CHAPTER-I

THOUGHT IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF EARLY WITTGENSTEIN

It was in a letter dated 13.3.1919 that Wittgenstein first ever spoke of the Tractatus. It was addressed to his teacher and dear friend Bertrand Russell and he called the work Logisch - Philosophische - Abhandlung. At this time he also believed that all the problems that had confronted them were finally solved. A copy of the manuscript was eventually sent to Russell. After this a series of letters were exchanged between the two stalwarts with Wittgenstein confiding that it would be difficult for Russell to understand the work without a prior explanation as it is written in brief remarks. In a further letter to Russell, dated 12.6.1919, Wittgenstein says that writing a commentary on his book is out of question. All this testifies to the fact that the concepts of the Tractatus, including the concept of thought calls for clarification and elucidation. And obviously it will generate a wide variety of interpretations. Apart from the Tractatus two other important works which were published posthumously belong to the early period of Wittgenstein. They are the Notebooks and the Prototractatus.

The Notebooks is in the format of a personal diary which contains entries on specified dates. The Prototractatus may be said to be an earlier version of the Tractatus. The Tractatus itself is an abridged version of these two works. This chapter will be devoted to the concept of thought and thinking self as it appears in the early period.

Three original writings from the early period of the great philosopher have been preserved. These are the three Notebooks. The first
two are dated in the time period between 9.8.1914 to 22.6.1915 and third between 15.4.1916 to 10.1.1917. These Notebooks have been edited by George Henrik von Wright with the help of Ms. Anscombe and published in 1961. They have been recovered from the house of Mrs. M. Stonborough at Gmunden who was the sister of Wittgenstein. Apart from this the Notebooks contain an Appendix which is a collection of the notes dictated to G.E. Moore when he had visited Wittgenstein in Norway in the April of 1914. The Prototractatus is the other important text. There is not much of a difference between the Tractatus and the Prototractatus in respect of contents but the numbering of the propositions differs to a certain extent. In the Prototractatus there are some thirty remarks (a paragraph or section containing several paragraphs) and six loose or unnumbered paragraphs which do not occur in the Tractatus. There are approximately 400 places where the actual wording of the PT differs from the corresponding place in the text of the Tractatus. This is however an insignificant difference. Other records from the early period which have been preserved include fifty seven letters from Wittgenstein to Russell during 1912-1921. Other records from this period also include letters from Wittgenstein to his friend, the architect Paul Engelmann, to Ludwig Ficker who was the editor of Der Brenner, to J.M. Keynes, to G.E. Moore and to C.K. Ogden.

This chapter is divided into two sections, one dealing with Thought and Meaning in the Tractatus and the other with the notion of thinking self in the same.

SECTION-I: THOUGHT AND MEANING IN THE TRACTATUS

In the Tractatus Wittgenstein defines thought in terms of language and in this connection he offers two sets of apparently inconsistent
propositions. The concept of thought (Gedanke) is introduced at TLP 3 which states that thought is a logical picture of facts. Yet TLP 4 defines thought to be a proposition with a sense. At the same time TLP 3.5 states that a propositional sign applied and thought out is a thought. These characterizations of thought project thought in relation to two concepts i.e. facts (which are by virtue of their nature ontological, existing in the world) and propositions (which are linguistic, existing in the realm of language). The essential point to be noted is that Wittgenstein is silent about the inherent nature of thought or Gedanke. Although thought (Gedanke) is depicted in relation to two notions, Wittgenstein does not specify its characteristics. Apparently these definitions of thought are devoid of any psychological element. This is in agreement with the spirit of the Tractatus where the divorce of philosophy from psychology is explicit at TLP 4.1121. Here the author warns against getting entangled in unnecessary psychological investigations (also in NB 10.11.1914). Yet is sharp contract to this there is a letter that Wittgenstein wrote to Russell in 1919. In it Wittgenstein explicitly mentions that a thought (Gedanke) consists of psychical elements.

"... But a Gedanke is a Tatsache: what are its constituents and components, and what is the relation to those of the pictured Tatsache?" I don't know what the constituents of a thought are but I know that it must have such constituents which correspond to the words of Language. Again the kind of relation of the constituents of the thought and of the pictured fact is irrelevant. It would be a matter of psychology to find out.
"Does a Gedanke consist of words?" No! But of psychical constituents that have the same sort of relation to reality as words. What these constituents are I don't know.¹

As far as the *Tractatus* is concerned, apparently we get no clue to these conflicting passages. This section attempts to analyse the early Wittgenstein's concept of thought or *Gedanke* in this backdrop.

**A. THE CONCEPT OF THOUGHT IN THE NOTEBOOKS**

The first entry that we have about thought in the *Notebooks* is on 1.11.1914 where Wittgenstein writes that the meaning of "a situation is thinkable" is that we can picturise it.² Here we get a categorical statement of thought and picture: a thought can be picturised. On 10.11.1914, he writes that does not the study of processes of thought correspond to the study of sign language. But the main problem with philosophers is that they get involved in psychological inquiries in doing it.³ This is a rhetorical question implying an affirmative answer. In the same entry he also says that study of sign language corresponding to the study of the processes of thought is essential for philosophy of logic. This remark is testimony to the fact that in the early stages of his philosophy Wittgenstein was not considering the psychological aspect of thought but was only interested in it from a logical aspect. The next entry about thought is on 8.12.1914 where he speaks about the background of thought. He says that behind thoughts, true or false, there always lies a dark background which can only be later expressed as a thought.⁴ Two things are evident in this remark. Firstly, he is of the view that thoughts are true and false, i.e., truth

1 *NB* pp.129-30 (Wittgenstein's Letter to Russell).
3 *Ibid.* p.28e.

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value is an essential characteristic of thoughts. And secondly, he holds that there are two stages in a thought process. (a) The thought itself which we are thinking or are conscious and aware of. (b) The background which we do not know and which can be accessed only later and brought to the forefront and expressed as a thought. This is indeed remarkable. The reader is left with a certain deduction: when the background is expressed as a thought, does not this corresponding thought also have a background? And if yes, there will be regress ad infinitum. It also hints on the possibility of the presence of thoughts not expressed in language.

The next entry we have on thought is on 12.9.1916. Wittgenstein says that it is becoming clearer to him why he thought that language and thinking were the same. And the reasons he gives are (i) thinking is a kind of language; (ii) a thought is a logical picture of a proposition; (iii) thought is a kind of proposition. In this remark the author is stating clearly the relation between thought and language. So we need to analyse what he is saying about propositions in this early stage.

After this on 15.10.1916 he writes that what cannot be imagined cannot be spoken about also. This remark certifies that at this stage, the author thinks that thinking (imagination) and language (speaking) correspond to each other. Or in other words what can be thought can be expressed in language; what cannot be thought cannot be expressed in language. Thus there is a correspondence between thought and language, i.e., the two mutually corresponds to each other by virtue of the fact that their limits coincide. In sharp contrast to this it may be noted here that the earlier remark regarding the background of thoughts suggested of the

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5 Ibid. p. 82e.
6 Ibid. p. 84e.
possibility of thoughts not being expressed in language, i.e., thought and language are not coextensive.

On 9.11.1916 he asks two questions: (i) whether belief is a kind of experience and (ii) whether thought is a kind of experience. And he also says experience is world which does not need a subject. Whether thoughts and beliefs are kinds of experiences, Wittgenstein does not even give an answer but goes on to say that experience is world. Assuming the answer is affirmative, we can deduce that thought is world (facts; ontology) and does not need a subject. This is indeed remarkable considering that thought or thinking can occur without the subject. One must remember that at an earlier date (10.11.1914) he had implied that the study of thought processes is not psychological but logical. Thus we can say that the logical aspect of thought does not require a subject and it is concerned with facts or ontology.

Nothing more has been said about thoughts in the Notebooks. I am going to point out certain entries in the Notebooks on the â-priori structure of the world. On 1.6.1915, Wittgenstein raises the question, which he considers to be his central problem, as to whether there is an â-priori order in the world and if so what does it consist of. At a later date, on 17.6.1915, he seems to answer this question where he writes categorically that the world has a fixed structure. At this stage, it is certain that Wittgenstein believed that the world had an â-priori structure and the world could be completely described by completely general propositions. A lot has been said about propositions. I will consider one by one some of the remarks on

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7 Ibid. p.89e.
8 Ibid. p.53e.
9 Ibid. p.62e.
10 Ibid. p.14e.
propositions which I deem to be relevant. On 27.9.1914, Wittgenstein writes that the sense of a proposition can be expressed only if it is a logical portrayal of it.11 On 29.9.1914, he writes that propositions have a sense (Sinn) independent of its truth value.12 On 15.10.1914, we have an entry regarding the elements of propositions. In this entry, the author writes that the relation between the elements of the proposition and its meaning is like feelers with which the proposition touches reality.13 But what is to be noted here is that the author himself asks whether this kind of picturisation is correct. So it may be deduced that Wittgenstein himself was not absolutely sure of the relation between language and reality at this stage. On 26.10.1914, he writes that the sense of a proposition is what it images.14 This entry means nothing but that the sense of a proposition lies outside the proposition and is what it is able to represent. On 29.9.1914 (see above) he writes about sense of a proposition being independent of its truth value. The former entry means that the sense of a proposition is what it is able to represent. By comparing this with the one on 29.9.1914, it may be concluded that what a proposition is able to represent is independent of its truth value.

On 24.11.1914, the author is giving an analogy. The relation between a proposition and a situation is like that between a yardstick and the length to be measured. He also writes that in a proposition a proto-picture is held up against reality.15 Still further on 16.6.1915, he writes that if a proposition has sense then it must be a complete sense.16 Prior to this, on 27.10.1914, Wittgenstein categorically states that the proposition is a model

11 Ibid. p.6e.
12 Ibid. p.7e.
13 Ibid. p.13e.
14 Ibid. p.19e.
15 Ibid. p.32e.
16 Ibid. p.61e.
of reality.\textsuperscript{17} Later, on 16.1.1915, he writes that a proposition is correlated with a hypothetical situation which is given by its description. Thus proposition is a description of a situation.\textsuperscript{18} On 3.4.1915, he writes proposition is a measure of the world.\textsuperscript{19} And on 15.4.1915, Wittgenstein is frustrated. He writes that he cannot show how far the proposition is a picture of the situation.\textsuperscript{20} Again on 9.5.1915, he writes that the proposition is the picture of the fact.\textsuperscript{21} All these entries show the germination of the picture theory. But where thought comes into the theory is not at all clear at this stage.

There are other entries in the \textit{Notebooks} on representation which will be considered now. On 17.10.1914, Wittgenstein writes that we can construct a picture of the world without saying what represents what. This amounts to saying that we do not require to find out what a picture or representation is about.\textsuperscript{22} On 20.10.1914, he writes that logical portrayal by means of language tells us about the nature of truth-relation.\textsuperscript{23} Still further on 27.10.1914, he writes that there is a difficulty in the theory of logical portrayal and that is of finding a relation between the signs on paper and a situation in the outside world.\textsuperscript{24} Here Wittgenstein is admitting that the relation between language and reality is not easy to find. On 30.10.1914, the author has jotted down quite a few thoughts on representation. He points out that all representations must have a truth-value.\textsuperscript{25} Next on 31.10.1914, he writes that all, portrayal takes place
through the elementary proposition.\textsuperscript{26} On 1.11.1914, the author says that how a picture is supposed to represent determines whether a picture will agree or fail to agree with reality.\textsuperscript{27} He goes on to say in the same entry that to represent two people as not fighting, we can represent them both as not fighting as well as by representing them as fighting and saying that the picture shows how things are not. Or in other words, representation can be done by means of negative facts as well as by positive ones. On 3.11.1914, Wittgenstein says that the proposition represent by being a logical picture of a situation.\textsuperscript{28} On 4.11.1914, he inquires into how the representation is done by a picture of a situation. And he points out that names are representatives of things, one name being a representative of one thing, and there is a certain connection between them so that the complete representation gives an image of the situation like a “tableau vivant”.\textsuperscript{29} In the Appendix-II,\textsuperscript{30} we find Wittgenstein writing that it is impossible to construct an illogical language. This implies that logic, language and thought are related, i.e., there cannot be illogical language or illogical thoughts.

Based on these data I am going to make some deductions as follows. Wittgenstein has said that a thought is a kind of proposition (12.9.1916) so what is true of proposition in a sense also should hold in the case of thoughts. Based on this the following characteristics of thought can be inferred.

(1) The sense of a thought can be expressed only if it is a logical portrayal of it (refer: 27.9.1914).

\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Ibid.} p.22e.  
\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Ibid.} p.23e.  
\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Ibid.} p.25e.  
\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Ibid.} p.26e.  
\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Ibid.} p.108.
(2) Thoughts have a sense independent of its truth-value (refer: 29.9.1914).

(3) The relation between the elements of thought and its meanings is like feelers with which the thought touches reality (refer: 15.10.1914).

(4) The sense of a thought is what it images (refer: 26.10.1914).

(5) In a thought a proto-picture is held up against reality (refer: 24.11.1914).

(6) If a thought has a sense it must be a complete sense (refer: 16.6.1915).

(7) A thought is a model of reality (refer: 27.10.1914).

(8) A thought is a description of a situation (refer: 16.1.1915).

(9) A thought is a measure of the world (refer: 3.4.1915).

(10) A thought is a picture of the fact (refer: 9.5.1915).

(11) A thought is a logical picture of a situation (refer: 3.11.1914).

(12) Illogical thoughts are not possible (refer: p.108).

(13) The logical analysis of thought does not require a subject. It is concerned with facts or ontology (refer: 9.11.1916 and 10.11.1914).

The above conclusions have been arrived at by merely substituting “thought” for the word “proposition” because thinking is a kind of language and thought is a kind of proposition (refer 12.9.1916). It may be inferred, that Wittgenstein did not find it necessary to elaborate on the concept of thought because of the fact that he was considering propositions explicitly. And the relation between thought and proposition he stated; so it was implicitly implied by the author that the features of
proposition will hold good for thought also. And my deduction is completely based on this line.

I am going to end this section by a citation from the *Notebooks*:

... A statement cannot be concerned with the logical structure of the world, for in order for a statement to be possible at all, in order for a proposition to be CAPABLE of making SENSE, the world must already have just the logical structure that it has. The logic of the world is prior to all truth and falsehood.\textsuperscript{31}

Or in other words, the logic of the world is already there i.e. a priori. Therefore, so must it be with thought and language. This clearly brings out the infatuation that the young Wittgenstein had with the a\-priori order in the world. He was convinced of this order and he attempted to exhibit it by considering language and thought, by showing that the structure of the three realms correspond with each other.

B. THE CONCEPT OF THOUGHT IN THE PROTOTRACTATUS

The *Prototractatus*, which was published posthumously, is an important work of Wittgenstein belonging to his early period. It is generally thought to be an early version of *Logische Philosophische Abhandlung*. From the Introduction to the book we came to know that George Henrik von Wright found in Vienna in 1965, a manuscript written by the great philosopher. This manuscript was the *PT*. Since this work was published at a much later date than the *Tractatus*, the editors have tried their best to show the conformity it has with the *Tractatus* and also to point out the differences. Some basic features thus presented in the comparison of the two works may be pointed out. The *PT* consists of around 30

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid. p.14e.
remarks exclusive to it; they are not contained in the *Tractatus*. [A remark is taken to be a paragraph or section containing several paragraphs]. Apart from this there are also 6 unnumbered paragraphs occurring only in the *PT*. The editors have further pointed out that at approximately 400 places the actual words of the two books differ. It may thus be concluded that the remarks of the *PT* were all rearranged and edited to form the *Tractatus*. In the view of Henrik von Wright the *PT* is an immediate precedence to the final composition of the book (i.e., The *Tractatus*).

After presenting the picture theory, the *PT* introduces the notion of thought at proposition number 3.

*PT 3* A logical picture of facts is a thought.

*Das logische Bild der Tatsachen ist der Gedanke*

Before this we do not have any mention of the notion of thought. This definition of thought may be analysed as follows:

(i) Thought is a picture.

(ii) Thought is not only a picture but a logical picture.

(iii) Thought is a picture of facts.

A picture is defined to be a model of reality\(^{32}\) presenting a possible situation in logical space.\(^{33}\) It is comprised of elements\(^{34}\) that have a determinate relation among them\(^{35}\) and these elements stand for objects.\(^{36}\) If thought is a picture then from the above the following deductions may

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\(^{32}\) PT 2.12
\(^{33}\) Ibid. 2.11; 2.202
\(^{34}\) Ibid. 2.13
\(^{35}\) Ibid. 2.14
\(^{36}\) Ibid. 2.13
be made. Thought is a model of reality being comprised of elements and presenting a possible situation in logical space. The elements of thought also must have a determinate relation among them and must stand for objects. At this point an observation may be pointed out. Any mention of the elements of thought is clearly avoided in the PT.

Further, Wittgenstein gives the explicit qualification to thought that it is a logical picture. A logical picture we are told at PT 2.181 is a picture whose pictorial form is logical form. Pictorial form is the common element between picture and reality, while logical form (i.e. the structure of reality) is the minimum of common element between picture and reality. Thus a picture may have more than logical form in common with what it depicts but every picture must at least have logical form in common. In other words one of the pre-requisites for a picture to be a picture of what it depicts is that it must have logical form. In this sense every picture is a logical picture.

Now thought being a picture and every picture being a logical picture at the same time, thought must obviously be a logical picture. This deduction is apparent yet Wittgenstein explicitly states the qualification in his definition at PT 3. It is not very clear why. The only thing that may be said i.e., that thought being a logical picture, it is a kind of picture whose pictorial form is logical form. It may thus be inferred that there is something in common between thought and of what it is a picture. Thought may be said to be a logical picture par excellence because it is the only kind of picture whose pictorial form and logical form coincide.

37 Ibid. 2.17  
38 Ibid. 2.18  
39 Ibid. 2.182
Still further, we have the qualification - thought is a logical picture of facts. Facts are combinations of things, groups of objects ordered or arranged in a particular manner. Facts exist in the world, i.e., they have an ontological existence and their components are objects which are the direct referents of names. From the above the reasonable conclusion is that thought being a picture of facts, thought is a model of reality. Or in other words thought is a model of reality (from PT 2.12, which states that a picture is a model of reality.)

Consider PT 3.001, which states that a state of affairs is thinkable (imaginable) means that we can picture it to ourselves. And PT 3.03 which states that thoughts cannot be of anything illogical because if it were then we should have to think illogically. These two remarks imply that it is 'we' who do the thinking. Thus thought as a model of facts originates in 'us'. No explicit qualification is provided by the author as to this 'us' and 'we'. In this context consider PT 3.1 which states that in a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses: The perceptible expression of a thought is a propositional sign. This statement means that a proposition is the perceptible expression of a thought and this implies that there might be thoughts in themselves which are unexpressed in language and hence are imperceptible to the senses. From this particular comment perhaps we can conclude that thought in itself, unless and until it is expressed, is psychological. The expressed thought in a proposition is a linguistic format of the original psychological thought. Thus the possibility remains that there could be thoughts which are not expressed in language. Thus thinking without speaking is a possible situation.

PT 4 defines a thought as a proposition with a sense (Der Gedanke ist der sinnvolle Satz). From this one might suppose that thought is completely
linguistic. This apparently contradicts the previous definition of thought at PT 3 which was ontological. PT 4.01 says that a proposition is a picture of reality. Therefore we can rewrite PT 4 as a thought is a picture of reality with a sense. The first half of this definition has already been encountered at PT 3; only now there is a special adage ‘with a sense’. Wittgenstein takes on Frege’s distinction between sense and reference only to use it differently. For Wittgenstein, the sense of a proposition, firstly, is that it represents such and such a situation. Secondly, he says that we grasp the sense of a proposition when we know what must be the case if it is true and what must be the case if it is false. These two definitions are not however opposed to each other, but somehow related – the truth value of a proposition can be determined only in its relation to a situation.

Now consider PT 4.07 where Wittgenstein writes that the connexion between a proposition and a situation is that the proposition is its logical picture. Or in other words a proposition is a logical picture of a situation / facts. We already have – A thought is a logical picture of facts from PT 3; so we can now conclude that both thoughts and propositions are logical pictures of facts. Wittgenstein has already shown the relationship of thoughts to propositions by saying that thought is a proposition with a sense (PT 4). If in this definition we replace the term ‘proposition’ with ‘a logical picture of facts’ we have: thought is ‘a logical picture of facts’ (proposition) with a sense.

From the above it appears that the linguistic element in the definition of thought has disappeared. We are back to PT 3, i.e., the ontological definition of thought. PT 4 is thus reducible to PT 3 with only
an adage 'with a sense'. Thus we come to a situation where PT 3 and PT 4 inspite of their apparently different formulations are at bottom the same. Of course, the two definitions cannot be reduced to identical ones but they do try to define thought from the same point of view, i.e., as a logical picture of reality. Obviously this is highly expected since the picture theory of meaning pertains to thought, language and reality. The point is, if the picture theory of meaning is correct then the definition of thought is also correct. But the emphasis is on the word 'if'.

At PT 2.013, Wittgenstein writes that if I can imagine a thing in a situation, then I cannot imagine it outside the situation (Wenn ich mir ein Ding in einer Sachlage denken kann ich es mir nicht außerhalb der Sachlage denken). This remark may be analysed as follows. A thing (object) can be thought (imagined) in a state of affairs (situation). But it cannot be thought outside the situation. Therefore we can deduce that (i) even in thinking objects or things cannot occur by themselves but always in a situation and (ii) if a thing or object is able to fit in a situation, it cannot be thought outside the situation i.e., objects or things misfitting in a situation cannot even be imagined. Can we consider the impossibility of illogical thinking from this viewpoint? If we cannot conceive of a situation with misfitting objects, i.e., an illogical state of affairs, it implies that there cannot be illogical thoughts also. So illogicality is ruled out in the three spheres of thought, language and reality primarily due to their correspondence with each other.

The remark of PT 3.202111 again, it is shown, does not conform to any remark in the Tractatus. The remark is cited as follows:
Although every word has meaning via its definitions, this only means that these definitions are necessary in order to present in our sign-language the full linguistic depiction of the thought to whose expression the word contributes. But the definitions can be left tacit and the word does not then lose its meaning since it still stands in the same relation to the objects which are depicted by means of the definitions - only we do not specifically depict that relation. Naturally this often simplifies the sign-language and makes the understanding of it more and more difficult, because the decisive factor now lies outside the signs in something that is not expressed - their relation to their objects.42

The above remark speaks of a linguistic depiction of thought which can be done fully by means of sign language. This remark is testimony to the fact that at this early stage Wittgenstein was quite sure that thoughts could be translated into language.

At PT 3.001, he writes that to say that a state of affairs is thinkable or imaginable is to say that we can picture it to ourselves. This remark adds to the relation between thought and picture. What is thinkable is picturable too. So does it follow that what is not thinkable is not picturable also? In this remark he also speaks of 'ourselves', i.e., the picturing is done by us. Picturing involves representing a possible state of affairs where the elements are related to one another in the same way as objects are related. Thus what is thinkable corresponds to a possible state of affairs. At PT 3.01, Wittgenstein writes that the totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world. He has already said that the world is the sum-total of reality (PT 2.07). At PT 2.06, he writes reality is the existence and non-existence of

\[42 \text{ PT 3.202111}\]
states of affairs. From these two remarks it follows that the world is the sum-total of the existence and non-existence of states of affairs. Combining this deduction with PT 3.01, we thus have that the totality of true thoughts is a picture of the sum-total of the existence and non-existence of states of affairs. Or in other words, the totality of true thought is a picture of possible states of affairs. Therefore thoughts must be true if they are to picturise at all.

At PT 3.02, he writes what is thinkable is possible too. This remark follows logically from PT 3.001. We already got true thoughts are a picture of possible states of affairs. Thus what can be thought depicts a possible state of affairs. What cannot be thought cannot depict a possible state of affairs. Therefore illogical thoughts are not possible for they cannot depict a possible state of affairs. Instead of saying this so simply, Wittgenstein at PT 3.03 writes that thoughts cannot be of anything illogical, since if it was possible we would have to think illogically. This remark shows that Wittgenstein categorically rules out the possibility of illogical thoughts or illogical thinking. Why? Probably because illogical thoughts cannot represent a possible state of affairs; thoughts must always represent a possible state of affairs. At PT 3.031, he writes that we cannot describe an illogical world; we cannot say what it would look like. Thus we see that (a) illogical thoughts are not possible; (b) language or thoughts cannot be used to represent an illogical world. Therefore in the whole relationship between language, thought and world, illogicality is ruled out. And the limits of the three realms coincide with the limits of logic.

Moving on to PT 3.04, we see Wittgenstein saying that if a thought were correct á-priori, it would be a thought whose possibility ensured its truth. We have already seen, truth of a thought involves picturing a
possible state of affairs. Thus if a thought were correct á-priori its possibility would have ensured the true picturing of a possible state of affairs under all possible circumstances. At PT 3.1, Wittgenstein writes that the perceptible expression of a thought is a propositional sign and he goes on to say at PT 3.11 that a propositional sign is a projection of a thought and continues at PT 3.111 that it is the projection of the possibility of a situation. From the above three statements, we may make the following deduction:

From PT 3.1 and PT 3.11 – The perceptible expression of a thought is a projection of a thought. Combining this with PT 3.111 we have – The perceptible expression of a thought is the projection of the possibility of a situation. Still further at PT 3.4, Wittgenstein writes that in a propositional sign the simple signs correspond to the objects of reality. Combining this with PT 3.11, we can deduce – In a projection of a thought the simple signs correspond to the objects of reality.

When Wittgenstein is saying at PT 3.1 that the perceptible expression of a thought is a propositional sign, does he imply that the thought when expressed becomes linguistic and the thought in itself is insensible (cannot be perceived by the senses) and probably therefore psychological? We have no confirmed evidence of this but the question arises as to why does the author say that in a proposition a thought expressed is perceptible by the senses. We can connect this with PT 3.05 where Wittgenstein writes that á-priori knowledge that a thought was true would be possible only if its truth was recognizable from the thought itself without reference the outside world. The thought itself is imperceptible to the senses. (From PT 3.1) So in this unexpressed thought we cannot say whether it is true; its truth is not recognizable. Moreover, thought being a
picture and no pictures being á-priori true, thoughts also cannot be á-priori true. Therefore we cannot say á-priori that a thought is true.

At PT 3.1, PT 3.11 and PT 3.111 Wittgenstein says that a thought can be expressed by means of a propositional sign and a proposition becomes a propositional sign when it is projected on the world. Therefore we can say that a thought can be expressed in a proposition only when it is projected on the world.

It needs to be seen what Wittgenstein means by propositional sign because at PT 3.3 we get a new definition of thought. Here Wittgenstein writes that a propositional sign applied and thought out is a thought. Propositional signs are the signs with which we express a thought or in other words propositional signs are the expressions of thought. Secondly, propositional signs are projections of thought in its projection of the possibility of a situation. At PT 3.15, we have that the elements of a propositional sign are simple signs and they stand in a determinate relation to one another. From this it follows that propositional signs are complex being composed of words. So can we say that when a thought is expressed in a propositional sign, its elements correspond to the elements of a propositional sign i.e. words? Again at PT 3.16 we see that a propositional sign is a fact. Thus we can say that a thought is also a combination of elements because the expression of a thought is a propositional sign which in turn is a fact. Thoughts are complexes being composed of elements. This has nowhere been asserted categorically but can only be deduced. At PT 3.161, we have that although a propositional sign is a fact it is obscured by the usual form of expression in writing or

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43 Ibid. 3.1
44 Ibid. 3.11
45 Ibid. 3.111
print. The same applies to thought, thoughts being expressed in a propositional sign are combinations of elements. At *PT* 3.163, we have, the essence of a propositional sign is seen in the arrangement of spatial signs like tables, chairs instead of written signs. *PT* 3.164 says that the spatial arrangement of these things express the sense of the proposition. And at *PT* 3.2 (this statement does not occur in the *Tractatus*), we have, a propositional sign with its mode of depiction is a proposition. Some deductions concerning thought can be made as follows. Thoughts also have a sense and this sense is contained in its expression, i.e., the propositional sign, in the spatial arrangement of objects of the propositional sign. Combining *PT* 3.2 and *PT* 3.1 we have the perceptible expression of a thought with its mode of depiction is a proposition. And combining *PT* 3.2 and *PT* 3.11 we have the projection of a thought with its mode of depiction is a proposition. Thus we can conclude that propositions are the perceptible expressions of thought. At *PT* 3.14, the author writes that in a propositional sign, the simple signs correspond to the objects of reality. Thus we can say that because a thought is a propositional sign, the elements of the thought correspond to the objects of reality. So the characteristics of the objects of reality will also hold good for the constituents or elements of thought. Wittgenstein goes on to say at *PT* 3.201 that the simple signs employed in propositions are called names. Thus it is extremely explicit that names correspond to objects. It is also clear that the constituents of thought correspond to objects and hence to names also. But the interesting fact is that these constituents of thought are nameless.

Thus the definition of thought at *PT* 3.3 shows that underlying it what really is implied is that there is a one-to-one correspondence
between the three realms of thought, language and reality. So though the
definition appears to be a linguistic presentation of thought it is in
agreement both with PT 3 and PT 4 which have already been considered
and shown to be in agreement with each other and not contradicting one
another.

Going back to PT 4 which describes thought as a proposition with a
sense, we need to see what Wittgenstein means by a proposition. He has
attributed various characteristics to propositions all throughout. These
characteristic features of propositions will all be applicable to thought.
Hence though Wittgenstein does not elaborate on the describing
characteristics of thought, the following deductions may be made. A
thought is a picture of reality [from PT 4.01] because if I understand the
thought, I also know the situation it represents [from PT 4.021]. A thought
must restrict reality to the two alternatives of yes or no and thus must
describe reality completely [from PT 4.0231]. Thoughts describe state of
affairs [from PT 4.0232] and reality by their internal properties [from PT
4.02321]. Thoughts should be able to communicate a new sense [from PT
4.05] and they are essentially connected with the situation they
communicate to us [from PT 4.06]. The thought is a logical picture of the
situation it communicates to us – this is the connexion between the
thought and the situation communicated to us [from PT 4.07]. Thoughts in
so far as they are pictures state something [from PT 4.071] and construct a
situation by way of experiment [from PT 4.0711]. A thought must have as
many distinguishable parts as the situation it represents [from PT 4.073]. It
is very important to note at this point that this deduction concerning the
parts of a thought sheds some new light on thought because Wittgenstein
has not spoken of the elements or parts of thought in his early period.
Here it has been deduced that the parts of thought correspond to the parts of fact, each part being distinct. Hence the isomorphism between language, thought and reality is established. This isomorphism between language and reality had clearly been adhered to and their constituents named but the constituents of thought are nameless. Thoughts are either true or false by virtue of being pictures of reality [from *PT* 4.09].

Going back to sense, we must remember that sense has been defined as that which a proposition represents. Thoughts thus must also have a sense and its sense must be independent of the facts [from *PT* 4.091]. Thoughts show their sense [from *PT* 4.022] and should be able to communicate a new sense to us [from *PT* 4.05]. Thus thoughts like propositions must have a sense.

I am going to point out some characteristics features of thought which have been deduced from the given data. Firstly, as I have already shown that the two definitions of thought, the ontological and the linguistic are at bottom the same and in the relation of thought, language and reality an isomorphism has been implied. This isomorphism exists between the elements of the three realms, that of language being names; of facts being objects; of thought being nameless constituents. Wittgenstein has enumerated some characteristics of objects and names but none of the constituents of thought. Of course, it cannot be denied that thought is complex and therefore must be comprised of elements. But the question is what kind of elements are they. If the isomorphism between the three realms of thought, language and reality is accepted then it follows that there must be a one-to-one correspondence between the constituents of the three worlds, i.e., nameless constituents of thoughts, names and objects.
Therefore, the elements of thought must have certain characteristics which can be inferred from the characteristics of names and objects. They may be enumerated as follows:

(1) The constituents of thought must be absolutely simple, not capable of further dissection; they are the ultimate elements of which thought is comprised [From PT 2.02 and PT 3.2021].

(2) The elements of thought cannot exist independently by themselves but must be possible constituents of thoughts [From PT 2.011].

(3) Knowledge of an element of thought implies knowledge of all its possible occurrences in thoughts [From PT 2.0124].

(4) Knowledge of all elements of thought implies knowledge of all possible thoughts [From PT 2.0126].

(5) Elements of thought are the substance of the thinking realm [From PT 2.021].

(6) Elements of thought are the common elements among all possible thoughts [From PT 2.022 and PT 2.023].

(7) The elements of thought are the unalterable and subsistent part of thoughts. It is their configuration which changes and produces thoughts [From PT 2.0271 and PT 2.0272].

(8) The structure of thought is constituted in the determinate relation in which the elements of thought are connected in the thought [From PT 2.032].
Nevertheless we must keep in mind that Wittgenstein has provided no discussion regarding the elements of thought probably, because it was implied in his whole theory of objects and names. What I have attempted is merely to elaborate on these characteristics of thought, implicit in Wittgenstein's picture theory.

C. THE CONCEPT OF THOUGHT IN THE TRACTATUS

Before considering anything in the Tractatus, it is necessary to refer to the picture theory of meaning, an ingenious invention of Wittgenstein which has come to be associated with his name. Wittgenstein prefaces his theory that a proposition is a picture with certain considerations about the world. He describes the world as a totality of facts and not of things. Facts are combinations of things, groups of objects ordered or arranged in a particular manner. Facts are of two kinds, a *sachverhalt* (atomic fact) is a fact which is not comprised of any other fact; a *tatsache* (fact) on the other hand is a fact consisting of two or more component facts. It is the facts, according to Wittgenstein, which uniquely determine the world, i.e., this actual world, as distinguished from other possible worlds. Thus the world divides into facts. The complex facts are composed of less complex facts which in turn are composed of still lesser complex facts and so on. Ultimately we get down to facts which cannot be further reduced. These are the atomic facts which are not made up of any further facts. But they do have components and so are not absolutely simple. These atomic facts are the ultimate building blocks of the world and are the simplest things that are self-subsistent. This conclusion is arrived at from the side of language.

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46 *TLP* 1.1 (*PT* 1.1)
47 *Ibid.* 1.2 (*PT* 1.2)
Next, Wittgenstein points out that a fact is the existence of states of affairs. He goes on to say that a state of affairs is a combination of objects. States of affairs are elementary or atomic. They are what correspond to elementary propositions in language. States of affairs consist only of objects in combination. The world includes all the positive atomic facts, all the existing states of affairs in their state of existing. Reality is wider. It includes all the positive and negative facts, all the existing and non-existing states of affairs in their respective states of existing and non-existing. The difference between an existent state of affairs and a non-existent state of affairs is that the former is an actual arrangement of existent objects while the latter is a non-actual arrangement of existent objects. A point to note here is that all objects are existent. No mention can possibly be made of non-existent objects, for any proposition mentioning them would be nonsensical. Therefore, all states of affairs, both existent as well as non-existent are arrangements of existent objects only. It also follows that all possible or conceivable worlds must consist of precisely the same objects that this actual world consists of.

The only difference between all possible worlds is in respect of the arrangement of the objects. It is their configuration which is varying and this configuration of objects produces states of affairs. A state of affairs is like a chain where its constituents, i.e., the objects have a determinate relation among them. Wittgenstein gives us a beautiful analogy. He says that in a state of affairs objects fit into one another like the links of a chain. An important characteristic of states of affairs is that they are independent of each other.

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48 Ibid. 2 (PT 2)
49 Ibid. 2.01 (PT 2.01)
Moving over to objects we find Wittgenstein enumerating some characteristics of objects. Objects are said to be the constituents of states of affairs. If all objects are given then all possible states of affairs are also given because objects contain the possibility of all situations. The form of an object is defined as the possibility of its occurring in states of affairs. Or in other words the different ways that objects can be configured are the forms of the objects. Objects are absolutely simple, being indestructible and indecomposable. Objects make up the substance of the world. If these objects fail to exist, however, the capacity of the elementary proposition to depict a possible state of affairs would be contingent on the truth of another proposition. Objects are the common elements among all possible worlds. Space, time and colour are forms of objects. Objects are said to be colourless also. It means that an object in itself has no colour. An object has colour only when configured with other objects, but in isolation from other objects, an object is colourless. It does not mean that an object lacks colour like water but rather it is unthinkable that apart from a configuration with other objects, an object has a colour. An object has two kinds of properties, essential properties and its accidental properties. Essential properties are those which an object must have in order to be the kind of object it is. Accidental properties of an object are those which an object just happens to have. Wittgenstein calls

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50 Ibid. 2.01 (PT 2.01)
51 Ibid. 2.0124 (PT 2.0126)
52 Ibid. 2.014
53 Ibid. 2.0141
54 Ibid. 2.02 (PT 2.02)
55 Ibid. 2.021 (PT 2.021)
56 Ibid. 2.022 (PT 2.022)
57 Ibid. 2.0251 (PT 2.0251; 2.0252)
58 Ibid. 2.0232 (PT 2.0232)
the former the internal properties and the latter the external properties of an object.59

Now, these objects are the direct referents of names, the constituents of elementary propositions. These elementary propositions correspond to states of affairs and are therefore also atomic. And all propositions, says Wittgenstein, are truth-functions of elementary propositions. Propositions are logical pictures. They are bipolar, capable of being true but also capable of being false. In this they reflect what they represent; a state of affairs which either does or does not exist. The logical analysis of propositions yields elementary propositions which are logically independent of each other because their truth depends solely on the existence or non-existence of atomic states of affairs. The ultimate constituents of elementary propositions are ‘unanalyzable’ names which stand for objects that are their meaning. Wittgenstein insists that there must be such elements of reality on the one hand, and of language on the other, if the latter is to represent the former. This is how language picturises facts.

There is a story of how the idea of language as a picture of reality occurred to Wittgenstein. It was in the autumn of 1914. Wittgenstein was reading a magazine about a law suit in Paris concerning an automobile accident. At the trial a miniature model of the accident was presented before the court. The model here served as a proposition that is as a description of a possible state of affairs. It has the function owing to a correspondence between the parts of the model (the miniature – houses, cars, people) and things (houses, cars, people) in reality. It now occurred to Wittgenstein that one might reverse the analogy and say that a

59 Ibid. 2.01231; 4.123 (PT 2.01241; 4.1022331)
proposition serves as a model or picture, by virtue of a similar correspondence between its parts and the world. The way in which the parts of the proposition are combined, the structure of the proposition depicts a possible combination of elements in reality, a possible state of affairs.

Before announcing that a proposition is a picture, Wittgenstein considers the nature of pictures in general. Wittgenstein counts as pictures not only paintings, drawings, photographs, but also maps, sculptures, three-dimensional models, and even such things as musical scores and gramophone records. A picture is a fact and it represents certain features of the reality depicted only because it is a fact. It is composed of elements. The elements represent the objects and the fact that the elements are arranged in the way they are, represents the fact that the objects are so arranged in reality. Pitcher\textsuperscript{60} points out that three conditions have to be satisfied for one thing A to be a logical picture of another thing, B. Firstly, there must be a one-to-one correspondence between the components of A and those of B. Secondly, to every feature of the structure or form of A there must correspond a feature of the structure or form of B. Thirdly, there must be rules of projection connecting the components of A and those of B. Rules of projection are rules whereby given A or B, B or A can be reconstructed from it. For example, the rules connecting a musical score and an actual performance of it; given either the score or the performance, the other can be reconstructed from it.

Certain key terms have been used by Wittgenstein in the picture theory which may be considered as follows:

(i) **Structure of a picture** – The connexion between the elements of a picture is the structure of a picture.\(^6^1\) Every picture has a structure but it is not identical with its structure.

(ii) **Pictorial relationship** – It consists of the correlations of the picture’s elements with things.\(^6^2\) Pictorial relationship is what makes the picture a picture. (The elements of the picture must stand for the elements of the situation to be represented). A picture consists of structure plus pictorial relationship.

(iii) **Pictorial form** – Firstly, Wittgenstein points out that the possibility of structure is the pictorial form of the picture.\(^6^3\) It is the possibility that things are related to one another in the same way as the elements of the picture. Secondly, Wittgenstein points out that there must be a common element between a picture and what it depicts and this common element is called pictorial form. He goes on to say that a picture cannot depict its pictorial form but can only display it.\(^6^4\) Pictorial form is the possibility of relationship between elements of the picture and pictorial form is also the common element between a picture and what it pictures. So pictorial form is also the possibility that the things represented are related in the same way as the representing elements in the picture. Thus a picture represents a possibility in the real world: as for instance an architect’s drawing or model shows a possible arrangement of buildings.

(iv) **Representational Form** – Representational form is that which is peculiar to a picture, which makes a picture a picture and not the real.

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\(^{6^1}\) *TLP* 2.15 (PT 2.151; 2.1510) [A picture is a fact (*TLP* 2.141) so it must be composed of elements].

\(^{6^2}\) Ibid. 2.1514 (PT 2.1515)

\(^{6^3}\) Ibid. 2.15 (PT 2.151; 2.15101)

\(^{6^4}\) Ibid. 2.172 (PT 2.173)
(v) **Logical form** – There must be a minimum common element between a picture and what it picturises i.e., reality in order to be able to depict it, correctly or incorrectly. Wittgenstein calls this minimum common element logical form.\(^{65}\)

(vi) **Logical picture** – A logical picture is a picture whose pictorial form is logical form.\(^{66}\) Every picture is at the same time a logical one.\(^{67}\) Since every picture must have logical form in common with what it depicts, logical form is part of the pictorial form of every picture; every picture is a logical picture in addition to being, e.g., a spatial picture or whatever other particular kind of picture it may be.

Wittgenstein explains the distinction between sense and nonsense in terms of the picture theory. That which cannot be picturised is nonsense. Of course generally nonsense includes gibberish which is not the concern of Wittgenstein. Further, what may not seemingly be nonsense like the propositions of logic and mathematics are so in Wittgenstein’s dialectic because they do not picture anything at all. Still further, the propositions of ethics, aesthetics and metaphysics are attempts to say the unsayable. So if they cannot be represented in language and thus represent a possible situation, they must also be nonsense. Therefore Wittgenstein’s picture theory is limited to what is sensible. Only what is sensible can be pictured and thus have meaning. And what is nonsense stems from the fact that it cannot be pictured and therefore have no meaning either. The sensible and nonsensible distinction in the *Tractatus* is connected with the distinction between the sayable and the nonsayable. The propositions of ethics, aesthetics and metaphysics are attempts to say the unsayable. Thus we see

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\(^{65}\) *Ibid. 2.18 (PT 2.18)*  
\(^{66}\) *Ibid. 2.181 (PT 2.181)*  
\(^{67}\) *Ibid. 2.182 (PT 2.182)*  

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that sensible propositions according to the *Tractatus* are of two kinds, empirical propositions and scientific propositions. They are sensible in so far as they are able to picture a possible state of affairs, i.e., they are sayable. Nonsensical propositions are of primarily three kinds – gibberish, which are due to incorrect syntax like 'Bread eats'. The propositions of logic and mathematics are the second type; they are senseless because they say nothing about the world, i.e., do not picture or represent any fact or situation. The third kind of nonsensical propositions is the nonsense which attempt to say the unsayable. Under this category come the propositions of ethics, aesthetics, metaphysics and even the propositions of the *Tractatus*. They are all attempts to represent something which can never be stated in descriptive language because they attempt to say something which is unsayable. It is important to remember that this distinction is a logical outcome of the á-priori order of the world, which Wittgenstein adhered to during the Tractarian period.

Wittgenstein seems to give inconsistent answers as to how a picture is connected with reality.\(^{68}\) At *TLP* 2.1511 (*PT* 2.1512), Wittgenstein says 'that is how a picture is attached to reality: it reaches right out to it.' This suggests that it is by pictorial form that picture touches reality. Later, he says that it is the pictorial correlations between elements of the picture and the object which 'are as it were the feelers of the picture's elements with which the picture touches reality'.\(^{69}\) Anthony Kenny points out that this inconsistency is only an apparent one. The connection with reality is made by the person who makes the correlation between the elements of the picture and of reality. Wittgenstein uses the term 'pictorial relation' for the relation between a picture and situation as a whole. A picture consists of

\(^{69}\) *Ibid.* 2.1515 (*PT* 2.1516)
structure plus pictorial relation, i.e., one between its elements and also between its elements and reality. Correlating signs and reality is something done by 'us', according to Kenny.\textsuperscript{70} Kenny points out: 'At the time he wrote the \textit{Tractatus} Wittgenstein thought this was an empirical matter of no importance for philosophy. Later he came to realize that it was intimately connected with the nature of representation. But in the \textit{Tractatus} he was more interested in discussing pictorial form than in discussing pictorial relationship.'\textsuperscript{71} The \textit{Tractatus} is very much akin to the \textit{Prototractatus} in respect of the concept of thought. Just as is done in the \textit{Prototractatus}, after dealing with the picture theory Wittgenstein in a similar fashion introduces the notion of thought at proposition number 3. \textit{TLP} 3 is the ontological definition of thought as compared to \textit{TLP} 4 which is the linguistic definition of thought. So the deductions that have been already made in the previous sub-section will also apply here. Therefore I am not going to dwell on them but instead in this sub-section I am going to put forward some of the views of some commentators. One important point to remember is that commentators have more or less refrained from making explicit comments on the notion of thought and have mostly alluded to it only briefly.

Before that, a few points may be stated. The Tractarian thought or rather thinking is conjectured as a picture representing a fact. And the function of language is to mirror thought and reality. All language which is meaningful expresses thoughts and represents how things are or what they may be. Correspondingly all thoughts must be capable of being expressed; each is a potential propositional sign. By thinking the sense of propositional signs, thoughts are projected onto reality. In this context, I

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid, pp.56-57.
would like to bring in the revised use of sense and reference in the *Tractatus*. According to the *Tractatus* only names have a meaning (*Bedeutung*) and propositions a sense (*Sinn*). Or in other words to understand a name we need to know its reference but to understand a proposition we need to understand its sense. We need not know whether the proposition is true or false, but rather what would be the case of it were true and also if it were false. This bipolarity of propositions is an important concept of the early Wittgenstein for it shows the propositions ability to represent reality. Thus thoughts must also have the same characteristic, being propositions with sense as well as logical pictures representing reality. Thus thoughts must also be capable of being true as well as false. This is testified in the *Notebooks* in an entry dated 8.12.1914 where the author writes that behind true or false thoughts there is always a dark background. Therefore true thoughts like propositions depict how things stand and false thoughts also depict but they depict that this is not how things stand. Just as only one reality corresponds to both a proposition and its negation, the same will be the case with thought. It is a well known fact that it was Plato who first pointed out the problem of what is not the case in his *Theaetetus*. What is the case exists but what is not the case does not exist and so the latter is nothing. But can we think nothing? That would be self-contradictory. The early Wittgenstein was also very much taken up with the problem of negation; it was a 'mystery' for him to think 'how things are not'. Thoughts can be both true and false. True thoughts represent what things are. False thoughts also represent, i.e., they represent the same reality but they represent what things are not and hence what does not exist. Thus, Wittgenstein writes, at *TLP* 4.0621 (*PT* 4.0921; 4.0922; 4.0923) that the signs ‘p’ and ‘~p’ both say the same thing for nothing in reality corresponds to the sign ‘~’. So, though the
propositions ‘p’ and ‘¬p’ have opposite sense there is one and only one reality corresponding to both of them. On similar lines, true thoughts must correspond with what is the case, a fact. But if the thought is false, the same fact corresponds to it, only it shows what is not the case. So the content of my thought is the same in both cases. Or in other words, the content of both a true and a false thought is the same; the only difference is that in the former it is actualised while in the latter it is not. The nearest mention we have of the elements of thought is at TLP 3.2 which says that in a proposition a thought can be expressed in such a way that elements of the propositional sign correspond to the objects of thought. But it is not very clear as to what those objects are. It is not at all evident as to whether the objects of thought refer to the constituents of thought or that to which thought is directed.

The original German for TLP 3.11 is as follows: ‘Die projekttionsmethode ist das Denken des Satz-Sinnes’, which has been translated by Pears and McGuinness\(^\text{72}\) as ‘the method of projection is to think out the sense of the proposition’. James Bogen points out that ‘Das Denken’ is more literally translated as ‘the thinking’ and instead of explaining ‘projection method’ in terms of ‘thinking’, Wittgenstein should be interpreted as explaining what it is to think in terms of ‘projection method’. He also points out Pears and McGuiness translated ‘Das angewandte, gedachte Satzzeichen ist der Gedanke’ as ‘a propositional sign, applied and thought out is a thought’ (TLP 3.5). This translation implied that applying the sign and ‘thinking it out’ were two separate things. Moreover the correct translation for ‘Gedanke’ should be ‘thought’ and not

'thought out'.73 *TLP* 3.12 speaks of the propositional sign being the sign by which we express the thought. It also says that the proposition is a propositional sign in its projective relation to the world. From this we may deduce the proposition is the expressed thought that is projected on to the world. *TLP* 3.11 says the method of projection is to think of the sense of the proposition. We may take the liberty to infer that in the projection of propositions on to the world enters thought i.e. when we relate the proposition with facts, in between comes the thought. An unseen, mental process is being implied though not categorically stated. It is ambiguous.

The early Wittgenstein believed that ordinary language is in perfect logical order. Only it lies hidden and needs to be discovered by analysis. Thus he points out at *TLP* 4.002 (*PT* 4.0014; 4.00141) that ordinary language disguises thought. Ordinary language conceals the logical structure just as clothing hides a body. It does not mean that ordinary language is logically defective.74 He believed that philosophical problems arise due to linguistic formulations. This belief he of course held throughout his life. Philosophical problems are due to our failure to understand the grammar or logic of language. It must be kept in mind that at the time of the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein believed that he had solved all philosophical problems that were confronting him. The task of philosophy is to analyse and elucidate. It does not seek to discover a system of new truths but only intends to clarify language through logical analysis. It aims at achieving a correct picture of the world and setting limits to language and consequently to thought.

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74 Also refer *PT* 4.0015 (does not occur in the *TLP*) which says that the outward aspect of ordinary language makes every kind of illusion and confusion possible.
Moving over to thought, we see that the Tractarian representation is nothing but an isomorphism between three different systems, language, thought and reality. Thoughts are logical pictures and therefore they must be intrinsically representational. Correlating signs and reality is done by us. Wittgenstein in the Notebooks writes that thinking is a kind of language (NB 12.9.16). Thoughts are propositional signs being projected onto reality. The Tractarian thought is not a psychic entity but only conceived as having an isomorphic relation with the realms of language and world. Thoughts are projected onto the world by means of propositional signs which is the significant proposition. Thus all thoughts must be capable, at least potentially of being expressed in language.

i. THINKING AND SPEAKING

The preface to the Tractatus, sums up the complete intention of the book which is to draw a limit to thought. Since this cannot be done because to do it we would have to think the unthinkable the task must be accomplished in the field of language. For in language we can distinguish the sensible from the nonsense and thus draw the limit. Thus limiting thought can only be made by limiting language. From this it appears that the realms of thought and language coincide. So whether there can be thoughts apart from their expressions, from the Tractarian point is hardly possible. All thoughts must at least be capable of being expressed. Each thought is a potential propositional sign. Or in other words, what is thinkable is possible too. In the Notebooks the author writes that a situation is thinkable means that we can picturise it to ourselves.75 Thus every thought can picturise a possible situation and hence is capable of being expressed in language. We have further evidence to the fact that

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75 NB p.24e.
Wittgenstein in his early days held that thinking and language are the same. (And obviously then they must be coextensive). Firstly, he held that thinking is a kind of language; secondly, a thought is a logical picture of a proposition and thirdly, thought is a kind of proposition: 'Now it is becoming clear why I thought that thinking and language were the same. For thinking is a kind of language. For a thought too is, of course, a logical picture of the proposition, and therefore it just is a kind of proposition.'\textsuperscript{76} He also says that what cannot be imagined cannot be spoken about also.\textsuperscript{77} Moreover at \textit{TLP} 5.61 (\textit{PT} 5.40421), Wittgenstein writes in unequivocal terms that we cannot think what we cannot think and therefore what we cannot think we cannot say either. It means what cannot be thought cannot possibly be spoken about either. These entries suggest that thinking and language (speaking) are coextensive.

Yet the early Wittgenstein makes a distinction between sense and nonsense. Propositions according to the \textit{Tractatus} are of two main kinds, sensible and non-sensible. Under the former are included empirical propositions and scientific propositions. Non-sensible propositions are of three kinds, gibberish, senseless propositions (\textit{Sinnloss}) which include the propositions of logic and mathematics and nonsense propositions (\textit{Unsinn}) which attempt to say the unsayable. Under this last category come ethics, aesthetics, metaphysics as well as the \textit{Tractatus} itself. They attempt to represent something which can never be stated in descriptive language because they are attempts to say the unsayable. Thus they become nonsense when expressed in language because they can never be expressed but must be 'passed over in silence'. This seems to suggest that there are things (thoughts) which cannot be expressed in language.

\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Ibid.} p.82e.
\textsuperscript{77} \textit{Ibid.} p.84e.
Therefore we cannot reach a definite conclusion as to whether the early Wittgenstein believed that thinking without speaking is possible or not. We have proof that thinking without speaking is not possible as well as on a deeper analysis the *Tractatus* seems to suggest that thinking without speaking is a possible case.

ii. THE VIEW OF FREGE

Gottlob Frege of course stands in need of no introduction and no study of Wittgenstein can be complete without a study of Frege. The capacity of the influence that Frege exerted on the mind of the young Wittgenstein was voluminous. One must go back in time and reminiscence the days when Wittgenstein renounced a lucrative career in aeronautical engineering to pursue philosophy. This intense interest in philosophical studies was stirred by the writings of Bertrand Russell from where he came to know of Frege and whom he eventually met at Jena, Germany in 1911. This pioneer in analytic philosophy advised the young engineer to study under Russell at Cambridge, which he did. But the fact remains that though Wittgenstein did not study under Frege yet the latter had an overwhelming influence on the former. Resultantly one can notice the impetus in Wittgenstein’s writings, the driving force of his master. In the Preface to the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein has expressed his indebtedness to Frege in unequivocal terms.

I do not wish to judge how far my efforts coincide with those of other philosophers ... I will only mention that I am indebted to
Frege’s great works and to the writings of my friend Mr. Bertrand Russell for much of the stimulation of my thoughts.78

Yet it must be borne in mind that Wittgenstein was never a copy of Frege. He did not follow his predecessor’s footsteps blindly but tried to construct a radically different kind of philosophy. The skeletal presentation of thought by the early Wittgenstein stands in sharp contrast to Frege’s presentation of the same who has dedicated three articles entirely to the concept of thought. The articles ’Thoughts’ (Der Gedanke), Negation (Die Verneinung) and ‘Compound Thoughts’ (Gedankengefüge) were published by Frege in the periodical Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus, the first two in 1918 and the last one in 1923. They have been edited by Peter Geach and appear under the title Logical Investigations.79 Geach is of the opinion that Wittgenstein had probably been influenced by the article Der Gedanke although he did not speak favourably about it to him. The best part of Frege’s articles is that he has endeavoured to discuss the concept of thought and also the Cartesian I as contrasted with Wittgenstein’s Tractatus in greater detail.

Before attempting to analyse the Fregean thought, one needs to glance at his more famous distinction between sense and reference which first appeared in 1892 in the paper entitled Über Sinn und Bedeutung. Frege made this distinction for the purpose of solving the puzzle that he encountered in identity statements which were either of the form a=a, being analytically true, or of the form a=b which were not analytic á-priori. Statements of the first kind like ‘the morning star is the morning star’ have no difficulty but it is only in the case of the latter that problems

78 TLP Preface p.3.
arise. Frege gives us the classic example - 'The morning star is the evening star'. He says that the two expressions 'the morning star' and 'the evening star' have two different senses by virtue of which they say where and when to look for the star. At the same time their reference denotes the same object and this was only a matter of discovery. The concept of sense and reference applies not only to proper names but also to constituent parts of sentences, as well as to sentences as a whole. Sense of an expression is regarded by Frege as the mode of presentation of the referent. It serves as a symbol of 'information about, a description of, or a means of picking out the referent.' The major point to note here is that though all expressions in a properly constructed language have sense, all of them need not have a reference. The same thing applies to all constituents of sentences.

Frege gives the definition of thought as the sense of a sentence. He holds that a sentence expresses a thought. This is the fundamental point in Frege's theory. The point to be noted here is that thought is not the reference but only the sense because every expression must have a sense though it may not have a reference. So every sentence must also have a thought. He says:

Without offering this as a definition, I mean by 'a thought' something for which the question of truth can arise at all. So I count what is false among thoughts no less than what is true. So I can say: thoughts are senses of sentences, without wishing to assert that the sense of every sentence is a thought. The thought in itself

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imperceptible by the senses, gets clothed in the perceptible garb of a sentence, and thereby we are enabled to grasp it. We say a sentence expresses a thought.82

An important point to remember is that Frege uses the term ‘thought’ in the sense of a judgement. Therefore, Frege holds that thoughts like judgements must have a truth value. Truth is an important characteristic of thoughts. Frege, tries to analyse the word ‘truth’ in order to draw a distinction between the logical and the psychological because he points out that ‘laws of thought’ generally implies something psychological. A thought, for Frege, cannot be perceived by the senses in the sense that we perceive sensible things. Truth is a property of thoughts and not of things because truth is not like the qualities of sensible things like ‘red’ and ‘bitter’. But at the same time it should be remembered that ‘truth’ does not make any new additions to a thought. Frege distinguishes between three processes –

(1) the grasping of a thought – thinking,

(2) the acknowledgement of the truth of a thought – the act of judgement,

(3) the manifestation of this judgement – assertion.83

We can analyse Frege’s definition of thought as follows – thought is the mode of presentation of the referent of a sentence because thought is the sense of a sentence and sense is the mode of presentation of the referent.

82 Ibid. pp.4-5.
83 Ibid. p.7.
Frege raises the question as to where thoughts exist, whether in the inner world of 'ideas' (ideas mean sense impressions, imaginations, feelings, sensations, wishes) or in the outer realm of objects. Before answering this question, Frege distinguishes between 'ideas' and 'things'. Firstly, he points out that unlike things of the outer world, ideas are not sensible, i.e., they are not perceptible by the senses. They cannot be seen or touched or heard or tasted or smelled. Secondly, ideas are something which we have, belonging to the content of our consciousness quite unlike things. Thus ideas unlike objects cannot exist independently by themselves but require an owner. For example, a pain must have an owner. Thirdly, ideas unlike objects are essentially private. Two persons, for instance, may observe the same thing but their sense perceptions differ. For one, the colour may appear to be dark green while for the other it may not appear so. Thus ideas are private and incapable of being compared with other people's ideas. Fourthly, no two persons can have the same idea because a single idea can belong only to one owner.

Thoughts are definitely not things of the outer world. But then are they 'ideas' of the inner world? Frege answers the question in the negative. He considers the thought expressed in the Pythagorean Theorem. If others and I agree to the thought expressed in the theorem, then the thought does not belong to my or to anybody else's content of consciousness, i.e., I am not its owner, yet I can accept it as true. But if different people have different thoughts about the thought expressed in the Pythagorean Theorem then in that case we have to say 'my Pythagorean theorem' and 'his Pythagorean Theorem' where each one's thought belongs to his own consciousness and in that case the sense of the thought can be true for one and false for another. If truth and falsity
characterize the content of my consciousness they will belong to the sphere of my consciousness only and in that case the existence of timelessly true thoughts like the one expressed in the Pythagorean Theorem would not be possible. Frege therefore points out the necessity of recognizing a third realm. The constituents of the third realm, thoughts, have something in common with ideas, i.e., they cannot be perceived by the senses. At the same time they also have something in common with things of the outside world, i.e., they do not need an owner. If this third world theory of thoughts is accepted then it will be easy to see why the Pythagorean Theorem is timelessly true irrespective of the fact whether anybody accepts it as true or not. It has always been there, even before it was discovered. No man created it, just as when a man ‘grasps’ or understands a thought he does not create it but rather stands in a certain relation to it.

The characteristics of the Fregean thought can be summarized as follows:

(1) A thought by itself is imperceptible but can be perceived when expressed in a sentence. In Frege’s language, a sentence expresses a thought.

(2) Thoughts exist independently of the thinker.

(3) Thoughts can be understood or ‘grasped’ by others, as well as by ‘me’. ‘Grasping’ means standing in a particular relation to it. Frege introduces the word ‘grasp’. ‘Grasping a thought’ corresponds to a special mental activity called ‘thinking’. Frege points out that ‘thinking’ does not create thoughts but merely grasps them.
'Grasping' a thought presupposes the thinker who is not the owner of thoughts but the owner only of the thinking (grasping).

(4) Thoughts are not owned by us in the sense that we own ideas.

(5) Thoughts do not occur like sense impressions.

(6) Thoughts do not belong to the inner world for they are not ideas. Thoughts at the same time do not belong to the outer world for they are different from the perceptible things of the sense, i.e., sensible things. Thoughts therefore belong to a third realm.

Frege further points out that in certain kinds of sentences, the sentence alone does not express the thought, the time of utterance is necessary. For example, 'this tree is covered with green leaves'. In this sentence the thought expressed cannot be timelessly true unlike the one expressed in the Pythagorean Theorem. In such kinds of sentences if the time specification is mentioned then only we have a complete thought.

Frege goes on to ask how a thought acts. And he says thoughts act by being grasped and taken to be true. Thoughts influence the masses because they can be communicated through the decisions we make. When thoughts act upon the external world they bring about changes in it which are perceived and then 'grasped' by others. The 'actuality' of thoughts is different from the actuality of sensible objects. Thoughts are communicated to others not in the sense that sensible objects are handed down to others because in the case of thoughts man has no control over it quite unlike sensible objects which are totally in his control.

Thoughts are not wholly unactual but their actuality is quite different from the actuality of things. And their action is brought
about by a performance of the thinker; without this they would be
inactive, at least as far as we can see. And yet the thinker does not
create them but must take them as they are. They can be true
without being grasped by a thinker; and they are not wholly
unactual even then, at least if they could be grasped and so brought
into action.84

In the next two chapters of the *Logical investigations* Frege discusses
different kinds of sentences to see whether their sense can be called a
thought, deals with false thoughts and also with compound thoughts.85 He
points out that interrogative and indicative sentences have the same
thought but the indicative one contains an assertion while the
interrogative one contains a request. For Frege, false thoughts exist as
sense of an interrogative sentence; as part of a hypothetical thought
complex. But the point to note is that in negation thoughts cannot be
altered. Our judgements do not alter them, what is true will be true even if
we insert a ‘not’. False thoughts are also thoughts and cannot be changed
or affected by negating them. A thought cannot be changed to a non-
thought by negating it and vice versa. A negative thought is less useful
then an affirmative one. Every thought has its contradictory. The falsity of
a thought can be acknowledged by admitting the truth of its contradiction.
The contradictory thought expressed in the sentence is formed from the
original expression of the thought, i.e., from the sentence by using a
negative word.

Frege next considers double negation. If A is not a fictitious thought
then the negation of A is also not a fictitious thought – of these only one is

84 Ibid. pp.29-30.
85 Ibid. Chapter Negation pp.31-53; Chapter Compound Thoughts pp.55-77.
true. Again of the negation of A and the negation of the negation of A there is only one that is true. The negation of A can be either true or not true. If it is true then A and the negation of the negation of A is not true, while if the negation of A is not true, both A and the negation of the negation of A are both true. Thus Frege concludes that ‘wrapping up a thought in double negation does not alter its truth value’.86

iii. A COMPARISON OF THE VIEWS OF WITTGENSTEIN AND FREGE

Unlike Frege’s presentation of thought in the Logical Investigations, Wittgenstein’s presentation of the same concept in the Tractatus is rather condensed. Nevertheless, certain aspects of similarity as well as difference are noteworthy.

SIMILARITIES

Frege in the first chapter ‘Thoughts’ in the Logical Investigations explicitly says that thoughts in themselves are imperceptible but when they are expressed in the perceptible sentences can be grasped. He calls the sense of a sentence a thought. Here a similarity can be noticed with Wittgenstein who also somewhat shares the same view, expressed at TLP 3.1. What Wittgenstein calls a proposition, Frege calls a sentence. And at TLP 3.1 Wittgenstein points out that a proposition is the sensible or perceptible expression of a thought. [TLP 3.11 says that the method of projection is to think the sense of the proposition]. Still further, in the same chapter Frege speaks about ‘Laws of thought’ and holds that they generally imply something psychological. In the letter to Russell,
Wittgenstein had expressed a somewhat similar view when he said that the constituents of thought are entirely psychical.

In the chapter on Compound Thoughts, Frege points out parts of a thought correspond to parts of a sentence; their structures correspond to each other. Frege illustrates this in the following manner: even if a thought is grasped by a being for the first time it can be translated into language and which in turn can be understood even by somebody to whom the thought is new. Thus thoughts are ultimately composed of simple parts which in turn correspond to the simple parts of sentences.

Wittgenstein also spoke of parts or psychical elements of thought that have the same relation to reality as words (Letter to Russell, 1919). Thus we see that Frege and Wittgenstein both admit of simpler parts of thought, though none of them deal with it explicitly nor name them.

In the chapter on Negation, Frege is concerned with false thoughts. He points out that if thought means the sense of a sentence, then the 'being of a thought does consist in its being true,' or in other words, false thoughts are possible. From false thoughts no inference can be made, but only if they are part of true thoughts it can be done. For Frege, false thoughts exist as sense of an interrogative sentence; as part of a hypothetical thought complex. But the point to note is that in negation thoughts cannot be altered. Our judgements do not alter them; what is true will be true, even if we insert a 'not'. A thought cannot be changed to a non-thought by negating it and vice versa. Though Wittgenstein does not use the word 'thought' yet something quite similar is said. At *TLP* 4.0621, Wittgenstein points out that 'p' and '~p' can both say the same thing because there is nothing in reality that corresponds to the sign '~'.
Though the proposition ‘p’ and ‘~p’ have opposite sense yet there corresponds to them one and the same reality. (One must remember that a thought is a proposition with a sense TLP 4). Thus Wittgenstein also shares the same view as Frege that negative thoughts do not signify anything new and do not add to our knowledge.

DIFFERENCES

Inspite of the similarities, certain points of difference may also be noted. Wittgenstein starts with an ontological definition of thought and proceeds to give a linguistic one (which analysis shows is reducible to the ontological one). On the other hand Frege sets out with a linguistic definition and ends up with the conclusion that thoughts are different from both ontological objects as well as psychical elements, i.e., ideas. Thoughts unlike objects cannot be touched or seen nor do they belong to the realm of consciousness like ideas; they exist in a third realm.

The one thing that comes to mind about Frege’s theory of thought is that it is akin to the basic note of Plato’s theory of Ideas. Ideas for Plato were not entities existing in the mind but had an independent reality of their own. But these objective realities at the same time did not exist in the ontological world but in a third world. Similarly Frege’s thoughts also exist in a third world. Frege’s thoughts are also timelessly true independent of their discovery; nobody can create thoughts but can only ‘grasp’ them. The same view is also held by Plato about Ideas; Ideas are also eternally true, indestructible, being beyond space and time. But the major point of difference between the two great philosophers lies in the fact that while Plato is out and out an idealist, Frege is not, he being a realist. The criticism that Aristotle had made against Plato may be made
against Frege also. Frege like Plato, instead of explaining the thought as the sense of sentence, goes over to a third world to explain their existence (Plato in order to explain reality, said that for every class of objects there existed an Idea which existed in a third world). Both thus appear to be men who unable to count with a small number of things double up the number of things to be explained.

Another point of difference between Frege and Wittgenstein is that while Frege calls the sense of a sentence the thought, Wittgenstein says a thought is a proposition with sense. Proposition is for Wittgenstein what sentence is for Frege. Firstly, the difference between the two definitions is not something very remarkable but there lies only a very fine underlying difference – the sense of the sentence is for Frege, the thought, while only if a proposition has sense, can it be called a thought, for Wittgenstein. Secondly, the concept of sense has been used differently by the two great philosophers. For Frege, the sense is the mode of presentation of the referent, while for Wittgenstein the sense of a proposition is that it represents such and such a situation (TLP 4.031) and also the sense of a proposition is independent of the facts (TLP 4.061). Max Black is of the opinion that Wittgenstein deviates from Frege in considering a ‘thought’ as a propositional sign in use i.e. as the significant proposition.\footnote{Black, Max. 1964. \textit{A Companion to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus}. Cambridge. At the University Press. Great Britain, p.96.}

Wittgenstein, I think was more accurate in his presentation in view of the fact that he never shifted from his basic aim, that of establishing a relation between language, thought and reality. A one-to-one correspondence has been explicitly stated by him between language and reality but that of thought has not been stated explicitly. But the definition
that ‘thought is a logical picture of facts with a sense’, which I have deduced from PT 3 / TLP 3 and PT 4 / TLP 4 go to show that there is a one-to-one correspondence between thought and reality. Wittgenstein’s presentation of thought is strictly speaking logical in line with the basic aim of the Tractatus. But Frege’s presentation of the same concept, I think hovers somewhere between the psychological and the ontological. He is sure that thoughts exist in a third realm but his proof is no proof at all. On the other hand if Frege would have stuck to his original definition of thought as being the sense of a sentence and embarked only on a linguistic interpretation of it, his theory would have been more acceptable. Instead he concludes that thoughts exist somewhere else which is absurd. But the greatest difficulty in Wittgenstein’s presentation is that he has not elaborated much on the concept of thought quite unlike Frege. So whatever we have to conclude from the Tractatus are all analysable deductions, nothing more. This is a serious difficulty.

iv. THE VIEW OF SOME COMMENTATORS

The Tractatus enjoys the enviable status of having a number of commentaries on it, where the different concepts have been variedly and diversely interpreted. But the important point to note here is that most have not dealt with the concept of thought (Gedanke) at length.

To begin with, the psychological interpretation of thought as given in the letter to Russell, some commentators have different things to say about it. Ms. Anscombe88 has pointed out that Wittgenstein’s letter to Russell from Casino may mean that it would be a matter of empirical investigation to find out both the constituents of thought and their

relationship to the 'objects' in facts, designated by the 'names' in language. She is of the opinion that at the time of the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein pretended that epistemology had nothing to do with the foundations of logic and the theory of meaning which was his main concern.

Peter Carruthers\(^9\), however, has something different to say. He holds that the term 'Gedanke' (thought) in Russell's letter refers to 'thoughts - in - the - mind'. Russell was using the term in this sense and Wittgenstein was giving his answers to the former's queries on the same lines. Of course, the term 'thought' in the letter was unambiguously considered to be psychological. According to Carruthers, actually what Russell was asking Wittgenstein was not an elucidation of the *Gedanke* (thought) of the *Tractatus*, but was rather taking the terms in its conventional use and his queries are sensible only if the term 'thought' refers to 'thought - in - the - mind'. Thus Carruthers is of the opinion that the letter should not be used as a guide to the *Tractatus*. Carruthers is also of the view that Wittgenstein's assertion that a thought or *Gedanke* consists of psychical elements having the same sort of relation to reality as words prove that thought or *Gedanke*, in the sense of thoughts - in - the - mind, was not the link between language and reality. Rather Wittgenstein was looking at both sentences and thoughts - in - the - mind at par, representing reality. This is evident by Wittgenstein's use of the phrase 'having the same sort of relation to reality'. Carruthers points out that neither *TLP3* nor *TLP4* support the psychological interpretation of thought. *TLP3* uses the term 'Gedanke' (thought) as a generic concept which includes all picturing of facts, pictures, maps, etc. *TLP4* refers to a proposition with a directed truth - condition. Carruthers points out that

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the *Tractatus* contains only two remarks which are favourable to the concept of thought being psychological. They are *TLP* 3.11 and *TLP* 3.5. *TLP* 3.11 states that the method of projection for a propositional sign is to think out the sense of the proposition. Carruthers interprets this as 'how to project a sentence onto the world'\(^90\). On the other hand, *TLP* 3.5 which states that a propositional sign, applied and thought out, is a thought is interpreted as "the 'thinking out' – the mental projection – of a sentence which gives it its content."\(^91\) Carruthers points to the different terms used in the two different translations of the *Tractatus*, the Pears and McGuinness one and the one translated by Ogden. The former have used 'a' thought and 'a' proposition at *TLP*4 which should instead have been 'the' thought and 'the' proposition. Carruthers goes on to interpret *TLP* 5.542 as saying that there is no relation between a subject or a soul and a state of affairs in an act of thinking or in a public saying. Rather thinking or saying are both ordered arrangement of signs used to represent that state of affairs. And the most important point for Wittgenstein is that thoughts exist independently of the thinking subject. In the same book, Carruthers points some other important characteristic features of the Tractarian thought. He points out that the Tractarian thought is a denial of the Fregean view that thoughts exist necessarily. On the other hand, the Wittgensteinian thought or *Gedanke* is abstract. It employs logical pictures which in turn are the structured arrangements of sign-takers, where the latter have a conventionally determined application. Carruthers also points out that the Tractarian thought considers private – thinking and public speaking on the same level. The crux of the Tractarian view according to Carruthers is:

a sentence consists of structured arrangements of signs which represent the world in virtue of the conventions which the speaker takes to govern the use of those signs and their mode of combination. So what makes public language significant is not any mental process, nor any associated belief or intention, but rather our capacity to use signs in a norm-governed way.\textsuperscript{92}

Ms. Anscombe,\textsuperscript{93} brings in the concept of thinking in connection with the picture theory of meaning. She points out that there are two distinct features of a picture. One is the relation between the elements of the picture. The other is the correlations of the elements in the picture with things outside the picture. The former feature must belong to a picture before the latter can. This is because only if significant relations hold among the elements of the picture then only they can be correlated with objects outside the picture so as to stand for them. And Anscombe points out that this correlating is not done by the picture but something which \textit{we} do. Actually \textit{we} give a sign a reference. She points out that even in a nonsensical sentence there is a relation between the elements of the sentence, because the relation between the elements must be there for a sentence to be a sentence. But a nonsensical sentence can be made to have a perfectly good sense if we could change the kind of reference that some part of the sentence has. Here again 'we' comes in as giving the reference to a sign.\textsuperscript{94} She points out that it is \textit{we} who use the sensibly perceptible signs as a projection of a possible state of affairs. And this is done by using the elements of the proposition to stand for the objects by us. It is \textit{we} who reproduce the possible configuration of objects in the arrangement of the

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid. p.102.
\textsuperscript{93} Anscombe, G.E.M. 1959. \textit{An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus}. Hutchinson University Library. London.
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid. p.68.
elements of the proposition. And hence a proposition is a picture. The sense of a picture, Ms. Anscombe points out, can be thought out by correlating the elements of the picture with actual objects. And this we can do in two ways, by depicting what is the case or what is not the case. So in connection with a picture we can think two senses and these two senses, the positive and the negative are integral to the picture once the correlation has been established and a picture whose ‘sense’ is ‘thought’ in either way is a propositional sign.

Thus we see that Ms. Anscombe brings in the concept of ‘we’ as using the perceptible signs as a projection of a state of affairs. For her, thinking the sense of a picture consists in correlating the elements of the picture with actual objects. This thinking is done in any of the following two ways, i.e., either by depicting what is the case or by depicting what is not the case. Therefore, thinking the sense of a proposition asserts either the existence or the non-existence of the situation represented. But what is noteworthy is in both the cases the same picture is being considered. That is to say, the relation between elements of the picture and actual objects is identical in both the cases of what is the case and in what is not the case. She refers to TLP 5.61 which says that we cannot think what we cannot say either, as meaning that it is not possible to say what it is that cannot be thought.

S.N. Ganguly holds that Wittgenstein’s formulation of thought in the Tractatus stresses on the logical character of thought. Wittgenstein’s interest in thought lay in virtue of its capacity of representing reality. He

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95 Ibid. p.69.
96 Ibid. p.70.
further points out that in the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein avoids any psychological description of thought and thought itself is a fact. (A *Gedanke* (thought) is a *Tatsache* (fact)). And this logical character of thought has been portrayed by Wittgenstein from the viewpoint of representing or picturing reality. The brevity of Wittgenstein’s reply to Russell’s letter is taken by Ganguly to mean that Wittgenstein wished not to give a psychological interpretation of thought. S.N. Ganguly points out that for Wittgenstein thought itself is a fact representing other facts. Therefore, he says, it does not make sense to ask how thought can represent something which is not a thought. Nothing can be said about the relation between picturing, thought and reality except that it does exist. Any significant assertion only picturises and thus only shows but cannot say anything about itself. Thus Ganguly points out the view that thought and reality are identical, which Hegel holds for instance, is nonsensical. The Tractarian thought is a fact which by its own form pictures reality. Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus* emphasizes on the ‘logico-linguistic character of thought’.

Thus, only, we can see that the relation is between two facts – an impersonal expression of the relation between thought and reality. This is why Wittgenstein rather impatiently, retorted to Russell’s enquiry that ‘*Gedanke* is a *Tatsache*’ and that ‘I do not know what are the constituents of thought, but I know that there are constituents.’

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98 Ibid. p.13.
100 Ibid. p.13.
102 Ibid. p.15.
S.N. Ganguly points out that the views of Frege and Russell differ from Wittgenstein’s because the former two did not advance a ‘radically logical view of thought’. Both Frege and Russell believed in sense and reference and reference involves an epistemological subject. But thought for Wittgenstein is nothing except description. Thought need not necessarily involve reference to a subject. Ganguly points out that in the *Tractatus, Gedanke* (thought) and *Tatsache* (fact) both are of the same level since a *Gedanke* (thought) is a *Tatsache* (fact). That thought is a fact cannot be determined in thought for that thought would be a fact and therefore would belong to the same level. According to Ganguly, Wittgenstein’s definition of thought as a logical picture of facts brings out two characteristics of thought. Firstly, thought is representative because it is a picture of facts. And secondly, thought is a symbolic function according to certain logical rules. The *Tractatus* has identified thought with language (*TLP 3.5*) and according to Ganguly, the early Wittgenstein believed that there are no thoughts apart from expressions. S.N. Ganguly points out that Wittgenstein never expressed thought as a mental occurrence; it is a propositional sign used according to certain rules. On the other hand he emphasized its logical nature; thoughts by nature are logical. And thus thoughts can never be of anything illogical (*TLP 3.03*). S.N. Ganguly suggests that for Wittgenstein the main task of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts (*TLP 4.112*). And this is to be done by expressing what can be said and thereby showing the limits of thought. Wittgenstein was of the opinion that ordinary language conceals the real logical nature of propositions and thus the aim of philosophy is a logical clarification of any thought. And the primary function of thought is to represent. Thus

104 *Ibid*.
105 *Ibid*. 
106 *Ibid*. 

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firstly, thought is representative (TLP 4) and secondly, thought is a symbolic function according to certain rules. Since language is used according to rules, thought also cannot go beyond those rules to perform any functions. Thought is thus, not a mental fact but a propositional sign used according to certain rules. And the very essence or nature of thought is logical.\textsuperscript{106} So there can be no illogical thoughts.

Peter Carruthers, however later pointed out that the letter of Wittgenstein can be discounted because it was written with 'impatience'.\textsuperscript{107} Thus a psychologicist interpretation of the \textit{Tractatus}, according to Carruthers hardly holds. For the early Wittgenstein, thinking and speaking are essentially similar although they are logically quite independent activities.\textsuperscript{108} Thinking and speaking are at par consisting of structured arrangements of symbols\textsuperscript{109}.

H.O. Mounce,\textsuperscript{110}, points out that the propositions numbered from 3.1 to 3.13 in the \textit{Tractatus} are misleading. He says that many commentators are misled in assuming that in these remarks, Wittgenstein has put forward a view which he later criticized. Mounce points out that Wittgenstein did not only mean a proposition to be a set of marks, where we give sense to those marks by psychologically correlating names with objects. Wittgenstein means that only when the elements of a proposition have been correlated with the world, does a proposition have a sense. Prior to that the proposition has only the possibility of sense. The psychological process of correlating a name with an object, no doubt

\textsuperscript{106} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{108} \textit{Ibid.} p.11.
\textsuperscript{109} \textit{Ibid.} p.73.
exists; it is necessary if correlation is to occur since it is we who correlate the two. But if by correlation is meant the logical connection between name and meaning, then it is independent and different from the psychological activity. Therefore, Mounce thinks that the term 'correlation' is ambiguous. Thus the psychological process of correlating a name with an object is irrelevant to philosophy or logic. What gives sense to logical form is not a psychological process rather logical form gives sense to a psychological process. The correlation between a mark or a name with an object can be done only if the mark stands in a logical relation to other marks in a proposition. So while psychological activity is essential if a correlation is to occur between names and objects, the process does not generate the logical connection between the two. And the psychological activity involved in correlation between a mark and an object is entirely meaningless; it is the logical structure into which the mark enters that gives it its meaning.

James Griffin, on the other hand, points out that correlation of name and meaning are both psychological.\(^{111}\) He further points out that thinking is a psychical fact composed of psychical elements.\(^{112}\) Griffin points out that Wittgenstein does not know the constituents of thought and does not think it necessary to know also.\(^{113}\) Griffin interprets TLP 3.5 as meaning that there is a thought when there is a propositional sign in use. Thinking is nothing but arranging the components of a propositional sign in such a way that it expresses something. When a propositional sign is applied to some situation by actually arranging its elements to make an assertion, we have a thought out propositional sign.

\(^{112}\) Ibid. p.87.
\(^{113}\) Ibid. p.90.
Thus, a thought must be the elements as put together, i.e. not just a propositional sign but a propositional sign when it is the outcome of this act.\textsuperscript{114}

Griffin further points out that TLP 3.11 shows that a thought is the outcome of the projecting i.e., projection, since thinking signifies the manner of projecting the fact into the proposition. The projection is not merely a propositional sign with a sense. Thus Griffin defines thought as: ‘A thought, then is a propositional – sign – plus – its – sense’.\textsuperscript{115} From TLP 3.11, Griffin deduces two conclusions. Firstly, he says that there can be no unexpressed thoughts. If pictures, written words, spoken words etc. are expressions of thoughts then there can be no unexpressed thoughts because a thought is a propositional sign when it is the result of a projection i.e., when it has sense. Secondly, Griffin says that if a thought is a propositional – sign – plus – sense then the identity criterion of thought is a double one, the criteria of identity of both a sign and a sense. If ‘aRb’ is uttered on three different occasions where it has the same sense, then it expresses the same thought. But ‘aRb’ and ‘cSd’ uttered on two different occasions, (where ‘cSd’ means the same as ‘aRb’) are different thoughts. And ‘aRb’ uttered on one occasion and ‘aRb’ uttered on another occasion (where the second has a different sense), are also different thoughts. It is because of this that TLP 3.11 says that thinking is a method of projection. If thoughts are the results of thinking then thoughts will vary with the changes in the method of projection. Again thoughts which results out of the same kind of projection of the same fact are the same. Therefore, Griffin attempts to redefine a thought as picturing – fact – plus – sense because he argues as in the case of propositional sign, thinking is

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid, p.118.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid, p.119.
projecting, so also for pictures, thinking must be projecting. Griffin points out that it is a mistake to equate thoughts with psychical facts. A thought is a picturing fact – plus – sense and since a psychical fact is only one kind of picturing fact, it is only one kind of thought. Griffin points out that in the *Tractatus* there are two kinds of thoughts. The first kind of thoughts is expressed in pictures of all kinds; it is the primary sense of thought. The second kind of thoughts is the psychical facts. The former are always expressed in a picture of some kind, even in private pictures; they are the *Gedanken* of the *Tractatus*. The latter kind of thoughts is never even named in the *Tractatus* but Griffin thinks do enter Wittgenstein’s ideas of the thought or *Gedanke* as a whole.

Henry Le Roy Finch has pointed out that thoughts are discussed in the *Tractatus* in a two-fold manner. On the one hand, thoughts are considered as propositions with sense (*TLP* 4) and on the other hand they are considered as logical pictures of facts (*TLP* 3). Finch points out that the numbering of the two remarks is to be taken note of and also the fact that the word ‘thought’ is switched from the beginning at statement 3 to the end position at number 4. Finch has attempted to draw a parallel between the two aspects of thoughts mentioned at *TLP* 3 and *TLP* 4 and Aristotle’s distinction between the passive and active intellect. Thought as a logical picture is ‘passive’ while thought as a proposition with sense is ‘active’. Thoughts as logical pictures are like every other picture; they are something we make to ourselves. On the other hand thoughts as propositions with sense are expressions or projections referring to the world and making an assertion. For Finch, *TLP* 3.5 implies that when a

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116 Ibid. p.120.
118 Ibid. p.57.
thought relates itself to the world i.e., applied, it is a proposition. If a propositional sign is to have some application then its relation to the world must be thought out. But unlike a picture, a propositional sign does not have intrinsic referentiality. By thinking the sense of a proposition, the possible references of a propositional sign are available. A propositional sign can be projected into a possible situation and this projection means thinking out the sense of the proposition. Finch considers three remarks on propositions and draws a conclusion.119

1. A proposition includes all that the projection includes but not what is projected.

2. A proposition does not actually contain its sense but does contain the possibility of expressing it.

3. A proposition contains the form but not the content of its sense.

According to Finch, these statements show that a proposition does not contain the ‘experienced, qualitative content’120 of a thought but contains only the possibility of expressing it. For example, in the proposition ‘Socrates was the teacher of Plato’, the names may refer in my mind to two other men, not necessarily Socrates and Plato. In order to grasp the sense of the proposition it is not necessary to have a direct experience of the two philosophers, but it will be sufficient to have any two particular men in mind.

Thus from the Tractarian point, thoughts are of two kinds. Firstly, thoughts are logical pictures of facts (TLP 3) and contain possibilities of situations (TLP 3.02). Secondly, thoughts are propositions with sense (TLP

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119 Ibid, pp.58-59
120 Ibid. p.59.

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4) and propositions express thoughts in perceivable ways (TLP 3.1) and are projections of possible situations as forms of sense (TLP 3.11). Finch makes an important observation about the constituents of thought.\textsuperscript{121} He points out that according to Wittgenstein, elements of a propositional sign become simple signs when a proposition is completely analysed, and these elements correspond to the objects of thoughts. (TLP 3.2; 3.201). The objects of thought, belonging to a thought when expressed in a completely analyzed proposition, will be simple and may have as representatives names or simple signs: 'When a thought, in other words, is expressed in a proposition in such a way that elements of the propositional sign "correspond to" objects of thought, these elements become names.\textsuperscript{122}

According to Finch, the representation of the world by thought and language is based on two premises.\textsuperscript{123} Firstly, representation is possible by means of structural identities and secondly, these structures must be in the logical form of possibilities of existence and non-existence. Finch points out that seven kinds of representation or picturing are discussed in the \textit{Tractatus}. They are pictures, thoughts, propositions, completely analyzed propositions, elementary propositions, truth functional propositions, logical propositions. Regarding thoughts, he points out that thoughts stand for objects of thought and their constituents are unknown.\textsuperscript{124} Finch contrasts a proposition with a thought. A proposition is a logical picture of a situation (TLP 4.03). A thought, on the other hand, is a logical picture of facts (TLP 3). This use of the terms 'facts' and 'situation' is significant because a thought contains the possibility of the situation of which it is the thought (TLP 3.02). On the other hand a proposition contains the

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid, p.76-77.  
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid. p.76.  
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid, pp.199-201.  
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.
possibility of expressing its sense (*TLP 3.13*), the possibility of representing a possible situation. Thus Finch says that a proposition has to be applied or has to be thought whereas a thought already has this status. And Finch points out that *TLP 3* and *TLP 4* need to be interpreted in the context of an entry in the *Note books* (p.82e) where Wittgenstein speaks of thinking and language to be the same, thinking as a kind of language.\(^\text{125}\) Finch considers *TLP 4.114* where Wittgenstein writes about the limits of thought and also the comment in the preface which deals with the same subject. He points out that Wittgenstein holds philosophy fixes the limits of what can be thought on the one hand. On the other hand the aim of the *Tractatus* cannot be to fix the limits of thought, for that would be impossible but only to set a limit to the expressions of thought. The need to demarcate between ‘thought’ and ‘what can be thought’ arises. Thought or thinking cannot be limited but we can limit the thinkable. To limit thinking, Wittgenstein holds that we would have to be able to think the unthinkable or go beyond thought, which is impossible. What limits thought is the possibility of thought and not the other way round. Thought is limited by what is thinkable.\(^\text{126}\) Now the question of the relation between thought and the expression of thought arises. The former cannot be limited while the latter can be limited. To show this relationship Finch refers to *TLP 3.31* where it is said that a proposition does not contain its sense but only the possibility of expressing its sense. Finch points out that a proposition and the possibility of that proposition are one and the same. But this is not so with a thought and the possibility of that thought. This is because a proposition depends upon thinking (*TLP 3.11*) whereas a thought depends upon facts (*TLP 3*). The possibility of a proposition and a thought as a


proposition both rest in the process of being thought. But the possibility of thought as a logical picture rests on the world. So ‘thought’ and ‘thinkable’ do not coincide in the same way as the ‘expressible’ and ‘what is expressed’. Thought contains more than logic; thought has a ‘content’ not had by language; a thought can never be of anything illogical. But language contains no more than the possibility of expressing what is thought.127 Finch goes on to point out that there is a transition from TLP 3 to TLP 4. TLP 3 which defines thought as a logical picture of facts implies that thoughts have the same content which is in pictures. Whereas TLP 4 which says, that a thought is a proposition with a sense implies that thoughts are simply the possibility of expressing this sense. Finch proceeds to give an illustration. The thought of a red house contains the ‘content’ necessary to recognise a red house but the, proposition ‘The house is red’ contains only the possibility of expressing this thought. Without the content of the thought, from the proposition it would not be possible to recognise the red house. But the thought contains also the proposition which could be understood by a blind person.128 Thus Finch points out that though thought and language are structurally identical yet thought has something more. Thought has something which is not there in a proposition. And this is the reason why we cannot limit thought but can limit what can be thought. The content of the sense of a proposition cannot be limited. But the ‘structure of thought or the possibility of the expression of thought’ can be limited. Hence the aim of the Tractatus is to limit the expressions of thought by clarifying the limits that are in language.129

128 Ibid. p.225.
According to Kenny\textsuperscript{130}, at the time of writing the \textit{Tractatus}, Wittgenstein considered propositions as expressing thoughts. As evidence to this he refers to \textit{TLP} 3.2 where Wittgenstein writes that a thought can be expressed in a proposition in such a way that the elements of the propositional sign correspond to the objects of the thought. The nature of thought can be ascertained through a study of the nature of language because language expresses thoughts. Kenny, very rightly has pointed out that thoughts are only briefly portrayed in the picture theory of the \textit{Tractatus}. Thoughts are logical pictures of facts and because every picture is a logical picture, thoughts cannot represent anything illogical. Kenny points out that Wittgenstein quite justly holds that there are no thoughts which are true á-priori (\textit{TLP} 3.04 – 3.05) because the truth of a thought cannot be determined from the thought itself. The truth or falsity of a picture can be determined only by comparison with reality. Kenny is of the view that the concept of the Tractarian thought serves as a link between propositions and states of affairs.\textsuperscript{131} According to Wittgenstein, the propositional sign is a projection of a possible state of affairs and this projection is done by thinking out the sense of the proposition which translates the sign into a symbol. It is thought which makes the propositional sign a proposition. And thus Wittgenstein often speaks of a proposition as actually being a thought. \textit{TLP} 3.5 which states that a propositional sign applied and thought out is a thought and \textit{TLP} 4 which states that a thought is a proposition with a sense are evidence to this. Wittgenstein elsewhere in the \textit{Tractatus} holds a proposition to be an expression of a thought (\textit{TLP} 3.2). Kenny points out that in an ideal language there should be a one - to - one correspondence between the

\textsuperscript{131} \textit{Ibid.} p.59.
elements of the sentences and the elements of the thought, which in turn correspond to the elements of a possible state of affairs i.e., to objects. And this correspondence can only be shown by philosophical analysis because ordinary language disguises the form of thought underlying it.

Max Black defends two of Wittgenstein's thesis on thought. The first being that there cannot be any illogical thought and secondly that thoughts cannot be true á-priori. He points out that a thought is a projection of a possibility upon the world just as a picture on a lantern slide is projected onto a screen. And it is because of this that there cannot be any illogical thoughts and thoughts cannot be true á-priori. Black combines TLP 3 and TLP 4 to give the equation: 'logical picture = significant proposition = thought'. Max Black suggests two alternatives for the term 'thinkable'. Firstly, he identifies 'thinkable' with 'the speakable' (TLP 4.115) which is nothing but 'what can be said' (TLP 4.022). Secondly, he says that instead of 'thinkable' we could use the term 'describable' (TLP 6.362). For Wittgenstein, thought is the significant proposition and thus Black points out that a thought is not some ideal complex of objects but a concrete fact, composed of words, images or other things, to which a sense has been attached in virtue of syntactical and semantical rules. From TLP 3.1 and 3.12 Black deduces: it is necessary to a proposition that it can be expressed in signs, a non-expressible proposition being an Unding. Illogical thoughts are not possible because the notion itself is self-contradictory. Max Black has also

132 Ibid. p.60.
134 Ibid. pp.95-96.
135 Ibid. p.159.
136 Ibid. p.97.
137 Ibid. p.363.
138 Ibid. p.100.
pointed out that Wittgenstein did not conform to Frege’s use of the term ‘Gedanke’.

Henry Le Roy Finch points out that the world of the *Tractatus* has two aspects, one being the empirical aspect i.e., things – in – situations and the other being the formal aspect i.e., objects – in – states – of – affairs. It is only through the latter that we can experience, think and talk of the former. The nature of the world is such that we represent things – in – situations by means of objects – in – states – of – affairs and we can represent it only in this way, because the world demands such a representation. The world has just this character that it can only be represented in this manner. Wittgenstein holds that both representable sense experience i.e. pictures and thoughts i.e. logical pictures, represent things – in – situations in a structural manner. This representation can also be done in propositions by the use of names. Both pictures and propositions function according to the same principle of representing “possible occurrences of things” as “possible structures of objects”. There is a difference – a picture “presents” a situation in logical space to do this (*TLP* 2.11). On the other hand a proposition “presents” a state of affairs to do it (*TLP* 4.0311). Propositions (thoughts) and pictures (thoughts) represent situations both structurally as well as logically. The structural character is provided by objects, or substance. The second is provided by reality (*Wirklichkeit*). It is the bipolarity of existence and non-existence for these possible structures. We are able to represent because the world has substance or form and structure. But we are able to represent truly or falsely only because reality has logical form. Reality comprises states of

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140 Ibid. p.4.
affairs which exist and for every existing state of affairs, the exact equivalent non-existence of the same state of affairs.\textsuperscript{141}

PMS Hacker\textsuperscript{142} however, holds that both thought and propositions are internally related to the state of affairs that make them true. The thought that p becomes true by the existence of the state of affairs that p. This is how the thought reaches right up to reality. This is because what one thinks (to be true) implies that this is how things are. Similarly, what we falsely think is how things are not. Thus the relation between thought and reality is internal which the predecessors of Wittgenstein overlooked. This brings us to the puzzle of negation which is traced to Plato. If we think what is the case then how do we think what is not the case i.e. how can we think falsely, for in that case the state of affairs in question is non-existent. Yet we do think falsely.

Hans-Johann Glock in A Wittgenstein Dictionary\textsuperscript{143} points out that the sense of a molecular proposition is derived from the sense of its constituents, i.e., elementary propositions which in turn being composed of unanalysable names, and whose sense is therefore derived from the meaning of logically proper names. Grammar hides the logical form of the propositions as well as the constituents. The process of calculation assumes a process of analysis but both these processes unconsciously take place. We are not aware of them unless and until a complete logical analysis of the propositions are made. Thus Glock says that a ‘string of thoughts’ result from calculating the sense of a proposition and these thoughts accompany communication.

\textsuperscript{141}Ibid. pp.59-60.
Thoughts are psychic facts which consist of thought constituents that correspond to the names in the propositional sign. The relation of these constituents to the objects of the depicted situation 'would be a matter for psychology to find out'. More, generally, the study of 'thought - processes' is irrelevant to logic.144

The early Wittgenstein appears to use the Gedanke or 'thought' in two different senses. One is as a logical picture of facts, whose only pictorial form is its logical form. And secondly, thought is a sentence-in-use. It is a propositional sign which is projected onto reality. And this method of projection involves thinking out the sense of the proposition. Apart from these uses, Gedanke signifies something psychical, as the famous letter reveals, which has psychical constituents. Glock pointed out that a thought is a psychic fact which has an isomorphic relation with a depicted state of affairs as well as a propositional sign. The psychical elements combine to form a thought when it is projected by a propositional sign. Therefore thoughts are capable of being completely expressed in language.145

Glock has interpreted the inconsistency of the Tractarian thought as being merely terminological. A sentence expresses a thought by its projective relation to reality.146 I also agree with this, keeping in mind the fact that analysis has shown that Wittgenstein intended to define thought from the same perspective in the two cases. They are actually the same, i.e., propositional sign being projected onto reality. The Tractatus seems to imply that the correlation between signs and reality is something which is done by 'us'. Using a propositional sign by the method of projection

144 Ibid, p.373.
146 Ibid, p.315.
involves thinking the sense of the proposition. This thinking implies that it is 'we' who have to do it by thinking the situation depicted. But this thinking is not the same as thought. The former is a mental process but the latter is not. Glock rightly says a thought is a proposition in the language of thought (Thinking being a kind of language NB 12.9.1916)\(^{147}\). The language of thought or the process of thought is thinking which is mental but thought in the language of thought is a fact. Thus thoughts in themselves are representational. This character of representation is the most important feature of the Tractarian thought. Thoughts are not considered from any other point of view.

Jaakko Hintikka in an article entitled *On Wittgenstein's Solipsism*\(^{148}\) points out that Wittgenstein's notion of a thought is nothing private or psychological. It is rather something public being shared by different people, like Frege's thought or *Gedanke*.

Norman Malcolm\(^{149}\) is of the opinion that the 'psychical constituents' referred in the letter to Russell had already been assumed in the *Tractatus*\(^ {150}\). Malcolm interprets Wittgenstein's *Notebooks* entry that thinking and language are the same as implying "that a thought is a structure in a certain medium, and a word-proposition is a structure in a different medium, and that these two structures can have the same sense, i.e., they can be the same proposition".\(^ {151}\) Malcolm points out, Wittgenstein never said that thought or *Gedanke* is of two kinds: one composed of mental or psychical elements and the other of non-mental

\(^{147}\) Ibid, p.249.
\(^{150}\) Ibid. p.70.
\(^{151}\) Ibid. p.65.
elements. Yet according to the *TLP*, a thought can be expressed in physical signs.\(^{152}\) So all thoughts are composed of mental elements and need not necessarily have to be expressed in perceptible sentences. The configuration of mental elements in a thought depicts the sense of the thought, which is a possible state of affairs. “If a thought is expressed in a physical sentence, what happens is that the sense of the thought is *thought into* the sentence.” The thought already has a sense and that same sense is given to the physical sentence. Therefore, there are two structures, one being comprised of mental elements and the other of physical signs, i.e., words. These two structures have the same sense and hence are one and the same proposition. Malcolm does not interpret *TLP* 3.5 as saying that a thought has to be necessarily expressed in a physical sentence. But rather he interprets it as implying that a sentence becomes a thought when it is imparted with a sense. Therefore, Malcolm points out, the Tractarian *Gedanke* (thought) is more basic than *Sätze* (word-propositions).\(^{153}\)

Malcolm also interprets Wittgenstein’s *NB* entry that a thought is a kind of proposition\(^ {154}\) as hinting that a thought is a configuration of mental elements. This *NB* entry and *TLP* 4 that a thought is a proposition with a sense may be together interpreted as saying that there are two kinds of propositions, says Malcolm. They are: thoughts, which are composed of mental elements and physical sentences that have been given sense and both are pictures of possible situations and hence may be called ‘propositions’.\(^ {155}\)

\(^{152}\) *TLP* 3.1; 3.11; 3.12; 3.14.
\(^{154}\) *NB* p.82.
Norman Malcolm is therefore endorsing a psychological interpretation of the early Gedanke or thought. He gives a detailed version of his case.\textsuperscript{156} Firstly, he says thoughts are composed of mental elements. He gives his deduction as follows. Thoughts are facts since thoughts are pictures (\textit{TLP} 3) and a picture is a fact (\textit{TLP} 2.141). Now all facts are composed of ultimate simple objects (\textit{TLP} 2.0272). So must be the case with thoughts also. Hence thoughts are composed of psychical constituents. Secondly, the intrinsic nature of thought shows that it is a picture of a possible situation, where the pictured situation is its sense (\textit{TLP} 2.202; 2.221; 3). Thirdly, the sense of a thought must be imparted to the physical sentence for making the physical sentence a picture (it is not intrinsically a picture). Fourthly Malcolm links this with \textit{TLP} 3.2 and 3.201 and says in \textit{TLP} 3.2 Wittgenstein is referring to a completely analysed proposition. Malcolm also points out that the phrase ‘objects of thought’ is confusing. It is not clear whether it refers to the objects of which thought is composed or the objects composing the situation which the thought is about. Malcolm is of the opinion that Kenny’s view ‘objects of thought’ as referring to the psychic elements constituting thought and corresponding to the elements of fully analysed proposition complies with the letter. But Malcolm opines “It is doubtful, however, that in 3.2 the phrase ‘the objects of the thought’ refers to the objects of which the thought is composed. It is more likely that it refers to the objects that compose the situation of which the thought is a picture”.\textsuperscript{157} For in the statements immediately following 3.2 Wittgenstein speaks of ‘the objects’, and clearly means the objects composing the situation which the thought is about. For example, in 3.21 Wittgenstein says: ‘The configuration of objects in a situation corresponds

\textsuperscript{156} \textit{Ibid.} pp.67-69.
\textsuperscript{157} \textit{Ibid.} p.68.
to the configuration of simple signs in the propositional sign'. Further Malcolm points out that the simple signs of language, i.e., a name corresponds in two different directions, i.e., to a thought-element and to a reality-element. But the depiction between thought-elements and reality-elements goes in one direction only i.e., only from the thought-configuration to the reality configuration and not the other way round. It is necessary for depiction that there must be two configurations. But a name, on the Tractarian picture, says Malcolm, must correspond both to a thought element, i.e., a psychical constituent as well as to a reality - element, i.e., a simple object. Malcolm admits it is difficult to say whether the relation of correspondence is the same in both the cases. He points out that the TLP only says that the meaning of a name is the objects it corresponds to. It does not suggest anything saying that a name also means the thought-element it corresponds to. And Malcolm wants to leave it as vague as Wittgenstein did, except that a name, 'corresponds to' or 'is correlated with' a thought-element. Malcolm argues, as a consequence of the previous steps, we may say that a thought hence becomes perceptible to the senses. An unexpressed thought is a configuration of mental elements, picturing a possible situation in the world. But if the thought-elements are correlated with language-elements, i.e., name, and put in the same configuration as the thought-elements, we have a linguistic configuration, i.e., a spoken or a written sentence. Hence a thought becomes perceptible to the senses.

Malcolm, I think is correct in pointing out that Wittgenstein does not elaborate on the psychological aspect of thought much because that is

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158 Ibid.
159 Ibid, pp.67-69.
160 Ibid. p.69.
not an important part of philosophical study. Philosophy should not be involved with unimportant and unnecessary psychological investigations which lie in the realm of psychology.\textsuperscript{161} Thus Malcolm says that although Wittgenstein was sure of a thought being composed of mental elements, yet he did not know anything about the nature of those thought-elements. Wittgenstein did not consider any inquiry about their nature pertinent because that was to be undertaken by psychology.\textsuperscript{162}

Malcolm points out the picture theory of propositions entails three different configurations with the same structure. Firstly, there is the thought, secondly, there is the word proposition and thirdly, there is the fact in the world. The former two structures are pictures of the third structure. Hence the important question that arises is how are the elements of the three structures related? It is clear that there must be correlations between the elements of all the three structures, where the three structures possess three different kinds of elements. Malcolm's point is that the correlation between the thought-element and proposition-element is completely different from that between thought-element and reality-element. Now for a configuration of thought-elements 'to be \textit{intrinsically} a picture' of a configuration of reality-elements (i.e., objects), a mental-element must 'intrinsically mean' an object, argues Malcolm. The correlation is not made but rather the former means the latter by its inherent nature. And Malcolm points out, a thought underlies a proposition (which is composed of names). The thought is composed of thought-elements each of which mean an object, not by convention but due to its intrinsic nature. But the correlation between thought-element and name is by stipulation or convention. Hence a name means an object.

\textsuperscript{161} \textit{Ibid.} p.70.
\textsuperscript{162} \textit{Ibid.} p.81.
because a thought-element already means an object (the meaning is not conferred by anyone) and a name is correlated with a thought-element. This account of supposing thoughts comprised of psychical elements as underlying word-propositions, Malcolm prefers to call as the 'hidden' philosophy of mind and language of the TLP. Therefore, the Tractatus shows that a name does not directly mean an object. Rather the relation goes through an intermediary 'mental' stage, i.e., a 'psychical constituent' of a thought which in turn refers to the object directly. And hence can be called the 'idea' of the object. Malcolm concludes:

... If a thought is a structure of mental elements, each element having an inherent meaning, then an arrangement of thought elements will intrinsically depict one and only one situation in the world. A thought is not open to different interpretations. When it is projected into a physical sentence it is the meaning of the sentence. It is in the thought that our understanding finds a firm footing. The thought is something that not only does not require interpretation but cannot be interpreted. It is where interpretation ends.

Anthony Kenny in his article Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy of Mind argues the thought or Gedanke of the TLP 3's and 4's is the same as that mentioned in TLP 5.541. Kenny takes note of the fact that Wittgenstein's answer to Russell's query of thought or Gedanke as consisting of psychical elements is immediately preceded by an explanation of the meaning of Sachverhalt (atomic fact) and Tatsache (fact) which does not really go with the Tractatus. Kenny points out the thought.

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163 Ibid, pp.75-76.
164 Ibid, p.79.
165 Ibid, pp.81-82.
or *Gedanke* of the 3’s is to be interpreted as a psychological fact with a relation between psychic elements, in accordance with the description provided in the letter. Kenny argues: since thought is a picture and we make pictures, so it is we who do the thinking (*TLP* 3.2; 3.03). Thoughts are not perceptible unless expressed in propositional signs (*TLP* 3.2).\(^{167}\)

Kenny further says *TLP* 3 may be taken to imply that every picture is a thought or that the thought is a picture whose pictorial form is *only* logical form. The former alternative is ruled out because *TLP* 4 nearly identifies thought with proposition and ‘whereas all propositions are pictures, there is no reason to think that the *Tractatus* regards all pictures as propositions’. *TLP* 3.1; 4 describe the relation between thought and proposition while 3.12; 3.11; 3.14 discuss features of the propositional sign or *Satzzeichnen*. Kenny writes:

> Just as a propositional sign can only be a proposition if projected by a thought on to the world, so a relationship holding between psychic elements can only be a thought if it is a projection, an application, of a propositional sign (3.5).\(^{168}\)

Kenny provides an analogy for the above case: ‘Just as a man can only be a husband if married to a wife, so a woman can only be a wife married to a man.’\(^{169}\) He says the proposition is the propositional sign together with the thought. That which provides sense to the proposition is the thought. So we may say, Kenny points out: ‘thought *is* the sense-full proposition’. Further Kenny points out the *Tractatus* speak of ‘the objects of the thought’ ambiguously since it is not clear whether it means the objects which constitute the thought or the objects which thought is about. The latter

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\(^{168}\) *Ibid.* p.3.

\(^{169}\) *Ibid.*
alternative may be ruled out after consulting the corresponding passage in
the PT, says Kenny. The passage has been altered between the PT and TLP
such that “which clearly meant the latter has been altered into one which
more naturally means the former.” ‘The objects of the thought’ must mean
the psychic elements related to each other constituting the thought. A fully
analysed proposition is one where the elements of the propositional sign
correspond to the elements of the thought. An unanalysed proposition
belonging to ordinary language disguises the thought and hence cannot
bear this relation. Ordinary language can be understood or the thought
underneath language can be grasped ‘only because of enormously
complicated tacit conventions (4.002).’ Kenny points out ‘“p” says that
p’ (TLP 5.542) is a pseudo-proposition which is devoid of the true-false
bipolarity. It only attempts to say what can be shown. Moreover
apparently 5.54’s appear to be devoid of any psychical elements. The 3’s
seem to imply that the projection lines between the world and the
propositional sign lie in the field of psychology. A distinction implied in
the 5.54’s needs to be applied to the 3’s: ‘In the thought itself, perhaps, we
can distinguish between the particular mental configuration, studiable by
psychology, and the significance or intentionality of that configuration,
conferred by the metaphysical self.’

In respect of the elucidations made by various commentators, I wish
to make note of the following points. The point made by Carruthers that
Wittgenstein in replying to Russell’s queries was using Gedanke or
thoughts as thoughts-in-the-mind is something I fail to agree with. It is
highly unacceptable that Russell’s queries were not related to the
Tractatus. Wittgenstein clearly says in his reply that the constituents of

\(^{170}\) Ibid. p.5.
\(^{171}\) Ibid, pp.8-9.
Gedanke (thought) have the same sort of relation to reality as words. Here Wittgenstein is speaking of language and the world of facts, the cardinal point of the TLP. So how can it be that in respect of thought or Gedanke Wittgenstein is not referring to the TLP? Carruthers says sentences with words as constituents and thoughts in the mind are at par i.e. both represent reality. This is acceptable but he is forgetting to note the relation between sentences and Gedanke or thought which are not two unrelated and unconnected concepts. He is also right in saying that TLP 3 and TLP 4 do not support the psychological interpretation. But that is only apparently. Since the method of projection in 3.11 and 3.5 hint tacitly of an underlying psychologism. Carruthers does say that 3.11 and 3.5 are favourable to the psychological interpretation and the Tractarian Gedanke or thought is to be interpreted as arrangements of signs representing the world of facts. Ms. Anscombe, I feel rightly points out that the representation is something we do by using perceptible signs as a projection of a possible state of affairs. S.N. Ganguly is against the psychological interpretation and emphasizes the logical character of thought. I am of the opinion that the Tractarian thought or Gedanke is no doubt a logical representation in keeping with the basic spirit of the book as an enquiry into philosophical logic. Yet the psychological undercurrent can hardly be ignored. Wittgenstein perhaps chose not to elaborate on the psychic character because of the dissociation of philosophical logic from psychology. But at the same time he could not totally ignore the prevalent notion of thought as being constituted of mental elements and his introduction of the method of projection whose application also called for an explanation. But he is not categorically certain of the nature of that application and deems it necessary only for psychological studies. Mounce has also pointed out that the psychological process of correlating a name
with an object is done by us. This may be regarded as the applicatory part of the method of projection. Correlation implies that a name directly signifies an object; but it also consists of a mental activity which should not be the concern of philosophy – only the logical relation is relevant to philosophy. I have reasons to disagree with James Griffin who is of the view that in the *TLP* thoughts are of two kinds, pictures and psychical facts. I feel that there is essentially one Tractarian *Gedanke* or thought which is shown from two perspectives, once in relation to language and once in relation to the world. They are all structurally the same though not identical and both thought and or proposition are shown to depict the world. This depiction is by means of a method of projection. And herein lies the psychical part. The projection is something we do. This is the application use. But ‘method of projection’ by its very nature also implies a one-to-one correspondence between constituents. Wittgenstein chooses to emphasize on the latter use of the term. It is this twofold manner in which the term ‘method of projection’ may be used that renders the ambiguity in the Tractarian thought or *Gedanke*. Hence while giving an elucidation to Russell’s queries Wittgenstein chooses not to overlook the other use of the term and replied that the kind of relation of the thought constituents and of the world is for psychologists to find out. Moreover if this interpretation is accepted the inconsistency in Wittgenstein’s assertions can also be resolved.

**SECTION-2: THINKING SELF IN THE TRACTATUS**

The I, self or the subject has been present in Wittgenstein’s writings right from his early days. In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein writes that there is
no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas.172 This clearly testifies his anti-Cartesian position. The concept of soul or self as presented in the early period is like the concept of thought very brief and cryptic. Wittgenstein speaks of a variety of subjects: the soul or subject of psychology which does not exist;173 this is the thinking subject or the subject that entertains ideas;174 the subject which does not belong to the world but is only a limit of it,175 i.e., the metaphysical subject which is not found in the world;176 this is the self or subject of solipsism which shrinks to a point;177 it may be said to be a non-psychological self which exists in philosophy.178 Wittgenstein identifies the philosophical self with the metaphysical subject.179 But the willing subject which is the subject of ethical attributes180 and exists only for psychological interests is independent of the world.181 Apart from this, Wittgenstein has frequently used the expression ‘my world’, which is suggestive of solipsism. The Tractatus being very much explicit about the non-existence of the thinking self, the most obvious question that arises is how the phenomena of thinking can be explained without a thinking self. Wittgenstein’s denial of the thinking subject182 seems to be inconsistent in view of the fact that when he has already discussed the notion of thought, albeit briefly, the subject of thought or the thinker cannot be done away with. This view of Wittgenstein certainly goes against the common man’s perception of the notion of ‘thought’. Ordinarily from the psychological or philosophical

172 TLP 5631
173 Ibid. 5.5421
174 Ibid. 5.631
175 Ibid. 5.632
176 Ibid. 5.633
177 Ibid. 5.64
178 Ibid. 5.641
179 Ibid.
180 Ibid. 6.423
181 Ibid. 6.373
182 Ibid. 5.5421
perspective there must be a subject who thinks in whose mind thought subsists. So thought necessarily implies a thinker, as admitted centuries ago by Descartes in his *cogito*. Quite unlike Descartes, Wittgenstein admits thinking though he does not admit the thinker. This section will be dwelling on the concept of the subject which thinks or represents as presented in the early philosophy of Wittgenstein.

Wittgenstein, very explicitly points out that the thinking subject is nothing but a mere illusion\(^{183}\) and asks whether it is not a mere superstition\(^{184}\). And in the same breath he explicitly affirms the existence of the willing subject\(^{185}\). These remarks undoubtedly point to the fact that he is distinguishing between the thinking subject and the willing subject. Yet at the heart of his work lies his isomorphic theory between thought, language and reality. Although the concept of thought has been dealt with, the thinking subject has been denied. Apparently this is a self contradictory position but how much of this charge can be justified against the philosopher needs to be elucidated.

There is irrefutable evidence to show that it is 'we' who do the thinking. Of course he never uses the term in that sense directly but the reference is implicit. On 29.9.1914, Wittgenstein writes that it is certain that we can portray all logical properties of situations in a two-dimensional script although we are not certain that we will be able to turn all situations into pictures on paper\(^{186}\). This remark goes to suggest that it is *we* (the thinking mind) which is portraying all pictures, from language to reality or vice versa. Without the activity of the mind this kind of portrayal

\(^{183}\) *NB* p.80e  
\(^{184}\) *Ibid.*  
\(^{185}\) *Ibid.*  
would never be possible. On 24.10.1914, he writes that we can make a statement only if we know how things stand if the statement is true.\textsuperscript{187} The terms 'we know' suggests that 'we' are thinking. The author uses the expression 'we know' in other instances also. He says we must know in advance how a statement will appear, whether a proposition is true or false.\textsuperscript{188} Who is this knower? Is it not the thinking I? Is it not the inner mind? On 1.11.1914 Wittgenstein states that the meaning of 'A situation is thinkable' is that we can make ourselves a picture of it.\textsuperscript{189} This remark definitely suggests that it is 'we' who do the picturing. The word 'thinkable' points to a subject. Again on 27.10.1914, Wittgenstein writes that the proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it.\textsuperscript{190} Definitely imagination is a kind of thought and 'we imagine it' means that there is a thinking mind where imagination takes place. Still further, on 30.10.1914, Wittgenstein writes that in a picture we could represent a negative fact by representing what is not the case.\textsuperscript{191} This remark says that it is we who represent facts. This 'we' is definitely the thinking – representing subject.

The most important fact about these remarks is that Wittgenstein is never for once using the term 'thinking subject'. Although he uses terms like 'we imagine', 'we represent', 'we know' which nevertheless point to a thinking mind or subject. There are other entries also on similar lines. On 1.1.1914, Wittgenstein writes that the method of portrayal must be completely determinate before we can compare reality with the proposition at all. And it is I who make this comparison provided the

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\textsuperscript{187} Ibid. p.18e.
\textsuperscript{188} Ibid. p.23e.
\textsuperscript{189} Ibid. p.24e.
\textsuperscript{190} Ibid. p.20e.
\textsuperscript{191} Ibid. p.21e.
method of comparison is given to me.\textsuperscript{192} Comparison is definitely a mental activity involving the thinking mind. Later he writes that we can deny that a picture is right but not the picture. And a picture represents a situation by our correlating the components of the picture with objects.\textsuperscript{193} Therefore, comparison and correlating is something we do, rather our mind does. So the existence of this thinking mind can never be denied. All these remarks are suggestive of the fact that there is a thinking mind operating behind the mental operations of imagining, representing, picturing, comparing, correlating and knowing. Otherwise these processes themselves would become self-defeating.

Wittgenstein also speaks of ways of representing. He says picture and way of representing are outside what is represented.\textsuperscript{194} He further says that the way of representing determines how the reality has to be compared with the picture.\textsuperscript{195} 'Way of representing' obviously refers to the manner of representing but who does it and where is it done? Thus we are confronted with an incomprehensible situation – the explicit denial of the thinking self, the thinker as well as evidence pointing to a thinker.

One must not forget that Wittgenstein's concept of soul or his theory of solipsism was particularly influenced by Schopenhauer's view of 'the world as idea' which he read when he was only sixteen years of age. He remarks in the \textit{Notebooks} that the 'I' is deeply mysterious.\textsuperscript{196} It is generally supposed that consciousness always refers to an 'I'. But an epistemological inquiry will only prove the contents of consciousness rather than the subject like perceptions, pains etc. as already endorsed by

\textsuperscript{192} \textit{Ibid.} p.23e.
\textsuperscript{193} \textit{Ibid.} p.33e.
\textsuperscript{194} \textit{Ibid.} p.21e.
\textsuperscript{195} \textit{Ibid.} p.22e.
\textsuperscript{196} \textit{Ibid.} p.80e.
Hume earlier. The ‘I’ cannot be found as a mind or a soul or a subject of consciousness. Only the contents of consciousness can be found. The ‘I’ for Wittgenstein is like the eye in the visual field.\textsuperscript{197} Wittgenstein’s ‘I’ is an ‘I’ with a difference. This ‘I’ lies outside the world and not within it. On 7.8.1916, Wittgenstein writes that the ‘I’ is not an object\textsuperscript{198} and continues on 11.8.1916 that I objectively confront every object but not the ‘I’.\textsuperscript{199} In the same entry he also writes that there must be an I in the non-psychological sense in philosophy.

The \textit{Tractatus}, and hence the \textit{Prototractatus} also, is deeply ingrained with anti-Cartesianism. One of the most oft quoted passages which is also one of the most obscure, bears testimony to this.\textsuperscript{200} Here Wittgenstein considers two forms of proposition in psychology, ‘A believes that p’ and ‘A has the thought p’ where ‘A’ is taken to be a subject and ‘p’ for a proposition entertained or believed by A. Wittgenstein seems to analyse this situation as meaning that the psychological self, i.e. the thinking, believing, representing self is united as a fact. Both A and p are facts. Instead of A being a subject who has a particular thought, it is a relation, an objective relation between two facts. To describe this relation there is no need for a subject. A, therefore cannot be a subject but is only a fact like the fact of believing, the fact of thinking, of saying, etc.

It is generally believed that Wittgenstein’s view at \textit{TLP} 5.541 is made against an incomplete book on the theory of knowledge which Russell was writing, while Wittgenstein was at Cambridge.\textsuperscript{201} Russell’s

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[Ibid.] p.72e.
\item[Ibid.] p.80e.
\item[Ibid.]
\item[Ibid.]
\item[	extit{TLP} 5.54-5.5421]
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
argument was for a Cartesian self, which was real, capable of thought and perception and at the same time logically simple. According to Russell, it was a thinking subject who holds the elements of a proposition together in its thinking. Therefore, a proposition "p" was of the form "A judges/thinks that p". On the other hand for Wittgenstein, a sentence of the form "'p' says p" expresses a relation between a fact and a situation. He seems to say thinking and believing are or involve representative relations. For A to believe that p or to say p, A must be able to represent the content of the proposition "p" to itself. Thus A or something in A must have the same logical multiplicity as p and is a fact. Therefore the idea of a Cartesian self can be done away with. So the 'I' of Descartes' dictum does not exist for the early Wittgenstein. But it does not non-exist altogether. It may be said that the "Tractarian 'I' though it is not a something, it is also not a nothing either".

For Wittgenstein, the subject as representing is an impossibility. He writes that a composite soul would no longer be a soul and says that there is no such thing as the soul. So the commonly held concept of a simple self, the thinking, believing, representing subject, which philosophers from Descartes to Russell have endorsed, is an absurdity for Wittgenstein. The soul, for the author, as the subject of psychology is no more related to philosophy than any other natural science. The self, not being an object cannot be found in the world; it is not a constituent of the world either. Therefore the early Wittgenstenian self is not a Cartesian Cogito. Nor can it be specified in the objective world.

202 PT 6.0041; TLP 5.5421
203 PT 4.100153; TLP 4.1121
204 NB, p.50e; PT 5.33541; TLP 5.631

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Although, Wittgenstein denies the thinking subject, he speaks of a certain 'T' which exists in a non-psychological sense in philosophy. And he goes on to say that the 'T' makes its appearance in philosophy through the world being my world. The expression 'the world being my world' is suggestive of solipsism. Quite contrary to the general view of solipsism that I and my world alone exist, Wittgenstein says that 'the world' and 'my world' coincide. Solipsism, for Wittgenstein coincides with pure realism and the 'T' of solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point. In the same entry he writes that the philosophical 'T' is not the human being, the human body or the human soul. Rather it is the metaphysical subject who is not a part of the world but its boundary. But the human body is a part of the world.

These remarks testify that he is bringing forth the idea of solipsism where both 'the world' and 'my world' exist, depending on the perspective you look at it. 'The world' becomes 'my world' when I look at it like the eye in the visual field. This 'T' of solipsism is the metaphysical subject which is not to be found in the world, or can even be a part of it. It is the boundary of the world and looking at the world from this boundary 'the world' becomes 'my world'. In the Notebooks, on 23.5.1915, Wittgenstein writes that the limits of my language stand for the limits of my world. He continues that there really is only one world soul, which I for preference call my soul and this remark provides the key to solipsism. He continues on 23.5.1915 to write that the book entitled “The World, I Found”, would include my body but not the subject i.e. not the

\[205 \text{NB. p.80e.} \]
\[206 \text{Ibid.} \]
\[207 \text{Ibid. p.82e.} \]
\[208 \text{Ibid. p.49e.} \]
’I’, for it could not come into the book. This remark makes it explicit that the ‘I’ can never be found in the world nor can it be a part of the world. It must be outside the world surveying it like the eye in the visual field.

Moving over to the Prototractatus and the Tractatus, we find the same note. Wittgenstein points out that the limits of my language mean the limits of my world. And goes on to say that this remark is the key to the truth of solipsism. And solipsism cannot be spoken about but can only be manifest. It is true that solipsism speaks of ‘the world’ as ‘my world’, which is the only world. But Wittgenstein is speaking of ‘my language’ through which the concept of my world comes in. My language is the language I use to describe my world. Without thought or language the world cannot be described or represented and therefore the limits of one mean the limits of the other. When I use the language that I understand to represent the world, the world becomes my world. Although, we must remember, that it is the only world. But is language the only language? Wittgenstein does not seem to provide a direct answer to this. But we can infer that if the world is the only world, being both my world and the world, language used to represent it is also the only language that I understand. It is the language that I use to represent, that I understand. So ‘my world’ and ‘the world’ both are identical and there is one language, ‘the’ language, that ‘I’ use, to make it ‘my’ language. ‘My language’ is obviously the language, that I understand or use. ‘The world’ which is described and represented by my language is limited in my language. And therefore becomes ‘my world’. And so solipsism cannot

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209 Ibid. p.50e.
210 PT 5.335; TLP 5.6
211 PT 5.3351; TLP 5.62
212 PT 5.3352; TLP 5.62
213 NB p.52e.
be spoken about but can only be shown.\textsuperscript{214} At TLP 5.63, Wittgenstein says that I am my world. We must remember that ‘my’ world is also ‘the’ world and in both those worlds, which are actually the same, I am the centre. Yet I cannot be found in the world.

Wittgenstein has something to say about the will. He calls the will the bearer of good and evil.\textsuperscript{215} And goes on to point out that good and evil enter the world only through the subject.\textsuperscript{216} On 5.8.1916, he points out that if there was no will then there would not be the centre of the world called ‘I’, and this ‘I’ is good and evil and not the world. He also points out that it is impossible to speak of the will as the subject of ethical attributes.\textsuperscript{217}

Wittgenstein has pointed out that the self comes into philosophy through the world being my world.\textsuperscript{218} Or in other words the self arises in the context of solipsism. And this self is the metaphysical subject which does exist but only as a limit of the world. This metaphysical subject is not to be found in the world. Just like the eye in the visual field, it lies outside the world.\textsuperscript{219} This metaphysical subject is the philosophical self. It is not a part of the world but only its limit.\textsuperscript{220} This metaphysical subject is the non-psychological self of philosophy and enters philosophy through solipsism.\textsuperscript{221} The self of solipsism is the metaphysical subject which ultimately shrinks to a point.\textsuperscript{222} And all that we see is the world, never this metaphysical subject or the ‘I’. It is like a perspectival point viewing the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{214} PT 5.3351; 5.3352; 5.3353; TLP 5.62.
\item \textsuperscript{215} NB p.76e.
\item \textsuperscript{216} Ibid. p.79e.
\item \textsuperscript{217} TLP 6.423.
\item \textsuperscript{218} PT 5.3351; TLP 5.641
\item \textsuperscript{219} PT 5.33542; 5.33543; TLP 5.632; 5.633
\item \textsuperscript{220} PT 5.33552; TLP 5.641;
\item \textsuperscript{221} PT 5.3355; TLP 5.64;
\item \textsuperscript{222} PT 5.3355; TLP 5.64
\end{itemize}
world. Therefore the world and I become coextensive. I am my world and solipsism coincides with pure realism.

A. RELATION BETWEEN GEDANKE AND SELF

Analysis shows that although apparently, there is a self-contradiction in denying the thinking subject, it disappears. The early Wittgenstenian thought or Gedanke is a non-psychological representation of the same and so the question of the thinking subject does not enter. An objective presentation of the world is the world of thought, language and facts and does not require a subject. So what Wittgenstein has said about the self or subject is in conformity with his theory of the Gedanke and does not seem to involve the author in any self-contradiction. Referring to the Notebooks, it may be pointed out that Wittgenstein poses the question without answering clearly whether thought is a kind of experience and goes on to say that experience is world without the need of a subject. Assuming the answer is affirmative, we can say thought is world and does not need a subject. Thus thought or Gedanke, construed as a totality of facts or propositions does not involve a subject. This is the 'no-agent view' of thinking. It may be pointed out that for the early Wittgenstein, the connection between knowledge and what is known is that of logical necessity. So all that is important is the logical representation.

We see that for Wittgenstein the idea of a simple self is an absurd one. A complex subject is also not possible because a composite soul would not be a soul at all. But the fact remains that he has offered no

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223 PT 5.33532; TLP 5.63.
224 PT 5.3355; TLP 5.64
225 NB p.89e.
226 PT 5.0444; 5.04441; TLP 5.1362.
227 PT 6.004 TLP 5.5421
proof as to why the soul cannot be composite. Wittgenstein’s position is thus anti-Cartesian. Still further Wittgenstein’s position has also been called anti-objectivism. In the Notebooks, he writes that the ‘I’ is not an object.228 So the I cannot be conceived of as an object in the world, as a material thing. Yet though Wittgenstein denies the subject or self, in conforming to his theory of thought or Gedanke, he does not deny the phenomenon of subjectivity, for the ‘I’ exists in philosophy, through the world being my world.229 Therefore though the self does not exist as a part of the world, yet the world is given to a subjectivity. But the peculiar position of this subjectivity is that it lies outside the world. And this subjectivity which is the metaphysical subject may be said to be the “non-objective” condition of the objective world. The world is given to it. But the important point to note is that Wittgenstein has failed to show the relationship of this subjectivity to our personal selves that we encounter every day. This is the chief drawback in the early Wittgenstenian theory of the concept of subject.

It would not be correct to suppose that Wittgenstein is a solipsist; he is not endorsing solipsism. But rather trying to show the place of the subject in the world of objects. And this cannot be said but can only be shown, in the language of Wittgenstein. He finds it so difficult to show the subject because he is out and out concerned only with phenomena. It is absolutely futile to look for the owner of experiences, as pointed out by David Hume years ago. But a point to note is that the Tractatus does not inquire into the relationship between the subject and his sensations and experiences. The subject is dealt as a total concept in relation to another total concept, the world. The world is given to the subject. It is not his

228 NB p.80e.
229 NB p.80e; PT 5.33551; 5.33552; TLP 5.641
creation. Yet the world itself is without the subject. The subject, by its very nature must lie outside the complex network of objects in the world. The world is the totality of facts, and facts are nothing but objects in a certain relation. These objects are distinct and independent from any kind of subjectivity. So the Tractarian world does not require a representing subject because all representation is between language and the world.

B. VIEWS OF DIFFERENT COMMENTATORS

It has been rightly pointed out by many commentators that Wittgenstein’s remarks on solipsism in the Tractatus constitute one of the most difficult sections of the book. And the still more difficult aspect of the topic under discussion is that there is hardly any agreement among the commentators as to its meaning and interpretation. It would be necessary to dwell on some of these in order to ascertain the true meaning behind these enigmatic remarks.

Henry Le Roy Finch230 has pointed out that Wittgenstein’s solipsism has three main features. Firstly, it denies the general concept of the self as a thinking and representing subject. Secondly, it emphasizes the concept of ‘the world’ and not ‘my world’. In contrast to general solipsism that there is only my world, it holds that ‘the world’ is ‘my world’. Thirdly, it holds that the I does exist but only as the ‘metaphysical limit’ of ‘the world’ and is identical with ‘my world’. Finch, further points out that the thinking subject is not required at all for thoughts mirror the world and this thinking subject has nothing to do. Since the relation between knowledge and what is known is that of logical necessity (TLP 5.1362), the thinking representing subject is not required. Finch proceeds to elucidate

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between 'the world' and 'my world'. And Wittgenstein goes or to show, according to Finch, that these are not two worlds but only one by the fact that 'the world' is 'my world'. And it is here that the I comes in. This I is not the Cartesian Cogito, the thinker, doubter or dreamer but only a perspectival point who establishes 'the world' as 'my world'.

According to Finch, Wittgenstein denies the thinking representing subject because the connection between knowledge and what is known is that of logical necessity (TLP 5.1362). There is no requirement for a subject to make this connection.231 Finch makes an important observation. He points out that there is a transition in the use of words from TLP 5.6 to TLP 5.62. In the use of the expressions 'my language' to 'logic' and to 'the language', there is a transition. Finch also points out that the Tractatus has not mentioned whether the metaphysical subject is singular or plural. Although the Notebooks speak of one universal I.232 Finch also points out that the Tractatus does not say anything about the world as the expression and experience of the subject. I is nothing but my world as what I experience. My qualitative experience is what I am. Or in other words I am nothing but all my experience. And the "experience need not be accounted for all experience is world and does not need a subject". The content of the world, which is experienced as my world belongs to the 'I'. But this first person experience is sayable as 'the world' only. Therefore, I am individuated by my world and not the other way round. I am my world because the subject cannot be separated from experienced content, i.e., from the world or my world. Finch goes on to interpret TLP 5.542 as saying that the psychological self which thinks, represents, believes are bound together in psychological states which are factual like anything else.

231 Ibid.
232 Ibid.
and the description of which requires no subject. So A is neither a subject, nor an object in ‘A believes p’ but only a fact.\textsuperscript{233}

Sachindranath Ganguly calls Wittgenstein’s solipsism ‘linguistic solipsism’ which is a consequence of the distinction between saying and showing. He interprets Wittgenstein as meaning that it is futile to search for a subject independently of the world. In any attempt to find the subject, all I find is the world and this cannot be said but only shown. Ganguly points out that according to Wittgenstein there is only one world for us to understand and that language (the language that I use) is also the only language.\textsuperscript{234}

Erik Stenius points out that the metaphysical subject is to be distinguished from the empirical ego. ‘The world as I found it’, refers to an empirical ego and not the metaphysical ego. But ‘the world is my world’ refers to the metaphysical ego. This statement according to Stenius is untrue because we cannot speak of the metaphysical ego.\textsuperscript{235}

Max Black points out that for Wittgenstein, the metaphysical subject cannot be identified with my body, my experience or any part of it. Black points out that Descartes’ I of the \textit{Cogito} is itself not a thought. Similarly, that which experiences is not itself an experience and cannot be a part of the world. The metaphysical subject is to be found in the limit of the world. It is not to be found within experience.\textsuperscript{236}

\textsuperscript{233}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{236} Black, Max. 1964. \textit{A Companion to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus}. Cambridge. At the University Press. Great Britain. pp.308.
David Keyt points out that the expression ‘my world’ consists only of the facts that I am personally acquainted with. Keyt makes an important deduction. He deduces that my world is endless, from the premises that world and life are one (TLP 5.621) and our life is endless in the way our visual field is without limit (TLP 6.4311). Keyt, interprets solipsism as saying that both my world and the world are identical, i.e., the macrocosm and microcosm are the same. He points out that the books ‘The World I Found’ and ‘The World’ are identical in content differing only in their title. But the important point to note is that the word ‘I’ in ‘I am the world’ refers to nothing, neither a simple nor a complex, and therefore is nonsensical. And therefore, solipsism ultimately coincides with pure realism. David Keyt considers TLP 5.6. He points out that the two expressions ‘the limits of the language’ and ‘the limits of my world’ are equated. And Keyt interprets it as meaning that the limits of language mean the limits of my language. Or in other words the limits of the language are not wider than the limits of my language. Keyt warns against interpreting Wittgenstein a la Schopenhauer that matter and knowing subject is ultimately the same thing, the will.237

H.O. Mounce points out that Wittgenstein’s main objection is to the concept of a non-composite soul as a subject in a proposition like ‘A believes that p’. He interprets Wittgenstein as meaning that certain psychological elements possessing logical form occur to A which picture or show a possible state of affairs. These psychological elements must have complexity and therefore A cannot refer to A’s soul (which must be non-composite). Mounce points out that initially Wittgenstein seems to endorse this Humean view that the self is a bundle of psychological

elements. But Wittgenstein's view becomes complex later on when he brings in the concept of the self in solipsism. Mounce is of the opinion that this section concerning solipsism from TLP 5.6 to TLP 6 is the most obscure in the Tractatus. Mounce interprets Wittgenstein as meaning that the self cannot be found in the world of experience because it is the source of the experience just as the eye cannot appear in the visual field. Mounce points out about this notion of the self held by Wittgenstein, that it is difficult to estimate whether the philosopher endorses it or considers it in order to reject it. Wittgenstein seems to suggest that my life has no end in the way my visual field has no end and myself is not an object in the world. According to Mounce, Wittgenstein through his remarks on solipsism is attempting to say that solipsism is the confused attempt to say something which cannot be said at all but can only be shown. And the truth of solipsism is that I have a perspectival point of view on the world which in turn does not have any 'neighbours'. And this world, that which I conceive of, is given to me in language. For there is no language but language and therefore no conception of the world other than the one that language gives. Mounce points out that for Wittgenstein the self is not an object and ultimately solipsism breaks down to realism.

For the solipsist in wishing to deny the independent reality of the world, in maintaining that only he and his ideas are real, has the idea of his self as an object standing, as it were, over and against an unreal world. But when he realizes the confusion in this, when he sees that there can be no such object as he takes his self to be, the

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239 Ibid. p.92.
world reappears as the only reality in which his self can manifest itself.\textsuperscript{240}

David Pears, however, has something else to say – he points out that if the subject is part of the world the doctrine of solipsism becomes self-refuting and if the subject is not part of the world, the doctrine is empty. He also points out that this dilemma is equally effective against a Humean solipsist who does not believe in a separate ego. This dilemma is in fact related, according to Pears. If there is self-experience then there must be a mind, the former presupposing the latter. This embodiment of my mind which destroys solipsism is the only way to avoid the emptiness. In the 5.6's, Pears points out that Wittgenstein by the limit of the world is meaning the limits of the range of alternative possible worlds that I can construct in imagination on the basis of the actual world. My world of facts floats within these limits of possibilities. Pears further points out that the limits of language is not like a boundary between two fields on a farm because its position cannot be related to what lies on the other side of it. The expression ‘the world’ points to the range of possible worlds in contrast, to ‘the world as I found it’. In ‘the world as I found it’ the objects underpin the language covering the range of possible worlds. Thus any language has to be understood from a point of view which cannot be captured in that language.\textsuperscript{241}

Pears refers to Russell’s theory of solipsism\textsuperscript{242}. Russell in ‘Theory of Knowledge’, 1913 and in the paper entitled ‘On the Nature of Acquaintance’, 1956 pointed out that the ego is known only by description

\textsuperscript{240} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{242} Ibid, p.161.
and never by acquaintance. Pears points out that Wittgenstein has developed Russell's idea that solipsism tries to limit what I can understand rather than what I know. But in the 'Problems of Philosophy', Russell had said something different – that the ego is probably known by acquaintance although we may not say that we undoubtedly have acquaintance with it.243 So the two views of how the ego is known differ in Russell's theory. Still further, Russell has pointed out an important point – If the word 'I' is defined as 'the subject-term in awareness of which I am aware', it is not a satisfactory definition.244

David Pears has pointed out that Wittgenstein criticizes general solipsism because firstly it cannot be made in factual language and secondly because it lacks sense, although it is not rubbish.245 If the solipsist's ego could be identified independently of its experience, the solipsist's claim would have been factual. The solipsist could independently identify his ego only if he attached it to his body but this is not possible because his body necessarily lies in part outside the field of his consciousness. Thus Wittgenstein points out that the solipsist's claim, if it is a factual claim becomes either empty or self-refuting246.

Pears goes, on to point out that the expression 'the world' represents a range of possible worlds in comparison to 'the world as I found it'. Again 'my language' represents my point of view which cannot be mentioned in my language. So, my language , in a way cannot talk about 'I' or 'me'. This 'I' or the ego or subject is a limit of the world. And it is not

246 Ibid. pp.164-165
possible for any language to mention this 'T', which is the point of view
from which the world is to be understood. In 'my language', 'I', cannot be
an object.247

Pears points out that Wittgenstein's introduction of the visual field
as an analogue has two parts. Firstly, the eye in the visual field is elusive
just like the ego (here we notice the influence of Schopenhauer). And
secondly, the boundary of the visual field is not like a hedge with another
field and thus is a perfect analogue for the world.248

David Pears repeatedly says that this section of the Tractatus i.e. the
one dealing with solipsism is the most enigmatic. He, quite rightly also
points out that it is a "misconception" to consider the early Wittgenstein a
solipsist. Wittgenstein simply means that the solipsist has a "good point"
which can only be shown and not said. Pears has rightly pointed out that
the early Wittgenstein has dwelled more on the problem of the owner of
experiences. The Tractatus repeats the Humean discovery that the ego
cannot be discovered by introspection.

Pears points out that the Tractarian solipsism is introduced to show
the way in which empirical reality is limited.249 One must keep in mind
that the limits of empirical reality does not mean the limits of the totality
of facts, but rather the limits of the range of alternative possible worlds.
(The possible worlds can be constructed in the imagination on the basis of
the actual world).

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247 Ibid.
248 Ibid. p.176.
249 Ibid. p.162.
Moving over to solipsism, Pears says:

Wittgenstein’s idea would be that one of the things that cannot be mentioned in any language is the ego which serves as the point of view from which that language can be understood. This idea has two peculiarities. First, the ego will not be in the same position as an object that I have not yet encountered. This is something that has already been expressed in Humean terms: it is not just that I am not acquainted with my ego, but, rather, that I could not be acquainted with it. When the treatment of solipsism takes a linguistic turn, this thesis goes with it: no language can possibly mention the point of view from which it can be understood. It is in this sense that the ego or subject is a limit of the world. It is, therefore, not in the same position as a nameable object, which, once it is named, is inside the limit of language although its existence cannot be asserted.250

Actually what Wittgenstein means is that the ego cannot be encountered. It is remote, ever more than unencountered objects, which once encountered can be named. But the ego can never be named.

Now there is a controversy regarding TLP 5.62. Pears dwells on it. The problem is whether Wittgenstein meant “the only language that I understand” or “the language that I alone understand”. Some commentators consider “the language that I alone understand” as the language in which I report my own sense-data, which are accessible only to me. Pears is of the view that the German word “allein” shows that Wittgenstein meant ‘the only language that I understand’.251 And Pears

251 Ibid, pp.172-173.
points out that this is confirmed by Wittgenstein himself on C.K. Ogden's translation of 5.62.

Pears particularly points out the influence of Schopenhauer in Wittgenstein's Theory of Solipsism. He points out that *TLP* 5.63 which says that I am my world (the microcosm) is an allusion to Schopenhauer's identification of macrocosm and microcosm in *The World as Will and Idea*. Pears points out that both the I's are negative. The I, the subject does not exist outside my world and I, the subject does not exist as an identifiable object within my world. So who is the subject? Pears points out that for the early Wittgenstein there is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas (*TLP* 5.631) because the subject or the I is not given as an object that can be experienced. This reflects Hume's view that I could not conceivably encounter myself as subject. The subject is neither a nameable object in the world nor can it ever be encountered which would then make it nameable. This subject exists only as the inner limit of the world. It is a magnitude less point from which point of view I view my world.

Hidé Ishiguro dwells on Wittgenstein's claim that there is no thinking, presenting subject at *TLP* 5.631. She points out that Wittgenstein is not denying the psychological facts about human beings who think or present facts to themselves. Rather for her, Wittgenstein is taking up the traditional philosophical problem of the transcendental ego which philosophers have considered as distinct from the psychological problem about subjectivity. Wittgenstein holds that the metaphysical subject cannot be thought of as something who is related to the world as a whole. The

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metaphysical subject is only a limit of the world. It is the limit of the language with which we can think and identify facts in the world.²⁵⁴

Howard Mounce points out that in representation, say between a particular statement and what it represents, we never step outside all representation. That is to say, we do not separately have the unrepresented world and a system of representation and then attempt to connect them. As a result, the connection between language and the world is not made by us. We can say that the world is revealed to us only in language if language is used to cover any system of symbols or representations. Therefore, Mounce, points out that we may step outside any given representation and compare it with the world but we cannot step outside all our representation to do so for then we would not be aware of a world to do the comparison. This is the reason why the limits of my language are the limits of my world (TLP 5.62). Mounce points out the connection between our knowledge of the world and language is not accidental. For it is in language that we know the world. Yet it is erroneous to believe that there can be no world independent of language. For if the world is known only in language, the world does not depend on language but rather our knowledge of the world depends on language. As Mounce says "It is not the world which is parasitic on language but language which is parasitic on the world". Thus the Tractatus adheres to realism although Wittgenstein does not prove it. The independence of the world is manifested in the use of language.²⁵⁵

Ms. Anscombe points out that when one is reading Wittgenstein’s remarks on solipsism in the Tractatus, one must remember that Wittgenstein was very much impressed by Schopenhauer as a boy and one who has not read ‘without any responsiveness’, ‘The world as Will and Idea’, will not be able to understand Wittgenstein’s remarks on solipsism. The ‘I’ of the Tractarian solipsism is not used to refer to anybody or soul because in respect of these all men are alike. Rather the ‘I’ is the centre of life; it is the point from which everything is seen. Anscombe points out that one of the most ‘notorious’ things that can only be shown and not said is the truth of solipsism. Although it is generally thought that wherever there is consciousness there is an ‘I’ yet it is illegitimate to speak of an I because all that we encounter are the contents of consciousness such as pain, images etc. These are things considered from inside and corresponding to them in the outer realm we only have manifestations of them in words and behaviour. Anscombe points out that in the TLP 5.6’s ‘the language’ refers to ‘my’ language and therefore must be my ‘private’ language. So there are many languages, one of which I alone understand. But any language must be a mirror of the world. Anscombe gives the argument as follows:

The limits of my language mean the limits of my world; but all languages have one and the same logic, and its limits are those of the world; therefore the limits of my world and of the world are one and the same; therefore the world is my world.

Anscombe points out that this ‘I’ is unique; it is not the mind, soul or subject of consciousness but an ‘I’ whose language has a special position in

the sense that the world it describes by this language is the real world. She further says that the ‘I’ as a mind or soul or subject of consciousness, as one among others cannot be found. All that is to be found are the contents of consciousness.\textsuperscript{258}

S.N. Ganguly points out that the search for a subject in the world involves ‘hitting at the limits of the world’. For Wittgenstein, all thoughts are a part of the world and hence in the world of facts. And there is only one world for us to understand and hence ‘that’ language is also the only language.\textsuperscript{259}

According to Anscombe, the Wittgensteinian ‘I’ does not refer to the body or the soul but to the centre of life. It is the point from which everything is seen. Thus the ‘I’ becomes ‘God-like’.\textsuperscript{260}

James Griffin however points out that the ‘I’ cannot be simple. He gives the argument as - ‘Cogito, ergo not simplex sum : I am not simple, because I think, and thoughts are pictures, and pictures are facts, and these picturing facts must share the complexity of the facts they picture, thus, I consist, among other things, of a number of psychical elements arranged to make up picturing psychical facts.’\textsuperscript{261}

Peter Carruthers points out that realism and solipsism are inconsistent. And according to him in the 5.6’s of the \textit{Tractatus}, Wittgenstein is speaking of a set of possible and not actual state of affairs. The limits of the world does not refer to the actual world but to the set of

\textsuperscript{258} Ibid. p.168.
metaphysically possible states of affairs. The limits of my world also refer to the set of possible representations. These two coincide mean, for Carruthers, that the metaphysical possibility, i.e., the real world and conceptual possibility, i.e., my world are one and the same.²⁶²

Carruthers points out that Wittgenstein in the Tractatus endorses Hume’s bundle theory of the self. The ‘I’ cannot be found in the world of experience nor can its existence be inferred. There are only thoughts of the thinking subject in the world, never the thinking subject. All that exists is a particular bundle of thoughts and representations. Wittgenstein while endorsing Hume’s empirical subject, tries to prove the metaphysical subject as a limit of the world. Caruthers further points out that a complete objective description of the world and its contents would describe all physical objects along with their properties. It would also include a description of all thoughts, experiences and perceptions of the world and would state which of these representations is possessed by who. Such a description would also include my body and my thoughts and experience. Yet they cannot be pointed to be my own, i.e. which of these are mine cannot be said. Carruthers thinks that this ‘myness’ of a given perspective is the truth of solipsism for Wittgenstein. This ‘myness’ of thoughts and perceptions is unique in the sense that it is incommunicable and because it is unthinkable it lies outside the world.²⁶³

Professor J.O. Urmson²⁶⁴ prefers to translate the original German. “der Sprache, die allein ich verstehe” as “the language, which I alone

²⁶³Ibid. p. 82.
understand”. Jaakko Hintikka\textsuperscript{265} however points out that the problem arises due to the word “allein”. According to him, this word is usually used to qualify the word it follows. And in the context of the \textit{Tractatus} “allein” can hardly mean “alone”. Hintikka is of the opinion that the correct translation of the words in the bracket at \textit{TLP} 5.62 would be “the only language that I understand”. He also points out that Russell in the \textit{Introduction} to the \textit{Tractatus} seems to interpret it in the same manner. Hintikka further states that a misinterpretation of \textit{TLP} 5.62 has led many commentators to believe that Wittgenstein accepted ordinary solipsism. According to Hintikka, Wittgenstein’s interpretation of solipsism can be understood only in the context of the other doctrines of the \textit{Tractatus}. Wittgenstein’s solipsism is a peculiar kind, which states that the limits of language are the limits of the world. Accurately speaking, he identifies the limits of one’s language with the limits of one’s self. And Hintikka points out that the self that Wittgenstein is concerned with is the ‘metaphysical’ subject of philosophy and not the empirical subject. The Tractarian solipsism concerns only with “what can be said to be mine necessarily”. But there is only one Tractarian necessity, the empty tautological necessity of logic. So there is nothing which is “mine” in the world, in this sense. Nor is there “any part of the world of which it can be said that it necessarily is”. Hence, Hintikka points out that Wittgenstein has rightly said that “in an important sense there is no subject”.

Russell very correctly has pointed out that the only things whose existence can be proved is ourselves and our experiences. And there is no logical absurdity in supposing that the world consists of myself and my own thoughts, feelings and sensations. But there is no reason to suppose

that it is true also. Russell points out that we have direct acquaintance with the contents of our minds but whether we also have acquaintance with our bare selves, as opposed to particular thoughts and feelings, is a very difficult one. He considers, it to be probable that we have acquaintance with the self as the subject of awareness, but of course there is no certainty in it. Nothing can be further from truth than this. Thus it is quite evident that empirically the existence of the self beyond any reasonable doubt can hardly be proved. This is the thinking self or subject of Wittgenstein. Yet, in the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein never also speaks of the discrete experiences, as done by empiricists like Hume. And here he conforms to the empirical view. He admits the metaphysical subject as a limit of the world. This is the self or subject of philosophy which does not exist in the world. He explains it with the help of an analogy – the eye and the visual field. Just as the eye can never be a part of the visual field, so also the metaphysical subject is not a part of the world but only its limit. The self can never be a part of the world because in the world we do not have an á-priori order of things, i.e. no part of our experience is á-priori. This non-psychological ‘I’ of philosophy is deeply mysterious for Wittgenstein. It is the centre of the world and the bearer of good and evil. It enters into philosophy through the world being my world, i.e., solipsism (NB p.80). On the other hand the thinking subject is a mere superstition (*TLP* 5.633). It is reduced to an illusion (*TLP* 5.631). Dr. P. Sarkar points out that Wittgenstein is here involved in a circle. The self entering philosophy through the world being my world involves a circle because ‘my world’ involves a reference to ‘I’, the self.

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In the light of the clarifications made by various commentators it may be noted that Finch makes the pertinent point of the thinking subject being redundant in the framework of thoughts mirroring the world. Mounce rightly points out in ‘A believes p’ A cannot refer to A’s soul which must be non-composite. A is a fact which is composite and not a unitary subject related to a proposition p. Rather it is a composite fact comprised of elements. It may be pointed out that Wittgenstein does not elaborate on those elements constituting A for that is not the concern of philosophy but of psychology. A philosophical enquiry reveals that such belief statements can be represented as one fact representing another fact and the owner of the belief as the subject dies a natural death. Ganguly, I believe is correct in pointing out ‘the world’ and ‘my world’ are the same as is also the case with ‘the language’ and ‘my language’. There is essentially one language, the one I understand which represents the one world. Ganguly says it is futile to search for a subject independently of the world. I wish to point out that in the Tractarian picture, the search for the thinking, representing subject should not even arise for it is a logical picture of the relation between thought, language and reality. This representation does not call for a subject who does it. In the words of the NB ‘all experience is world’ and hence does not require a subject. That the self is not an object which is to be experienced in the world of experiential facts is the key point made by Wittgenstein.269 Although Wittgenstein is speaking of the non-encounterability of the subject as an object that can be experienced which is akin to the Humean theory yet he is no where endorsing Hume’s view of the self as a bundle of psychological elements resulting from an empirical investigation. For Wittgenstein the

269 The I is not an object. I objectively confront every object. But not the I. So there is a way in which there can and must be mention of the I in a non-psychological sense in philosophy (NB p.80e).
representation happens and whether anybody does it is irrelevant because the psychological self or subject is not a matter of philosophy.

CONCLUSION:

Inspite of the apparently discordant remarks on the Gedanke, we therefore observe that the dualism disappears. The thought of TLP 3 is the same as that of TLP 4 because thought as a logical picture of facts is identified with sign language. Yet there is an element of psychologism when we consider thought as being projected on to reality which occurs like "feelers" reaching out. The position is not very clear and one may infer that the young Wittgenstein was harbouring a subtle psychologism in his concept of thought. The psychical element creeps in the projective relation of thought, language and reality since it is we who interpret the projection. But apart from the projection, Gedanke's psychical nature is unimportant. And perhaps Wittgenstein instead of laying stress on how the projection is done and interpreted which would have involved a psychological answer, prefers to emphasize the one-to-one correspondence between the three realms as the pillar of meaning. It may be pointed out that in the isomorphic picture between language, thought and reality, the subject as an entity does not arise. So although thought or thinking is there it is not necessary to introduce the thinking subject. It is redundant because it is never a part of the world, does not enter into the isomorphic picture. Therefore, Wittgenstein says the thinking subject is a mere illusion. It may be called the logico-factual presentation of the subject or the 'T' in conformity with the logical presentation of thought. I am of the opinion that Wittgenstein is not involved in any kind of self contradiction in this regard. Actually the Tractarian picture of thought, language and reality is a picture of representation. In this picture the subject who
represents or thinks is redundant because it is an impersonal, objective representation. This representation if it is done in the terms of 'my' is actually the 'the', i.e. both coincide. And 'I' as a thinking mind does not arise at all. 'I' becomes a fact like any other fact in the world.