I. What is transcendental philosophy?

Before we undertake any critical appraisal of Schelling's Transcendental Idealism we ought to enquire into what transcendental philosophy is in general. And then only we could ask, how far Schelling's system is also a transcendental philosophy.

Schelling understood by transcendental philosophy, as we have already seen, a study of the subject of knowledge. His primary interest is in the notion of intelligence as such, taken in isolation from the objective world.

We shall first of all enquire into views of some other philosophers to see what they meant by 'transcendental philosophy'.

The expression 'transcendental' was used by the Scholastics and they meant by it what is beyond the categories. But the transcendental system of philosophy, as we ordinarily understand, was brought into light by Descartes. Descartes' Meditations certainly led us to a new kind of philosophy which undertook to enquire into the origin of our knowledge. Descartes' ego cogito indeed is the first presentation of the transcendental subjectivity. Descartes, as we all know, felt that knowledge given to us by the natural sciences must be re-examined. He began by doubting all objects of knowledge and the only indubitable which he arrived at, as we also know, is the consciousness itself. Thus
for Descartes the origin of all knowledge is the self-certitude of the knowing ego.

Husserl, one of the most popular transcendental philosophers of our age, recognised Descartes' *ego cogito* as the true ancestor of the transcendental ego. Husserl also finds transcendental thoughts in Hume, though he sees that Hume's "sensualistic scepticism" is such that it negates itself through an inner contradiction.

It is true that Hume enquires into the origin of the validity of knowledge which are for him either of relations of ideas or of matters of fact. But Hume can trace no identity of consciousness, at the most he refers to certain laws of association to account for the source of knowledge.

Although we shall find at the end of our discussion in the present chapter that the influence of Hume or of Descartes is quite obvious on Husserl yet the philosophies of Descartes or of Hume may not be referred to as 'transcendental' in the sense in which Kant's philosophy is so. For it is Kant who brought the problem of the possibility of knowledge to our notice and enquired into the a priori conditions under which knowledge is made possible.

II. Transcendental philosophy as understood by Kant:

The idea of transcendental philosophy is

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Tosely associated with Kant. With the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant seemed to have revolutionised the philosophies of his time. Kant brought about, as he called it, a Copernican Revolution by asking, how is knowledge possible at all, and he introduces to us a new system of philosophy which will resolve this issue by showing that it is understanding which makes nature.

(a) What Kant says of transcendental philosophy:

Let us look deeper into Kant's philosophy which is to us a matter of considerable importance. We shall first recall what Kant says of transcendental philosophy and then point out what he means by it. Kant says that the transcendental philosophy is not what goes beyond all experience but what deals with a priori conditions in which experience is made possible. For Kant transcendental philosophy is the principle of pure reason or of pure speculative reason. It is what Kant calls the touch-stone for judging the validity and invalidity of knowledge a priori. For Kant transcendental knowledge is what deals not so much with objects as with our a priori concepts of objects. A system of such a priori concepts therefore is transcendental philosophy.

What is meant by Kant's transcendental philosophy? What is this new science which perplexed philosophers of his age and actually revolutionised philosophical thinking after him? What is Kant's problem in transcendental philosophy?

Kant means by 'transcendental' not what is beyond experience but the a priori conditions of the possibility of experience, and Kant's critical philosophy therefore introduces to us the most fundamental epistemological problem: how is knowledge at all possible? What are the conditions of possibility of knowledge? Kant's entire philosophical endeavour in the Kritik involves an enquiry into these conditions of the possibility of knowledge. Kant has been led to believe that knowledge begins with experience, but its possibility rests on certain conditions which precede all experiences. These conditions Kant regards as a priori. Kant further argues that if philosophy should deal with these a priori conditions of possibility of knowledge, it must demand an enquiry into the faculty of reason itself and reason as free from all its objective references. The conditions therefore in which knowledge is made possible, are treated as a priori, in that they are pure and free from all objective references. Now we may say that Kant's critical philosophy may be called transcendental philosophy inasmuch as it discards all references to the object of knowledge and considers how knowledge itself is possible, viz., it is concerned with the processes involved in knowledge of objects.
If Kant intends to deal with pure a priori concepts, the question immediately arises, how are these a priori concepts related to the objects. How is thought related to the real object?

To discuss this problem Kant introduces in the *Kritik* the transcendental deduction of the categories of understanding, as he calls it. Kant, as we all know, has distinguished between a priori forms of intuition, viz., space and time, and the forms of understanding, viz., categories. What are given in space and time are conceptualised by thought and thus the categories, as Kant sees them, although they are subjective forms of thought are yet objectively valid. The significance of transcendental deduction, we may note, is in this, that it requires no empirical concepts but the a priori concepts, and tells us how these subjective concepts are related to the objects.¹

It is worth referring here to Jan.M.Broekman's analysis of this point in Kants' philosophy. Kants' *Kritik*, says Broekman, represents the transcendental method of theory of knowledge, which is concerned with the a priori conditions of the possibility of knowledge. Kant, he says, looks for principles which are necessary presuppositions of knowledge. And the legitimacy of these principles lies in the transcendental deduction, which therefore guarantees the validity of principles of knowledge.²

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¹ Kant, loc.cit., p.110f.
We may look deeper into the problem of relating subjective concepts to real objects. Thus we may point out that Kant conducts the transcendental deduction in the first edition of the *Kritik* in a more psychological fashion, and that the notion of transcendental imagination here plays a significant role. And it is this imagination which enables us to apprehend representations without the presence of objects. Kant, we must note, distinguishes two kinds of imaginations, productive and reproductive. Whereas the former binds representations according to the forms of understanding or the categories, the latter binds representations according to the laws of association. It is the productive imagination which is important for Kant because in it alone we may relate the subjective concepts to objects. Broekman points out that in this imagination we encounter the subjective source of knowledge (subjektiven Erkenntnisquelle) or in which we may reach for an analysis of the subject or of human mind.

We may ask now, does Kant find in his transcendental productive imagination alone the ultimate ground of our experience? Do we find the conditions of possibility of our knowledge in this imagination alone? What then is the status of the unity of apperception?

2. Ibid., p.127.
We propose to answer this in the following manner. It is true to say that the transcendental productive imagination plays a significant role in the deduction of the categories. Broekman has too abruptly remarked that in imagination we find the subjective origin of knowledge; for to deal with the various synthesising activities and the subjective unity, we need to discuss a lot more.

Let us begin with the notion of productive imagination itself. Heidegger tells us about the proper function of Kant's imagination. For he calls it the constituting medium of knowledge, or in other words, it is a faculty which unites sense and understanding.¹ Kant himself says that transcendental imagination occupies an intermediate position between sense and understanding. It is regarded as a power which represents an object in intuition, even as the object is not present.² It is thus connected with sensibility. Imagination, Kant believes, synthesises the sense-manifold according to concepts. It is thus connected with sensibility on the one hand, and with understanding on the other.

We should not forget to mention also that Kant has given us two views of transcendental imagination of the two different editions of his Kritik. In the first edition Kant

². Kant, loc-cit., p.126.
Kant treats the faculty of imagination as a separate faculty altogether. Kant, while discussing the transcendental deduction of the categories, speaks of three subjective sources of knowledge; sense, understanding, and imagination. In the second edition Kant regards imagination as a lower form of understanding, an unreflective mode of operation of understanding. Imagination, in Kant's philosophy, therefore is one of the sources of the origin of elements of knowledge, and not the only source.

According to Kant knowledge occurs through the various synthesising and combining activities, viz., the synthesis of apprehension in intuition, the synthesis of reproduction in imagination and the synthesis of recognition in concept. Imagination therefore does the important job of combination or of synthesising elements of knowledge. But how combination or synthesis itself becomes possible needs further examination. Our various synthesising activities refer to a unity of the subject. No combination, Kant believes, would be possible unless there were a unity of the subject. If the subject were a changing series of representations then no synthesis would be possible, and therefore no objective experience. Kant thus believes that there is a subjective unity which is the ultimate condition of the possibility of all synthesis and therefore of all objective experience. Kant calls this the transcendental unity of apperception and means by it not a substance but a subject; and he finds in it the unity of act. The categories, Kant believes, are modes through which this unity operates.
Transcendental deduction, we may note, begins with the question of objective validity of the categories and ends with the idea of transcendental unity of apperception as the ultimate condition of the possibility of knowledge.

We may now sum up Kant's statements regarding the unity of apperception.

(1) The unity of apperception is said to be the presupposition of knowledge of objects; that is, Kant believes that our objective experience presupposes an identity of the subject.

(2) The unity for Kant is not the category of 'Unity', but the unity of act.

(3) The unity of apperception is taken as transcendental and not empirical. It is said to be transcendental, because it is consciousness of the act of thinking in abstraction from the object of thought.

(4) It is also said to be original and not derivative, i.e., it is supposed to produce the same idea, or is the idea 'I think' in all consciousness and thus must be able to (müssen können) accompany all ideas, and is not to be derived from any of them. It is said to be original also in the sense, that, it is that element in self-consciousness which while unifying presentations cannot itself be unified with other presentations.¹

(5) Hence the unity of apperception may be regarded as pure in that the relation between the synthesis of manifold and the 'I think'

¹ Ibid., p.115.
is necessary and in this respect is different from empirical apperceptions, where the relation between self-awareness and other presentations is a mere contingent association.

(6) Finally, we may add that for Kant the unity of apperception is a synthetic one and not analytic. The analytic unity of apperception, we must note, is the unity of thought, which is manifested in uniting different ideas under a common concept by means of analysis. An example of this is 'I am I'. A synthetic unity Kant believes is manifest in combining different intuitions into one by means of synthesis, e.g., 'I think that......'. The unity of apperception, Kant therefore believes, as the condition of possibility of knowledge must be synthetic. 'I' is to be found in the fact that, 'I add one idea to another and am conscious of this synthesis'.

As against this, Schelling believes, as we have discussed in chapter 2 that, the 'I am I' is both identical and synthetic and not merely analytic. Since we have discussed there how it is so, we need not deal with it again. Schelling therefore largely derives from Kant the idea of a unity of subject, but unlike Kant he finds it in the 'I am I'. Schelling derives this notion of the subject directly from Fichte and not from Kant.

Fichte, we must note, had taken over from Kant the problem of transcendental philosophy, viz., what is the ground of the possibility of our knowledge of objects. Fichte,

1. Ibid., p. 115 fn.
Further intends to build a system of knowledge based on one highest principle of knowledge which he refers to as self-consciousness itself. The transition from Kant to Fichte, however, points to a change in the notions of the subjective unity. For Kant it is the synthetic unity of the 'I think', while for Fichte it is the synthetic identical unity of the 'I am I'; or the ego as an absolute subject which Fichte regards as the beginning-point of his philosophy. Fichte believed that the 'I think' presupposes the 'I am I' because the subject is not only aware of itself as dealing with something, but also of itself as itself. The latter is primary to the former.

III. Schelling's notion of transcendental philosophy:

The transition from Kant's philosophy to Fichte's is an important one in understanding Schelling's notion of transcendental philosophy. For it is Kant's notion of the unity of apperception as modified by Fichte which is introduced to us in Schelling's Transcendental Idealism. Schelling thus believes, as we have already seen in chapter 2, that transcendental philosophy is meant to show the original ground of the knowledge of objects. It is not an individual part nor a special object of knowledge that Schelling's philosophy is interested in, but it is knowledge itself and knowledge in general that we ought to take into account. For this, transcendental philosophy must necessarily presuppose an absolute subject which always remains identical with itself.

IV. Husserl's notion of transcendental philosophy:

It is, however, interesting to note that Schelling's transcendental philosophy reminds us more of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology than Kant's transcendental philosophy. We mean to say that there is lot more difference between Kant's system and Schelling's than one finds between Schelling's thought and Husserl's. Husserl's ideas in the phenomenology tend to explain most of Schelling's ideas and methods in the Transcendental Idealism. For this, we shall begin with Husserl's criticism of Kant's transcendental philosophy and then discuss Husserl's own view of the same with a view to point out that Husserl's contentions of transcendental phenomenology illustrate the main issues of Schelling's transcendental philosophy.

Husserl finds fault with Kant's system on the following grounds:

(a) Husserl points out that the correlation between the subject and the object that Kant looks for in the subject itself is an external correlation. This does not give us, says Husserl, the true sense of correlation between knowledge and the object of knowledge. In the transcendental aesthetic, for instance Kant regards, Husserl points out, space and time as forms of sensibility which makes Geometry possible. Kant, says Husserl, deals with perceptual space (just as the natural sciences deal with perceptual objects) and not with pure sensibility itself as it may be seen before all synthesis. Kant is not considering the
(b) Husserl also points out defects in Kant's transcendental analytic. In this part of the Kritik, as we all knew, Kant deals with conceptual thinking which is said to conceptualise the given sense-manifold by the forms of understanding. Husserl finds Kant's dealing with the world of phenomena insufficient. Kant's transcendental deduction, Husserl says, is very confused and his notion of the transcendental apperception is also not clear. What is lacking in Kant's discussion, Husserl says, is a clear distinction between the intuition and the intuited, the forms of appearances as modes of consciousness and the forms of appearances as objectively seen. Husserl means by this that, Kant has failed to distinguish between the act of knowledge and the object of knowledge.

What solution does Husserl offer to us? His answer will be this: the nature of thought which is required in the deduction of categories is such that if we eliminate from it all phenomenological irrelevances, says Husserl, what we are left with is the correlation between objectivity and knowledge, so that we may study the essences of objectivity (like space, time, motion, change etc.) as a priori or immanent in the elements of consciousness. Now, says Husserl, if we look at objects only in relation to knowledge do we find the importance of the

2. Ibid., p.367.
transcendental aesthetic and the transcendental analytic.¹

And if we reformulate Kant's problems in these in Husserl's manner, we should ask: (a) how does the object constitute itself in intuition, or how does the object represent itself in that it may be said to be constituted in our intuition; (b) how does the object constitute itself in thought, or how does nature constitute itself in consciousness. These, Husserl says, should be our problems in the transcendental aesthetic and in the transcendental analytic respectively. And Husserl is led in this to the transcendental phenomenological question, viz., how is nature constituted in spirit or in pure consciousness itself. Kant, argues Husserl, has failed to formulate the problem this way, because he meant by 'intuition' perception and thus he has dealt with the givenness in perceptual space and time. If consciousness merely functions as a perceptual one, Husserl believes, it cannot lead us to the proper apperception of things; and nature cannot be said to be constituted in consciousness.²

Husserl further argues that, for the essence of the correlation between nature and consciousness it is required that nature must be constituted in consciousness in accordance with the essential patterns of consciousness. The identity of consciousness, says Husserl, therefore is the most significant factor for the possibility of knowledge of nature. Besides we must

¹. Ibid., pp.387,388.
². Ibid., p.388.
take into account, says Husserl, for the knowledge of nature, the entire coherence of perception (Wahrnehmungszusammenhängen), i.e., intuition, perception etc., and the forms of thought, and not mere perception. 1

What follows from Husserl's criticism of Kant's doctrine may now be stated. Husserl's transcendental phenomenology may be looked upon as an improvement on Kant's transcendental philosophy on two grounds; (1) Husserl attempts to explain how nature at all may be represented by showing how nature (in its essence) correlates with (the elements of) consciousness, and (2) he offers us a fuller account of the subject itself. Husserl's problem, we may say, is not merely to find the a priori forms or conditions of the possibility of knowledge but to consider how nature is constituted according to the forms of consciousness. And for this Husserl also sets out to give us a theory of the knowing subject itself.

Let us pursue this point a little further. Husserl takes into account three things: (a) the possibility of nature (b) the possibility of essences (of objects) in consciousness, and (c) the possibility of constitution of nature in elements of consciousness.

Nature, as it is dealt with in the natural sciences, Husserl believes, is a factual nature and the consciousness employed in it is a factual consciousness. (This is

1. Ibid., p.389.
What Kant takes into account in his *Kritik*. If we bracket this standpoint or go beyond the factual nature we enter into the world of phenomena, says Husserl, and our problem then is the possibility of the constitution of this world in consciousness. To deal with this, Husserl says, we discuss the elements of the constituting consciousness, i.e., the various transcendental acts of perception, memory, etc. These elements of pure consciousness in which nature is constituted, Husserl believes, are the essences of consciousness. Thus the problem, how nature at all is possible, depends on our enquiry into the elements of consciousness or the conscious essences. Thus, Husserl sets out to give a fuller account of the ego than Kant has done.

This directly leads us to believe that the central notion in Husserl's transcendental phenomenology is the notion of the transcendental subject. To deal with the problem of the origin of knowledge, Husserl primarily interests himself in the subject of knowledge. An account of Husserl's transcendental subject will be given in the section B of this chapter. It suffices here to note that Husserl's transcendental philosophy may be looked upon as an egology, for it clearly puts forward an explication of the ego through itself or the ego's self-explication or becoming-conscious-of-itself, which means "Vermenschlichung des Menschen".

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1. Ibid., p. 393.
We therefore find in Husserl's transcendental philosophy the two notions, nature and consciousness, as equally important. The subject and the object of knowledge are both 'significant' in this philosophy, for the problem of knowledge is dealt with subjectively from the side of consciousness and objectively from the side of nature. Husserl thus proposes to look deeper into the correlation between knowledge and object than the natural sciences do and thereby departs from all false metaphysics. He is, in other words, dealing with nature as it is constituted in consciousness and thus looks into a correlation between nature and consciousness. We may further point out that Husserl means by transcendental philosophy not what sceptically separates knowledge from the world but what explains the world in its subjective appearances. There arises therefore, says Husserl, a harmony between the world itself and truth or between the act of knowledge and the world as known. Husserl is interested in the entire theme of knowledge, viz., he is taking into account the entire situation in which we are subjects, experiencing a common 'environment' or the world as it is 'present' to us.

2. Ibid., pp.381,382.
3. Ibid., p.246.
4. Ibid., p.245.
5. Ibid., p.247.
Husserl, we may say, is therefore neither interested in the self as isolated from the world of objects, nor in the knowledge of the world as the natural scientist gives us, but in a transcendental phenomenological world where outer world is seen as essentially constituted according to the essences or elements of consciousness.

We may furthermore add some critical remarks. Although Husserl has been largely inspired by the problems of Kant's theory of knowledge, viz., how knowledge at all is possible, yet we find that he seems to be more directly inspired by Descartes' cogito in his conception of the subject of knowledge and by the British empiricists' method in his formulation of the transcendental method.

It is true that Husserl is said to be inspired by the cartesian motive of an enquiry into the ultimate origin of knowledge, which depends on the entire question of the relation of the ego to the world. Husserl himself admits that he is attracted to Descartes' cogito which consists of all the acts of perception, memory, judgment, fancy, feeling etc., in which the world in its spontaneity is present. As to the method Husserl employs in his philosophy he says thus: his transcendental phenomenological method is the fulfilment of the old intentions, viz., what the English empiricists refer to when enquiring into the validity of knowledge by tracing its origin. Husserl refers to the logical origin of knowledge by pointing to the logical principles and axioms with which scientific knowledge progresses. Husserl further says.
that if we press beyond the logical origin we attain the
transcendental phenomenological origin of knowledge, viz., the
constitution of being in the transcendental subject or the
consciousness.

We may now sum up the main points of Kant's
transcendental philosophy and Husserl's transcendental phenomenology.
(a) Kant means by transcendental the a priori conditions of
possibility of knowledge. Husserl means by it a consideration of
the notion of the ego as isolated from its references to the
objectively real world, and at the same time in its relation to
this world.
(b) Kant means by 'pure' what is opposed to the empirical, Husserl
means by it the immanent. Thus Kant deals with pure forms of
intuition and understanding in that he discards any reference to
objects of intuition or of understanding in this.
(c) Kant is interested in the synthetic a priori judgments on which,
he believes, rests the progress of the sciences and is thus dealing
with factual nature in terms of a factual consciousness. Husserl
introduces to us his remarkable method of reduction to give us
knowledge of the transcendental subject itself. Husserl deals
with the constitution of these forms (of objects) by tracing them
in the elements of consciousness and thus looks for them as they
are immanent in consciousness.
(d) Kant traces the conditions of possibility of knowledge to a
synthetic unity of apperception, while Husserl finds them in elements
of a transcendental self.
(e) Kant proposes to give us a theory of knowledge, Husserl offers us an epistemology.

Husserl, however, would agree with Kant in the basic assumption of transcendental philosophy, viz., that transcendental philosophy is not concerned with object of knowledge as directly as it is with the subject or the human mind wherein lie the a priori conditions, which make knowledge possible. Husserl's nearness to Kant, Broekman for instance says, is in that they both have the same object of philosophical consideration, viz., the human mind, yet there is a vast difference in the method which Husserl adopts (for it is with the method of phenomenological reduction that we may attain knowledge of the transcendental subject and also in their conception of the subject itself, which we shall discuss in the section B of this chapter.

V. Conclusion:

It is now clear to us that Schelling's basic conception of transcendental philosophy is nearer to Husserl's transcendental system than that of Kant. Schelling's point of departure from Kant has been brilliantly summed up by Wilhelm Szilasi. Szilasi points out that Kant's transcendental enquiry is meant to take into account the human faculty of knowledge in respect of its origin, capacity to function, and the extent of its functioning. That is, Kant's enquiry goes beyond the human faculty to

deal with it as a priori conditions in which knowledge becomes possible. Kant does this, says Szilasi, in order to deal with the problem of the essence of man. And one is enquiring into what man essentially is, says Szilasi, when he asks: 'What can I know, what ought I to do, and what may I hope?' In other words, these questions constitute the question, 'What is man?' Kant's philosophy therefore enquires into the essence of man.¹

Schelling, however, sees more in this question. Szilasi points out that: the question, 'what may I hope?' for instance, involves in it the other question, viz., 'What is forbidden for me to be hoped?' The question thus arises, which ego may hope and may not hope, which ego goes outside itself to deal with itself critically. These questions, Szilasi points out, seem to refer to two egos and thereby consequences upon Schelling's transcendental philosophy.² Schelling's transcendental system therefore finds the essence of man not in that it can have sense-experience but in that the possibility of experience arises in us and we have reality even without being engaged with the sense-giverness. In Schelling's philosophy, Szilasi means to say, man is in both these senses and these two Seinkonnen of man are essentially related. Szilasi is also right in saying that Schelling

² Ibid., p. 53.
has not rejected scientific knowledge, viz., the knowledge of the world as empirically constructed. But Schelling, as it were, brackets this world in the sense in which Husserl does, to deal with the transcendently constructed world, which is not an unknowable world but the world of pure act or of the ego. This is where Schelling shares with Husserl and not with Kant his interest in transcendental philosophy, viz., the problem, how nature arises in spirit, how is nature represented, or how is nature constituted in conscious act.

We may say that although we have dealt with both Kant's views and Husserl's inadequately, yet we have managed to point out their basic differences and similarity. And thereby we have also been able to see where Schelling stands, how much he has taken over from Kant and how much he departed from him; and how much in his thought anticipates Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. Now we propose to give an account of Schelling's philosophical standpoint and compare it with that of Husserl.

Section B.
I. Schelling's philosophical standpoint:

We may begin by referring to an account of Schelling's philosophical standpoint given by Rudolf Hablützel. Hablützel has rightly shown that the success of Schelling's philosophical system lies not merely in his attempt to understand

1. Ibid., pp. 55, 56.
interpret the world in its entire set up, but just as much
in dealing with humanity as the essence of the world and the world
as the condition of conceiving humanity. The world process is
for Schelling, Hablutzel further argues, is the vehicle for
realisation of humanity; humanity on the other hand is, in a higher
sense, a cause, an ideal ascent, and end of the world process.¹

Hablützel, further points out that the world
separated from man is a mere noumenal coherence. Schelling, however,
believes that no noumenal world is entirely abstracted from man,
it involves a reference to man. Things, Hablutzel points out, are
brought into the world by man and it is man again who arranges
them in a coherent system only in his rational knowledge of it.
It is in this sense that man may be regarded as the ideal Urheber
or authority of the world. Man's relation to the world is looked
upon by Schelling not as an adjustment of the subject with the
objective world, but a sort of creative activity in which world
arises in man. This activity, Hablutzel further reminds us, may be
called knowledge in Schelling's philosophy. The theory of relation
of man to his world is, therefore, the theory of knowledge.²

The world, therefore, has no a priori being.

1. Hablutzel, Dialektik und Einbildungskraft – F.W.J. Schellings
Lehre von der menschlichen Erkenntnis, edited by Karl Jaspers,
Basel, 1954, p.11.
2. Ibid., p.5.
but is a mode of appearance of man’s capacity to know and it appears only as conditioned through the structure of human faculty of knowledge. The basic condition of these appearances merely refers to the Fichtean activity of positing; man posits himself as free being and at the same time also disengages himself from this. The world of objects, which Kant looks upon as mere appearances or which some of the Indian philosophical systems look upon as mâyâ or illusion, is for Schelling real when it is made an object of enquiry and this is possible in knowledge.¹

Hablytzel’s account brings out the essential points of Schelling’s Idealism, viz., that philosophy is directly concerned with the essence of man.² He has rightly said that the essence of man in Schelling’s philosophy is given expression in a world process. Thus the relation of the ego to the world of object may be seen thus: the world is produced or ‘posited’ by the ego in which it realises itself. If now we combine the accounts given by Szilasi and Hablützel as regards Schelling’s philosophic standpoint, this is what we find. Schelling begins his philosophical speculation with the notion of intelligence or humanity or man himself. His problem is, what is man. What man essentially is depends on his relation with a world-process. Man’s relation with the world is absolutely necessary, for in this alone man is what he is. This relation contains two sides, man’s becoming what

¹. Ibid., p.3.
². Schelling, Werke I, p.156.
enters into a relation with the world and the necessity of the world itself so that man may realise himself in it.

And the consequence of this determination of relation of man to the world in Schelling's Transcendental Idealism is the distinction between empirical ego and transcendental ego.

II. The distinction between the empirical ego and the transcendental ego:

We shall first discuss this distinction as we find it in Schelling and then we shall refer to the parallel distinction in Husserl.

The central problem of Schelling's Transcendental Idealism consists in this that we must necessarily distinguish between two egos, the empirical ego and the transcendental ego, but also relate them. Szilasi shows the differences between the two egos in the following manner:

The being of the ego may be taken in two senses. There is a sense in which it may be said that I am, in that I am ill, I am unlucky, I am mortal etc. Here the being of the ego refers to the facticity of the ego, i.e., the verb 'is', here refers to the ego's involvement in the factual world. This is the case where one may speak of an empirical ego, whose being is involved in affairs of objects; it is here that the 'is' needs a predicative supplement.

In the other sense, the ego is not a subject which needs to be supplemented by the object. This is the pure ego,
whose being is pure, in that it is not determined through any object but must be taken in separation from all objects. This, according to Szilasi, refers to God's being.¹

The nature of our enquiry demands that we take each notion of the ego separately and ask, what is involved in these notions, and then go on to determine their relation. To deal with the notion of the empirical ego we find it necessary to discuss it in reference to Kant's notion of the knowing subject. And we propose to deal with the notion of the transcendental ego taking into consideration not only Schelling's view of it but also Husserl's view of the same.

(a) The notion of the empirical ego:

The character of the empirical ego, as we have just said, is that it finds expression in its commerce with an objective, real world. This notion has been characterised in Kant's critical philosophy as the spontaneous and receptive subject of knowledge. It is receptive because it is looked upon in Kant's philosophy as the faculty of receiving objects and it is spontaneous because it is open to and acts upon what is given to it. Szilasi characterises the Kantian subject as an empirical subject, for it refers to the subjective unity behind empirical representations and that its spontaneity and receptivity are merely empirically so.²

¹ Szilasi, loc.cit., pp. 53, 54.
² Ibid., p. 56.
The question which now arises is: how could Szilasi refer Kant's unity of apperception as empirical when Kant himself calls it transcendental and arrives at his notion of the transcendental subject as he deals with the problem of knowledge transcendently.

This is an interesting question and let us consider it in reference to what Schelling himself says of the empirical ego. Schelling says that all that is opposed to the pure ego may be taken to refer to the empirical ego. By this Schelling means a conditioned ego, which, according to Szilasi, is none other than the unity of apperception.

Schelling's empirical ego may thus be seen as the subject which is spontaneous to and receptive of the world of objects. To say what is meant by the empirical ego as receptive, we shall have to say what is meant by receptivity itself. Szilasi distinguishes between two kinds of receptivity, objective and subjective. Szilasi accepts objective receptivity in the Aristotelian sense, in which a tree may be said to have receptivity when it is said to be fit to be made, for instance, into a mast. The tree is receptive to be made into a mast in the sense that it is fit to be made so, or is suitable for it. Human receptivity is different

1. "Empirisch ist alles was dem reinen Ich entgegengesetzt ist, also überhaupt im bezug auf ein Nicht-Ich steht." (Schelling, Werke I, p. 176).
2. Ibid., p. 169.
from this, in that the tree has no possibility of expecting what it is fit for. Human receptivity, on the contrary, involves a readiness to expect a world of object. Our readiness to expect an outer world enables us to be open to the world; and this openness would refer to our receptive capacity. We may now understand Schelling's empirical ego by saying that it is in Kant's sense the subject or human faculty which receives a world of objects in that it expects the world and is ready to be open to it. Receptivity therefore involves the subject's expectation of the world and communication with it on the one hand, and the object's conformity to this expectation on the other.

It may be added that it would be profitable to regard Schelling's empirical ego not only in the light of Kant's unity of apperception but also in terms of Husserl's factual ego or the ego in its natural standpoint, i.e., as the subject of the consciousness of the existence of material things.

(b) The notion of the transcendental ego:

The word 'transcendental' is the same as the word 'pure'; transcendental ego therefore means pure ego or the ego as it is taken in its self-consciousness. The transcendental ego therefore is what is taken in abstraction from the consciousness of the world of objects. Schelling says it is what excludes the

1. Ibid., pp. 58, 59.
non-ego\(^1\) and is merely conscious of itself qua itself. Unlike the outer object it is revealed to us by itself.\(^2\) The pure ego is what reveals its reality through itself. It is nothing, says Schelling, to what is outside it.\(^3\) The notion of pure ego thus includes the idea of a philosophical solitariness (\textit{Einsamkeit}) which Husserl speaks of.\(^4\) This sort of pure consciousness is referred to by Wittgenstein when he says that there is a sense in which we may talk in philosophy of an ego that is not psychological.\(^5\)

We may therefore understand by transcendental ego the self-consciousness itself.

(c) The determination of the relation of the empirical ego to the transcendental ego:

Let us restate what we have already said and form this problem. If we assume that the transcendental ego is apprehended only in its exclusion of the entire empirical coherence then the question arises: how is the transcendental ego related to the empirical ego. That is, if the transcendental ego is understood in its contrast with the empirical ego, then only we may ask, how are the two related.

\(^1\) Schelling, \textit{Werke I}, p.205.
\(^2\) Ibid., p.179.
\(^3\) Ibid., p.178.
\(^4\) Husserliana VI, p.188.
Husserl has discussed this issue more adequately than Schelling. We shall therefore refer to Husserl's treatment of this problem, and then go on to explain that of Schelling in the light of it.

Husserl distinguishes between two regions (Bereiche), the transcendental and the factual. He thus conceives of a transcendental ego and the factual ego which must necessarily be shown as related.

The problem of relating the two egos arises also in Husserl's philosophy because the transcendental ego and the factual ego are looked upon as distinct and the former is said to be conceivable in its isolation from the latter. The problem thus may be stated, if the transcendental ego does not come out of its transcendentality, how can it be related to the factual?

If we want to pursue Husserl's treatment of this problem we must have to refer to some of the key notions of his thought. These notions are: splitting-of-the-ego (Ich-spaltung), reflection, switching-over (Ausschaltung), reduction, and intentionality.

The phenomenon of Ich-spaltung refers to a separating process by which the ego divides itself into itself and itself as made object of its own enquiry. Broekman explains this point by saying that Husserl uses the expression once to mean

the separation of various parts of the ego, and at another to mean the possibility of the ego to effect itself in such separation. Husserl's problem is, how does the ego becomes its own object. This is made possible by the ego's splitting of itself into itself and the non-ego, which is not the outer world as such, but the reference to the world as the ego actualises itself in it. We therefore confront two notions, the ego itself and its actualisation in the world.

If we now ask, how is the ego's self-splitting possible, Husserl's reply is that, the ego may divide itself only in an act of reflection. Husserl argues that only in self-reflection I raise myself above myself; I separate myself into the higher ego and the lower ego or the ego of the reflective act and the ego on which I reflect. Husserl relies so much on reflection of the ego on itself that he believes the possibility of transcendental phenomenology itself depends on this. On reflection alone, says Husserl, rests the possibility of the phenomenological reduction in which we merely change our standpoint from one sphere to the other.

Reflection, we note here, is not only useful in explaining the phenomenon of Ich-spalting, but it also explains the phenomenon of switching-over or change of standpoint.

and eventually the method of reduction itself.

To understand these we ought to refer to Husserl's distinction between two spheres. He distinguishes between two levels of consciousness, naive and non-naive or between pre-reflective and reflective spheres.¹ By these Husserl simply refers to the ego in its consciousness of something (factual) and the ego in its absolute being (transcendental), and they are essentially related in Husserl's philosophy by a peculiar sort of switching over or Ausschaltung from one to the other.

Let us be clear about the notion of switching over. By switching over Husserl plainly means transposing or shifting (Umstellung).² Analogically, it may be represented as the baton of the conductor in a symphony orchestra which swings from the direction of the violinist to that of the cellist mainly to draw the attention from one group to another and indicate that it is their turn to play.³ Switching over therefore means for Husserl a change in points of view or Einstellungsänderung from one sphere to the other. To switch over from the naive to the non-naive or reflective sphere means to bracket the former or put it out of a action and change our viewpoint to the latter. Now the question

1. Husserliana VI, p.213.
2. Broekman, loc. cit., p.58.
3. Broekman refers to this explanation of Strohal and Von Kries, which we find most appropriate to explain the phenomenon of Ausschaltung. (Ibid., p.57).
arises, what is bracketed, the object or the act which is directed to the object.

We shall answer this after we have dealt with the notion of intentionality in Husserl's philosophy. Brentano, as is well known, made this notion prominent in philosophy by using it to define the domain of psychology. All mental states, he held, are characterised by this peculiar directedness-to-objects; in this sense, they all possess an intentional character. Instead of pursuing Brentano's theory we may consider how far Husserl takes it over from him. Husserl, it may be noted, is more interested in the intentional act than in the intended object and he employs it in his theory of knowledge. The relation of object to the subject is looked upon by Husserl as an intentional one, the subject as intending and the object (its objectivity) as entering into a relation with it. Husserl, we may further note, associates his theory of knowledge with his philosophy of the ego. His conception of an intentional act therefore explores the structure of the transcendental subject. It is then no more Brentano's intentional act in empirical consciousness. For Husserl, intentionality refers to a "glancing ray" from the pure ego, directed upon the object, i.e., the correlate of consciousness. Thus if we talk of bracketing the world of object it means we bracket the entire process or the conscious act as directed to the object. With the suspension of our consciousness of the world we

achieve what Husserl calls phenomenological residuum or the consciousness in its absolute being. ¹

III. Conclusion:

We may sum up our discussion in this chapter in the following manner:

(a) Husserl shares Kant's interest in philosophy, viz., to trace the foundation of knowledge as given to us by the natural sciences. Kant has not questioned knowledge of the natural sciences but has looked into its a priori conditions of possibility. And Kant found this in a unity of apperception, "I think........", the subjective unity behind all synthesising activity.

Husserl has questioned our knowledge of the world as given by the natural sciences and decided to reformulate the entire question of knowledge to see how nature itself is constituted in conscious acts. For this he has given us a different sort of theory of the subject itself.

(b) Where Husserl differs from Kant he actually shares in common with Descartes' philosophy. That is, Husserl, like Descartes, casts doubt upon the world of the scientists and reconsiders the problem of knowledge in terms of the cogito. It is Descartes' "I think" more than Kant's "I think" which Husserl adopts in formulating his notion of the ego. Descartes, by his method of doubting, sets

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¹ Ibid., p.140.
aside the scientistic world and begins his philosophical enquiry from the indubitable thinking ego. Husserl, likewise, "brackets" or "disconnects" the same world to begin his phenomenological enquiry from the transcendental subject.

(c) Husserl begins his philosophical enquiry from what he calls the natural standpoint, in which we reflect psychologically on our ego and its experiences. We deal with, Husserl says, the nature of consciousness of something, or our consciousness of the existence of material things. ¹

Over and above the natural theoretical standpoint whose correlate is the world, Husserl recognises a new standpoint which is achieved through a "phenomenological reduction". We switch off the "psycho-physical totality of nature" and what is left out as a residue is the absolute consciousness. Instead of naively carrying out the acts, Husserl says, peculiar to the nature-constituting consciousness we put it out of action or we take no part in them, we direct our thought to pure consciousness in its absoluteness. The whole world is thus suspended with all things, living beings, men ourselves included. What we have won is the Absolute Being. ²

From this survey of Husserl's theory it becomes evident that if Schelling's conception of transcendental philosophy is to be made intelligible it has to be taken in view

¹ Ibid., p.103.
² Ibid., p.140.
of Husserl's phenomenology. If Schelling's empirical ego is to be rendered meaningful, it is to be taken in the sense of Husserl's ego in the natural theoretical standpoint; and Schelling's transcendental ego may be seen in light of Husserl's pure consciousness.

Husserl conceives of the transcendental ego, both in its absolute self-consciousness and in its consciousness of the existence of the material things, both as transcendental and as factual. They are separate and yet connected because the same ego may be considered from the two standpoints. We change over from one to the other, while we bracket or suspend the one that we change over from. And this is achieved, as we have seen, by Husserl's remarkable phenomenological method. Schelling has dealt with the same issue, though differently. He introduced to us no such method of reduction. Yet he has considered the ego as both transcendental and empirical, as essentially separated as they are related in that the ego posits its two activities. Although there is a vast difference between Schelling's transcendental philosophy and Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, yet we may understand the structure of the ego in Schelling's system in reference to what Husserl says of the same issue.

Schelling's notion of the ego, however, shares a lot in common with that of philosophers of his own age, viz., with Fichte's ego and Hegel's Spirit. We should therefore bring out these affinities in greater details, and propose to do that in the next chapter.