CHAPTER 3.

THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY.

I. The system of theoretical philosophy according to the basic proposition of Transcendental Idealism.

Under this caption Schelling discusses his theoretical philosophy, which ought to be conducted in reference to the basic proposition of Transcendental Idealism. By this is meant that we must necessarily restrict our discussion of theoretical philosophy within the basic contention of Transcendental Idealism. This demands that we deduce self-consciousness in such a manner as to be able to show that it contains all those acts which may be called theoretical. In other words, all our acts of consciousness which give us knowledge of the external world are to be deduced from the ego.

Schelling could hold such a view because the ego in his philosophy is looked upon as an absolute act, which includes subsidiary acts. Schelling calls self-consciousness an absolute synthesis, and then proposes to derive the individual constituent acts, viz., the theoretical ones from it.

We may ask now, how could theoretical acts belong to self-consciousness.

This is possible because Schelling characterises self-consciousness as both subjective and objective, ideal and real, unlimited and limited. An endless series of objects must necessarily confront self-consciousness, which in its turn must evolve itself...
into endless series of acts in which it may deal with them.

Schelling now turns to the deduction of these acts. He mainly speaks of two things, the ego's repetition of itself in these acts, and its evolution through these acts. The former is possible because every constituent act is a limitation of the absolute act. The absolute act, says Schelling, is original and the constituent act is a copy. It therefore is conceivable that self-consciousness evolves through these acts.

What is meant by these arguments is this. We may be said to know a world independent of us and outside us only if we represent this world to us. The world in its multiplicity cannot be represented to us all at once in one single conscious act. There must be many acts of representation, which may eventually refer to an absolute act. The universe also must be represented in a sequence. There are therefore as many acts as there are ways of representing the world. Schelling is also right in saying that we are now introduced to a new but familiar world, the world of time, where objects follow each other in temporal sequence. It is interesting to note that a similar argument is found in Husserl's phenomenology where he gives us a reduction of the constitution of the world to the original time-consciousness. Schelling would not find it unacceptable because he himself says that the evolution of the absolute act of self-consciousness means that it enters into this stream of temporal change.

We may conclude by saying that Schelling takes
into account in his theoretical philosophy only those acts that constitute important stages in the history of theoretical consciousness. That is, he proposes to deal with the acts that are most important in our theoretical understanding of the structure of the universe. He deals with sensation, perception, and conception. If the ego is limited in general there arises in it the act of sensation, and if it is specially limited, in that what limits it in general is itself limited by a definite content, what arises is perception or productive intuition. If we reflect on perception we may abstract act from object or concept from intuition. Schelling’s purpose here is to see how the ego, in the theoretical acts, attempts to reflect more and more on itself.

II. The first 'Epoche':

Here Schelling discusses the ego's first limitation, i.e., the act of sensation.

'Sec.A': The crucial issue to be decisively accounted for is: how should the ego intuit itself as limited, if it could at all do so?

Hypothetically considered, if the ego is to intuit itself as limited it could only do so at a common point where real and the ideal, the two apparently contradictory activities of it encounter each other. This point of termination is not a mere repose or complete inaction, but far more significantly an equipoise of the ego’s opposed activities. Where two activities are made fixed, what emerges is an equilibrium or balance of the dual-gaze of the ego, it itself remaining indifferent to both.
Schelling would later introduce 'matter' at this third common point of the equipoise—the view whose significance and implication could be explored later in course of discussion.

The true picture of this third point is that, though being indifferent to the contradiction of the real and the ideal it shares something in common with both, in that it is subject and object at once, the ideal and the real together.

Strange as it may seem, the ego's activity cannot remain confined to its first construction, the point of equilibrium in peace, because the hurrying series of the objective world disturb the equipoise, outcome of which is the shift of attention of the ego primarily from the subject to the object and then from one object to another. The ego in its continued striving towards an ideal is limited by emergence of objective nature from whose grip it attempts to free itself. This means that the ego limits its real activity that has already limited its ideal one. It cannot but go through this difficult path because it has to construct nature right from dead matter to sensibility.

The ego's ideal activity, viz., its search for the infinity remains unlimited and unlimitable; no matter to what extent it is restrained from its striving its passion for a desperate search for itself remains intact. The real activity, on the other hand, though obstructing the ego's positing of itself also gets limited itself every time it is specified by a definite content. Specification of the real activity, however, depends on the ego's own discretion. The
ego posits whatever it chooses to. The indefinite sensation now gets a definite content. The ego is not incapacitated as inactive with this necessity of the definite object of sensation, it is rather inspired to take an active initiation to intuit what exactly impinges on it. Choice of the ego is in conformity with its subjective ideal. Whatever is posited as real therefore is deduced from the ideal. The immediate question arises, how could the real ego be limited for the ideal ego. This seems to be telling upon the issue, how does the ego intuit itself as limited.

These arguments as such sound utterly abstract unless we consider them in respect of what is yet to come. One gets an uneasy feeling of heading towards something that would reveal the significance of these obscure statements. All these talks and suggestions about an-yet-unintelligible common point and the ego's being unlimitable on the one side of this point and being limited on the other seem to anticipate what is yet to be found and established, in order that these sayings are rendered meaningful.

Let us refer again to the possibility of the ego's intuition of itself as limited. It is arguable that if such intuition is possible it is only when the ego contrasts its being limited with its unlimitedness. This contrast could take place at the so-called common point of limit, where the ego decomposes itself into the ideal and the real, the subjective and the objective, the unlimitable and the limited. If the point is removed these apparently opposed activities of the ego would flow as one and the
same, in its non-objective ideality. The limit seems to have a two-fold function; it not only distinguished the two activities, it relates them also. Truly what is separated must become necessarily related. What relates is the ideal activity; what is thereby related is the real activity. This statement leads us no further than a circular reasoning, viz., why the ego divides its own activity and relates them also is explainable if we care to refer to the point of limit. The point itself exposes their distinction and hint that they are to be related as well. Why they are distinguished and thereafter related, in other words, the ground of their distinction and relation is found at the present moment in the real activity. The ego initiates itself to the positing of something that could make explicit the pressure of the real on the ideal. Schelling has not advanced to the extent of locating the ground of this crucial difference within the ego, although it is convincing to say that the reason why the ego divides its activity could be just as well traced in its ideal activity of self-positing. Why Schelling feels this difficulty presently to locate the ground in the ideal activity also seems unaccountable because it is the ideal activity that changes itself into the real. Let us, however, assume that the ground is found in the real activity. What does it lead up to? It is worth nothing here that the ego's intuition of what is not itself is as positive an activity as its intuition of itself. The former negates the latter in that it opposes the latter, not that it denies the same. What opposes the ego undoubtedly is foreign to it; but even in its
counter-pressure against the ego it cannot deny that it is posited by the ego. The source of its arising is the ego itself. The real, in this sense, could be declared as negative or the Negative. In its capacity of contradicting the ego's self-intuition it could be said to be grounded in the non-ego. We seem to catch a clue to the problem; how would the ego intuit itself as limited, if it at all could do so. The ego cannot intuit itself as limited unless it intuits this limitation as an affection of the not-ego, more specifically known as the thing-in-itself. The ego is compelled to differentiate from its activity-of-positing-itself an activity that posits everything but itself.

Pressure of the activity of the thing-in-itself is actually felt by the ego in an act of sensation, which must be deduced if objective nature is meant to be apprehended. Sensation therefore makes the ego aware of an impatt on it from the world at large. It makes the ego feel the first touch of what is not itself. It is the ego's very first awareness that something from somewhere presses on it which it cannot specify at this point. It hears the call of without not knowing what actually sends it out. It may be argued here that if at least in sensation the ego is affected by something foreign to it, Idealist philosopher's claim is reduced, because the ego recognises the necessity of externality. A deeper insight into transcendental philosophy would show that the ego, even in sensing something that opposes its original activity, is not a passive receptivity; it remains in its characteristic nature, viz., an activity of positing. This is compatible with the act of sensation because what affects the ego is a pressure of the activity of the
thing-in-itself not an outside object. Activity of the thing-in-itself
is what the ego finds within itself as counter-acting against its
ideal activity. Although sensation means for the ego an immediate
awareness of what is limiting it, as it were, from outside, this
awareness is as spontaneous as its awareness of itself. Nothing as
such could exist at all as opposing the ego. Affection of the
so-called non-ego is what the ego finds within itself contradicting
and restricting its original tendency to self-intuition. Activity
of the thing-in-itself opposes the ego's ideal activity not because
it is there to do so but only because the ego itself finds something
intruding on it. The self-positing ego is the 'Findernde' or what
finds, what it has found so far is not a definite content but
'something' indefinite, which in its being found so opposes what
finds it.

Possibility of sensation depends on two
factors, viz., that the balance between two activities is broken;
the equilibrium that could view the ego as subjective-objective at
once is disturbed. The ego is evident in its mere objectivity. This
foreign element is not outside self-consciousness, it is
self-consciousness in limitation. Furthermore, the ego's
possibility of sensation depends largely on the fact that the
ideal ego must necessarily intuit the real world. In sensation the
ego is aware of something indefinite limiting it; in doing so it
cannot intuit itself as limited, which perhaps is a task of a
subsequent act.
Schelling's conception of sensation is not only different from the usual belief, viz., we sense definite objects, which seems a far more intelligible account of sensation, but it also appears to be arbitrary. The nearest way we could conceive of a situation like this is to imagine the ego as confined within its dwelling of self-intuition, when somehow something knocks at its closed door with a view to intruding into its peaceful abode. The ego senses that somebody is at its door.

The only justifiable claim, as regards his account of sensation is that, Transcendental Idealism in its estimation of sensation stands as the right sort of medium between the extreme standpoints of the Realists and the dogmatic Idealists. Whereas the realist philosopher explains sensation as an awareness of exclusive externality, which affects consciousness to the extent of nearly paralysing it to a state of inactivity, the dogmatist or the extreme Idealist senses nothing but presentations of his own inner awareness. Transcendental philosophy finds in sensation the subjective ego in its awareness of its objective activity for the first time separated from itself standing over and above it. This makes a provision for a subjective-objective conjoined picture, though in it the objectivity predominates presently.

Sensation is the first opening into the vista of knowledge. Knowledge is possible when subjectivity feels the presence of the objective. Being therefore changes into knowing in so far the ego produces it to be known. To say that there is a cube in a particular portion of space is to mean the consciousness of that
part of space in the form of a cube, i.e., as filled by the cube. Objective existence of the cube is known through an act of the ego's intuiting.

Since knowledge arises with the ego's awareness of something limiting its unlimitable striving, in this first act of knowing or sensation the ego is limited in general. If the ego has to be limited at all it must feel right in the beginning that something or other limits it, which it cannot locate as at once as it feels. The ego's first limitation signified as the 'general limitation' is the most obvious feeling shared in common by all rational beings. We are indeed aware that we are as such finite and limited. The feeling of being limited at all, in order to be philosophically accounted for, must be necessarily presupposed in the absolute act of the ego itself, viz., under the guise of a pressure of thing-it-itself or the real activity of the ego.

The ego could not rest in peace with this feeling of a 'general limitation'; it must necessarily specify what exactly limits it. If this is possible the ego would be assigned with a 'special limitation' or its second limitation. It is interesting to note that owing to a special limitation in the ego we belong to a particular order of presentation, we intuit the Universe itself, the whole of planetary system as such not as something else. This limitation narrows the absolute ego to the extent of reducing it to an individual. Every presentation is
produced in its unique definiteness once a possibility of a second limitation is presupposed.

'Sec.B': The ego's being limited in a special way cannot be intuited in the same act that intuits its first limitation. It was in an act of sensation that the ego became aware of its being limited at all. A further act has to be deduced if the ego decides to intuite itself as sensing. Strange as it may seem, the ego cannot intuite itself as intuizing at once. In intuizing it is what is sensed, not what senses. The ego could see itself as what is sensed and what senses, both at once only if it is limited in a very special way. This task could be resolved only in a new act.

The whole procedure seems to be an application of a method of synthesis. Two opposites, a and b (subject and object) are united through the act x; a new contradiction, viz., c and d, or the sensing and the sensed seems to arise in x, which thereby becomes the object of our investigation. How this is conceivable is explained in a new act, z, that might perhaps contain further opposition within itself. Solution of this task leads us to the deduction of a number of problems relevant in the transcendental philosophy.

(i) The ego, as it were, concentrates on a point where two of its opposed activities, the ideal and the real, sustain together in a balance. The point extends through a line because objectivity within the ego adopts the distinct look of an activity of a thing-in-itself. It could be so distinctively observed because
the ego feels a pressure on its ideal activity; objectivity seems to dominate the situation.

The ego initiates itself to locating the pressure. If it decides to do this, it finds itself in a position where it must necessarily produce. Only through its active producing, the ego could specify what actually affects it; in other words, it must limit the activity of thing-in-itself so that a definite content of some sort takes shape.

(ii) An act has to be deduced that would enable the ego to produce. This act is called productive intuition in Transcendental Idealism, which is usually understood as perception. This is the so-called third activity of the ego, which exposes and unites almost at the same time this inherent apparent opposition of the two tendencies of the ego.

The third activity, like third dimension, gives solidity to the ego's concentration on a point, which itself was the common junction of the ego's conflicting tendencies. Through productive intuition we, as it were, magnify the point, see it in its full three-dimensional look; the ideal and the real are seen as touching each other exactly as they are found at the point; but their conflict that was so long implicit is made observably explicit. The unique subjective-objective point extends through the line of the objective, consolidates itself in a productive intuition.

(iii) What is the definite product of the third activity? It is the emergence of matter or the material world.
The truth of the contention lies in the fact that the material world is possible not because my own mind perceives it, or other minds perceive it but because subjective experience conforms to an objective meaning. A red rose appears in nature not because I merely intuit it but, more importantly, because my intuiting the thing as red rose is specified in accordance with a universal and necessary standard, which is nothing more external than the intuitions of the other minds that would at once understand if I say what I have intuited as red rose. An absolute ego could certainly accommodate such subjectivity and objectivity within itself because it could include just as well my consciousness and any other.

The problem is far more complicated. Subjectivity and objectivity have been pictured as the ego's capacity to expand to the infinity and be restrained in its effort by the counter-acting contracting force. Where two forces meet an equilibrium is maintained in a third force, viz., gravity. Gravity, expressed in nature, is matter. Matter therefore arises when two conflicting forces terminate.

(iv) Matter, seen in nature, is an equipoise between conflicting forces of expansion and contraction; intuited as produced in consciousness, it is an equilibrium of the ego's opposed activities, the expanding ideal and the contracting real.

It is to be noted at the same time that the opposition under consideration is an absolute not a relative
Of the two opposing activities each taken in itself is a positive one. The ego's awareness of not-itself is as positive as its awareness of itself. Similarly in nature a body that moves out of a point on earth towards infinity propelled by a force of expansion is as equally positive as when another presses it back to the same point on earth under the compulsion of a contracting force. This is because the two forces have the same root, viz., the point on earth; in the case of the ego's activities the ego itself is the root and the two activities arise out of it merely to stare at each other. Each activity is opposed in its turn by the activity which counter-runs it.

Matter, as the common product of the ideal and the real activities of the ego, is like a point, unextended and directionless. Let us take an example. If C remains a possibility of any and every direction, any direction it moves to, CA, CB, or CC, a counter movement negates it, AC, BC or CC. The counter-acting forces if consolidated a solid materials content prevails.

Matter is then a construction possible in three moments. In the first moment, expansive and contracting forces are merged into a unity at a common point, wherefrom expansion could take place towards any direction.

Since the positive force is entitled to reach for the infinity it moves in the supposed direction, which is determined only when an opposing force presses on it to push it back
to its starting point. The unity is not only broken but the contracting force all the more gains ground as the predominant force specifying a definite line of its operation, a line that also contains a suppressed expansive force. This is the second moment in construction of matter.

The third moment is where the exposed conflict is held together in a balance, two forces are distinct and yet united, the point is consolidated as a definite matter.

These three moments furthermore enable us to intuit matter in a three-dimensional space. The first moment reveals matter in its left-to-right dimension, second moment or the contracting force gives matter its breadth; and the third moment, where matter actually appears, gives it the third dimension or solidity. A further correspondence could be found in construction of matter in consciousness and in nature. The three moments are imagined as coinciding with the three categories of Physics, viz., Magnetism, Electricity, and Chemical process.

With these puzzling, strange and inarticulate arguments Schelling attempts rather confusedly to show how far natural laws and their behaviour mirror the mechanism of consciousness. His Idealist position cannot be maintained on such a shaky ground as this because his conception of physical science itself is inadequate and defective, to apply it to philosophical issues is all the more irrelevant and arbitrary.
III. The second 'Epoche':

The problem to be dealt with here is: how does the 'I' intuit itself as productive, if it is at all possible?

Sec. I. What is involved in the self-intuition of the ego as productive? It must be able to do two things before it could be aware of itself as productive. It must contemplate itself as self-positing activity, and itself as positing activity that posits a definite content of some sort other than itself.

The ego therefore divides its activity into simple and complex, of which the former is the non-productive activity of the ego in the sense that the ego in its pure simplicity is aware of itself as itself. The latter or complex activity, on the contrary, is the ego's awareness of all that it produces or posits as opposed to itself as self-positing. It is named complex mainly because in it the ego and the object posited are conjoined in a compound process of action and reaction, in that the ego produces the object and in its turn is being affected by the object in so far the object responds to it.

As before, Schelling is arguing here under the spell of natural science. He claims to explain the nature of complex activity with an unjustifiable reference to the complex laws of mechanical motion in which bodies act and counteract on other.

Employment of analogies from mechanics is arbitrary in explanations of epistemology.
Let us, however, assume that the original activity of consciousness is separated into two which stare at each other in opposition. Simple and complex activities have to be conjoined if the flavour of Idealism is to be preserved. Schelling's logic operates through such confused labyrinth that simple and complex activities can not meet unless a third activity emerges as a joint product of the two. This higher concept in itself remains indifferent to both and yet shares something in common with them.

The so-called third activity properly understood is a magnified simple activity, which would be better conceived if contrasted with the first simple activity. The first activity is the ego's awareness of itself, mingled and almost merged with it is a feeling about the thing-in-itself. The second activity reveals what and who actually is the thing or a definite content. The ego and the object that were so long merged into a unity and whose separation was implicitly contained in the first activity is made conspicuously explicit in the third activity, in which their unity is restored as well.

Schelling inclines rather than deduces to have a third activity as a simple one despite the fact that it is set with a two-fold task of exposing the difference of the two opposed activities of the ego and to relate them as at once as at the time.

That the two activities are related is essential to their nature because they are originally one and the same intuiting activity of the ego. It is a mere accident that they separate in a manner such as one is simple while the other is complex; one
refrains from producing any object whatsoever; the other necessarily is compelled to engage itself in producing object of some sort or other.

The pathetic tale of the ego's autobiography reveals that the ego has to necessarily produce because the thing-in-itself presses on it. Out of a necessity what the ego produces is contingent in that it could have produced something else. Necessity in production leads to what is merely accidental; this is named by Schelling the limitation of limitation; its being so-called could be justified because of the fact that the produced object limits the activity of thing-in-itself since it is the individual specification of the thing-in-itself, which in its turn limits the ego in general in so far as it opposes the ego's pure self-positing activity.

The simple activity is identified with the ego's inner awareness or its awareness of itself. It is not difficult for the ego to intuit itself as itself. Inner awareness being provoked by a pinch on it from the thing-in-itself sacrifices its simplicity for a complex activity so that a definite object is produced. The object although a product of the ego is referred at least in part to the thing-in-itself. Inner intuition has now therefore changed itself into an outer intuition.

This adds to the further advantage of the inner intuition to recognise itself as pure inner intuition. The inner knows itself as such only if it contrasts itself with what
is no more inner but with what is directed towards the outside world. Inner awareness of the 'I' as 'I' ceases as the objective world intrudes on it. The point of distinction is the particular object that is produced, which being taken away, inner and outer intuitions flow as one and the same. The two intuitions are separated and most peculiarly conjoined into a higher unity which is nothing but inner intuition itself magnified. The inner simple activity, observed in two ways, viz., with naked eyes as well as through, as it were, a magnifying glass, not only posits merely itself but is as equally conscious of its positing itself. Difficulty seems to be girdled round the complex activity that preserves its complexity on the ground that it produces object. In positing its object, strange and odd as it may sound, it fails to see itself involved in this complexity; in other words, the ego's complex activity is consciousness of object that is not aware of its consciousness of object. Why there is not yet a consciousness of consciousness of object in the ego has not been explained till now. What we have achieved through this is the 'inner awareness' on the one hand, and 'sensible object' on the other.

'Sec. II.' The resulting question that obviously arises is: how can the 'I' be aware of its sensing the object?

This is possible only when the ego contrasts itself as consciousness with the unconscious object. Since we have already seen that the inner and outer senses differentiate only when a positive object is posited as the joint product of the two at a point where they mutually limit each other. The produced object
could be safely proclaimed as the characteristic point of limit between conscious inner sense and the unconscious objective world. The object, as we have just seen; in being a product of the ego belongs to consciousness in part, while in the other part it has to be referred to the thing-in-itself. It is at this cross-road that the ego maintains its separation between itself and the object and the two are able to encounter each other. At their point of encounter the ego presents itself as if it were passive, while the object despite being its product as acting on it from without.

The object, however, limits both the ego and the thing-in-itself. It limits the pressure of the thing-in-itself in a definite content; it limits on the other hand the passivity to be found in the ego. The ego should be able to resume its active nature, but it finds itself set with the task of locating the ground of the object it has just produced. What presses forth is again another thing-in-itself, which thereby causes the ego to produce indefinitely and unceasingly, on account of which it separates itself from the object produced. The ego makes its way through under the impact of one thing-in-itself to another. The specific way in which it becomes limited in course of its journey is a contingent feature in that it does not follow from its essential nature. It accidentally becomes what it becomes.

When it actually becomes an object it is limited in a way and is in that sense passive. The ego's being in a state of passivity is technically called by Schelling self-feeling.
Self-feeling, however, cannot be recognised; or in other words, the ego can know itself as being limited only when it contrasts this with itself as unlimitable. This is a concern of moments in time: the ego contrasts its present moment of being limited with the previous moment when it was unlimited and the unlimitable.

Self-feeling, it seems, is a moment of intensity in time as devoid of space. The object, in so far it is opposed to this self-feeling, is purely in space that is stripped of all temporality in it. Space and time are conceived as strictly separated from each other. Outer sense reveals itself only in pure spatial extensity; while inner sense recognises itself in unextended time.

Schelling, like Fichte, indulges in a doctrine of space, time, and the categories deducible from the ego. Since we have not yet arrived at the domain of categories let us confine ourselves to the sphere of space and time. Schelling's tells us that space and time, in order to be a true continuous unity, have to be separated first and considered individually. Such a claim on the part of space and time for an ultimate unity is perfectly legitimate; but the way Schelling deduces it seems utterly arbitrary.

'Sec. III.' Space and time are separated and held in opposition on the ground that the ego contrasts itself with the object, owing to which inner and outer senses distinctly contradict...
each other; the inner sense is a feeling of myself in an intense moment in time not in space. It is in one of those intense, intimate and unaccountable moments of feeling when intelligence seizes upon itself. Outer sense, on the contrary, is the awareness of an object extended spatially. It seems inevitable that the ego's feeling of itself would not be possible in mere points of time unless an object out there in space confronts it on the face. This being the case, space and time are compelled to join hands, though each being infinite in itself, in a relation in which each limits the other. The joint product of this relation is motion, which is assigned with the function of showing the extensity of space as occupied by a positive content, viz., an object in a fixed duration of time. The space that it occupies is limited by the span of time, i.e., the space that is occupied is measured by the length of time that is required by the object to travel the distance in a uniform motion. What is its duration, on the other hand, is to be measured by the extensity it covers. Time that was so long, as it were, contracted to a point remaining only a possibility of any and every direction is now able to stretch in a line extending to definite direction.

What happens to the object in this space-time continuum? The object is both spatial and temporal at once. It persists as at once at the same time as it changes. It endures in its substantiality while changes in its accidents according to the situation in which it is intuited; whereas former is possible through space, the latter in time.
What so changes is not a chaotic mess but constitute an order, a successive sequence. Objects therefore are produced by the intelligence and presented before consciousness one after the other, in which case intelligence has the chance of opposing itself not only to one object but a while range of them, one following another. Successive presentation must be perceived in a link of causal chain. If objects are considered as mere persistence in a pure spatial extension abstracted from temporality these would be immobilised as intransitory repose not being able to glide on, giving place to the 'next' in that it would cause what ought to follow it. We view the world in such a manner that objects are both spatial and temporal. What endures through space is the substantiality of object or the substance. What changes in time are mere states of the substance or the accident. Accidents, which are essentially of substances, are by their very definition transitory in a manner that one accident of an object causes that of the other. Causal law must be there to dictate the fixed manner of behaviour of each object in varying circumstances; it must explain why an object is what it is and remains so in midst of all different situations and references.

Causal succession in Transcendental Idealism is seen as an essential link running not only from cause to effect but also from effect to cause; in other words, reciprocity is the real character of causal relationship, which strides from A to B and from B to A. This clearly indicates that intelligence understands the world in which objects mutually determine each other in that each reciprocates the every other.
It is also true to say that this reciprocal successive order is not only a feature of the objective world but also of subjective experience. It not only tells us how objects are arranged but also how our experience is ordered. Let us explain this further.

Kant had considered successive order to be found in nature, i.e., that we have a 'perception of succession', which always strides from A to B and B to C. As apart from this objective succession we could also observe an order in our inner awareness. Conscious experience has its own arrangement, which is capable of running both ways, from A to B, as well as from B to A. 'Succession of perception' therefore not only follows the order of events in nature but could just as well return to itself with a view to verifying that, what it has just perceived is so. Reciprocity is possible only when the ego initiates it. Objects are seen as determining each other in a reciprocal succession, but this is only because consciousness experiences them so. Recognition of an objective reciprocity enables Schelling to see also the substances as coexistents. His Transcendental Idealism offers us no definition of substance. To say therefore that substances are coexistents is to mean that the states of substances coexist, which we experience. And the substance itself remains a transcendental idea. The relation of substance and accidens may be seen as follows.

Substance and accidens are opposed as distinct
categories only ideally in the subjective experience of the ego. Their separation is possible in thought alone. What is real is their unity in an object. Experience of objects therefore involves that one object causes another as at once as it is caused by the other and thereby is able to coexist with a whole range of multiplicity of objects, and yet maintain its self-identity.

Nature, divided in substances and accidents, synthesises itself into the objects. Cause and effect contrast each other in order to combine in a mutually-determined multiplicity of objects.

But synthesis, revealed at the point of objective unity, cannot have a claim to permanence. It is a floating synthesis that emerges through a temporary unity of outer and inner senses in a produced object, which again sinks with the shift of attention of consciousness. Consciousness, which is an original identity, perenially attempts to return to its identity and yet moves away. It finds no other alternative but to go through a whole series of producing because a host of 'what' stand opposed to it and demand solution. At each point that a product arises a synthesis prevails for a time being that is suspended as soon as the contradiction within the ego gains ground. The process continues till infinity where perhaps the contradiction is permanently resolved giving place to an eternal absolute synthesis.

Schelling draws a parallel from the physical sciences, where it is said that the force of gravity establishes a temporary equilibrium at the cross-road of two interacting world
bodies that extend to infinity where a permanent equilibrium may emerge. Productive Intuition, likewise, achieves a synthesis of two diverse tendencies of the ego that may attain permanence in infinity. This opposition never comes to an end in one object; there are many objects in which the temporary synthesis emerges and is again pushed back. We are thus dealing with objects as immediately present and as produced one after another. No object in that case is dealt with in isolation but as essentially belonging to the universe as a whole, where objects coexist in a causal reciprocity. Intelligence thus cannot remain involved in dealing with a succession of presentations but must at the same time presuppose a totality of interacting substance. How could one and the same intelligence do this?

Transcendental Idealism resolves this issue by introducing here a distinction between absolute intelligence and finite or empirical intelligence; they are meant to view the universe in its two phases. To the absolute intelligence the universe presents itself not gradually but all at once as a synthetic unity within which substances reciprocate each other so that they could live together in peaceful coexistence. Finite intelligence, on the contrary, is consciousness in time; it sees the universe gradually arising in time, each object appearing at distinct moment of temporal series; we are conscious of objects as immediately present, each at a time.
The universe is a totality of mutually related substances because the ego primarily is limited. If the ego is primarily limited an original conflict arises. What emerges (as limitation of the ego) is the universe as a whole, where consciousness takes its start from. This sounds like the Kantian doctrine that our knowledge of space as a whole must precede the knowledge of its parts.

This does not suffice us to explain why a particular intelligence is what it is, e.g., why I am this specific intelligence. What accounts for self-consciousness as finite and individual? How does the ego restrict itself to concentrate on one object at a time? This special or second limitation is explicable only when we assume that the universe arises before intelligence gradually in a temporal series. Whatever is posited by the ego in its special limitation is already posited in its original general limitation; the difference consists in the fact that, whereas in the former it emerges as successive parts of a whole, in the latter it is the given whole all at once; the one sees things arising in time, while the other is beyond temporal order. It ought to be remembered at the same time that infinite intelligence is not an entity apart from the finite for it is one and the same intelligence which being specially limited becomes finite; and if its special limitation is taken away the intelligence falls back on its own infinity. It is not legitimate to think that it is divided into two independent acts; in one and the same act
the universe is posited as a whole and then specified into parts as arranged in a successive series. The finite intelligence means a limitation of the absolute intelligence, and absolute intelligence means a general limitation of the pure ego itself. If I begin to abstract from myself all marks of individuality I am still left with my absolute intelligence; further as I remove from my absolute intelligence all its apparent limitations I am basically the pure ego in its original identity. The ego is primarily limited if it differentiates itself into subjectivity and objectivity, whose synthesis is needed as the ground of its primary limitation. It is further arguable that if intelligence remains arrested within a synthesis of its first or any of its one single product, this object would permanently be objective nature, remain there as the dominant factor while intelligence would cease to be. Intelligence therefore must necessitate itself to come out of the synthesis and keep on producing unceasingly. This is possible only when the first limitation is further specified with the help of a second; in other words, intelligence is limited as a finite individual as it were destined to intuit the universe not all at once but from a particular point of view. The difficulty involved in explaining how everything is dependent on one act of intelligence, which is able to attend only one object at a time this pre-determined successive series, is resolved through the distinction of intelligence as finite and absolute. Empirical succession is nothing but the evolution of absolute synthesis in time and everything that evolves necessarily
belongs to this pre-established Absolute synthesis. The presentation that arises seems to be independent of the individual in that the finite individual could not have produced it before; it has to wait till consciousness intentionally chooses to restrict itself in a very special way that would narrow its standpoint to a finitude of an individuality enabling it to focus its attention on one object after another. It seems a terrible tension on the ego, because it deliberately brings about its definite individuality that cripples itself in such a manner that it is utterly incapable of intuiting universe as a whole.

It remains for us to consider the notion of the universe as arising in time. In the forthcoming section Schelling discusses the evolution of the universe from the point of view of his own Transcendental Idealism.

'Sec. IV.' Evolution of the universe through an act of intelligence is conceivable in the category of organism. To understand universe as a complete whole, in which parts determine each other through an inner principle of an inherent movement in themselves, coincides with the conception of nature as an organic unity. Intelligence, in course of its producing objects in space and time not merely as substances and accidents but also and cause and effect reciprocating each other, has eventually arrived where it has posited organic nature in which it finds, for the first time, a mirror to reflect it. Intelligence sees inorganic nature its pale reflection, and not its full vision of itself.
Organic nature is indispensable on the ground that the ego has to intuit itself as productive, all that it has produced have to be essentially organised into a unity. Succession cannot just flow on; it has to be halted. Succession made fixed or petrified is organism. This means that organism is necessary if in succession a product claims to be cause and effect at the same time.

Organism, furthermore, must be supposed as an arrangement according to a gradation, because it truly pictures the development of the universe from the lowest to the highest, revealing more and more of it only through succeeding stages. Organism must necessarily begin with the least developed part of the universe and gradually grow up the scale of hierarchy to attain its complete perfection, as the fully constructed universe, in infinity alone.

What arises as the most primary stage of organic nature is plant. The next higher in the world is animal kingdom, which begins with the lowest state of growth, viz., that of diffused sensation, wherein hearing and sight function; there is hardly any awareness of immediate presentation. Further in the process of growth, different senses emerge in their due order, first hearing then sight and so on.

It is, however, not the task of transcendental philosophy to give a complete account of organic growth, and to deal with it would need a separate science all together. Organism is necessary only in that intelligence is able, through a succession of presentation, to intuit itself as dealing with it itself. Its sole purpose is to recognise itself as...
succession, it must necessarily presume that the succession arises in its own activity. Successive presentations are to be organised through an inherent mobility within themselves; organism considered in this way is apprehended as living, in which alone intelligence can see itself. Hence arises a distinction between living and non-living organism, organic and inorganic nature. Intelligence could see itself as identical with living organism, which would amount to its journey back to itself, at least half-way. Intelligence strives, and, as it were, struggles to organise itself such as to express more and more of the absolute synthesis; this indicates the significance and importance of gradation in organism.

All that has been said is of considerable importance for it leads to the concept of life itself, appearing at the highest grade of organic unity. Basic character of life is that it has for its centre an inner fundamental principle, within which it moves, grows and varies in its process of growth; and whatever it does it depends on its inner principle of motion to which it always returns. Living organism therefore is the condition under which the ego recognises itself as productive. Intelligence, as we have seen before, could not have determined objects in their substantiality as well as in respect of their ever-changing accidents unless it has seen them in a causal relationship, in which each is cause and effect at once. Cause and effect would not be specified, on the contrary, if they are not fixed in substances and accidents.
What truly is substance is decided in its coexistence with others. Togetherness of substances is conceivable in an eternal reciprocity; this is attainable in an absolute organisation, in relation to which individual organism itself appears again accidental.

Schelling has not offered us any definite conception of substance in the Transcendental Idealism. Substantiality of a thing consists in its being coexistent with others and yet being able to maintain its self-identity. This cannot be achieved in an individual organism but must be looked for in infinity.

The legitimate point reached so far is that, intelligence sees itself in living organism as its first reflection in nature, which undoubtedly is possible because there is reciprocity in nature, which is a reflection of subjective reciprocity.

Reciprocity therefore is the a fundamental notion in Schelling's Idealism; owing to it alone intelligence (as reflected in living organism) finds a possible way to return to itself, no matter how much it gets involved in its constant producing. Productive intuition has so far led the ego to its producing, viz., objects as coexisting in their substantiality, and appearing as different in their changing qualities, against a space-time continuum.

The second 'Epoche' has shown us that intelligence, driven out of its dwelling in consciousness, on
account of a conflict arising within it, was made to go through producing objects in a synthetic way, so that each of its products gave way to something new, and eventually arrived at the living organism, in which it saw nothing but its own reflection. One is apt to ask: does intelligence as it were lose its identity forever in its first reflection. An Idealist philosopher would say 'no' to it; all efforts of philosophing will be futile unless intelligence returns home and reports to consciousness that nature is only the other side of itself. This unity of the subjective and the objective is not maintained in intelligence when it busies itself with producing. Its attention concentrates wholly on what it produces; the act of producing recedes into oblivion, the act merges itself with the product.

It may be asked: how could intelligence isolate itself not only from one of its products but from the whole range of them and return to its original unity. If it can do so that would be its true self-recognition. Answer to this constitutes the theme of the third 'Époche' at the end of which we hope to see how far and whether at all intelligence returns to itself.

IV. The third 'Époche':
'Sec. I.' Intelligence can separate its act from the product in an act of free reflection. It cannot isolate itself from what it has produced from the standpoint of synthesis; it has only gathered bit by bit which it must break up now. In order to do this intelligence must rise to the standpoint of analysis; it must reflect
on itself in a manner that it is able to analyse the product and remove it from the act that has produced it. The act of reflection is free in contrast with the act of producing, which was necessary. Intelligence therefore chooses to abstract the act from its product so that it could concentrate exclusively on the act alone. It is the act that becomes the object of intuition. What is involved in this, that the ego intuits its producing and thus intuits itself as intuiting object. Two things must happen.

Reflection must be able to abstract first, the act from its producing an empirical object immediately present before an individual consciousness, and secondly, from its producing not only one but any object at all. The former is identified as empirical abstraction, the latter as transcendental abstraction. It is an important feature that the former is implied in the latter because the ego, in order to be suspended of its job of producing any object at all, must be first made free from its possibility of producing even a single individual object.

Let us consider the first case. Intelligence, so long as it produces, becomes one with its product. It could not see itself as involved in this production unless it frees itself from what it has produced. We do not as yet know if this isolation could at all take place; our consideration is a hypothetical one, viz.: if this is presupposed what becomes of intelligence. Let us assume that an isolation of this sort occurs and thereafter deduce what is to follow.
Intelligence begins to reflect on its own act: the outcome is that the unity between the act of producing and the produced object is suspended, the act in itself could be investigated. The act of producing becomes an object of consideration in a new act, viz., that of conception. Concept of an object arises only when that particular object in concern is taken away from the specific act that has produced it. That an object agrees with our notion of it could be sufficiently shown in a judgment that we utter. The seeming opposition between an object and its notion is resolved into a unity in an act of judging. Judgment, though has not been properly defined as yet, could be conceived as an act of comparing a concept not with another concept but with intuition. This is evident in what may be referred as the primary judgment, viz., "this is a table". Our intuition, the table itself, and our notion of something conceived as table agree when we pronounce the judgment so. Situation is complicated in a higher order judgment. In judging, even in its most basic form, we adopt a procedure in which we construct it, i.e., we follow a rule in formulating a judgment. The rule is called "Schema" or a schema; commonly understood it is nothing but a skill that we employ so that when we intuit, for instance, a table and say so, we certainly refer to the notion of a table which we all share in common. We mean to show a correspondence between the notion of table with the object table with the help of a schema. The schema is neither a concept nor an image of the object. Image differs from its object in that, unlike its object, the
image is not tied to a definite territory in space. Schema truly is the rule in accordance with which we attach our notions to objects intuited. Schema is for concept what symbol is for idea.

The act of intelligence abstracted from an individual object is incapable of freeing itself from the whole range of its products. Abstraction must be as rigid as to isolate the act from objects in general. Intelligence must free itself from any of its products. Such higher or transcendental abstraction is possible if the act is taken in its complete isolation where we could see those universal modes or conditions under which any and every object is possible. These modes are what Kant and following him Fichte and Schelling call categories. Schelling means to consider how far the ego's true nature is reflected in these modes.

'Sec. II.' In transcendental abstraction there arises an absolute separation between concepts and intuition. Kant's belief in an interdependence of intuitions and concepts, owing to which objective world at all is possible, finds a reassertion in Schelling's transcendental philosophy. He too, like Kant, would prove that intuitions without concepts are blind and concepts without intuitions are empty, first by showing what becomes of intuition when it is devoid of concept; secondly by showing what happens to concepts if it is separated from intuition all together. (a).

Intuition, bereft of concept, or indefinite intuition is not a specific object, but a form in which any object is possible. Intuition, as act, is a possibility of objectivity,
not objectivity itself. It is understood as infinite space, an empty void, in which objects may be related. Intuition, if it must concentrate on actuality, if it must be an intuition of an object, ought to be conceptualised; in other words, space has to be limited. Geometry, whose procedure had greatly influenced Schelling, in this sense is a true conceptual science. This view makes no allowance for space as form of possibility; it is either limited, in which case it is the very background of actual objects though in their inter-relation, or occupied space, or an empty indefiniteness. An actuality cannot be singled out unless intelligence compares and contrasts it with other objects. Outside world is understood only when objects are related in definite ways.

(b) If concepts are devoid of intuition altogether, they are empty forms or the structures of judgment as such. We observe in it pure concepts or categories. Categories therefore are abstract modes of relation in which any object is possible. If we care to analyse the act of producing we would remove the content of it, viz., the objects of any sort; what we are left with are pure forms in shape of which objects are possible. From the standpoint of reflection or analysis, categories are formal concepts (as they are treated in formal logic), to be deduced from functions of judgment. A remark about categories would not be superfluous. The word itself is of Aristotelian origin where it was meant as forms of being as being. Kant employed them as forms of understanding and unhesitatingly derives them from the Scholastic
table of judgment. Schelling follows in line with Kant, but he further shows that the function of judgment itself is to be derived from transcendental philosophy, in that categories are not formed in vacuum. They are forms in which objects are related to each other. He also adopts Kant's division of categories into dynamic and mathematical ones; the former are the categories of relation and of modality; the later are the categories of quality and quantity.

The character of dynamic categories is that they have correlates, while mathematical categories have none. Each of the categories, substance, cause, actuality, necessity, etc., has its corresponding forms with which it is contrasted, e.g., accidens, effect, possibility, contingency. Dynamic categories seem to combine inner and outer senses, e.g., substance is persistence in space while its accidens change in time. Mathematical categories rigidly divide themselves into separate groups, one belonging to the outer sense the other to the inner sense. The respective categories are that of quantity and of quality. Of each group of the categories the first two are opposed to each other while the third alone is their synthesis. The whole mechanism of the categories follows the same pattern, because a higher opposition, viz., that of space and time, is at the very basis of our enquiry. The pattern of the categories show that one of them is the most fundamental. The categories of relation are considered as basic to all because we could derive them right in the beginning from the original mechanism of intuition. This is undeniable, for the.
objective world is not possible unless in relation to a subject that intuits it and reflects on it. Certainly objects are possible when intelligence posits them as enduring in space and as varying in time. Quantitative and qualitative categories also cannot determine objectivity as such because an object is a unity only in relation to the subject that produces so.

Mathematical categories are subordinated if the dynamic ones, in that they presuppose the latter. Quality and quantity seem to separate what is made into a unity through relational categories. This opposition may be related in the third of each group of the mathematical categories, which therefore presupposes the category of reciprocity. Totality of objects is not thinkable without a reciprocal interaction of them, nor is it possible to think of limitation of anything unless there is something to limit and something else in relation to which it is limited. Categories of relation therefore claim to be the fundamental ones. Even the model forms appear later in the act of reflection. Modality expresses the relation of objects to the faculty of knowledge as such. An object is possible, actual, or necessary, only when intelligence is capacitated to apprehend it so. Significance of this argument would be clear in the succeeding section.

'Sec. III'. Transcendental abstraction is the condition of judgment, not judgment itself. It only explains how intelligence separates every and all objects from their notions. Such a rigorous abstraction could not be overcome except through a very special skill,
which mediates between pure concepts and mere intuition. This is called transcendental schema, distinct from an empirical schema, in that, whereas transcendental schema is the sense-intuition of a rule in accordance with which objects are possible in general, empirical schema explains the sensibly intuited rule under which one individual object is empirically presented.

In so far the schema contains a rule it is an object of inner intuition, in so far it is the rule of construction of an object it is externally intuited in a definite space. The schema in this sense is a connection between inner and outer senses. What originally connects inner and outer senses is time, not as mere point of limit but as it were stretched through spatial dimension. Time, from the standpoint of intuition, is the form of both outer and inner senses. This is because in intuiting we are aware of objects out there in space. In order to reach an occupied extension inner sense must necessarily become outer. This mediation is possible because temporal succession not only reveals order in nature but also our inner awareness of them. Time, from the standpoint of reflection, is the form of inner sense alone. Time alone is qualified to belong to both inner and outer as the transcendental schema. It is significantly regarded as the only possibility of reconciling contradictions. In an act of reflection, what is reflected upon is the ego's producing of objects, what is analysed is the awareness of objects; and what emerges is the separation of the act of producing from the object, in particular which presupposes a separation of objects and concept
in general. And there arises a separation of intuition and concept. This is a case of logical abstraction, an abstraction conceived in thought. It is not meant to preserve itself in face of an operation of schematism of time. Time bridges the gap as it were created by a body moving in two opposed directions A and not-A.

The mechanism of the categories largely depends upon the temporal schema. Let us now consider, how categories are schematised in order that object is made possible. A study of the categories must show them in their application as modes of possibility of object. But the ego must see itself directly involved in categorising nature, to consider pure forms in which objects are produced at all.

Let us consider these categories as mere concepts without intuition or as unschematised, and then consider them as schematised or as determined in time.

 Beginning with the most fundamental of all categories, the categories of relation, one could show that these alone, as the only categories of intuition, form the direct link between inner and outer senses. Relation of substances and accidents, the first group of relational categories, mark the first unity of inner and outer senses. Substance as the pure unschematised category is a mere logical notion, a subject, accidents likewise considered is a logical predicate. With further abstraction subject and predicate are removed, we are left with pure extensity, space, and absolute point or time. How subject and predicate become substance
And accidents therefore is explained through determination of time.

Intervention of time immediately gives rise to a second group, viz.,
the cause and effect; this group is required by the first group in
order to show its own significance. The first group is intuited
only if transcendental schema of time introduces an opposed group
each of which is meaningful in contrast with the other. Substance,
for instance, is intuited as such because it endures in space; its
duration becomes evident when its states keep changing in a temporal
succession. Change in time is a causal succession. What succeeds
in a relation of cause and effect cannot do so unless their succession
in time extends through space. This is an opposition in which each
declare the other. Through their mutual demand two different groups
of relational categories determine each other in the third category,
viz., reciprocity shows itself as the unity of opposition, between
the first and the second groups. Two points are to be remembered as
important in connection with the very structure of mechanism of
these categories. First, contradiction between first two categories,
substance and accidents, is due to the original opposition between
space and time. Secondly, the categories of cause and effect are
necessary because they alone could schematise the first group and
thereby maintain their synthesis.

The mathematical categories operate on the
same mechanism. Let us take the case of quantitative categories,
the first in order of which is unity. Pure unschematised unity is
the logical concept of unity as such, not attached to any object.
If it must be intuited logical unity must be determined in time. Unity determined in time is number. Numerical unity at once finds itself confronted with a host of multiplicity, or the second quantitative category. Number is apprehensible when there are many. I feel like counting not when there is one but when there are many before me. I do not say 'one' unless I am sure that there are others to follow. Multiplicity intervenes through time and according to the second group of relational categories multiplicities are ordered in a causal nexus; in other words, objects, in their innumerable diversities, would be always looked upon as one following the other, viz., we count as 1, 2, 3, 4 etc. Unity as such demands a whole range of many. It is again reciprocity or the third category that constitute the true meaning of unity in diversity.

The category of quality could be dealt with in the same way. Pure qualitative category, bereft of intuition, in a mere logical notion of position; if it should be intuited it must be filled in by an object of some sort. This becomes conspicuous in contrast with a pure negation. What fills space makes us all the more aware of it when it is not there anymore. The transition from its presence to its absence is a matter of succession in time. What was out there at the previous moment is no more now. This attaches importance to the category of negation. Negation, logically considered, is not a vacuum in thought but is a positive mode of apprehension of what is not present. The Vedantists' claim is true, that Negation or Abhava (\text{अभाव}) is a
positive category of logical thinking, which the mind or Manas (मनस्) apprehends directly in a definite act of knowing, viz., Anupalobhi (अनुपलोभि).

What is absent is intuited so simply because it was previously intuited as present. Operation of reciprocity undoubtedly makes this mechanism work. It is the transcendental schema that brings synthesis in the otherwise separated categories. The importance of transcendental schematism is obvious if we knit together the main arguments of the three 'Epoche'. In original intuition what emerges is the notion-space-time, not as distinct and separate but all at once as one admixture. Productive intuition has shown us how consciousness unites these three determinations in the unity of an object though remaining unconscious of its so doing. Transcendental abstraction had done away with time and thereby separated notions from their intuitions. What immediately arises is; how do the pure concepts attach themselves to intuitions, so that they become actual presentations of nature in all its variety. This has been accounted for in the operation of the transcendental schematism.

'Sec. IV.' A complete account of an analysis of the ego's production is achieved in the transcendental abstraction, where the act of producing is separated from the object produced. We attain a complete removal of objects from their notions, the original synthesis of intuition is suspended. As a result intelligence and nature are distinctly separated and held apart.
One may ask now: does the ego, by freeing itself from its theoretical limitation and determination arrive at its full self-consciousness? That is, does the ego find its full reflection in transcendental abstraction? Schelling would say that the ego has merely arrived at where it is dealing with pure concepts, although it has made itself free from objects of intuition.

The ego, to overcome its theoretical limitation must become practical. Schelling thus turns to practical philosophy.