CHAPTER 2.

AN EXPOSITION OF SCHELLING'S SYSTEM OF TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM

In this chapter, I propose to give a faithful exposition of Schelling's System of Transcendental Idealism, and in doing so to follow the arrangement of the chapters of the book itself. The book begins with (I) Introduction, and which is followed by (II) the First Chapter and (III) the second Chapter, each of which is divided into several sections and these again into sub-sections.

I. Introduction:

The Introduction consists of four separate sections bearing the titles: (a) The notion of transcendental philosophy, (b) Corollary, (c) The preliminary division of transcendental philosophy, and (d) Organ of transcendental philosophy.

(a) The notion of transcendental philosophy:

The notion of transcendental philosophy will not be clear, Schelling believes, unless it is contrasted with the notion of natural science, since these two systems constitute for Schelling philosophy in general. Schelling says that philosophy in general is composed of two sciences: the natural science and the transcendental philosophy.

Having this division in view we may say that these two systems will be contrasted in regard to their standpoints; for Schelling distinctly mentions that while the procedure of science is from the object to the subject, the philosophical approach is from the subject to the object.
This may be explained on the presupposition that knowledge of any sort, scientific or philosophic, arises out of an agreement of the 'object' with the 'subject'. By 'object' Schelling refers to outer nature and by 'subject' he means the intelligence or consciousness or pure self. In knowledge, however, the two are so mingled that none precedes the other. To study how they are related and to explain their identity, Schelling believes, they should be set apart and that each ought to be rigorously investigated into. The natural sciences, Schelling believes, deal with objects of nature. They attempt to make nature intelligible, while transcendental philosophy, says Schelling, sets out to give us a rounded account of consciousness itself.

One assumes that nature is unconscious and then one asks, as Schelling does: how is it brought into consciousness. In other words, his question is, since nature as such is unrepresented to us, how does it come to be represented. In Schelling's language, how does intelligence supervene on nature.

This problem, it may be noted, is left here untackled, for Schelling does this in his Philosophy of Nature. As regards the scientific standpoint Schelling merely says that the necessary tendency of all natural sciences is to proceed from nature to intelligence. The final perfection of natural science would be the complete intellectualisation of all natural laws into the laws of intuition and of thought. He further elucidates it by saying that if magnetism or gravitation are stripped off their material content what remains are the laws of explaining the mechanism of movement of heavenly bodies.

Transcendental philosophy, on the other hand, will have to show that consciousness though deeply involved in affairs of an outer nature, is also engaged in knowing itself and remoulding it to fit its ideal. It is always engaged in finding order and purpose, some sort of design in nature, it intends piling up all chaos to find a deep-rooted teleology everywhere.

(b) Corollary:

It is in the following Corollary that we find a few relevant passages that throw light on the standpoint of transcendental philosophy. The object of its enquiry, says Schelling, is the subject or the self. Transcendental philosophy will talk exclusively of our intellectual activities. If we are further led to believe: that we refer to an objective world, transcendental philosophy will have to show that all our intellectual efforts are meant to provoke in us an interest in other things. This outward interest is fundamental to our basic convictions for, as Schelling argues, we are always convinced of two things at the same time, viz., that we are and that there are things apart from us. The two convictions in Schelling's view are at root one. And it is for transcendental philosophy to point out not how they are identical but that they are identical, that our belief in other things is contained in our belief in us. In Schelling's words, we are as immediately aware of other things as we are of ourselves. The former certainty, like the latter, is equally inborn and deep-rooted in our minds.

If transcendental philosophy is meant to show that our belief in other things rests on our belief in us, viz., that our understanding of nature depends largely on our belief in our own intellectual efforts, it must presuppose an identity of these two items.
And to show that the identity is real Schelling says that we must necessarily imagine a situation where nature and consciousness are separate, and that we must artificially create an atmosphere of deriving one from the other (viz, our knowledge of an external world from our knowledge of ourselves). And this truly will amount to what Schelling calls a transcendental way of considering the problem we have here raised.

To end our discussion of this section we shall mention the difference which Schelling introduces between common-sense way of knowing and transcendental way of knowing. Whereas the former deals with the object of knowledge, the latter is mainly interested in the mode of knowing this object. Hence it has for its object of enquiry not the object itself, but our conscious activities which are engaged in knowing the object. Transcendental philosophy in this sense is directly concerned with the subject of knowledge. In common-sense view of knowledge, Schelling means to say, the act freezes into the object, while in transcendental knowledge the object melts into the act; in one, the concepts are implicit, in the other, they are explicit. If transcendental philosophy is said to be purely subjective, it is meant to be so precisely in this sense.

Before we go on to the next section, we may sum up what we have said so far. Schelling, as we have seen, has shown here what Transcendental Idealism is, by contrasting it with his Philosophy of Nature. The latter studies nature by arranging natural objects under laws which are formulated by the mind about nature merely to render it intelligible. The Transcendental Idealism is different
from this in that it directly deals with the consciousness itself. It is in main interested in the intelligence as such, not merely as it deals with object, but also in itself as dealing with them. It is this second order or higher order consciousness which we are to deal with in the Transcendental Idealism. We should also note here that his conception of philosophy rests entirely on his doctrine of knowledge, viz. that in knowledge there is a correspondence of object and the subject. We may add here that Schelling's distinction between the objective approach and the subjective approach presupposes this particular theory of knowledge. We shall, however, discuss later Schelling's conception of knowledge, and it suffices here to bear in mind the exact sense in which Schelling holds that the Transcendental Idealism adopts the subjective approach.

(c) The division of transcendental philosophy:

This subjective approach will be found to do two jobs at the same time: (1) theoretically understanding the structure of the universe, and (2) finding the best possible way of life. Schelling will accordingly divide Transcendental Idealism into theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy. Schelling's arguments in this connection are complex and difficult. What he suggests is that while theoretical philosophy is meant to deal with the possibility of all our experience, practical philosophy must consider the possibility of our free actions. The former asks: how is knowledge possible? The latter asks: how do we act upon this world we have known? Schelling thus says that not only there is a world of object—
existing outside us, but our representations correspond with it because the objects are nothing but what we represent. Theoretical philosophy is meant to resolve this task, for it enquires into the possibility of experience.¹

The second original conviction, says Schelling, is that representations, which freely arise in us without being necessitated, go from the world of thought to the real world and attain objective reality.²

Thus a second problem arises, viz., how could the objective world undergo a change by mere thinking, so that it may coincide with the thought of it. And this, Schelling says, will be

1. "Daß nicht nur unabhängig von uns eine Welt von Dingen außer uns existiere, sondern auch, daß unsere Vorstellungen so mit ihnen übereinstimmen, daß an den Dingen nichts anderes ist als was wir an ihnen vorstellen........" (Ibid., p. 346).

Scheffling now goes on to imagine that these two parts of philosophy, as it were, oppose each other's standpoint. The two sets of problems pose a conflict; if theoretical philosophy assumes the independence of the real world and the practical philosophy, the supremacy of thought, how do we achieve a relation of the two?

We may, however, suggest here that we do not find any opposition between the theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy, although they may be seen as dealing with different sets of problems. Schelling, however, believes that their opposition is reconcilable, for they supplement each other. And we may overcome this apparent opposition, according to him, if we progress to a higher notion in philosophy in which the truth of knowledge and the reality of free will may be brought to a synthesis. And this constitutes the theme of Transcendental Idealism, which should show that our conscious activity participates in knowing the outer world as well as in our seeking the best life. It is due in main to the nature of our intelligence, that we produce the outer nature in our representations and also remould what we have produced, to fit them to our ideal requirement.

Schelling holds that our theoretical activities and practical activities are at bottom one, because it is one and the same intelligence which engulfs into these two sets of activities, and the former becomes prominent in theoretical philosophy, while the latter in practical philosophy.

We may add here that it is because of this identity of consciousness that Schelling speaks of an identity underlying both the natural world and the subjective order.

The important outcome, we may note, of Schelling's idealism, is that he arrives at the notion of teleology. In his Introduction he says that in teleology alone all philosophical problems are resolved, the conflict of theory and practice is overcome; for we find in it that unconscious nature serves our conscious purpose.

This leads Schelling to say that proper teleology finds expression in art. We shall discuss Schelling's conception of art in our Chapter 4. It may suffice here to say, as Schelling does, that the ideal world of art and the real world of objects are the products of the same activity, the coincidence of both the conscious and the unconscious; the real world is unconscious and the aesthetic world is the conscious one. The objective world is merely the original yet unconscious poetry of the Spirit, the general organ of
philosophy and the endstone of its entire arch — the philosophy of art.

We may repeat here in brief once again, that transcendental philosophy is mainly interested in the intelligence or the pure consciousness itself.

(d) Organ of transcendental philosophy:

Schelling thus says that the object of transcendental consideration is the subject itself, and the method of its philosophising is the inner sense. By this Schelling means to say that the object of transcendental philosophy is nothing but what is freely produced in an inner intuition. In this respect the object of transcendental philosophy is different from the object of Mathematics, for these are not freely produced but what is given in outer intuition. The object of transcendental philosophy, Schelling believes, may be said to resemble the object of art, for both are what are freely produced and reflected upon. But the distinction between the object of transcendental philosophy and the object of art is that although the artist freely produces an object of art and reflects on it, what he reflects on is the product of art (as

1. "Die ideale Welt der Kunst, und die reelle der Objekte sind also Produkte einer und derselben Thätigkeit; das Zusammentreffen beider, (der bewussten und der bewusstlosen) ohne Bewusstsein gibt die wirkliche, mit Bewusstsein die esthetische Welt.

Die objektive Welt ist nur die ursprüngliche, noch bewusstlose Poesie des Geistes; das allgemeine Organon der Philosophie——und der Schlußstein ihres ganzen Gewölbes——die Philosophie der Kunst." (Ibid., p.349).
the expression of the artists' vision), while philosophy produces
the conscious act itself in an inner intuition and reflects on it.

We have thus far not only taken into account
what Schelling says as to the notion of Transcendental Idealism,
but we have also acquired some rough idea of what it deals with in
general. Schelling, in other words, gives us here in brief the
theme of his Idealism. It includes, he says, theoretical philosophy,
practical philosophy, the former dealing with the problem of
knowledge, the latter with our volitional activities. Since these
two parts of his Idealism oppose each other, he seeks their synthesis
in a higher philosophy of art. Schelling looks upon art as glorious, for
philosophical truths, he believes, are attained in art.

Philosophical reflections find their fullest expression in the
artistic intuition, for the complete unity of the unconscious and
the conscious, of nature and intelligence, which his Idealism aims
at is eventually found in art.

II. The First Chapter: On the Principle of Transcendental Idealism:

Schelling has, in his Introduction, discussed
the notion and subject-matter of Transcendental Idealism and now
he sets out in his First Chapter of his book, to discuss in two
sub-sections (a) the necessity and nature of the highest principle
of knowledge and (b) the deduction of the principle itself.

Schelling, we may recall here, regards the ego
as the highest notion in his Transcendental Idealism and he refers
to it as the highest principle of knowledge or as the absolute
subject of knowledge. He will first tell us why we need such a
principle and then determine its nature and also deduce it. This is what we shall deal with now.

(a) The necessity and nature of the highest principle of knowledge;

Schelling offers us five arguments to prove the necessity of such a highest principle of knowledge, each of which we shall state and also examine.

1. Schelling's first argument in support of the contention that knowledge requires a first principle is the direct outcome of his idea of knowledge. Schelling argues that if all knowledge rests on the correspondence of an object and the subject, then our entire knowledge consists of propositions which are not immediately true but derive their truth from something else. A mere coincidence of one subject with another, says Schelling, cannot give rise to knowledge proper. For knowledge proper sets up a coincidence which can only be mediated. And there must be something which, Schelling says, mediates the correspondence of object with the subject or which is the only ground of knowledge.


2. "Es muß also etwas allgemein Vermittelndes in unserem Wissen geben, was einziger Grund des Wissens ist." (Ibid., p.353).
Schelling's argument suggests that knowledge consists of propositions which are not immediately true, but are said to be true only through their reference to a ground of knowledge. Thus, propositions are true only in so far as they refer to some basic truth in knowledge. In this sense we may say that the propositions are true only in a certain context.

2. This argument directly leads us to the idea of a system of knowledge, for propositions in a context constitute a system of knowledge, and Schelling's second argument for the necessity of the highest principle in knowledge is, that if knowledge is taken as a system then this system must be regarded as based on a first principle.

Schelling argues that if knowledge is taken as a system, it must be seen as an entire whole whose ground should fall within the system itself.

We may suggest that what Schelling means to say in his first and second arguments appears to be similar to the well known Coherence theory of Truth. The Coherence theory entertains the idea of knowledge as constituting a system. It gives us a system of

1. "Es wird als Hypothese angenommen, in unserem Wissen sei ein System, das sei ein Ganzes, was sich selbst trägt und in sich selbst zusammenstimmt...." (Ibid., pp.353, 354).

mutually supporting judgments, none of which is certain in itself but each one of which derives its certainty from the fact that it has a place in the system as a whole. Thus every judgment is true only in so far as it belongs to this system. In other words, every judgment is true along with its conditions. And we must note that both a judgment and its conditions belong to the system, although what is absolutely true is this basic principle from which all other judgments derive their truth. Such a coherent system, in which judgments cohere with each other in so far as each coheres with the basic principle, stands or falls with the fundamental principle itself. Examples of such coherent systems may be found in history and the natural sciences. We may say that 'Napoleon attacked Moscow' is a true judgment not only because it is in accordance with the facts, but also because it relates itself to other factors such as that Napoleon became the Emperor of France and that he set out for an European campaign etc. This is also true of the scientist. He does not assert the validity of any particular law on its own merit, but takes it as established because it coheres with the rest of his scientific conviction.

If then we are to understand Schelling's arguments (1) and (2) as regards the necessity of the highest principle of knowledge, we should understand it in terms of the Coherence theory. Only if we regard knowledge as a coherent system, we could justify our need for a basic principle or the highest principle of knowledge.
There are, however, interesting objections raised against the Coherence theory itself, and if Schelling's contentions are taken in the light of the Coherence theory then these objections may also hold against his arguments. There are two such major objections, to which we may refer here. First, it may be contended that at least some propositions are true independent of a system in that they refer directly to facts and evidence. This seems to be true of both historical judgements and scientific judgements. Simple judgements of sense like 'I hear a loud noise' are also immediately true. This is true on its own merit without depending on a system.

The other likely objection is based upon the fact that the basic principle in a system is presupposed and regarded as self-evident and is therefore not to be judged true in the same way as other propositions of the system. If this holds good, it would follow that the principle of the system does not fall within it. Every science or systematic study takes for granted notions which it does not itself examine, the causal law, for instance, is assumed in Physics. One may ask, what is the status of these assumptions? Walsh has shown that the official way of dealing with them inside Coherence theory is to hold that they can be validated by the same means as any other judgement, by showing that they cohere with the rest of our beliefs. But it is absurd, for the basic principles on which any given system is built up cannot be treated in the same way as any particular judgement in the system. It is thus absurd to say that the basic presuppositions of a system fall within it.

1. Walsh, loc. cit., pp. 84, 85.
We wonder how Schelling would have defended himself against these objections. If Schelling would not deny that historical judgments and scientific judgments rest on the evidence of fact, yet he would not for this reason depart from his conception of a coherent system of judgments. Although Schelling may agree that the basic principle of a system is not to be treated in the same way as other judgments, yet he would refuse to believe that a system does not include its basic principle as the absolute truth. Schelling has dealt with these problems inadequately and we do not quite know how he himself would have tackled them. We only find him arguing that if knowledge is a system it must contain a fundamental principle to which is referred every other proposition in it.

3. The third argument which Schelling offers is that, if knowledge is true (which it is), there ought to be one true basic principle. This principle, says Schelling, must be only one, for all that is true is at once true. There may be degrees of probability but truth has no degree. This would not be possible if all truths do not derive from one principle. There must be then one principle basic to all knowledge.

1. "Dieses Prinzip kann nur Eines sein. Denn alle Wahrheit ist sich absolut gleich. Es mag wohl Grade der Wahrheit ist sich absolut gleich. Es mag wohl Grade der Wahrscheinlichkeit geben, die Wahrheit hat keine Grade; was wahr ist, ist gleich war. — Daß aber die Wahrheit aller Sätze des Wissens eine absolut gleiche sei, ist unmöglich, wenn sie ihre Wahrheit von verschiedenen Principien (Vermittlungsgliedern) entlehnen, es muß nur Ein (vermittelndes) Prinzip in allem Wissen sein." (Schelling, Werke II, p. 354).
Our comment on this argument is this: it is wrong to say that there is one principle to which all truths are related. Schelling may refer to Geometry as an example, but we may point out that Geometry begins with several axioms as to basic truth.

4. Schelling's fourth argument is this: the principle is mediately or indirectly related to the natural sciences and immediately or directly related to the transcendental philosophy.

To explain: Schelling means by the highest principle of knowledge, the ego itself. We may, therefore, regard the ego as the first principle of transcendental philosophy or as directly related to it. The natural sciences which are based on their primary laws and basic assumptions tend to show that these presuppositions of the natural sciences are but formulations of the intelligence itself; we may therefore, in this sense, treat the ego as an indirect principle of the natural sciences (in that their presuppositions relate to the ego).

What we have said now are certainly the implications of Schelling's following arguments. Schelling says that our reference is not to the absolute principle of being, but only to an absolute principle of knowledge. Transcendental philosophy, says Schelling, asks; not, 'Which final ground of knowledge may be outside our

knowledge? but 'What is the final in our knowledge, beyond which we cannot go?' It, therefore, looks for the principle of knowledge, inside knowledge. There is a last principle, Schelling holds, from which all knowledge begins and beyond which there is no knowledge. Transcendental philosophy, in other words, asserts that there is for us a first knowledge.

The first knowledge, Schelling says, is the knowledge of ourselves. If self-consciousness is the first knowledge to which all other knowledges refer then it must be said to fall inside the system of knowledge; Self-consciousness, Schelling believes, cannot be explained by anything else, for it is, a way of knowledge that is the highest for us.¹

It is in this sense of the highest knowledge that, according to Schelling the principle of knowledge falls within the system of knowledge. And this may be taken as a reply to the objection, previously mentioned, that the principle of a system is self-evidently true and thus cannot be treated as any other proposition and it, therefore, cannot fall within the system.

The question that we may now ask is: 'How could Schelling say that our first knowledge is of ourselves, when we find that what we immediately know is an object of the outer world?'

Schelling's reply is this, that...
(or the outer world) is put as the first, then we cannot reach self-consciousness. If we put the object first, Schelling tells us, we would then either infinitely traverse from the grounded to the ground. To avoid it we must interrupt the series intentionally so that we posit an absolute which in itself is the cause and effect, the subject and the object at once. This notion, Schelling points out, is none other than that of self-consciousness. Even the natural sciences, says Schelling, which may begin with the object eventually refer to self-consciousness. In any case, he thinks it may be proved that self-consciousness draws the boundary of our knowledge and it always remains the highest.

Before we take up the fifth argument which is different in nature from those given so far, we ought to look back upon what we have discussed so far. Schelling’s contentions are, in brief, these: (a) Transcendental philosophy is meant to constitute a system of knowledge which includes all the natural sciences by relating the basic presupposition of each of these sciences with its own basic principle. (b) This principle must be the highest principles of knowledge and not a principle of being. (c) Our first knowledge must be nothing other than self-consciousness.

1. Ibid., p.356.
2. Ibid., p.357.
The following criticisms may be made against the above contentions of Schelling:

(a) It is first of all wrong to assume that any natural science has only one basic principle, which may be related to the principle of transcendental philosophy. Each science, one may find, is based on as many truths as it needs.

Furthermore, it is also a questionable opinion that the principle of philosophy must be one. Aristotle has spoken of the basic laws of thought. Even an absolutist like Hegel, does not definitely hold that the process of dialectical development of thought arises out of any one fundamental notion. Hegel would rather begin the philosophical account of thought by showing it in its primary stage, for instance, of sense-perception. Hegel is right in pointing out that philosophical speculation does not begin with self-consciousness, but that all processes of thought eventually work up to arrive at the final notion of Spirit and this finds expression in the higher kinds of our intellectual activities like art, religion and philosophical reflection.

One may therefore question the legitimacy of speaking of one first principle of knowledge. And to conceive of a first principle in a scientific system is arbitrary. In that case, Schelling's idea of relating the basic principle of each of the natural sciences to the basic principle of philosophy would appear to be untenable.
(b) It would consequently follow that although one may refer to the unity of the subject in our knowledge of the external world, yet this need not necessarily lead us to one principle of knowledge.

(c) One may further contend that our knowledge of objects is preliminary to our knowledge of the self, that we know the one only through our knowledge of the many.

5. We may now turn to Schelling's fifth argument, which is extremely difficult to understand. Schelling argues that if we could refer to the form and content or the method and object of the natural sciences, we could likewise speak of the form and content of philosophy.

What Schelling means to say is this: if we postulate an absolute principle of knowledge and regard philosophy as a system then we could hold that philosophy includes the natural sciences as its content by organising the sciences into a coherent system of knowledge. The principle of philosophy must be such, says Schelling, that in it the content is to be conditioned through the form and the form through the content and the two must presuppose each other.

1. "Daß Prinzip der Philosophie müßte also ein solches sein, in welchem der Inhalt durch die Form, und hinwiederum die Form durch den Inhalt bedingt ist, und nicht eines das andere, sondern beide welchselseitig sich voraussetzen."

"(Ibid., p.360)."
We may bring out the implications of this argument as follows:

(a) The entire content of transcendental philosophy may be said to be determined by the absolute principle of knowledge, because all our conscious acts, which Schelling will deduce as theoretical acts and practical acts, are regarded as derived from the original absolute act of self-consciousness.

(b) The form of transcendental philosophy may be said to be derived from self-consciousness itself, because our consciousness of object always involves a reference to our consciousness of the self. It is, therefore, true in this sense that the self-consciousness or 'I = I' may be seen as contained in all our objective awareness.

These beliefs give meaning to the argument that philosophy relates the basic assumptions of the natural sciences to its own, viz., the self-consciousness itself; and that it includes the sciences as its content. And it systematises them as coherent, which shows the form or method of philosophy. It is, therefore, not absurd to say that in Schelling's philosophy the content is determined by its form and the form by its content. What content philosophy should have, depends on what philosophy can systematise as cohereing with its basic truth; and what form it should adopt is determined by the relation of the natural sciences.

We may further point out that on Schelling's view the natural sciences in aiming at a knowledge of the objectively real world presuppose a subjective unity.

Thus if we ask Schelling in what sense the
proposition "I = I" refers both to the form and content of philosophy, Schelling would answer that the proposition 'I = I' refers to the form of the ego's self-identity which is involved in our knowledge of objects; and that it also refers to the content of transcendental philosophy because self-consciousness is, in it, looked upon as an act of synthesis. It thus includes all our conscious acts.

Schelling ends this section by giving us an example, viz., the proposition 'A = A,' which refers to both a form and a content. Being a proposition of identity it refers to A's self-identity which is its form. But in it we also refer to a content, viz., the reality of A in our thought. How this example enables us to understand that the proposition 'I = I' also has a form and content will not be clear until we have discussed in our next Section the deduction of the principle of knowledge.

B. The deduction of the principle:

We may state here that we not only require a first principle of knowledge, but we should also deduce it. The question that Schelling asks is, how could the first principle be deduced? For there is nothing which may precede it and from which it may be deduced. Schelling, however, means by the deduction of the principle not that the principle is to be deduced from anything higher but that it must be deduced from its own dignity. It must show itself to be the first principle of knowledge. Deduction here then is used in Kant's sense of deduction of the categories, viz., to
In this deduction Schelling proves that the principle is the highest and contains in it all the characters which justify its claim to be so.

In other words, Schelling intends to prove that self-consciousness is the only basic principle of knowledge. It is the point where the object and the concept or the object and its representation are originally one, where the subject and the object are one, the intuition and the intuited object are the same, what is introduced is the same as that which introduces.  

In order to show this, Schelling gives us a series of arguments which we shall examine now.  

1. First of all, he refers to two sorts of knowledge, the conditioned and the unconditioned. Knowledge is said to be conditioned, if it is derived from another higher knowledge; it is said to be unconditioned if it is not derived from anything higher.  

Our knowledge of the ego is unconditioned for it cannot be derived from anything higher. Our knowledge of the external world is conditioned, for it presupposes our knowledge of the ego.

2. Schelling further explains 'unconditioned knowledge' with an illustration, viz., 'A = A.' This proposition may be regarded as an unconditioned knowledge because 'A' refers not to any real object but is merely the projection of our thought. The self-identity of W is posited in our thought.

1. Ibid., pp. 364, 365.
3. A question now arises; how is knowledge possible if there is no reference to the objective world, for, as Schelling himself maintains, knowledge occurs only if the subject and the object meet? Thus Schelling will have to contend either that propositions of identity are not to be regarded as giving knowledge or that they are really synthetic. Schelling will take recourse to the second alternative. And we, therefore, ask: 'How is the (apparently) identical proposition to be regarded as being really synthetic?'

To answer this, we ought to reformulate the entire issue regarding the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments which in its classical form goes back to Kant. For Kant all judgments are either analytic or synthetic. An analytic judgment is one in which the predicate is contained in the concept of the subject, a synthetic judgment is one where it is not so contained. Kant also believes that all analytic judgments are a priori because the determination of their truth and falsehood would not depend on experience. Kant, however, would not say that all synthetic judgments are a posteriori. But unlike his predecessors he said that some synthetic judgments are a priori. He also tells us that the propositions of mathematics and some in the natural sciences are of this character. For Kant the possibility of such judgments in metaphysics remains problematic, and he enquires into this in his Critique.

Kant's idealist successors raise objections against Kant's theory by saying that the distinction of judgments into
analytic and synthetic is misconceived because every judgment is both analytic and synthetic at once. These philosophers believe that judgment is a process in which we analyze a continuum of experience; but we analyze merely to relate these parts again into a satisfactory whole.

Modern logic also points out against Kant's definitions of analytic and synthetic judgments that they apply only to subject-predicate propositions and fail to include relational and existential judgments.

We are, however, not concerned with the objections that modern logic would raise against Kant's doctrine; but it is the idealistic contention that all judgments are analytic in one sense and synthetic in another, which we are mainly interested in. We are interested in this because Schelling may be said to propound it also.

Schelling says that the proposition 'A = A' is both identical and synthetic at once. 'A = A' is an analytic proposition, in so far as the predicate 'A' is contained in the subject 'A'. The relation, therefore, of the two 'A's is of identity. It may also be seen as a synthetic proposition in that we analyze 'A' to show that the subject 'A' and predicate 'A' are different and that they may be related by a relation of identity. We need to analyze to show that 'A' is identical with itself.

It is, therefore, Kant's definition of analytic and synthetic judgments which Schelling makes use of when
He says that in every proposition two concepts are compared with each other, i.e., they are posited as either equal or not. In identical propositions thought compares itself with itself. In synthetic propositions predicates are added to the subject. And yet Schelling follows the post-Kantian tradition when he says that the separation of the analytic or identical judgments from the synthetic judgments is not full. One should in that case admit propositions, which are both analytic and synthetic. According to Schelling, 'A = A' is such a proposition.

Has Schelling really shown this? In answer, we may point out that Schelling merely states that 'A = A' is an identical synthetic proposition; and apart from giving us the definitions of identical and synthetic propositions he has not said much. This is why we had to refer to Kant's distinction of analytic and synthetic judgments and then to the idealists' contention that every proposition is both analytic and synthetic in order to understand what precisely is meant by the assertion

that proposition 'A = A' is both identical and synthetic.

We may end this section by mentioning that Schelling believes that the proposition 'A = A' also presupposes the identity of the subject, viz., 'I = I'. For it is the ego which posits 'A' as 'A' and if it posits 'A', then it is 'A'. It is on this ground that Schelling holds that the proposition 'I = I' is also likewise both identical and synthetic.

C. Explanations:

In this subsection Schelling further explains some features of self-consciousness to show mainly that it is the starting-point of his philosophy.

Self-consciousness, says Schelling, is an act, but through every act something is conceived. Every thought is an act and every definite thought is a definite act. Concepts arise in our thought. The concept thus is nothing but thought itself. Through the act of self-consciousness some concept is thought of and it is, says Schelling, the ego. Thus the ego becomes its own object of consideration in self-consciousness. For in self-consciousness what I deal with is myself. Schelling further says that the ego has being only in the act of self-consciousness; outside this act the ego is nothing. Its reality rests only on this act, and it is itself nothing. Its reality rests only on this act, and it is itself nothing other than this act. It does not require any proof to say that the notion of the ego, i.e., the act through which thought itself becomes its own object is not evident apart from the act and if it is at
Schelling thus says that the ego is nothing other than its thought: the thought of the ego and the ego itself are one; the ego is nothing but the thought in general.

Schelling further adds that the ego is not a thing not an object but what is always the not-object.

The question that arises at this stage is this: 'How can we have knowledge of the ego, if it always remains the non-object? What sort of knowledge do we have of the ego?'

Schelling's own answer to this question amounts to this, that the ego becomes an object only in the sense that we freely reflect on it or that we freely produce it. The ego, as it were, chooses to reflect on itself and thereby makes itself its own object. In this sense, therefore, it would not be absurd to argue, as Schelling does, that the ego may be looked upon as the subject and the object at once.

We may note that this leads Schelling to introduce to us an interesting distinction, viz., between what is originally object and what is made an object. To the former category belongs the real world as the permanent object of knowledge, while to the latter belongs the ego itself which is the principle of

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1. Ibid., pp. 365, 366.
2. Ibid., p. 367.
3. Ibid., p. 368.
knowledge or the absolute subject of knowledge. It cannot be an
object as an original object is, unless one assumes that in a special
act of freedom it is made an object of reflection.

We are thus led to another important issue
in Schelling's philosophy, viz., that our knowledge of the ego must
be different from our knowledge of the objectively real world.
Knowledge of the ego arises, according to Schelling, in an intuition
which he characterises as intellectual. We propose to deal with
this notion of intellectual intuition in chapter 6 of this thesis.
For the present we need only bear in mind that unlike the world
of objects the ego is intellectually intuited. The world of objects
is given to us, while the ego is freely produced and intuited in a
special faculty of intellectual intuition. It is, therefore, an
intuition, Schelling believes, in which the subject and the object
are the same where producing and intuited are one and the same
activity. In Schelling's philosophy, the concept of intellectual
intuition plays an important role, for philosophical speculation
is made possible by it.

Schelling goes on to say that the ego is
its own intellectual intuition. This intuition, he says, cannot be

1. "Ohne diese Anschaung hat das Philosophieren selbst kein
Substrat, was das Denken trüge und unterstütze; jene Anschaung ist
es, was im transcendentalen Denken an die Stelle der objektiven
Welt tritt und gleichsam den Flug der Spekulation trägt." (Ibid., pp. 369, 370).
demonstrated, but only demanded as a postulate, as in Geometry in which the basic axioms are postulated. The principle of knowledge, therefore, is the postulate of transcendental philosophy. Schelling further argues that if the principle of knowledge is a postulate, it must therefore be originally constructed in inner sense.

This needs an explanation. We have to remember that Schelling is haunted by the model of Geometry as a perfect science. Geometry presupposes space as its pre-requisite and our most preliminary geometrical study begins with some construction in space. Thus intuition of space is what Geometry deals with. Schelling believes that in philosophy also we presuppose the ego, or the principle of knowledge as a pre-requisite. Since our intuition of the ego may be possible only in inner sense, just as our intuition of space is possible in outer sense, so it is conceivable that philosophical enquiry begins with a construction in inner sense, viz., the intuition of the ego by itself. Thus construction here means intuition and the first construction, therefore, is a postulate in philosophy as it is the case in Geometry.

D. General remarks:

After he has characterised the ego as an act in which it produces itself as its own object and reflects on itself, and which is to be regarded as the pre-requisite of philosophy, Schelling in the following subsection called 'General Remarks,' further characterises the nature of the ego in a beautiful

1. Ibid., p.371.
passage. He says that, Kant finds it noteworthy in his *Anthropology* that the child, as he begins to speak in reference to the subject I, e.g., 'I want a red pen', 'I walk' etc., a new world emerges. This is the intellectual world which opens to him, for everytime he uses the word 'I' and says something, it takes him over to the outer world where his intuition meets the alien factor. Philosophy, says Schelling, should begin with such a concept, which shall deal with the intellectual world.

Another important point which Schelling makes here is that, the notion of the ego is something higher than the mere expression of individuality. It is the act of self-consciousness in general, and all individuality is to be derived from it.

To conclude our discussion of this section, we may raise two questions:

1. Is self-consciousness an immediate intellectual intuition of the ego?
2. Is self-consciousness really presupposed by all other knowledge and if so in what precise sense?

We have dealt with the first question adequately in the fashion in which Schelling does. We may once again point out that in Schelling's view self-consciousness is an immediate intellectual intuition of the ego. The ego, in other words, produces itself as its own object and reflects on itself qua itself; and
this is nothing but an intellectual intuition by the ego of itself.

The second question, however, is intriguing to all philosophers. Philosophers like Fichte and Schelling would believe that self-consciousness is presupposed in all knowledge. But there are equally strong views which contend that knowledge of objects cannot be said to presuppose self-consciousness, for there is no self apart from its object-entangled expression. Hume, for instance, tells us that even a most intimate entry into one's self reveals nothing but some particular perception or other (of heat or cold, love and hatred, pain or pleasure). One can never catch one's self without a perception, says Hume, and one can never observe anything but the perception.¹

This sort of philosophy, we may note, is basically different from Schelling's Idealism. We need not discuss here if these critics are right. But we find that Schelling intends to give an account not of our knowledge of the external world, but of the conditions under which such knowledge is possible. These conditions refer to a fundamental principle of knowledge on a unity of the subject, to self-consciousness itself. Thus on Schelling's view there is a sense in which self-consciousness is said to be presupposed in all knowledge of objects, not as what is temporally prior to our knowledge of objects, but as the ultimate condition of the possibility of our knowledge of objects.

III. The Second Chapter: The General deduction of Transcendental Idealism.

Schelling has so far tried to prove that there is a highest principle of knowledge. Now he will show how Transcendental Idealism may be deduced. This, Schelling says, largely depends on the nature of the ego itself. The ego is said to be an activity. Now, Schelling further asserts that this activity may be seen as twofold: one in which the ego intuits itself, the other in which it intuits itself as dealing with an outer world. Thus the activity, is both subjective and objective, infinite and finite, unlimited, and limited. When Schelling says that the ego is infinite, he means that it is infinite for itself. By saying that it is infinite for itself, he means that it is infinite in its self-intuition. But, says Schelling, this originally infinite activity would also become finite and limited, which is the condition of self-consciousness. The limitation is therefore, the condition under which alone the ego can be infinite. The ego is, says Schelling, unlimited, insofar as it becomes limited; and it is limited only through its being unlimited.

The most important argument is, therefore, this: that the proof of necessary coexistence of both activities in the ego would be a general proof of Transcendental Idealism.

2. Ibid., p.384.
3. Ibid., p.379.
Let us explain this further. Schelling regards the ego as an activity in which it intellectually intuits itself. But this self-consciousness divides into two apparently opposite activities. Pure self-consciousness is depicted in a subjective activity, which is infinite and unlimited. It is subjective, because the ego is merely intuiting itself; it is infinite, because the ego's self-intuition is unrestricted; it is unlimited, because the ego always intuits itself qua itself. There is another activity of the ego which impinges on a barrier, viz., the objective world and returns to the ego. It is objective, because in it we are dealing with objects; it is finite, because in it, the object surrounds the ego; it is limited, because in it, the infinite and unlimited activity is limited by finite objects.

We may raise two questions: (1) Why should the ego posit an outer world which confines and limits it? (2) If it be so, how would the ego overcome this confinement?

The answer to the first, will be this; Schelling believes that the unlimited cannot become conscious of itself as unlimited unless there is also an endless series of objects which confine it and limit it. In other words, the ego creates a resistent environment merely to bring to our notice its own activities.

The answer to the second will be this; the ego, Schelling would have us say, can also overcome this confinement, because, it merely creates an illusion of opposition. It may be shown that, the ego overcomes its opposition by arranging the world of objects theoretically under laws of thought or by practically
remoulding it to fit our ideal requirements, and shows that, in every activity the ego attempts to reflect on itself.

There is another important point to which Schelling draws our attention: the ego's self-positing activity may be regarded as an ideal activity, because the ego's self-intuition always remains an idea or an ideal to be pursued. And the ego's positing of an outer world may be referred to as a real activity, because in it the ego is meant to deal with real objects.

Thus we may say in conclusion that the ego has been shown to be both infinite and finite, subjective and objective, ideal and real, and it is, therefore, natural that, the Transcendental Idealism is to be divided into theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy.

In the subsequent chapter we shall deal with the theoretical activities strictly in the manner in which Schelling does.