CHAPTER-II

THE TRANSITION (1929-33):
A STEPPING STONE

After the publication of the *Tractatus* in 1922 Wittgenstein took a break from active philosophy and occupied himself as an elementary school teacher in Lower Austria in the three villages of Trattenbach, Otterthal and Puchberg during 1920-1926. He had already been trained as a school master at the Lehrerbildungsanstalt in Vienna from 1919 to 1920. During these days Wittgenstein was not writing any philosophy, yet his experience of association with young children had its impact. His composition of a wordbook for children shows his perpetual preoccupation with language. But his novel methods of teaching did not go well with the parents and villagers and he resigned to become a gardener’s assistant at the monastery Klosterneuberg at Hutteldorf, outside Vienna. He remained in Vienna from 1926-1928. During this period he also helped his friend Paul Engelmann design a mansion for his sister Margaret Stonborough at Kundmannngasse. It was also during this time that Wittgenstein met Moritz Schlick of the Vienna Circle. The Vienna Circle had already been reading the *Tractatus* at its meetings during 1924-26. Schlick met Wittgenstein in 1927 in private and they continued to meet accompanied by Friedrich Waismann for sometime. Of course Wittgenstein never took part in the Vienna Circle directly but his conversations with the two above mentioned members did have its impact on the Logical Positivism of the Vienna Circle. In his autobiography, Rudolf Carnap recalls, Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* was read aloud and
discussed in great detail in the Vienna Circle although it would not be correct to say that the philosophy of the Vienna Circle was just Wittgenstein's philosophy. One may also recall Schlick's letter to Wittgenstein in 1924, where Schlick wrote to the latter in Puchberg that he wanted to meet him and that his meetings with colleagues and students in Vienna often included discussions of him. "So there are a number of people here - I am one myself - who are convinced of the importance and correctness of your fundamental ideas and who feel a strong desire to play some part in making your views more widely known".1

Wittgenstein attended a lecture by L.E.J. Brouwer in Vienna in 1929 and from that time his thoughts returned to active philosophy. He returned to Cambridge and received the doctorate degree in June 1929 and was appointed a Fellow of Trinity College from 1930. He began lecturing at Cambridge till 1947.

The early transitional phase covers the years from 1929-32. The Philosophische Bemerkungen (Philosophical Remarks) may be considered as the first work in this period. It was also the work which helped Wittgenstein to renew the grant for his research. Russell in his report to the Council of Trinity pointed out that the bulky manuscript contained novel and original ideas although he would not want them to be true, being a logician preferring simplicity.2 Just after returning to Cambridge, Wittgenstein wrote an essay Some Remarks on Logical Form in 1929. It was first published in Knowledge, Experience and Realism, the only work other than the Tractatus to be published during Wittgenstein's life time. Apart

1 WVC p.13.(Letter to Wittgenstein from Moritz Schlick.)

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from these two works, Wittgenstein’s lectures at Cambridge from 1930-32, Waismann’s record of conversations with Wittgenstein and Moore’s record of lectures from 1930-33 may be said to belong to the early transitional period. Wittgenstein’s lectures after 1933, the Philosophical Grammar, the Blue and Brown Books may be said to belong to the later transitional period because they contain his new methodology and ideas of his later philosophy as was to appear in the Philosophical Investigations.

In this chapter I will attempt to trace the development of Wittgenstein’s thought primarily in the period 1929-33, in respect of thought (Gedanke) and the thinking self (Seele). The major works that will be considered in this respect are the Philosophical Remarks, Some Remarks on Logical Form, Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, Moore’s record of Lectures 1930-33 and Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle : Conversations recorded by Friedrich Waismann. There will be an attempt to juxtapose Wittgenstein’s views related to the concept of thought and that of the thinking self in this phase with that of the TLP by showing the deviation and the line of continuity in his theorizing.

The early transitional period in the philosophy of Wittgenstein registers certain fresh and novel conceptions, the chief one being verificationism. Nevertheless a Tractarian ring is still present but his approach is more candid and discussion like. The major point to be noted is that the works published in this period were never intended to be so; at least Wittgenstein never thought that they would be published in the manner they have been published. This chapter will be divided into two sections. In section-I, I will attempt to show the continuity of the Tractarian thought in respect of thought or Gedanke and the thinking self or Seele, while section II will deal with the break in the continuity and try
to show the introduction of new ideas in the context of thought or *Gedanke* and the thinking self or *Seele*. This is necessary in order to trace the blossoming of the young student into the mature philosopher.

**SECTION I: THE UNBROKENNESS**

A survey of the primary literature of this period reveals that Wittgenstein has discussed thought or *Gedanke* more often in the *Lectures of 1930-32* than anywhere else. Apparently what is observed is an explication of what had already been stated in the early period apart from some deviations. As regarding the thinking self or *Seele*, Wittgenstein elaborates on it and reaffirms his belief in the non-existence of the thinking self or subject.

**A. THOUGHT, LANGUAGE AND ONTOLOGY**

In the *Lectures* Wittgenstein states that there is a distinction between the thought that *x* is the case, the proposition that *x* is the case and the fact that *x* is the case; the thought and the proposition indicating the method of finding out whether *x* is the case.\(^3\) This is a restatement of the Tractarian position that thought, language and reality are related to each other.\(^4\) Here Wittgenstein is not resorting to any kind of picturing but rather says that thought/proposition indicates the method of finding out the fact. Or in other words it is the fact which verifies the other two. In the *Philosophical Remarks* Wittgenstein says that two things are involved in the fact that a thought is true, i.e., the fact and the thought.\(^5\) This may be taken to imply

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\(^3\) *WL 1930-32* pp.5-6  
\(^4\) *TLP* 3 states that a thought is a logical pictures of facts; 3.01 states that a totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world; 3.5 states that a propositional sign applied and thought out is a thought while 4 states that a thought is a proposition with a sense. These remarks show that there is a relation between thought, language and fact and that thought / language is a picture of fact.  
\(^5\) *PR* p.63.
that it is the fact which verifies a true thought. In the Lent Term of 1930 (Feb. 17th), Wittgenstein is close to his Tractarian opinion. He says representation in language is done in two ways. Firstly, propositions represent a state of affairs and are either true or false. The only difference with his Tractarian viewpoint is that he is now using the word “represent” instead of “picture”. In the TLP the picturing was done by a one-to-one correspondence but now propositions represent facts (in the sense of being literal pictures) and no one-to-one correspondence is alluded to. And secondly, says Wittgenstein for propositions to represent there must be some common element between both language and reality. Wittgenstein also points out that for thought to be thought, thought must have the logical form of reality. These remarks reverberates the early viewpoint. Elsewhere in the Lectures Wittgenstein says that what is common between thought and reality must already be expressed in the expression of the thought. Therefore it is abundantly clear that Wittgenstein is still revolving around his older doctrine of propositions representing reality by virtue of logical form and that between thought, language and reality there must be logical form in common.

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6 WL 1930-32 p.10.
7 TLP 4.023 says that a proposition is a description of a state of affairs while 4.06 states that a proposition can be true or false only in virtue of being a picture of reality. These remarks show that a proposition is a representation of a state of affairs.
8 TLP 4.03 states that a proposition communicates a situation to us and the connection is precisely that it is its logical form.
TLP 4.12 states that propositions can represent the whole of reality but cannot represent what they have in common with reality, i.e., logical form. For to be able to represent logical form we would have to move outside the world.
TLP 4.121 states that propositions cannot represent logical form; it is mirrored in them and that propositions show the logical form of reality. These remarks show that there must be a common element between proposition and reality and that is nothing but logical form.
Now he is saying thought must have the logical form of reality. This shows that thought and language/proposition has something in common, a fact implied in the TLP.
Wittgenstein reverts to the pictorial nature of propositions often but it needs to be seen whether he was using the expression 'propositions are pictures' in the same way as he had used it in the Tractarian days. In the Philosophical Remarks he says that the pictorial nature of propositions become evident if propositions are considered as instructions for making models.\(^{10}\) In the Lectures, Wittgenstein at the very beginning says that language consists of propositions and a proposition is a picture of reality and we compare propositions with reality; that there must be a picture–pictures relation between propositions and reality because propositions prescribe actions.\(^{11}\) Regarding pictures, Wittgenstein says that a picture is a picture in the sense of a portrait, where one resembles the other and a picture can also be a picture not in the sense of resembling but in intention.\(^{12}\) In the conversations with Waismann, Wittgenstein remarks that in the early period when he was considering a proposition to be a logical picture of facts (TLP 3; 4.01; 4.03) or was comparing propositions to a model (TLP 4.01; 4.04), he was primarily concerned with the common element of propositions and pictures. Wittgenstein goes on to say that in the early days he was using a picture in the same way as a proposition because both agree in a certain respect.\(^{13}\) Now this particular remark is very important in the sense that it testifies the fact that in the Tractatus he was considering thought or Gedanke and proposition to be the same in structure. Now he interprets TLP 3 which says that a thought is a logical picture of facts as a proposition being a logical picture of facts. This shows that thought and proposition were on the same level in the early period and he attempted to show their relation with facts or ontology. And

\(^{10}\) PR pp.57-58.
\(^{11}\) WL1930-32 p.1.
\(^{12}\) Ibid. p.4.
\(^{13}\) WVC pp.185-186.
picturing came up because of the common element between a picture and a proposition and one could be used in the same manner as the other. This is the transitional Wittgenstein interpreting his 'pictures' from a neo point. Consider Moore's Lecture notes:

In connection with the *Tractatus* statement that propositions, in the 'narrower' sense with which we are now concerned, are 'pictures', he said he had not at that time noticed that the word 'picture' was vague; but he still, even towards the end of (III), said that he thought it 'useful to say "A proposition is a picture or something like one"' although in (II) he had said he was willing to admit that to call a proposition a 'picture' was misleading; that propositions are not pictures 'in any ordinary sense'; and that to say that they are, 'merely stresses a certain aspect of the grammar of the word "propositions" - merely stresses that our uses of the words "proposition" and "picture" follow similar rules'.14

[III consists of lectures given in the May Term of 1932; II consists of lectures in the academic year 1930-31].

Moore also points out that Wittgenstein often used the words 'project' and 'projection' in regard to the question of similarity between experiential 'propositions' and 'pictures'.15 This testifies that Wittgenstein is now relating experiential propositions with pictures. All these remarks

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14 *WL 1930-33* p.263.
Propositions in the 'narrower' sense refer to experiential propositions. When Wittgenstein is speaking of propositions as pictures, he means literal pictures. And the point he is trying to get through is, the terms 'proposition' and 'picture' can be used similarly because they follow grammatically similar rules.
afford, beyond reasonable doubt that Wittgenstein is still endorsing a kind of representationalist theory. He still insists on the comparison of propositions with pictures, but with literal pictures. He no longer alludes to the isomorphic theory by means of which the proposition was a picture of reality but now propositions are pictures in the literal sense. In the conversations, Wittgenstein categorically says that during the Tractarian days the concept of logical analysis and ostensive definition were unclear to him. At that time he thought a connexion existed between language and reality (TLP 3.263). This neo-comparison of propositions with pictures retains none of the famous older view of logical atomism and Wittgenstein now prefers to say that the words 'proposition' and 'picture' can be used similarly. This shows a beginning of his later thinking about the correlation of meaning with the use of expressions in majority of cases. It appears that Wittgenstein is in an oscillating mood; he still proclaims the representationalism of language. In the *Philosophical Remarks* Wittgenstein points out that when a child thinks, it must think in terms of pictures but these pictures are arbitrary in the sense that other pictures could perform the same function also. Therefore it is clear that the theory of the constituents of thought, language and reality corresponding to each other is no longer the cardinal point. In its place is introduced a comparison, although representationalism still persists.

In the *Lectures* Wittgenstein states that there are no true a-priori propositions because language can never show the truth or falsehood of any particular proposition but only the possibility of constructing them. In the *Philosophical Remarks* Wittgenstein asserts that the truth value of a

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17 PI §43.
18 PR pp.53-54.
thought or proposition cannot be determined by an inspection of it.\textsuperscript{20} If there are no true \( \text{\`a-priori} \) propositions, we may infer that there are no true \( \text{\`a-priori} \) thoughts as well (based on the premise that thought and language have the same structure). The \textit{Tractatus} of course does not categorically state anything like this although there are some statements in this direction. Consider \textit{TLP} 3.04: If a thought were correct \( \text{\`a-priori} \), it would be a thought whose possibility ensured its truth and \textit{TLP} 3.05: \( \text{\`a-priori} \) knowledge that a thought was true would be possible only if its truth were recognizable from the thought itself (without anything to compare it with). We have seen in Chapter I that a thought is a propositional sign projected onto reality, so obviously the question of its truth value will depend on whether it agrees or disagrees with reality. Therefore, the possibility of a thought being true \( \text{\`a-priori} \) is ruled out in the \textit{TLP}. This possibility is stated more explicitly in this period and one cannot fail to notice the continuity in the concept of thought or \textit{Gedanke} in this respect from the early days.

Both in the \textit{Lectures} and the \textit{Philosophical Remarks} we find Wittgenstein asserting the point that propositions are expressions of thought and so also are plans, which may not always be in words.\textsuperscript{21} He also says that a thought may be a wish or an order\textsuperscript{22} and that the terms expectation, thought, wish etc. that \( p \) will be the case is the process having the multiplicity that finds expression in \( p \).\textsuperscript{23} Wittgenstein calls an

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{20} PR p.78.
  \item \textsuperscript{21} WL 1930-32 pp.23-24; pp.85-86.
  \item Here Wittgenstein categorically says that thinking means operating with plans and understanding a plan means that a person is able to translate it into other symbols.
  PR p.63.
  \item Here Wittgenstein speaks of translating a plan into a description and vice versa where the rules of translation are similar to the rules of translating one verbal language into another.
  \item \textsuperscript{22} WL 1930-32 pp.23-24.
  \item \textsuperscript{23} PR pp.69-70.
\end{itemize}
articulated process a thought because the expressions (of thought) are articulated, the processes being the interpretation of signs. From these remarks it is clear that thought has varied expressions, i.e., wishes, plans, orders, propositions etc. Wittgenstein had not spoken of such expressions of thought in the early period although he had equated thought and proposition. The concept of wishes, plans, and orders as being expressions of thought is an additive. Wittgenstein is now saying that a thought is an articulated process. In the *Tractatus* he had said that a proposition is articulate and is not a mere blend of words (*TLP* 3.141). On the basis that thought and language/proposition are the same (in structure) we may say that the concept of thought being an articulated process was already hinted covertly in the *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein now states it explicitly. Definitely the continuity in conceptualizing thought or *Gedanke* cannot be overlooked.

In Waismann’s *Theses*, a work elucidating the Tractarian statements, some important entries on thought or *Gedanke* may be noted. Waismann writes, in picturing facts to ourselves we produce thoughts and in grasping a thought we grasp its sense which is the existence or non-existence of states of affairs. Waismann goes on to write that the object of


25 There are other statements in the *Tractatus* asserting that a proposition is articulate. *TLP* 4.032 states that only in so far as a proposition is logically articulated is it a picture of a situation. *TLP* 3.251 states that a proposition is articulate. Now from the Tractarian point of view since thought is a proposition with a sense (*TLP* 4) we may deduce that thought being a logical picture of facts (*TLP* 3) is so only by virtue of being logically articulated.

26 *WVC* p.235.


This entry by Waismann elucidates *TLP* 3 that thought is a logical picture of facts. This entry elucidates thought in the context of *TLP* 4.1: Propositions represent the existence and non-existence of states of affairs, and *TLP* 4.2: The sense of a proposition is its agreement and disagreement with possibilities of existence and non-existence of states of affairs.
a thought is a fact and by means of thoughts we reach beyond reality.\textsuperscript{28} He further writes, a proposition is the perceptible expression of a thought and language must extend as far as thoughts.\textsuperscript{29} These entries by Waismann elucidate the Tractarian view that thought and language correspond with each other by virtue of their structures and are related to reality.

Other obvious indications can be cited which proclaim that language and thought are convoluted. In the \textit{Philosophical Remarks}, for example, Wittgenstein writes that probably the first use of language can be traced to the occasion when a definite thought was translated into spoken words and that learning a language can be done by a child only by thinking in that language and it is hopeless that a child can use a language but cannot think in it:

The arbitrariness of linguistic expressions: might we say: A child must of course learn to speak a particular language, but doesn't have to learn to think; i.e., it would think spontaneously, even without learning any language?

But in my view, if it thinks, then it forms for itself pictures and in a certain sense these are arbitrary, that is to

\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Ibid.}
The object of thought is not referred to in the early period except at \textit{TLP} 3.2 which states that in a proposition a thought can be expressed in such a way that elements of the propositional sign correspond to the objects of the thought.

Probably here Waismann is elucidating \textit{TLP} 3 in the sense that thought is directed towards facts. \textit{TLP} 4.03 states that reality is compared with propositions while 4.021 and 4.01 states that a proposition is a picture of reality. \textit{TLP} 3.01 states that the totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world and \textit{TLP} 2.06 states that the existence and non-existence of states of affairs is reality. Therefore, we may say that thoughts help us to reach beyond the existence and non-existence of states of affairs.

\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Ibid.}
\textit{TLP} 3.1 states that in a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses.

Here we see an affirmation of the deduction made in Chapter 1 that thought and language is co-extensive in the field of the sensible.
say, in so far as other pictures could have played the same role. On the other hand, language has certainly also come about naturally, i.e., there must presumably have been a first man who for the first time expressed a definite thought in spoken words. And besides, the whole question is a matter of indifference because a child learning a language only learns it by beginning to think in it. Suddenly beginning; I mean: there is no preliminary stage in which a child already uses a language, so to speak uses it for communication, but does not yet think in it.30

Wittgenstein goes on to call Mach's thought experiment a grammatical investigation:

What Mach calls a thought experiment is of course not an experiment at all [3]. At bottom it is a grammatical investigation.31


Thus the point that thought and language are the same is restated.

In the Lecture: Symbol and Thought, Wittgenstein says that in the process of thinking, the thought does not appear first to be translated into words later. It is not the case that something exists before it is translated into words or imagery.32 It appears from this that Wittgenstein is suggesting that thought and language are not two separate independent

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30 PR pp.53-54.
In the Notebooks Wittgenstein very clearly says that thinking and language are the same [NB p.82e].
31 Ibid. p.52.
32 WL 1930-32 pp.85-86.
processes but are the same and thinking means using language. As has already been mentioned, according to Wittgenstein, thought, proposition and plan are all on the same level. Therefore we cannot fail to notice the continuation of the Tractarian view that thought and proposition, i.e., thinking and using language are not two separate processes.

B. PROPOSITIONS

If thought and proposition are the same in their form then it becomes essential to see what Wittgenstein is saying in connection with propositions in the transitional period. Firstly, language consists of propositions and a proposition is a picture of reality and we compare propositions with reality. Secondly, propositions are the basic elements of our description of the world and can be significantly negated. Thirdly, they are the smallest units of language having sense. Fourthly, propositions describe facts, i.e., what is the case and are either true or false. Fifthly, to understand the sense of a proposition is to know how the issue of its truth or falsity is to be decided. Sixthly, the constituents of propositions are words which function only in propositions and have no meaning or function outside propositions. The last feature enumerated registers a clear deviation from the Tractatus. In the TLP simple signs in propositions were called names (TLP 3.202) and a name in a proposition was the representative of an object (TLP 3.22). Wittgenstein had not

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33 Ibid. p.110.
34 Ibid. p.1.
This has already been stated in the Tractatus, at TLP 4.01 and 4.05.
In WVC Wittgenstein says we trace the form of reality as it were in a proposition [WVC p.108].
36 Ibid. p.22.
37 Ibid. p.57.
38 Ibid. p.45.
39 PR p.77.
WL 1930-32 p.2.
spoken of words at all in the early period but had said that a name has meaning only in the context of a proposition. Now it is noted that he considers words instead of names to be the constituents of propositions. Moreover names were used in the technical sense of directly signifying objects as their meanings. It remains to be seen whether words are also used in a technical sense. Regarding the relation of proposition and reality, Wittgenstein says it is like the relation of a measuring rod to an object; just like a measuring rod can measure an object from different sides so also a proposition can be held against reality from different aspects.40

Moore recalls Wittgenstein saying, that the question 'What is a proposition' is one that is not clearly understood; yet later on he considered it more or less arbitrary as to what we call a proposition and still later Wittgenstein said that he could not give a general definition of 'proposition' any more than he could give of 'game' and that he could only give examples and any standard would be 'arbitrary' because nobody would have decided whether to call so-and-so a 'proposition' or not.41 Moore writes:

40 Ibid. p.6.

The Tractatus states that a picture is laid against reality like a measure (TLP 2.1512). In the Philosophical Remarks Wittgenstein says a proposition fits onto reality in case we compare it with reality [PR p.77]. In the conversations, Wittgenstein points out that his previous conception of laying a proposition against reality like a ruler (TLP 2.1512-2.15121) needs to be amended. Instead he now recommends speaking of a system of propositions rather than a proposition being laid against reality like a measure. An entire system of propositions is compared with reality. For example, when we say that a particular point is blue, we also mean that it is not red, green or orange. And in that case the entire colour scale has been laid against reality at once. And Wittgenstein states that his previous conception was erroneous and it led him to believe that it was not possible to infer the non-existence of one state of affairs from the existence of another (TLP 2.062, 4.211, 5.1314-5.135). But on his new conception of a system of propositions being compared to reality, it is possible to infer from the existence of one state of affairs, the non-existence of all the other states of affairs described by this system of propositions [IVVC pp.63-64].

41 WL 1930-33 p.261.
In (II), however, he had said that the word ‘proposition’, ‘as generally understood’, includes both ‘what I call propositions’, also ‘hypotheses’, and also mathematical propositions; that the distinction between these three ‘kinds’ is a ‘logical distinction’, and that therefore there must be some grammatical rules, in the case of each kind, which apply to that kind and not to the other two; but that the ‘truth-function’ rules apply to all three, and that is why they are all called ‘propositions’.\footnote{Ibid.}

As is well known and also certified by Moore’s Lecture notes, Wittgenstein distinguished between three different kinds of propositions in this period. ‘Genuine’ propositions are the first kind. They are those that can be conclusively verified or falsified by comparison with reality. Such propositions describe immediate experience and hence may be called sense-datum statements. The second class of propositions are called ‘Hypotheses’. Such propositions cannot be verified conclusively by being referred to experience. Hypotheses include propositions about objective particulars, about the past or future, about other people’s mental states, universal generalizations, laws of nature etc. They are different from the propositions of immediate experience and cannot be classified as true or false in the same sense. They have a different formal relation to reality from those statements which can be conclusively verified. ‘Mathematical’ propositions constitute the third class. Such propositions cannot be compared with reality and therefore neither agrees nor disagrees with reality. The sense of a mathematical proposition is given by its proof.\footnote{Hacker, P.M.S. 1996. Wittgenstein’s Place in Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy. Blackwell Publishers. U.K. pp.56-57.} The
genuine propositions are referred by Moore as 'experiential propositions'. Based on this the following deductions can be made about thought or Gedanke (considering that thought and proposition are similar in form):

1) Language may also be said to consist of thoughts (or as expressions of or as identical with thoughts) and a thought is a picture of reality and thoughts can be compared with reality. [From language consists of propositions, and proposition and thought are the same in form and thoughts find expressions in propositions]

2) Thoughts may be considered to be one of the basic elements in the description of the world and can be significantly negated.

3) Thoughts have sense.

4) Thoughts describe facts and are either true or false.

5) The sense of a thought can be understood by knowing how the issue of its truth or falsity is to be decided.

6) The nameless constituents of thought function only in the process of thought and may be said to correspond to the words of propositions. But these constituents cannot be said to have objects as their meanings.

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44 WL 1930-33 p.262. Moore points out Wittgenstein said the word 'proposition' was used in two ways, a wider and a narrower sense. The wider sense included all three kinds of propositions and the narrower sense included the first two but not the third. And he used the expression 'experiential propositions' to refer to propositions in the narrower sense.

45 In reply the Russell's query regarding the constituents of thought, Wittgenstein had written "I don't know what the constituents of a thought are, but I know that it must have such constituents which correspond to the words of language ..." [letter to Russell, 1919]. NB p.130.
7) A thought can be held up against reality from different aspects.

8) It is a system of thoughts that are compared with reality.

Therefore we notice some significant shifts in the Wittgensteinian concept of the proposition during this stage and so also the same should apply in the case of thought.

C. THE NON-PSYCHOLOGICAL GEDANKE

Wittgenstein's non-interest in the psychological aspect of the Gedanke displays an incessant persistence from the Tractarian days. In the Lectures, Wittgenstein in no uncertain terms says it is injurious to consider the physiological process of thought like where it occurs, whether it involves images etc.; this should not be the concern of a philosopher but rather his subject is the symbolic aspect of thought process.\(^{46}\) Wittgenstein points out that quite contrary to common belief, thought is not a hidden process but an open process to be seen.\(^{47}\) Elsewhere he says that a philosophical analysis of thought can give no new information about it and even if it did, it would not be of substantial interest. Thought as a scientific analysis is a psychological event, capable of explanation by means of other thoughts. The new data that may be provided by this kind of scientific analysis is of no concern to the philosopher.\(^{48}\) Therefore, a similar line of speculation is noticeable as in the early days. Wittgenstein now appears to be more vociferous in his stress that philosophy and the

\(^{46}\) WL 1930-32 pp.24-25.


\(^{48}\) Ibid, p.34.

This remark is reminiscent of the early opinion in 1919 that thought as a psychological process should not be of interest to the philosopher (NB p.130).

Also consider TLP 4.1121 which states that psychology is no more closely related to philosophy than any other natural science. The opposition to a psychological approach and analysis is very apparent.
psychological thought or Gedanke are distinct arenas and the latter cannot be the subject matter of the former. This case is again echoed in the Lent Term of 1931 where in answer to the question what a proposition is, and whether it is an expression of a thought, Wittgenstein points out that thought as a psychological process serves no utility to the philosopher. The causes, conditions and effects of thought should not be our concern but rather we should be interested in thought as a symbolic process, whose duration is as long as its expression.\textsuperscript{49} Elsewhere in the Lectures Wittgenstein also emphasizes the correctness of the study of the non-psychological aspect of thought: He says that it is a mistake to suppose that in thought some kind of a representation occurs in the mind and emphasizes that there are no mental processes that cannot be symbolized.

...But, it may be asked, even if words do not stand for or represent things, cannot thought do so? Is not this the peculiar property of mental phenomena? Is there not representation “in the mind”? This suggestion is a pernicious mistake. It separates thought into two parts, organic (essential) and inorganic (non-essential). But no part of thought is more organic than another. There is no mental process which cannot be symbolized, and if there were such a process which could not take place on the blackboard, it would not help. For I could still ask for a description of this process, and the description would be in symbols which would have a relation to reality. We are only interested in what can be symbolised.\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid, p.37.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid, p.45.
When Wittgenstein is saying that there is no mental process that cannot be symbolized, he is ruling out the case of thinking without language or in other words, he is endorsing that all thoughts are capable of being expressed. Therefore the Lectures testify that Wittgenstein is keen to avoid the psychological study of thought or Gedanke in so far as the study of the philosophy of language is concerned and thought is not some hidden mysterious process having an enigmatic character. At least not from the viewpoint of philosophical study and if it did that should not be the concern of philosophy.

In the conversations with Waismann a footnote mentions that thinking does not imply the generation of experiences; for example, for understanding words like 'blue', 'red', etc. it is not necessary to hallucinate colours but rather it would suffice to understand the sense of the proposition where the words occur. In the conversations Wittgenstein also argues against the prevalent view that understanding is a psychological process accompanying a spoken or a written proposition. He admits that it is true that we cannot deny that a number of processes occur within us when we hear or read a proposition like conjuring an image, various kinds of associations, etc., yet understanding cannot be said to be a particular psychological process at all. Understanding, says Wittgenstein, is operating with a proposition and cannot be an internal state like a toothache. Therefore the general notion of understanding as an internal mental process is under the axe. This is in conformity with the early view that the psychological consideration of thought is extraneous to philosophy. All these references show beyond any reasonable doubt that the concept of something going on in the mind, a hidden mental process is

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51 WVC p.86.
52 Ibid. p.167.
irrelevant to philosophy and emphasize the persistence with the early period.

**D. THINKING AND SPEAKING**

Wittgenstein in the *Philosophical Remarks* states that thought is an articulated process. This remark can be taken to imply that thoughts in order to be thoughts have to be expressed. Or may we infer that there can be thoughts which cannot be expressed in sensible language? If this is the case then obviously we see the continuity from the Tractarian period that there is a part which cannot be put into words (*TLP* 6.522) i.e., the unsaid (the nonsense) part of the *TLP*. According to the *Tractatus* in the domain of the sensible, language and thought are the same, i.e., co-extensive while in the expanse of the non-sensible, which constitutes a large portion, lies the unsaid part, which can only be shown but cannot be spoken of. In this segment language and thought do not integrate and agree to each other, i.e., they are not co-extensive. So the possibility remains that thinking is possible without speaking (in the early period).

In the conversations Wittgenstein says that man has a tendency to run up against the limits of language. The limits of language were already mentioned in the *TLP* (*TLP* 6.522) and he now says that it is ethics. It is in ethics that we attempt to say something that cannot be said. So what lies on the other side of language, what cannot be said is now explicitly mentioned by the author of the *Tractatus* as being ethics; it is the unsaid part. Wittgenstein also points out that all description is

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53 *PR* pp.69-70.
54 *WVC* p.68.
55 In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein had said that it is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental and that ethics and aesthetics are one and the same (*TLP* 6.421).
within the world and in a complete description of the world an ethical proposition does not occur; he also says what is ethical is not a state of affairs.\textsuperscript{56} So the previously established distinction between sense and nonsense, in terms of what can be said and what cannot be has endured the first phase of the transitional years.

In the \textit{Philosophical Remarks} Wittgenstein says that if it is the case that a sentence makes sense to one and not to another person then in that case it implies that the two persons are not using the words with the same meaning, i.e., one is giving a different meaning to the words or is speaking without thinking.\textsuperscript{57} From this it is evident that speaking without thinking is a possible case and that depends on the way one is using words. In the \textit{Lectures} Wittgenstein says:

You can describe the experience of learning a particular language, but you cannot describe the experience of learning to use language because you would then have to be able to think what it was like to have no language at all—i.e., to think what it would be like not to think.\textsuperscript{58}

This remark may be interpreted to imply that learning to use language begins by thinking in that language. This has been endorsed in the \textit{Philosophical Remarks} where he says that we think in a language and it is impossible for a child to use a language but not think in it.\textsuperscript{59} And it may be inferred that it is in this sense that language and thought are considered to be the same, accorded the same status. In the Preface to the \textit{TLP},\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{56} \textit{WVC} p.92.  
\textsuperscript{57} \textit{PR} pp.54-55. We also notice 'use' of words settling in here.  
\textsuperscript{58} \textit{WL} 1930-32 pp.85-86.  
\textsuperscript{59} \textit{PR} pp.53-54.  
\textsuperscript{60} \textit{TLP} p.3.
Wittgenstein says that to draw a limit to thought we have to be able to think what cannot be thought. We can collate this remark with the previous cited remark from the Lectures that we cannot think what it is like not to think at all. Such remarks tend to imply the perpetuity of the opinion that language and thought are co-extensive (at least in the field of the sensible) and one cannot happen without the other. Therefore thinking without speaking is ruled out in the sphere of the sensible.

E. SELF AND SOLIPSISM

In the Philosophical Remarks Wittgenstein writes that the use of the word 'I' is more often than not misleading particularly when it is used to express immediate experience like in 'I can see a red patch'. If it would be possible to depict immediate experience without the use of the personal pronoun then we could show that the 'I' is not necessary for the representation. Philosophical errors arise when we try to represent immediate sense-data by using ordinary physical language. The forms of speech that we use are taken from ordinary physical language and cannot be used without error in epistemology or phenomenology. Wittgenstein also points out that I cannot draw the limits of my world although I can draw limits within my world. The 'limits of my world' correspond to the 'limits of my language' and possibly the boundary cannot be made

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61 Also consider TLP 5.61 and NB p.84e which state that what cannot be imagined cannot even be talked of. These remarks imply that learning to use language originates in thinking and so both are co-extensive.
62 PR p.68.
It may be noted in this respect that in the early period Wittgenstein does not speak of the use of the word 'I' but explicitly denies the thinking subject [TLP 5.631; NB p.80e]. Now Wittgenstein does not say that the thinking subject as 'I' does not exist but rather it could be done away with in our ordinary language to refer to first person experiences.
63 Ibid p 178.
In this light consider TLP 5.6 which states that the limits of my language mean the limits of my world.TLP 5.62 states that the world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world. In the Notebooks he writes that the limits of my language stand for the limits of my world [NB p.49e]. So Wittgenstein had already spoken of the 'the limits of my world' as corresponding to the 'limits of my language'.

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because to do so would involve ‘to think what it is not to think at all’. This is a reassertment of the Tractarian point. In the conversations Wittgenstein says that the word ‘I’ can be done without, it can be eliminated from language.64

Moore in his notes from the Lectures writes:

For he said that ‘Just as no (physical) eye is involved in seeing, so no Ego is involved in thinking or in having toothache’; and he quoted, with apparent approval, Lichtenberg’s saying, ‘Instead of “I think” we ought to say “It thinks” (‘it’ being used, as he said, as ‘Es’ is used in ‘Es blitzet’); and by saying this he meant, I think, something similar to what he said of ‘the eye of the visual field’ when he said that it is not anything which is in the visual field. Like so many other philosophers, in talking of ‘visual sensations’ he seemed not to distinguish between ‘what I see’ and ‘my seeing of it’; and he did not expressly discuss what appears to be a possibility, namely, that though no person enters into what I see, yet some ‘person’ other than a physical body or a voice, may ‘enter into’ my seeing of it.65

Thus Wittgenstein points out that it is possible to omit the ‘I’ and say ‘It is thinking’.66 Moore points out that Wittgenstein does not make any

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64 WVC p.49.
65 WL 1930-33 p.309.
66 Lichtenberg had said something similar: one should not say “I think”, but rather “it thinks” (es denkt), just as one says “it thunders”.
distinction between the subject and the object of perception and Moore says that though no person may enter in the picture yet the act of apprehension cannot be denied.

These remarks show that in describing immediate sense data, the personal pronoun can be done away with. It is not necessary. And the way the term 'I' is used makes us think that the self as a thinking subject has a separate existence. So we find Wittgenstein adhering to his Tractarian viewpoint of the no-agent view of thinking. And the 'I' of philosophy is a non-psychological self. Therefore the subject as the owner of thoughts cannot be encountered and Wittgenstein is keen to deny its existence.

In this respect one can refer to Russell who while criticizing Berkeley's theory of idealism pointed out that the question of the distinction between the act and the object in our apprehending of things is vitally important. Russell says that the primary characteristic of the mind is to be acquainted with things other than itself; it is the power of the knowing mind. This line of thinking as tacitly implied by Moore is missing in Wittgenstein.

Therefore the pervading influence of the early period regarding the view that there is no thinking, representing subject (denkende, vorstellende) also envelops the early years of Wittgenstein's return to philosophy. As has been observed, in the Tractatus and Notebooks, Wittgenstein had adopted a Humean stand, trying to show that the self cannot be

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67 In the Notebooks Wittgenstein clearly says that the 'I' is not an object because I can confront all objects objectively but never the I [NB p.80e].
68 TLP 5.641 state that there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a non-psychological way [also in NB p.80e].
encountered like an object of experience in the perceptible world. He went on to show that propositions of the form ‘“p” says p’ involves the correlation of facts by means of the correlation of their objects rather than correlating a fact with an object, (TLP 5.542). This is followed by the conclusion that there is no soul. This is the thinking, representing subject. But this subject is not the concern of philosophy, but rather of psychology.

The concern of philosophy is rather the metaphysical subject which does not belong to the world but is its limit (TLP 5.632) just like the eye is related to the visual field (TLP 5.633). So though Wittgenstein rejects the thinking subject on the grounds of non-encounterability, he does not do so for the metaphysical subject. The latter is not a part or a constituent of the world but exists as its limit. Apart from this Wittgenstein affirms the willing subject (NB p80e). Some commentators interpret the willing subject as being identical with the metaphysical subject. It is the metaphysical self which brings about solipsism. And all that is correct in solipsism is that ‘the world is my world’. Yet the self of solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and solipsism coincides with pure realism (TLP 5.64).

Actually solipsism attempts to say the unsayable. It cannot be said but can only be shown. And what the solipsist means is “that the world is my world. This inexpressible truth shows itself in the fact that ‘the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world’.”

This was the early view. The early transitional Wittgenstein attempts to put forward the same view of the non-existence of the thinking self but he treads a different path to reach it. The early period

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70 At TLP 5.631, Wittgenstein states that in the book The World as I found it, I could include a report of my body but a mention of the subject or the self would not be possible because it could not be found in the world. In the Notebooks he writes that the I is not an object because it cannot be objectively confronted (NB p.80e).

emphasized non-encounterability of the thinking self. But now Wittgenstein prefers to give it a linguistic touch. He now says that the 'I' as a term can be shoved aside; it is not absolutely necessary in our description of personal experiences because the 'I' does not denote an owner. And what is involved in the solipsist's claim, for Wittgenstein now is a grammatical error. The point to note is that despite the major changes, the thread linking the early and intermediate years can hardly be overlooked.

So we see that Wittgenstein was working on his earlier ideas and at the same time developing new ideas. In this section the ideas which were found in conformity with his earlier thinking have been highlighted. The next section will concentrate on the diversion and the new way of theorizing.

SECTION II: THE DIGRESSION

The early transitional years recording Wittgenstein's return to philosophy is swathed in a chain of subtle changes in his thinking, although remnants of the early period still cling on. The predominant alteration is noticed in the fact that the earlier atomic theory of meaning is abandoned and now replaced by the principle of verification which states that the meaning of a proposition is its method of verification. The á-priori method of the *Tractatus* has now taken a back seat and in its place is introduced the á-posteriori method of investigating actual phenomena. There has been a shift from the firm belief of the early days in a primary language as describing phenomena to a physicalist language. In this section I will consider the break in the continuity of Wittgenstein's
thought, particularly as related to the concept of thought or Gedanke and the thinking self or Seele.

A. INTRODUCTION OF VERIFICATIONISM

As is well known, the early 1930's saw the emergence of a novel criterion of meaning, the verification criterion of meaning. This criterion is generally associated with the Vienna Circle who owe their indebtedness to Wittgenstein for having filtered it to them through its members like Schlick, Waismann, Carnap and Feigl. The criterion states that a proposition is meaningful if it can be verified and its meaning is its method of verification. In the Philosophical Remarks, Wittgenstein writes that to understand the sense of a proposition means to know how the issue of its truth or falsity is to be decided.\textsuperscript{72} He, very clearly in the Philosophical Remarks also says that we can never believe something for which some kind of verificationism cannot be imagined.\textsuperscript{73} In the conversations with Waismann, we find Wittgenstein discussing verificationism in the context of the sense of a proposition, and he says that there are two conceptions involved. According to one, a proposition cannot be verified completely and no matter what we do, we cannot be sure of not being mistaken. According to the other conception if the sense of a proposition cannot be verified completely then it cannot mean anything either. Wittgenstein asserts his adherence to this latter conception. And he points out that the sense of a proposition can be determined only if we know a specific procedure for when to consider the proposition as verified. The reason why we cannot be certain when a proposition is completely verified is because words oscillate between...

\textsuperscript{72} PR p.77.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid, pp.89-90.
different meanings. And sometimes verification becomes difficult.74 Moore records that in 1930 Wittgenstein had remarked that the sense of a proposition is the way in which it is verified.75 In the conversations Wittgenstein says that different verifications account for different meanings.76 Therefore according to the transitional Wittgenstein, propositions have meanings according to their verifications and their meanings are as varied and diverse as their verifications. The following remarks from Mr. Stein’s notes are to be taken note of.

The sense of a proposition is the method of its verification. A method of verification is not the means of establishing the truth of a proposition; it is the very sense of a proposition. In order to understand a proposition, you need to know the method of its verification. To specify it is to specify the sense of a proposition. You cannot look for a method of verification. A proposition can only say what is established by the method of its verification.77

So according to this doctrine a proposition can be said to be meaningful only if it can be verified or falsified completely. And according to Wittgenstein’s threefold classification of propositions, only the propositions of the first kind, the experiential propositions, i.e., the sense-datum statements are capable of being conclusively verified or falsified. The other two classes of propositions cannot be verified conclusively or

Words oscillating between different meanings may be interpreted as being tacitly suggestive of words having different uses. Now Wittgenstein is clear that the meaning of a word is not fixed but it is subject to change. This is also suggestive of his abandonment of his belief in the á-priori system. He is now stressing the relevance and importance on an á-posteriori system.
75 WL 1930-33 p.266
76 WVC p.53.
77 Ibid. p.227.
falsified by virtue of the different kind of relation they have with reality. Therefore, verificationism as a criterion of meaning is applicable only to the first kind of propositions, i.e., experiential propositions. P.M.S. Hacker opines experiential propositions as being referred as elementary propositions in the *Tractatus.*

Waismann in his *Thesis* writes that the sense of a proposition is the way it is verified.\(^7^9\) Waismann goes on to write that the sense of a proposition is independent of the truth-value of the proposition. The latter is known by experience unlike the former. And a statement can have sense only if it can be verified, while a proposition which is not verifiable fails to have any sense. Therefore, all verifiable statements are formulated in a legitimate manner. A specification of the method of verification will lay down the form of the proposition, the meaning of its words, rules of syntax etc. And the same word can have different meanings in propositions verified in different ways.\(^8^0\) In the *Lectures* Wittgenstein clearly says that while the meaning of a word lies in its use and that too not singularly but only in the context of a proposition, the meaning of a proposition is the mode of its verification.\(^8^1\)

This was the transitional Wittgenstein giving a theory of meaning. And the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle also professed the same theory. They were captivated by the *Tractatus* which was read and interpreted at its weekly meetings. The *Tractatus* provided the

\(^7^9\) *WVC* p.244.
\(^8^0\) *Ibid.* pp.244-245.
\(^8^1\) *WL* 1930-32 p.66.

We notice that meaning as use is coming in respect of words while in respect of propositions it is its mode of verification.
infrastructure to the Vienna Circle's declaration that empirical propositions are the ones that can be known. But the most crucial fact is that the members of the Vienna Circle while they were espousing their verificationist principle attributed it to Wittgenstein. Rudolf Carnap, for example, calls it "Wittgenstein's principle of verifiability". Victor Kraft also traces the 'verification formula' to Wittgenstein and considered the *Tractatus* the point of inception of the theory of meaning and meaninglessness of the Vienna Circle. Other evidences also suggest that the *TLP* was interpreted by the circle as espousing verificationism. How far the claims of the logical positivists hold ground is a huge matter of controversy. Findlay points out that Wittgenstein himself considered that his views were being 'distorted' and 'vulgarized' by the Vienna Circle, especially the problems of traditional philosophy and Wittgenstein was so upset at this in the 1930's that he could not stand to hear their names. Anat Biletzki points out that 'the Circle admittedly used their interpretation of Wittgenstein's "anti-metaphysics" to buttress their own'. J.N. Findlay points out that the Vienna Circle interpreted the 'atomic simples' of the *TLP* as being 'elementary sense-particulars' and their 'simple sense-qualities' and 'its elementary facts' as what can be stated in 'elementary sense-protocols'. Anat Biletzki opines that

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82 The distinction provided in the *TLP* between meaningful and nonsensical propositions provided the guideline.
attributing verificationism to the *Tractatus* involves an intricate and misguided reading of the *Tractatus*.88

Biletzki writes:

Given the leanings of the Vienna Circle to language and linguistic discussion, we cannot but also wonder at the subtle, but yet profound, difference between their final, bottom-line as it were, solution to the problem of the senseless and Wittgenstein's treatment of this same point. Russell had already noticed the hardship involved in Wittgenstein's obdurate labelling of logical truths (and contradictions), or mathematical truths, or truths *about* language, as being senseless propositions (if propositions they be), and had suggested – but no more than suggested in the Introduction to the *Tractatus*—what he later worked out in detail, a hierarchy of languages. The Vienna Circle seem to be going one up on Russell by simply ignoring Wittgenstein's sincere effort to draw the limits of language. They develop their versions of language, meta-language, and so on, in order to make room for the possibility of doing what they thought was most important: talking about language in general, and the language of science in particular. And since this talk could not, under any circumstances, be perceived as senseless—it was their explicitly formulated philosophy—they not only

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organized it formalistically and systematically, they also made mince of the thought that it would be senseless.89

One may refer to Findlay who says that the 'sensationalistic' interpretation of the *TLP* is 'quite wide of the mark.'90

P.M.S. Hacker91 has pointed out that the principle of verification was first printed in Waismann's 'A Logical Analysis of the Concept of Probability' (1930-31). In the opening page he acknowledged his use of Wittgenstein's ideas. He went on to say:

If there is no way of telling when a proposition is true, then the proposition has no sense whatever; for the sense of a proposition is its method of verification. In fact, whoever utters a proposition must know under what conditions he will call the proposition true or false; if he cannot tell this, then he does not know what he has said.92

Hacker93 also refers to the Theses of Waismann.

A person who utters a proposition must know under what conditions the proposition is to be called true or false; if he is not able to specify that, he also does not know what he has said.

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89 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
To understand a proposition means to know how things stand if the proposition is true.

One can understand a proposition without knowing whether it is true.

In order to get an idea of the sense of a proposition, it is necessary to become clear about the procedure leading to the determination of its truth. If one does not know that procedure, one cannot understand the proposition either.

A proposition cannot say more than is established by means of the method of its verification ...

*The sense of a proposition is the way it is verified* ...

A proposition that cannot be verified in any way has no sense.94

Hacker also points out that Waismann connects the principle of verification with that of ostensive definition as the connection between language and reality.95 He refers to the following:

There are two ways of giving a sign a meaning: 1. By means of ostension (*Aufweisung*) ... 2. By means of definition ...

... Ostension steps outside language and connects signs with reality ... If we analyse the signs in a statement, replacing them by other signs in accordance with their definitions and

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94 *WVC* p.243.
replacing those by yet other signs, etc., the verification-path becomes visible step by step.

Definitions are sign posts. They show the path leading to verification, ... a verification-path cannot lead to infinity ... but ultimately we must reach propositions that ... point to reality ...

If it were otherwise ... there would be no connection between language and the world.

The propositions that deal with reality immediately are called elementary propositions.⁹⁶

Hacker is of the view that the Tractatus was implicitly committed to verificationism as a criterion of empirical meaningfulness for elementary propositions.⁹⁷ He says it is generally now accepted that the simple objects of the Tractatus are objects of acquaintance (though not as sense-data) and the elementary propositions of the Tractatus are descriptions of states of affairs that are objects of possible experience. Elementary propositions can be determined to be true or false by comparing (i.e., verifying) them with reality (TLP 2.223) and the proposition is like a yardstick to be held up against reality (TLP 2.1512). If simple objects are the objects of acquaintance (which they supposedly must be because names are attached to the objects that are their meanings by a process of meaning or by a mental act) and if we can understand an elementary proposition only by knowing what must be the case if it is true, then understanding such a

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⁹⁶ WVC p.246.
proposition means to know what experience would verify it. But in spite of all, Hacker points out that it must be noted that the *TLP* did not give a verificationist definition of meaning in terms of the method of verification.

As Hacker\(^98\) points out that there is no doubt about the fact that verificationism was adhered to by Wittgenstein in 1929-30 but this leads to the important question why did he later insist that he had not brought forward verificationism as a theory of meaning? In this connection one may refer to Wittgenstein’s remark:

> I used at one time to say that, in order to get clear how a certain sentence is used, it was a good idea to ask oneself the question: How would one try to verify such an assertion? But that’s just one way of getting clear about the use of a word or sentence ... some people have turned this suggestion about asking for the verification into a dogma—as if I had been advancing a *theory* about meaning.\(^99\)

Hacker\(^100\) points out that it is doubtful whether even during 1929-30 Wittgenstein considered the verifiability criterion as a *theory* of meaning. According to Hacker, probably Wittgenstein meant the point that Schlick had elaborated in ‘Positivism and Realism’:

> It would be quite mistaken to see, somehow, in what we have said a “theory of meaning” (in Anglo-Saxon countries this

\(^{98}\) Ibid. p.57.

\(^{99}\) Reported in D.A.T. Gasking and A.C. Jackson, ‘Wittgenstein as Teacher’. Reprinted in *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Man and his Philosophy*, 1967. Ed. K.T. Fann. Dell Publishing Co. New York. p.54. It may be noted that this remark has the possibility of referring to the method of verification as giving a use for a particular word, i.e., method of verification gives a use for a word.

insight, that the meaning of a proposition is determined wholly and alone by its verification in the given, is often called the “experimental theory of meaning”). What precedes every formulation of a theory cannot itself be a theory.101

Actually the point Hacker is emphasizing is that there can be no Wittgenstein theories, for the philosopher was much against any so called ‘theory’. Hacker also refers to Schlick’s paper ‘Meaning and Verification’ (1936)102 where Schlick pointed out that his views follow from conversations with Wittgenstein. Hacker points out that Wittgenstein’s later denial of his adherence to the Principle of Verification is ‘disingenuous’ and it is clear that Wittgenstein adopted an extreme verificationism during 1929-32.103

Undeniably, the Philosophical Remarks, the conversations with Waismann, the lecture notes of Moore and those taken by his students in 1930-32 all corroborate that Wittgenstein was devoted to a verificationist approach during this period.104 And certain statements from the Tractatus may be taken as forerunner to the case. TLP 2.1511 and 2.1512 speaks of a picture being attached to reality and being laid against it like a measure.105 TLP 2.201 states that a picture depicts reality by representing a possibility of existence and non-existence of states of affair and TLP 2.21 states a picture agrees with reality, or fails to agree; it is correct or incorrect, true

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102 Schlick, M. ‘Meaning and Verification’ in Gesammelte Aufsätze. p.341. [Also in The Philosophical Review 45(1936)].
104 WVC pp.53; 244; WL 1930-32 p.66; WL 1930-33 p.266.
105 In the Philosophical Remarks Wittgenstein speaks of the proposition being able to fit on to reality in case we compare it with reality [PR p.77].
or false. TLP 2.222 and 2.223 state that the agreement or disagreement of the sense of a picture with reality constitutes its truth or falsity. So we can say whether a picture is true or false by comparing it with reality. TLP 4.01 declares that a proposition is a picture of reality; TLP 4.023 says a proposition restricts reality to two alternatives, i.e., yes or no and TLP 4.024 states that to understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true.\textsuperscript{106} TLP 4.05 states that reality is compared with propositions. These remarks in the \textit{Tractatus} may be considered to annotate verificationism. Wittgenstein of course does not lay it down as a theory of meaning but rather Wittgenstein seems to imply that propositions are to be compared with reality (which is a kind of verificationism), to determine their truth value. Or in other words it is verification alone which determines the truth value of a proposition. In this context one must refer to Waismann's \textit{Thesis} where he considers the idea that to understand a proposition is to know under what conditions it is true and moves on to the principle of verification.\textsuperscript{107} Waismann writes that to understand a proposition means to know how things stand if the proposition is true and to get an idea of the sense of a proposition it is necessary to know the procedure leading to the determination of its truth. Immediately after this Waismann writes that the sense of a proposition is the way it is verified. This is followed by Waismann writing that sense is a method of verification and not a means or a vehicle. Therefore, the \textit{Tractatus} is elucidated as saying that the sense of a proposition is its method of verification. The \textit{Tractatus} does not say anything about meaning but only of \textit{sense} in the context of proposition so it may be inferred that the older theory of sense is replaced by meaning in respect of propositions.

\textsuperscript{106} In the \textit{PR} Wittgenstein says that to understand the sense of a proposition means to know how the issue of its truth or falsity is to be decided [\textit{PR} p.77].

\textsuperscript{107} WVC pp.243-245.
Later Waismann writes that a proposition that cannot be verified in any way has no sense. And a statement has sense only because it can be verified and not because it is constructed in a legitimate way. Immediately after this Waismann writes that specifying a method of verification lays down the form of the proposition, the meaning of its words, rules of syntax etc. Here it is markedly distinct that the theory of sense is gradually moving towards meaning.

If the conjecture of the *Tractatus* implying a tacit verificationism is accepted then certain conclusions can be drawn in the case of thought or Gedanke. It is apparent from Waismann's elucidation that the sense of a proposition is its method of verification. *TLP 4* may be interpreted in this light. One may take the liberty to infer that a thought is a proposition where a method of verification is specified (thought being a proposition with sense). And if the method of verification cannot be specified the thought is nonsensical, a meaningless thought. And if we attempt to interpret the Tractarian remark on thought in the light of the remarks on verificationism in the transitional period, we are liable to deduce that the meaning of a thought is its method of verification and a thought which is not verifiable has no sense. The method of verification will determine the truth value of the thought and hence there can be no thoughts that are true á-priori.¹⁰⁸ These deductions may be supposed to be correct if the criteria of meaning as picturing facts in the world can be accepted to mean the same as the method of verification. But the point to be emphasized is that there is a shift in terminology used by the early and middle Wittgenstein: from 'sense of a proposition' he is moving on to 'meaning of a proposition'. And Wittgenstein's engagement with verificationism was

¹⁰⁸ These deductions are based on the fact that thought and proposition are similar in form and co-extensive.
short lived being only a transitory affair in his philosophical career. He later called it a 'rule of thumb':

Near the beginning of (I) he made the famous statement, 'the sense of a proposition is the way in which it is verified'; but in (II) he said this only meant 'you can determine the meaning of a proposition by asking how it is verified' and went on to say, 'This is necessarily a mere rule of thumb, because "verification" means different things, and because in some cases the question "How is that verified?" makes no sense. He gave as an example of a case in which that question 'makes no sense' the proposition 'I've got toothache', of which he had already said that it makes no sense to ask for a verification of it— to ask 'How do you know that you have?'109

Moore goes on to write:

He went on to say 'verification determines the meaning of a proposition only where it gives the grammar of the proposition in question'; and in answer to the question 'How far is giving a verification of a proposition a grammatical statement about it?' he said that, whereas 'When it rains the pavement gets wet' is not a grammatical statement at all, if we say 'The fact that the pavement is wet is a symptom that it has been raining' this statement is 'a matter of grammar'.110

Therefore here we notice verificationism is moving in the direction of grammar. Wittgenstein is in vacillating disposition, the role of grammar

109 WL 1930-33 p.266.
110 Ibid. pp.266-267.
is entering his speculation. And therefore we may take the liberty to assume that thought or *Gedanke* is also making a transition towards grammar in the post verificationist period. But this of course needs to be authenticated.

**B. LANGUAGE OVERHAULED**

On returning to philosophy in the late 1920's and early 1930's, Wittgenstein re-evaluated his views concerning language. Wittgenstein openly admits that his former belief of a primary language as opposed to ordinary language is wrong. There is no primary language at all.\(^{111}\) In the conversations with Waismann Wittgenstein explicitly mentions that he does not any longer adhere to his earlier opinion of two languages, the everyday language and a primary language. He now thinks that there is only one language, i.e., everyday language. He points out that our ordinary language is already in order provided we know what it symbolizes. The impediment lies in making the syntax simple and clear.\(^{112}\) Elsewhere he says that our language is in perfect order and our task is to recognise the syntax.\(^{113}\) Here we see Wittgenstein has graduated to ordinary language as early as the initial years of his return to philosophy. This revision is suggestive of the rejection of his former firm belief of an a-priori order in the realm of language and correspondingly in the world.\(^{114}\)

In *Some Remarks on Logical Form* Wittgenstein writes:

\(^{111}\) *PR* p.84
\(^{112}\) *WVC* pp.45-46.
\(^{114}\) It was because of the conviction of an a-priori order in language and the world that Wittgenstein did not bother to provide any example either of an elementary proposition or of a name or of an object.
That is to say, we can only arrive at a correct analysis by, what might be called, the logical investigation of the phenomena themselves, i.e., in a certain sense a posteriori and not by conjecturing about a priori possibilities.\footnote{Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1929. \textit{Some Remarks on Logical Form} in \textit{Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society}. Supp. Vol.9. p.163.}

It is crystal clear that Wittgenstein is now concerned with \textit{a-posteriori} considerations. He says that the use of syntax is arbitrary and no justification can be given as to why a particular syntax is used.\footnote{WVC p.104.}

Wittgenstein also considers nonsense \textit{de novo}. In his \textit{Thesis} Waismann writes that syntax is related to the possibility of nonsense because syntax does not allow the nonsensical combination of words.\footnote{Ibid, p.239.} In his \textit{Lectures} Wittgenstein says that nonsense involves using forbidden combinations.\footnote{WL1930-32 p.46} He also says that nonsense means unmeaningful scratches or sounds or combinations.\footnote{Ibid. p.48.} Elsewhere in the \textit{Lectures} he says that if a proposition is to have sense we must commit ourselves to the use of the words in the propositions.\footnote{Ibid. p.36. Here the 'use' of words is being reiterated.} Of course the \textit{Tractatus} had also pronounced a clear and precise distinction between the sense and the nonsense in the context of expressibility in language. If it is possible to picture a particular state of affairs it is meaningful, otherwise not. And sentences violating syntax were straightaway classified as the non-sensible. But apart from such propositions there were other classes of propositions also under the realm of the non-sensible. In contrast to this,
the early transitional Wittgenstein is considering nonsense solely from the point of using forbidden combinations and violation of syntax.

The *TLP* had already declared that all propositions of our everyday language are in perfect logical order (*TLP* 5.5563). But his mistaken belief was that it was hidden and covered. Wittgenstein now believes that there is nothing hidden or underlying our ordinary language which needs to be broken through. Wittgenstein himself has often asserted that there is nothing hidden in his philosophy and his remarks are “clear as crystal”.121 In the *Big Typescript* Wittgenstein writes:

> All reflections can be carried out in a much more homespun manner than I used to do. And no new words have to be used in Philosophy [such as “pictorial form”, “representational form”, “logical form”, “pictorial relationship”, etc.], but rather the old common words of language are sufficient.122

Therefore the transitional Wittgenstein is of the view that there is no riddle or mystery shrouding language waiting to be explored. Hacker observes: “the *de facto* practice of philosophy in the *Tractatus* was ‘the symptom of a disease’ (as he wrote in Schlick’s copy of the book); the *de jure* recommendation for future philosophy was flawed by its commitment to ‘analysis’.”123

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122 *BT* p.420.

A noticeable shift can be observed as to how propositions/language is to be compared with reality. Wittgenstein is still comparing propositions with pictures but with pictures in the 'literal' sense which have no relationship with the picture theory of meaning enunciated in the *TLP*. This new kind of 'picturing' was not even alluded to in the *Tractatus* where the backbone of the picture theory was the theory of logical atomism. In the *TLP* a proposition was a picture of reality. It described a state of affairs by depicting it. The names of elementary propositions stood for simple objects which were their meanings. As the theory of logical atomism is shunned, the picture theory of meaning also breaks up and nothing of it is retained. Wittgenstein is now considering a proposition as 'imaging' or 'mirroring' a situation, picturing a situation of what might be the case if the proposition is true. So a proposition is a picture of the fact that will make it true. So is the case with wishes, expectations, commands or intentions. An expectation may be said to contain a picture of what will fulfil it; a command of a picture that will comply with it; an intention or desire, a picture of what will satisfy it.\(^{124}\) The requirement that elementary propositions are concatenation of names which refer to objects in the world as their meanings is shunned. This has been scripted by P.M. S. Hacker in explicit terms.\(^{125}\) He writes the collapse of the logical theory of the *TLP* 'assailed the associated metaphysics of logical atomism'. The world now no longer consists of an enumeration of objects but rather a description of the world accords statements of facts. And a statement of fact is a true statement and does not describe a configuration of objects because facts are not concatenations of objects in reality. (We cannot point


to a fact but only point out a fact). Pointing out a fact implies pointing out that things are such and hence making a true assertion. Objects are not the elements of facts as held in the Tractatus. These supposed objects whose existence had to be necessitated are actually ‘samples employed in the grammar of our language’. Thus Hacker points out that the thesis of isomorphism was a ‘mythology of symbolism’ i.e. the claim that elementary propositions consisting of simple names being connected to simple objects which are their meanings ‘by being projected on to them by mental acts of meaning’ was not really the case. Hacker writes:

Names may be connected by an ostensive definition to the samples which provide standards of comparison for their correct application. But the samples that thus define them are not their meanings. The meaning of an expression is not an object of any kind, neither a mundane, perishable one nor a sempiternal one. And defining samples are best conceived as instruments of grammar, and so as belonging to the means of representation. In the sense in which the Tractatus held that language must be connected to reality—by names as it were being pinned on to the objects that are their meanings—there is in fact no connection between language and reality. It was mistaken to claim that a proposition is a fact (that only facts can represent facts) or that only ‘simple names’ can represent simple objects. It is not the fact that the constituent words are combined thus – and – so that makes it possible for the resultant sentence to mean what it does, but rather that this combination is given this use by the rules of our language. Far from the logical syntax of any possible language having to
mirror the logical structure of the world, the rules of a
language are autonomous. They owe no homage to reality.
They do not reflect metaphysical possibilities, determined by
the essential nature of objects represented, but rather
themselves determine logical possibilities—that is, what it
makes sense to say. And different languages may be
constituted of different rules, constrained only by human
interests and needs, human discriminatory capacities, shared
abilities and reactive propensities, and by the limits of what
we call ‘a language’.

Instead of the singular system, Wittgenstein in transition chooses to
say that a system of propositions (Satzsysteme) is held against reality like a
yardstick. Wittgenstein admits that in his Tractarian days he was
confused about ostensive definition and analysis and of the connection
between language and reality. He now realizes that it is a mistake to
conceive of an ostensive definition as pointing to something outside
language. He says meanings, thus understood are now obsolete.

The transitional Wittgenstein in his Lectures says that language
consists of propositions and a proposition is a picture of reality where we
compare propositions with reality; there must be a picture – pictured
relation between propositions and reality because propositions prescribe
actions. He goes on to say that the constituents of propositions are
words which function only in propositions and outside propositions

\[\text{\textsuperscript{126} Ibid. p.80.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{127} WVC p.209.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{128} WL 1930-33 p.238.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{129} WL 1930-32 p.1.}\]
words do not have any meaning or function.\textsuperscript{131} This comparison of propositions with reality may perhaps be interpreted as the case of verifying propositions with reality. Moreover, he is talking of words which function only in propositions. Wittgenstein categorically denies that the meaning of a word is the object pointed to.\textsuperscript{132} This is confirmed by Moore in his Lecture notes where he documents that Wittgenstein’s considerations of language can be classified under two categories: the meaning of single words and the other about propositions.\textsuperscript{133} Moore points out that according to Wittgenstein “the meaning of any single word in a language is ‘defined’, ‘constituted’, ‘determined’ or ‘fixed’ [...] by the ‘grammatical rules’ with which it is used in that language.”\textsuperscript{134} And also “every significant word or symbol must essentially belong to a ‘system’, and (metaphorically) by saying that the meaning of a word is its ‘place’ in a ‘grammatical system’.”\textsuperscript{135} Moore further points out that apart from these two affirmations Wittgenstein negated three commonly held beliefs.\textsuperscript{136} Firstly, it is a mistake to suppose that the meaning of a word is an image which arises by some association.\textsuperscript{137} Secondly, it is erroneous to give an

\textsuperscript{131} Ibid. p.2.

\textsuperscript{132} In the Lectures Wittgenstein says that we tend to confuse the meaning of a word and the bearer of a name, and the meaning of a word is not the object pointed to in an ostensive definition [WL 1930-32 p.62]. In the conversations Wittgenstein admits that during the Tractarian days the concepts of logical analysis and ostensive definition were unclear to him. At that time he thought a connection existed between language and reality (TLP 3.263) [WVC pp.209-210].

\textsuperscript{133} WL 1930-32 p.257.

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid, p.260.

\textsuperscript{136} Ibid, p.260.

\textsuperscript{137} In this context consider an entry in the Philosophical Remarks where Wittgenstein says that the theory of considering the image of a word as its meaning is not completely wrong e.g. the image of sky blue colour can be used as a basis for recognizing that colour [PR pp.57-58]. One may interpret this as saying that a word conjuring up an image as its meaning is one of the several uses that a word has and hence cannot be completely discarded as wrong. Moore points out that Wittgenstein admitted that sometimes it is necessary to refer to an image to understand the meaning of a word but here the image is also a symbol as much as the word [WL 1930-33 p.260].
ostensive definition of a word by pointing to the object as its meaning. And thirdly, it is a mistake to suppose that a word is related to its meaning just as a proper name is related to the ‘bearer’ of that name. In this connection Wittgenstein pointed out that while the bearer of a name can be substituted for the name the same cannot be done for the meaning of a word. This is a complete turn around from the view projected by the young philosopher that names, the simple constituents of elementary propositions have a one-to-one correspondence with simple objects. It was inferred that a similar relationship existed between the nameless constituents of thought or Gedanke and how the relation was effected was the subject matter of psychology. But now Wittgenstein prefers to say that the smallest units of language having sense are propositions which in turn consist of words whose meaning is determined by its place in a grammatical system.

Regarding words, Wittgenstein states that a word has meaning only in the context of a proposition. He points out that just as a cogwheel functions only along with other cogs, so also does a word function only in a proposition. He gives another analogy. Just as in a control room different handles perform a wide variety of functions so do also words in a language. Here we notice Wittgenstein emphasizing the point that

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138 Moore records Wittgenstein as having once said that ‘the meaning of a word is no longer for us an object corresponding to it’ [WL 1930-33 p.261]. Also refer Lectures, where Wittgenstein says that the word does not stand for or represent any object [WL 1930-32 p.45]. This is indicative of the dismantling of the name – object theory of meaning.

139 WL 1930-32 p.57.

140 Lectures. Here Wittgenstein says that the rules of grammar help us to use language and choose words to be used in a particular situation [WL 1930-32 p.48]. Elsewhere he says that grammar is not arbitrary by virtue of its use because we can use a particular word in one sense in a particular proposition / grammatical system and in another sense in another [WL 1930-32 p.49].

141 PR pp.57-58; WL 1930-32 p.2.

142 PR pp.57-58.
words can have a wide array of functions which are as varied as the functions of the levers of a machine. The use of words is therefore quite often referred to by the middle Wittgenstein and he says that we learn or teach language by using it.\textsuperscript{143} He goes on to say that if a proposition is to have sense we must commit ourselves to the use of the words in the propositions: ‘A proposition has sense, it may perhaps be said, if the words in it have meaning.’\textsuperscript{144} ; the way a word is used characterises it.\textsuperscript{145} He also points out it is the rules of grammar that help us to use language and choose words to be used in a particular situation.\textsuperscript{146} Wittgenstein says that grammar is not arbitrary by virtue of its use because we can use a particular word in one sense in a particular proposition/grammatical system and in another sense in another.\textsuperscript{147} And the use of a word is justified by giving a rule; this of course does not mean that we have the rule in our head always—we are actually not aware of using the rules in language;\textsuperscript{148} and the importance of language rests on its use.\textsuperscript{149} In the conversations the same viewpoint is echoed:\textsuperscript{150} Waismann remarks that the meaning of a word is the way in which a word is used. And giving a name to an object does not establish an association between the two; rather we get a rule for the use of the word; Wittgenstein remarks that it is a complicated process. In a certain sense there is some relation like that existing between two signs which are beside each other in a diagram. Actually what we do with a sign in the calculus is the same thing we do

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{WL 1930-32 p.5.}
\footnote{Ibid. p.22-23}
\footnote{Ibid. p.45.}
\footnote{Ibid. p.48.}
\footnote{Ibid. p.49.}
\footnote{Ibid. p.50.}
\footnote{Ibid. p.60.}
\footnote{WVC p.169.}
\end{footnotes}
When we understand the words of a language; and we operate with them. In his *Thesis* Waismann writes:

> If you know how to use a word, you know its meaning.\(^\text{151}\)

Therefore a perceptible oscillation is quite apparent in Wittgenstein; he is graduating from the meaning of propositions in terms of verification to the meaning of words in terms of use. And in this period, i.e. the initial years of the transitional period Wittgenstein can be seen juggling between the two.

**C. THE Gedanke**

A noticeable explicit linguistic inclination can be perceived in respect of the *Gedanke* in this stage. Not that such was not the case in the earlier stage but now it appears to be more pronounced as will be shown. Wittgenstein chooses to call Mach’s thought experiment a ‘grammatical investigation’.\(^\text{152}\) It has already been traced that thought and language are at par with each other both lying on the same level and Wittgenstein is more candid in his assertion of this than the early period. So there is a difference in ‘degree’ about the relation of thought and language, rather than in kind from the early period. And the same goes with his ‘non-psychological’ interpretation of thought or *Gedanke*.

Only some minor deviations can be noticed. Consider the *Philosophical Remarks*. Here Wittgenstein says that the thought is different from the state of affairs asserted by the proposition.\(^\text{153}\) It is difficult to understand what this means exactly but it is to be noted that the earlier

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\(^{151}\) Ibid, p.237.

\(^{152}\) PR p.52.

\(^{153}\) Ibid. p.78.
definition of thought or *Gedanke* as being a logical picture of facts is not once alluded to in this period and he now says that thought is different from ontology i.e., states of affairs. It may be recalled that states of affairs were concatenations of objects and the setting aside of the isomorphism between the three realms deems it necessary to show thought as being different from states of affairs.

In the *Lectures* Wittgenstein for the first time speaks of the forms of thought like hope, fear and doubt. He raises questions about the duration of thought and concludes that thought is a symbolic process which has duration as long as its expression.\(^\text{154}\) Of course such a remark may be interpreted in the line that thought and language (the expression of thought) are on the same level and all thoughts are capable of being expressed in language. It is again a reassertion of the continuity from the early stage only in a more pronounced manner.

In the *Lectures* Wittgenstein points out that just as understanding a musical score means to be able to translate it on the piano, understanding a thought (a symbolic process) means to be able to translate it 'according to a general rule'; the rules of translating correspond to the rules of grammar and there is no justification for this because the language which would attempt to justify the rules would also have to have a grammar itself.\(^\text{155}\) It is clear from the remark that the rules of grammar govern the

\(^\text{154}\) WL 1930-32 pp.24-25.

Elsewhere in the *Lectures* Wittgenstein says that thinking is a symbolic method where we think by means of the sign [Ibid. pp.28-29]. In the Lent Term of 1931, Wittgenstein while answering the question as to what a proposition is and whether it is an expression of a thought points out that thought as a psychological process is of no use to the philosopher. We should not concern ourselves with the conditions, causes and effects of thought but rather we should be interested in thought as a symbolic process whose duration is as long as its expression [Ibid. p.42].

Elsewhere he says it is a pernicious mistake to speak of representation in the mind [Ibid. p.45]. Moreover he also points out thought is not something hidden but open for all to see [Ibid. p.26].

\(^\text{155}\) Ibid. p.44.
translations of thought. At a later date (26th January, 1931), Wittgenstein says that thought is autonomous and it is so in the sense that thought is 'complete in itself'; thought does not point to anything external to it, although it appears to be so because of our use of symbols. That language is autonomous, free from the reins of the world is obviously the neo belief and outlook of the post-Tractarian Wittgenstein. The above remark may be interpreted to mean that thought also does not conform to any pre-ordered system of the world but is self-determined and therefore its use is arbitrary. Hence both thought and language have an independent character from the world. This also shows the divorce from the earlier atomic theory.

In discussing the reasons for thinking (why do we think at all), Wittgenstein points out that there can be no reasons for thinking primarily because 'reason' is applicable within a system of rules. The game of thinking can be described but not the reasons for thinking. What can be given are only the rules of thinking although no justification can be provided for the rules. Therefore, he says that it is nonsense to ask for reasons for the system of thought. Here Wittgenstein is stating that no reasons can be given for the process of thinking perhaps just as we cannot give reasons for using language. Only the rules of thinking can be given. The notes made after discussion with Wittgenstein contain some important remarks on thought: Language is a calculus and thought is the actual use of the linguistic calculus; and the relation of thought to language is not the same as having a toothache and saying I have a toothache are related. Wittgenstein is here perhaps trying to drive across

156 Ibid, pp.45-46.
157 Ibid. pp.87-88.
158 Ibid, p.117.
the point that language and thought are not two processes but the same, i.e., language is also thought and thought also language. So when we think, we think in terms of language. We cannot think in any other way, this is perhaps the main thesis that Wittgenstein is concerned with.

Concerning rules of grammar Wittgenstein points out that the rules of grammar help us to use language and choose words to be used in a particular situation.\textsuperscript{159} He goes on to say that the use of a word is justified by giving a rule; this of course does not imply that we have the rule in our head always—we are not actually aware of using the rules in language.\textsuperscript{160} And the meaning of a word is now determined by a description of language or its rules.\textsuperscript{161} We have already noted that thought or \textit{Gedanke} is governed by the rules of grammar which in turn determine the use of words. So may we take the liberty of conjecturing that in thought or \textit{Gedanke} also we are governed by the use of words which reiterates the conclusion that all thinking is in terms of language. And because of this Wittgenstein is time and again emphasizing that thinking and language are the same, i.e., thinking is using language and using language is thinking. The two realms thus coincide and are intimately convoluted.

D. THE SELF

The available documents of the early transitional period establish Wittgenstein’s enduring conviction of the non-existence of the thinking self. But unlike the abstruse \textit{TLP}, Wittgenstein is more explicit in his endeavour to demonstrate the use of the term ‘I’ as misleading and ultimately redundant.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{159} \textit{Ibid.} p.48.
\item \textsuperscript{160} \textit{Ibid.} p.50.
\item \textsuperscript{161} \textit{Ibid.} p.64.
\end{itemize}
In the conversations Wittgenstein says that the word 'I' can be eliminated from language:

The word 'I' belongs to those words that can be eliminated from language.162

In the *Philosophical Remarks* he states that the use of the word 'I' is more often than not misleading particularly when it is used to express immediate experience like in 'I can see a red patch'. He continues that if it would be possible to speak of immediate experience without using the personal pronoun then it would show that 'I' is not essential to representation. And philosophical errors arise when we try to represent immediate sense-data by using ordinary physical language. The forms of speech that we use are taken from ordinary physical language and cannot be used without error in epistemology or phenomenology.163 This denial of the thinking self had already been asserted in the early times but the point to be noted is that the *Tractatus* does not mention the 'I' in the context of first person experiences of immediate sense data. It may be recalled that in this intermediate phase Wittgenstein classified propositions of the form 'I have . . .', 'I feel . . .' as genuine propositions which are about immediate sense-data and can be conclusively verified or falsified. The *Tractatus* only says that there is no such thing as a subject or soul in the world (TLP 5.5421) and analysis showed that the 'I' was redundant. The transitional Wittgenstein seems to explain why he considers so. Our linguistic expressions of first person experiences tend to take the 'I' as an owner or possessor and the way we represent our immediate sense data is misleading. It is this erroneous representation that

162 WVC p.49.
163 PR p.88.
is the root of making us believe that there is an owner of our experiences although this owner can never be encountered in our experiences of sense data, as already stated by Hume a couple of centuries ago. In the *Philosophical Remarks* he writes:

... The experience of feeling pain is not that a person 'I' has something.

I distinguish an intensity, a location, etc in the pain, but not an owner.164

The point that Wittgenstein is perhaps trying to accentuate is that the subject in experiences is not exigent because it cannot be separated from the experiences themselves. Thus the owner is not necessary at all and it is simply an erroneous use in our language. And this fact can also be established by showing that there is no necessary connection between experiences and the subject of experiences. It is purely a contingent relation. The experiences that I suppose to belong to me could equally be anybody else's and I may not have a particular experience at all. Consider what Wittgenstein is saying in the *Philosophical Remarks*:

... What sort of a thing would a pain be that no one has? Pain belonging to no one at all?

Pain is represented as something we can perceive in the sense in which we perceive a matchbox. What is unpleasant is then naturally not the pain, only perceiving it.165

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In the *Notebooks* he had said that the I is not an object [NB p.80e]. Now it is clear that the I cannot be perceived like any other object of perception, i.e. the distinction between subject and object cannot be established empirically.
It seems from this remark that in our language we represent pain (a sense datum) as any other objective reality like a matchbox. And in pain we perceive only the unpleasantness; this perception is all that we have. And just as a matchbox can have an owner, or lack one, but can we talk of pain that nobody owns? Hacker points out that it makes no sense to speak of ownership because it makes no sense to speak of an unowned pain; a matchbox can have an owner because it can lack one also. Ownership makes sense only where it makes sense to speak of no ownership; so ownership is transferable.\textsuperscript{166} Dr. Sarkar on similar lines points out that one does not distinguish an owner when one is in pain because subjective experiences are always owned by someone or other. Therefore it makes no sense to speak of pain owned by nobody and it follows that there is no sense in saying that the pain is owned by somebody.\textsuperscript{167}

The most recurring example of sense-data in the transitional period is of 'toothache'. Wittgenstein cites the instance of 'toothache' and conceives of mono-centric languages where one or the other person is the centre and where representation could be done in different ways. These mono-centric languages show that the T is not an essential constituent of representing experiences and sense data. In the \textit{Philosophical Remarks} Wittgenstein says, that for example, if L.W. has a toothache then that can be represented by 'There is a toothache'. Again, 'A has a toothache' can be represented as 'A is behaving as L.W. does when there is a toothache'. Similarly we can also, say 'It is thinking' like in 'It is snowing' and 'A is behaving as L.W. does when it is thinking'.\textsuperscript{168} In the conversations,

\textsuperscript{166} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{168} PR pp.88-89.
Wittgenstein asks Waismann to imagine himself as a despot in the orient where everybody is forced to speak the language whose centre is Waismann himself. In such a language, we would say 'Waismann has toothache; Wittgenstein is behaving, like Waismann when he has toothache'. Or if Wittgenstein spoke the language he would be saying 'Wittgenstein has toothache; Waismann is behaving as Wittgenstein does when he has toothache'. All these languages can be translated into one another. But what stands out is that the language which has 'me' as its centre, for example, where I can say 'I feel real pain' has a privileged status. The distinct status lies in its application. But a description of this application will not express the privileged status because it lies in that language itself. In any language, primary experience is unique so different languages differ only in their application and their uniqueness cannot be expressed. Moore records Wittgenstein as saying that the idea of a person does not enter into the description of the visual field and visual sensations just as the physical eye does not enter the description of what is seen. And similarly the idea of a person does not enter into the description of 'having toothache'. Actually, Moore goes on to point out that the idea of a physical body does not necessarily enter the description, and 'person' was used to refer to a 'physical body'. Moore writes:

... 'A description of a sensation does not contain a description of a sense-organ, nor, therefore, of a person'. He was, therefore, still maintaining apparently that one distinction between 'I have toothache' and 'He has toothache' was due to the fact

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169 WVC p.49.
170 PR pp.88-89; WVC p.49.
172 WL 1930-33 p.309.

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that the latter necessarily refers to a physical body (or, perhaps, to a voice instead) whereas the former does not. But I think this was not the only distinction which he had in mind, and that he was not always using ‘person’ to mean the same as physical body (or, perhaps, a voice instead). For he said that ‘Just as no (physical) eye is involved in seeing, so no Ego is involved in thinking or in having toothache’; and he quoted, with apparent approval, Lichtenberg’s saying ‘Instead of “I think” we ought to say “It thinks”’ (‘it’ being used, as he said, as ‘Es’ is used in ‘Es blitzet’); and by saying this he meant, I think, something similar to what he said of ‘the eye of the visual field’ when he said that it is not anything which is in the visual field.  

This remark is reminiscent of TLP 5.633 where Wittgenstein had said that just as the eye is not a constituent part of the visual field so also the metaphysical subject is not a part of the world. Wittgenstein is now elaborating that the ‘I’ never refers to a physical body, quite contrary to common belief. He now no longer talks of the metaphysical subject but only of ‘I’ as a subjective owner. Although when we talk of experiences of other people we are referring to other physical bodies. And Wittgenstein refers to Lichtenberg’s reduction of ‘I think’ to ‘It thinks’ (es denkt) as in ‘It thunders’. In the conversations Wittgenstein says that we know only from experience what the parts of our body are, like I know that I do not have two bodies only through experience.  

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173 Ibid.  
174 WVC p.49.
owner of thoughts and beliefs and feelings. In the conversations Wittgenstein says:

If I am ‘A’ [If A has toothache], he, can say, ‘Now this tooth is hurting’, and this is where verification comes to an end. But B would have to say, ‘A has toothache’, and this proposition is not the end of a verification.\(^{175}\)

This implies that in the case of first person experiences, verification does not arise; and the subject as the owner of the experiences also cannot be verified. Moore thinks that the difference between ‘I have toothache’ and ‘He has toothache’, according to Wittgenstein is not because the word ‘toothache’ is used in a different sense in the two sentences. But rather it is because the latter expression necessarily refers to a physical body unlike the former. In the former expression, Moore points out, Wittgenstein insisted that ‘having toothache’ is a ‘primary experience’ and the characteristic feature of ‘primary experience’ is that in its case ‘“I” does not denote a possessor’.\(^{176}\)

Wittgenstein distinguishes between two propositions: ‘I cannot feel pain in your tooth’ and ‘I cannot feel your toothache’. The former proposition has sense stating an empirical knowledge whereas the latter is utter nonsense because such a proposition is not allowed by syntax.\(^{177}\)

Moore records Wittgenstein as saying that the verification or criterion for ‘I have toothache’ is very different from that of ‘He has toothache’ and therefore the meanings of the two expressions must also be

\(^{175}\) Ibid.

\(^{176}\) WL 1930-33 p.308.

\(^{177}\) WVC p.49.
different. Later on Wittgenstein had said that the meaning of 'verification' is different in the case of 'I have' from that of 'He has'. Still later Wittgenstein said that there is no verification for 'I have' because the question 'How do you know that you have toothache?' is nonsensical. Wittgenstein also pointed out that 'I have it' is grammatically on a different level from 'He has it' and this follows from the fact that it is nonsense to talk of verification of the fact that 'I have it'. That these two expressions, i.e., 'I have it' and 'He has it' are on a different grammatical level is also evident from the fact that they both cannot be substituted for values of the single propositional function 'x has toothache'. To support this view, Moore points out that Wittgenstein gave two reasons for saying that they are not both values: firstly, "that 'I don't know whether I have toothache' is always absurd or nonsense, whereas 'I don't know whether he has toothache' is not nonsense" and secondly, "that 'it seems to me that I have toothache' is nonsense, whereas 'It seems to me that he has' is not".178

Therefore Moore points out that according to Wittgenstein, the 'I' in 'I have toothache' does not 'denote a possessor'. Moreover this is supported when we talk of 'my body'. The body cannot be verified as belonging to me (i.e., the body in question as belonging to me cannot be verified by reference to that body itself). Moore goes on to point out that yet Wittgenstein said at one place 'If there is an ownership such that I possess a body, this isn't verified by reference to a body', i.e., that 'This is my body' cannot possibly mean, 'This body belongs to this body'.

178 WL 1930-33 p.307
According to Wittgenstein, where 'I' is replaceable by 'this body', 'I' and 'he' are 'on the same (grammatical) level'. Thus Moore writes:

He was quite definite that the word 'I' or 'any other word which denotes a subject' is used in 'two utterly different ways', one in which it is 'on a level with other people', and one in which it is not. This difference, he said, was a difference in 'the grammar of our ordinary language'.

Wittgenstein went on to give examples. He considered the propositions, 'I've got a match-box' and 'I've got a bad tooth' to be on the same level with 'Skinner has a match-box' and 'Skinner has a bad tooth'. This is because 'I have ...' and 'Skinner has ...' are values of the same propositional function, where 'I' and 'Skinner' are 'possessors'. But in 'I have toothache' or 'I see a red patch', 'I' is used in a completely different manner. Therefore from the above records by Moore it appears that Wittgenstein was implying that in the case of first person experiences i.e., about immediate sense data, the 'I' does not denote a possessor or an owner but it does so in other cases. What he is stressing here is the use of the word 'I'; therefore, we see a reassertion of the early denial of the thinking self. But now he is trying to elaborate the reasons for it unlike the Tractatus. And according to him it is only a grammatical convention, a use in our language which dislodges the 'I' as an owner or possessor in our description of immediate sense-data. The 'I' is an unnecessary part of the

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180 Ibid. p.310.
181 Ibid.
182 A majority of these lectures particularly those dealing with the difference expressed in the propositions 'I have toothache' and 'He has toothache' were given in 1932 and in the academic year 1932-33.
description. So in 'I think', 'I' does not refer to a subjective thinker. This is in perfect conformity with his earlier views.

Regarding solipsism, Wittgenstein said the two statements 'The only reality is the present experience' and 'The only reality is my present experience' are both 'equally absurd' but the idea they express is of 'enormous importance'. He later pointed out that solipsism is right if it says 'I have toothache' and 'He has toothache' are 'on quite a different level' but 'if the Solipsist says that he has something which another hasn’t, he is absurd and is making the very mistake of putting the two statements on the same level'. Therefore what Wittgenstein is laying stress on is a fact of grammar, which the solipsist tends to confuse with a metaphysical necessity; the proposition 'I cannot feel your toothache' is a grammatical proposition and does not describe a feature of the world but rather explains a linguistic convention.

E. STRAWSON: THE ARGUMENT FROM PERSONS

Strawson formulates the problem of personal identity as follows. The idea of the self must be the idea of some particular thing which is experienced by the experiencer, yet which is set against all other things which is experienced by him and which are distinct from himself. The idea of the self as that which has all the experiences of the experiencer is difficult to beget, if it is just an article within the experiences of the experiencer. Yet we do ascribe to ourselves 'actions and intentions'; 'sensations'; 'thoughts and feelings'; 'perceptions and memories'. This ascription to oneself is done in two senses, i.e., 'location' (position) and

183 Ibid. p.311.
'attitude'. Besides these transitory states and situations we also ascribe relatively permanent characteristics that include physical characteristics, like height, colouring, shape and weight. Now the point noteworthy is that the characteristics that are self-ascribed like the last mentioned kind are also ascribed to material bodies. But we never ascribe states and situations of the first kind to material bodies. When we ascribe characteristics like height or colouring to a physical body, like what we call one’s body, it helps us in identifying the body. But what appears to be problematic is that states of consciousness are ascribed to the same thing to which physical characteristics are also ascribed. This calls for explanation.\footnote{Strawson, P.F. 1959. \textit{Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics}. Methuen. London, p.89.} Some philosophers have emphasized on the unique position and role that a person’s body has in his experiences in order to explain this. Such explanations tend to show that there is one body for each person. That body has a central causal position in connection with that person’s experiences. Moreover, in relation to all other kinds of perceptual experience the person has, that particular body is unique as an object in his field of experiences. Further this unique single body appears to be a contingent matter. Such facts may help to explain why a subject of experience regards his body as unique from others, or why someone feels a sense of attachment to what he calls his own body. But it affords no explanation as to why I should at all have the concept of \textit{myself} and why my thoughts and experiences should be ascribed to anything at all. The uniqueness of position and role of one’s body does not explain why we ascribe certain corporeal characteristics as well as thoughts and feelings to oneself. But we do it for we do say ‘I am bald’; ‘I am cold’; ‘I am lying on
the hearthrug' or 'I see a spider on the ceiling' Therefore Strawson argues:

Briefly, the facts in question explain why a subject of experience should pick out one body from others, give it, perhaps, an honoured name and ascribe to it whatever characteristics it has; but they do not explain why the experiences should be ascribed to any subject at all; and they do not explain why, if the experiences are to be ascribed to something, they and the corporeal characteristics which might be truly ascribed to the favoured body should be ascribed to the same thing. So the facts in question do not explain the use that we make of the word 'I', or how any word has the use that word has. They do not explain the concept we have of a person.

In the history of philosophy, generally this problem of personal identity has two views. One is the Cartesian view, held by Descartes and others. According to this view, a person is a conglomerate of two different kinds of substances which are mutually exclusive. States of consciousness are ascribed to one of these substances only. The other view is the no-subject view, held by Lichtenberg, Wittgenstein and probably by Schlick also.

Strawson points out that Moore's Lecture notes testify that Wittgenstein at one time adhered to the so-called 'no-ownership' or 'no-subject' doctrine of the self. Strawson draws attention to the fact that points out the no-ownership theorist starts his argument by illustrating the 'unique causal position' of a material body in a person's experiences.

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186 Ibid. pp.92-93.
187 Ibid pp.93-94.
188 Ibid. p.94.
The uniqueness of this body can give rise to the idea that the experiences one has can be ascribed or owned by a particular individual thing. We can then suppose the individual thing to be the body itself. In that case it is easy to show that the experiences could have also belonged to some other individual. But the theorist points out that then one becomes confused and hence resolves it by making the inadmissible admission that the particular thing is not considered as a body, but as something else, like an Ego, "whose sole function is to provide an owner of experiences." Strawson argues:

... And the theorist cannot consistently argue that 'all the experiences of person 'P' means the same thing as 'all experiences contingently dependent on a certain body B'; for then his proposition would not be contingent, as his theory requires, but analytic. He must mean to be speaking of some class of experiences of the members of which it is in fact contingently true that they are all dependent on body B. The defining characteristic of this class is in fact that they are 'my experiences' or 'the experiences of some person', where the idea of possession expressed by 'my' and 'of' is the one he calls into question".189

Strawson says this is a serious internal incoherence since it denies what 'prima facie is the case'. The case is: one ascribes states of consciousness to something like oneself and this is deemed to be unsatisfactory by the no-ownership theorist since my pain can equally be another's.

P.F. Strawson argues that the no-ownership theorist does not take into account all the facts, but rather is giving only a partial account. For it

189 Ibid. p.97.
is important to note "that it is a necessary condition of one's ascribing states of consciousness, experiences, to oneself, in the way one does, that one should also ascribe them, or be prepared to ascribe them, to others who are not oneself". This means that we use ascribing phrases for oneself as for others. But first person ascriptions cannot have the same sense as second-and-third person ascriptions because their methods of verifications are also dissimilar. The method of verification is there for others but not for oneself. So the question arises, how ascription can be made unless there is that to which the ascription is made and this gives rise to difficulties where that someone is oneself, but not in the case of others. Strawson says:

But this query answers itself as soon as we remember that we speak primarily to others, for the information of others. In one sense, indeed, there is no question of my having to tell who it is who is in pain, when I am. In another sense, however, I may have to tell who it is, i.e., to let others know who it is.

Strawson points out, self-ascription of states of consciousness is possible only if one can ascribe them to others and in that case one has to identify other subjects of experience. But one cannot identify others as only subjects or possessors of states of consciousness.

Strawson introduces the concept of a person. It is the concept of a type of entity to which both predicates describing states of consciousness as well as predicates describing corporeal characteristics are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type. And states of consciousness are not applicable, or cannot be ascribed unless they are

\[190\] Ibid. p.99.  
\[191\] Ibid. p.100.
ascribed to the very same entities to which certain corporeal characteristics are ascribed. This is a necessary condition for the ascription of mental states. We have a general tendency to suppose, says Strawson, that a person is a compound of two kinds of subjects, one being a subject of experiences, i.e., pure consciousness and the other being a subject of corporeal attributes. But this line of assumption gives rise to difficulties. If the concept of a person consists of two subjects, then we cannot assign experience to other subjects, and hence not to oneself also. Therefore, the concept of pure consciousness or ego is something that cannot exist. It may exist although not as a primary concept, as a secondary and non-primitive one which is to be explained in terms of the concept of a person. It is this concept of pure consciousness or ego, points out Strawson, which Hume failed to encounter and of which Wittgenstein said there is no such thing as the subject.\textsuperscript{192}

Against the no-ownership theorist, who claims 'I' is not a referring expression at all, Strawson points out: "It refers; because I am a person among others; and the predicates which would, per impossible belong to the pure subject if it could be referred to, belong properly to the person to whom 'I' does refer".\textsuperscript{193} So what does the primitive concept of a person mean? Strawson elaborates:

The concept of a person is logically prior to that of an individual consciousness. The concept of a person is not to be analysed as that of an animated body or of an embodied animal. This is not to say that the concept of a pure individual consciousness might not have a logically secondary existence, if one thinks, or finds, it desirable.

\textsuperscript{192} Ibid, pp.102-103.
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid, p.103.
We speak of a dead person—a body—and in the same secondary way we might at least think of a disembodied person.

A person is not an embodied ego, but an ego might be a disembodied person, retaining the logical benefit of individuality from having been a person.\textsuperscript{194}

Strawson's argument may be given as follows. Self-ascription of states of consciousness or experiences makes sense only where it is possible to assign the same to other individual entities of the same logical kind. If one regards oneself as the subject of such predicates then one should also be ready to accept others as subjects of such predicates. This is based on the premise that there are different individuals, one can be identified and distinguished from the others. And to each of these individuals both states of consciousness as well as corporeal characteristics can be ascribed. Strawson proceeds to distinguish between two kinds of predicates. The first kind called M-predicates includes those that can also be applied to material bodies. Predicates of states of consciousness are however not ascribed to material bodies. Examples of M-predicates: 'weighs 10 stone', 'is in the drawing-room' etc. The second kind is called by Strawson P-predicates and includes all that we apply to persons, viz., 'is smiling', 'is going for a walk', 'is in pain', 'is thinking hard', 'believes in God', etc.\textsuperscript{195} The concept of a person is a primitive one. It is a concept to which both predicates ascribing states of consciousness as well as predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics can equally be applied. But we are not to consider the concept of a person as a secondary kind of entity in relation to two primary kinds of entity, i.e., a particular

\textsuperscript{194} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{195} Ibid. p.104.
consciousness and a particular human body. If we are to avoid the Cartesian error, says Strawson, "... we must not think of ‘I’ or ‘Smith’ as suffering from type-ambiguity. Indeed, if we want to locate type ambiguity somewhere, we would do better to locate it in certain predicates like ‘is in the drawing-room’ ‘was hit by a stone’ and c., and say they mean one thing when applied to material objects and another when applied to persons”. The characteristic feature of P-predicates is pointed out by Strawson. They ‘imply the possession of consciousness on the part, of that to which they are ascribed’. It follows that we can ascribe P-predicates to others based on the observation of behaviour. In case of others the behaviour criteria is sufficient for ascribing P-predicate. At the same time self-ascription of some P-predicates constituting an important class are not based on the observation of behavioural criteria. Yet there are P-predicates which one ascribes to oneself on the same basis that one ascribes to others like those assessing character capability. Besides, there are cases where one has a sufficient basis for self-ascription of a P-predicate although this basis is different by means of which the predicate may be applied to others. So we report a state of mind or a feeling, ‘I am in pain’ or ‘I am tired’. But how can one ascribe such P-predicates to others: "How can this fact be reconciled with the doctrine that the criteria on the strength of which one ascribes P-predicates to others are criteria of a logically adequate kind for this ascription?” Such P-predicates have a unique logical character. They have both first- and third-person ascriptive uses. Yet they are ascribed to others based on behavioural criteria but not so in case of self-ascription

197 Ibid.
Therefore, Strawson points out:

To learn their use is to learn both aspects of their use. In order to have this type of concept, one must be both a self-ascriber and an other-ascriber of such predicates, and must see every other as a self-ascriber. In order to understand this type of concept, one must acknowledge that there is a kind of predicate which is unambiguously and adequately ascribable both on the basis of observation of the subject of the predicate and not on this basis, i.e., independently of observation of the subject: the second case is the case where the ascriber is also the subject.199

Strawson gives an example. Consider X’s depression. X’s depression is one and the same thing, which is felt by X but not observed by him and which is observed by others but not felt by them. And Strawson’s point is that such kinds of P-predicates have both uses, self-ascriptive as well as non-self ascriptive ones. They cannot have one without the other aspect. And the problem stems from the failure to see both the aspects of such P-predicates. Instead we have a tendency to consider one aspect as self-sufficient and as a result ‘oscillate between philosophical scepticism and philosophical behaviourism’. It is essential to the nature of such predicates that they are both self-ascribable and other-ascribable to the same individual where self-ascription is not based on observation like other—ascriptions, but is made on a different basis. And complexities arise because of our tendency to consider the self-ascriptive aspect of the use as primary.200 Thus Strawson urges us to admit the primitiveness in the concept of a person and hence acknowledge the uniqueness of P-

199 Ibid. p.108.
predicates. He says: "what I am suggesting is that it is easier to understand how we can see each other, and ourselves, as persons, if we think first of the fact that we act, and act on each other, and act in accordance with a common human nature. Now 'to see each other as persons' is a lot of things, but not a lot of separate and unconnected things ... The topic of the mind does not divide into unconnected subjects."201

Strawson’s concept of a person shows that there is one and only one being to which properties designating consciousness as well as physical features may be attributed. Self ascription which is not done on the basis of observation is different from other ascription which is done on the basis of ‘logically adequate’ criteria. It may be asked what exactly is meant by ‘logically adequate’ criteria as done by Ayer.202 For Strawson the concept of a person is a primitive one, meaning thereby that it cannot be further analysed. At the same his argument is based on the distinction between M-predicates and P-predicates which are applicable to the concept of person. The obvious question is does not this ascription of predicates make the concept of person analysable? Moreover is not there an implicit duality involved in the unifying concept of person? Still further non-human living creatures also could be brought under the concept of the two kinds of predicates. But no one says cats and dogs are persons. Wittgenstein is tagged with the no-ownership theory by Strawson. Wittgenstein’s point is the first person authority having a privileged access is a ‘misnomer’. For him ‘I know I have a toothache’ is not analogous to ‘I know he has a toothache’. The latter expresses an assertion of knowledge unlike the former. The former does not have epistemic function to provide knowledge; it is simply an assertion, a grammatical

201 Ibid, p.112.
one to emphasize the toothache. Wittgenstein’s point is if in such an assertion the first-person pronoun is omitted, the meaning is not changed nor does the sentence become incomplete, as the language of the despot in the Orient shows. So the term ‘I’ does not have any novelty nor does it add to our epistemic status. Wittgenstein’s grammatical investigation may be said to illuminate the misgivings we have about the ‘I’ as enjoying a special status. Wittgenstein’s establishment of the no-ownership is purely attempted from the side of language.

CONCLUSION

The early transitional phase is marked by the influence of more explicit statements about thought or Gedanke unlike the early period. Wittgenstein in transition replaces sense with meaning. The transitional phase records Wittgenstein’s perception about thought and language as not being different from one another in respect of the fact that they are not two independent processes and all thoughts are capable of being expressed. Rather using language and thinking are the same and thought can have varied expressions. Moreover, Wittgenstein’s non-interest in the psychological aspect of thought or Gedanke is very much pronounced during this stage. This is continuous with the early period where the psychologism was only hinted at by means of the projection view but not elaborated. The thinking self is eliminated from the perspective of language and now Wittgenstein appears to show why the ‘I’ is an illusion, being only a grammatical convention. Still further Wittgenstein is seen to be juggling between verificationism and use as meaning. So the mood is oscillatory. And we do notice a great many new ideas coming in.