Chapter 3

The Limits of Rationalism\(^1\) and Rethinking Modernity

As has been described in the chapter one, the Iranians' early encounter with modernity was result of the expansion of the Western history in their realm of life. In absence of a rational tradition of thought, Iranians became mere consumers of the Western thoughts and ideologies. Following the Western debates they saw themselves, as had been presented by the Western philosophers and sociologists, as the "other" or the "non-part" of the West. Therefore to embrace modernity meant for them to get rid of whatever local and indigenous they may have had. As a result a paradigm of thinking and acting emerged which believed that to modernize Iran meant the elimination of all signs of traditional life from the public life, including all kinds of institutions. They thought that by replacing their traditional institutions by Western ones, the prosperity and power of the West would also transform into Iran. The present study believes that if on the one hand the domination of above mentioned discourse was result of the institutional incapability of Iranians and the poverty of rational thinking, it is related on the other hand to the Western understanding of modernity and the way which it has been introduced by the Western predominant thinkers. Modern thinkers from their early age in the Enlightenment to the twentieth century assumed the East to be the non-part or the counterpart of the West i.e. a cultural entity with

\(^1\) By rationalism we mean the trend of thought which is in favor of reason and opposes the sacred sources like the holy book or Church. It favors reason in a variety of ways, it may consider reason as the cognitive faculty of individuals as it was for Descartes, or it may consider reason as the idea and the essential driving force of world history as it was for Hegel, or the attitude which considers reason as a historically specific mode of thinking and looking at the world, as Weber considered capitalism as the outcome of a particular mode of rational thinking.
all kinds of negative aspects of which the Western culture is authentically devoid of them. This assumption can be found in Montesquieu's "Persian Letters" or in the way that Hegel explains 'Historical movement', or in Weber's definition of Modern Rationality. For Hegel the Orient is the other of the West, although the world spirit starts its dialectical movement from Persia, but due to some reasons, the spirit feels homesick in the East, and to get rid of this sickness, the dialectic movement of history takes the spirit to the home, which means the West. As a result, if the East wants to become a part of the dialectical movement of reason in history, it has no choice except to become the West. The same trend of thought can be traced in the sociological studies of Weber. He considers modern rationality as a mere heritage of the Western civilization, but since it has a universal character, it can also be acquired by any other civilization. If non-westerner approaches modernity through a Weberian horizon, will conclude that Westernization and an imitative pattern of life are the unavoidable results of a successful modernization.

In this chapter we are going to study some of these views and the way that modernity was understood and presented by the western thinkers. Then we consider the works of some critics of these approaches which, by extending our horizon of thinking toward modernity and our non-Western context, will try to find a context-sensitive notion of modernity. The latter notion does not necessarily equate modernization with Westernization in an imitative way. In other words, we require a notion of modernity which helps us to rethink our relation with our own tradition, not in order to replace it with its Western counterpart, but to re-insert it into the process of transformation from the present miserable situation of non-productivity into a situation in which not only by accepting a rational openness toward the surrounding world, the Iranian tradition of thought is able to regenerate itself, but also it is able to provide proper answers to the crisis which the society faces in different ways.
By exploring the views of the Western thinkers, the study hopes on the one hand to show how their thoughts helped the flawed and improper imagination of modernity and therefore the farther failure of project of modernization in a country like Iran, but also the thesis goes through their thoughts and views in order to test or to find out the relevance or the irrelevance of their ideas in order to form a better understanding and definition of modernity which is more suitable to our particular context.
A. Modernity as the Triumph of Reason in History

The pathological critique of modernity can be traced back to Hegel, whose philosophy, ironically, aimed to crown modernity, rather than to criticize it. Unlike Kant, who was heralding the coming of a new age, Hegel believed that a new age had already started, an age in which man is able to understand world-history, not in order to change it or to show how “it ought to be”, as his materialist followers later on claimed, but merely to show intellectually how historical transformation is taking place. To separate himself from the philosophical thinking of his age, Hegel asserted that philosophy “can only show how... the ethical universe is to be understood... whatever happens, every individual is a child of his time; so philosophy too is its own time apprehended in thoughts” (Hegel, 1967, p.11). Modernity was the overarching concept by which Hegel tried to explain the movement of the universalizing forces of history. The peculiarity of the age was related to its notion of understanding. To penetrate reality and its substantial truth through thought and absolute thinking allows man’s mind to ascend to a free subjectivity. This could not take place if man was not liberated from the traditional framework of thought. Therefore the awareness of the subject of itself is the hallmark of the new age. Modernity is an epochal concept that asserts the transition of the world history into a new period. “The discovery of ‘new world’, the Renaissance, and the reformation, these three monumental events around the year 1500 constituted the epochal threshold between modern times and the Middle Ages” (Habermas, 1987, p. 5).

The Reformation, by freeing spirituality and faith from its imprisonment in the official institutions of established religion as the external incarnation of divinity in reality, in its search for a pure spirituality, and by making the presence of God a matter of faith and internal to human beings, paved the way “for the task of making this presence objective and real in the external world... The world was
ready for a state founded on reason" (Taylor, 1975, p. 400). Considering history as a frame that according to the movement of *Geist* or Spirit, through the process of becoming 'shapes the world development, allows Hegel to consider the world-history as a meaningful and preplanned movement. Through different stages, according to the Plan of God in the world the communities and states actualize their particular being. According to his teleological notion of history individuals and nations are "all the time the unconscious tools and organs of the world mind at work within them. The shapes which they take pass away, while the absolute mind prepares and works out its transition to its next higher stage" (Hegel, 1967, p. 217), Therefore history is made of necessary ascending moments that embodies the rise and fall of different nations. This does not make Hegel consider history as the verdict of mere might, which moves according to the inevitabilities of a blind destiny. Since the Idea or Reason becomes clear and unambiguous to itself in mind as knowledge "the world history is the necessary development, out of the concept of mind's freedom alone, of the moments of reason and so of the self-consciousness and freedom of mind. This development is the interpretation and actualization of the universal mind." (Ibid., p. 216).

For Hegel the peculiarity of modernity is related to the principle of subjectivity which through free reflection makes man able to know in order to harmonize himself with a true notion of reality. By challenging the Kantian notion which denies the human ability to know "Providence" and the Plan of God, Hegel believes modern subjectivity is able, at the level of mere speculative thinking, to scrutinize and comprehend the truth of the universal reason beyond the external world. As a result, for Hegel the Cartesian notion of self-realization - which the human mind, through a radical separation from the non-self, makes things as objects of its cognition - is the starting point of modern philosophy, the kind of philosophy which demonstrates the human mind as "thinking intelligence" and capable
to will freely and attain freedom. "This self consciousness which apprehends itself through thinking as essentially human, and thereby frees itself from the contingent and the false, is the principle of right, morality, and all ethical life." (Ibid., p. 30). Hence, the uniqueness that Hegel attributes to modernity is related to man's competence in knowing while enjoying the awareness of his historical situation - the quality that was absent in the previous ages of human history. "The key historical events in establishing the principle of subjectivity are the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and the French Revolution" (Habermas, 1987, p. 17).

Despite his admiration for the formation of subjectivity in modern philosophy, which started from Descartes and culminated in Kant, the principle critique of Hegel is directed toward this trend of thought which he calls "philosophy of reflection". By considering the free will as an arbitrary and "empty self-activity" of the human mind, the philosophy of reflection separates, and therefore creates a contradiction, between the subjectivity and the objectivity of the external world. Therefore, it failed to see the world as a concept, enjoying the presence of an idea beyond its objective reality. The main aim that Hegel's philosophy strives to attain is to overcome the contradiction between subjectivity and objectivity. In his eyes the new Europe which started from the Reformation, was a missioner to realize the Christian principle of "freedom of all", the rationale that underlies the progressive movement of the world history. As a consequence, Hegel understands "actual history from the perspective of this principle as the ever-to-be renewed and never-ending struggle for this freedom" (Gadamer, 1983, p. 9). With this notion of freedom in which human subjectivity is connected to a universal reason which encompasses the subjectivity and objectivity, Hegel confronts the Enlightenment's idea that freedom can be found by pure human reason. "Hegel was convinced that the age of the Enlightenment culminating in Kant and Fichte had erected merely an idol in reason."
It had falsely put understanding or reflection in the place of reason and thus elevated something finite to the status of an absolute” (Habermas, 1987, p. 24). The subjective freedom of the individual will comprise only one moment in the world history, therefore a necessary step toward the next moment in its development toward the establishment of a full ethical life. In his eyes the philosophy of the Enlightenment is suffering from a “shallowness of thought” which resulted from the one-sidedness of the rationality of the age and its ignorance about the objective rationality implicit in every element of the world. Hegel believes every object of the world is enjoying an implicit presence of meaning, in other words, everything possesses a telos and is directed toward a definite end. The Enlightenment thought ignored this implicit rational will in objectivity.

This deficiency in the philosophical thinking of his age, is mainly related to the Enlightenment’s counter-movement against the Reformation, and its rejection of the notion, which prizes the active, but unmediated, presence of God in community. The Enlightenment reduced subjectivity to the mere human capability of understanding. It was successful in debasing the legitimacy of the traditional authorities of knowledge and social formation - the Church and the despotic kings - and made human beings able to penetrate efficiently into the external world by imposing their scientific knowledge on reality. But Enlightenment failed to extend human freedom from scientific activities and civil society to other vital realms. Although he realized this fact, Hegel did not recommend backward step and a U-turn to the past authorities. Rather than searching for an alternative, either in the past or in the future, he hoped for the expansion and accomplishment of the modern notion of self-determination, not in the sense that had been projected by the philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but in the sense that got started by the Reformation. Hegel's critique of modernity rather than be directed in any particular situation, was directed toward a type of understanding
which confined human development to its present outlook. Therefore, it is neither able to recognize its present inadequacy, nor to foresee its future incarnations. As a result, at the social level it confuses civil society with the state.

To overcome the confusion, Hegel's phenomenological study of modernity is directed to the clarification of the fact that civil society and its internal organization are merely a moment within ethical life as the substance of world history. For Hegel history is the self-determining movement of the Idea or Spirit, which through self-consciousness and willing of its movement, in its process of becoming, through knowing attains its freedom. "Ethical life is the Idea of freedom in that on the one hand it is the good become alive... while on the other hand self-consciousness has in the ethical realm its absolute foundation and the end which actuates its effort. Thus ethical life is the concept of freedom developed into existing world." (Hegel, 1967, p.107) Ethical life is an order in which individual subjectivity and his will are identified with the Idea of good in objective reality. Although the self-conscious will is forming the disposition of the world, its activity is determined by the inherent truth in reality. It is bound to the particular ends of a universal Idea or Providence.

By unifying itself with the actual mind of a family and a nation the essential truth realize itself as concrete concept in history. Hegel distinguishes three moments in the process: "(A) ethical mind in its natural or immediate phase—the Family. This substantiality loses its unity, passes over into division, and into the phase of relations, i.e. into (B) civil society—any association of members as self-subsistent individuals in a universality...Their association is brought about by their needs, by the legal system... and by an external organization for attaining their particular and common interests. This external state (C) is brought back to and welded into unity in the constitution of the state which is the end and actuality of both the substantial universal order and public life devoted thereto" (Ibid., p. 110). If family is a
moment of love in which members are related to each other by natural instincts based on mere altruism, civil society is a moment where members are related to each other as a mere object of their will. That is why the individual is an abstracted member, and others are related to him as a means to his particular end. Since man is not able to attain "the whole compass of his ends", in order to secure himself and his property, to be able to attain his willed ends, and to regulate his affairs, he enters individually into a contractual relationship with others. According to Hegel's notion of history, civil society is a moment in which the internal relationship is dominated by egoism and the ethics of utilitarianism. It is because of the presence of this morality that Hegel believes it cannot be the last moment of the world history, mainly due to the fact that the unity and universality which are present in civil society are out of necessity and not the attainment of a will for freedom. In order to overcome the inadequacies of civil society, and to accomplish its objectification the spirit and inherent truth of history, through the determining forces of history, take man into the last moment of the world history, the moment of the membership in a perfect community or the state as "the fuller community within which civil society has its concrete existence and its given rational limits (Kolb, 1986, p. 37). In other words, the "self-subsistent" individuals turned away from their family ties by considering themselves as members of the state, link their will and interest to the universal interest and the will of the community, as the larger family of which their particularity is a part, but not as an agglomeration of atomic individuals as it has been presented in the classical liberal democracies. "The concrete state is the whole, articulated into its particular groups. The member of a state is a member of such a group, i.e. of a social class... His mere character as universal implies that he is at one and the same time both a private person and also a thinking consciousness, a will which wills the universal" (Hegel, 1967, p. 200). The universal to which Hegel is referring is the ethical Idea or the divine subjectivity, implicitly present in the mind of a nation,
therefore the rationality that he is attributing to the state is related to the
self-consciousness of a nation regarding the presence of substantial will in the sociopolitical formation of the society. The individual subjectivity and his concrete freedom are destined to be determined by the universality of a higher rationality. As a result of living in the state, the "personal individuality and its particular interests not only achieve their complete development and gain explicit recognition of their right (as they do in the sphere of the family and civil society) but, for one thing, they also pass over of their own accord into the interest of the universal, and, for another thing, they know and will the universal; they even recognize it as their own substantive mind; they take it as their end and aim and are active in its pursuit" (Ibid., p. 160) On the one hand, individuals are allowed to follow their interests and whatever is supposed to be valid for them, and on the other hand their pursued ends should be in harmony with the universal interest of everybody else.

By interconnecting the particular interests to the universal interest Hegel aimed at overcoming the Cartesian dualism and the gap which was created between human subjectivity and the external objectivity. By considering the world as a meaningful entity, not only he reconnects his philosophy to the Reformation view of the universe, but also gets close to a notion of rationality, which originally was celebrated by the ancient Greeks. "The modern shift to a self-defining subject was bound up with a sense of control of the world—at first intellectual and then technological. That is, the modern certainty that the world was not to be seen as a text or an embodiment of meaning" (Taylor, 1975, p. 7), as it was for the Greeks. By rejecting the Kantian division of knowable and unknowable entities, like the Greeks, Hegel considered the world as a text but not as assumed by the Enlightenment, written in mathematics of which its rules can be discovered as natural laws in order to control the world. "For the Greeks, man with his perceptions and theories did not bring the world
out of hiddenness nor collect it together into an order. Man’s task was to harmonize himself with what was revealed" (Kolb, 1986, p. 122). By seeing the world as a domain in which the universal truth and Geist, by entering into the process of becoming, realize itself, Hegel takes philosophy back to its Greeks origins, as the contemplation of the truth.

Art, religion and philosophy are the cognitive means, by which man is able to know the implicit truth of the reality. Therefore, by becoming an agent of the actualization of the reason, man gains his individual interest and freedom while he still has a share in the realization of the universal freedom in the moments of the world history. To consider the individual as a mere agent and a historical vehicle is far removed from the Enlightenment’s notion of self-determinism. Despite having a strong Christian flavor in his philosophy, Hegel recognizes that modernity as a new epoch “could not derive its legitimacy from the past but would have to do so from within” (Ingram, 1987, p. 79). Therefore for him the Enlightenment is a go-between which from one side delegitimizes the traditional authorities of the Church and state, and from the other side provides legitimacy for the novelty of the coming age. But what the Enlightenment missed, was to establish “an interpretative dialogue with the past (by which) one is stimulated to reflect on one’s own situation and thereby overcome the limits of one’s own parochial understanding” (Ingram, 1987, p.3).

The dialectical movement which Hegel was attributing to History was not a mere negation of the previous phase and a development toward a total new phase, but rather a process of enrichment, encompassing negation and critique along with the preservation of the targeted object. By equating the delegitimization of the traditional authorities with the wholesale elimination of tradition in order to be able to establish a fully new order according to its will the Enlightenment, according to Hegel, is suffering from a serious narrow-mindedness. To move, consciously, from one historical stage to the next one, demands
a full understanding of the universal purpose and will of God in history. The Enlightenment denied any plan but its own.

Although logically, at least in modern times, man is able to comprehend the purpose of the universal will, it is not always the case that man can grasp the aim of reason in history. While man is thinking and trying his own plan, in reality, he is striving to realize the plan of the universal will. To make such cases explainable and logical in the process of world history, "Hegel introduces his famous idea of the cunning of reason. Reason is represented in this image as 'using' the passions of men to fulfill her own purpose. Particular men and their purpose fall in the battle, but the universal purpose carries on safe about it" (Taylor, 1975, p. 392). It seems that for Hegel the French Revolution was one of the crucial moments in history, where the wills and ambitions of men concurred with the cunning of reason in its universal plan of historical transformation. As a result of his view on history, the terror and disasters that were ushered in with the revolution do not lead him to consider the disastrous situation as a setback in history. The French were mere agencies to finish the traditional form of the state in Europe, and therefore pave the way for the emergence of the full modern Europe.

Hegel's philosophy was aimed at overcoming the inadequacy of the philosophical thought of his age that according to him was suffering from the crudeness of thought. This crudeness was mainly related to the Enlightenment's notion of subjectivity as self-consciousness and the way, in which it was objectifying whatever non-self that it was confronted with. Although at a speculative level Hegel succeeded in overcoming the above-mentioned dualism, practically his philosophy resulted in a situation which his philosophy originally wanted to avoid. Basically for Hegel philosophical understanding could not be used in order to change the world, "philosophy...always comes on the sense too late to give...instruction as to what the world ought to be" (Taylor, 1975, p. 423). To know the reason in its historical process
means to uncover its plan for the world as the rationale of man's behavior in history. To consider himself as an agent and to be aware of the implicit plan within the history, necessarily transform man from a mere vehicle into an active agent who strives to realize the plan of Idea in history. In other words, Hegel paved the way of the transformation of philosophical thought into the political ideologies of the right and the left in the twentieth century.

Hegel's effort to answer all questions related to historical changes of the world, made his philosophy one of the greatest philosophical systems of all ages, but he could not reach the aim except through an over speculation in the realm of thought, that made it so complicated and difficult not only to apply his philosophy to the real history, but even, as he had wished, to understand the reality according to his philosophy. By considering modernity as the last stage of the dialectical realization of the reason in history, not only his philosophy closes off the future, but it also implies that, since reason is only at home in the modern Christian world, non-Western societies have no choice but to accept Westernization and become the vehicle of the self-realization of the Geist in their societies. If they could not fulfill the goal by their own free will, it will be done by the cunning of the reason. In his framework of thought there is no place for the formation of rival historical paths. Viewing historical stages in a deterministic manner, Hegel distinguishes four moments or realms for the world history, which he classifies as follow: "(1) the Oriental, (2) the Greek, (3) the Roman, (4) the Germanic" (Hegel, 1967, p. 220). The principles of each moment are secured in a particular historical nation. Under pressure of the dialectical movement of history, if other nations want to secure fortune and good life, they have no other way but to be separated from their tradition in order to attain the characteristics or the principle of the nation which in that particular moment manifests the presence of the Idea in the realm of the mundane. In modern times it is the Germanic principle of life which is entrusted, as the last
realm in the dialectical movement of the world history, to realize and unify the objective reality with freedom and the concept of truth. Other nations have to develop the same principle but not as something latent and embryonic in their tradition of life, but, in Hegel's words, as an adopted child. According to this reading of Hegel, the Iranian early modernists should not be blamed for equating modernization with Westernization and a delicate process of imitation and replacement, rather than as a rational openness to the surrounding world. It seems that the greatest philosopher of modern times prescribed the same approach to them.

Horkheimer and Adorno also tried to explain the historical changes dialectically i.e. to see history as a process of negation of opposition, but not like Hegel to reveal the progressive movement of the reason in history. Rather more like Nietzsche's unmasking of Enlightenment, they applied the dialectical approach in their study in order to disclose the irrationalities of a full rationalized modern world and the return of the myth. “In the tradition of the Enlightenment, enlightened thinking has been understood as an opposition and counter force to myth” (Habermas, 1987, p. 107). The Dialectic of Enlightenment upholds the failure of this confrontation. For its authors not only the reason fails to overcome its opposition in modern times, as has been inspired by Hegel, but also in between it is the individuals' freedom which disappears within the process of modernization. Hence the Enlightenment thinking was committed to social and individual freedom, the realization of its thoughts in actual life, in the form of the progressive rationalization of society, took away freedom from the social life of individuals. The Enlightenment projected its own failure and from the outset fostered the seeds of “self-destruction”. For Horkheimer and Adorno the reason of this deterioration, is related on the one hand to the Enlightenment's failure to elude from myth and to stop its own return to mythology, and on the other hand to the Enlightenment's mutilation of reason and its equation with the
instrumental notion of rationality. As Hegel claimed the Enlightenment is projecting thought into the world, but not in a way that he presumed as the essence and the final truth which is realizing itself to the benefit of the community and the entire generation. On the contrary, the Enlightenment conceived reason as "the mere instrument of the all-inclusive economic apparatus. It serves as a general tool, useful for manufacture of all other tools, firmly directed toward its end...a pure organ of ends" (Adorno/Horkheimer, 1973, p. 30). The importance of the "Dialectic of Enlightenment" lies in the fact that, firstly, it considers the transformation of reason into a mere instrument of fulfillment of human wishes, as a process of the degeneration of reason, and, secondly, although this transformation has been theorized and realized during the Enlightenment and afterwards, Horkheimer and Adorno trace it back to mythology and Homer as "the basic text of European civilization", in which Odysseus by an insidious mode of calculation, employs reason to his ends. "The seafarer Odysseus cheats the natural deities, as does the civilized traveler who offers them colored glass beads in exchange for ivory...By calculating his own sacrifice, he effectively negates the power to whom the sacrifice is made" [Ibid., pp. 49-50]. By realizing one of the oldest human wishes - to be able to use reason for the realization of the given ends of man, the Enlightenment relinquished its own realization, the thought of freedom. The Enlightenment was programmed as a process of disenchantment to remove myths and irrationalities from the world in order to free man from the fear of unknowable things. The Enlightenment thus considered knowledge as power by which man could control the world. It was convinced that there should no longer be mystery, if man's will to control could be fully realized. The primary motive of man in this process was mere "self-preservation" as it was for Odysseus in mythology. "Enlightenment is mythic fear turned radical" [Ibid., p. 16]. In order to survive the myth turn into the form of its opposition. Therefore the Enlightenment, rather than being able to emancipate itself from
myths, "receives all its matters from myth, in order to destroy them; and even as a judge it comes under mythic curse. It wishes to extricate itself from the process of fate and retribution, while exercising retribution on that process." (Ibid., p. 12). The essence of the mythological world of Homer, "cycle, fate and domination" becomes the essence of the enlightened world of modern time. Abstraction is the means by which the Enlightenment not only makes everything repeatable but also makes everything to be decided in advance, as fate was doing to its subjects. The Enlightenment became wholesale domination, which must be related to the Enlightenment's image of knowledge and the way by which the Enlightenment strove to obtain knowledge and apply it to the reality. For the Enlightenment "knowledge consists of subsumption under principles. Any other systematically directed thinking is unoriented or authoritarian. Reason contributes only the idea of systematic unity, the formal elements of fixed conceptual coherence" (Ibid., p. 82). By reducing knowledge to a mere means of self-preservation and of dominating nature and other individuals, the Enlightenment abandoned any notion of self-consciousness. As a result, subjective rationality—the crown of Enlightenment thinking—was nothing but the subjugation of a disenchanted nature and other human beings to the instrumentalist thinking of human mind. "Knowledge, which is power, knows no obstacles: neither in the enslavement of man nor in compliance with the world's rulers" (Ibid., p. 4). Calculability becomes the yardstick of thinking. As a consequence, the Enlightenment acted toward things and men as a dictator toward his subjects; it knows them in order to manipulate them. Reason was not any longer the fruit of contemplation, or the activity of understanding, a means of assimilation to eternal ideas. The Enlightenment reduced reason to the rational function of the human mind in order to find a proper means to attain the goal, which due to any reason, one has adopted. Hence, reason by itself does not possess any substantial goal, it is neutral toward ends, a mere tool of planning and coordination. "On
the road to modern science, men renounce any claim to meaning” (Ibid., p. 5). Man projected a complete scientific control over his own life. As a consequence of the wrong projection, the words “reason” and “man” lost their original meaning in the Enlightenment, “the word 'reason' does not stand for a theory of reason such as once was based on the unshakable belief that a just world could still be brought into existence. The word 'man' no longer expresses the power of the subject who can resist the status quo, heavily it may weigh upon him.” (Horkheimer, 1994, p. 4). Reason and Man became a part of the system over which none of them have any control. The mastery over nature did not bring to man self-determination, as the pioneers of the Enlightenment had demanded. As modern society develops, it requires a full rational management and administration, under the compelling force of the idea which justifies the function of society as a system, “man as a person, a bearer of reason, is destroyed...Any decision-taking functions which still appear to be left to individuals are in fact taken care of in advance” (Horkheimer/Adorno, 1973, p. 205). The Enlightenment was not aware of the fact that the program, which it was projecting on society, was breaking its own backbone. For Adorno and Horkheimer failure was not only related to the way that the Enlightenment understood and approached the world but also to its commitment to a liberal economy. The irrationalities of the old society transformed themselves into the modern life, where the immaturity of man, which the Enlightenment aimed to destroy, has been disguised by giving man as a liberated subject an indiscriminate place in a market-like society. The immaturity was transformed into man’s inability to bargain in a world where ‘self-preservation’ became the premium principle of life. Progress was nothing but progress of power over those who were unable to be powerful. “The unleashed market economy was both the actual form of reason and the power which destroyed reason” (Ibid., p. 90)

Although Adorno and Horkheimer were convinced that the thought of
social freedom was inseparable from Enlightenment thinking, the reversal truth of the reality directed them, in a radical way, to illuminate the Enlightenment thinking about the destructive aspects of its progress in history. In their phenomenological study of the modern life, through an unmasking approach—rather than a constructive critique—they disclose the total failure of the Enlightenment project of disenchanting the world. The world just seems to be disenchanted, the modern world is a new incarnation of the mythical world, "in which powers influence one another and no element remains that could transcend the battle of the powers" (Habermas, 1987, p. 125). Therefore, the Enlightenment failed to stop the return of the myth. The "Dialectic of Enlightenment", contrary to what Hegel prescribed, does not represent the realization of reason or Idea in history, where reason through its strive for freedom and reaching self-consciousness, releases itself into the world. For its authors modern history manifests the eternal return of the myth rather the realization of reason. Therefore, unwillingly, Horkheimer and Adorno relinquished any claim to evaluate truth or delusion in history, and saw World history, as Nietzsche had seen before them, as a world of "irreconcilable struggle between powers, as if it were the mythic world." (Habermas, 1987, p. 127). In their introduction to "the Dialectic of Enlightenment", Horkheimer and Adorno claimed that their critique toward the Enlightenment was aimed at accommodating a critical reflection on the recidivist elements of the process, because if not, "it seals its own fate. If consideration of the destructive aspect of progress is left to its enemies, blindly pragmatized thought loses its transcending quality and its relation to truth" (Adorno/Horkheimer, 1973, p. xiii). But by debasing all rational criteria of the modern thought and equalizing modern world with its mythic counterpart, their study reached the same end which the anti-progressive thought of counter-modernity had reached before them. The modern world is much more than bourgeois economy and a self-maintaining system. "The Dialectic of Enlightenment does not do justice to rational content
of cultural modernity...I am thinking here of the specific theoretical
dynamic that continually pushes the sciences...further, to the
universalistic foundations of law and morality...the forms of
democratic will formation...individualist patterns of identity formation”
(Habermas, 1987, p. 113). By ignoring many potentialities of the
Enlightenment thinking and by leaving no rational criterion intact,
Adorno and Horkheimer, in their effort to enlighten the Enlightenment
about itself, took away any type of progressive orientation from the
critical studies of society. As a result of their approach, contrary to
their will, their study provides a regressive turn in favor of the counter
Enlightenment forces against the critical thought which strives to save
and extend “the residues of freedom” in the modern society.

By presenting modernity as the final realization of Reason in the West
as a pattern of life which will necessarily be followed by other
societies, Hegel defined history as the evolution and triumph of
Reason over the irrationalities and myth. In a similar fashion,
Horkheimer and Adorno saw history as the eternal reappearing of
myth and constant return of the irrationalities of the past into the
order of the present. Both of these approaches are suffering from their
deterministic view on the historical movements. For our non-Western
context, history can be much more than a mere war between reason
and myth, and a constant battle between the present and the past.
B. The Rationalization\textsuperscript{1} of the World

Contrary to Hegel's futuristic and teleological approach in the study of modernity, Max Weber's genealogical autopsy of modernity is directed to the description of the present situation of modernity - therefore not necessarily to diagnosis its maladies, even not as it was for Nietzsche to unmask the past in order to deconstruct the present. Like Hegel, Weber sees modernity as a process of rationalization, but in Weber's approach reason is not considered as a universal faculty for which particular social and historical conditions of the West provided the occasion for its realization, and which will eventually be realized everywhere else. The rationality that Weber attributes to modernity, as it was for Hegel, is peculiar to the West and a part of the Western cultural heritage, and therefore alien to other civilizations, but it is still the only type of rationality which has the potentiality for being universalized. For Weber, capitalism is the dominant factor of modern life, and basically it is the expansion of the attitudes attached to capitalism into other realms of society that forms the modern culture. The main purpose of Weber's sociological study of modernity is to find out the begetters of these attitudes in the modern life. Therefore, rather than seeing the modern culture as a continuity and a natural development of the culture of pre-modern life, Weber considered it as a result of a radical break with and alteration of the old attitudes and values by their new substitutes. The Reformation, or more exactly, Calvinism, is the source of the radical change in the attitudes of the Western man, which brought about the modern disposition of the world.

In 'The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism', Weber quotes from Montesquieu that among the nations of the world, the English achieved the greatest progress in three realms: 'in piety, in commerce, and in freedom'. Weber then brings up a question that overshadowed

\textsuperscript{1} It means to make the world in a way that conforms to the plans of a subject-centered reasoning.
his entire approach toward the study of modernity. He asks, "[i]s it not possible that their commercial superiority and their adoption to free political institutions are connected in some way with that record of piety which Montesquieu ascribes to them?" (Weber, 1958, p. 45). The answer which Weber provides to the question is in many ways in contradiction with the predominant notions of socio-historical change, which merely consider modernity as a result of change in material conditions of human life. By reversing the relation, Weber puts emphasis on the process of internal rationalization and its positive role in shaping the orientation of human actions toward the external world. In this way Weber relates his concept of rationality to the concept of value-orientation and the psychological condition of acting. For him, "every value-orientation, religious or secular, involves an integration of meanings, values and disposition and represents a practical 'stand in the face of the world' at the same time that it expresses a 'systematic and rationalized 'image of the world'" (Brubaker, 1984, p. 63). By giving a salient place to attitudes and value-orientations of man in the historical course of social transformation, Weber makes culture, empirically, the most effective element of historical change vis-à-vis economics or politics. In the formation of the modern personality and the modern ethics of social living, Weber attributes the biggest role to what he calls the "Worldly asceticism" which mainly originated from the Calvinist idea of 'predestination' and living according to a 'calling'. "The Puritan, like every rational type of asceticism, tried to enable a man to maintain and act upon his constant motives, especially those which it taught him itself, against the emotions. In this formal psychological sense of the term it tried to make him into a personality." (Weber, 1985, p. 119). The thing which made Puritanism so peculiar, is the fact that Calvinism applied the asceticism to the worldly activities of a person whose belief in the doctrine of predestination already freed him from the spiritual authority of the Church. In order to live according to a calling, and to prove that he is among the chosen ones, the Calvinist
entered into “a life of good works combined into a unified system. There was no place for the very human Catholic cycle of sin, repentance, atonement, release, followed by renewed sin” (Ibid., p. 117). As a result, salvation was regarded as a mere gift of God, and individuals’ efforts had no impact on their salvation, everything having been decided in advance including their final fate. Contrary to other notions of fatalism, a Calvinist was psychologically determined to prove that he was among the few chosen ones. Like a Hegelian individual, the puritan considered himself as a vehicle of God’s will, but with an important difference: the latter one demanded a methodological and systematized way of living. It was not a mere request to work hard or to obtain possessions, which was characterizing the moral virtues of Calvinism. The main reason of the uniqueness of puritan asceticism was its emphasis on a rational achievement through well-calculated measures.

The worldly asceticism that Calvinism propagated was the corollary of the idea that the internal rationalization of a believer was linked to the rationalization of the life order. For Weber the belief in rational conduct, which is attributed to modern culture, has the same content as the puritan worldly asceticism, but without its religious basis. As Weber mentioned, “the peak of purely religious enthusiasm was past. Then, the intensity of the search for the kingdom of God commenced gradually to pass over into sober economic virtue; the religious roots died out slowly, giving way to utilitarian worldliness.” (Ibid., p. 176). For Weber the ever-increasing rationalization of the life order is the hallmark by which the modern way of life has separated from the traditional one. Rationality, which predominantly regulates modern life, is the child of the rationality inherent in Calvinism, through which man, according to the idea of calling, was rationalizing his life in the world.

By giving a historical character to rationality through the tracing of its ancestral background, Weber introduced a typology of several kinds of
rationalities. Contrary to the Enlightenment thinkers and Hegel, who had an absolute notion of rationality, Weber believed in different types of rationality rather than in different degrees of rationality. Therefore the difference between a modern nation and non-modern ones is not the degree of the presence of rationality, but is related to the possession of a different type of rationality that is not matching modern life.

The rationality, which penetrated the life of Calvinist societies through Puritan worldly asceticism, has been conceptualized as a practical rationality, which "from the three perspectives of employing means, setting ends, and being oriented to values," (Habermas, 1984, p. 172) can be differentiated from other types of rationality. As soon as individuals are freed from habits in a traditional framework or mere emotions, and are therefore aware of their action which they have deliberately and consciously conducted, the action can be evaluated as a rational action. The rationality of which can be judged from two points of view: "from the instrumental standpoint of efficacy of means and from the standpoint of the correctness with which goals are inferred in view of given preferences, means, and boundary conditions. Weber calls these two aspects of instrumental rationality and rationality of choice, taken together, 'formal rationality', in contradiction to substantive evaluation of the value systems underlying the preferences." (Ibid., p. 171). As a result, on the one hand the formal rationality or Zweckrational action is directed towards the achievement of some particular ends which are believed to be the result of the acting. On the other hand, substantive rationality or Wertrational action is directed towards the realization of some values which are inherent in a particular action. These two types of rationality can be combined: the result of the combination is the methodic-rational conduct of life which, according to Weber, has been practiced in Calvinism in a general way by individuals. But these two kinds of rationality can also vary and be separated. The increasing
rationalization that Weber is attributing to modernity is the expansion of formal rationality deprived of its substantive values. "The Puritan wanted to work in a calling...when asceticism was carried out of monastic cells into every day life, and began to dominate worldly morality, it did its part in building the tremendous cosmos of the modern economic life." (Weber, 1958, p. 181). Eventually, the irresistible force of economic acquisition along with a strong desire for the rational control of every procedure, transformed life itself into an "iron age". "Today the spirit of religious asceticism...has escaped from the cage. But victorious capitalism, since it rests on mechanical foundations, needs its support no longer." (Ibid., p.181). The socio-economic system imposes itself on the individual as the ultimate order in which he is bound to live.

In Weber's work, the rationalization of the modern state is as prominent as the importance of rationalization for capitalism, especially the rationalization of the law and the legal system and the bureaucratization of the administrative procedures. The rationality of the legal system rooted in its formalism. "Judicial formalism enables the legal system to operate like a technically rational machine. Thus it guarantees to individuals and groups within the system a relative maximum of freedom, and greatly increases for them the possibility of predicting the legal consequences of their action" (Brubaker, 1984, p. 17). In Weber's study and pathology of modernity, bureaucratization has a key role: it is mainly through bureaucratization that formal rationality occupies every aspect of an individual's social life. Its rationality is not only rooted in its formalism and impersonality which is attached to its procedure of formation, but also in knowledge and the professional capability to control the system, including material objects, others and itself. In Weber diagnosis of problems of modernity, the over-bureaucratization of society occupies a salient place. It is not confined to the administrative realm of the state but covers all domains of social life including political, economical,
religious and cultural ones, in short, it covers the activities of all types of organizations.

In Weber's reading of modernity, it is a process that started with the rationalization of culture and worldviews which by transforming itself into the value-orientation of individuals' actions, allowed the rationalization of the modern social life order. Accordingly, in its embryonic phase, modernity has drawn upon a combination of formal and substantive rationality. Eventually, by the expansion of formal rationality from economics to the state, particularly its penetration in the legal and administrative system, modernization on the one hand deprived individuals of the freedom regarding their position towards the external world, and on the other hand by making the value-orientation unnecessary and useless for social action, it robbed the meaning from their life. In this way modernity should be understood as the gradual process of man's loosing freedom and meaning in his social life, and therefore the gradual disappearance of individuality. Weber's diagnosis of modernity on the one hand is directed toward positive aspects of modern rationality in establishing new institutions and the over-expansion of the mechanisms of formal rationality into every aspect of human life. On the other hand the disappearance of individuality is related to the negative character of modern rationality, which Weber calls the disenchantment of the world. For Weber the loss of meaning in individual life is basically related to this negative character of modern rationality, which, by disentangling formal rationality from substantive rationality, prepares the world for a calculated manipulation. Consequently, the disenchantment, rather than being related to the political secularization and functional differentiation of religion and politics, is related to the development of scientific knowledge. "Modern science 'disenchant' the world by construing it as a rationally calculable and manipulable causal mechanism... disenchantment divests the world not only of 'mysterious incalculable forces' i.e. of obstacles to instrumentally
rational action but also of its meaning...it develops refutations of every intellectual approach which in anyway asks for a "meaning" of worldly occurrences." (Brubaker, 1984, p. 80). By taking away value-orientation from individual action, the process of disenchantment not only deprives human action from any type of moral backing, but also makes it impossible for individuals to form a genuine notion of personality.

Despite admitting the exceptional eminence of Weber's study of modernity, particularly his scientific ability to trace back the origins of modern rationality to the non-rational aspects of the Reformation, we cannot be satisfied, due to many reasons, with his depiction of modernity. Reducing modernity to the expansion of formal rationality deprives the approach of cultural and political values, which modernity from its very outset has stood for. By reducing the function of modern rationality to the creation of knowledge-based systems and subsystems of control, Weber overlooked the emancipatory aspects of modernity. He illustrates modernity as a process of cultural development in which humanity will end up in an iron cage. To see modernity as a realm, dominated by the instrumentalism of formal rationality, Weber disabled his approach to find a way out of the cage.

The only answer that it provides us is to say that it is supposed to lead to a better life, but not to a cage. Looking at the issue from a non-Western point of view, we cannot be happy with his approach, not only because of the historical facts - the development of capitalism and the arrival of modernity in the societies with a different worldview from the Puritans - but also because, to consider modernity as a cultural development will justify the traditionalist resistance against modern values in non-Christian countries. To avoid the Marxist reduction of the historical development to the progress of economic forces, Weber gives a central role to cultural elements and overlooks the role of economic and political interests and the part which the formation of social stratification can have in the sociopolitical
formation of society. As a result, the relation which Weber establishes between the prosperity of the English people and their religion, might rather be related to the type of political formation that the English were enjoying in the seventeenth century; and the lack of the same prosperity in France, Spain and Italy, must be linked to the lack of a particular type of sociopolitical formation, and not to their religious attitudes - although this does not mean that we underestimate the role of religion in historical transformation. To view modernity as a mere expansion of formal rationality, allowed the dictator regimes, like the Shah's regime in Iran, to leave out the modern democratic values from their project of modernization. These regimes in the name of modernization tried their best to destroy whatever which could resist the officially required change in society. In a similar pattern, by giving a very limited definition to modern rationality and by differentiating between modern sciences and technology and modern democratic values and institutions, the Islamic fundamentalism became able to utilize modern technology and the method of modern organization against the democratization of Islamic countries. In Weber's view of modernity there is no necessary relation between realization of modernity and democratization of society.
C. Crisis of Rationalism

Like Weber, Husserl relates the present crisis of modern life to its mode of rationality, but rather than relating it to the break and change which the post-Reformation Western mode of life has undergone, Husserl connects it to the philosophical tradition of the West. Accordingly, to find out the cause of the crisis of modern life, "we had to work out the concept of Europe as the historical teleology of the infinite goals of reason; we had to show how the European "world" was born out of ideas of reason, i.e. out of the spirit of philosophy". (Husserl, 1970, p. 299). As a result, the catastrophe of the present time can only be fully comprehended if it is studied in its philosophical context—for Husserl philosophy is another name for rationalism. Considering the crisis of modern life as a crisis in rationalism that has originated from the Greeks' philosophical understanding of the world, does not lead Husserl to join the existentialist followers of Nitzsche in their rejection of the entire edifice of Western rationalism. His critique is aimed at the reconstruction of a genuine philosophy, which in modern times, has been misguided from its higher goals by the domination of objectivism and naturalism. According to Husserl, philosophy in its ancient origins in the city-states of Greece wanted to become a science as a universal knowledge of the objective world, but the Greeks did not stop at this level of understanding. They "saw fit to recast the idea of 'knowledge' and 'truth' a higher dignity, that of a norm for all knowledge. In relation to this, finally arises the idea of a universal science encompassing all possible knowledge in its infinity" (Ibid., p. 121). Philosophy could not achieve this end until the modern age and the mathematization of nature by modern science. Modern science obtained this goal by passing philosophy through "naiveté", and the simplification of the truth of reality, which led to the misapprehension of reality and the misguidance of philosophical understanding.

Unlike Hegel who considered Descartes as the starting point of
modern philosophy, Husserl traced it back to the works of Galileo and his geometrical perspective of the world, including the natural bodies, devoid of any type of spirituality, a self-enclosed world of figures. As a result of the necessities of the age, in the beginning of the modern times, the pattern of science that Galileo practiced, "possessed the highest rationality because it was guided by pure mathematics and achieved, through inductions, mathematical results...The world must, in itself, be a rational world, or mathematized nature; correspondingly, philosophy, the universal science of the world, must be built up as a unified rational theory more geometric" (Husserl, 1970, pp. 60-61). For Husserl this is the point where the crisis of the modern world takes off. The main thing which differentiates Hegel's critique of modernity from Husserl's, is the latter's view on the actuality of the crisis of Western rationality. For Hegel even by means of cunning, reason will realize its plans, therefore it is irrelevant to his logic to speak of the crisis of rationality. The crisis which Husserl is attributing to modern rationalism is related to its cognitive power. By reducing the world to a collection of natural bodies determined by mathematics and mechanical rules, modern science presumed the possibility of a perfect cognitive power over the universe. This cognitive power led to mastery of man not only over nature but also over other human beings and himself. Man was trapped by the idea that the more he had control over his surroundings, the happier he would be, hence, fuller control would bring fuller happiness. Full control could only be realized if the world were split into two parts, the psychic world of man - his cognitive power - and the natural world and everything in it including human beings. For Husserl complete control of man's life and his world is neither possible nor desirable; it originated through a misunderstanding of an old philosophical wish, therefore, if the understanding could be corrected, the exit from the crisis could be also be realized.

The critique of modern rationalism does not make Husserl drift pace
into any type of irrationalism. As he mentioned, "we must not take
this [the crisis of rationalism] to mean that rationality as such is evil
or that it is of only subordinate significance for mankind's existence as
a whole. Rationality, in that, high and genuine sense which in the
classical period of Greek philosophy had become an ideal, still
requires, to be sure, much clarification through self-reflection, but it
is called in its mature from to guide [our] development." (Husserl,
1970, p. 290). To overcome the evil of scientific objectivism or the
"naïvete" of philosophy, on the one hand by connecting his philosophy
to German idealism, Husserl emphasizes the understanding of
subjectivity, which any kind of science is preconditioned by it, while
the subjective structure, which is independent of human
consciousness, determines the process of knowledge formation; on the
other hand, by upholding the goal of ancient metaphysics, he
attempts to understand the orientation of the world as a whole. With
the help of the concepts of "life-world" and of "horizon", Husserl
establishes his own epistemology. "Whatever way we may be
conscious of the world...we, each 'I-the-man' and all of us together,
belong to the world as living with one another, have the world pregiven
in this 'together', as the world valid as existing for us and to which we,
together, belong" (Ibid., pp. 108-109). Accordingly, life-world is like a
milieu which 'already is there' and whenever any kind of knowing is
started, it is the pregivenness of the life-world that forms the sphere
and milieu in which human subjectivity flows. The structure-likeness
of the life-world does not lead us to consider it as a purposeful
formation as it is for Hegel. The higher reason inherent in the life-
world is the result of human beings living together, and their
communicative collectivity. By bringing the past to the present, it
keeps us in touch with a tradition and the roots, and by providing
awareness of our past, it provides us with a chance to establish a new
epoch. The world is pre-given to a human being and he lives in it
without being compelled to know the life-world. Husserl calls this
"natural-life", a life that is naïve, without being thematized by human
beings. Being thematic to the world means being awake toward the world, “waking life is always a directedness toward this or that, being directed toward it as an end or as means, toward the private or public, toward what is daily required or intrusively new. All this lies within the world horizon” (Ibid., p. 281) of the person or a community which is directed to a particular object of the life-world. Therefore the quality, position and other conditions of human conduct and man’s understanding of a particular thing as an object of his consciousness is determined by the horizon which is provided by his life-world. “All our theoretical and practical themes we can also say, lie always within the normal coherence of the life-horizon ‘world”’ (Ibid., p. 144).

It seems that for Husserl modern subjectivity is trapped in a self-enclosed world-horizon. The mathematization of the world and the inherent objectivism of the different sciences limited the human horizon of understanding. By reconnecting philosophy to its Greek origin, human reflection could be aimed at contemplating the direction of the life-world as pre-given to him and others who live with him, and hereby become able to overcome the naturalism of modern life and the naivete of philosophy. Therefore as was the case for the Greeks, the rationality of the present order be connected to a higher rationality resulting from the togetherness of man’s living in community. From a constructive intercommunication of man, not only with his contemporaries, with whom he shares the living order, but also with the past and the entire heritage of the community, man gets an opportunity to recreate himself and reconstruct his living order.

Although Gadamer agrees with Husserl that modern Western life is in pains because of the crisis of rationalism, he tried to scrutinize the problem from a wider angle. Like Husserl, he blames modern science, not merely for the mathematization of nature, but mainly for the way that science approaches the world, in order to change it according to his own plan. Therefore Galileo’s scientific inquiry and the way he employed theory, is the beginning of the crisis. Gadamer suggests that
in ancient Greece science in its old fashion was a method by which a "disciplined eye" was able to approach and discern the order of the universe including human society. The crown of the old sciences, metaphysics, was providing "a whole orientation to the world, which brought the natural experience of the world and its linguistically mediated interpretation of the world to a unified conclusion" (Gadamer, 1983, p. 144). Modern science, however, moves into the world by means of experiment and hypothesis, and transformed itself into "a knowledge of manipulable relationships by means of isolating experimentation...into an ideal of construction, into the ideal of a nature artificially produced in accord with an idea" (Ibid., p. 70). For Gadamer this transformation is the main reason for the present crisis of the Western civilization. The transformation and crisis happened not merely in the way that man viewed nature and used scientific reason as the apparatus of knowledge and control in order to get mastery over nature, but it reached its climax when scientific reason had been extended into social life, and tried to change it according to its own ideas. This transformation led to a structural re-formation of society which, in turn, led to an accurate systemized structure of which the management is controlled by few expertise. This condition eventually reaches a situation where the individual has no share in the management, a total systemized society. Seeing the present situation of the industrial societies in the above-mentioned sense, Gadamer contends, that "a potential outgrowth of our economy and technology on the path that we have hitherto been treading is leading in the foreseeable future toward making life on this planet impossible" (Ibid., p. 84). The only way to rescue the civilization, Gadamer believes, is to change the path of historical progress which has been started from the Renaissance and Enlightenment, not toward the irrationalism of the past, but to give rationality a new direction. This can only be done by a methodical return to the Greek notion of rationalism. Contrary to modern notion of rationality, which considers reason as a mere property of self-conscious human thought, in Greek
philosophy rationality meant "the rationality of being...which is the whole and appears as the whole in such way that human reason is far more appropriately thought of as part of this rationality" (Ibid., p. 18).

It seems that the existentialist concept of being which Gadamer is referring to has the same implication as the concept of life-world has for Husserl. The rationality of being is not constituted by the intentionality of a person or a particular group of people in a historical period, it belongs to the historicity of man's living, which shapes a kind of all-embracing milieu that constitutes man's perspectives of thought and understanding, and therefore confines the extension of his action in the world. The historicity that modern science attributes to itself, objectifies the past as a matter of cognition which through postmortem examinations can fully be understood. For Gadamer this full understanding is a myth which not only originated from the Enlightenment's notion of subjectivity and the idea which has confidence in the attainability of an absolute rationality, but also is related to the Enlightenment's misinterpretation of the concepts which it uses in order to explain the reality.

To form a better notion of understanding and to get rid of the limits of "the modern scientific notion of cognition", Gadamer demands a different direction for human reflection, "it has to try to establish a new relation to the concepts which it uses. It must be aware of the fact that its own understanding and interpretation is not a construction out of principles, but the development of an event which goes back a long way" (Gadamer, 1981, p. xiv). To grant a historical character to human understanding and consciousness does not mean that the validity of human recognition must be derived from the past or tradition, it just compels us, in the course of research, not to disconnect the object of understanding or the concept from the background from which it comes from. Gadamer calls this notion of historicity "effective history" separated from the Enlightenment tradition which considers understanding a subjective behavior toward
a given object. For him, this understanding itself belongs to history, and it is the history of the object of understanding that influences our understanding. Modern scientific cognition is unable to show the effective influence of history within our understanding. It fails to recognize that the history of a given object of research is part of the world of the researcher that shapes his being. In the humanities the aim of the study is to demonstrate the fusion and intermingling of the past and present as two interconnected universes. For Gadamer only a proper historical hermeneutics can embrace both universes. As a result of a hermeneutical reading of human life, there is no clear division between the world of the present or the past or the future, they can be differentiated but not disconnected. Enlightenment man's mistake is that he thinks that he is going to establish a total new order, disconnected from tradition.

By giving a twist to the concept of prejudice and utilizing Husserl's concept of horizon, Gadamer tries to capture the historical transformation in a way that the continuity of the whole is not neglected. By propagating the idea of an absolute self-construction of the life-order by human reason, the Enlightenment believed in self-perfection through deliberation from superstition and the prejudices of the past. By giving a negative character to all kinds of pre-reason judgements and prejudices the radical Enlightenment established its own dogma that whatever is old and comes from the past must be eliminated. Contrary to the view which attaches a negative value to all kind of prejudices, Gadamer claims that "prejudice" means a judgement that is given before all the elements that determine a situation have been finally examined... 'prejudice' certainly does not mean a false judgment, but it is part of the idea that it can have a positive and a negative value" (Gadamer, 1981, pp. 239-240) By rejecting the radical Enlightenment's notion of prejudice, does not mean that Gadamer appreciates a reversal notion of history and recommends a return to the prejudices of the past, to the forces of
irrationalism, to the world of the myths and a reconstruction of unreflected tradition. In Gadamer's hermeneutical study of man, he is subjected to the historical situation he lives in. Therefore, always and in all conditions, man's historical operation is limited to the situations and conditions in which he finds himself. As a result it will be impossible to construct a total new life order according to an absolute notion of reason. To avoid the path of the radical counter-Enlightenment, which ends in a blind credit of the past, Gadamer indicates the way that has been advocated by the Reformation and the German Enlightenment in their approach towards tradition. They did not accept the truth of religion because of its legitimacy provided by the existing institutions or because of the authoritative decrees of the pope. They accepted the transmitted tradition when they became able to safeguard it by human reasoning against the unreasonable demands of traditionalism. Accordingly, since "the human intellect is too weak to manage without prejudices" it is necessary to strive for "a fundamental rehabilitation of the concept of prejudice and a recognition of the fact that there are legitimate prejudices, if we want to do justice to man's finite historical mode of being" (Ibid., p. 146). It was the radical Enlightenment's prejudice and its tyranny against all other kinds of prejudices that made scientific reason deaf toward the hidden voices of tradition in our modern life. To reveal these hidden voices is for Gadamer the main task of hermeneutics in its historical understanding of the subject of inquiry. By taking advantage of Husserl's concept of "horizon", he gives a stationary meaning to the concept of understanding. In other words, A hermeneutical understanding means to put yourself in a situation. "We define the concept of 'situation' by saying that it represents a standpoint that limits the possibility of vision. Hence, an essential part of the concept of situation is the concept of 'horizon'. The horizon is the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point" (Ibid., p. 269). The past is presenting itself as a text, which confines our present horizon, it shapes the form and range of
our interpretation. The larger the horizon, the more accurate is our understanding. The horizon not only defines the range and possibilities of the understanding of the past, it also forms and demarcates our further development in the future. Since the horizon of the present is a process of continuous formation, it demands a continuous testing of prejudices, which originate from the past and flow in our world-horizon. "An important part of this testing is the encounter with the past and the understanding of the tradition from which we come. Hence the horizon of the present cannot be formed without the past, there is no more an isolated horizon of the present than there are historical horizons. Understanding, rather, is always the fusion of these horizons which we imagine to exist by themselves" (Gadamer, 1981, p. 273).

By accepting the presence of the historical horizons in the process of understanding, on the one hand we are able to see the past by the eyes who lived in it, and on the other hand, we are also able to able to differentiate between the criteria and prejudices of the past and our present ones. Hence, any entity and formation in the past is an answer to a particular question, raised from a particular historical horizon, which itself also is subject to a penetration of the horizons of its past, from where it came. If we as non-Westerners admit this truth in our present situation, we are facing the question of modernity in a very different way. Modernity appeared as an answer to the problems and questions of the West within its particular world-horizon. Could it also be a right answer to our particular questions within our non-Western context? Is it possible that despite belonging to two different historical situations we non-Westerners and the Westerners, who upheld modernity, are struggling with the same questions?

The advantage of the critical approach of Husserl and Gadamer is mainly related to the way that they presented their critiques of modernity, in the sense that they neither ignored the credibility of the past and overlooked the importance of the continuity of tradition in
modern life, nor advocated the return of irrationalism of the past. As has been mentioned earlier, one reason for the failure of a democratic modernization in Iran was related to the way that modernity and tradition were understood by Iranians. As a result of a flawed understanding, modernization was projected as the confrontation of modernity with tradition or the present with the past. The way that Husserl and Gadamer manifested the concept of understanding, the above mentioned confrontation not only is unnecessary but also is very damaging if man must project the order of his social life. They criticized modern scientific reason and the dominant notion of subjectivism while carefully distancing themselves from a deconstructive type of critique, aimed at debasing the entire foundation of modern life. By criticizing the autonomy of a self-conscious doer or knower, they helped to transform the concept of modern rationality into an offshoot of inter-subjectivity of interacting individuals who are situated in their particular context of living, but they did not clarify how this rationality can be achieved or how one can avoid the kind of interpretation that equalizes the rationality of the community with the super historical being of a community, of which the members are deterministically requested to strive for its realization. While taking on board the advantages of Husserl and Gadamer's philosophical method, we believe that Habermas' sociological approach toward modernity may provide us with criteria and a procedure not only to implement modernity in a better way in both the Western and non-Western societies, but also to judge, develop and, if necessary, reconstruct it according to the particular requirements of the local context.