspirations concern­
ing the state and society was not satisfied. Furthermore member­
ship was compulsory for every resident.\textsuperscript{52}

Indonesian leaders in the Putera or the Hokokai were
urged to aid the Japanese war-effort in two ways: by persuading
the people to enlist themselves in the Japanese war-services,
by indoctrinating the people against any sympathy for the
Allies. This was not enough. In order to elicit greater coopera­
tion in war operations the Japanese Premier Tojo\textsuperscript{53} broadcast in
June 1943 a hint of independence for Indonesians. Tojo empha­
sised the need for a comprehensive political organisation among
Indonesians piloting towards independence. In the same year
the Japanese offered to Indonesians some bigger and deceitfully
palpable concessions. On September 5\textsuperscript{54} were set up the Central
Advisory Council and also Advisory Councils for Municipalities
and Residencies for facilitating popular participation in
government. At first these were established in Java; in Sumatra
the Central Advisory Council was not established before 27th
June, 1945.\textsuperscript{55} As a token of appreciation of Japan's conciliatory
move Sukarno, the Chairman of the Council, and two other members
Hatta and Hadikusumo, paid a visit to the Japanese capital;
expressed keen appreciation and conveyed "the thanks of 50
million Indonesians from Java".\textsuperscript{56}

There was a striking interplay of opposing forces in the
activities of the Putera or the Hokokai. The Japanese created
them for mobilising Indonesia's material and human\textsuperscript{57} resources
in view of the war against the Allies. Furthermore, if Indo­
nesians could not be taught to revere the Japanese, they could
at least be taught to hate the Allies and even to fight them —
so thought the military governors in the Indies. Indonesian
leaders, on the other hand, sought to secure through the
organisations widespread mass-contact and mass-sympathy for the
kindred cause of nationalism — the Dutch had barred, as we can
remember, effective contacts between the leaders and the peoples, which could now be re-established freely and frequently. The most significant benefit was the annihilation of inferiority-complex natural to a downtrodden people and an immense addition to the nationalist potentials of the country. Popular self-consciousness, so long dormant, was worked up to ceaseless activity. In a measure this was rendered possible by services of the radio on which Sukarno was an indefatigable participant. "At proscribed hours the population was required to listen to official broadcasts, including the frequent speeches of Sukarno." In these, according to his instructions from the Japanese, he attacked the Allies, extolled the Japanese and called upon the population to support their war-effort. An examination of these speeches, however, will support Sukarno's contention that "75 per cent of their content was pure nationalism". Moreover, they were full of subtleties and double talk which generously passed over *the population heads of Japanese monitors but were meaningful to the population, especially those of Javanese culture. Such talk made it easy for the peasant to equate "anti-imperialism" with "anti-Japanese".

Van Mook also attests that it is wrong to view all Indonesians "who accepted office in what were obviously, puppet positions as mere collaborators or vain and egoistic weaklings". He admits that "the ideal of an independent Indonesia was a very real part of" Sukarno's character and that in Sukarno's "most bombastic rantings against the Allies ('we shall iron out America and break up the British') there were always ambiguous sentence concerning the future relation to Japan."

The Japanese also planted other organisations to indoctrinate and allure in the people. The Peta (Pembela Tanah Air or Defenders of the Fatherland) was set up to offer military training to Indonesians whom the Japanese dreamt of employing in the war against the Allies. Another military organisation set up by the Japanese
was the Heiho forming the auxiliary armed forces. Indonesians recruited in the Heiho were sometimes employed in guarding the internment camps. Later on members of these defence organisations played a splendid role in warding off Dutch attempts to recolonise Indonesia.

The Japanese were wise to establish spying and propagandist organisations to cover the youth as also older public. The Seinendan clawed the young people, the Keibaden embraced the older generation. Religious prejudices were also utilised by the politic Japanese who founded the Masjumi to fan religious fanaticism and make Moslems anti-Christian and therefore anti-Western.

The high-pressure chicaneries of Japanese propaganda could not contain discontent among Indonesians. The Japanese machinery of exploitation was too cruel to be hidden under constant propaganda. The sight of Indonesians forcibly employed in unhealthy areas to prepare roads or construct bridges for the Japanese army was too horrifying to be compensated by pernicious lies. People perished in thousands in fertile food-surplus regions owing to inhuman insensate policies of production and procurement adopted by the Japanese militarists. Even the appeal to Islam as against Christianity could not evoke popular loyalty as the Japanese enforced profane practices: every Indonesian must bow to the Emperor's picture, they must show reverence to Japanese soldiers. Indonesians also found galling inequalities in the military corps which they were invited to join and which gave them military training. These military organisations moreover offered some unsightly exercises shocking the conscience of Indonesians. Increasingly they were driven to the arms of underground organisations. They strengthened the striking arm of the Indonesian national movement. Simulating hatred among Indonesians sometimes exploded in frantic flares.
aided by the underground in many places like Indramaju, Tasikmalaya, etc. Revolts broke out even in the ranks of the Japanese sponsored army corps in Blitar and other places. The sway of the underground organisations magnified as the Japanese, in spite of their hardest efforts, could not conceal their multiplying defeats in the hands of the Allies. The Japanese too became agonisingly aware of the approaching doom as the year 1944 advanced. Military disasters made them acutely conscious of the need to make significant concessions to Indonesian nationalism. They might not be able to rule Indonesia for a long time, but they might leave an independent Indonesia resisting a reimposition of Western dominance. The West would then, to a vicarious satisfaction of Japan, be baulked of the fruits of hard-earned victory. After the setting up of the Central Advisory Council "Further Japanese steps towards Indonesian independence did not follow until after the allied military action had become a direct menace to Java, but then kept pace with that action." The Tojo Cabinet in Japan resigned under the shadow of Allied advances. Koiso succeeded Tojo. The Japanese military authorities disagreed as to the offer of indulgences to Indonesian nationalists. A compromise was effected on September 2, 1944. Koiso was to declare to the Diet that the Indonesians would be eventually granted independence. However, the Japanese military authorities quietly forgot to fix up any date when their promise would be fulfilled. Koiso announced it to the Diet on September 8, 1944. Sukarno welcomed the announcement and declared: "Today the 70 million inhabitants of Indonesia received the confirmation that the Dai Nippon Taikoku has sanctioned the future independence of the whole Indonesian people so that, as is hoped, the lasting and eternal prosperity of the whole people of Indonesia might be built up...." But Japan's brain was divided. Japan's heart was torn between fanatical hopes of survival and awful signs of defeat.
On November 1, 1944, an Indonesian Journal, subsidised by the Japanese, castigated people who were impatient because of the delay in getting independence. The Allied forces had already landed in the Philippines on October 19. The Japanese announced on November 7 that Indonesia would be granted independence. Towards the end of November a Japanese officer informed Gandaubrata — the officer claimed to be transmitting an announcement of the Japanese Army — that "Japan has given freedom to the Indonesian people and country." But Gandaubrata was frustrated as he listened to the Radio Jakarta announcing that Indonesia "would be freed in a few day's time." The Japanese would not acquiesce in complete instantaneous independence as long as they hoped, however dimly, to turn the scales in war. Even when they lost their hope they would erect psychological barriers against the excruciating feeling of impotence. They would not firmly act on the withering hopes.

As the war progressed and defeat chased the Japanese, they were impelled to take some decisive steps towards Indonesia's freedom. The Japanese Commander-in-Chief in Java issued a decree on March 1, 1945, declaring the formation of an Investigating Committee for preparation of Independence. The working period of this Committee could not be fixed, announced the Japanese government on April 28, 1945 "as it does not only depend on the productiveness of the Committee but also on the general course of the war and on other circumstances." It must not be supposed, however, that the Japanese founded this Committee solely on their own initiative. Indonesians pressed for it and popular revolts forced the Japanese to be more complaisant. The first session of the Investigating Committee was held from May 29 to June 1, 1945. During this session on June 1 Sukarno came forward with his formula of five principles serving as the keystone of a free Indonesia which he boldly announced before the Committee of Investigation.
Sukarno, remarkable for his synthetic approach to national problems, presented an elaborate combination of principles, Eastern and Western, rural and urban, communistic and non-communistic, sectional as well as secular, in his celebrated formulation of Pancasila. An examination of these principles is important not only because it records the genuine impressions of a dauntless devotee to country's cause but because it helps us to realise the policy-foundations of a major Asian country till lately smarting under Western dominance.

The first of these principles is nationalism conceived in a very wide sense to cover all the inhabitants 'from the Northern tip of Sumatra to Irian'. It is rid of imperialistic tendencies. As Sukarno asserts: 'Undoubtedly there is a danger involved in the principle of nationalism. The danger is that probably men will narrow down nationalism to chauvinism do not let us say that the Indonesian nation is the noblest and most perfect, whilst belittling other peoples. We should aim at the unity and brotherhood of the whole world.' Sukarno referred to Gandhiji's saying "I am a nationalist but my nationalism is humanity." The second principle is this humanitarianism or internationalism, deducible from the first. Here too his view is well-balanced, steering midway between narrow nationalism and cosmopolitanism. He lays down: "We should not only establish the State of Free Indonesia, but we should also aim at making one family of all nations.... But when I say internationalism, I do not mean cosmopolitanism, which does not recognise nationalism, which says there is no Indonesia, no Japan.... and so on. Internationalism cannot flower if it is not rooted in the soil of nationalism. Nationalism cannot flower if it does not grow within the garden of internationalism". The third principle is the principle of consent, the principle of representative
government, the principle of consultation." "The Indonesian State shall not be a state for one individual, neither a state for one group, nor for the wealthy. But we are to establish as state "all for all", 'one for all', 'one for all, all for one'.'

In the fourth place, Sukarno postulated social upliftment or social justice. Sukarno put the following interrogation95: "Do we want a free Indonesia whose capitalists do as they wish, or where the entire people prosper, where everyman has enough to eat, enough to wear, lives in prosperity, feels cherished by the homeland that gives him sufficient keep?" In Indonesian this is the principle of Batu Adil. "The people wish for prosperity. The people, who recently have felt themselves what it is not to have enough to eat nor enough to wear, wish to create a new world in which there is justice, under the leadership of Batu Adil."96 Lastly, Sukarno expounded the religious principle of belief in God. He explained97: "Not only should the people of Indonesia have belief in God, but every Indonesian should believe in his own particular God...... But let us all have belief in God. The Indonesian state shall be a state where every person can worship God in freedom.... without 'religious egotism.'" "Let us observe, let us practise religion, whether Islam or Christianity, in a civilised way. What is that civilised way? It is the way of mutual respect."98

But the master synthesiser would not stop there. He would reduce the first two principles to socio-nationalism, the next two to socio-democracy. And then he would put forward the Indonesian term 'gotong rojong' (mutual cooperation) as standing for the five principles now compressed into three. And he stated99: "'Mutual Cooperation' is a dynamic conviction, more dynamic than 'brotherhood', gentlemen. Brotherhood is a static conviction, but Gotong Rojong, mutual cooperation, portrays one endeavour, one charity, one task..... The piety of all for the interests of all!" In this way, "Pantjasila becomes Trisila, Trisila become
The birth of Pancasila marked the triumph of Democratism in Indonesia. Sukarno's unreserved attachment to democracy came out as he spoke fully and eloquently about the five principles. It serves to delete the notion that Sukarno was a Japanese underling won over to Fascism. In spite of strict Japanese censorship Sukarno fearlessly upheld the principle of democracy. He "never relinquished the democratic idea during the whole period of the Japanese occupation. He held fast to it and always tried to find a way to realise it."

The second session of the Investigating Committee was held from July 10 to July 17, 1945. Reportedly the Committee reached agreement on the "constitution, government, economic problems, defence, education, etc." Thereupon the Committee was adjudged to have completed its work.

Meanwhile Indonesians were getting more restless as the psychological warfare launched by the Allies made them sense Japan's cataclysm. It also sapped the Japanese morale as reflected in a rise in the proportion of surrenders to killed among Japanese troops from 0.6 per cent in the first three months of 1944 to 12.5 per cent in June/July, 1945, with an equally significant rise in the proportion of voluntary surrenders. As the belief in the impossibility of Japan's surrender vanished, the military governors in Indonesia took another step towards the liberation of Indonesia. On August 7, 1945, they announced that the Preparatory Commission for Indonesian Independence would be set up in the middle of August. Discussions between Sukarno-Hatta, Wedijodiningrat and Japanese authorities took place in Batavia on the evening of August 8, 1945. The three Indonesian leaders next morning flew to Dalat near Saigon for a meeting with Marshall Terauchi, the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Army in the Southern Territories. Possibly they conferred on the membership of the Preparatory Commission and on finalizing the grant of independence. Membership of the Preparatory Commission...
for Indonesian Independence (PPKI or Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia) was later declared to be 21 representing the whole of Indonesia.  

Before he left for Saigon Hatta had a crucial discussion with Sjahrir who asked him to draw a sharp dichotomy between Japanese and Indonesian interests in the coming interview so that Indonesians "would be forced into a position of open conflict" with the Japanese. Sjahrir was in favour of making the situation "as revolutionary as possible" in order that disunity among Indonesians resulting from a show of collaboration by many of them might be dissipated. Since the beginning of the Japanese occupation the undergrounds had strengthened their organisations, amassed striking power and augmented their fighting zeal so that the colonial evil might not reappear. The undergrounds were not supported by pro-Dutch elements or even the Chinese as they had expected. The pro-Dutch elements had made no preparations for underground activities and after mass arrests they could not even try for it. The Chinese gave but little assistance in the form of smuggled arms – this they did presumably on profit-motives and not on nationalist sympathies. Nevertheless the undergrounds commanded courage, if not the required strength, to fight the Japanese in order to erect a Free Indonesia.

Hatta returned to inform Sjahrir that the Japanese had fixed the date for declaration of independence on August 19. But during the absence of Hatta, Sjahrir got a report that Japan was about to capitulate. He spurned the August 19 offer as a pious fraud. He told Hatta (it was August 14) that the Japanese might surrender before 19th and independence must be proclaimed before surrender. He insisted on immediate proclamation. It would be a drastic step. But it would have a singular advantage. The proclamation would be interpreted to be the result of Saigon parleys. That would perhaps urge Indonesians in the Japanese Administration to act loyally under nationalist leaders. Furthermore the proclamation would be the signal to resistance organisations for a
united offensive against the Japanese. Sukarno did not agree. He was afraid, an immediate proclamation might infuriate the Japanese to retaliate. Sjahir went to his place and persuaded him to proclaim independence at 5 p.m. that day, i.e., August 14. Messages were accordingly transmitted to underground organisations. Thousands of youngmen assembled outside Batavia to wait for the proclamation, and then to march in, ready for demonstrations and even fighting. But Sukarno threw a bomb-shell just before 6 p.m. He sent a message seeking postponement for a day. It was an explosive situation. Members of the underground organisations got exasperated. Many of them desperately suggested that proclamation should take place without Sukarno. But Sjahir did not accept it. He wanted to avoid dissensions in the nationalist camp. Others thought of kidnapping Sukarno when Sukarno turned down the request of a delegation from that assembly. Sjahir rejected the plan, but some youngmen, mainly students, became quixotic and kidnapped Sukarno and Hatta.

The Japanese detected that Sukarno and Hatta had been kidnapped and found out the place of detention. Mass arrests would have taken place but for the interposition of nationalists working under the Japanese and their friends in the Japanese Navy. The captains were released and went to the residence of Japanese Admiral Mayeda after Sukarno had promised to make the proclamation on the 16th. Sjahir felt chagrined as the proclamation ceased to be a popular revolutionary affair. He was disappointed that the odium of Japanese initiative would attach to the proclamation if it was issued by the Preparatory Commission. He refused to participate in the meeting of the Commission and discuss the proclamation. The meeting was held in Mayeda's house and later on Sjahir was satisfied to learn that Mayeda was "personally sympathetic toward Indonesian national aspirations" and that the Japanese did not influence the deliberations of the Commission.

Although the Japanese Navy was viewing the problem compassionately and rather idealistically, the Army was destined to oppose...
the move of proclamation. Leaders demurred. But the friends of revolutionary groups in the Japanese press office (the Domei) "forced the issue" by broadcasting the proclamation to the world, and on the seventeenth Abdul Rachman finally read the proclamation on the lawn of his house. He was to be the President and Hafir the Vice-President of the new Republic."

Curtain dropped on the short-lived Japanese hegemony in South East Asia. Uprisings of the subjugated peoples and defeat in the hands of the Allies left the Japanese regime tottering. It collapsed with the fall of Atom Bombs.

On Indonesians the Japanese interlude bestowed lessons immensely valuable for the national movement. The sweeping victories of Japan over Europeans made them feel that white domination was not permanent or impossible to overturn. Japan's tyranny taught them to hate all forms of colonialism, white or yellow. The Japanese excelled the Dutch in tyranny and in stupidity. The Japanese were stupidly arrogant in their personal behaviour and administrative actions, while their tyranny steed led the minds of Indonesians, their stupidity gave Indonesians a sense of superiority. This sense was vivified as they became more confident with the acquisition of military training and administrative experience under the Japanese rule. They could infer that given suitable facilities they would not lag behind the Japanese or Europeans (who had suffered many defeats in the hands of the Japanese) in military or administrative capacity. The Japanese further injected them with political ambitions as they set up a school (Ashrama) where Indonesians would receive discourses on political science and listen to eminent personalities like Sukarno, Hatta, or Sjahrir. Oppressor and hatred, propaganda and training, agony and expectation, all boiled up in the Japanese era to kindle nationalism. The legacy of Japan to Indonesia was renewed confidence in a capacity for self-government, a raging indignation against foreign dominance and a grim determination to stave off colonialism at all costs.
NOTES
JAPAN OVER INDONESIA

1. B.H.M. Vlekke, Nusantara, Cambridge, 1945, p.266

2. "Japan apparently was resolved to make full use of the opportunities created by the defeat of Holland, the downfall of France, the seemingly hopeless position of Great Britain, and the internal dissensions in the United States. The prize was here if she was ready to grab it." Vlekke, The story of the Dutch East Indies, p.200

3. International Military Tribunal for the Far East (hereinafter referred to as IMTFE), Exhibit 541.

4. IMTFE, Record of the Proceedings, pp.11724-7. A Japanese Foreign Ministry document, dated October 4, 1940, exhibited by the Dutch - contained the Japanese plan to capture Singapore, an ideal military base, as a precondition for the gradual establishment of their control over the N.E.I. As the first step the Japanese thought of giving a place to the Dutch in the new scheme of govt from which the Dutch were to be removed at the next stage.

5. IMTFE, Exhibits 1335 and 1336
Also see IMTFE, Record of Proceedings, pp.11724-7.


8. Ibid, p.64

9. Jones, Japan's New Order in E.st Asia, p.245. Also see IMTFE, Record of Proceedings, p.11743.


11. "In this connection the peace party in Japan probably did a disservice to their cause by representing the power of the military in Japan as more impaired than in fact was the case, ... Chinese propaganda worked to the same end, and, because of her failure to force China to accept peace, Japan was dangerously underrated as a military Power." Jones, op. cit., p.316.
12. Japan's ambassador in Germany worked hard to keep Germany out of the fray for the Indies spoils. On May 22, 1940, Germany assured Japan that she was not interested in the N.E.I. IMTFE, Exhibits 517, 518, 519.

13. In this connection a fundamental question, which would perplex any student of international relations, is whether this 'campaign was a part of Japan's over-all conspiracy for securing the domination of East Asia, the Indian and the Pacific Oceans. As a matter of fact, this was alleged by the prosecution at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE). But Dr. R. B. Pal of India, one of the Presiding Justices at the IMTFE, has denied the validity of this charge against Japan in his dissentient judgment in the Tokyo War Crimes Trials - vide his book International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Sanyal & Co., Calcutta, 1953.

According to him - vide Pal, Ibid, p. 498-99 - the available evidence did not indicate "any aggressive design on the part of Japan though it may be that Japan was casting her wistful eyes on the underdeveloped resources of the Netherlands". We may, however, admit, in all fairness to other Judges of said War Crimes Trials, that the border-line between casting wistful eyes on a country and harbouring an aggressive design against it may not always be clear. But, as Pal adds: "Not a single powerful member of the so-called International society can perhaps say that its behaviour does not disclose similar concern with foreign resources".

had cancelled his instructions about disregarding surrender orders and that he intended his orders to be obeyed. The last was quite unexpected." "Yet something might have been done but for the quandary in which the British had now been placed by reason of the Dutch Commander-in-Chief’s broadcast. This had been promulgated on behalf of the British forces, as well as on that of the Dutch, but without consultation with the A.O.C. or G.O.C. and although the British intention to continue resistance was well-known to the Dutch C-in-C." Cited in Dorothy Woodman, The Republic of Indonesia, p.176.

This report has an interesting parallel in Sjahrir's reports. Sjahrir informs us that even after the fall of Singapore the Dutch in Indonesia were not visibly perturbed and there were "so many young Europeans or Eurasians of service age who were in police uniforms, and so few in military service. There was no warlike atmosphere, and everything went on quite normally. After the fall of Singapore no one thought the Japs could be kept out of Java, and yet the prospect evidently did not seem frightening." Out of Exile, p.231.

Perhaps the decision of the Dutch C-in-C was unavoidable as Japan's thunderbolt attack on Pearl Harbour left the whole of South East Asia defenceless. "The Japanese Navy and air force were free to blanket the whole area; at one moment they had five invasions moving at the same time, each under a protection stronger than the combined fleets and combat planes available to the Allies. The defence was so feeble and fragmentary that millions of people did not notice that they were defended at all." See Van Mook, SDFP p.134. He further observes (and this strikes us to be a fairly accurate description): "Fighting accompanied the advance of the Japanese only in those few places where resistance was possible. Elsewhere, for the great majority of people, the change hardly announced itself before it was already there." Ibid, p.138.

16. This collapse may be regarded as the logical outcome of the emergence of a powerful Asian state that could contest the British naval strength. Britain at that time was fighting her mortal European enemies. But in the 20th century it was British sea-power that helped to protect the Dutch holdings in the archipelago, and it was British goodwill that kept the Dutch in possession of the widespread and rich island region. Britain, after all, was interested in maintaining the Netherlands - their closest European neighbour and a logical starting point for any invasion of Great Britain - as an independent country, and hence did not wish to deprive them of an economic asset which enabled them to survive free from great-power control. Without British backing Indonesia might have attracted a conqueror long before it actually did, and the naval weakness of the Dutch would have made effective resistance almost impossible." — vide A.F. Sokol, 'Communication and Production in Indonesian History', Far Eastern Quarterly, August, 1948.

17. According to Sjahrir, "Long before Pearl Harbour it was widely felt that they (i.e., the Japanese) would invade Indonesia. While many of the Dutch still thought and hoped that Indonesia could be kept out of the war - and even a few thought, like the French in Indochina, of reaching an agreement with the Japanese - among the mass of the Indonesian people the conviction was generally held that war would come to the islands." Out of Exile, p.219.

18. As Sjahrir remarks: "The fall of Holland evoked secret satisfaction, and it was expected that there would be still more radical happenings........ the people derived a vicarious satisfaction from the misfortunes of their rulers. And this provided a stimulus for further estrangement from the Dutch and for a growth of national self-consciousness." The downfall
of the erstwhile masters was "for an average Indonesian" nothing but God's punishment for "the evil, the arrogance and the oppression that they had brought to Indonesia." Out of Exile, pp. 218-19.

19. One section of the people in Indonesia was thoroughly dissatisfied - the Chinese. The Chinese in Indonesia had for a long time past bitter feelings towards the Japanese. One reason for this was a deep-seated inferiority complex nurtured by a discriminatory policy adopted by the Netherlands. "...... the Japanese were accorded in Java a legal status equal to that of "Europeans", and in 1909 they were allowed to have a Japanese Consul in Batavia, although the number of Japanese citizens residing in the Indies was, and until World War II always remained, very small." - Sidney B. Fay, 'Revolt in the Netherlands Indies', Current History, December 1945, p.543.

20. Sjahrir portrays this aspect of popular reaction and the contents of the myth vividly: "People said openly that the Djojobojo story would be fulfilled, and that days of white rule were over. The coming of the Japanese, they said, would bring liberation. After a hundred days of their occupation, the promised days of freedom would be at hand." Out of Exile, pp.232-33.


Perhaps this was a reason why Indonesians refused to cooperate with the Dutch militarily in countering the Japanese threat. "To meet the emergency the Governor General
But different indigenous organisations, "in short, the entire people of Indonesia opposed its introduction, because it was intended only to maintain Dutch Power in Indonesia." - B.A. Ubani - 'Indonesian fight for freedom' - United Asia, January-February, 1949, p.417.

Possibly a more important reason was that much before the Japanese invasion Indonesians wanted to cooperate with the Dutch in galvanising the war-effort. The Dutch disdainfully rejected this faithful offer. "The loyal and legal Indonesian nationalists offered to form an Indonesian militia and to assume responsibility for it in support of the war-effort. Their offer was ignored. It was felt to be unimportant; experiments with nationalists, which might later be a source of disturbance, were considered unnecessary." Soetan Sjahrir, op. cit., p.218. Also see Aidit, op. cit., p.17.

22. For example, as Shahrir says, Hatta "was particularly disturbed over the pro-Japanese attitude of the people." Out of Exile, p.232.

23. Sjahrir "was convinced that the people would be disillusioned only after the arrival of the Japanese. My advice to the others was wholly based on the assumption that a complete turnabout in popular sentiment would take place after the occupation began". Out of Exile, p.233.

The people, however, were thoroughly irritated by the behaviour of Dutch troops and automatically swung over to welcome Japanese troops. "The Dutch had clearly shown themselves to the world that they were as impotent to defend their fatherland as to defend their colonies. And worst of all, lacking the discipline of the Japanese troops, they did more looting and destruction than the invaders." Sumonesoro, 'The part Indonesia played in world upheaval', The Voice of Free Indonesia, Dummy Number (1945?), p.22.
It must not be supposed that the press was free. The Japanese Administration controlled the news and sought to utilise newspapers for securing their propaganda objectives. Ibid, pp.26-27.

"Almost all work, and particularly technical work, was turned over to the Indonesians; and they soon realized that the Japanese supervisors who had been placed over them generally knew nothing about the work they were supervising." Sjahrir, op. cit., p.248. This surely helped the development of self-respect among Indonesians.

An account of the Japanese occupation of Banjumas Residency, Java, March 1942 to August 1945, Department of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University, Data Paper no.10, p.10. Mr. Gandasubrata was promoted to the post of the Resident in that area.

The Japanese were spiritually prepared for their role as the Light of Asia. "They believe that their social and political institutions were derived from the gods and are therefore divine, and are vastly superior to the institutions of other countries. Being Superior, these institutions should be propagated throughout the world...." E.R. Dickover, 'The Japanese War-Machine: its strength and weakness', Department of State Bulletin, February 18, 1945, p.245.

Sjahrir, op. cit., pp.246-47.

The Coprosperity Plan could never materialise while Japan's social and economic situation remained unaltered. "Had Japan wanted to make good her promises, she would have had
NOTES (contd.)

- 8 -
to liquidate her imperial set-up, liberate the countries she now held, form alliances with them on terms of equality...." Otherwise co-prosperity could not be achieved. "But Japan had no such intention...." Kamaladevi Chattapadhyay, "Freedom Movements in Asia", United Asia, May 1948, p.27.

33. "Concisely, Japan's economic blue-print for the Indies consisted of sending thence to Japan the materials needed for prosecuting the war and for making victory eventually profitable, and in the interval of making the area itself self-sufficient." Virginia Thompson, 'Japan's blue-print for Indonesia', Far Eastern Quarterly, February, 1946, pp.202-3. It is, however, difficult to agree on the latter part of the comment, and decide how far the Japanese were really interested in making the Indies self-sufficient. The Japanese plans to remodel Indonesian agriculture were too dangerous and did not reveal a concern for Indonesia's self-sufficiency. "......the peasants were arbitrarily forced to plant whatever the Japanese thought might be of use; sometimes castor-bean seeds, sometimes cotton. Experiments were conducted on a large scale with both the ground and the people. If the experimental crop failed, the work of hundreds of thousands of people came to nothing." Sjahri, op.cit., p.247.
34. Japan's East Asian Plan contained not an economic and political but also a cultural blue-print. Japan wanted to proclaim her cultural sovereignty. "Japan's obsession to assert her cultural hegemony in East manifested itself in Indonesia, as elsewhere in South-Eastern Asia, by the establishment of numerous Japanese-language schools, .... the diffusing of literacy and elementary vocational instruction through 'revised textbooks' and 'reformed distribution of literature and pictures and teachers'/the broadcasting of programmes that would redound to the greater glory of Japan...." V. Thompson, Ibid, p.206.
34A. "The Japanese officers and men were harsh to the inhabitants of all races. As a result, people generally felt afraid. To strike the head and so on was their custom." Gandasubrata, op. cit., p.3.
NOTES (contd.)

35. "The order to all students to shave their heads, and the use of slap on the head as a pedagogical technique, contributed considerably to strengthen the feeling of self-consciousness and self-confidence." Sjahrrir, op. cit., p.147.


37. The Voice of Free Indonesia, Dummy Number (1945?), p.11.


40. ".... everywhere, where Indonesians gathered in intimate circles, they were talking about when and how they could get rid of this Japanese spiritual and material oppression, and become free." The Voice of Free Indonesia, Dummy Number (1945?), p.12.

41. Statement of de Weerd (IMTFE, Exhibit 1251).

42. "The situation being what it was Indonesian leaders considered it expedient to divide their line of action into two coordinated forms. For a section of the leaders, it was deemed convenient to pretend cooperation with the Japanese, while the other section went underground." Ubani, op. cit., p.16.

42. Also see J.A. Vredendorp, 'Indonesia at the Crossroads', Pacific Affairs, December 1946, p.346.

43. Sjahrrir, Out of Exile, p.346.

44. Sjahrrir, op. cit., p.242.

45. ".... the Japanese system of military government made it impossible for political parties to continue their activities. The leaders of the political parties of the time soon worked out a new method of struggle in accord with the existing possibilities." Roeslan Abdulgani, Indonesian Affairs, Oct/Nov/Dec 1952, p.8.
NOTES (contd.)

49. IMTFE, Exhibit 1351.

50. In the beginning the Japanese disbanded the Walikraad and also the local councils. They wanted to sponsor new local, regional, and central manuskut councils. Vide the announcement of Kumakishii Harada, the Japanese Commander-in-Java, on August 1, 1942. Harada said that Indonesians would be given larger number of posts in administration if they were willing to cooperate.

52. Ibid.

53. Tojo was prepared to assure Indonesians in definitive terms that ultimately they would be granted independence. Vide Evidence of Tojo, IMTFE, Record of the Proceedings, pp.36466-7. But the Supreme Command and the Japanese governors in the East Indies were opposed to it. At the Imperial Conference of May 31, 1943, the Japanese could agree to accord Indonesians some share in the administration - Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

Sukarno perhaps had another objective. He wanted to win over Tojo and secure independence of the kind granted to the Philippines. He was not successful - IMTFE, Exhibit 1344.

57. Certain sections of the people, notably the Chinese and Eurasians were excluded from membership in the Putera. Perhaps this was favourable for the growth of Indonesian nationalism through the Putera. The Japanese tried to play off one section against another. Vide IMTFE, Exhibit 1351.

58. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, p.108.
NOTES (cont'd.)

59. Van Mook SDSEA, p.143.

60. Ibid, p.151.

Sukarno "made a constant effort to rouse nationalism in his speeches together with admiration for Japan and abhorrence of the Western nations." Ibid, p.154.

61. General Harada expressed his willingness to form the volunteer forces in October 1943. IMTFE, Exhibit 1351.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. Van Mook, SDSEA, p.162. In this book Van Mook has nowhere referred to the Putera.

65. IMTFE, Exhibit 1351.

66. The Japanese tried to organise the vast man-power horizontally through youth groups and vertically through religious associations. They set up these organisations "for the performance of voluntary labour and for building defence and public works on the islands. Threats, praise and appeals to Asiatic solidarity were used to mobilise this labour force for use not only in the Indies but in Malaya and Burma as well." V. Thompson, 'Japan's Blueprint for Indonesia', Far Eastern Quarterly, February, 1946, p.204.

67. Sjafrir, op. cit. pp.247-50. "The villages were decimated by starvation and sickness, particularly malaria, for which no medicine was available. At the same time the Quinine factory in Bandung, which had produced Quinine for the whole world, operated day and night at full capacity, producing for the Japanese military forces. In some villages the Japanese labour conscription took such a heavy toll that only women remained."

68. Ibid.

Also see the Voice of Free Indonesia, Dummy Number (1945?), p.22-23. "In an obvious attempt at maintaining the brotherly
policy at any cost, the Japanese authorities organised mass rallies where flaming speeches were poured, reiterating their intention of goodwill and brotherly relation towards all Asiatic races, but in the meantime the death rate went steadily on increasing an account of famine and forced labour in the farflung malaria-stricken areas."

Also, Candasubrata, op. cit., p.11, "At the peak of the shortage in the regency of Banjumas there were 3,800 people suffering from 'ungoroedema' out of a total recorded population of 740,000; a figure which exceeds the epidemic in the years 1933-1935."

69. Ibid

70. Indonesians in the Heiho were given the same type of military training as the Japanese but were treated "badly and coarsely" and given worse food, "This was similar to the experience of Japanese soldiers at the time of the Netherlands Indies; they were never given potatoes to eat." Ibid, p.19.

71. Sjahri, op. cit., p.250.

72. "Underground leaders were holding midnight meetings in caves and forest hideouts to organise themselves for freedom. This upsurge of nationalism expressed itself in ever-increasing opposition to the Japanese in the form of sabotage and uprising." B.A. Ubani, 'Indonesian fight for freedom', United Asia, Jan-Feb, 1949, p.417.

This shows that "the Javanese youth had not fallen hook, line and sinker for Japanese methods and propaganda", although many Hollanders thought otherwise - Laurens Van Der Post, 'Some Considerations on the New South Asia', Political Quarterly, Vol.2, 1961, p.129.


75. Significantly enough, Sjahri is hardly mentioned in Professor Gerbrandy's book, 'Indonesia', nor are Amir Sjarifuddin's records;
although he has always painted the promoters of the Indonesian Republic as Japanese puppets.

After all, Gerbrandy is not an Indonesian. But even Aidit does not mention the name of Hatta or Sjahrrir while he discusses Japanese occupation.

77. See IMTEF, Exhibit 1344
78. Ibid, Exhibit 1348
80. Louis Fischer, The Story of Indonesia, p.73.
82. Ibid
83. Gandasubradja, op. cit., p.20
84. Ibid
85. "While the war was in their favour the Japanese unequivocally indicated that Indonesia's independence must wait until the end of the war in the Pacific." Djadjadiningrat, op. cit., p.3.
86. The Japanese offensive was at an end. Even their resistance began to fail. There were serious weaknesses in the Japanese military machine which foretold ultimate collapse. Firstly, the Japanese militarists were "abysmally ignorant of every- thing outside their military tactics" and "principles of economics". ".... the Japanese coprosperity sphere could not succeed without access to outside markets. It is true that within the so-called Co-Prosperity sphere there lie most of the world's resources of rubber, tin, cinchona, kapok, Manila hemp, and various other raw materials, but the people of Asia cannot eat or wear these things. Consequently, the Co-Prosperity Sphere has turned to be a "co-poverty sphere" with a ragged, hungry population hating their conquerors.

Secondly, "the treacherous Japanese attack at Pearl Harbour disclosed a lack of knowledge of the psychology of
peoples. The Japanese warlords "did not realise how their treachery would sweep away the very pacifism and division of opinion of the American people" and that was disastrous for the Japanese who had to face overwhelming odds.

Thirdly, another weakness lay in the "evident antagonism between the Army and the Navy" which seldom confined itself to healthy rivalry.

Lastly, Japan had always profited from borrowing Western technological devices. "Under the stimulus of war the Western nations have made tremendous technological advances. The Japanese have been unable to borrow the new technological ideas and formulae for adaptation to their own uses, while their own progress has not been "equally spectacular."


Ibid.


90. Ibid, p.9 - in the Introduction written by Dr.K.R.T.Radjiman Wedijodiningrat who had been the Chairman of the Investigating Committee.

91. Ibid, p.22.


94. Ibid.


96. Ibid, p.27. Javanese speak of the goddess of justice as Ratu Adil.
In order to have a glimpse of the charms of oratory that Sukarno exercised, we can go through the following passage, "Gentlemen, I have already proposed to you 'The Principles of the State'. There are five. Is this Pantja Darma? No. The name Pantja Darma is not suitable here. Darma means duty, whereas we are speaking of principles. I like symbolism. The symbolism of numbers also. The rites of Islam are five in number. Our fingers are five on each hand. We have five senses. What more is five in number? (One of those present: R Pendawa Lima, the Five Pendawas, five characters in the Mahabharata epic). The Pendawas also were five persons. And now, the number of principles: nationalism, internationalism, conferring, prosperity and belief in God, also five in number." Ibid, p.29.

101. See The National Struggle (Past & Present), Issued by the Information Service Indonesia, New Delhi, p.6.

102. Lahirnya Pantjasila, p.9 - stated by Wedijödinrat.


104. Ibid

105. For details see Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Supreme Allied Commander, S.E. Asia, 1943-45, by Earl Mountbatten.

106. Ibid, p.255.


The decision had been reached by the Japanese Supreme Council for the Direction of the War on July 17, 1945. The whole country was to be recognised independent as early as possible. I.M.P.E., Exhibit 1351.
NOTES (contd.)

110. Ibid
111. It has been reported that in a meeting on Aug. 12, Terasuchi told the Indonesian leaders: "It is up to you when Indonesia will be independent." See Djajadiningrat, op. cit, p.5. A similar report is available in the U.N. Document (in Note 62).
114. This raises a few points of enquiry. Firstly, it is not clear how far the undergrounds, in spite of their preparation and determination, could succeed in their contemplated insurrection. For there is a strong opinion that "the Japanese forces could easily have maintained control if they had desired; they had Sukarno and his associates under their hand in Batavia, and needed only to seize upon them to deprive the movement of leadership." Vide Jones, ‘Japan’s New Order in East Asia‘, p.381. Now Jones makes this comment on the proclamation of Indonesian independence on Aug. 17, 1945. Naturally this might be applied with greater justification to any outburst in an earlier period. Of course, it might be pointed out that Sukarno and Hatta were not in direct charge of the underground movement. Secondly, even assuming that the strategy of the underground leaders succeeded, it would still have been difficult to avoid the charge that the Republic was a Japanese parasite. The stiffnecked supporters of colonialism would not have been convinced that way.
115. Ibid, p.244
116. Ibid

It should be noted that under the Japanese regime "The Chinese were less persecuted. The majority kept themselves out of the
limelight and quietly continued their commercial activities or hid their stocks for better times. They were the "milch cows for the often-repeated drives for war funds and victory celebrations and bought their freedom with 'voluntary' contributions." See Van Mook, SDSFA, p.149. Gandasubrata also observes: "The Chinese, who generally like to look for profit, and also motivated by a fear of looting the people after the Dutch power had disappeared, quickly sought protection and friendship from the Japanese Army." He further says: The Chinese who were classed as rich were also obliged to give help in the form of money, household goods and food."

See op. cit., p.3.

118. Ibid., p.254.
119. Ibid.
120. Ibid.
121. Ibid, p.255.
122. It is reported that the followers of Tan Malaka did the kidnapping - John Coast, Recruit to Revolution, Christophers, London, 1952, p.12.

John Coast's book remains a valuable document. An English military man interned by the Japanese during the Second World War, he had an earnest desire to help Indonesians in their fight for freedom. He joined the Indonesian nationalists and became Adviser to the Republican Foreign Ministry.

123. Out of Exile, p.258.

It is said during consultations in Hayada's house "a highly placed Japanese privately informed Hatta that by the terms of the surrender Japan had no jurisdiction or freedom of action, she could only act for the Allies and was therefore in no position to grant independence or sanction a declaration of independence." See Louis Fischer, op. cit., pp.75-76.
124. Certain ungenerous critics have twisted it to prove that Indonesian nationalism was a byproduct/collaboration between the Japanese and the Javanese. This is, for example, the viewpoint of Professor Gerbrandy - Vide his book 'Indonesia'. But Gerbrandy appears to forget that nationalistic tendencies were prominent in Indonesia even before the war. Fortunately, all Dutchmen do not share the same view. Thus, J.H. Francois - Vide his book '37 years of the Indonesian National Movement (37 JAAR Indoneische Vrijheids beweging)', Hilversum: De Drihock, 1946; - has taken an unprejudiced attitude. P.M. Kattenburg in reviewing that book observes: This "retired adviser to the Department of Internal Affairs in the Netherlands Indies Government" wrote this book "with the avowed purpose of correcting the misconception prevalent in Holland that the Republic was a purely Japanese tool, a creation through which a few rabblerousers would rule for the benefit of Nippon over ignorant masses still profoundly loyal to the Queen." Vide Pacific Affairs, 1947, pp. 454-5.

125. Out of Exile, p.258.

126. "But tribute must be paid here to the few Japanese idealists who really wanted world brotherhood and really worked for it, though many times they had to oppose their countrymen." See The Voice of Free Indonesia, Dummy Number (1945?), p. 12.

127. This role of Indonesian revolutionaries working in the Japanese press office is not sufficiently emphasised by writers.


Rafit is the pseudonym for Hatta, Abdul Rachman is the pseudonym for Sukarno.

129. These uprisings furthermore confirm the view that the Indonesian nationalists were not merely
Japanese creatures. One may be impressed that "the Japanese, far from surveying the flamelike spread of nationalism with the proud air of Machiavellian progenitors, regarded it more like people who found that what they had mounted as mules or donkeys had suddenly turned into outsize tigers." Vide Laurens Van der Post, 'Some Considerations on the New South Asia,' Political Quarterly, Vol.2, 1951, pp.129-30.

These occurred in different parts of the shortlived Japanese Empire in South East Asia. "The guerrillas in the Philippines as well as the Thakins in Burma swelled and drilled and resisted. The nationalism of these countries could not be allied to the imperialism of Japan. They stood for freedom in terms to be translated into their own lives." Vide Kamaladevi Chattopadhyay - 'Freedom Movements in Asia' - United Asia - May 1948 - p.27. She correctly concludes: "Thus was Japan's doom sealed even before the Atom Bomb."

Ibid.

130. "The bombing of Pearl Harbour, the fall of Singapore and even the use of white labour as coolies on the Burma-Siam railway - all terrible to us - were as tonics to most inhabitants of colonial territories, who saw in such disasters proof that an Asiatic nation could beat the white man at his own game and with his own weapons." John Coast, Recruit to Revolution (hereinafter to be referred to as R&T), p.8.

131. "During the centuries in which white men alone had been in any position to practise imperialism an assumption had grown up, on the part both of the subjected peoples and of the imperialists themselves, that this was an art or crime (whichever you like to call it) peculiar to white men. The Japanese taught us otherwise." John Strachey, The End of Empire, London, Victor Gollancz, 1959; p.130.
132. "Dutch rule had been replaced by another foreign domination that was considerably worse." Djajadiningrat, op. cit., p.3. "Under the Japanese, the people had to endure indignities worse than anything had known before...." Sjahrir, op. cit., p.249.

133. "The well-educated native of South-East Asia, agile and as a rule soundly trained, could see no mental supermen in the general run of Japanese who professed to be his superiors or his equals; he often found them rather stupid and mediocro." Van Hook, SDSEA, p.145.

134. ".....the strength of the Indonesian people was further augmented by the extensive military training and opportunities for leadership in government administration provided in that period." What is more important, "this was to prove of great importance" - the Indonesians themselves admit - "in the armed revolution waged against the Dutch from 1945 to 1949." Vide 'The National Struggle (Past and Present)"; issued by the Information Services Indonesia, New Delhi, p.19.

135. 'Indonesian students in the National Struggle'by A.B.L. Merdeka, May 31, 1948, p.40.

Sjahrir says that in this Ashrama Indonesia Merdeka (Association for a Free Indonesia) he had been invited to lecture specially because his movements would then be restricted. But the school became an inventory of nationalist energy and talents. "The courses I gave concerned nationalism and democratic principles, and I must admit that I derived some pleasure from the results. Quite a few of those who took the course later became capable fighters for our freedom and our republic." Out of Exile, pp.251-52.