THE NON-COMMITTED WORLD

Introduction:

In the previous chapter we have discussed regional defense pacts of the Communist orbit and by making an analysis of the working of the pacts we have drawn conclusion there of. It is a significant point to note that pacts of both the Communist and the non-Communist world have atleast one thing in common i.e., ideological basis of security. In other words, in the non-Communist coalition it has been taken for granted that the members would hardly take any coercive measure against an aggression conducted by a non-Communist state. The same policy also applies to the Communist world, which would not allow itself to be a party to an enforcement action against the Communists.

But these two power blocs have significantly failed to embrace all the states and specially the non-aligned and neutral ones who have stroneously kept themselves aloof from either of these two power blocs and thereby maintaining their separate and distinctive identity in the structure of world politics. In short, the non-aligned states do not intend to follow the lead of either Communist or non-Communist bloc and they form a separate force in world politics, and as such, they are placed in a separate cate­gory under this chapter. The most characteristic feature of this force is that this group makes no prior commitment to any bloc with regard to the struggle for power between the two blocs, and keeps its opinion reserved with regard to vital issues of law,
justice and enforcement action.¹ They emphasise the principle of peaceful co-existence for removing the scourge of war from the succeeding generations. We will now pass on to the non-Committed world and examine some important regional defense pacts with the object of making an assessment.

A. THE ARAB LEAGUE

Background:

Efforts to achieve unity were made by the Arabs since earliest days, - the first Egyptian Asiatic League was formed before 1400 B.C. The desire for unity persisted and found expression in different periods of history. In the modern age it took a new form in the later part of the nineteenth century with Arab awakening. Arab was still under colonial rule but in the struggle for independence by the Egyptians against British rule the Egyptians won independence in 1928. The wind of nationalism and freedom blow over the Arab land, and by 1933 Iraq became independent. In the changed situation, Britain wanted to utilise Arab unity for her own interests and during the Second World War one such scheme of Arab unification under the leadership of pro-British Hashimite dynasty was launched but it failed. However, the aspiration for unity based on common religion, language, and culture as well as common level of economic backwardness and common denunciation of Western imperialism drew them together.

Most of the important Arab states have become independent by 1945 and these states organised themselves to form their cherished organisation. The representatives of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Transjordan, Yemen and Saudi-Arabia met in ALEXANDRIA with active encouragement from Britain and formed the Arab League on March 22, 1945 on the basis of the Alexandria Protocol. Certain other members, viz. Libya, Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman subsequently joined the League. In 1971, its total membership stood at seventeen.

In the San Francisco conference, 1945, the Arab League and the Latin American members were most vocal in their demand for autonomy of the regional arrangements. It was largely due to their strong insistence that a separate chapter on Regional Arrangements was inserted in the U.N. Charter as a sort of compromise formula of the regional with the universal principle.

Main features:

1. In the Preamble, the members have expressed their sincere desire not only to achieve security and "common good of all the Arab countries" but also to achieve solidarity among themselves on the basis of independence, sovereignty and non-intervention.

2. Article 1 provides that "any independent Arab state has the right to become a member of the League" and the prospective

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2. Judith Laikin - British Influence on the Arab League, Columbia Jour. of International Affairs, 111 (Spring, 1949). See also J.S. Raleigh, Middle Eastern Affairs, Jan., 1955.
member should submit its request to the council which will decide the case of admission (no mention is made whether the decision would be taken by unanimous vote or by majority).

3. According to Article 2 and 9, the members aim at all-round integration to safeguard their independence and sovereignty, and with this object they desire also cooperation in economic, social, cultural and other affairs for mutual benefit. In terms of Article 4, other Arab countries may also participate in special committees created for implementation of Article 2.

4. Article 3 provides that the Council is responsible for smooth realisation of its various aims both in the field of security and economic development. The decision-making body of the League is the Council in which juridical equality is maintained by granting a single vote to each member. Here also no mention is made as to how decisions are to be taken, but Article 7 stipulates that unanimous decisions shall be binding upon all while "majority decisions shall be binding only upon those states which have accepted them."

5. Article 5 is unique in prohibiting the members from using force in resolving disputes among themselves, and prescribes that decisions on such disputes brought before the Council "shall then be enforceable and obligatory." The disputant states shall not participate in the deliberations of the Council, and the dispute would not be affecting state's independence and territorial integrity.
6. Article 6 is the heart of the treaty; it stipulates that in case of aggression or threat of aggression from outside member, the Council shall determine by unanimous decision necessary measures. In case of aggression by a member state his vote shall not be counted in determining unanimity.

7. Non-intervention in internal affairs and system of government is accepted as a general principle in Article 8 of the League.

8. According to Article 10, the headquarters of the League is at Cairo, with a permanent Secretary General. Article 12 stipulates that the Council by a majority of two-thirds of the states of the League appoint the Secretary General enjoying the rank of Ambassador.

9. Article 18 provides for withdrawal from the League, and any member can withdraw by serving one year's notice from the date of withdrawal. Again, any member is liable to be expelled by unanimous vote for not fulfilling its obligations.

10. According to Article 19 the Pact may be amended by a two-thirds vote of the total members, and amendment "cannot be taken prior to the session following the session in which the motion was initiated." Any state unwilling to accept the amendment may withdraw.

11. Last, but not the least, the Pact does mention neither Articles 52-54, nor Article 51 of the U.N. Charter - a position
taken by the SEATO suggesting apparent similarity between them.

Assessment:

The pact aims at fostering security and economic cooperation among Arab States who are politically disunited, militarily weak, and industrially backward, but these drawbacks could not hinder their spirit of solidarity based on nationalism, freedom and anti-colonialism. An hot bed of cold war, the area has gained prominence also for its strategic position and oil resources.

During first ten years of its operation, 1945-1955, the League had to face various obstacles for smooth achievement of its principles. Among the problems, the Jewish one ranks first, for the League could not prevent creation of Jewish state - Israel in 1947. Not only the Jewish problem has remained unsolved, but also it has since then greatly been multiplied. The League was embroiled with the Jewish problem and formed a loose Arab Liberation Army for this purpose. Defense against Israel was their number one problem which consumed their major energy. The Council insisted on joint and united action with regard to Israel and on April 13, 1950 seven member-states of the League signed a joint Defense Pact to create a military political, and economic front of the Arab States and a system of automaticity was introduced in the defense pact. It also took exception to Jordan's

Foot Note: Despite apparent similarity on this point between SEATO and the Arab League, these two pacts do not conform to same structure, aim and ideology, for SEATO is a pact of the anti-Communist coalition led by the U.S. while the Arab League follows a policy of non-alignment and anti-colonialism.
annexation of any part of Palestine. In the secret meeting of the Political Committee of the Arab League held in Jan. 1951, the question of identification of the pact with either bloc was discussed when Iraq favoured that the members should ally themselves with the West, but Egypt took the stand of neutrality. The collective security pact was signed by all except Jordan. In a statement the League, on February 2, 1951, emphasised to uphold the principles of the U.N. in the matter of maintenance of international peace and security, and of peaceful settlement of disputes. It also affirmed the right of individual or collective self-defense, and principle of sovereign equality and non-intervention. In Sept. 1953, the Supreme Defense Council of the League held its meeting with the object of consolidating Arab unity for defending peace and security. The League played active role in the matter of attainment of independence by Yemen from Britain and also by Tunisia and Algeria from France. In its council meeting in June, 1954, it congratulated Egypt on signing of the agreement on Suez Canal Zone. The question of Egypt's arms deal with Czechoslovakia was discussed in March, 1955 when Iraq considered it hostile to Turkish-Iraqi Pact, for she was linked with NATO.

3. Middle Eastern Affairs, April, 1950 and May 1950.  
8. International Organisation, Vol.IX No.1  
On the issue of British, French and Israeli attack over Egypt in October, 1956, the League showed remarkable solidarity. In a communiqué issued in November, 1956, the members supported Egypt in her glorious fight against Anglo-French aggression and asserted Egyptian sovereignty over Suez, and demanded early withdrawal of Anglo-French troops from Egyptian soil. They also supported the demand of the Algerian people for independence. In November 1957, it decided to give financial aid to "Free Algerian" government, discussed United Kingdom's aggression against Oman, and Lebanese complaint of U.S. interference in her internal affairs. Egypt's decision to utilise the revenues of Suez Canal after nationalisation was fully approved by the Political Committee. The League aimed at close economic cooperation and, for that, proposal for establishment of Arab Common Market and Arab Development Bank was readily accepted. Egypt's relation with Iraq and Tunisia became strained, Iraq boycotted Casablanca meeting in Sept 1959, and both Iraq and Tunisia objected UAR domination in the Arab League. The Council approved U.A.R.'s closing of Suez Canal to Israeli ships, the meeting was attended for the first time by the Algerian Provisional Government. It condemned NATO countries for supporting French cause in Algeria. In December, 1960, the Economic Council decided to take measures of economic cooperation and to apply rigorous economic sanctions against France. In the meantime, Iraq has changed her hostile attitude

and resumed close political and military cooperation with the UAR. In the Arab Summit Conference held in Alexandria in Sept., 1964, following decision on joint defense measures, General Amir Ali was appointed as Commander-in-Chief of the joint Arab forces. In the Council meeting of Sept., 1963 they decided that Palestinian Military Units would be placed under the C-in-C for liberating Palestine. In Sept. 1965 the League expressed its determination to maintain solidarity of the Arab world, and reaffirmed its intention to strengthen unified Arab Command. It supported the principles of non-alignment and the general principles of the U.N. and the Bandung. It felt concern over Indo-Pak conflict and Vietnam. It expressed its support to the freedom movement of the peoples of Angola and Mosambique against Portuguese rule, denounced apartheid policy pursued by South Africa, minority rule in South Rhodesia; and supported Afro-Asian solidarity and the efforts of the OAU in their struggle against colonialism and zionism. In the meeting of the Arab Defense Council in December, 1966, Iraqi proposal for stopping oil supplies to all Western countries, so that, they might not send it again to Israel, was not accepted. In Sept. 1967, it affirmed that lands occupied by Israel in the 1967 - war are Arab lands which should be regained, by every means. After 1967 - war, the League insisted on strengthening

15. Current Documents, American Foreign Policy, 1965, Dept.of State.
common politico-military strategy against Israel, Nasser insisted on General Fawzi's mobilisation plans against Israel, but owing to refusal by Morocco, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia it did not materialise. Nasser again conferred with Lybia and Sudan in December, 1969 for greater politico-military cooperation with the object of meeting Israeli threat. The joint Defense Council in November, 1971, took secret resolutions declaring its intentions to fight against Israel with greater military and financial cooperation. The Lebanese delegate insisted on "Pan-Arabization of the battle." The Egyptian President warned Nixon against American plan to supply Israel with missiles but the U.S. denied.

In September, 1971, three new members - Bahrain, Quator, and Oman were admitted and the League's membership rose to seventeen. Kosygin and Sadat held talks and in a communiqué, October, 1971, they affirmed their desire for mutual cooperation and also to the cause of peace specially in the Middle East. It was held that the Arabs would achieve success in their "just struggle for national independence." In 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the Arab countries have demonstrated greater solidarity in their common cause of defeating Israel. The war has since been stopped by the U.N. with the cooperation of U.S. and the Soviet Union, and attempts are in process for peaceful solution of the problem.

Conclusion:

The Arab League was formed in a set-up different from

that of NATO or the Warsaw Pact which we have discussed earlier. Its main object was regional integration of Arab States for defense and economic cooperation which are also the professed aims of the pacts concluded by the communist and non-communist world. We have seen that there is a wide divergence between the professed aim with the actual operation of the pacts of both communist and non-communist coalition, but this divergence is meagre in the Arab League whose members have tenaciously endeavoured, even under odd circumstances, to act according to its declared principles, for they want to pursue a foreign policy keeping in line with the spirit of regionalism embodied in the U.N. Charter.

Some of the members have attained their independence recently from the colonial Powers, and naturally they want to uphold their independence, and this could be successfully maintained only by achieving solidarity among themselves who are economically under-developed, militarily weak, and politically disunited. Their ardent support of successful national liberation movements in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Oman is not only commendable from their own point of view but also completely in tune with the Declaration on Decolonisation made in the General Assembly on 24 October, 1972 which asserts "the legitimacy of the struggle of the colonial peoples and peoples under alien domination to exercise their right to self-determination and independence."

This pact has not been promoted either by the United States or the Soviet Union - the two main protagonists of power blocs. Not that they did make no attempt to include them in their respective orbits, but the members of the League resisted not unsuccessfully to remain out of either power bloc. This stance in a predominantly bi-polar world is rooted in non-alignment supported by Nehru and Nasser, and Egypt being the main state in this area was largely responsible for rejecting U.S. leadership in the Arab League. Egypt had to pay the penalty for Egypt's dislike for America in the form of withdrawal of U.S. assistance for Aswan dam. As a result, Egypt took a bold stand by nationalising the Suez Canal for utilising its revenues for construction of Aswan. Britain, France and Israel attacked Egypt as a challenge, but soon the aggressors submitted to U.N. plan and peace was restored mainly on Egyptian terms. The whole Arab League demonstrated its unity and support to Egypt - an example in the history of the Arab League. Egypt, although received arms assistance from socialist countries like Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, did not align with the communist camp or accept the Soviet lead. In the U.N. we have seen that in vital issues the United States has voted against Egypt, and the Soviet Union generally supported Egypt. But the tragedy is that although the members, avoided the super Powers, became involved in the cold war.

The members of this Pact have no ulterior motive of using it as a cloak to further their own interests than what proclaimed in the pact. All the members are occupants of the same area and the pact unlike NATO or SEATO demonstrates homogenity
as well as identity of aims and aspirations. This pact is directed against no state or no ideology, as such, there is no global strategy to fight against. It is primarily defensive and not concerned with furtherance of any ideology (not even of neutralism) by force. Excepting Israeli trouble it has tried to maintain international peace. It's plea of self-defense is genuine in the face of long Israeli hostility and the pact is more concerned with defense of Arab territory and sovereignty.

In dealing with Israel, it could not achieve success and this Arab-Israeli feud not only disturbed their mutual relations of peace and good neighbourliness, but also entire peace in that area. This was partly because of lack of adequate politico-military integration, as advocated by late President Nasser, for dealing with Israeli threat. The aggressive policy of Israel became a constant problem for the League, but the members could not take even appropriate economic measures aiming at preventing supply of oil to Israel through Western countries. The Palestinian Military Units were created for liberation of Palestine, now under Israeli occupation, but it has not yet materialised. The members have achieved considerable amount of economic cooperation through the creation of Arab Common Market, and Arab Financial Organisation.

Durable peace in that area could not be established without just solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the lines indicated by the U.N. Israel had not vacated large portion of Arab territory occupied in 7 day's war in 1967 and has openly
defied Security Council resolution 242 of 1967 recommending withdrawal from occupied territories. Not only the delegate of India, USSR, Egypt, Syrian Arab Republic, but also United Kingdom and France suggested speedy implementation of the said Security Council resolution affirming the principle of non-admissibility of acquisition of territory by force of arms. Upon a request made by Lebanon against Israeli aggression, the Security Council, in its resolution 316 of 1972, deplored "repeated attacks of Israeli forces on Lebanese territory and population in violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter." The said resolution was passed but abstention of the United States indicated that she was indirectly encouraging Israel. The United States was busy in stepping in that area on the ground of so-called power vacuum and enunciated the Eisenhower Doctrine but that was not favoured by the Arab States. The U.S. also vetoed a Security Council resolution on Sept. 10, 1967 when it decided to take action against Israel for alleged aggression on the territory of Lebanon and Syrian Arab Republic. Israel was not only flouting former U.N. resolutions aiming at establishing peace but also "destroying refugee shelters in the Gaza strip" meant for Palestine refugees and constructed as a part of relief and welfare programme by the U.N.agency.

The pact bears great prospects as a genuine regional organisation aiming not only self-defense but also positive support

to world peace. But it is equally true that owing to internal dissensions arising from dynastic rivalry, Egypt's leadership, and different economic interests and external threat of Israeli aggression, the pact could not achieve greater integration without which it would not be able to play the desired role in world politics. Internal political dissensions arising out of their urge for leadership have until the recent war (October, 1973) with Israel kept them disunited. It is only in the said war they demonstrated their solidarity in their attempt to regain their territory occupied by Israel. S.H. Longrigg has rightly observed that although there were urges for genuine sentimental, cultural, linguistic and religious unity of the Arab peoples, they were not sufficiently cooperative and unified to achieve political unity. Continuing he said that the Arab League has not fulfilled the hopes held at the times of its formation. J.S. Raleigh also observed that the sense of Arab Unity could not subdue "separate interest and aspirations of the various Arab States." The League, by creating a united front in the United Nations and serving as a pressure bloc to the West, has added psychological and moral stimulus to the Arab nations to stand to the need of the time. By overcoming these defects the League is gradually achieving desired amount of integration and unity of purpose required for an effective organisation. Moreover, it has cooperated with the U.N. in the vital task of maintaining international peace and security.


B. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU)

Background:

Reawakening of Africa from the shackles of imperialism and colonialism is a major event after the Second World War. It has filled the hearts of the new and independent African states not only to assert their newly-own independence but also to achieve their much-desired unity. Decolonisation in Africa has a long and bitter history, but the movement gained momentum after the Second World War when the British, French and Belgian colonial empires collapsed under the impact of freedom movements sponsored by the colonial and coloured peoples of Asia, Africa and elsewhere. The post-U.N. situation was largely unfavourable to the colonial powers who were bound to withdraw themselves from their dependencies either through peaceful transfer of power (India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia), or after some unsuccessful context (Indo-China, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia) See Foot Note."

With the birth of a large number of independent and sovereign states, the statesmen in Africa saw new opportunities to achieve their cherished goal of African unity. The idea of Pan-Africanism has become more dynamic than ever. Not only it has spear-headed national liberation movements in Africa, but also

Footnote: The conductive role of the United Nations in the matter of decolonisation should be mentioned and the U.N. is still endeavouring to attain independence for the Trust and Non-self-governing territories.
introduced a new force in international relations. It has not only put an end to colonialism and the theory of superior capacity of the imperialists, but also has with the entry of a large number of states, following a policy of non-alignment, changed the pattern of world politics.

The idea of African unity or Pan-Africanism developed through a series of Pan-African conferences and in the activities of Kwame Nkrumah and Jomo Kenyatta the movement gained the modern form. After independence of Ghana, in 1957, the movement to liberate the remaining parts of colonial Africa as well as to achieve their unity gained momentum. Two principal organisations - the conference of Independent African States (1958) and the All-African People's Conference (1960) arose to work towards these goals. Winning of political independence by a large member of African states during 1960-61 imparted further stimulus to the Pan-African movement. In this background thirty African Heads of State and Government took a decisive decision in the Addis Ababa Conference held from May 23-26, 1963 and drew the Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U.).

Main features:

1. Born with the blessing of the U.N. Secretary General, the Organisation of African Unity aims to promote unity and solidarity of the African people for whose well-being the U.N. has been making untiring efforts. It aims at emancipation of the colonial people

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and abolition of apartheid and in these two fields it has acted
colaterally with the United Nations.

2. It struck a balance of two important forces - one of
nationalism and the other of federalism. Dr. Nkruma of Ghana
fostered the idea of federalism and insisted on strong integra-
tion to form an "Union of African States". But Nigeria opposed
Ghanaian approach and favoured a looser form of organisation.
The Casablanca group favoured Ghanaian approach but the Honoriva
Powers lent their support to Nigeria.

3. The organisation aims at not only defending independence
of all African peoples, but also raising their standard of living
and developing their economic condition. Mutual cooperation and
mutual respect are the two principal pillars upon which the whole
organisation rests. Article 2 stipulates for all-round coopera-
tion including that for defence and security.

4. In Article 3 the principles of non-interference, peace-
ful settlement of disputes and non-alignment are affirmed.

5. According to Article 7 the principal organs of the
organisation are (a) Assembly of the Heads of state and Govern-
ment, (b) Council of Ministers, (c) the General Secretariat and
(d) Commission for Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration (See
also Article 19).

6. Article 8 provides that the Assembly of the Heads of
State shall be the supreme organ, discuss common matters of the
organisation and coordinate various activities. The Assembly
shall meet once a year and each valid resolution would be carried by two-thirds majority (Articles 9 and 10).

7. In terms of Article 11, the Council of Ministers shall consist of Foreign Ministers of others designated by the government, meet at least twice a year, and prepare conference of the Assembly.

8. Article 16 stipulates that the Administrative Secretary General appointed by the Assembly of the Heads of state shall be in charge of the secretariat.

9. According to Article 20 there shall be several specialised Commissions including Defence Commission and Economic Commission.

10. In terms of Article 32 any state may renounce its membership by a written notification to the Secretary General, and withdrawal becomes automatic at the end of one year from the date of such notification.

11. Article 33 provides for revision of the Charter. All the members have to duly notify the Secretary General regarding amendment which in order to be valid requires two-thirds majority of the members.

12. Lastly, the Liberation Committee is an important organ of the Organisation, and although not a part of the charter was created by resolution of the 1963 Summit Conference which created the Charter itself.
Assessment:

It is a special type of organisation and it made splendid moves to foster genuine cooperation among African States. The U.N. Secretary General U. Thant in his Annual Report for the period June 16, 1962 to June 15, 1963 supported the creation of the Organisation of African Unity. He specially mentioned moderate tone of the Charter, able statesmanship of the African leaders, and their desire to be loyal to the U.N. Charter and to promote international cooperation according to the principles of the U.N. Charter and Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The first meeting of the Organisation was held in Cairo in July, 1964 when 33 out of 34 members attended, the republic of Congo (Leopoldville) did not attend. It condemned South Africa's apartheid policy being "incompatible with its political and moral obligations as a Member state of the United Nations." It recalled the members to implement decision on racial discrimination against South Africa reached in May, 1963. It called "the African States to take a vigorous stand against declaration of independence of South Rhodesia by a European minority government." The members declared their intention to renounce war and use of armed forces except in self-defense. They also adopted a resolution on demuclearisation of Africa, requested the Adhoc Commission of the O.A.U. to continue the work on settlement of border
dispute between Algeria and Morocco,\(^8\) and made a declaration on status of territorial integrity of Basutoland, Bachualand and Swaziland.\(^9\) They passed a resolution in promoting the unity and solidarity of African states, and entered into an agreement on Sept., 10, 1964 on the establishment of African Development Bank, signed at Khartoum in August, 1963.\(^10\) The OAU supported U.N. measures against South Africa and Portugal. In 1963 and 1964, it has stood solemnly by the side of the U.N. OAU's African Liberation Committee (Committee of Nine) was formed for fighting, training and propaganda in colonial areas.\(^11\) The OAU held its meeting in Accra in October, 1965, when it discussed the problem of refugees in Africa and adopted a resolution.\(^12\) It expressed its firm determination to oppose outside subversion against any member.\(^13\) It also discussed the work of the Liberation Committee and congratulated the committee towards liberation of African territories.

Cooperation with the United Nations in economic and security matters is earnestly carried out by the OAU on the basis of a General Assembly resolution dt. Oct., 11, 1965 seeking cooperation of the OAU.\(^14\) In compliance with a request dt. 23 Sept., 1965 from Algeria, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Ghana, Morocco, United Arab Republic and others requesting inclusion in agenda of items of the 20th session of the General Assembly, it invited the Administrative Secretary General of the OAU to attend the sessions of

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8. OAU doc. CM/Res. 37(III).
9. OAU doc. AHG/Res. 12(I).
13. OAU doc. AHG/Res. 27.
the Assembly as an observer for greater cooperation between the
two organisations.\textsuperscript{15} Subsequently, on November 15, 1965, an agree-
ment was signed by the OAU and the United Nations Economic Commi-
sion for Africa (ECA).\textsuperscript{16} The OAU Assembly welcomed the General
Assembly’s resolution and requested the Administrative Secretary
General of the OAU to do his best for attaining cooperation with
the United Nations in matters of common interest.\textsuperscript{17} The OAU also
affirmed to support the activities of the Liberation Committee of
nine and insisted on launching liberation movement in each coun-
tries. Peaceful settlement of intra-member disputes is an impor-
tant function of the OAU which sent a mission to resolve the
dispute between Ghana and Guinea.\textsuperscript{18} The OAU also considered the
problems of South West Africa. It welcomed the U.N. resolution
2145 (XXI) and stated that it considered continued dominance of
South West Africa by South Africa an illegal military occupation
of an African sister country, and called all members to put an
end to that.\textsuperscript{19} The General Assembly requested the U.N. High Commi-
sisioner for Refugees to act in cooperation with the OAU to increase
assistance to the refugees from the territories under Portuguese
domination.\textsuperscript{20} The Nigerian case was discussed by the OAU when
it adopted a resolution on Sept. 13, 1967 affirming its desire
for territorial integrity and peace in Nigeria.\textsuperscript{21} The OAU noted with pleasure the joint declaration, by Kenya and Somalia, by which they have peacefully settled the dispute in the spirit of the Charter of the OAU.\textsuperscript{22} Dean Rusk, former Secretary of State, in his testimony before the U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Committee expressed his support for the OAU.\textsuperscript{23} A part of Nigeria seceded in May 1967 to form a new territory Biafra, and this caused trouble to the Nigerian government. The OAU Assembly, discussed the Biafran issue and adopted a resolution in Sept. 1967 condemning secession of states and affirming their integrity.\textsuperscript{24} The United Nations Special Committee on Decolonisation continued its relentless fight against Portuguese colonialism in achieving self determination and independence for the people of Guinea (Bissau) and in its efforts it sought valuable cooperation of the OAU.\textsuperscript{25} The Administrative Secretary General of the OAU expressed satisfaction at the visit of the liberated areas of Guinea (Bissau) by the Special Committee on Decolonisation.\textsuperscript{26} The Chairman (Special Committee on Apartheid) observed that in the recent meeting of the OAU in Rabat, in which he attended, the African states were united in their condemnation of South

\textsuperscript{21} OAU doc. AEG/Res. 51(IV)
\textsuperscript{22} OAU doc. AHG/S.T.1.
\textsuperscript{24} American Foreign Policy, Current Documents, 1967, pp. 254-55.
\textsuperscript{26} U.N. Monthly Chronicle, June, 1972.
Africa's harmful policy. It was recommended by the Special Committee on Decolonisation that the General Assembly should render possible assistance to the peoples in colonial territories with the cooperation of OAU. Ghana, an important member of the OAU in a statement made to the twenty seventh session of the General Assembly supported the Liberation Committee so that it could achieve its aims. In view of OAU's active cooperation with the U.N. the former is making steady progress in different fields.

Conclusion:

From the above assessment of the operation of the OAU we may reach the conclusion that the organisation very nearly approaches the type of regional arrangement conceived by the framers of the U.N. Charter. It has not only expressed its unflinching faith in the principles and purposes of the U.N. but also had taken pains to work out these principles and decisions of the U.N. in actual practice. It follows the United Nations both in letters and spirit. We have noticed that the United Nations on various occasions have sought cooperation of the OAU in its fight against apartheid and colonialism. The United Nations had adopted a policy of decolonisation, which has found support not only by the members of the OAU but also other states including Haiti,

Japan, Australia, Nepal, India, Canada, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. Owing to identical policy of the U.N. and the OAU, both have increased their sphere of cooperation than of any other regional organisation (NATO or Warsaw Pact) which seeks justification to evade the responsibility imposed upon it. In a sense, the Organisation of African Unity not only represents progressive and just principles of international law but also acts as a body complimentary to the U.N. The NATO or Warsaw Pact has sometimes acted independently and openly violated the decisions of the U.N. on some pretext or other, but the OAU has acted in close collaboration with the principles of the U.N. It does not seek to expand regional principle at the cost of the UN.

The organisation aims at true regional co-operation for achieving wellbeing, and independence of the African states which were exploited for two or three centuries by the imperialist powers. In its attempt to secure economic development and unity, its level of performance has been fairly good, and provide scope for further success through greater unity and solidarity by harnessing the elements of disruption and discord. To quote Francis O. Wilcox, "Unlike the OAS the OAU has not been involved in any jurisdictional squabbles in connection with collective measures." It has solved some disputes among members (between Kenya and Somalia, and Algeria and Morocco) and, this not only created a peaceful atmosphere within the organisation, but also largely


contributed to the general cause of international peace. Like NATO or Warsaw-type regional organisations, the organisation does not use the clause of self defense or defense for aggressive purposes, for, they themselves being victims of yesterday's aggression, do not like to put others today in their former position. The underlying reason of this just and peaceful attitude largely lies in their non-aligned status in international relations and thereby remaining uncommitted to either of the two power blocs. Its emergence has strengthened the uncommitted or non-aligned bloc to exercise greater influence in world affairs in the strenuous task of building a peaceful world with just principles. The OAU has also some defects which deserve attention. Prof. Rupert Emerson has criticised Pan-Africanism as "charged with emotion", and lacking knowledge of reality. 33 Recent trends in OAU demonstrate that some of OAU states are ruled by Generals and this fact coupled with discord among the members have prevented it from achieving greater integration and unity required in its challenging task.

In fine, the merits outweigh the defects, for it mainly aims at world peace by placing greater reliance on the U.K. and also by directing the activities of the organisation in conformity with U.N. principle of maintaining international peace.

C. **Bandung**

It is the first Afro-Asian conference aimed at defining their common attitude with relation to international affairs and also for fostering closer cooperation in economic, cultural and political fields. The conference was organised by five sponsoring powers viz., India, Burma, Ceylon, Pakistan and Indonesia who met at Bogor in December, 1954 for preliminary settlement. The conference was held at Bandung (Indonesia), April 18-23, 1955, and attended by twenty-nine important states including Afghanistan, Cambodia, Peoples Republic of China, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, the Philippines, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, State of Vietnam and Yemen. Dr. Sastroamidjojo, the Prime Minister of Indonesia presided over the conference.

Attended by surprisingly large number of countries the conference was unique in its character. It represented not only diversity of race and religion but also of opinion and social system, but they focussed some common attitude in their determination to socio-economic cooperation and condemnation of imperialist or colonial powers. Some of its members (Cambodia, Pakistan, South Vietnam, Japan and Communist China) even though participated with anti-communist or communist security system, participated in the conference.

The following factors prompted the participants to make this grand assembly. Firstly, the spirit of independence and effervescent nationalism, after long and painful subjugation by...
colonial powers found an outlet at Bandung. "The Bandung Con-
ference", says Carlos P. Romulo; "was really a first flowering of the
spirit of this new Asia and Africa." They wanted to proclaim
their independence and sovereign status by exercising their right
to act independently and collectively. Secondly, they posed a
silent revolt against European-dominated power politics of the
world. The unassuming demand was that Europe should recognise
them with due honour and be made a responsible partner in the
structure of world politics. That their importance be felt in
the international field they wanted. Thirdly, they served notice
on the European Powers, so that, they might withdraw their dogma
of "white man's burden." This reflected their self-confidence
which they must cultivate and maintain in order to have an osten-
sible meaning of their declaration. Fourthly, they do not want
to establish colonies or exploit peoples, rather they themselves
stand against such activities. They want to live and let others
live on the principles of peaceful co-existence. They are ge-
nuinely concerned for world peace than the Super Powers. Although
some of them were aligned to colonial powers or members of region-
al pacts they were equally emphatic to proclaim the said aims.
Fifthly, a considerable majority, notably, India, Ceylon, Burma,
Egypt, Indonesia and Afghanistan, of the participants are ardent
adherents of non-alignment, and by their policies and actions
they have prevented themselves to be identified or committed to
either of the two blocs which divides the world. They do not

34. Carlos P. Romulo - The Meaning of Bandung, University of North
Carolina, 1956, p.53.
support either of the rival blocs but their stand has been undeniable by the two power blocs.

Declaration at Bandung, 24th April, 1955

The salient features of the Declaration are as follows and embodied in a communique. A. The members stressed the need of economic cooperation for development of industrial strength of this area through every possible means. B. They also envisaged cultural cooperation for "promoting understanding among nations" and condemned denial of cultural rights in some parts by the colonial powers. C. The U.N. Charter on Human Rights was accepted as the standard and they deplored any form of racialism and discrimination. They stood for self-determination of the Asian - African peoples. D. They declared that colonialism with its attendant evils "should speedily be brought to an end," as subjugation is very contrary to the fundamental freedom of humanity. E. They urged that the problems which have created tensions in several parts of the world be peacefully solved and peace is restored. F. They aspired for world peace and mutual cooperation and intended to work for the cause of peace. To this end they specifically adhered to the urgent need of disarmament and also prohibition of use and manufacture of atomic weapons. G. They gave further emphasis on world peace through some commonly accepted principles — known as the Five Principles (or Panch Sila). These Principles were re-stated by Nehru and contained the basic

norms of a justiciable world order. These are (1) mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) mutual non-aggression; (3) mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; (4) equality, and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful co-existence. By way of elaboration of these principles they adopted a Declaration on World Peace and Cooperation in which they also affirmed their loyalty to the U.N., their intention for peaceful settlement of international disputes and their determination to prevent collective defense arrangements "to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers."

Assessment: Its principles are good and commendable but this does not correct the inherent deficiencies to which it is subjected to. Taking an account of the liability side we may note the following. First, its aims were magnificent, but lacking adequate machinery these were merely solemn declarations. It could not set up any permanent machinery for achieving these aims. Second, the participant members varied so widely in their interests and attitudes that hardly there was any unity of purpose. For example, Pakistan and India - two sponsoring members seemingly possess different interests, and Ceylon's attitude towards Russia is very much harder than that of India. Sir John Kotelwalla of Ceylon called Russia an imperialist power to which Indian Prime Minister Nehru very much objected. Third, majority of the states lacked adequate military and economic strength to make their declaration effective, rather they were largely dependent upon Western Powers for building their economy. Fourth, the Conference could not stop aggression or conflicts, e.g. Sino-Indian
disputes of 1962, Indo-Pak conflict of 1965 or Vietnam war, although parties to these disputes are also members of the Conference. Fifth, this irritated the western powers although they outwardly commended the principles. Moreover, this was very much underrated by the Western Powers who did not like to let their importance belittled.

Mr. Carlos P. Romulo saw in the Bandung "a new spiritual unity of Asia and Africa."³⁶ Almost in the same spirit Nehru emphasised independence of Asia and Africa. But these eloquent commendations on Bandung were hindered by internal weakness. Due to divided interests and lack of any permanent machinery these principles could not be implemented. In reality, the objectives were asserted, but for want of united effort or adequate organisational set-up these could not be attained.

Some events after 1955 in the Asian sub-continent, especially Sino-Indian border dispute of 1962 and Indo-Pak conflict in 1965 struck a heavy blow on Bandung. Moreover, inherent contradictions among Afro-Asian States, Sino-Soviet rift, and interference by Big Powers made the difference between the members so wide that Indonesia's proposal to hold a second meeting of Bandung was coolly received by most of the countries. It is no surprise that Dulles, although called Bandung an event of decisive importance,³⁷ interpreted it in terms of its efficacy to serve as a

³⁷. Documents, Ibid.
check against Communism, but, in fact, it is based on the principle of non-alignment.

Conclusion:

The Bandung Conference is significant for more than one respect. Although the members had no common organisational structure to pursue their declared principles, they held their loyalty to the non-aligned principle. The principle of non-alignment was further affirmed in Cairo conference and Belgrade conference. The impact, it produced in the international field, is of supreme value in a bipolar world. To quote E.B.Haas and A.S. Whiting, "The net impact of the bloc's international position has been a reversal of the trend toward bipolarisation of power and ideology." The moral appeal of Bandung principles was profound, and following Bandung, almost half the world affirmed its principles. This principle found expression in Article 3(VII) of the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Commending this principle O.T.Elias observes it as a desirable policy and "the only possible one for developing countries."

Even the major Powers were influenced by this in their attempt to devise means of peaceful co-existence through the U.N. Besides ideological impact, it impelled the non-aligned Powers to play a conducive role in the matter of peace-keeping work in Korea, Congo, Cyprus and the Middle East. It stood upright as a great force in international cooperation. Cecil V. Crabb rightly

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opines that the Great Powers 'needed' "the neutralist community and had to some extent become dependent on it to prevent diplomatic or military confrontation from turning into a full-scale war." 40