THE COMMUNIST WORLD (THE WARSAW PACT)

Introduction:

We have discussed in the preceding chapter regional defense pacts organised by Western Powers comprising non-Communist world and after examination of the said pacts have stated our conclusions. The most cardinal factor of the Communist Camp is its faith Communist (or Socialist) ideology and aversion to Western type of democracy called "Capitalist democracy." In the Communist bloc, Communist ideology is considered sacred and all other matters of alliance are consequently governed by ideological considerations. The Party Secretary has not only a distinctive position but also definite and sometimes predetermined role to play in the whole system of communist alliance. The Party Congress of the Communists consolidates the Communist States and the Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party plays a vital role in determining the shape of the alliance [See Foot Note].

The Communist world, in a sense, is the result of historical process posing itself as a contradictory doctrine of capitalism. It has now put greater reliance on state craft pursued by the Western powers and has organised the Communist coalition

Foot Note: This differs in different cases - the Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party exercises greater control with regard to Warsaw Pact-Member-States, but with regard to China, Yugoslavia and Albania Soviet control is questionable.
to make the polarisation complete. In short, it has accelerated formation of bi-polar pattern of world politics. Perpetuation of control over the Communist bloc in global struggle against the non-Communist powers is a major aspect of the Communist bloc which has built up an alliance system for professed aim of defense. We shall now discuss one of the main pacts - the Warsaw Pact of the communist world.

Background:

Soviet desire to secure control of the Danubian basin and the Baltic region for strategic, military and economic reasons dates back from the days of Czars. The Crimean war, in a sense, could not check Soviet expansion. The Soviet Union, after the Revolution ingeniously attempted to secure hold of the neighbouring states for fulfilling her objectives. In East Europe, she utilised common cultural and linguistic affinities to attain her purpose under the banner of Pan-Slavism; and in some cases supplemented by the impact of tremendous economic and military strength upon the weak and small states to be purposely drawn into her "sphere of influence" [See Foot Note.]

By 1944, the Red Army was almost in virtual control of the Eastern Europe, and the Allies, who according to Walter Lippman "became grossly dependent for their security upon the power

Foot Note: The United States enunciated Monroe Doctrine for legalising her slogan of Pan-Americanism, and then after a series of acts she developed the present Inter-American system. Unlike Pan-Americanism, Pan-Slavism is less of contractual nature but this shortcoming is compensated by greater ideological affinity.
of the Red Army," could not override Russian supremacy. As such, Anglo-American influence to oust Russian hegemony from Eastern Europe became largely futile and the Declaration of Liberated Europe was shelved in the archives. At Yalta, a compromise was reached but at the cost of large concessions to the Soviets. Even after that the relation between the Soviets and the Allies became shaky and new cracks appeared. During 1946 and 1947 the Allies thought that they could not find a honourable solution with the Soviets, and accepted the 1945 - position as fiat accompli. This complacent attitude on the part of the Allies encouraged growth of the Soviet orbit through political, economic, military and ideological bonds. This resulted in hardening of altitude of both the parties who drew further away from each other and thus polarisation was made complete.

With the object of strengthening and consolidating the communist camp on Marxist - Leninist doctrines, the Russians went on vigorously, but this was vehemently opposed by the Allies. The Russians by 1947-48 succeeded in consolidating their position in Eastern Europe through a network of bilateral treaties of friendship and cooperation concluded with Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Jugoslavia, and Finland. Consequent upon guaranteeing of Austrian neutrality and termination of Soviet occupation of Austria, Russia legally integrated East Germany (GDR) "into the Soviet commonwealth and thereby called for a new justification for continued presence of Soviet troops in East Germany."

On the eve of Paris Accord 1954, which authorised re-militarisation of West Germany and her inclusion in NATO, the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact-powers issued on December 2, 1954 a warning to the Western Powers that in the event of ratification of the Paris Agreement, they would "take joint measures in the organisation of their armed forces and commands, and also other measures necessary for strengthening of their defensive abilities." Inspite of that warning the Paris Agreement was duly ratified by the Western Powers and the Western European Union came into being. This served as the raison d'etre of the Warsaw conference resulting in conclusion of the Warsaw Treaty. Modelled after NATO the Warsaw Pact is the direct counterpart of NATO. It is the result of a "Conference of European countries of safeguarding Peace and Security in Europe" held in Warsaw from May 11-14, 1955, attended by Soviet Russia and leading East European states with an observer from Communist China. On May 14, 1955, the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (commonly called Warsaw Treaty Organisation) was signed by Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. Justifying the creation of Warsaw Pact Mr. Bulganin on 11 May, 1955, criticised re-militarisation of West Germany not only dangerous to the peace of Europe, but also a great hurdle to the cause of German re-unification, and in view of this imminent danger, the Warsaw Pact-Powers, in exercise of their right of individual and collective self-defense accorded by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter have bound themselves through this treaty. He deplored the policy of 'positions of strength'
but at the same time defended his policy as a 'retaliatory measure' and they were compelled to take such defensive measures for the reason that military blocs were set up against them and were threatened with atomic war.2

Main features of the Warsaw Pact:

The Warsaw Pact is the direct counterpart of NATO; Mr. Baldwin calls it "Communist NATO."3 It made formal institutionalisation of Soviet Russia's relation with East European states which had already concluded bi-lateral treaties with the Soviet Union. The states of Eastern Europe are bound with the Soviet Union through a network of nearly twenty bi-lateral treaties reinforced with the doctrine of cominform. Further, the admission of West Germany on May 9, 1955 in the N.A.T.O. Council and inauguration of the West European Union on May 7, 1955, were taken as a big question, the reply of which was readily given in the Warsaw Pact.

(1) In the novel Preamble of the treaty the members register their urgency for "the organisation of a system of collective security in Europe, with the participation of all the European states, irrespective of their social and state systems..." for securing peace of Europe. Admittance of West Germany in NATO and creating of Western European Union were considered as deterrent to the cause of European security. The declaration of the intention

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2. For Mr. Bulganin's speech see Documents on International Affairs, 1955, R.I.I.A., London.
of a system of collective security for all Europe is novel although difficult to attain. The second para sets the causes of formation of the treaty. A casual reference to the principles of the U.N. Charter is also made in the construction of the treaty.

(2) In Article 1, they affirm their implicit faith in the U.N. by pledging to refrain from use or threat of force in their international relations. They also declare in Article 2 not only to cooperate in maintenance of international peace and security, but also to take effective measures for "reduction of armaments," and prohibition of atomic or hydrogen weapons. The inclusion of disarmament clause is uncommon to other Western-oriented or Soviet-oriented security pacts. See Foot Note.

(3) Articles 3 and 4 form the heart of the treaty. In case of an armed attack, when any one of them may determine the presence of a threat, the parties according to Article 3 intend to confer among themselves in the matter of organising their defense. But Article 3 does not leave scope of action which is reserved for Article 4.

The pact is based on Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, in terms of Article 4 which stipulates that in the event of an armed

Foot Note: The problem of disarmament is a vexed as well as complicated one. In the League era, the scheme for disarmament did not succeed. The question of disarmament was taken up by the members of the U.N. with avowed seriousness; the Disarmament Conference had been working for a long time but the great Powers have achieved agreement to a very small area of the problem. With the creation and maintenance of rival military pacts championed by Super Powers, the states have practically accelerated the armament race.
attack against one or several members, each member shall "in the exercise of individual or collective self-defense" render assistance, including use of its armed forces to the victim. At the same time, they also pledge to "advise" the Security Council of the actions taken, and "these measures shall be stopped as soon as the Security Council has taken the necessary measures for restoring and upholding international peace and security."

(4) Another outstanding feature that they "have agreed on the establishment of a joint command for their armed forces is contained in Article 5. This NATO-like joint command shall be responsible for safeguarding the inviolability and security of the participants' states. The first Commander-in-Chief would be Marshal Konev of the Soviet Union and the military leader of the participating states would be deputies to him, the Headquarters of the United Armed Forces would be set-up at Moscow.

(5) Article 5 provides for the establishment of a "Political Consultative Committee," composed of representatives of each states for the purpose of facilitating implementation of the treaty. This provision serves as a political guide-link of the alliance for focussing political nature of the alliance as NATO does.

(6) Under Article 7, the parties agree not to enter "into any coalitions and alliances" whose aims are contrary to the provisions of this treaty. At the same time, they declared that their international obligations (with regard to the U.N. and other international agreements) remain unimpaired.
(7) The parties in terms of Article 8 agree to act in "the spirit of friendship and cooperation" for developing economic and cultural relations between them by "adhering to the principles of mutual respect for their independence and sovereignty and of non-interference in internal affairs."

(8) Article 9 of the Treaty contains a novel feature, hitherto not found in Western regional pacts, by making the "treaty open to be acceded by other states - irrespective of their social and state systems." By this, the treaty makes an indirect invitation to the Western powers to lend their efforts for the declared purpose of safeguarding international peace and security. Of course, accession would hardly be possible without the consent of at least major parties.

(9) According to Article 11, the present treaty shall remain in force for twenty years, and any party may withdraw by submitting notice one year before its expiry, otherwise, "it shall remain in force throughout the following ten years."

(10) Last, but not the least, the treaty visualises "the establishment of system of collective security in Europe", and upon the conclusion of a General European Treaty, a goal which they strive for, the present treaty shall lapse "from the date on which the General European Treaty comes into force."

**Western reaction to Warsaw Pact**

The conclusion of Warsaw pact was an event of paramount importance to the Western Powers who since 1949, for the first time,
came to realise that the Warsaw Pact, in effect, was created by
the Russians mainly as a military counterpart of NATO. The Russians,
in this Pact consolidated their position to the utter displeasure
of the Western Powers who had so long enjoyed an unique position
in Europe by uniting themselves through the Atlantic Pact. The
Western Powers and specially NATO branded it as an aggressive
colalition of the Soviets and her Eastern European satclites. As
to the special provisions of the treaty by which the Western Powers
could secure their entrance to it, the Western Powers characterised
it as unreal, for absence of modus vivendi of the Pact would make
it unworkable as a security arrangement. Moreover, the idea of
conclusion of a European security treaty was also unnecessary as
the area (Europe) is already covered by the United Nations collec­
tive security system [See Foot Note]. In fine, the Western Powers
rejected Russian proposals as unreal and unnecessary and took the
Warsaw Pact as a challenge to NATO.

Assessment :

The conclusion of Warsaw Pact in 1955 was considered by
the Western Powers as a challenge to their collective security
arrangement devised through NATO. But, it represents politico-
security integration modelled after NATO which after admission of

4. The NATO Hand Book - The Noith Atlantic Treaty Organisation

Foot Note: Since then there had been dramatic changes in the
European situation and following U.S.-Soviet detente talks of an
European Security System has already begun in Helsinki on July 3,
1973 participated by 34 Foreign Ministers from Europe, the USA and
Canada.
remilitarised West Germany supplied the Soviet Union and her allies necessary impetus to form the pact in Eastern Europe.

In the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee held in Prague, in January, 1956, the members decided admission of East German army to the unified command of the pact with certain reservations. It held that neither East Germany nor West Germany should possess atomic weapons, and the NATO and Warsaw Pact should resolve their differences peacefully. The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) which bears striking similarity with Western European Economic organisations, is aimed at mutual economic cooperation among Warsaw-Pact-powers. In the meeting of the COMECON in May, 1956 (China and Yugoslavia attended as observers), the members took a programme of mutual economic cooperation. The Political Consultative Committee held its meeting in May, 1958, which was attended by all, and communist China attended as an observer. It heard a report of the Soviet Commander-in-Chief (Marshal-Konev) of the joint armed forces of the pact. It approved withdrawal of Soviet troops from Rumania, and reduction of Soviet troops from Hungary. Reviewing East-West situation, it submitted proposal for non-aggression pact between NATO and W.T.O. It also spoke highly of the deterrent value of the pact in the face of NATO. It advocated admission of communist China to the U.N. and criticised nuclear explosions by Britain and the U.S. In the next meeting of the Committee held in Moscow,

5. Keesings, 1956-57, p.14704
in February, 1960, the general international situation was reviewed, and it was held that West Germany which was supplied nuclear weapons by NATO-Powers, would be danger to peace. It also affirmed its readiness to sign non-aggression pact with NATO. This meeting was significant in the sense it was attended by observers from North Vietnam and Mongolia. In March, 1961, the Committee held its meeting; in the communique it was held that in the interest of securing peace, it was necessary to eliminate the remnants of the Second World War by concluding a peace treaty between both the German states, and to demilitarise Western Berlin and to make it a free city. The next meeting of the pact was held in Moscow in June, 1962; it was attended by seven members and in view of rift with Albania she did not participate. The Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr. Gromyko informed the delegates that talks were held between the governments of USSR and USA regarding peaceful settlement of German question. All the representatives supported the viewpoint of the USSR and they wanted that Soviet-American talks should continue for finding possibility of solving this question. Mr. Krushchev, Soviet Premier during his visit to East European countries during June-July, 1963 called for signing of a German peace treaty and also suggested that states with different social systems could peacefully coexist. Relations between Albania and the Soviet Union deteriorated and she drew closer to communist China. Chou-En-lai visited Albania when the Prime Minister of Albania strongly attacked Mr. Krushchev's proposal for a non-aggression

pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The committee held its next meeting in Moscow in July, 1963, all the members except Albania attended. It held that in view of continued activities of NATO, the members of the Warsaw Pact decided to strengthen themselves, and so they made plan of some military exercises. In January, 1965, the Committee held it meeting in Warsaw; seven nations participated and Albania was absent. The members expressed concern over nuclear powers of NATO and they felt that it was a serious threat to peace in Europe and the world. They demanded that Western Powers should stop their plans to create a nuclear force, and to arm F.R.G. with nuclear weapons. The Committee held its meeting in Bucharest in July, 1966, attended by seven members. They made a declaration about strengthening peace and security in Europe. On 6th July they signed a declaration with regard to U.S. aggression in Vietnam supporting the Vietnamese stand. They also appealed to the governments of all states to do everything possible for putting an end of U.S. aggression in Vietnam and to reduce the international tension and thus normalise international relations. As relations with Albania did not improve she resigned from the W.T.O. in September, 1968. In the meeting held in Sofia in March, 1968, the members took note

of criminal actions of American imperialists as an expansion of American aggression in Vietnam, and urged that the U.S. must put an end to the aggression in Vietnam. They appealed to all states to put an end to U.S. aggression in Vietnam. In March, 1969, the Committee held its meeting in Budapest when it called the European countries of having an all-European conference on security and collaboration. The members expressed their support to the operation of the new joint armed forces and joint command of the W.T.O. With a view to consolidating Warsaw-Pact-countries under Soviet management, Mr. Brezhnev put forward his doctrine of "limited sovereignty" for regulation of relations among the socialist states. The doctrine emphasised that consolidation of socialism was more important than enjoyment of independence. But, Rumania and Czechoslovakia repudiated so-called Brezhnov Doctrine and attacked Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. The Rumanian President asserted that doctrine of "limited sovereignty" was incompatible with Marxism - Leninism. President Tito also repudiated Brezhnev doctrine. In the meeting held in Bucharest in February, 1971, the members emphasized the need for calling an European security conference. They held that NATO Powers, by

17. Ibid. 1968, p.443.

This doctrine was used as pretext for making intervention in Warsaw-Pact-states with the stated object of consolidating socialism, but actually for removing anti-socialist (Soviet) elements.
their insistence on prior solution of the Berlin problem, were causing "serious obstacle". The most startling development in the pact was Rumania's growing divergence with the Soviet Union on ideological grounds. Advocating ideological flexibility in the socialist camp, Rumania held that her stand was not incompatible with socialism. The Rumanian President openly affirmed independence from the implications of the Brezhnev doctrine and expressed his desire to improve relations with the United States and China.

Conclusion:

The Warsaw Pact is a strongly integrated politico-security pact organised by the Soviet Union. It is the direct counterpart of NATO. Like NATO, it aims at both defence and deterrence in a most vital part of the world - the Europe, representing politico-ideological struggle between Western Powers and the Soviet Union.

The Pact formalised Soviet alliance - structure in the height of cold war in an area where the Soviets had already established politico-military control. Based on communist ideology, the Pact divided Europe, as previously observed by Churchill, by drawing an "iron curtain." The Soviet Union, as the main promoter of the communist system has played a part important to none, for the other members of the pact were not in a position to exercise same of amount of influence in shaping the pattern of the pact [See Foot Note]. The pact, in comparison to NATO, appears to be


Foot Note: E.N. Van Kleffens observes that the Warsaw Pact furnishes an example of a coerced pact. See also subsequent discussion - Comparative Study of Western and Soviet Pacts.
more rigid in view of ideological and military pretension which
the Soviet Union is keen to maintain. From the Soviet point of
view, the pact is result of NATO's aggressive policy against the
Soviet Union which thought herself entitled to organise the Soviet
c bloc in matters of defense and security. Already through bi-
lateral security pacts with East European States, the Soviet Union
had concluded a network of defense facts for consolidating the
bloc.

But these apparent achievements of the alliance are
partial and full of contradictions. Moreover, as we shall see
these have been designed not for contributing to the greater cause
of global peace according to the principles of the U.N. Charter.

This is a pact participated by a Super Power and in this
case, the Soviet Union holds a commanding position in relation to
other members who are small powers. It is lacking reciprocity
and in the field of defense, and the assistance being one-sided
from the Soviet Union, it may be termed as an assistance-type pact
but not fully conforming to SEATO-type pact. It is an undeniable
fact that with regard to military strength the weak states (Hungary,
Poland, Czechoslovakia) are no match for the Soviet Union which is
a Big Power. In short, the members of the pact are lacking mili-
tary and economic strength comparable to the Soviet Union and this
disparity has given greater leverage to the Soviet Union in design-
ing the shape of the alliance.

Owing to lack of identical national aims and interests
between the smaller Powers and the Soviet Union, the raison d'être of the pact is of questionable value. The small and weak powers are not responsive to Soviet insistence on greater integration on the principle of Brezhnev's doctrine of "limited sovereignty" which is nothing but a cloak to extend Soviet control. Brezhnev urged for consolidation of socialism than on independence. Rumania and Czechoslovakia denounced Brezhnev doctrine in clear terms; and the Rumanian President went so far as to assert that the doctrine of "limited sovereignty" was incompatible with the principles of Marxism-Leninism. See Foot Note. This suggests that the small powers seek to register their independence and throw away ideological rigidity even without withdrawing from the pact. Albania's defection from the pact in 1968 and her leaning towards China in view of her disagreement with the Soviet Union on several issues and particularly on Soviet intervention of Czechoslovakia is significant. These are glaring inconsistencies which the Soviet Union could not resolve. The members have been pressing for a more important status, than hitherto enjoyed in the pact. Prof. Osgood rightly suggests that Rumania in W.T.O. plays the role of France in NATO.


Foot Note: The United States enunciated several doctrines notably, Monroe doctrine for Latin America, Truman Doctrine for Europe and Eisenhower Doctrine for the Middle East with the purpose of extending U.S. hegemony. The Brezhnev Doctrine also seeks to extend greater Soviet control.


The professed aim of the pact is to render immediate armed assistance to the state in the case of an armed attack with the object of safeguarding security. Thus it seeks to function mainly as a regional security pact, and also for promoting peace in Europe. It aims at development of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance. During its life of 18 years the pact could not find any opportunity to thwart "armed attack" for there was no outside attack. The pact aims at peaceful means and deplores threat or use of force in international relations. But the Soviet Union, since its inception had armed the states with large weapons including atomic and thereby had set the arms race on motion. This had created a constant tension which aims to disrupt peace instead of strengthening it.

Although the pact aims at maintaining international peace, it has, in actual practice, failed in that responsible task. It could neither solve the problems of German reunification nor of European security. Soviet Union's insistence on two-German theory is calculated to maintain tension in Europe and to invigorate the cold war. In the internal field, Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968 amounted to gross violation of sovereign and independent rights having international effects, of the member-states guaranteed by the pact itself. It ran counter to the principles of freedom and liberty.

Attempt by the Soviet Union to use the Warsaw pact as a cloak to serve her own interests in strengthening her position
in the global strategy against the Western Powers - is revealed.
Soviet Union's repressive measures against Hungary and Czechoslovakia were taken only to the cause of serving Soviet Union's interests and not for consolidating socialism, for, Western penetration into Hungary and Czechoslovakia would be against Soviet's interests. In the Hungarian crisis it has been revealed that the Soviet Union refused to extend her cooperation to the U.N. and failed to implement the resolutions on Hungary. The finding of the U.N. Special Committee on Hungary also clearly suggested that Soviet Union paid very scant respect to the purposes and principles of the U.N.

The claim by the Soviet Union that the Warsaw pact is a defensive pact with peaceful intentions is hardly tenable. As noted, it heavily relies on armaments with the object of repelling any attack. Here the word "defense" is used only to give a defensive label to the pact and the plea of self-defense is made only with the object of avoiding implications of U.N. control which is reasonably imposed on regional security arrangements. In this way, the pact has undermined the general scheme of global security and worked almost independently of the U.N. by not making the pact subordinate to the U.N.

25. doc. DVC. A/3463.
Short comparative study of the Western with the Soviet/Communist system of pacts.

In order to assess the nature of interaction of the Western and Soviet system of alliances in the field of international politics, a short comparative study of these two systems is useful, for this would not only reveal their similarities or dissimilarities, but also the extent of their mutual compatibility.

Striking parallels between N.A.T.O. and W.T.O. on the following aspects focus their similarities. First, both do conform faith in the U.N. Charter. Second, all the attributes of a collective defense pact are present in both. Third, each of these alliances is headed by a Super-Power in which smaller states have participated enjoying juridical equality, but in actual practice the senior partner enjoys a commanding position. Fourth, these are formed among states of a particular political philosophy which forms the rationale of the military pact, thus providing a philosophy of the pact.

But these common features, on a careful analysis, appear more in form than in spirit. These fundamental differences have been aptly pointed out by Prof. W.W. Kulski who holds that the Western system "is based on multilateral agreements while the Soviet

27. This discussion is based on W.W. Kulski's excellent article - The Soviet System of Collective Security compared with the Western System - The American Journal of Int. Law, July, 1960.
system is formed by a series of bi-lateral treaties." Although the Soviet Union tends to glorify the conclusion of bi-lateral agreements, these, in fact, provide "with an imposing and well-coordinated network which produces the same political and legal effects as one multilateral treaty."

Secondly, in the Western system the role of political parties in working out the alliance is not very much significant, but in the Soviet system the Communist Party plays a vital part by serving as a connecting link between the Soviet Union and the participant states. The dominating control of the Soviet Communist party on party leaders and policies of the lesser Communist states is an open secret; it permeates no other system or policy in that state which is not socialist in Russian judgment. George Modelski refers to a "Communist international system" with Soviet Union as its guiding force and the other socialist states form part of that system [See Foot Note].

Thirdly, the N.A.T.O. or O.A.S., sponsored by the Western Powers are of a multipurpose type pact, i.e. these not only aim at organising collective defense but also achieving mutual cooperation in economic, cultural and other fields. In NATO and OAS the partners have laid great importance on political, economic and cultural cooperation for increasing solidarity among them, but in WTO this is negligible and the work of economic development has

Foot Note : With the conclusion of Sino-Soviet Treaty in February, 1950, the Communist system gained solidarity but following Sino-Soviet rift Chinese communism has largely become competitive of Russian brand.
been taken up by the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (C.E.M.A.) which aims at creating "world socialist market" for furthering unity in the socialist camp. Moreover, activities of the Political Consultative Committee of W.T.O. are not similar to those of NATO Parliamentary Assembly for, in the former, the influence of the Soviet Union is excessive and unavoidable, but the latter functions under different conditions providing an element of flexibility.

Fourthly, a striking difference is also noticed in the wording of the *casus foederis* between the Eastern Europeans agreements and the treaties concluded by the Soviet Union with Great Britain and France. To quote Kulski again, "while the Eastern European agreements are directed against any third power, be it an ex-allied state, the Soviet-British and the Soviet-French treaties were careful to limit the obligation of mutual assistance to an action against enemy state." Again, *casus foederis* of the Brussels and the Atlantic Pact is restricted to an armed attack by a third power against any one of the contracting parties, but in contrast, different terminologies e.g. "war", "aggression", "attack", "aggressive policy" are used in East European pacts. Analysing Eastern European bilateral treaties, (say, Article 4 of the Soviet-Polish treaty, or Article 3 of the Polish-Czchoslovak treaty) we find that according to terms of the treaty Soviet Union wants to render all military help in case of aggression by Germany and/or other states. Commenting upon the flexibility of such term - "to join Germany's aggressive policy directly or in any
other way" Kulski is judicious in observing that "the scope of those treaties depends upon the manner the Soviet Union interprets such terms." 28

Fifthly, the superior authority of the Security Council in terms of Article 51 of the Charter is recognised in the Warsaw Pact, but left blank in the Sino-Soviet treaty. In terms of Article 51, measures of mutual assistance taken by members of a collective security pact shall immediately be reported to the Security Council, and shall be terminated as soon as the Security Council takes appropriate measures. An exemption of overriding authority of the Security Council is available only in case of actions taken against ex-enemy states in accordance with Articles 53 and 107. Article 5 (both of the Rio Treaty and NATO) and Articles 4(l) of SEATO and 4 of CENTO uphold the right of the Security Council and the U.N. but the Sino-Soviet pact does not recognise the superior authority of the Security Council possibly with the object of keeping the operation of the pact outside Security Council's jurisdiction. [See Foot Note].

Sixthly, the members of the Soviet system enjoy an inferior status to that of the members of the Western system with the result that the former are labelled as "satellities" of the Soviet. Dr. E.N. Van Kieffens suggests that the members of the Soviet system


Foot Note: Communist China was not a member the international Organisation (U.N.) when Sino-Soviet pact was concluded and the legal position of the Pact and China's responsibility towards the U.N. were highly problematical issues of whose no acceptable solution has been found.
are not in a position to exercise their free will necessary for a true and proper "regional alliance" of the Western type. It is true that in both, the Super-Powers as organisers of the pact enjoy special status, but the Soviet Union retains a greater degree of control than the Western counterpart.

Lastly, the Western Powers envisage the development of the "Atlantic Community" based on free cooperation and democratic ideals among the occupants of the Western Europe - an area which has been the cradle of Western civilization. Contrary to this, the Soviet system is not keen to foster community feeling among its members, rather it has persistently endeavoured to consolidate "socialism" and "international socialism" as its goal.

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29. E.N. Van Kieffens - Ibid. This is not true to Communist China which as partner of Sino-Soviet pact is placed on equal basis with the Soviet Union.