BACKGROUND

Indonesia's crescent of rich green islands reaches the magnificent total of three thousands — Indonesians are a 'people against Geography'. The major islands are only four in number — Bali, Java, Sumatra, Borneo. This peculiar geographical feature is to be specially mentioned because the awakening of national sentiment does not take place simultaneously in all parts of a large country and wayward geography makes it increasingly more difficult in the case of Indonesia. This fact, therefore, also serves to illustrate the quality of statesmanship displayed by those heroes of freedom movement who have to work untiringly in order to form public opinion, organise public action and canalise popular energy avoiding any overflow.

National Sentiment dawned in Indonesia out of several well-known factors. In the first place, there were not a few social grievances. The Dutch were the rulers and the Indonesians envied the superior position they enjoyed and enforced in comparison to their own servitude. Even the Eurasians were granted privileges which the Indonesians could not claim, e.g., as regards employment. Many Eurasians added to social discontent by looking upon Indonesians as inferior beings always in need of their condescending guidance. This bitterness was all the more inflamed as the Dutch made them face an unequal competition with the Chinese in Indonesia. Indonesians were smarting under some restrictions regarding residence and travel from which the Chinese Government were made free. Moreover, the Dutch even passed some laws favouring the Chinese only such as extending financial help to Chinese schools. In the second place, outside influences must be reckoned. These grievances centering social inequality were cemented with the modernisation of Japan. Japan thereby lifted herself to a status equal to that of the European nations and also instilled in the downtrodden Indonesians a just craving.
for equality. There were two stirring events in Asia in the first decade of the 20th Century – the Russo-Japanese war and the Chinese Revolution – both focussing the formation of the national movement and the growth of a resurgent Asia. The former restored the confidence of the dormant Ecst in their ability to tear away the clutches of the West. The Ru-so-Japanese war impressed on the minds of Indonesians the secret to success of the Western colonial powers – their technical superiority. Once Indonesians could master technological efficiency, especially the use of modern weapons, they could maul their colonial masters. The strident and swelling nationalism of Japan provided ideas as also dramatic examples of ideas in action. These to an extent filled up the anarchic vacuums in the lives of Indonesians created by the negligent attitude of alien overlords. The Chinese Revolution, again, provided a precedent justifying the urge of Indonesians for sweeping internal reconstruction. They were impelled to rescue themselves from the disorder into which colonial upbringing had plunged them. The visible initiative of nationalism in Japan and China started Indonesians on a road of self-examination; it fanned their nationalist discontent to higher temperatures. In the third place, enlightened advocates of colonial upliftment in the country of the colonial power itself did a lot. They argued out the case for concessions to the conquered. Exploitation in some spheres at least gave way to paternal despotism. From the end of the 18th century to the beginning of the 20th Dutch interests veered round what was essentially commercial and tangibly profitable. But with the opening of the 20th century the Dutch became aware of the civilisational aspects of their Indonesian enterprise. In 1901 the Queen of Holland, while opening the session of the Dutch Parliament declared: "The Netherlands, being a Christian nation, have the duty to permeate their policy with the conviction that they have a moral obligation towards the people of these territories (the Netherlands Indies)." The government took some steps to relieve the economic suffocation of the common people, e.g., by providing credit facilities to peasants.
All that emphasized the little achieved and the vast to be attained, and crystallised public sympathies for concerted action. Lastly, the favourable response that the Indies Chinese received from governmental circles by acting through an organisation incited among Indonesians hatred for the Chinese and the Dutchmen just as it also stimulated a hope of success. Indonesians grew zealous for a strong common organisation launching a unified struggle for the removal of disabilities.

However, the first glimpses of the coming freedom-movement can only be caught by a few advanced minds. And here we must look at a letter written as early as 1900 by a Javanese woman named Kartini, daughter of an Indonesian aristocrat, to one of her friends. "With heavy hearts", she wrote, "many Europeans here see how the Javanese, whom they regard as their inferiors, are slowly awakening. But we are going forward, and they cannot hold back the current of time. Many of them (Hollanders) are among our best friends, but there are also others who dislike us, for no other reason than we are bold enough to emulate them in education and culture."

The first association to be formed with a nationalistic leaning is also associated with Kartini's name. Of course, nationalism had to be contented with an humble beginning because the association was primarily cultural. Kartini in 1902 founded a school where western education would be imparted to women who were for the first time enabled to reap the fruits of modern female education. But the membership was limited and granted only to the female progenies of Indonesian officials. Insipite of this aristocratic basis the school undoubtedly furthered national ideals. Insipite of the Mohamedan religion, the Indonesian women found a common cultural platform which could be easily utilised to form a political association.
The next important step in the direction of a national cultural movement was taken by a Javanese medical man M.W.S. Husodo. He aimed at enlightening his countrymen on western teachings plus Indonesian heritage. Unsuccessful at the beginning, he was mightily backed up by Medical students of aristocratic birth in founding in 1908 the organisation, Budi Utomo, the name standing for 'Noble Endeavour'. Two of its prominent founders were Dr. Sutomo and Mangunkusumo who later on played an important role in the national movement. The organisation looked to the elders for mature guidance, to the youngmen for a forward drive. Within a year the membership total recorded significant increases. In its earlier days the Budi Utomo had no political aims at all, agitating only for more education and better social conditions. The Budi Utomo was, in fact, an organisation of the educated sections of the Indonesian society. The masses were not drawn to this organisation. Even when its aims were later expanded into political objectives and membership increased, it remained a party of intelligentsia. This was, however, the only social and political association of Indonesians that counted upto 1911.

The first politically based organisation commanding mass-appeal was the Sarekat Dagang Islam (Moslem Chamber of Commerce, founded in January, 1911, by Hadji Samanhudi, a Surakarta businessman. This organisation registered rapid advances and received wide following within a short period of time. Like Budi Utomo, it was in origin a non-political organisation, but later launched on a political career, the objective being democracy and social justice. The strength of the organisation was vastly enhanced under the leadership of Hadji O.S.Tjokroaminoto. His political insight and understanding was prudent and perspicacious. He is regarded as the father of the Indonesian
national movement. In 1912 he changed the name of the association into Sarekat Islam. At first it sought to organise social life on Islamic principles. One reason for the popularity of Sarekat Islam was that the majority of Indonesians are Moslems. Another reason was its economic programme of bolstering up Indonesian traders as against Chinese competition. People, therefore, gravitated to this organisation in large numbers and it grew to be the first mass organisation of Indonesia. Thousands, and ultimately, millions of Indonesians paid their allegiance to it.

While the masses hailed the existence and expansion of Sarekat Islam with all enthusiasm, the reaction of the aristocratic classes was different. They watched with anxiety the division of interests between them and the people brought out by the leaders of Sarekat Islam. Anxiety gave birth to a feeling of insecurity that turned into active opposition. The Sarekat Islam taught the masses to hate social injustice, and, therefore, the aristocrats, who were the legatees of privileges. Especially, Indonesian Civilians could no longer be trusted by the masses as the repository of goodwill and justice. Some of the laws were oppressive and sometimes the native officials executed them without trying to mitigate their rigour. In effect, people began to look down upon the Indonesian administrative officers as the custodians of such tyrannical laws.

Side by side with the growth of Sarekat Islam nationalism found a powerful exponent in another party - the Indies Party, founded in December, 1912, by Dr. Djipto Mangunkusumo. It had certain novel features. Firstly, it was the product of a Eurasian-Indonesian combination. Secondly, it marked the rise of modern nationalism based on the oneness of the people inhabiting the same country and bound together by a common cultural
heritage. On the contrary, nationalism promoted by the Sarekat Islam was rooted in uniform religious beliefs. Thirdly, it frankly challenged the Dutch Government and proclaimed openly the goal of self-government—unlike any of its predecessors. The government too grew hostile.

The suspicion of the government increased when the name of the party was changed into Insulinde and its propaganda became more pungent and censorious. In August 1913, the government exiled three principal leaders of the party, Dr. Mangunkusumo, Ki Hadjar Dewantara and Dr. Douwes Dekker, as it began to adopt revolutionary tactics.

This party could not master mass-support because of its mixed composition. The common people could not identify their status national with that of Eurasians many of whom joined that party because they felt themselves to be Indonesians. The ordinary men in Indonesia mistook many Eurasians for colonial-minded Hollander. The intelligentsia, however, were attracted to this party and became its mainstay. One is reminded of the Budi Utomo whose influence also was largely confined to the intelligentsia. But there was one significant difference. The Insulinde cast its shadow over different parts of Indonesia, whereas the Budi Utomo could not spread its following beyond Java. The party in once more changed its name into Indian National Party (National Indische Partij). Its sharp propaganda fanned up nationalistic feelings and its influence mounted so much that even the Sarekat Islam had to swallow some of its exhortations.

With the exile of the Insulinde trio many Eurasians, imbued with nationalism, looked for leadership and found it in the Dutch officials, Sneevliet, Branisteder and Dekker, who brought Marxist
notions to Indonesia. In May 1914, they established the East Indian Social Democratic Association at Semarang. The Marxist ideology gained a firm footing in Indonesia.

The Sarekat Islam had to assume the role of a primarily non-political organisation up to 1916 as the government did not grant the right to plunge in full-scale political activities. But the government could not slumber over its growing popularity nor could it go all the way in suppressing Sarekat Islam altogether; that might have been dangerous, evoking universal hatred and rebellion. Therefore, the Dutch authorities resorted to the novel plan of non-recognition. They would not acknowledge the unity of the organisation so that its strength could be sapped in a roundabout but nonetheless effective manner. To that end the government passed an act in March, 1941, whereby it accepted the legal status of the different branches of Sarekat Islam, but refused to grant the same for the association as a whole. But this policy undermined the strength not of the party as a whole but of a section of the party. The Central organisation of the party was largely composed of the champions of Islam. Hence their authority was weakened as they became isolated from the local branches of the party ruled by leaders given over to Marxist ideas as a result of the mounting influence of the East Indian Social Democratic Association. The government policy thus paved the way for predominance of communistically inclined leaders.

This change in the Sarekat Islam was further facilitated as Smevilet's grasp of political reality was immense and as he knew how to capture the imagination of Indonesians. He was a Marxist while in the Netherlands and also while in the Indies. Indonesians must be won over to Marxism, he decided, and
set himself to the task of infiltrating Sarekat Islam which exercised at that time the greatest influence over the Indonesians. He began to make increasing and effective contacts with communistically inclined leaders of the Sarekat Islam. He succeeded in securing a Marxist orientation of Sarekat Islam with the help of some leaders of the Sarekat Islam, namely Darsono and Semsun. Darsono and Semsun joined Sneevliet's Association but they did not leave the Sarekat Islam. They began to aid the germination of Marxist ideas in the Sarekat Islam.

There were three principal reasons rendering Sneevilet's task easier. The Russian scene of 1917 considerably influenced the events in Indonesia. Indonesians became increasingly responsive to ideologies that pledged, at least theoretically, the emancipation of the toiling humanity. Secondly, the first world war produced political and economic instability, made the people restless and sensitive to radical thoughts. The third factor was, as mentioned before, the domestic legislation that led to a split in the Sarekat Islam as between the Central organisation and the various branches, the latter being admitted as legal entities while law did not recognise the unity of the party as a whole.

As the branches of Sarekat Islam pressed more and more for communist orientation of the party the central organisation had no alternative but to yield and modify its principles in the light of recent resurgent tendencies. The effect was discernible in the programme adopted at the Second Congress in October, 1917, at Djakarta. At this Congress Semsun, only 19 years of age, raised a dissentient voice and opposed the ideological moorings of the Party. His Marxist bias was quite apparent. His challenge could not be ignored. The need to recast the party programme was quite evident. The former aim of self-government now gave way to the new demand of independence coupled with various schemes of social reform. By themselves those aims were not opposed to the tenets of...
Islam. But, significantly enough, they were accompanied by an unfeigned denunciation of capitalism. The proceedings at the Third Party Congress in October, 1918, further underlined the Marxist bias of the organisation and the manifest revolutionary tone of its ideals. In its programme the demands for regulating wages and working conditions figured prominently. The Congress favoured cooperation with the Dutch and hoped to persuade them to grant self-rule.

It is only in the context of the growing nationalist activity that we can examine the turns of Dutch Policy. The national movement, fortified by the Russian example, bolstered up by Serekat Islam, strengthened by the inroad of Marxist ideas, brought home to the Dutch authorities the everapparent need for change. To those we might add the demand of Socialists in Holland for a liberalisation of the colonial rule. The visible result was the establishment in 1918 of 'Volksraad' or 'Peoples' Council', although the bill was passed by the Netherlands Parliament in 1916. Restricted franchise, indirect election, racially determined voting strength discriminating against Indonesians, all combined to make the Volksraad a flauntingly unrepresentative body. Indonesians were not satisfied with a Parliament that had merely advisory powers and no real legislative power. With the nominated members looming large and the Dutch forming a majority and enjoying an in-built predominance, the Volksraad failed to become a safety valve to seething nationalist sentiments.

Indonesian opinion was clearly reflected in the proceedings of the Volksraad even during the first year of its working. Many members agitated for far-reaching reforms and initiated motions designed to transform the Volksraad into a powerful legislative chamber and an effective organ of public opinion. At that time the Russian Revolution had its repercussions in Holland also. Revolutionary tendencies began to grow in Holland and instilled fear in the Dutch Governor General of Indonesia.
He nervously reacted to pressures in Indonesia reinforced by circumstances in Holland. He rashly promised the Council quick and extensive reforms in the governmental structure. But he forsook those promises, made in November, 1918, as soon as the spectre of revolution haunting Holland seemed out of sight.

The Governor General misjudged the whole situation. Empty promises could not pacify nationalist opinion. On the contrary, they incited more deepseated resentment and provoked more widespread unrest. From now on a larger number of Indonesians became sceptic about the outcome of cooperation with the Dutch.

The Volksraad served as a focus of nationalist agitation. But there came forth a division, so long dormant but being drawn up, in the nationalist front. This division did not centre round the objective, which remained independence; it centred round the means thereto; it lay broadly as between the Communists and Non-communists, between non-cooperators and cooperators, between impatient advocates of immediate insurrections and others less impetuous. Inspite of Sneeviliet's arrest and exile in 1918, the Communist infiltration of Sarekat Islam went on, systematically under the inspiring guidance of Semaun, Darsono, Alimin and Tan Malaka. They had no faith in cooperation with the Dutch and never tried to join the Volksraad. Semaun, with the help of three other leaders mentioned above, built up a strong leftist section in the Sarekat Islam. The cleavage between the two sections became sharper and sharper, although even in the Fourth Party Congress of 1919 the Marxists were not to control the organisation. That explains why Semaun, being disgusted of the central leadership of Sarekat Islam, along with his followers in the Social Democratic Association transformed themselves into the Communist Party of the Indies, shortly known as the PKI, on 23rd May, 1920.

The Communists, however, stuck to spiking the Sarekat Islam from within. The three prominent followers of Semaun, i.e., Darsono, Alimin and Tan Malaka, retained their membership of the
Sarekat Islam. They stayed on to oppose the leaders of the party consistently and to propagate Marxism uncompromisingly. The leaders of the Sarekat Islam, e.g., H.A. Salim and Abdul, were impelled to adopt a sterner attitude to Communist dissidents. A split seemed imminent. At the Sixth Party Congress of October 1921 in Surabaya an order was issued forbidding members to accept the simultaneous membership of the PKI. The clashes at the Congress widened as one section was willing to cooperate with the Dutch while continuing the struggle for self-government. Others, mainly Marxists, condemned such cooperation. And their leaders were vociferous in attacking the central leadership for being oblivious of class conflict and being religiously minded. H.A. Salim came to the rescue and won by a vitriolic counter-attack that the Prophet had expounded Socialism and Materialism centuries ago. This completed a formal split and signalled the secession of the Communist group from Sarekat Islam.

Logically there ensued a long-drawn-out struggle for control of various branches of Sarekat Islam with dire consequences for the progress of the national struggle.

Those leaders of the Sarekat Islam who pinned their faith in parliamentary action and cooperation with the rulers resorted to a purge and formed a new organisation called Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (P.S.I.I.) after the Madiun Congress of February 1923. The Communist wing’s answer to this was the organisation called Sarekat Rajkat Merah (Red People’s Association) which combined with the PKI.

In 1925 the controversy with regard to cooperation with the Dutch authorities again came to a head as in that year Indonesian representation in the People’s Council was extended. The powers of the Volksraad were also increased, including such important ones as the power to alter government bills, to pass the budget and to question that might lead to debates and even a vote of confidence. As usual, the reactions of the two camps were quite different. While the moderates were jubilant over the victory of parliamentarism, the Communists called it a betrayal of the nationalist cause.
The P.S.I.I., anxious to expand its authority, launched the missile of Pan-Islamism. In a pre-eminently Moslem country like Indonesia the call for a unity of Moslems in different parts of the world as against the onslaughts of infidels served to rally popular sentiments. An All-Islam Congress was established calling itself the "World Islamic Congress, East Indies Section," or M.A.I.H.S. (Mukhtar al-Alam al-Islam far' al Hindasj-Sjarayah), and participating in the World Islamic Congress at Mecca in 1926. This in a way served to guard the ramparts of the P.S.I.I. against communist inroads.

The Communist front, while expanding, was the victim of an internal division. Two sections fought for mastery. One section believed that the time for a revolutionary overthrow of the Dutch Colonial government was not ripe as yet. Another section was wedded to incendiarism leading to a speedy dissolution of Dutch authority. Even the members of the latter group were not agreed as to the exact timing of the inevitable coup. The task of the Indonesian communists became more complicated as they had to pick up directives from Moscow. These directives were not always unequivocal and became more perplexing with the intensification of Stalin-Trotzky rivalry. Stalin opposed the Trotskyite policy of fomenting insurrections abroad if it was likely to prove Trotsky right. He would lend half-hearted support to such a venture and supply perfunctory assistance provided it led to a failure of the uprising and thus discredited Trotsky. This happened in China and made the Stalinist strategy transparent. Stalin supported Chiang Kai Shek as opposed to Trotsky, but he changed his policy after the Shanghai massacre of the Communists in 1926, ordered by Chiang Kai Shek. This only proved Trotsky's insight into the Chinese situation. So Stalin hung changed his policy and authorised a revolt in Canton in 1927. But he framed his policy in such a way as to stigmatise Trotsky. He
did not try to provide the ill-starred Communists in Canton with requisite assistance. The coup was a complete fizzle.

In Indonesia ruthless desperadoes of the PKI were eager to launch a revolution. But they had to wait for Stalin's beacon fire. In 1925 Muso and Alimin, two top leaders, went to Moscow for support. "But Stalin reportedly turned them down on open support."4 According to Darseno5, the Soviet leaders at first sanctioned a Communist upsurge in Indonesia and later on shrank back; this had been Kremlin's policy towards Germany in 1923. The Indonesian Communists plunged into a rebellion in Java in November, 1926, and in Sumatra in January, 1927. When the first blow was struck on November 12, 1926, it was vehemently repulsed by the Dutch authorities. The revolutionary disturbances were summarily quelled by active state measures. The Dutch government announced that on November 16, 1926, 13000 Indonesians were arrested. The government could crush the resistance easily because of lack of popular enthusiasm. Powerful popular support would have seriously jeopardised the safety of the government with only 10000 white soldiers. Successful strikes and even successful fighting against Dutch forces occurred in several areas, but they were not plastered by strong mass support and lacked coordination. Even the leaders of the Communist Party sometimes displayed a fatal ambivalence in their attitude. Tan Malaka opposed the coup and withdrew his support. And the Dutch were not ready to lose any ground by remaining on the defensive. They took this opportunity to repress the national movement in all possible ways. The government exercised extra-ordinary powers to intern people without any trial. The Dutch troops hunted down revolutionaries, suspects and innocents in an orgy of fear and vengeance. Because of a fear-complex the Dutch officials often mistook a peaceful nationalist for a plodding revolutionary. They began to act so as to prevent any similar upsurge in future.
The Netherlands Indies Government instituted rigid controls over freedom of speech, expression and assembly. Trade unionism had already been suppressed by a series of government regulations beginning from 1920. In 1925 the government had issued an ordinance for arresting the leaders of the PKI and banning that party and the Sarekat Rakjat. The 1926-27 coup only brought a climax to the Dutch tactics of unashamed repression and violence. The Volksraad received in May 1929 a statement from the government showing 62 children, 420 women and 1124 men as banished to Boven Digul, a swampy disease-infested region of West Irian. Indonesians, however, put the figure at roughly 4500 many of whom died of tropical diseases and other 'unknown causes' in the unhealthy environment of Boven Digul. "These internment orders were so hated that people spoke about them in a proverbial way as 'di-digulkam' - 'to be digulled'.

The Netherlands Indies government could pride itself on smartly sapping the communist strength. "But there is one thing which cannot be forgotten and that is that this revolt showed the Indonesian people that the Dutch could be thrown into confusion, that colonial power could be shaken, and that this power was not eternal."
The Indonesian nationalist movement was now at cross-roads and soon took a new turn. The Communist failure was to serve at least one important purpose. It helped to clarify issues. It underlined the main issue of nationalists' internal feud—the question of co-operation with the rulers. At this stage of the Indonesian freedom movement social, political, cultural, religious, all factors combined to develop the national self-consciousness of the masses. People instinctively opposed foreign overlordship and castigated many of their practices. Nationalists brought to their aid traditional elements in their culture and tried thereby to overrule from foreign influence. Islam modernised, Islam, stripped of its mystical dogmas, served as a counterweight to Western ideological penetration. The nationalist ideology always asserts the ability and right of man to fashion his social life without being hindered by alien domination. It stimulated Indonesian activity in various sectors of civil existence.

The significant turn in Indonesian nationalism was evident from the non-political associations to which the peoples and leaders began paying greater attention and through which they chose to eliminate the curses of foreign rule and elevate the masses. This decision was necessitated by the melodramatic struggle between the Communists and Sarekat Islam and afterwards the vengeful government measures against any attempted communist revolution. Thus, a large section of the non-communist bloc of Sarekat Islam entered the Muhammadijah. The Muhammadijah was an organisation as old as 1912, its founder being K.H.A. Dahan, a staunch advocate of Islam modernised. Its first target was education. Later the programme expanded to cover many aspects of social welfare such as medical aid, popularisation of the Koran and, therefore, its publication in several indigenous languages, founding of schools, libraries, etc. But although
there was professedly no political aim of the organization and its collective activity centred round Modernist Islamic ideas, there could have been no bar to the fruition of the individual political bias and action. Islam prescribes brotherhood among all peoples as the basis of world peace. This has an unwritten corollary, the elimination of colonial exploitation without which true brotherhood cannot be achieved. An unequal law imposed by a foreign power on a crippled colony cannot produce fraternity and peace. Islam also enjoins a democratic system of government the absence of which will always pinch the disabled devotees of Islam in a colony. Hence the principles and activities of Muhammadiah must have had its political offshoots. Modernist Islamic ideas had political riders and Muhammadiah must have contributed to the political growth of Indonesians.

The Taman Siswa movement, launched by the Javanese educational leader K.H. Dewantara, displayed an almost similar activity. The word Taman Siswa means 'the garden of pupils'. It was first established on July 3, 1923, at Jakarta. The system of education provided by the Dutch in Indonesia was faulty in two respects: (a) it did not offer extensive facilities to Indonesians; (b) it was impractical. Dewantara aimed at harmonising the Western and Indonesian methods in building up an educational system that would equip the young Indonesians with practical sense and spiritual self-sufficiency. The Taman Siswa showed rapid progress and had 27 branches in 1929, 181 in 1935 and 215 in 1942. Many persons, trained in these schools, later turned out to be nationalist leaders. That proves the political efficacy of this pronouncedly non-political organisation.

Of great importance was the somewhat complete unification of the hitherto scattered youth movements. There were various youth groups working in different parts of Indonesia. As early as March 1915 students of the Jakarta secondary school institute the Youth Movement Tri Koro Darmo (The three Noble Principles of Strength, Character and Service). These principles were
consecrated in their first published journal that came out on November 10, 1915. The movement changed its name to 'Jong Java' (young Java) in 1918, the motto remaining unchanged. Other islands emulated this example and many youth movements, e.g., 'Jong Sumatran Bond', 'Jong Celebes', 'Jong Ambon' came into existence. All these youth organisations had their headquarters in Djakarta which had the largest number of secondary schools drawing students from all parts of Indonesia. This obviously supplied a bond of unity among youth organisations that tended to grow with time. Representatives of various movements began to come together and deepen the consciousness of Indonesian unity. In 1925 they formed a Committee and paved the way to the first Indonesian Youth Congress held in Djakarta. At the second Youth Congress in December 1928 an attempt to amalgamate the different organisations fell through. But it reaffirmed a lasting faith in Indonesian unity. In the same year the different youth associations accepted the principle of merger in their separate associations. A preparatory Committee was set up. It framed a charter on 31st December 1930, incorporating all the youth movements in one grand assembly. The Indonesia Muda (Youth Movements Union) came into being as an organ expressing Indonesians' unity enshrined in the hearts of young Indonesians.

The women too did not lag behind. The women had their organisations in different parts of Indonesia. They brought out papers in Java, Sumatra and other regions. Their task was mainly educational intended to lift the Indonesian women from the centuries-old slavery to inhuman Adat, but they began to support the nationalist cause avidly with the growth of national consciousness and the progress of the freedom movement.

In the period between the failure of Communist rebellion and the Japanese interlude the 'Perhimpunan Indonesia' (Indonesian Union) was one of the greatest forces shaping the national movement.
The PI (Perhimpunan Indonesia) had its roots in the Fast Indian Association. (Indische Vereeniging) established in Holland in 1908 by Indonesian students carrying on their studies in Holland. From Holland they would render as much support as possible to the freedom struggle in the mother country. The name of this Association was changed into the PI which strove unceasingly to act as the gallant spokesman of the Indonesian freedom movement in Europe. Europeans were repeatedly reminded of the sufferings and successes of Indonesian nationalists. In Berlin in 1926 the 'League against colonial oppression and for national independence' was established. At the meeting of the League in February 1927 Dr. Hatta, the President of the PI, represented the organisation and for the first time Indonesia's demand for self-government had a world platform. The importance of such propaganda at the formative stage of the national movement can hardly be over-rated. But the activities of the PI frightened the Netherlands government into adopting a policy of repression. In September 1927 four leaders of the PI including Hatta were accused of inciting rebellion against the Dutch government and arrested. They were, however, released by the Court at the end of an exciting trial. This trial moved the masses in Indonesia and undeniably stimulated their national consciousness. That many of the post-1927 leaders of the Indonesian national movement were the active members of the PI is a commentary on its gigantic influence.

In the same year, i.e. 1927, Indonesians saw the birth of the Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Party) or PNI in Bandung with Sukarno as the Chairman. Sukarno had the rare acumen to effect a symbiosis of the Eastern and the Western, himself having a measure of both Western and Muslim education. He had also the unique capacity to convey all these to the illiterate in an intelligible and forceful fashion. The party aimed at full political and economic liberation. But the emphasis on non-cooperation with the Dutch was significant. Sukarno spoke of...
united resistance against the Dutch, divested of any religious bias. Any division along religious lines would mar unity. After all, independence was as much a necessity to the Moles as to the non-Moless of Indonesia.

The PNI concentrated on moulding the labour unions and building up a system of national education. For the latter task they found a useful ally in the Taman Siwa Movement which already provided a framework. Oratorical brilliance and sincere implementation of the programme brought the party the reward of rapidly increasing membership. We must not, however, forget the contributions of the government to the growth of the PNI. The communist revolution was followed by the Governor-Generalship of De Graeff. He was liberal and tolerant. He did not try to crush the flourishing organisation that would one day seek to remove the very chair he occupied. The role of the PNI becomes all the more impressive as we note its attempt to achieve unity amongst the various nationalist organisations in Indonesia. It effected a flexible coordination through the Consultative Council of Indonesian National Political Organisations, shortly known as the PPPKI founded on December 17, 1927. The whole freedom movement, now coming under the dominant influence of the PNI, assumed an attitude of non-cooperation.

With the birth of the PPPKI the government felt the necessity to foment äm divisions in the nationalist camp. It issued a Declaration placing nationalists into two groups, evolutionists and extremists. Against the latter it advocated stern measures. The PPPKI opposed this move by a resolution at its conference of December 1928. The conference also passed resolutions calling for the abolition of notorious internment camps at Boven Digul and recommending the despatch of a memorandum on forced labour in Indonesia to the International Labour Organisation. This PPPKI further discommoded the Dutch
as it decided at its conference in Jogjakarta in March 1929 to resist some odious provisions of the Criminal Code. The Netherlands Indies Government formulated certain provisions of the criminal code with a view to bar political activities and strikes and thereby dam up the nationalist agitation. The PPPKI threatened to organise mass-meetings to express their opposition to the cramping Criminal Code. It also instructed the PI in Holland to arouse international public opinion on Indonesia's misfortunes.

But the government could not sit complacently over the alarming growth of the PNI which was the nucleus of the PPPKI. The PNI's criticism and attacks against the government thoroughly embittered the feelings of the Dutch in Indonesia. Their agitation became more and more organised and their propaganda more and more dashing. The government began to plan severe measures against the PNI. On 29th December, 1929, Sukarno and a few of his associates were arrested. Sukarno got 4-year's imprisonment; his colleagues received less. Many Dutchmen felt that Sukarno had been unjustly arrested and imprisoned. The Dutch professor of criminal law at Djakarta, Dr. J. M. J. Schepper, wrote a pamphlet in which he fervidly contested the validity of the Sukarno trial. Liberal Hollanders in Djakarta did not believe that Sukarno was ready to use violence and encourage armed clashes between the nationalists and the government.

Sartono, second to Sukarno in the leadership of the PNI, could retain the support of a large number of his old associates and formed a new organisation 'Partai Indonesia' (generally known as Partindo) after the lapse of more than a year, on April 29, 1931. Its means were not extremist, but it abridged neither the goal of complete self-government nor the slogan of non-cooperation bequeathed by the PNI. Many members of the PNI disapproved Sartono's scheme to build the Partindo on the
ruins of the PNI which had been dissolved on 25th April under Sartono's initiative. Sartono's critics thought he was afraid that he would have to follow the footsteps of Sukarno to the prison-house if he did not disband the PNI. Those who stood against Sartono formed the Independent group (Golongan Merdeka) which too held fast to the principles of the late PNI. But initially it was not a political party properly so-called. The Partindo over-shadowed it both as to membership and the programme.

In 1932 Hatta and Sjahrir, two Sumatrans of extraordinary calibre, returned from Holland. Those members of the old PNI who resented Sartono's move now welcomed the leadership of Hatta and Sjahrir in the 'Independent Group' (Golongan Merdeka). Sjahrir reached his country later than Hatta and after his return the name of the organisation was changed to Indonesian National Education Party (Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia). Now it became a full-fledged political party proclaiming some new principles, e.g., collectivism. This new PNI, however, never cast away the basic tenets of the old PNI.

Hatta and Sjahrir sought to educate the public steadily while at the same time encouraging the growth of auxiliary leadership upon which the movement could fall back in the case of an arrest of the foremost leaders. However, the Dutch after a time came to realise the forthcoming results of this party's policy. Hatta and Sjahrir were arrested in February 1934 and were not released till the Japanese attack in 1942. They were exiled to New Guinea without trial. Many of their followers also were exiled without trial. Yet the organisation did not die and it confirmed the sincere workmanship of leadership and the solidarity of the bands of disciples as they followed their captains and filled the prisons.
Fortunately for the freedom movement, Sukarno had been released on the last day of the year 1931. On January 2, 1932, Sukarno attended the meeting organised by the PPPKI and spoke about the need for national unity. He said, the two parties established after the destruction of the old PHI should come together and oppose Dutch colonialism jointly. He assiduously attempted to combine the Partindo and the Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia into a unity. Failing in that task he chose Partindo and was instrumental in increasing the strength and popularity of the organisation. The government could not overlook the overt danger and promptly arrested him in August 1933 and exiled him to Flores island and thence to Benculen. He too was not free till the Japanese invasion in 1942.

The government policy was one of cynical repression. All the important leaders were arrested and exiled. The Dutch colonial policy "caressed with soft hands the Indonesians to sleep, scowled at those who opened their eyes, slapped those who get up, and kicked unconscious those who tried to wake up the sleepers." The secret police played a great game so that secret political manoeuvrings were all the more difficult. The parties sometimes vainly retaliated by ignoring the Volksraad and sending in no members.

Repeatedly the people saw the grim determination of the Dutch to crush the nationalist machine whenever it was deemed to be sufficiently menacing. They realised ruefully that victory was hard to accomplish and thought of extracting concessions from the rulers without wounding their vanity or inviting a terrorist reaction. It stood to reason to recognise the superior physical strength of the enemy and its capacity to be ruthless. That explains the formation of the Great Indonesian Party (Parindra) in 1935 led by Sutomo, Thamrin and others. It was alive to the
situation at hand and would adopt non-cooperation or cooperation conveniently. In the Volksraad it came out as the most powerful organisation. But its activity and influence lay more in the social than in the political arena. It promoted agrarian banking and cooperation; it instituted a drive against such social vices as illiteracy.

But if the revolutionists could not gain their ends and were crushed, the moderates too were not to experience a smooth sailing. The year 1936 proved to be disastrous for the evolutionists. The Volksraad passed a resolution celebrated as the Sutardjo proposal providing for the self-government of Indonesia within the Dutch kingdom through a cabinet responsible to the Volksraad. This plan would pacify nationalist sentiments and at the same time soothe the colonising sensibilities of Dutch diehards. However, it was summarily rejected by the authorities. The high hopes of a victory for parliamentary means were nipped in the bud. The rulers would not bow down to the peace-loving national heroes in Indonesia.

Even this disillusionment could not smother the political initiative of Indonesians. We witness the formation in April 1937 of a new political organisation, Indonesian People's Movement, GERINDO (Gerakan Rakjat Indonesia). This new party accepted and recast the familiar principles of the old PNI, the Partindo and the new PNI into the objectives of social, political and economic democracy in a liberated Indonesia. The Gerindo did not denounce cooperation, although this was a striking feature indeed. The leaders of the Gerindo included Dr.A.Sjarifuddin and Dr.A.K.Gani who later on occupied key cabinet posts in the free Republic of Indonesia. An increasing awareness of the strength of Fascist totalitarianism on the offensive all over the world moulded the outlook of the Gerindo. At that time Soviet Union was busy upbring...
Front against Fascism. The Comintern, therefore, in August 1935 issued a directive that the communists in all countries could combine with the detestable bourgeois democratic elements only to counteract the more detestable menace of Fascism. Muso, therefore, returned to Indonesia from Moscow in 1935 in order to popularise the new communist strategy. He inspired the communists in Indonesia to adopt the new party line professed by Moscow and urged them to join the Gerindo. This party showed a mixture of firmness and moderation. Its leaders, Gani, Sartono, Sjarifuddin, became all radicals as regards their attitude to the mischiefs of a heartless administration. But at the same time they dreaded fascism and on that account developed a tendency to help the Dutch in their fight against the fascist coalition. They joined the Volkraad and backed the government on acceptable affairs, but they were insistent in their pressure for obtaining self-government.

Meanwhile the old PSII was being torn by internal feuds. The PSII had been implementing its hidjrah policy - a policy of non-cooperation with the Dutch - and conservatism. After the Communist fiasco in 1927 the party sank deeper into conservatism and its strength was decaying. Some leaders wanted to give up the tactics of non-cooperation and regain mass-support. The policy of non-cooperation was confronted by the Dutch policy of unrelenting repression and scared away the masses. Therefore, H.A. Salim, M. Ruma, Sjamsuddin and others in the PSII wanted to discard the hidjrah policy. But in 1937 they were expelled. They founded a new party, the Barisan Penjadar PSII (Indonesia-Conscious PSII). Another party, the Partai Islam Indonesia, had been founded by Mr. Sukiman who had left the PSII on account of a personal quarrel with Tjokroaminoto, the leader of the PSII. Sukiman, who afterwards became a Prime Minister, returned to the PSII after a short period and to some extent rejuvenated the organisation.
In 1939, war and the fear of Fascism shook the whole world but served as a unifying factor in Indonesia where the political parties formed together the Federation of Indonesian Political Organisations or GAPI (Gabungan Politik Indonesia). The manifesto of the GAPI, issued in the same year, called for a parliamentary system of government in Indonesia directed towards the achievement of democracy, social, political and economic, cradled in popular elections. Of course, the manifesto did not fail to point out the necessity of a united anti-Fascist action of the parties in Indonesia and the Netherlands. Mr.M.Wirjopranoto placed the Manifesto before the Volksraad. In December, 1939, the GAPI organised a Peoples' Congress which approved this manifesto. The slogan 'Indonesian berparlimen' began to be increasingly popular. In August 1940 the GAPI passed another resolution insisting on (i) the transformation of the Volksraad into a popularly elected Parliament with each political or racial group having satisfactory representation; (ii) the replacement of Heads of Departments by Ministers responsible to the legislature.

As an answer to all these political demands the government decided to supply a sedative. The crisis in Europe awakened it to the necessity of wooing Indonesians. It tried a harmless but ineffective device of an enquiry commission. In 1940, September, the Volksraad appointed a Committee chairmanned by Mr. Visman. It was entrusted with the task of ascertaining the state of political organisations in Indonesia and reporting on it. The Report of the 7-man Visman Committee was published in 1941 - it covered the period between the two world wars. Essentially, the report noted the progress of the nationalist movement and the urge for equality with the Europeans amidst the non-Europeans. It opined indifferently that Indonesia could get a Parliament only after Holland had been cleared of German invaders. The Committee achieved nothing and satisfied nobody. It only hardened
the people in the belief that the Netherlands was not ready to quit her colony or quench their thirst for self-determination. The Committee merely pretended to respect their political aspirations. And it failed to deceive the people.

While Indonesian antipathy for the Dutch deepened it served to promote Indonesian national integration. This was reflected at the Peoples' Congress in September, 1941. Out of it arose the Majlis Rajkat Indonesia (Indonesian Peoples' Assembly) having a cabinet called the Dewan Penimipin. It was considered to be a representative body for the nationalist movement as a whole and comprised the GAPI, the Federation of Muslim Organizations, the Federation of Government employees, and also Women's Organizations, Youth Organizations, and the Trade Union Movement. Thus for the first time nationalists had a common forum because they could shed the differences in doctrines and dogmas, means and ends. Of course, differences could not be totally eliminated; only they were relegated to the background by a wave of enthusiasm that could emerge as a unified national outlook and finally even with an organization. This combination of parties attempted clearly ... to lay down the bases of parliamentarism in Indonesia. It also spoke well for the morale of Indonesian freedom-fighters. Repeatedly in the past the Dutch had unequivocally demonstrated their colonial policy of pitiless persecution. Yet the Indonesian nationalists, much to the agonising amazement of the foreign rulers, time and again rebuilt their crumbling citadel and strove for unity and success.

Very soon Indonesians had to face an entirely new situation. Indonesian national movement came to be abruptly affected by new forces in international relations. On December 8, 1941, Japan bombed Pearl Harbour and brought about one of the greatest calamities in American and world history. Within a few months her invading armies swooped down upon the countries of South East Asia and made a short work of Western Dominance. Since then the freedom movement in Indonesia was visibly shaped by the
changing pattern of world politics. The fate of Dutch colonialism in Indonesia was to be conclusively determined by the progress of the second world war and some of the divergent currents of world politics after the war.

Before Japan occupied Indonesia certain traits of Indonesian National Movement were prominent: "firstly, a tendency for revolutionary nationalism to become more moderate; secondly, a concentration of the strengths of the political parties; thirdly, the aspiration for a Parliament." 8 The parties could form federations because of the common inviolate goal of Indonesia Merdeka (Free Indonesia), although there were roughly three big currents in the National Movement, "the leftist national group, the national Islamic group and the moderate national group." 9

The moderates were perhaps the most frustrated group in the struggle for freedom. They looked upon a few small concessions by the Dutch as the precursor of more far-reaching reforms culminating in complete independence. They knew the Dutch were not being humanitarians as they granted those concessions, but the changes were welcome. The Dutch scornfully spurned the lust for liberty in Indonesians. In the 18th century Edmund Burke requested the English King to renounce the colonial gains in America so that relations between England and America might endure profitably. Burke's argument did not convince English administrators till they suffered military disasters in the colony. The Dutch administrators in Indonesia also revealed a stubborn indifference to the rightful demands of the colonial people. Indonesians were strapped by laws after laws shattering freedom of thought and speech. They were disillusioned, their agony snow-balling into chronic frustration and suspicion. "This administration," 10 exclaims Sjahrir, "will progress only bit by bit, if conditions force it to do so. By itself it does nothing and, anticipating events, I shall say that it will do nothing."
The Dutch wantonly threw away the opportunity to build up lasting friendship with Indonesians tending to their mutual advantages.

The Dutch all the time prided themselves on following an ethical policy. But, as a Dutch politician poignantly observes: "Everything short of naked force was called 'ethical' by the colonial Dutch before they were put into the camps by the Japanese." 11