CHAPTER 6
SOME IMPORTANT NOTIONS IN THE SYSTEM OF TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM.

I. Introductory remarks:

There are certain notions in Schelling's transcendental philosophy, which we may regard as central to his system, in the sense that a proper understanding of them is necessary for a correct appreciation of the system. In the present chapter we intend to deal with two such notions, the notion of the ego and the notion of intellectual intuition. These two notions are amongst the most intriguing ones in Schelling's Transcendental Idealism.

Of the former we may point out that it is Fichte's model of consciousness which Schelling takes over and that Hegel's notion of Spirit also derives from it. We shall therefore refer to these two views while discussing Schelling's notion of the ego.

The notion of intellectual intuition is also a matter of immense philosophical interest. Philosophers of all ages and of all places have to say something or other on this. We shall discuss some of the views philosophers have held on it and then ask which of these help us to appreciate Schelling's view most appropriately.

II. The notion of the ego:

(a) Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel admit that the ego must be taken in the sense of an absolute subject of knowledge. This view, although it differs widely from Kant's unity of apperception, certainly takes its root there. For, Kant regards the transcendental
subject as a unity of act. It has no definite empirical content and hence cannot be referred as a substance. It has being, for these philosophers, only insofar as it is postulated. It is present in its self-consciousness.¹

(b) The ego must be looked upon in these philosophies not as a substance but as a subject. And this leads us to say further that this subject must not be seen as the antecedent condition from which certain activities may arise. It cannot be separated from its conscious and self-conscious activities. The ego is identical with its activity. It is, because it acts, and it acts, because it is.²

(c) The ego in these philosophies may be said to be sustained in an activity which is generally characterised as 'positing'. The equivalent German word that has been used is "setzen".³

(d) Two sorts of activities are said to be included in the ego's positing activity. One is its self-positing, the other is its positing of itself as in commerce with an outer world. One is self-consciousness, the other is consciousness-of-something. That is, one is mere awareness of object, the other is a higher-order.

4 Ibid., p. 290.
consciousness or our awareness of awareness of objects. Thus it is believed in these philosophies that there is a duplicity, latent in the ego's character.¹

(e) The ego therefore may be regarded as an infinite reflection. Part of this infinite self-reflection may be seen as impinging on a barrier and returning to the ego. We may put it diagramatically thus. The ego may be represented as a point. The line ab may represent its infinite self-reflection. The line ac may represent the finite activity, which impinges on the barrier represented by another point, that is an outer object and which again returns to the ego.

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\text{infinite self-reflection} = \text{self-consciousness}
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\begin{array}{c}
\text{Ego} \\
\text{consciousness-of-object}
\end{array}
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(f) The ego's object-positing activity may further be characterised as an objective activity because in it the ego confronts objects which limit it. It may also be referred to as theoretical activity because it is meant to theoretically understand the structure of external nature.

¹ Ibid., p.423.

Hegel, Werke II, p.77.
The ego's self-positing activity may further be characterised as subjective activity because in it the ego deals with itself. It is also referred to as an absolute activity because it may be seen as what presses beyond all barriers towards infinity. This absolute activity is one in which the ego posits its own being, unlimited and unobstructed by anything objective.

(g) So far Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel would agree, but they are found to differ in their answers to the question, in what does the self-consciousness find its fullest expression. It is obvious that Fichte characterises this absolute activity as an absolute practical activity, for he sees the ego's self-reflection truly achieved in an absolute moral striving, in an 'ought' that is unconditionally so. It is in moral experience that we are said to be fully self-conscious. Schelling sees the ego's full expression in artistic creation which truly combines the conscious and the unconscious. Hegel, however, finds the expression of his Spirit in our religious devotions, aesthetic creations, and philosophical reflections, but at its best in philosophy.

(h) Another question that arises as regards these two activities is, what is their relation. Here again these three philosophers will agree to say that the relation of these two activities is one of opposition. The idea is that Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel would regard that one and the same activity of the ego, as it were,

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divides and becomes two, one limiting the other and thus creating
an illusion of opposition.

(i) We may further ask: why should the ego posit anything other
than itself and such other that limits it? The answer would
be that it is due to the inner nature of the ego itself that it
requires an obstruction or a resistant environment merely to make
its own activity explicit. The unlimited therefore cannot be
conscious of itself as unlimited unless it contrasts itself with
its limitation, i.e., unless a real world subdues it.

(j) This opposition between the two activities therefore is a
mere illusion and not a real one.

(k) Reality therefore belongs to the ego.

(l) The ego is regarded as the infinite.

(m) This is the highest philosophical notion in these philosophical
systems.

We have adequately described the ego as
the absolute subject of knowledge, which knows object only in so
far as it knows itself as dealing with it, that it is the real
and absolute truth in philosophy. We have also collected a number
of points, as difficult as they are interesting and brilliant, in
which these philosophers have been found to agree in their
conceptions of self-consciousness. We must now give a more systematic
account of this notion.

In course of his exposition of Hegel's
notion of Spirit, Findlay has pointed out that the ego may be
expressed by the pronoun 'I' and may be regarded as what I am conscious of when I enter most intimately into myself and see myself not merely as absorbed in commerce with definite objects but also of myself as active in dealing with other objects. Two things are involved here, there is our experience and there is also an awareness of this experience. Thus we may speak of self-consciousness. What is meant by this notion? Hegel's notion of the universal-in-action may be used to render this notion intelligible. Self-consciousness, Findlay is right in pointing out, may be seen as a process or an activity which unifies and universalises. It is an activity in which an object yields up a universal meaning of which it is an instance; self-consciousness therefore is said to be the universal-in-action. This certainly is what Hegel says. Findlay thus argues to say that the universal pattern appears in an object in a petrified form and its disengagement from the object is an affair of consciousness. Thus to say I am self-conscious is to say that the universal becomes disengaged from object and it becomes explicit. 

With this explanation Findlay elucidates the other components of the self-consciousness. The positing activity therefore must consist in disengaging universality from particularity. In disengaging universality from particularity,

2. Ibid., pp. 38, 39.
self-consciousness is said to disengage itself from everything else (which Hegel calls its power of absolute negativity) and in this it may be seen as overcoming the distinction of persons and as achieving an inter-subjective form. These norms are, according to Findlay the fit expressions of the universal-in-action. But self-consciousness, as Findlay has explained, is not only infinite and supra-personal, but also finite and personal, for the universal-in-action is also "wedded" to particular finite contents. It may be thus recognised as the infinite-in-finitude. This notion of universal-in-action, Findlay shows, also explains self-consciousness as the absolutely real. For we can understand anything adequately only if we see it as a stage towards or condition of the emergence of Self-consciousness, which therefore is the only reality. In this sense, it is the absolute reality or the truth of everything.

Let us re-consider the issue with reference to what Fichte, Schelling, and also Hegel understand by the notion of self-consciousness. We ought to ask: do they mean by self-consciousness a universal notion, or do they mean by it

1. Ibid., p.39.
2. Ibid., p.40.
3. Ibid., pp.40,41.
4. Ibid., p.43.
individual self-consciousness. It is usual with English readers to take the pronoun 'I' to mean this or that person or to refer to the one in a context. Wittgenstein says that the use of the pronoun 'I' is like putting up one's hand when talking. Certainly the normal use of 'self' or the 'I' indicates no universalising function. It merely refers to the individual. However, the post-Kantian philosophers took the word 'self' or the word 'I' out of their normal use and employed them in an extra-ordinary sense where it refers to no one individual or other but to a universal principle, an absolute subject, or a supra-personal being.

It is interesting to note that some of the Indian schools of thought also use 'self' in an unusual use. The Upanishads and the school of Advaita Vedanta, for instance, understand by 'self' some sort of pure consciousness not belonging to any definite individual, but what includes them all and yet is beyond them. These philosophies look upon this self or Atman as the only reality. But the main difference between these views and the German Idealists' views lies in this that while self-consciousness is treated as the principle of being in the former, it is said to be the absolute subject or principle of knowledge in the latter. It seems therefore that a discussion on this line would not be profitable. We would rather explain the Fichtean ego on its own merits. Findlay attempts to depict this notion by referring to it as a "self-collection out of random inconsequence". He says that although we may be conscious
in many "blunt" and "uninteresting ways" yet our conscious life regularly tend to "sharpen itself" into "an intelligent state" which is both analytic and synoptic. We therefore, inspite of being conscious of all that confront us, may also attain to this sort of intelligent state and self-consciousness may then be shared by us all. And in this sense it may achieve universality.

That I am self-conscious therefore means that I isolate myself from every externality or that I disengage universality from particularity. And this cannot be true of my individual self or of someone else's, but must be characteristic of all of us. We may thus speak of a universal self.

After we have dealt with the notion of self-consciousness we may go on to ask, how is knowledge of self possible? Is the self to be known in the same way as the objects, or do we mean by 'self-knowledge' an altogether different sort of knowledge? Schelling tells us that self-consciousness is an infinite activity. It is known in an intuition of the intellect. We may ask: is Schelling's view tenable? If it be so, what is meant by this sort of intellectual intuition. Thus we pass over to the next section where we propose to deal with the notion of intellectual intuition in general and to assess Schelling's notion of it in particular.

1. Ibid., p.51.
III. The notion of the intellectual intuition:

The idea of the intellectual intuition has been offered in various forms by the rationalist philosophers. The rationalist thinkers advance their doctrine of the intellectual intuition in connection with their views of scientific knowledge. Their main contentions are these:

(a) Scientific results are to be expressed in deductive system. And the basic premises of a deductive system are evident in an intellectual intuition.

(b) What necessarily follows from the first contention is their absolute trust in mathematical knowledge. They look upon Mathematics as the ideal science and mathematical knowledge, they believe, is truly intuitive in an intellectual way.

(c) Their basic assumption is therefore that our scientific knowledge is based on certain basic principles and that scientific propositions are true in so far as they may be related to the basic principles. These basic principles, they believe, are self-evidently true and such self-evidence is not demonstrated but to be intuited intellectually. The truths of the basic principles are thus given in a sort of flash of insight.

Aristotle, as we all know, is the forerunner of this theory. He looks upon science as a deductive system in which propositions follow in a linear inference. Any proposition, in Aristotle's view, in a system of science is justified in its being related to the basic principles of the system. These basic
principles themselves cannot be demonstrated but are intuited. Descartes is another propounder of the doctrine of intuition of the self-evident. He always believed firmly: that the progress of the sciences is in main due to such intuitions of self-evident truths.

(b) Another important aspect of the rationalists' doctrine is their absolute faith in mathematical knowledge. The intuition of the self-evident is to be met with only in Mathematics. Both Aristotle and Descartes regard Mathematics as the model of scientific knowledge.

Aristotle looks upon mathematics as a deductive system in which reasonings follow from primary principles which Aristotle believes are self-evidently true. Aristotle may be found to add further to his theory by saying that Mathematics is not merely a precise science built on a strictly logical method, but that it is a science with practical application because its premises are not mere assumptions but general truths of fact. Each different branch of Mathematics, in Aristotle's view, therefore deals with some aspect or department of reality and thus begins with intuitions of basic truths about them. Geometry for example, Aristotle would tell us, is concerned with space and it may be said to begin with the intuition of certain basic truths about spatial relations or an intuition of construction in space. Arithmetic likewise, Aristotle would have us say, is about number and it begins with an apprehension of basic truths about numerical system. And for apprehension of these basic truths,
rationalists take recourse to the intuition of the intellect.

Descartes certainly was following the intellectual fashion of his time, viz., to apply mathematical method everywhere and declare supremacy of mathematical knowledge. He says that the progress of physics is because of the mathematical method, and that Metaphysics would also attain the sure path of science if it would adopt this method.

We may remark here that it is Spinoza who actually applies mathematical method in Metaphysics. We may further add that both Spinoza and Leibniz held the view that philosophy itself would only advance if it adopted mathematical methods and sets out its results in mathematical form.

The possibility of intuition of the intellect in Mathematics is completely ruled out by the empiricists' doctrine of basic truths in sciences. Mill, for instance, held the view that the so-called fundamentals in sciences are not self-evident truths but empirical generalisations with which we become so familiar that we come to treat them as self-evidently true.

Kant, on the other hand, would have also argued against the rationalists' doctrine if he had said that no intellectual apprehension on the concept of five and seven, for example, would enable us to say that their sum is twelve. Mathematical propositions for Kant are synthetic, that is to

1. Walsh, loc. cit., p. 54, p. 88f
prove these propositions we must necessarily construct figures in intuition and apprehend the connection concretely. And the intuition, Kant would say, that is involved in Mathematics is not an intellectual one but an a priori intuition of space and time.¹

Instead of pursuing Kant's view, which we may note is very different from the rationalists' and which we need not look upon as an improvement in any way upon the rationalists' doctrine of the possibility of intuition in Mathematics, we may turn to deal with this issue as it may be judged today. That is, no theory of mathematical knowledge would be complete if reference is not made to the modern empiricists' view of the same, which we may say, is the working out of an empiricist philosophy of Mathematics.

Their main contentions are these: (i) that mathematical propositions are analytic, (ii) that mathematical reasoning is a matter of pure reason, its conclusions follow from its presuppositions by logical rules; (iii) and that it is not the case that the primary principles of a mathematical system are self-evident truths established by intellectual intuition.

The important outcome of our discussion lies not in dealing with the modern empiricists' doctrine of Mathematics but only their contention that there are no self-evident truths to be intuited in Mathematics. We need not go actually into their philosophy of Mathematics. We may only remark here

¹ Kant, loc.cit., p.42.
that the modern empiricist by ascribing logical necessity to mathematical propositions retains something of the rationalists' view and yet rejects the possibility of apprehension of mathematical fundamentals in intellectual intuition.

Another important issue that demands our attention in connection with the possibility of intuition in mathematics, is that the notion of intellectual intuition is very much important also to logic. The rationalist thinkers distinguish logic from mathematics and believe that intellectual intuition plays an important role in logic also. They would therefore say that logical axioms are also apprehended in our intuition.

The criticism of this view once more comes from the modern empiricists who treat logic on a par with mathematics and look upon inference or formal thinking as strictly analytic.

Again, we need not go into the modern empiricists' view of logic for a full length discussion. We restrict ourselves to sum up the main contentions of the rationalists in order to be able to ask, if Schelling's view owes anything to the rationalists' doctrine.

Let us first reconsider what we have discussed so far. We have stated the mainstay of the rationalists' view, viz., that scientific knowledge is built on primary principles which are apprehended only in an intellectual intuition. This, they believe, is true in all deductive systems, viz., in Mathematics and in logic and in physics.
We have also referred to the modern empiricistic view which denies the possibility of intuitive grasp of mathematical and logical fundamentals. We have yet to show if intuition is necessary in physics. We ought to discuss Locke's view in this connection, because Locke, an empiricist philosopher, strange as it may seem, was attracted to the mathematical method and regarded intuitive knowledge as supreme, and yet he would reject the Cartesian ideal of an a priori physics where each proposition is guaranteed by an act of intuition. Let us then take into account Locke's view of knowledge.

Locke in his Essay, Chapter I, says that knowledge occurs when we perceive that our ideas agree or disagree with each other. 1 In Chapter II, Locke goes on to distinguish three degrees of knowledge, viz., intuitive, demonstrative, and sensitive knowledge. The highest degree of knowledge for Locke is intuitive in which truth is revealed at once. In demonstration, Locke believes, the agreement and disagreement of ideas is mediated by an intuition. And sensitive knowledge, Locke says, is so-called by courtesy. The sensitive knowledge of particular existences are mere convictions of the existence of external things and may be called knowledge only by courtesy. 2

But Locke, on the other hand, limits human knowledge within certain bounds. In the Chapter III of his book,

2. Ibid., p. 166.
Locke discusses the extent of human knowledge by saying that there are four types of agreement and disagreement of ideas, (i) identity or diversity, (ii) coexistence or necessary connections, (iii) relation and (iv) real existence. Locke believes that our knowledge of identity refers to the psychological precondition of knowledge, that is, it is of our ideas. This knowledge is for Locke intuitive. By coexistence Locke means plainly our knowledge of substance. And it is here, Locke says that we have no insight into why ideas coexist. Locke also has difficulty with our knowledge of relations. Of our knowledge of real existence Locke tells us that we have intuitive knowledge of our own existence, demonstrative knowledge of God, and sensitive knowledge of other things.¹

Thus, although Locke proposed a somewhat rationalistic theory of knowledge yet in limiting the extent of human knowledge he has ruled out the possibility of our knowledge of history and of nature. For to have such knowledge we should have self-evidently true propositions about the necessary connection of nature and this, Locke believes, is what we do not have. Thus we find Descartes' conception of an a priori physics breaking down if Locke's view is favoured. The importance of Locke's theory lies in this that he pointed out that the physical sciences do not consist of self-evident truths and yet one cannot deny that they do contain genuine knowledge. This position was, however, not

¹. Ibid., p.158 f.
appreciated till Hume's discussion of causality and Kant's discussion of synthetic a priori propositions.

We are, however, not going to accept Locke's theory as such. We have merely used it as criticism against the rationalists' contention of intuition of proposition in physical science.

An improvement upon the rationalists' doctrine of intellectual intuition is, however, the modern Coherence theory which at the same time points out the one-sidedness of the traditional rationalists' and also the empiricists' views and yet retains something of them both. For as we know Coherence theory holds that the progress of knowledge rests on the mixture of deduction and induction. Coherence theory, in a word, looks upon knowledge as a system in which premises are included only if they cohere with each other and this coherence of propositions eventually refers back to its primary principles. And for the proof of these Coherence theory will also rely upon an intuition of the intellect. Coherence theory also propounds the intuition of the self-evident as the main thesis of scientific knowledge in a much more elaborate way.

We may now sum up our discussion thus: The rationalists associated the theory of intellectual intuition with scientific knowledge, for they believed that success of scientific knowledge is due in main to their primary propositions and premises which are self-evidently true. Self-evidence, they also believed, is known only in an insight of the intellect. We have discussed
in this connection chiefly the views of Descartes and Aristotle and also of Locke to a considerable length. We have also suggested criticisms of these views and in due course attempted to prove that it is not the case that our knowledge of history, of nature, of Mathematics and of pure logic is a matter of some sort of intellectual insight. We may say that we have referred to the empiricists' views only as a way of criticising the rationalists' contention in Mathematics, physics or pure logic. Whether we should support the empiricists' views is a question which cannot be decided here. Modern empiricism certainly offers us an interesting philosophy of Mathematics and logic, which is not our business here to discuss. The relevant question that we should ask here is: how near is Schelling's doctrine of intellectual intuition to the rationalists' view.

Our answer will be this: Schelling's view of intuition may not be looked upon as very different from the traditional rationalists' main contention. Although there are many differences between his system and their yet he also conceives of the progress of scientific knowledge as due only to our intuitive apprehension of their primary principles.

Certainly, the coherence theory, if not the traditional theory of intuition, is post-Kantian. Fichte and like him Schelling distinctly treat philosophy as a system of knowledge which begins with the intuitive apprehension of the basic principle of all human knowledge, viz., the ego's
self-consciousness. The model of Geometry as a coherent system impressed these philosophers and they decided to build a coherent system of knowledge on a similar foundation.

Let us now go deeper into the problem of intellectual intuition to see what Schelling has in mind when he refers to it.

(1) We shall first analyse the character of an intuitive intelligence as distinct from a discursive intelligence.

(2) Then we shall state in brief the views of those philosophers who advocate the thesis of intuitive intelligence.

(3) Eventually we propose to examine Schelling's own view.

(1) Roughly speaking, we may refer to discursive intelligence as a mind which does not originate its own raw-materials of knowledge but receives them from outside. In our case the raw material may emerge in manifold of sensation and thought or discursive intellect interprets the given and conceptualises them. In this process there is always a separation between the knower and the known object.

An intuitive intelligence, on the other hand, is said to be what produces its own object and does not receive anything from an outside source and reflects on its own production in a manner in which it becomes one with the uniqueness of the object. Whatever is apprehended is revealed to us in an indivisible whole. This is where the knower and the object known are united as one. We may illustrate this sort of apprehension by showing that it is present in our enjoyment of object of beauty.
Thus although philosophers argue to show that discursive intelligence renders particular experience meaningful yet a certain uniqueness of reality is only grasped by an intuitive intelligence. Such intuition, we may regard, as essential even for the discursive function of our mind.

This will become clearer if we take into account the views of some of the philosophers who give importance to the intuitive intelligence.

(2) Spinoza, for instance, offers us an interesting account of intellectual intuition. In his Ethics, Spinoza distinguishes between three ways of knowing: knowledge by imaginatio, knowledge by ratio, and knowledge by scientiva intuitiva. The first, as we know, refers to knowledge by sense-perception, the second refers to scientific knowledge which begins with basic truths and ends up by drawing conclusions from them, e.g., Euclid's Geometry. But scientific knowledge, Spinoza believes, gives us universal truths and thus introduces scientiva intuitiva to grasp the unique reality as a whole. He refers to it as a kind of knowledge in which the whole universe is seen in its relation to God's infinite essence.

Bradley's problem is very much the same: how can we know the absolute entirely. For this, Bradley distinguishes three stages in apprehension; feeling below the level of relations, relational thought, and feeling above the level of relational thought. He first gives us immediate contact with reality. But
at the second level, thought operates with a distinction of the 'that' and the 'what'. For anything real has these two aspects and thought must also keep within this distinction. Thus thought here is relational and discursive and if it ceases to be so it commits suicide.\(^1\) In the third level, Bradley sees a higher intuition, which may be called thought if one wishes but which must be seen as being above the level of relational thought. It may be characterised as having the immediacy of feeling and as being able to apprehend the absolute whole or the entire universe itself. Bradley then goes on to argue that if such a state exists it is possible in self-consciousness alone. But, he says, no such state exists.\(^2\)

Thus Bradley's account of an absolute experience is ambiguous. Although he conceives of an intuition above the level of relational thought he gives no further illustration of it. He merely says that human knowledge progresses through the other two stages and points to the absolute experience, and leaves the matter at that.

Bergson's conception of intuition agrees with Bradley's in so far as Bergson also regards intellect as discursive and analytic and then proceeds on to a higher intuitive level of mind. It is intuition again which for Bergson immediately apprehends reality, and knows it as a whole. We may not for this

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2. Ibid., p. 153.
reason look upon Bergson's doctrine as anti-intellectual. Bergson, we may note, would refuse to characterise his intuition as intellectual; but it is a matter of considerable importance that Bergson has derived the notion of intuition by combining the advantages of both intellectual and instinctive activities. This is seen in the definitions Bergson gives us of his intuition. He gives us three definitions.

1. By 'intuition' he says he means a kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object, to coincide with what is unique in it and thus inexpressible in it. This undoubtedly is the intellectual element in intuition.

2. By 'intuition' Bergson also means an effort which finds expression in man's placing himself back within the object by a kind of sympathy, in breaking down by an effort of intuition, the barrier that space puts between him and his model.

3. Bergson also defines intuition as the instinct that has become disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting upon its own object, and enlarging itself indefinitely. This is the instinctive element in intuition. The combination of the first and third definitions therefore leads us to say that instinct should be made self-conscious and intellect sympathetic, and that what we achieve thereby is neither but intuition. One may question this view in many ways but one could not regard it as entirely anti-intellectual.

Bergson, however, has improved upon Bradley by maintaining that his intuition is to be found in the aesthetic faculty of man. This aesthetic intuition for Bergson attains the entire whole in all its details.

Croce is another of those thinkers who distinguished two levels of knowledge, logical and intuitive. Logical knowledge, he believes, are of universals and of concepts, intuition is of the individual. Croce also found the expression of intuition in art, but his is a rather different and difficult theory of intuition, for he regards intuitive knowledge as not having reference to objects; it is images that are expressed in art, he says thus; in his doctrine what is intuited is the image. This truly is arbitrary and peculiar to Croce's doctrine.

The notion of intuition has also been widely discussed in Indian Philosophy. The basic contention of the Indian thinkers, however otherwise they might differ, is this, that they mean by intuitive knowledge a certain state which the Western thinkers would designate as mystical, where the self attains its own knowledge not through an outer object but through itself. This is where we find their difference from the doctrines most of the Western intuitionists. The Indian systems have meant by intuition self-knowledge, the Western philosophers have looked for intuitive knowledge of the world of objects. They thought that intuition

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is either of basic truths or of universals or of mathematics. The Indian thinkers speak of intuitive knowledge, if there be any, of the self alone.

The Upanishads describe this stage as one in which everything has been submerged in the self. This is where the self is imagined as realising itself not through any instrument, not even through the instrumentality of Manas (mind). It is rather the realisation of the self by itself when all instruments or Karanas cease to operate.

The Vedanta, likewise, refers to the same sort of knowledge when it speaks of aparoksanubhuti. It has distinguished knowledge as paroksa and aparoksa or cognition of existence and cognition of anything in its essence, svarupa. Aparoksanubhuti, Vedanta maintains, is the immediate knowledge of self. Samkara, it may be noted further, describes this state as one where one attains truth and thus becomes free from the original metaphysical ignorance of avidya.

Such peculiar state of intuition has also been characterised as the state of meditation or concentration. Patanjali, for instance, describes the stage as rtambhara, stage of infallible truth where the soul being "adept in the concentration on subtle things" has become transparent. This sort of intuition which Patanjali speaks of perhaps reminds us of Bergson's intellectual sympathy, where the subject reaches a level of the object, where the object is revealed to it and submerged.
in it, where all their differences are overcome.

Discussions of intuitive knowledge will not be complete unless we have dealt with Hegel's views which one may regard as the most significant of all the European views we have discussed. Hegel's doctrine develops out of his criticism of Kant. We should, therefore, discuss Kant's view of intellectual intuition, if there be one, before we go on to state Hegel's view.

A brief statement of Kant's views would be this: Kant, as we all know, distinguishes between sensibility and understanding and regards the former as an intuitive faculty and the latter as a discursive faculty. Kant further says that in sensation we are acquainted with what is given to our senses, and it is thought which combines them or brings them to concepts. Sensibility therefore gives us raw material of knowledge which understanding or thought relates, combines, interprets, and thus renders meaningful.

As a contrast to this situation Kant introduces us to a different situation all together in which the one and the same faculty at once intuits particulars and also thinks them. This, Kant believes, is true of an intellectual understanding if it at all existed. Kant, we find, says not that there are actually such intelligences, but he only argues to show that if such intelligence were possible we could then investigate it. Kant further mentions that it is not possible for such an intelligence to take shape in human mind; it
would, he believes, only be true of God's consciousness. We have thus formulated some rough idea of this intuition as Kant discusses it. It, we may say, typifies an experience where there would be no separation as it is with us between the intuitive and the conceptual, and thus all opposition of sense and thought would be overcome and in which we would know in a flash of insight the particular in the universal.

What we find in Kant's doctrine is this: (a) that Kant distinguishes between sense and thought and puts them in absolute separation; and (b) that Kant, by characterising human intellect as discursive, and by denying to it the intuitive element, incapacitates us to know beyond the world of appearances and thus takes recourse to the hypothesis of the thing-in-itself, whose knowledge, he says, we do not have. This is simply because a discursive intelligence is one which does not originate the material of knowledge, but accepts what is given to it. This leads us to look for the source of the given, which for Kant is the thing-in-itself.

We may defend Kant by saying that although Kant distinguishes between sense and thought he does not assume them as entirely different; rather he looks upon them as correlates, that is for Kant there is no sense-manifold that is not

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1. Kant, loc. cit., p. 78.
conceptualised and conception cannot take shape without the sense-manifold.

One may either accept the strange hypothesis of the thing-in-itself as the source of the given or one may see how Kant's immediate idealist successors treat this problem.

Hegel rejected any separation between sense and thought and consequently the hypothesis of the thing-in-itself, by distinguishing, broadly speaking, between three levels of thought, viz., the immediacy of sense, abstract understanding and higher or concrete reason, and by relating them dialectically. Common-sense thinking, scientific thinking and the higher philosophical thinking are for Hegel steps in the same process. They must be seen as members of a single developing series in which each step after having revealed its inadequacies points to the next higher step where these inadequacies are overcome. Common-sense thinking thus leads to scientific thinking which gives way to philosophic thinking. For Hegel, philosophic thinking alone involves an intuition of the intellect. This we shall presently deal with.

It is, however, a matter of choice either to be inclined to hold like Kant that, if there are human intelligences they are discursive and not intuitive. For, then intuitive intelligence, if it is conceivable at all would be true

1. Walsh, loc.cit., p.64
only of God's mind. Or one may agree with Hegel that over and above discursive thought there is an intuitive intelligence or higher thought. Hegel could hold this because he takes into account human faculties not merely as separate and also as interrelated and shows the progress of thought. Thus we can, in his philosophy, not merely perceive objects or understand them conceptually but can also have intuitive grasp of an absolute idea. To discuss Hegel's view in a manner which may be profitable to us we may refer to a view, up-to-date and yet sympathetic to Hegel's philosophy, which is willing to put up with Hegel's almost unapproachable language and see through its legitimate points, and which is prepared to appreciate Hegel's methods, problems, and ideas. This is found in Findlay's re-examination of Hegel.

Findlay shows that Hegel has conceived and made use of the notion of intuition in three senses.

(i) We find the first sense when Hegel refers to an unanalysed awareness like "sensation" or "sense-awareness". Hegel says that all our ideas, thoughts and concepts of external nature, of law, morality and of Religion develop out of our sensitive intelligence. Findlay is right in pointing out that this is the same as Kant's Anschauung or sense-intuition (of the given in space and time).

(ii) The second sense in which Hegel conceives intuition is that which extends to the data of inner life. Hegel means by this that all our mastery over the emotions, for instance in art, involves an ability to look at them with a detached manner.
(iii) Hegel uses 'intuition' in still another sense when he associates it with a certain activity of attending, viz., voluntary attention. In such attending we voluntarily enter into a most intimate contact with what is given to us so that it may appear with more clearness.

Whatever senses Findlay may have pointed out in which Hegel conceives intuition Hegel means by an intellectual intuition an immediate grasp of the whole. Hegel says in his *Philosophy of Spirit* that intuition is a consciousness filled with the certitude of reason, whose object has the character of being reasonable as a totality, a coherent fulness of determinations. A talented historian, for instance, Hegel says, has in his intuition the whole of history of states and events together. He thus has the knowledge of history in substantial.

IV. Conclusive remarks:

We have assembled a number of views of the intellectual intuition as propounded by different philosophers. Their doctrines may differ as widely as one may consider. But philosophers would agree on the following points as regards the notion of the intellectual intuition. They would all agree that (a) in intellectual intuition the difference of the subject and the object is no more there. And that (b) it means no other than man's immediate apprehension of what he holds truth for him. Be it our intellectual sympathy with objects or a higher kind of love.

for God, it may be said to refer to this directness of our contact
with the truth in us. And this certainly is different from
sense-intuition. Kant gave us the correct view of it, although
he failed to see that it is also possible for our minds. Hegel
believed this is possible and says that this sort of intuition is
at work in all those superior activities of man, like religious
devotions, aesthetic creation, and philosophical reflections.

We may now assume that Schelling would accept
intellectual intuition in the sense, we have mentioned now,
although he has not elaborately discussed his notion of the
intellectual intuition. Schelling says two things in connection
with his view of the intellectual intuition. He finds in
intellectual intuition the emergence of self-consciousness. We
are therefore conscious of ourselves in an intuition of the
intellect. Schelling may be looked upon here as sharing the view
propounded by the Indian schools we have referred here already,
viz., that our self-knowledge is attained in intellectual intuition.

Then Schelling goes on to say that such intuitive activity is
evident in aesthetic creation.

The main defect in Schelling's theory
is that he has not distinguished between intuition of the absolute
ego of itself and the artistic intuition.

Hegel's view is reasonable enough, for he
finds our higher kind of intellectual activity in all three,
religion, art, and philosophy. This is a legitimate claim but to say that all our superior intellectual activities find expression in art alone is a too narrow view. It restricts the use of intuition. Self-knowledge, we may say, is not the same thing as the aesthetic intuition of objects of art. Pure self-consciousness is a distinct philosophic notion and the aesthetic creation is attained in an activity which needs further analysis. We shall devote a portion of the final chapter, though we have already taken into account Schelling's doctrine of art in the Chapter 4, to discuss Schelling's notion of aesthetic intuition. What we have gained in our discussion of intellectual intuition is that we have an idea of what Schelling sees in intellectual intuition, viz., a unity of the subject and the object, and an experience of the whole not as mere adding of parts but in its uniqueness. Besides, we may now determine the relation of art to philosophy in Schelling's thought. This is; Schelling sees them as identical. Schelling's intellectual intuition is not self-knowledge of the Indian thought, nor philosophical reflection of the absolute whole whose expression is in art, religion, and philosophy as Hegel sees it, but it is somewhat akin to the Bergsonian sympathy of the subject and the object in which the object is one with the subject although Bergsonian notion of intuition is different from Schelling's notion of the same.
This unity for Schelling is achieved in art because the object of art, he believes, is nothing but the perfect expression of the idea of the subject. And philosophy if it should find an explicit expression it does so in the organon of art. This is the climax of romanticism that European thought must have reached, viz., that philosophical self-knowledge is attained in art. One may reject it or question it but one could not deny its significance.