CHAPTER - VII
REGIONALISM ON TRIAL

Some Case Studies

Introduction

In the previous Chapters we have made an assessment of operation of regional pacts - formed under non-communist Communist and uncommitted bloc and have drawn conclusions thereof. We have seen that both the regional security pacts under the non-communist and the Communist blocs have failed to act according to the purposes and principles of the United Nations in the matter of maintenance of international peace and security. These pacts have largely deviated from their professed aims, and as a result of which they could not act properly in cases threatening international peace and security. On the other hand, the pacts under the non-committed bloc have not only profoundly emphasized the principles of the United Nations but also acted in tune with them. In this Chapter we will make an analysis of some cases which have direct bearing on the non-communist or Communist regional security pacts. These case studies will demonstrate that the said regional security pacts were virtually of no use in the matter of solution of these cases or disputes and thereby largely failed to perform the prime duty of contributing to the world peace.

With the consolidation of bi-polar pattern of world politics, the Great Powers were busy in increasing strength of their respective camps and found themselves increasingly interested
in conclusion of regional security pacts whose prominence they have given so much and each became less interested with the maintenance of world peace. The professed aim of the regional pacts to maintain international peace by stopping aggression, presumably, serving as an adjunct to the collective security measures of the Security Council of the United Nations has been flouted under various pretexts. It has been rightly suggested by Inis L.Claude, Jr. that these "regional organisations are not in practical fact subject to the overriding control and authority of the world organisation."¹

Moreover, the powers have sometimes engaged themselves in unilateral actions (sometimes in the form of intervention) which are basically outside the United Nations, for the purpose of fulfilling their individual interests. To cite such cases - U.S. action in Dominican Republic (1965), in Vietnam (1954-1973), in Cuba (1962), British-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt (1956), U.S.S.R. action in Hungary (1956), and in Czechoslovakia (1968). As a result of unilateral and selfish actions of the Powers through the media of these regional pacts serious international crises developed.

Among these, we have selected four cases from various areas because we believe these areas are marked by major tensions, and peace in these areas would mean peace in the world. We shall try to assess in this Chapter by an analysis of these cases in

detail how far the regional security pacts have been successful in achieving the professed aim of maintaining international peace and security by providing an acceptable and peaceful solution. In course of our analysis we will see these pacts have largely failed to make any positive contribution to establish peace and stability by achieving solution of these problems. Most of these problems are still unsolved, but the U.N., in each case, by preventing further conflagration, restored international peace.

Case Study - 1. BERLIN

Berlin seems to be the starting point of cold war, and since its inception it has continued to be "a fecal issue in world politics." Commenting upon the complex nature of the Berlin problem says Hans Herzfeld, "The significant aspects of the history of Berlin are inextricably interwoven with the general history of the period after World War II— with developments in Germany, in Europe and the world at large."²

The roots of the Berlin problem may be traced from the war-time disagreements between Russia and her allies which arose in 1944 with regard to Berlin's status. In terms of Protocol of Sept. 12, 1944, Germany was to be divided into four zones of occupation by the four victor powers viz - the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France.² The Protocol provided for "a special Berlin area which will be under joint occupation

---

³ France signed the Protocol in July, 1945.
of the four Powers." Thus Berlin was made the fifth occupation area with "an inter-allied governing authority." In the Yalta Conference, February 5, 1945, the question of zones of occupation was discussed among Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill. In course of discussion President Roosevelt handed over a map of the proposed tripartite zones to Stalin\(^3\) [see enclosed map]. At first France was not included among the administering powers in Germany, but France's importance was realised by the President and France was given a zone.\(^4\)

From the very beginning there was basic disagreement among the occupying powers, and, as a result, the machinery of four-power-governance was weakened. Local self-government was established in each of the four occupied zones. The Soviets, with the help of Communist-dominated Socialist Unity Party successfully carried on "Sovetization" of East Germany and in 1949, a "Peoples Democratic Republic" was established in Germany's Soviet zone. The unilateral activities of the Soviets in East Germany accelerated cooperation among Great Britain, the United States and France "for the economic and political integration of the Western Zones of Germany", and thus the basis of Federal Republic of Germany was laid. The three Western powers agreed to take a unified programme in West Germany and that collided with Russia's policy resulting precipitation of the crisis in 1948 known as Berlin blockade.

---


A few months before the blockade in June, 1948, American Military Governor General Lucius D. Clay stated in unambiguous terms the necessity of Western forces to remain in Berlin for withstanding Russian designs. The Western Powers and the Soviet Union failed to reach an accord, and on March 20, 1948, Russia withdrew from the Four-power control Council (Kommandatura) alleging Anglo-US-French non-cooperation. The United States apprehended that after Czechoslovak coup, West Berlin and West Germany would be next targets of the Soviet Union. The Western Powers felt greater urgency of building Western European coalition and, President Truman announced his significant decision in June, 1948, that Americans would stay in Berlin. Meanwhile, the Western powers participated in the Marshall Plan, launched by the United States, which aimed not only economic recovery of Europe, but also unity and political stability needed to check expansion of communism. On the Soviet side, the Soviet Union established contact of varying degrees, of the East European countries, through Comminform, and by 1947 the division of Europe into two blocs — one under the leadership of the Soviet Union and the other under the United States became an accomplished fact.

Geographical position of the Western Berlin as an enclave within the Soviet zone demanded, under normal conduct of nations and international law, right of passage through Soviet zone. The parties being unable to reach any agreement, divided Berlin into two sectors — the eastern sector assigned to Soviet Russia and Western sector to the Western Powers, Brandenburg lying between

Before splitting of Berlin, the Allies tried to accommodate with the Russians but frequent use of Russian veto in Kommandatura (mainly owing to their superior geographical position) was very much unpleasant to the Allies. Berlin was dependent upon the surrounding region for supply of foodstuffs, but the supply factor was used as a lever in the political manoeuvre by the Russians. With a view to impose great pressure, the Soviet Union soon blockaded Berlin on March 1, 1948, and access to West Berlin through a number of connecting highways, roads, rails, canals and airlinks was prevented. The immediate issue of the Berlin crisis was the controversy over Western proposal for much-needed currency reform. Western proposal for quadripartite control of circulation was rejected by the Russians who also withdrew from the Allied Control Council and the Berlin Kommandatura. Faced with this situation, the Western Powers supplied Berlin by air for nearly a year. In September, 1948, the issue was referred to the Security Council by the Western States, but the issue remained unsolved. This was an unnatural situation and the Western Powers, during July and August, 1948, entered into negotiations with the Russians for ending of Berlin impasse when the latter disfavoured the idea of establishment of a West German state.

Subsequently, through direct negotiation between the Soviet representative Jacob Malik and U.S. representative Phillip C. Jessup in New York, agreement was reached and the blockade was lifted on.

May 12, 1949. But in the stipulated meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris, the parties failed to reach any agreement on the basic problem of politico-economic unification of Germany [See Foot Note]. With active encouragement of the Soviet Union, East Germany proclaimed itself a new state and the new constitution of the G.D.R. came into force w.e.f. Octo.10, 1949, and with emergence of German Democratic Republic the division of Germany became more real and pronounced.

The Berlin problem, in the context of all-German unity is symbolic of the East-West struggle for supremacy over Europe. It heightened the tensions of the cold war supplemented by two rival military pacts - NATO and Warsaw only to create a dangerous situation at the very heart of Europe. Thus, not only Germany but also Europe stood divided. The Soviet Union in her note, March 31, 1954 suggested the Western Powers for Russian membership in NATO, but the Western Powers discarded it as both dangerous and impracticable.

The Allied High Commission (France, UK, and U.S.) in a proclamation May 5, 1955 declared termination of occupation regime and simultaneously with this the Federal Republic of Germany declared her independence on the same day. In its note May 20, 1957, the F.R.G. raised the question of German reunification with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government in its reply Sept. 7, 1957 put some conditions for implementation of this proposal —

Foot Note: West Germany and East Germany were subsequently included in the NATO and Warsaw Pact respectively.

(1) prohibition of manufacture of atom bombs in Germany and (ii) withdrawal of two German states from the NATO and Warsaw Treaty respectively. The German Democratic Republic, rather suggested on July 27, 1957 a scheme of a confederation of two German states. But no agreement was reached.

The Federal Republic of Germany in its memorandum to the Soviet government Sept 2, 1956 emphasised on German re-unification by free all-German election by secret ballot. But the Soviet government in its reply Octo. 22, 1956 held that West Germany alignment to NATO aggressive bloc had put hindrances in the chances of reunification and insisted on withdrawal of two German States from NATO and Warsaw Pacts. It is natural that Berlin problem would automatically be solved in the greater context of reunification of Germany, and this division of Germany is untenable on nationalist economic and political grounds. It has also its international repercussions, for, this division has heightened the tension.

On the vexed problem of Germany the Soviet Union insisted on two German with Berlin as a free city under international supervision of the U.N. It appeared that the Soviet Union was not prepared to loosen her hold over East Germany, and insisted on West Germany's desertion from NATO. The Western Powers did not accept these suggestions and held that the future of Germany would

be settled through an all-German free election under international supervision. The Soviet Union, in the context of the German problem, submitted a draft for Non-Aggression Pact between Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries to the Disarmament Committee in February 1963, but was not accepted. On April 24, 1967 Brezhnev submitted proposals for liquidation of the military organisations of the NATO and the Warsaw Pacts and suggested that the question of European Security should be settled in a general European Security conference.

With relaxation of East-West tensions, the relation between West Germany and the Soviet Union have changed and they have concluded West German-Soviet Union Non-Aggression Treaty in August, 1970. The Western Powers insisted on freedom and independence of West Berlin and its right of access and travel to East Berlin and vice versa. The Western Powers regard the Berlin problem as the sin-qua-non of the East-West detente. Subsequently, the Four-Power negotiation on Berlin had been started in 1971 and is a move in the right direction. Chancellor Brandt during his conversation with Brezhnev and Kosygin in Moscow in August, 1970, was of impression that the Soviet leaders wanted a solution of the Berlin problem in order that it would facilitate ratification of Soviet-German treaty. In this context, the leaders of the West Germany and East Germany expressed their desire to establish

friendly relations with the ultimate object of re-unification. Although no acceptable solution has yet been reached the trend is favourable.

The continuance of the Berlin problem for last 26 years demonstrates inability of the two regional Security Pacts, e.g. NATO and Warsaw, of that area to solve the problem in the spirit of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Contrary to the professed aim of these pacts, the Western Powers and the Soviet Union were more interested in furtherance of bloc interests than of the general interests of peace and security. As a result, the urgent need of German unification and peace in the heart of Europe were undervalued and tension continued. Recently, realising the need for German national unity, both the German states have held direct talks on the common goal of German re-unification\textsuperscript{16} through which the Berlin problem would be automatically solved.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid, August 15, 1971.
Case Study - 2. KASHMIR

Kashmir presents an unique issue in the Indian Subcontinent. Once famous for its loving beauty it has become a hot bed of politics. Its strategic importance has not only increased the competition between India and Pakistan but also among U.S., U.K., U.S.S.R. and China.

Formerly an Indian state, Kashmir acceded to India by an instrument of accession by Maharaja Sir Hari Singh See foot note. The State of Jammu and Kashmir has a population having Muslim majority as good as 77%, but despite this fact, the Muslim League failed to establish control over the State. The Hindus constituted not more than 20%, but the Kashmiris in general were imbued with secularism of Indian National Congress and thereby defeated pro-Pakistan trends. This inflamed Pakistan to challenge the validity of the State's accession contrary to Pakistan's expectation, but India held that according to the terms of Indian Independence Act, 1947, Kashmiri's accession to India was legal and valid.

At first the Maharaja could not decide his mind, and India was ready to wait but apprehending that delay would lose its bait, Pakistan decided to take unilateral action in violation of the standstill agreement. By October, 24, when the frontier tribes-men helped and assisted by regular forces of the Pakistan army had advanced considerably, the Maharaja appealed for India's help. India decided to assist the Maharaja in defending Kashmir, and

Foot Note: After lapse of British paramountcy, from August 14, 1947, the former Indian princely states were given option to accede to either India or Pakistan. It was annexed by the British in 1846 by the treaty of Amritsar.
after the Maharaja signed the letter of accession on October 24, 1947, Indian forces were sent to Kashmir.

The conflict thus intensified and India accused Pakistan of invading Kashmir. India also formally lodged complaint to the Security Council on January 1, 1948, stating that Pakistan was assisting the raiders who were attacking Jammu and Kashmir which is a part of Indian territory.\textsuperscript{17} On January 20, 1948, the Security Council established United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) for resolving the dispute and the Security Council directed the said Commission to proceed to spot with a dual function of investigating the facts and to exercise "a mediatory influence likely to smooth away difficulties."\textsuperscript{18} The enlarged commission recommended that Pakistan should withdraw from the state of Jammu and Kashmir "tribesmen and Pakistan nationals" which have entered the state for the purpose of fighting.\textsuperscript{19} The Commission on its arrival learnt that regular Pakistani troops were introduced.\textsuperscript{20} The main task of the U.N. Commission now changed to that of mediation calling for cease-fire and truce agreements and indicated that a plebescite would follow truce.\textsuperscript{21} The proposals for cease-fire were accepted by India and Kashmir on January 1, 1949, and on March 14, 1950, the Council appointed a United Nations for Representative/truce observance and to arrange for plebescite administration.\textsuperscript{22} The Security Council insisted on vigilance by the

\textsuperscript{17} UN Year Book, 1948-49, p.279.
\textsuperscript{18} Security Council Resolution s/726 (1948).
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{20} S/995 (1948).
\textsuperscript{21} S/C/doc. s/1100.
\textsuperscript{22} S/1461 (1950).
Military Observer Group.

That Admiral Nimitz was appointed plebescite administrator according to choice of both the parties but he could not make progress as he was unable to secure agreement on the terms of plebescite to be held. After his resignation Dr. Sir Owen Dixon was appointed in 1951 to resolve the issue but his mission failed for his plan for partition of Kashmir was not accepted by the parties. Moreover, no progress towards demilitarisation and for the arrangements for plebescite had been made. Now came Dr. Frank Graham as U.N. Representative in 1951 and he insisted on maintaining the cease-fire line by India and Pakistan before any progress in this respect was made. He stated that fate of Kashmir should be finally decided through a free and impartial plebescite under U.N. auspices, but the parties could not agree to the terms of plebescite. On February 21, 1957, the Security Council took a fresh attempt by requesting its President to visit and report on the situation. Accordingly Mr. Jarring came to make a settlement by negotiation with both the parties but his attempts were futile. The Security Council considered the matter and on December 2, 1957 requested both the parties to sincerely cooperate in carrying out demilitarisation of Kashmir which was necessary prerequisite for a fair plebescite. But no action followed this resolution. India insisted on withdrawal of all "raiders" according to the recommendations of the previous Security Council

resolution of 1949, to create peaceful atmosphere for holding plebescite but Pakistan very much relied on military solution of the problem by use of force. Pakistan has also, in the meantime, established in her occupied zone a so-called Azad Kashmir government and tightened her control by greater use of military force, and, although peace was maintained by the U.N. Commission, there were frequent border incidents along the cease-fire line, each alleging the other for the incident.

In 1962, during India's clash with China the border incidents declined and Pakistan turned towards China to seek friendship. Pakistan, without giving least consideration of India's stand in Kashmir unilaterally concluded with China (which is not a party to the dispute) a border treaty and thereby donating a part of Kashmir. At this stage direct talks between India and Pakistan could be of little help, and these talks ended in failure.

Perhaps considering that U.S. support to Pakistan in Kashmir was more valuable than Chinese help (China was not then a member of the U.N.) both for U.S. arms and U.S. support in the Security Council, Pakistan was giving pressure on the U.S. in order to influence India to agree to a settlement. Wainhouse further tells us that Ayub afterwards changed his views and decided to start fresh trouble along cease-fire line. Pakistan already became heavily armed with U.S. weapons, e.g. Patton and Sherman tanks, and other equipments to lodge her attack against India in September, 1965. But India was prepared and a full-scale war started and

Pakistan's case in the field was going from bad to worse. Peace not only in Kashmir, but also in the entire sub-continent was threatened, but nevertheless of this dangerous position - the war-situation, owing to timely initiative by the U.N. Secretary General U. Thant, was localised and halted. The Security Council resolution was accepted by both the parties and enforced on Sept. 23, 1965.\textsuperscript{28} After cessation of hostilities, peace was shortly restored to the troubled area largely by strenuous efforts of the Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin who invited both Ayub and Shastri in January, 1966 to hold talks in Tashkent and was responsible for reaching Indo-Pakistan accord followed by Tashkent Declaration of January 10, 1966.\textsuperscript{29} The Tashkent Declaration was more of a truce arrangement than solving the root cause of the problem. No doubt, it achieved stabilisation of the cease-fire line by force-withdrawals and aspired for cultivating friendly relations between the neighbours, but subsequent events in 1971 suggested that Pakistan little cared to honour the provisions of Tashkent which were again flagrantly violated by starting the war against India.

India's relations with Pakistan were far from satisfactory, and in the intervening period there were charges and counter-charges by both sides. In 1969, Pakistan\textsuperscript{30} complained to the Security Council against India for introducing a bill allegedly curtailing right of the peoples of Kashmir. But, India\textsuperscript{31} replied that she was within her sovereign rights to do so.

\textsuperscript{28} S/Res. 211. Sept. 20, 1965.
\textsuperscript{29} S/2711 (1966) and S/2719 (1966) Addl. 6.
\textsuperscript{30} S/9151 lett. of Pakistan April 4, 1969.
\textsuperscript{31} S/9504 lett. of India Nov. 17, 1969.
The Kashmir issue demonstrates several factors responsible for continuance of tension in that area. Some of the Great Powers are interested in using Pakistan as a pawn in the power politics and Kashmir fell in the vortex of power politics. The United States became openly interested in Kashmir and supporting Pakistan in the Security Council largely ignored India's stand for peaceful solution of the problem. Moreover, the United States drew Pakistan in her alliance system and Pakistan also allied with the United States through two regional security parts e.g. CENTO and SEATO only with the object of securing more arms in the context of her hostility against India over Kashmir issue. The late Indian Prime Minister Nehru asserted that Pakistan by her adherence to these pacts has received large quantities of military equipment and assistance which were utilised in rearming Pakistan and constituted a matter of great threat to India. Indian concern was duly informed to the United States which gave formal repeated assurances that these arms would not be used against India. But contrary to U.S. assurances, these arms (Patton tanks, and bomber planes etc.) which were given to Pakistan by way of assistance for her adherence to CENTO or SEATO, were used in 1965-war. It has nothing to do with the fighting communist menace which is the avowed aim of these pacts, but contrary to the declared principles of these pacts these arms were utilised against India. India registered her strong protest to the United States but the latter did not take the matter with seriousness.

These suggest that U.S. policy in Kashmir was to rearm Pakistan against India, so that, Pakistan could exercise pressure upon her adversary and thereby jeopardising U.N. attempts to solve the problem peacefully. But the U.N. although failed to secure a political settlement had contributed towards an effective cease-fire for more than 24 years. Moreover, the United States failed to check Pakistan in use of U.S. arms against India. It is clear that CENTO or SEATO has nothing to do with Kashmir for the nature and context of the problem are outside the scope and jurisdiction of these pacts which aim at repelling communist aggression. If arms received by Pakistan, as a member of regional pacts can be used against a peace-loving neighbour-India, whom the first views as an enemy, the regional pacts become a source not of peace but of conflict.

Contrary to our expectations Pakistan's attitude did not change after Tashkent, and she, as usual became re-armed with U.S. weapons. The story unfolded in September, 1971 when Pakistan started an undeclared war against India, but lost the war. See Foot Note 7. This time also India became liberal and after truce was established India concluded Simla Agreement for troops withdrawal, and demarcation of cease-fire line with the object of improving relations with Pakistan. Although not without obstacles


Foot Note: This time Pakistan's case became very much complicated as Bangladesh (East Pakistan) launched a movement for independence and self determination with Indian economic and military assistance and was successful in establishing the new state - Bangladesh. Pakistan tried to suppress the movement ruthlessly with the use of U.S. arms but could not.
progress has been made in this respect but the main issue of Kashmir has still remained unsolved. Agreement between India and Pakistan has already been concluded to solve humanitarian issues of 1971-war, but Mr. Bhutto has been harping the same tune on Kashmir, and the tension still persists.
Case Study - 3. VIETNAM

The Vietnam war is not only the lengthiest war since Second World War, but also controversial owing to ideological and strategic implications.

Its early history dates back to the days of colonial rule by France, but during the Second World War, with Japanese occupation, Japan established puppet Bao Dai regime in Annam (Vietnam) and France was overthrown. In the meantime, Ho Chi Minh, a communist, succeeded in establishing a provisional government in Hanoi named as Democratic Republic of Vietnam and proclaimed independence of Annam, Tongking and Cochin China.

After Potsdam conference, 1945, France took possession of her territory and wanted to retain her control by granting certain amount of autonomy, but Ho Chi Minh was not ready to accept less than complete independence. Struggle between France and Ho Chi Minh went on, and France established a puppet government under Bao Dai in Saigon in 1949. This resulted in virtual division of the country into two parts - the South controlled by France and the north by the communists. Bao Dai was recognised by the USA and Britain while Ho Chi Minh by the Soviet Union and China. France continued the war against Ho with American support but at Dien Bien Phu France's defeat was final.

Encouraged by French withdrawal, the United States stepped

35. Frank N. Trager - American Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia, Studies on Asia, 1965, p.28.
in to fill the vacuum in Southeast Asia. Indo China was to be defended from Communist take over, and Dulles pointed out its riches and strategic importance. So with U.S. lead SEATO was organised in September, 1954 as a bulwark against Communist expansion. In order to make exit by France honourable, the Geneva Conference was called in April, 1954 with the initiative of Britain and France. Delegates from nineteen nations including Soviet Union, Canada, India, China, Vietnam and Vietminh attended and accord was reached on July 21, 1954:36

1. Cease-fire agreements for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia were reached with simultaneous recognition of sovereignty of these states, and termination of French colonial rule.

2. Vietnam would be partitioned at the 17th parallel for force withdrawal to respective sides, but it was stipulated that these two "zones" would not be "interpreted as constituting political or territorial boundary."

3. Arrangement for free general election under the supervision of the International Control Commission (composed of Canada, India and Poland) to be made by July, 1956 for establishing a united democratic government for the whole country.

4. Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos were prohibited to join any military alliance [See Foot Note].


Foot Note: South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos were subsequently included in SEATO through a separate protocol with the object of evading Geneva provisions, but the protocol had the same effect of the treaty. For U.S. view see The Threat of a Red Asia, Address by Dulles, Deptt. of State Bull. April 12, 1954, p.540.
Although the Geneva Conference had certain loopholes, it was nevertheless a right step forward in preparing the way for peaceful solution of the problem. But these expectations were upset by the United States which established a puppet regime under Diem in Saigon, in 1955, and Diem refused to cooperate with the Control Commission in the matter of holding free elections. The scheduled election was not held and commission accused Saigon. Diem's government was autocratic and unpopular; this discontent prompted the communists to form the "National Liberation Front of South Vietnam" (NLF). Since then popular support increased on NLF and Diem was overthrown to be succeeded by his General. The rule by General in succeeding years (and till now) is a permanent feature of South Vietnam politics and the United States maintains good relation with them. Again, in 1962, with deterioration of the situation in Laos and Cambodia, the Geneva Conference was reactivated. It stressed the need for peaceful solution of the problem and guaranteed neutrality of Laos.

The National Liberation Front had by 1965 become successful in establishing Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) in South Vietnam and with intensification of the struggle the U.S. Secretary of Defence McNamara bluntly observed that the Vietnam war is not a civil war. But this has been rightly refuted by the Secretary of State Rusk before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Jan 28, 1966.

---

achieve a military solution of the problem. This change in American policy was most significant for it not only intensified the horrors of war but also produced deep criticisms against U.S. intervention by various nations of the world. The following figures indicate tremendous amount of military assistance rendered to South Vietnam in the form of men and money. 39

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amt. in million dollars</th>
<th>Total strength of U.S. armed forces.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>23,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>1,81,392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>3,89,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

U.S. aid for keeping the Saigon government in power is also very large, for U.S. aid is essential for running of this weak government and also bearing the pressure of war.

The United States justified her participation in the Vietnam war on the following grounds:

(1) Communist China, as an expanding power, was trying to overthrow established government by direct military intervention or by subversive activities. The United States decided that American presence in Vietnam is essential for withstanding Communist aggression, for the Communists (both China and North Vietnam) have shattered the 1954 agreements. 40


(2) The states of Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia are weak but nevertheless are important states of Southeast Asia for their strategic position, and if these states fall prey of communism, the whole of Southeast Asia would be run by communism. Johnson asserted that "defense of Vietnam held the key to the political and economic future of free Asia." 41

(3) Both Communist China and the Soviet Union rendered military and economic assistance to Ho Chi-Minh's government which under the name of "liberating" wanted to bring the "free" regime of South Vietnam under their control. See Foot Note 7.

(4) The United States stepped in Vietnam after she received a request by South Vietnam government to give her assistance against North Vietnamese aggression 42 and such mutual assistance between two sovereign states is legal (right of self defense). This stand has been approved by John Norton Moore that U.S. has lawful right to render military assistance to an independent state like South Vietnam. 43

(5) As a great and responsible power, the United States should be true to her commitments and if she failed to honour her commitments in Vietnam, peoples of other states would not put their faith on her. Mr. Rusk in a speech dt. March 14, 1966


Foot Note: Despite Sino-Soviet rift, both of them followed the same line with regard to rendering military and economic assistance to North Vietnam. They also condemned American aggression in Vietnam.


stated that the House in a joint meeting and by majority vote accepted the obligation of the U.S. to defend the protocol state (South Vietnam). 44

U.S. action in Vietnam, especially heavy and indiscriminate bombing in defiance of world opinion was bitterly criticised not by Socialist and non-aligned powers but by her allies (Britain and France). President de Gaulle insisted on political solution of the Vietnam problem. The Secretary General of the U.N. stated that bombing should be halted before feasible peace negotiations could be started. He deplored escalation of the conflict. 45 He offered his good offices several times but no response was received from the parties. 46 Even in U.S. the Vietnam war was vehemently criticised by Senator Fulbright and Kennedy.

United States' participation in the Vietnam war has been termed as an unjustified act of intervention on the following grounds:

(1) The United States was virtually intervening in a civil war in which two contesting parties — the North and South Vietnam were engaged in a strife in securing authority over the entire country. The best course for U.S. was to keep herself aloof.

(2) The puppet regime which was established by the U.S. in Saigon served U.S. interests and not interests of the peoples of Vietnam. That regime was undemocratic, unstable and unpopular, for majority of the people shared their support to the Liberation Front created by Hanoi for liberating the South for its eventual unification with the North. U.S. involvement in Vietnam to support self-determination of South Vietnamese peoples is also a good pretext.

(3) U.S. participation on the basis of a "request" made by Saigon government which being heavily dependent upon American economic and military aid is hardly justifiable. Moreover, invoking of the right of self defense by South Vietnam under Article 51 is not tenable.

(4) The United States has violated the Geneva Agreements by including South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos in the so-called protocol of the Manila Treaty (SEATO) with the object of evading prohibition clause of the treaty. The U.S. played a great part to mould Saigon's decision to defer election which was to be held in July, 1956, under the provisions of the Geneva Agreement for unification of the country.

(5) The United States participation in Vietnam war is illegal and unjustified under existing circumstances. It has disregarded the very principles of the U.N. Criticising U.S.


policy in Vietnam Prof. W. Friedman opined that U.S. military assistance to South Vietnam is not lawful; the Vietnam conflict "moves in a legal vacuum." 49

B. Teplinsky rightly indicated that significant failures of the U.S. in the Vietnam war occurred largely due to patriotic resistance of the peoples. 50 Realising failure of his policy President Johnson ordered a halt to the bombing in October, 1968 in order to start quadrilateral Paris peace talks among the U.S., North Vietnam, South Vietnam and Provisional Revolutionary Government. Peace talks opened at the end of January, 1969 when North Vietnam put forward a 10-point programme for political settlement. It insisted on withdrawal of foreign troops from South Vietnam and arrangements to hold a general election for the country. But the U.S. and Saigon rejected the essentials of the proposal. On October 8, another "peace plan" was offered by Nixon but that was rejected by Hanoi. The bloody war continued with its horror scanned only by negotiations for peace. At last Paris Peace Conference was resumed in between Henry Kissinger, U.S. National Security Adviser, and Lee Duc Tho, Politburo member, North Vietnamese Communist Party and they concluded a Draft Agreement. At last, much-desired Paris Peace Agreements were signed on Jan.27, 1973 among the four parties. It provided for cessation of hostilities, withdrawal of foreign troops, exchange of prisoners, and calling a Political conference for peaceful solution of the problem.

It also stipulated that South Vietnam would have its freely elected government uninterfered by the North Vietnam. The Political Conference participated by North Vietnam. Provisional Revolutionary Government, (PRG), South Vietnam, and United States was held and agreements were signed in the presence of the U.N. Secretary General Dr. Waldheim who expressed gratification.

U.S. policy in Vietnam war revealed futility of achieving security and peace through regional security pacts like SEATO. The Vietnam issue was discussed every year in the meetings of SEATO in a stereotyped manner alleging North Vietnam of continuing aggression and expressing determination to fight communism. It is irony that President Nixon who had escalated the war by indiscriminate bombing piously asserted before the 24th Session of the General Assembly, "A just peace in Vietnam has been, and remains our goal." U.S. involvement in Vietnam was made with the professed ultimate object of defending the whole of Southeast Asia from aggressive designs of Communism and if Vietnam fell the whole of Asia would be run by Communism. Therefore, defence of South Vietnam was of utmost necessity to save Asia but important Asian countries (India, Burma, Indonesia, Ceylon, Malaysia) including two protocol states (Cambodia and Laos) of SEATO did not ascribe to this view. The United States used not only sophisticated but also deadly weapons (including napalm

bombs and chemical weapons) for attaining success. It struck not only military targets but also schools, hospitals and dykes and populated areas with the object of inflicting heavy civilian casualties and economic damage. The massacre of Mailai is more shocking than Nazi persecution of the Jews. All these brutalities and atrocities were undertaken by the U.S. with the sole aim of imposing a military solution for Vietnam, but this idea miserably failed before the spirit of nationalism and patriotism of the Vietnamese people. Criticising U.S. policy of conducting the war Prof. Hans J. Morgenthau rightly observed that the United States faced in Vietnam "a nation-in-arms, in a war which can be won only by incapacitating the total population,\(^{55}\) United States Vietnam policy was even unacceptable to her allies, for Pakistan and France have openly disassociated from the U.S.\(^{56}\) The United States was so dogmatic with her policy that she even disregarded former Secretary General's suggestion for cessation of bombing and opening of peace talks.\(^{57}\) The Vietnam war is not an isolated affair; it is a part of calculated U.S. policy to gain strategic strong-hold in Southeast Asia in her struggle against Communism. The fact that even after conclusion of Vietnam Peace Agreement, peace in that area is far away, for, the United States wanted to retain her control over Cambodia which is at


present ruled by pro-U.S. general. Cambodia is the by-product of Vietnam. The situation in Cambodia has become threatening since 1964 due to United States' open intervention in that State. Formal complaint was lodged by Cambodia against U.S.-South Vietnamese aggression several times.\textsuperscript{58} It is very much undesirable that after Vietnam, the United States, by resumption of bombing, Cambodia, should foil peace in that area. Here also, Nixon wanted to override the cautions of the Congress, which remembering its past, costly experience in Vietnam, is against U.S. involvement in Cambodia. As such, the Congress wanted to curb the President by curtailing military expenditures.\textsuperscript{59} All this suggests that not only U.S. public, but also U.S. Congress has realised the futility of Vietnam war.


\textsuperscript{59} The Statesman (Cal), May 14 and 16, 1973.

\textsuperscript{60} Senate Hearings, Ibid.
Case Study - 4. HUNGARY

The Hungarian crisis of 1956, evolved out of tension between Hungary and the Soviet Union, posed a challenge to the Soviet alliance system. Hungary, in the post-Stalinist period, tended to deviate from the type of socialism pursued by the Soviet Union, and that caused strain within the Soviet system. The Soviet Union, in her own criteria of judgement, found grounds to make armed intervention.

Hungary was formerly an enemy state of the Allies during the Second World War. With her defeat, the Soviet Union which had already occupied that area got a free hand in extending her influence and control over a large part of East Europe including Hungary. The Allies, tacitly as well as most unpleasantly acknowledged this adverse situation in the renewed phase of cold war. Hungary developed into a "People's Democracy" and up to 1953, Mr. Rakosi was the Secretary General of the Party as well as the Premier. After Stalin's death, the principle of collective leadership was accepted and on July 2, 1953, Imre Nagy was appointed Prime Minister but Rakosi still held the office of the Party Secretaryship.

The trouble began when Nagy, in response to popular demand wanted to introduce some reforms of the productive system. As head of the all-party government led by Nagy, he announced that free elections would be held, Soviet troops to be withdrawn from Hungary, and after withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact wanted to adopt a policy of permanent neutrality. But Rakosi was opposed

to Nagy's measures and this brought instability in Nagy's regime. Nagy's measures also displeased the Soviet Union for "having gone too far with his new course." He was expelled from the Party.
Censor was placed against liberal criticism and towards later half of 1955 "Petofi Circle" was organised as a criticism of this measure. Following 20th Party Congress in February, 1956, anti-Stalinism went too far and Rakosi was replaced by Ernoe Geroe as party chief. Meanwhile, the students' unrest became strong advocating Nagy's Prime Ministership. A group of University students declared the need for "Hungarian way of socialism", withdrawal of Soviet troops and return of Nagy. The disturbances took a serious turn with police firing on October 23. On October 24, the Hungarian Central Committee announced its decision to place Nagy as the head of the government. In the meantime, the government "called on Soviet forces stationed in Hungary for help and that these troops were taking part in the restoration of order."

On October 24, Nagy assumed Premiership and "offered amnesty to all those who laid down their arms," but there was little response and the disturbances spread all through the towns and the villages. On October 24, Mikoyan and Suslov flew to Budapest and, on October 26, Geroe was replaced by Kadar as the First Secretary of the Hungarian Workers' Party. On October 27, Nagy as head of the

62. Documents on International Affairs, 1956; (R.I.I.A.)

Foot Note: There is controversy on the point as to who invited the Soviet troops. During a debate in the U.N. on Nov. 19, 1956 Mr. Shepilov disclosed that the Hungarian government in a telegram d.t. 24.10.56 appealed for Soviet help. But this was subsequently denied by Mr. Nagy (See Documents, Ibid). It subsequently became known that Geroe and not Nagy had been responsible for calling Soviet troops. (See Keesings, 1955-56, Ibid.)
coalition government declared 'cease-fire' and a policy of economic reforms. On October 29, he announced that negotiations with the Soviet government, which had agreed to withdraw her troops, had begun. Mr. Nagy in his broadcasts on October 25, and 28 declared the above decisions affecting reorganisation of the Party and the State. On October 29, he announced end of single-party rule and Soviet's decisions of withdrawing her forces. 63

Although it was announced that withdrawal of troops had begun according to previous promise made to Nagy, there were also rumours of Soviet build-up during that period and the situation was largely obscure owing to conflicting reports. At the same time, the Soviet Union in its declaration on October 30, expressed its readiness "to review with other socialist countries, which are members of the Warsaw Treaty the question of Soviet troops stationed on the territory of the above-mentioned countries." The Soviet government also confirmed withdrawal of troops and upto November 3, Hungary remained free from Soviet interference. Nagy protested against additional inflow of Soviet troops and insisted on Nagy's withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary. 4 Considering Hungary's decision of withdrawal, not only detrimental to the Warsaw Treaty, but also to the entire Soviet system Mikoyan and Suslov decided to dislodge Nagy and put Kadar who would follow the Soviet line. In the meantime, Soviet reinforcements increased

63. Documents, Ibid.
The climax reached during the midnight of November 3, when General Serov arrived in Hungary, and ordered the Hungarian delegation which had begun negotiation with the Soviets the same day, to be arrested. Within a few hours, Soviet troops re-entered Budapest, and fierce fighting broke out between the Hungarians and the Soviet troops. Mr. Nagy announced in the Budapest radio that the Soviet troops had attacked Hungary "with the obvious intention of overthrowing the lawful, democratic Hungarian government." He then took refuge in Yugoslav embassy. On November 4, the Soviet forces occupied Budapest, and Mr. Kadar declared that he had set up a new government. After taking Premiership he asked the Soviet army "in smashing sinister forces of reaction" and to restore order. He also mentioned that Soviet troops would be withdrawn from Hungary, but made no reference to free election or Hungarian neutrality. The Soviet government justified her stationing of Soviet forces on the ground of security of member-states of Warsaw Pact. It also stated that counter-revolutionary forces were impeding economic progress. It observed that Soviet forces were sent to Hungary "at the request of the Hungarian government" for helping Hungary to restore order, and that these troops would be withdrawn as soon normalcy was restored. The

Foot Note: In two despatches, Daily Telegraph and The Times, October 28, ruthless repression by Russian soldiers on unarmed Hungarian people was affirmed.

64. Ibid.
65. Ibid, See also Keesings, Ibid.
situation became confusing and fighting increased. The Soviets, armed with heavy weapons, brutally crushed the freedom movement of the unarmed, patriotic peoples of Hungary whereby 25000 were killed and 50000 were wounded.66

The Security Council met on November 4 on the basis of Hungarian government's (Nagy's) complaint of October, 31 against Soviet intervention to "consider the situation created by the action of foreign military forces in Hungary in violently repressing the rights of the Hungarian people." But Kadar's government contended that the issue rested with her domestic jurisdiction. The Soviet government supported Hungarian view and also exercised veto in the Security Council thereby blocking further action67

[See Foot Note]. The Security Council resolution calling for withdrawal of Soviet troops was again vetoed by the Soviet Union, and the issue was placed in the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace resolution. The case was taken in the Emergency session of the General Assembly which requested the Soviet Union twice for withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, and condemned "violent repression by the Soviet forces of the efforts of the Hungarian people to achieve freedom and independence."68 In view of the emergent situation the General Assembly, on November 12, 1956 discussed the issue and in a resolution ardently requested

66. Despatch of November 9, 1956, in the Manchester Guardian.  
Foot Note: Non-intervention in civil war is an accepted principle in international law, but the Soviet Union by way of justifying her intervention stated that outside elements (Austrians) were supporting the rebels and as such it constituted aggression. 68. Resolutions 1004 (E.S) and 1005 (E.S.) GA.O Rs.Sec.Em.Spl.Sess. Suppl. 1 (A/3355).
the Soviet and the Hungarian authorities to stop repression and refrain from committing genocide. The Secretary General in his report dt. November 30, 1956, on "Implementation of the United Nations Resolutions on Hungary" drew attention to the Soviet government for early compliance and also wanted personally to go to Budapest for on the spot investigation, but no cooperation was received from the Soviet Union.

Faced with continued non-cooperation from the Soviet and the Hungarian authorities, the General Assembly set up on January 10, 1957, a Special Committee on the Problem on Hungary. The findings of the said Committee are the following which reveal the true nature of things: (i) the uprising in Hungary is spontaneous, (ii) Hungary had grievances against the Soviet Union against her (Hungary's) inferior status, (iii) Nagy government did not invite Soviet troops, (iv) removal of Nagy government was unrecorded, (v) the Soviet intervention was ruthless and (vi) Kadar government had no popular support. The final act of the Hungarian drama was played by Kadar who, according to Soviet dictates re-established Soviet system of Socialism. In March, Kadar visited Moscow and the Soviet-Hungarian Treaty was signed on March 27, 1957. Kadar also declared that presence of Soviet troops was necessary and thus Hungary was again under Soviet control.

70. Doc A/3403.
The Hungarian question teaches us the tragic lesson that the Soviet Union was not ready to allow changes in domestic or foreign policy of Hungary if these were detrimental to the integrity of the Soviet bloc. Nagy's programme of economic reforms in response to popular demand was considered by the Soviet Union as deviation from socialist principles. Evidently, this was a domestic issue taken up by Nagy, who felt the need for a "Hungarian way of socialism". Nagy's declaration that Hungary would henceforth be a permanent neutral state and withdraw from the Warsaw Pact further annoyed Kremlin who saw no other alternative than to depose Nagy and establish a pro-Soviet regime in Hungary under Kadar. In both these issues (domestic and foreign policies of Hungary) the Soviet Union caused intervention with the pretext of defending socialism and maintaining security. It is daylight clear that the Warsaw Pact has nothing to do with domestic or foreign policy of an independent state. But the Soviet Union invoked the Warsaw Pact and made ruthless use of force for repressing "the efforts of the Hungarian people to achieve freedom and independence." The condemnation by the General Assembly that the Soviet Union, by her activities in Hungary, has violated the U.N. Charter in depriving liberty of the Hungarian peoples, and similar other resolutions reveal the real motive of the Soviet Union in maintaining control through a

Foot Note: Yugoslavia has already deviated from the Soviet type of Socialism; so also China, Cuba, Abania which are all socialist countries but each of them is independent of Soviet control.

pro-Soviet regime. Such attempts are not only against basic principles of international law, but also against the very fundamental values of human rights and liberty which the members of the international community (including the Soviet Union) aspire to uphold. Nagy was termed a traitor but the Report of the Special Committee of the General Assembly clearly pointed out that the uprising in Hungary was spontaneous and that Kadar government had no popular support. This suggests that Nagy was popular and his course reflected the wishes of the Hungarian people but he had to pay the penalty.

The Soviet contention that Hungarian issue is an internal one of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis Warsaw Pact is hardly tenable, for it disturbed international peace in the heart of Europe by the Soviet Union's unilateral use of a force upon unarmed peoples of Hungary taking the toll of 25000 lives. Such ruthless use of force by the Warsaw Pact against a member for its alleged deviation from the socialist principles also could not be justified even by the terms of the Warsaw Pact which aims to thwart only outside aggression against any member. In concluding Warsaw Pact, the members took NATO as the possible enemy. But in the Hungarian crisis no outside power attacked Hungary, and, therefore the question of deploying Warsaw Pact forces in terms of Article 4 does not arise. The Hungarian issue is mainly a domestic one involving questions of political liberty and economic reforms. Moreover, Soviet intervention

73. Ibid, cited in 9, see also U.N. doc A/3572, Res.1131 (XI).
74. Ibid.
also runs counter to the accepted principle of "non-inference in internal affairs" affirmed in Article 8 of the Pact. The Pact has been concluded for defense, but the term "defense" is used as a cloak to foster bloc interest of the Soviet Union.

Soviet repression in Hungary was deplored by the United States and India. The NATO Council in May, 1957 condemned Soviet intervention in Hungary. Soviet action in Hungary was specifically disapproved by the U.N., which was although unenforceable, had the effect of a moral sanction.

Soviet veto in the Security Council and her refusal to cooperate with the United Nations were against the basic principles of international cooperation and international peace. The peaceful aims of the Pact were foiled by Soviet Union herself which wanted to utilise the Pact as a strategy in her global struggle against the Western Powers. In reality, it tried to establish Soviet hegemony over Warsaw-Pact states at the cost of independence of the members. Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 also demonstrated that she was less interested in defense - the professed aim than to secure her dominance in the bloc.

75. For V.K.Krishna Menon's (India) Speech in the General Assembly, 10 Dec. 1956. see GAOR, Sess 11, Ply.mtg. 614.
Crisis of regionalism:

Crisis of regionalism developed not only in view of the failure of the regional security pacts in their professed aim of maintaining international peace and security but also of the internal rift among the members. Among these we would discuss French divergence in NATO and Sino-Soviet rift for their greater impact upon respective blocs.

French divergence in NATO:

French divergence in NATO caused severe strain in the Atlantic alliance. It grew out of a number of factors of which we mention the following:

1. France wanted to play an important role in the Atlantic Alliance and proposed in 1958 for a Three-Power (U.S., U.K., France) Political Directorate of NATO but that was not complied with.

2. France feared that her independence would largely be subordinated to the U.S. if her commitments to NATO were to be fulfilled. She considered that "permanent presence of allied (NATO) military elements" on French soil and subordination of French forces under a foreign commander were incompatible with her concept of sovereignty and she would not continue in the military alliance. She withdrew from NATO's integrated military command.\footnote{France's withdrawal from NATO's military command without...}

\footnote{Keesings 1959, p.16961.}


4. French Premier Pompidou stated on April 13, 1966 that owing to fundamental changes brought about by Russia's possession of nuclear power, France's possession of atomic weapons, economic recovery of Europe, Communist China's growth and greater significance of Asia, France wanted to defend her national interests. 81

5. President de Gaulle's visit to Moscow in June, 1966 and his insistence on France-Soviet rapprochement helped to establish friendly relations with the Soviet Union. 82 The Franco-Soviet Agreement, August, 1971 is significant.

6. France did not support multilateral nuclear force (MLF) for NATO, for that would give U.S. greater chance for domination. France has developed atomic weapons and has become an independent atomic power which is of great significance. 83

7. French desire for increasing cooperation with the Soviet Union in the economic field for mutual economic benefit also denotes


a shift of French attitude.

8. French opposition to any scheme of West European integration on a supra-national level, is made for she feared that through projected European Political Community her independence would be undermined. 84

Its implications:

1. French divergence in NATO and her consequential withdrawal from NATO's military command has serious geographic, military, political and psychological implications. It has caused drastic changes in the concept of NATO. 85

2. This has hastened Franco-Soviet rapprochement and has softened ideological sharpness between the two blocs. It would to some extent decrease the tension at the heart of Europe.

3. U.S. monopoly over Western Europe has been curtailed and not only France but also other European members of NATO have tried to assert their independence from the United States. France has been termed "a bad ally" for her independent attitude.

4. After French withdrawal, NATO was reorganised by giving the key role to Germany, so that, Germany might play a greater role in NATO.

5. From the point of the Soviet Union, this has given her extra advantage in the strategic and ideological fields.

84. I. Lemin - "Crisis of West European Integration and Its Political Aspects, International Affairs, (Moscow), May, 1966.

Sino-Soviet rift:

China and the Soviet Union drew close together, concluded Sino-Soviet Pact of 1950, but soon rift developed between them.

1. In the ideological field, China and the Soviet Union differed on the interpretation of the principles of Marxism-Leninism. The Soviet Union relies on peaceful co-existence but China holds the opposite views. China refused Soviet domination in the ideological world (See Foot Note).

2. Sino-Soviet boundary dispute is a potent factor in aggravating their conflict. China claimed large chunks of Chinese territory, now within Russian jurisdiction, on the ground that these were acquired by the Soviet Union through unequal treaties.

3. The cleavage between China and the Soviet Union lies deep owing to fundamental difference in their nature of civilisation and tradition. In China communism has flourished in a set-up different from that of Europe.

4. China and Russia differed with regard to their policy towards Afro-Asian States. Both contested for extending greater influence in these states.

Foot Note: Already in 1942 Marshal Tito has deviated from Stalinist socialism. Rumania and Albania have also deviated. Albania, a member of the Warsaw Pact has withdrawn from it.

Although China professes not for greater collaboration with the capitalist world, in actual practice she has changed her policy towards the United States for cultivating better relations.

5. Chinese military build-up and her possession of atomic 
weapons including missiles exerted great weight in moulding the 
pattern of the Sino-Soviet alliance.\footnote{See Foot Note.}

**Its implications:**

1. The basic unity of the communist bloc was lost. It 
challenged Soviet monopoly and paved the way for propagating 
Chinese brand of communism. It introduced some amount of flexi-
bility in the ideological realm.\footnote{Z.K. Brzezinski - *The Organisation of Communist Camp, World 
Politics, Jan., 1961.* See also George Modelski - "Communist International System," Research Monograph No.9, Centre for 
Int. Studies, Princeton, 1961.} The Harvard Report contended 
that the communist system could not "escape the influence of other 
ideologies."\footnote{"Ideology and Foreign Affairs" - Harvard University Report 
pursuant to Senate Res. 336, 85th Cong. and Sen. Res. 31, 
86th Cong.}

2. China considers Soviet Union as her enemy in the struggle 
for power and as such she took a conciliatory attitude towards the 
United States for establishing some form of detente. China suppor-
ted U.S. presence in Southeast Asia for counteracting Soviet 
pressure.

3. Sino-Soviet schism has proved to be beneficial to the 
United States. In a testimony before the House Foreign Affairs

\footnote{Hungary and Czechoslovakia defected from the Soviet 
Union but were ruthlessly repressed by the Soviet Union. But 
in case of China, the Soviet Union's attack is limited to 
theoretical plane.}
Sub-Committee, D.S. Zagoria observed that Sino-Soviet conflict had been a "blessing" to the U.S.

4. Russian interest in communist China diminished and her interest in the non-aligned states increased instead, not only for counterbalancing Western but also Chinese influence.

Tendency of the Great Powers to use the regional arrangements for ideological and political purposes:

The Great Powers profess to utilise these regional arrangements for defensive purposes, but have often utilised these as instruments for gaining ideological and political objectives. According to the Western Powers (and specially the U.S.) their alliance system stands for democracy and individual liberty against the onslaught of communism. They assume their bloc as the "free world" which should be defended. Similarly, the Soviet Union contends that the Soviet bloc wants to defend socialism based on Marxist-Leninist principles. Both the U.S. and Soviet Union are keen to counteract ideological deviation (cases of Lebanon, Cuba, Hungary and Czechoslovakia) even with use of force.

The two blocs in their attempt to consolidate ideology have entered into political fields under various pretexts. Moreover, these ideologically-based pacts are used as instruments by the Great Powers in their struggle for power in the international field.


See also Hans J. Morgenthau - Politics Among Nations (2nd Ed.), 1954, pp. 80-87.