So far we have taken into consideration only those acts that are employed in our theoretical understanding of the structure of the universe. Now we shall be wholly dealing with our volitional activities. We shall, following Schelling's exposition, enquire into those acts that are involved in practical life. We shall discuss the practical problems like, the problem of self-determination in will, of imagining ideals and our urge to keep to these ideals, and the problem of our choosing only such actions that lead us up to fulfilling our ideals, and consequently of the necessity of social institution as promoting right actions and justice and eventually of the notion of history and of progress of human race through different stages in history.

Schelling calls the opening section of the part the system of practical philosophy according to the basic proposition of Transcendental Idealism. By this Schelling seems to suggest that whatever acts of consciousness that the practical philosophy introduces to us must be conceived as necessarily belonging to the ego itself.

We are not given here, we should remember, a moral philosophy. Schelling is interested in a transcendental deduction of the conceivability and explicability of moral notions. That is, Schelling investigates into moral notions a priori, or as taken.
apart from moral experiences and sees them as conditions under which moral experience is made possible.

Schelling introduces his problem in a peculiar manner. He presents to us at the outset of this discussion an absolute act of will which he peculiarly names as an act of absolute abstraction. What he means does not become clear till we come to his argument in the following corollary.

Schelling points out here that in this act of absolute abstraction the ego could free itself from the act of producing an outer nature and deal with itself consciously. In the intuition of an outer world the ego is conscious of objects but not necessarily of itself. In will alone the ego becomes conscious not merely of objects but also of itself as dealing with them. Schelling calls this act absolute because it is an absolute act in every practical experience; i.e., it is an absolute practical act, which cannot be derived from intelligence or any of our theoretical acts. It is absolute in volition, but it is not absolute in relation to the original self-consciousness for it derives essentially from the original self-consciousness.

We thus have a more or less definite picture of the act of will that Schelling introduces at the outset of the practical philosophy, viz., that it the ego sees itself as producing or becomes conscious of itself in a definite sense and that with it we enter into a sort of conscious activity that is very different from the act of knowledge. Two questions arise now: (1) what precisely
is the distinction between theoretical and practical philosophies,
(2) what is the distinction between the ego's self-consciousness in will and its original self-consciousness.

Schelling's answer to the first question may be stated thus:
(a) In theoretical philosophy we produce objects (intellectually), intuit them and theoretically understand them, but we, as Schelling reminds us, are not aware of ourselves as knowing or intuiting (the world). We are merely aware of something, or of definite objects or of their concepts. In practice, the ego, says Schelling, is fully aware of its intuitions, (b) Thus we enter a new stage where the ego does not cease to produce further objects, but becomes conscious of its production and acts voluntarily on it, (viz., the world of objects itself).

As to the second question we must argue that only by showing this distinction between the ego's self-determination in will and its original self-consciousness that we shall understand clearly the act of an absolute will in Schelling's philosophy.

Fichte certainly would identify the two and say that the ego's true reflection is in an absolute will or in the Kantian categorical imperative. This is true for Fichte because he believes that philosophical truth is attained in a supreme moral experience. Schelling's attitude to philosophy is at this point different from Fichte's. For him the ego's self-expression is not to be found in
an absolute will but in some other sphere, which we shall discuss later (and to discuss it we shall have to reach the end of the Transcendental Idealism itself). Schelling himself has not specified the difference in the beginning of his discussion of the practical philosophy, but we must assume that he bears this distinction in mind. The discussion of the practical philosophy itself, we find, rests on this distinction between the ego's absolute abstraction and the original self-consciousness, for his central problem now is; how would the ego overcome this state of its self-determination and return to its original self-contemplation.

Our comments here would amount to this: what Schelling says is, that the notion of the self-consciousness itself refers to the ego's pure self-intuition; a clearer indication of this state we come across in the Vedantic notion of the self-knowledge. The act of will is a derived state of consciousness in which, according to Schelling, the ego is self-conscious in that it determines itself as infinitely producing an outer world merely to act upon it.

Schelling now turns to another important point in this connection. He points out that another significant point of distinction between absolute will and the original self-consciousness also lies in this, that the original self-consciousness cannot be conceived to be in time. The ego is conscious of itself not at one time or another but always and infinitely. It cannot be, Schelling believes, logically aware of itself now and not aware of itself in the next moment.
But the self-determination in an act of will, Schelling points out, essentially belongs to a temporal order. The ego, says Schelling, is conceived here as entering into a series of actions which must be looked upon as successive. For the ego, Schelling reminds us, neither produces the whole of nature at once nor acts on it at once.

With the introduction of the notion of time we enter into a world of temporal sequence, and our discussion seems to turn on a new point. In the temporal world, Schelling now goes on to argue, we regard the will no more as absolute but as definite and many and as arising in time. The absolute will, Schelling believes, is thus limited into individual will or we are, in other words, dealing with finite volition.

Let us consider in further detail Schelling's temporal world. He believes that with the idea of time we enter into the world of the individuals, where the absolute will is distributed among all of individuals and where we are said to act freely merely to determine each other. In other words, we reciprocate our self-determination in which alone free actions or moral actions thrive.

What is meant by this reciprocal self-determination? What is meant by saying that someone else's action is a necessary condition of my self-determination? Why should my self-determination not rest on my free actions alone, but must also depend on such actions of other and thus how could my free action
be responsible for others' determination of themselves? He now puts forward his peculiar theory of the world of interrelated beings. He says that there is a certain sense in saying that our actions are prompted by others, and thus our self-determination rests not merely on our action but on others' actions too.

This may be understood in the following manner: I pursue a certain course of action not so much because I have pursued something previously or that I intend to pursue some other in future, but also and mainly because some one else is not pursuing this course of action (which I am prompted to undertake) but some other (which I am thus not free to pursue). Since my action should not clash with others their inaction in a sense determines my action and my inaction determines their action.

This theory, as it is presented to us, seems puzzling. There is a certain sense, we may admit, in saying that I am doing what someone else is not doing or that some one else is doing something which I am not doing; but this indeed is a very limited case. Let us take an example and show this. There is a certain logic, we may thus argue, in saying that I cannot build a house on a plot of land which belongs to some one else, where he builds his own; but there is no excuse in saying that I cannot or do not paint or play the piano or be a social worker or take up some definite profession because some one or other is doing these. I would pursue, we may thus argue, any of these actions if I have the aptitude and interest in them and also if I have the capacity.
to do any of these: Hence it may be reasonably maintained that there are cases of my free action that are strictly determined by my will alone.

We may further add here that an exact opposite of Schelling's theory of free actions is found in the Indian doctrine of Karma. For in this doctrine it is argued that each individual (self) is responsible for the course of action he chooses and that the life of the individual is determined by the actions done by the individual himself. It also says that our self-determination and our free actions would not come to an end in one life but continue through many lives (also in the ones yet to come), and in each life, this theory holds, man's self-determination is said to rest on his actions of previous life. It is not for us to pursue this point here, for we intend to mention here merely that the Indian doctrine of self-determination and Schelling's doctrine of the same may be held as opposite views, and that we may not adopt any of the views but suggest that the question of self-determination hangs on the situation in which it is taken. Thus there are cases where man is entirely responsible for what he does; he, we may argue, does what he intends; and there are also those cases where we are determined in our actions by those of others.

However, we cannot reject Schelling's theory altogether in the present context, for it leads to many fresh problems and notions in Schelling's discussion of the practical philosophy. We shall therefore take up the issue afresh.
Schelling's main contention as regards the question of self-determination is this: Through the individual limitation of every intelligence, or a negation of a certain activity in it, what arises is nothing but an activity of an intelligence other than this. Two things are important: (i) What is not my activity, and because it is not my activity, must be recognised as an activity outside me, (ii) Through my individuality itself, without any limitation from outside, a negation of activity is posited in me.

The following question may be raised:
(i) How could an action outside me be only an indirect ground of my self-determination which ought to be due in main to my own activity.
(ii) In what sense may one accept a pre-established harmony as operating in us.
(iii) If one supposes that one freely remains inactive because someone else acts in a way that renders the other inactive, how could inaction precede freedom itself, for all our actions, as Schelling has already said, arise out of freedom itself.

Schelling cannot answer these questions unless he takes recourse to his notion of the individual itself. Schelling holds that the individual is not so much a product of social environment, nor of education as we ordinarily understand, nor yet of inherited dispositions. The individual, in his view, is the most
direct outcome of a moral awakening. This moral awakening, Schelling tells us, consists in ones recognising the free actions of others in view of which one ought to adjust one's own action and thus determine oneself as oneself. If Schelling says that education helps the growth of the individual he means it in a special sense, for education for him means, as he says, the influence of one intelligence on another. The important point about his doctrine of moral awakening is that it enables him to answer the three questions that have been presently raised.

(i) Schelling's answer to the first question amounts to this: it is due in main to my moral awakening that I say my will is free, but the condition of possibility of my will must be necessitated. In this sense an action outside me may be looked upon as an indirect ground of my self-determination.

(ii) As to the second, Schelling argues that since we reciprocate and determine each others' free actions, we may be said to represent a common world, i.e., our individual representations may be said to be coordinate. And this becomes conceivable if we presuppose that we are bound together by some previously established harmony. This is again established in our moral experiences.

(iii) As to the third, Schelling has to say this: my free action, he argues, logically precedes free will in the sense that only in recognising other's actions do I choose my course of action. I am necessitated only in my moral education,
to remain inactive in respect of what some one else does; though I remain free within my territory of actions. It is also true, he would point out, that none of our specific actions or inactions may be conceived as preceding the notion of freedom itself.

At the end of this section there is an Appendix where we find further arguments contributing to the above discussion. Schelling argues here that we represent a common world, inspite of the fact that there are as many individuals as there are ways of representing the world.

This brings us to a problem of immense philosophical interest, viz., the status of object in his philosophy. Schelling argues that since we represent a common world and intuit one and the same world, the object that is not in one individual consciousness would not become non-existent, but must necessarily become the object of someone else's intuition.

We may add here as our comment that although Berkeley's theory of perception differs as widely from Schelling's Idealist doctrine as one may imagine yet what Schelling says here reminds us of Berkeley's subjectivism, viz., that esse ist percipti. For, Berkeley also maintains that if an object is not perceived by me, it is perceived by some one else, at least by God himself.

We may now summarise the above discussion thus: Schelling's purpose in his practical philosophy is to investigate into the moral notions transcendentally, taken as separated from all our moral experiences. To do this Schelling
introduces an absolute act of will, and says that our demand for practical philosophy itself presupposes such a notion. After having introduced this notion he goes on to characterise it by saying that the absolute will is separate and different from the absolute self-consciousness itself. The most essential point about our self-determination in will, Schelling has told us, is that it leads us to a temporal world.

The problems that arise in consequence concern the individuals, their interrelation and the concepts of self-determination and free actions. Schelling has so far tried to venture into this complex world of individual will and definite objects. What we should bear in mind is that he has merely introduced to us the notions that one finds essential for discussion of the practical philosophy.

It is now that Schelling will turn to deal with the moral problems or the problems of the practical philosophy. With the section 'E', Resolution I, Schelling will begin by taking into account our moral problems, which, he believes, seem to arise with his notion of the absolute will. Schelling discusses here two main problems.

(1) The will, he argues, is directed to an object. Schelling claims that will or volition cannot thrive in void but must necessarily be directed to objects. Thus, if we will, Schelling would argue, we will some object or other.

(2) Schelling also argues that in willing we
pursue an ideal. The entire notion of having an ideal involves the following. Schelling assumes that intuition is different from volition and that they oppose each other. And to overcome this opposition between our knowing an object and acting on it he introduces the peculiar sort of imagination which alone, he says, gives us our ideals for moral pursuit. The imagination which Schelling introduces here constitutes the ideals of all our practical activities.

Schelling's next argument will be to show how will or volition consists in remoulding the objects of our intuition in order to make them fit our ideals. The question that arises is this: what is meant by remoulding an object. Does it refer to some substantial change in the object itself or do we change its contingent properties?

While answering these questions, Schelling will be led to determine the true character of volition or our practical activities. He would specify volition as a higher kind of contemplation and then go on to justify, in this connection, the possibility of objects outside us in will. These, we may note, constitute the theme of the Section I. In the Section II, we find him passing on to the problems regarding the ideal itself and our pursuit of it in volition.

Let us first restate the problem which Schelling faces in the practical philosophy. We intuit or theoretically know an objectively real world. Although we must act
upon the world of intuition our actions are meant to pursue certain ideals given to us in our practical reason. In doing so, we find that the real world is somewhat in disparity with the ideal world. Thus, one may ask, do we shift from our ideals to accept the world of intuition or do we change the world of intuition to maintain our ideals. Schelling decides in favour of the second alternative. He therefore believes that we stick fast to our ideals in all our volitional activities by a natural force, by an impulse, or an urge.

One may ask here, how could impulse prompt free actions or actions of reason. In the sub-section A Schelling answers this in the following manner.

(a) Since we direct our volition, argues Schelling, to the objects we have already known, what we attempt in volition is to modify these objects in order that they may fit our ideals. Further, we may change objects only if we know them previously. We may be said to change an object, he reminds us, only if we have the idea of what it ought to become. Thus, our ideals or ideas precede our actions.

This further leads him to show what sort of change he could speak of in the moral world. Any change in nature, we all admit, would be conceived as a causal change. But change brought about in our moral life, Schelling rightly points out, must be regarded a teleological change. And teleological change fully justifies his statement that man in his volition changes an object only because an ideal or an idea of what he wants it to be precedes
his action itself. And this is clearly indicated when he says that in teleological change the conditions in which an object is made precedes in our thought the actual occurrence of the object.

Schelling further argues to show that the conception of a teleological change also explains how an impulse prompts us in our free actions; teleology, he says, is itself possible if an inner urge prompts us to give an outlet to our ideals of what we want to make the world to be and thus act on it.

There is another important point that Schelling mentions here, viz., that in changing the world teleologically we do not modify nature as a whole all at once. In it too, as in causal change, we change one object at a time and go on to another and thus enter into a temporal series.

(b) Leaving this issue behind, Schelling goes on to ask: what do we change in an object. We cannot, he argues, change an object substantially, for an object to be substantially changed it must be conceived as occupying space and thus remain in our intuition. Thus if we change the object as it occurs in time we only change its accidental properties. This is a reasonable view, we may remark, for an object 'now' may become different (though essentially remaining the same) some other time.

(c) Thus Schelling is led to hold further that we cannot change nature substantially for it offers us resistance.

In the sub-section B, Schelling raises the issue that is a natural outcome of what he has just said. He asks: how could we change an object when it offers resistance.
Schelling answers this by saying that changing an object should not be taken to mean altering it completely. By changing an object one only modifies the object. Further, the possibility of all our practical activities rests on this that we should act upon situations outside us. Hence our actions demand that there should be external objects.

It is interesting to note here that the object is conceived as outside not in the realist's sense of the term, but in the sense that we contemplate the object as external to us.

Schelling's further arguments may be summed up thus. His doctrine of practical reason throws light on two significant philosophical issues in his Transcendental Idealism:

(1) it helps us to determine the relation of man's intuiting activity to his volitional activity; and

(2) it helps us to determine the status of the object (of will) in his moral philosophy.

Schelling deals with these two problems in the following manner:

(1) From the point of view of the Transcendental Idealism it would not be wrong for Schelling to say that there is a deeper identity of the two activities, the intuiting and the volitional. By this he means that all our theoretical and practical activities principally derive from self-consciousness itself, or that self-consciousness holds the point of identity of all our intuiting and volitional activities.
It is, therefore, reasonable for Schelling to hold that when we think we also act, and when we act we also think. The two activities cannot be absolutely separated. When we intuit an object, we intuit it with a view to act on it, and in our acting on it or changing it we merely know the same object more fully and adequately. Volition therefore, amounts to deeper intuitions of the objects. In volition we become acquainted with the objects of intuition.

This view has an important element of truth in it, for it is correct to say that we would not act upon anything with which we are not familiar. We would not seek, one should admit, what we know not. We thus change what we know and we may further admit that we do not seem to create anything new in our volition. In volition we are said to modify an object, truly in this process we may be said to rethink the object, and thus gain a better grasp of it than we at first had in our intuition.

(2) Schelling now goes on to show in what sense the world of objects is objective. His argument about the identity of our intuition and volition evidently leads us to determine the status of the objective world in the following manner. For Schelling, the world is objectively real not in the realist’s sense of mind-independence. The world is objectively real in the sense that the world arises in our intuition, and as this intuition becomes our object of consideration the world also becomes objectively real.
Schelling's Idealism, like most other Idealistic doctrines, fails to give a satisfactory account of the status of the object. First, we should ask, how could we produce an outer world unless we also presuppose its reality as being apart from that of consciousness. Secondly, we should also ask, how could the outer world attain reality when we are dealing with the intuition of it.

In section II, Schelling raises the following moral problems:
(i) What is involved in our pursuit of our ideals? and
(ii) How do we bring this to our consciousness.

(i) Schelling mentions two possible ways of pursuing our ideals. One may adopt either a phenomenal path or a non-phenomenal or spiritual one. There are accordingly, two groups of people; those who seek their ideals in the material world or the world of objects, and those who renounce this world to seek the ideal in the spiritual world of self-contemplation. The two worlds thus are separate. And will, Schelling argues, may express itself either in our pure self-discipline or abstract self-determination, or in our numerous practical activities as directed to definite objects.

We shall first determine, following Schelling, (a) the nature of our moral pursuit in our deep self-contemplation and then (b) also in the world of experience, and (c) finally go on to determine their relation.
Our moral pursuit in the world of pure self-determination arises out of an inner demand. This demand, Schelling believes, ought to be regarded as rigorous in that it is binding on us all. Thus self-determination for him is demanded in the same way as the categorical imperative is for Kant. If we ask why should we all react to an objectively true will Schelling would answer that, we, as intelligent beings, share this common view that we should follow one and the absolute moral order. Schelling's argument, we may say, is ideally correct, for only an appeal to our reason tells us that we should follow an absolute moral order. But how far we do act in this way, we must admit, remains problematic.

Our conclusion would therefore be that an absolute moral order is pursued chiefly due to the dictate of our reason and that this is attained in our exclusive region of self-determination.

(b) An exactly opposite activity (to that of self-determination) is recognised by Schelling, which he calls self-indulgence. Schelling tells us that we seek self-indulgence not in the spiritual world but in the world of objects. Thus we enter a phenomenal world where we pursue pleasure or happiness, Glückseligkeit, and we act no more at the dictate of reason but out of the impulse or Trieb seeking our own pleasure.

(c) Schelling's description of the two worlds and
the nature of our pursuits in these two worlds is correct and it is also correct to hold that these two worlds oppose each other. Their relation is seen by Schelling as one of opposition. The possibility of moral action itself, Schelling would say, rests on the opposition of the spiritual and the material, of reason and impulse. What he means is that if our moral aspiration is to survive we ought to imagine that we are struggling against the impulses to attain to the higher region of self-discipline, which is the demand of our reason.

The notion that Schelling makes most use of is that of choice. For we are said to overcome the dualism of reason and impulse, Schelling holds, merely by choosing to renounce the material and adopt the spiritual. It is thus, argues Schelling, a matter of choice that we restrict impulse and employ reason in moral pursuit.

There is another important point which Schelling has not forgotten to emphasise, viz., that this dualism of two worlds poses no problem for the absolute self-consciousness itself but only to us (for whom will is both absolute and also individual).

In the following Appendix Schelling introduces us to an entirely new concept of his philosophy and seeks a compromise of reason and impulse in this notion. This is the concept of justice. Justice, now he goes on to argue, saves our pursuits of the two ends from entirely excluding each other. We
ought to note that in connection with justice Schelling will further argue that justice operates in social institutions and that we may study this in history. Thus we shall arrive at a very important notion in the philosophical systems of Germany of this period, viz., that of history, which as we know, was extensively discussed by Hegel, and which certainly constitutes a significant portion of his philosophy.

We may now consider what Schelling says about justice.

(1) Moral action, Schelling argues, consists in keeping to a just order. He says rightly that the moral issue itself arises out of this problem, viz., whether we ought to pursue our own comfort or ought we to pursue a common good. He further argues that justice alone resolves this dispute and shows how we compromise self-interest with the good of others and pursue our actions in that line of order. Thus the common good in Schelling's view should include interest of all and morality thrives in our pursuit of the common good.

(2) Justice, Schelling further contends, promotes the growth of social or legal institutions in that it encourages man's coexistence with man in a society. In following a just order in life, Schelling rightly tells us, we seek not merely our own good but also the good of others and thus promote peace among us.
(3) Just order, Schelling goes on to argue, must not be looked upon as a causal order. Schelling, like Kant, distinguishes causal law from the moral law by saying that causality has been looked upon by philosophers as systematically explaining the course of nature, and man's moral life is seen as guided by the free will. And Schelling would point out that justice alone gives expression to the free will, for justice, as he has shown, maintains moral life in shape.

(4) However, justice, Schelling adds must necessarily be distinguished from morality. Morality consists in moral virtues which we practise; and justice must be looked upon as a notion in our mind (which helps us to practise moral virtues).

(5) Schelling ends his talk about justice by showing its origin. Justice, he argues, is a notion deeply rooted in man's reason; but it is seen, he says, as functioning only in a situation where man needs to protect himself against all wrong. Schelling's view here, we may suggest, is vague for he should deal with the notion of justice by referring to the concrete cases where it functions. It is rather general to say that the notion of justice remains rooted in our mind and arises out of our needs to protect ourselves, which Schelling characterises in general as self-protection. It is true to say, we may agree, that a just order prevents wrong acts and promotes the right ones alone and that our natural demand is to keep to the right actions.
which offer a security for all, and it is also true to say that the entire idea of this just living is deep-rooted in our faculty of reason. But we feel that Schelling should have given fuller account of justice if he had analysed the nature of man's important needs, the meaning of social security, and discussed the cases where justice truly functions. Schelling has instead talked about human needs for a just order by saying that we do not know our needs a priori, and that our needs arise in course of time and what we need presently will be determined by the progress and achievement of the present age. Justice, he says functions in every age for our general need for a just order.

Here again, Schelling has not shown that our needs are varied and different not merely in different ages but that they may be different in the same age with different people. Human needs are not only different but they have been found to contradict each other at different times within the same age or at different ages. Woman's vote to right is one of the just actions, recognised by the present-day-world and yet it was not so only a few years ago!

Schelling's discussion, inspite of all its inadequacies, throws light on two points, viz., that the notion of justice remains an idea in our mind and that human actions are actually depicted in the just order. And it is not in any specific situation, Schelling means to say, that the just order functions, but it must be seen as operating in the society.
Thus we may repeat Schelling's arguments about justice. (1) Justice, he says, is an idea rooted in the faculty of reason and is said to find expression only in actions that are regarded just or moral. (2) Justice must not be treated, Schelling tells us, as the principle of causality; for the laws of human actions is solely guided by the freedom of will, which is not to be found in nature. We find that justice perpetuates moral order but is not itself the moral order. (3) The nature of moral action, Schelling tells us, is such that it combines in it ones personal interest with the general interest and thus promotes general good. Closely associated with the idea of morality (or the pursuit of the Summum Bonum), Schelling truly argues, is the idea of society.

It is now that Schelling proceeds further with his philosophic contentions, that justice functions in all social institutions and thus the idea of state gains philosophic support, and that if the philosopher studies the progress of the evolution of justice in human society he comes to take into account history itself. This accounts for Schelling's philosophic interest in history, and he believes that justice may progress with historical ages and thus may appear as emerging perfect and complete in a world-state, which for Schelling is the highest state of progress in history.
We do not mean to discuss the merits and defects of this doctrine; we accept it as Schelling presents it to us. The main outcome of this view is the philosophic idea of history, and the idea of development of states, and the emergence of the world-state, which for our present age, we may remark, is not merely philosophically significant but is also important politically.

In section III, with its subsections A, B, and C, Schelling introduces to us his philosophical idea of history.

The notion of history, Schelling argues, involves both contingency and necessity. Historical facts are regarded by him as contingent in that they are not arranged methodically. He means that history cannot claim the strictness of a method which science does.

But history also contains necessary elements: history is not mere chaos but is definite in taking into account a specific set of facts. History records those facts alone in which man's moral actions are depicted. Historical facts are those that show the functioning of justice itself.

By way of illustration, we may point out that history would not record, for instance, some one's studying at King's College, London, unless the person lives to contribute to the maintenance of justice in society. Each instance in life of Gandhi is of historical import because he lived only to be just and moral in the sense Schelling has discussed.
We may add one more argument which Schelling has not mentioned. To do this we should ask: do we merely record in history man's noble and glorious acts. One may argue here to show that although it is true that we are likely to record in history only man's moral actions yet one should not fail to see that man's misdeeds have also been historically recorded. Life of Hitler, for instance, is not full of glorious events, yet it constitutes a portion of the 20th century history. Thus Schelling's argument that history necessarily takes into account man's just actions is not correct. There is no doubt a certain truth in saying that history is meant to show an evolution of the justice. But for this purpose we may add, it is not merely that the just and noble acts alone have to be recorded, but that we should also take into account man's wrong doings, which offer us a good contrast with the moral acts. And in so far these wrong actions are also historically important in that they, in their contrast with right actions, give us a better example of the right and the wrong actions to the posterior generations.

In subsection A, Schelling asks, why do we need to study history at all. History, he argues, gives an account of human progress by showing how justice evolves through ages of history. History therefore specifies (1) the age that has gone before, (2) the present age and the progress achieved in it and (3) also points to the future age that may be
anticipated in the light of the present age and what has gone before. According to him, history is not singularly interested in the growth of science nor in progress of art only but in the fact of right action in general. And although, Schelling argues, an age decays, a generation passes away, and man's fall is inevitable, yet the right actions are repeated in all ages.

In sub-section B, Schelling does not say much except that our study of history is profitable, for our knowledge of the past events helps us to choose the right and avoid the wrong. He means that human mistakes are not likely to be repeated if we have thoroughly studied history.

In sub-section C, Schelling brings to our notice an important philosophical conviction, viz., that the idea of freedom is at bottom the same as the idea of necessity. In other words, our free actions are what we should necessarily do. We are free, says Schelling, only to act necessarily (for the benefit of all). He further argues to show that the study of history alone shows that freedom and necessity are originally identical. He, however, proposes to give us a full account of his notion of identity of freedom and necessity in his System of Identity. Here he merely mentions that we ought to be familiar with the idea of historical development in course of which it is seen that our moral actions are both free and necessary at the same time. If the two notions are separated, Schelling argues, it is because they are to be investigated into.
Another important notion that Schelling brings to notice here is the notion of race. He believes that free or necessary acts are not meant to be performed by individuals singly but by the entire race itself of all ages. He means thereby that freedom is not a privilege of any one individual but is enjoyed by the whole generation of mankind.

This idea of race further enables Schelling to hold that the idea of all free and necessary actions or of moral action itself has been handed down to the posterior generations by the previous one.

To end this discussion, Schelling turns to the classification of our study of history. We should mention at the outset that the classification itself is entirely arbitrary and that there are other ways of studying history consistently and comprehensively than Schelling offers us here. It is, however, interesting for us to take a look at Schelling's classification.

The study of history, Schelling says, develops through three periods: fatalism, atheism, and the religious period.

The first period has been imagined by Schelling as the tragic period, when fate or Schicksal is the predominant idea. This is where, according to him, unconscious and blind forces might have gripped man's conscious efforts. This is how Schelling dreamt of the ancient world.

The second period, Schelling believes, is depicted in the Roman Republic, which he imagines as neither tragic nor
moral, but as following the course of nature more closely than anything else. Man's conscious efforts, Schelling says, in this age are realised in natural laws.

It is only in the third period, by which Schelling refers to no definite age, that he sees the emergence of the idea of God in us and neither Schicksal nor nature, but Vorsehung or providence becomes the predominant idea in this age.

Schelling's discussion of historical ages is not merely arbitrary but also inadequate. He has not elucidated any of the periods he has mentioned here. We may, however, give him some credit not for discussing historical periods as much as for having introduced to us the notion of history itself and arguing to show what is involved in this notion and also by bringing into our notice the important point of our study of history, viz., the emergence of justice.

We may now summarise what Schelling says about history. He has rightly remarked that although history would not claim to follow a specific method yet it has to take into account not any fact that comes on its way but, out of necessity, only a certain sort of facts. It is to show the functioning of justice that history records as its facts the just actions of mankind as an entire race. History, Schelling thus believes, intends to show moral progress through different periods from the past to the present and then on to the future. Further, this progress of mankind is intended merely to specify
the character of morality itself, viz., that the moral actions are to be looked upon as both free and necessary. It is through the progress of ages in history that we see how moral action that arise out of necessity become more and more free. With this we pass on to the chapter 5 of the System of Transcendental Idealism where Schelling will discuss this identity at a fuller length.

In this chapter Schelling introduces the idea of teleology in his philosophy, which, it seems to us, is a direct outcome of his previous discussions.

The central argument of Schelling in this chapter is this: Although nature is a product of blind natural forces yet nature is in and through purposive. By this is meant that all our conscious activities are directed to objects in nature and thus the natural objects that are unconscious and non-purposive in themselves become conscious and purposive by the fact that our conscious efforts are realised through their medium.

Schelling swings over to another argument by saying that he finds unity of the conscious and the unconscious for the free and the necessary in organic nature. Every natural product, he believes, shows this unity. Every plant, argues Schelling, maintains this unity. Man is a fragment for in man, Schelling says, actions are either necessary and not free or free and not necessary.
It is for this reason, Schelling points out, that man sees nature either as free or as necessary, but not both together. Thus we imagine matter and intelligence as separate and then we go on to believe, that either matter becomes purposive or that our conscious activity directs itself to matter to give it purpose.

The former, Schelling points out, is the Hylozoists' point of view, the latter process shows how artificial objects are produced.

It is here that Schelling distinguishes between natural objects and artificial object, a difference worth considering. We merely intuit natural objects, argues Schelling, and we produce artificial objects out of our ideas. These ideas therefore precede the (artificial) objects. Thus in producing artificial objects, we are guided by our ideas, and the artificially produced objects, are also the natural objects which we first intuit. And ideas take shape in our mind which again find expression in the artificial objects.

Schelling has so far spoken of nature as the unity of two elements though they are seen as separate in our consciousness. Now he goes on to introduce to us a special act of intuition which he calls aesthetic intuition, and which he regards as different from theoretical or practical acts. It is not an act, Schelling believes, in which we intuit objects, nor one in which we change an object, but one in which we produce objects
artificially according to the ideas we have in our mind. We thus arrive at a point where Schelling's theory of art, takes over the argument.

II. Philosophy of art:

In the final and chapter 6 of the System of Transcendental Idealism, Schelling gives us his philosophy of art.

Schelling begins in the sub-section I his discussion of the theory of art by mentioning the important characters that the object of art should possess. He gives four such characters (1) An object of art, he argues, must involve our conscious effort, i.e., only a conscious effort produces aesthetic objects; (2) it must also involve an unconscious element; (3) the object of art should serve a conscious purpose and (4) finally, the object of art, is originally a natural object.

Let us illustrate these points with an example. An artist, let us suppose paints a bunch of roses. What is involved in it? We may put it as follows:

Although the artist has freely produced the roses on his canvas out of his own conscious intentions the roses are originally natural roses, which the artist has been before and must have been impressed. The artist thus forms a clear vision of what he is to produce, viz., the ideas of a certain number of roses, in a certain perspective, of some definite colours etc. And when he actually produces it he finds
it agreeing more or less with the ideas in his mind. This evidently reminds us that the artistic productions are teleological, or that they may be regarded as serving a conscious purpose. Another point which we should notice is that, apart from all these factors, viz., the artist's clear vision, acquired skill or training, and the conscious effort, all of which contribute to the production of the object of art, there is another element present, which we may call an unknown element, which shows itself in every object of art. The artist, after having produced his object of art, finds in it something different from what he imagined himself as producing. This unknown element, we may point out, constitutes the originality of aesthetic production. It does not, Schelling would say, disgrace art but immortalises it.

Schelling rightly calls this unconscious element genius. And he argues that an object of art is a joint product of the two contrasting activities, the conscious and the unconscious. The artist's intuition, Schelling admits, in fact survives in this conflict of the conscious and the unconscious and this inner struggle gives an impetus to the artist's creation and isolates him from the ordinary mankind.

Thus, the true picture of the whole process of aesthetic production is this: the artist produces freely and makes full use of the methods he has learned, and along with it his inner genius shows up which makes his creation unique and original.
There are two more features that Schelling attributes to artistic productions, viz., that (1) such objects bring satisfaction to the artist himself and that (2) such objects are always appreciated and admired.

However, it seems to us that none of these two characterisations are tenable, for (1) the artist is more often than not dissatisfied with his works. His inner conflict continues are thus he might be prepared to redo his works. The artist in fact is never satisfied with his works and that is why, it is not wrong for us to say, that he continues to produce not one thing but many of them with the expectation of achieving fuller expression of his vision and thus more perfection in his products. Art, we may hold, survives in this sort of dissatisfaction which is common to the artistic temperament.

(2) It is also not true to say, we may further argue against Schelling's view, that a work of art is always appreciated. Many trash objects, crude antiques for instance, are preserved and admired while beautiful object of art may be found to be neglected, ignored, and forgotten at times.

In the sub-section 2, Schelling mentions few more distinctive features of the works of art and distinguished them from natural objects and objects of art in general, by which Schelling seems to mean reproductions or copies.

A work of art, Schelling says, expresses its idea eternally. The painting of a youth, for instance, represent
not merely a certain youth who has been thus painted; but the
idea of youth itself. Schelling regards Greek mythology as a
perfect work of art, for in it he sees an infinite expression
of all our ideas.

It is this character of the works of art
which according to Schelling, distinguishes a genuine work of
art from the copies or the masterpieces from ordinary ones. We
may justify Schelling's statement by arguing that vast number
of men and women may be trained as painters, writers etc. but
only few turn out to be genius in Schelling's sense. It is true
that a trained artist would produce through what Schelling calls
reflection, by which he means the training itself, while the
genuine artist produces his works out of his inner visions and
that there is always in his works an originality which makes
his works unique.

We agree that what Schelling says here is
of considerable importance. It is true to say that the works of
a genius are different from those of copy-artists (if we may
call them so), mainly because the genius, although he makes
use of his training, yet in main produces out of his inner
intuition and that these works immortalise the creator's ideas;
while the works of the copy-artist bear none of these characters.
They produce what they are taught to do. This is why Rembrandt
is different from his other contemporany Dutch painters. We may
further add that in this respect alone we sort out fine art
from commercial art which is in main the outcome of training.
Schelling's second argument regarding the distinction of genuine works of art and mere reproductions of the copy-artists is what he had said previously, viz., that the genuine works of art bring joy to the artist himself. We have discussed this earlier.

Schelling's third argument is central to our discussion of his theory of art, viz., that all objects of art express the idea of beauty itself.

The notion of beauty, argues Schilling, is necessarily connected with the works of art, for the artistic products must necessarily be beautiful, while natural objects of which Schelling gives no specific example may or may not be beautiful.

Schelling goes on to argue that the idea of beauty survives not by excluding ugliness but by including this opposite idea and by contrasting itself with it. In recognising aesthetic objects as beautiful we always contrast them with what might be called ugly objects.

Schelling has not made it clear, we may point out, what is meant by aesthetic objects as being necessarily beautiful. Certainly a painter could paint some ghastly scene or some ugly woman dying etc. and yet the work itself may be a perfectly beautiful production. Hogarth, for instance, depicted the miserable life of the poor in slum and yet his works claim to be master works of art, and are considered aesthetically beautiful.
We may explain this problem by saying, which Schelling has not done, that it is not the content of art which is always beautiful, but it is the form of art to which we ascribe the notion of beauty. The natural objects may be beautiful to look at or ugly. These natural objects, beautiful or not, as intuited by the artist and produced as aesthetic objects become essentially beautiful. That is, they attain beauty in the form in which the artist presents them. In this sense alone the portrait of an ugly woman may be looked as beautiful. Schelling has not explained this, but this precisely is what he means when he says that the idea of beauty is contingent to natural objects and necessary to the aesthetic objects. Schelling distinguishes aesthetic objects from natural objects in that the former are necessarily beautiful and latter are contingently so.

Schelling has distinguished the genuine objects of art or aesthetic objects from mere reproductions or copies, and also the aesthetic objects from the natural objects. Now he distinguishes aesthetic objects from invented objects or what he calls objects of art in general. The invented objects are useful to us in our daily life to make our living materially comfortable, while aesthetic objects produce an inner delight, peace of mind, or spiritual satisfaction. This is what Schelling means when he says that the general products of art serve an outer purpose and the aesthetic products serve an inner purpose. It must be noted
that Schelling has specified these general products of art as something akin to scientific products.

Schelling ends this discussion by saying that the aesthetic product or the genuine work of art is a contribution of the Genie, for only the genius would create the whole and not add up parts. And this is different from mere talent or Geschicklichkeit.

In the final chapter of this book Schelling determines the relation of art to philosophy. Both philosophy and art offer us unity of the subject and the object in that the object is what the subject produces. But there is also a difference between them in that only a few attain the philosophic point of view, art brings joy to all. The rest of what Schelling says is poetic and beautiful.

There is a short general remark at the end of the book where Schelling sums up the main arguments of the System of Transcendental Idealism. This system of philosophy is meant to give us a narrative of the life of the ego and the central notion in it is that of self-consciousness. All our mental acts that we take into account in knowledge or in volition must be regarded as derived from the self-consciousness. In theoretical understanding of nature what predominates is the idea of nature itself, for our interest here is in the knowledge of nature. In volition, however, we are explicitly aware of...
ourselves. In choosing the right from wrong and in pursuit of the right we are certainly aware of ourselves as acting. The complete expression of self-consciousness, viz., as the unity of the subject and the object is to be found in art.

III. In conclusion, we may point out that two issues arise out of our exposition of the System of Transcendental Idealism: (i) What is involved in the notion of the ego itself, and (ii) what is the relation of art to philosophy? These will be taken up in the following chapters.