CHAPTER-IV

'THE SWIM AGAINST THE TIDE'

The *Philosophical Investigations* encompasses a vast array of subjects. Yet one incessant thread underlying it is Wittgenstein’s rejection of an inner private realm as being an important and unavailable part of human nature, to which only the subject has access. This culminated in the famous argument against the possibility of a private language, a language understandable only by the person speaking it, where words refer to his private sensations and are hence beyond the comprehension of anybody else. Wittgenstein, against the prevalent notion, vociferously denies that ‘meaning’, ‘understanding’, ‘thinking’ are psychological concepts. They in fact are not related to any inner processes but rather depict human activity in practice intertwined with the web of language in vogue. Wittgenstein had written in Schlick’s copy of the *TLP* that each sentence in it was the symptom of a disease “*Jeder dieser Sätze ist der Ausdruck einer Krankheit*”.¹ The *PI* attempts to provide a cure for this disease. Meaning and understanding are not mental processes. Nor can they be classified as physical processes. The meaning of an expression is its use. And understanding is an ability, the ability to use linguistic expressions and respond to others use of them, all within the stream of human life. The core of modern philosophy about the certainty of the subject and subjective experience is brought under the hammer. Wittgenstein’s sustained attack against the inner-outer (*Innen-Außen*) dichotomy undermines the assumption of the mind as an intensely private arena to

which only its subject enjoys privileged access. This attack against the mentalist tradition is the “swim against the tide”, as he told M.O.C.’. Drury in 1949, “Perhaps in a hundred years people will really want what I am writing”.\textsuperscript{2} Wittgenstein refurbishes the idea that human beings are essentially language using animals. Over a period of time, the usage of linguistic expressions determined by human beings becomes a matter of practice. And it is this which settles the mysterious question of meaning as giving life to otherwise dead signs. Language, for Wittgenstein, becomes the sea of life, which includes the whole range of human activities. This sea of life is the background of shared practices. In this light, this chapter will discuss the concept of thought and the thinking self as it appears in the later period under two sections.

\textbf{SECTION I: THE GEDANKE}

Going by the \textit{Tractatus}, one may recall that thought is a logical picture of facts (\textit{TLP 3}) and the sign with which we express a thought is a propositional sign (\textit{TLP 3.12}). When a propositional sign is applied and thought out we have a thought (\textit{TLP 3.5}). And a thought is a proposition with a sense (\textit{TLP 4}). Moreover, a thought consists of psychical elements that have the same sort of relation to reality as words (Letter to Russell). From the one-to-one correspondence between thought and facts, it is shown that thought represents reality. Therefore, for the early Wittgenstein, a thought (\textit{Gedanke}) is a logical picture of facts whose pictorial form is logical form. And it is also a propositional sign projected onto reality. Secondly, \textit{Gedanke} signifies a mental entity with psychical constituents. This was the Wittgensteinian \textit{Gedanke} or thought of the early

days. Wittgenstein's later view of the Gedanke or thought is directed against this portrayal.

A. Meaning and Understanding

It is well known that *Pl* break ground with the famous example of the language game of builders, where words like 'pillar', 'block', 'slab' are used by the builder to give instructions to his assistant. It attempts to show that naming objects is not the only task of language, and naming is not the only basis of meaning, as was supposedly held and widely accepted by many including the author of the *Tractatus*. Accordingly, the Augustinian Urbild which evoked widespread belief was that every individual word is a name. Names stand for objects which are their meanings and the connection between names and meanings is established by ostensive definition which is based on a mental association between word and objects. Wittgenstein’s view is that ostensive meaning cannot be the basis or foundation for language learning because in order to know that an object is being named by a particular word, the learner must already be in command of at least a part of the language, i.e., the language game of naming objects. So naming cannot be the basis of meaning nor is the naming relation based on ostensive correlations between sounds or marks and objects. But rather all words, names and naming have to be understood in terms of the way they enter our linguistic activities. The examination shows that expressions like 'if ... then', 'the' do not refer to objects but are meaningful by contextual definition and a sentence cannot be a mere conglomerate of names. Moreover, considering meaning from

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3 *Pl* §2.
4 *Pl* §1.
The early Wittgenstein was conforming to the Augustine tradition when he said in the TLP: "A name means an object. The object is its meaning" (TLP 3.203; 3.22).
this perspective includes only proper names, mass nouns and sortal nouns and cuts out verbs, adjectives, adverbs, connectives, prepositions and exclamations. Wittgenstein points out that generally we tend to assume that in naming some sort of queer and occult process is attached. Wittgenstein says the word ‘meaning’ is used illicitly if it refers to the object corresponding to the word and that amounts to confusing the meaning of a name with the bearer of a name. The meaning (Bedeutung) of a proper name is not its bearer, the object named. For example, when Mr. N.N. dies, we say that the bearer of the name dies and not that the meaning dies. The sentence, ‘Mr. N. N. Is dead’ does not cease to have a meaning even if Mr. N.N. is dead. Baker and Hacker further add that a name has a use even when we cannot determine whether it has a bearer, e.g., ‘Homer’; and a name has a use when we know it has no bearer, e.g., ‘Vulcan’.

Wittgenstein in the celebrated quotation in the PI positively considers meaning as:

For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word “meaning” (“Bedeutung”), it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use (Gebrauch) in the language (Sprache).

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6 PG§19; BB p.77; PI §27.
7 PI §38.
Elsewhere Wittgenstein says that we are inclined to think of meaning as a queer kind of mental act which anticipates all future steps before we make them [LFM p.28].
8 PI §40.
9 Ibid.
Also in WL 1932-35 p.44.
PI §44: In a language game, a name is also used in the absence of its bearer. So names are meaningful irrespective of the existence of their bearers.
And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its 

bearer (Träger).¹¹

Wittgenstein uses two German words: Gebrauch and Verwendung in connection with use. They represent the two aspects of Wittgenstein's thought about use, use as fact and use as act, i.e., actual use and possible use. Verwendung is used for imaginary uses (PI §6), metaphysical uses (PI §116); "unheard of" uses (PI §133), and figurative uses (PI. p.215). Gebrauch is used for what is learnt (PI §6); practiced (PI §9), and defined (PI §30). It may be noted that the "use of a sentence" is always Verwendung and never Gebrauch, and the "use of language" is both. Gebrauch is used in connection with words, numerals, names, signs, signposts, expressions and rules. Verwendung is used in connection with sentences, questions, orders, reports, expressions, formulae, concepts, descriptions and rules.¹²

What is noteworthy is Wittgenstein's refusal to make "meaning as use" a wholly inclusive 'theory' applicable in all situations and cases. Wittgenstein may be interpreted as saying that in a vast number of cases meaning of a word is its use. Therefore, meaning of an expression is the use (Gebrauch) in the multiplicity of language games the expression can be put into, in accordance with human practices. No one formula or rule can be asserted to accommodate use in its entirety. This is primarily because

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¹¹ PI §43.
Also in BB p.69.
According to Andrew Lugg, Wittgenstein used the word 'erklären', which has been translated as 'defined'. But 'explained' would be more preferable and more so because in the next paragraph erklärt is translated as 'explained'. [Lugg, Andrew. 2000. Wittgenstein's Investigations: A Guide and Interpretation 1-133. Routledge. London. p.83].
It may also be taken note that Wittgenstein later remarked "Not every use, you want to say, is a meaning" (LVI 289).
He also said: "... A meaning of a word is a kind of employment of it.
For it is what we learn when the word is incorporated into our language" (OC 61).
the use of expressions is as varied and diverse as in the multifarious language games they are employed. There are as many meanings of words depending on their employment. Wittgenstein compares words to tools in a tool-box. Just as hammer, pliers, screw-driver, glue, saw, etc. have diverse functions so also is the case with words and the cause of confusion is the uniform appearance of words. He also compares words to handles of a cabin in a locomotive, which look and appear similar although having different and varied functions. Meaning does not constitute anything mental, anything that is present to the mind or goes or in the mind. To say that meaning is a mental activity would be as absurd as saying that the rise in price of butter is due to an activity of butter. Wittgenstein includes ostensive definition also within the purview of use. He says naming is like attaching a label to a thing which is in preparation to the use of a word, and ostensive definition explains the use – the meaning of the word.

The later view of meaning may be summed up as follows. Meaning does not consist in any denotative relation between words and things. Meaning is not an accompanying inner experience or process. Meaning is also not a mental activity. Meaning is not determined by what interpretations we give to a sign or what accompanies a sign. Wittgenstein

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13 PI §11.
This analogy has been criticized by Baker and Hacker on the grounds that tools work in isolation, whereas words need to be assembled to constitute a move in a language game apart from one word sentences. [Baker, G.P. and Hacker, P.M.S. 1980. An Analytical Commentary on The Philosophical Investigations. Vol.1. Basil Blackwell, Oxford. p.36].

14 PI §12.

15 In the BB, Wittgenstein says that the meaning of a phrase is characterized by the use we make of it and it is not a mental accompaniment to the expression [BB p.65].

PI §675.

Wittgenstein says nothing is more wrong-headed than calling meaning a mental activity [PI §693].

16 PI §693.

17 PI §26.

18 PI §30.
defines meaning of a word as its use in the language. Meaning is determined by the manner in which people use signs and respond to others use of it. Hence meaning cannot be a private experience but is something public in accordance with social conventions and applications. As Rush Rhees rightly points out:

Our words refer to things by the way they enter in discourse, by their connexions with what people are saying and doing, for instance, and by the way they affect what is said and done. What we say makes a difference. What expressions we use makes a difference. And the notion of a rule goes with that. If it made no difference what sound you made or when, you could not be understood and you would have said nothing.19

In a lecture in 1939, Wittgenstein shows the use of a new word 'Boo'. Supposing I point to a coat and say “The tailors now call this colour 'Boo'.” People who have undergone a similar training will react in the same manner. But it could be otherwise also. If I just say “This is called 'Boo',” there could be 10,000 meanings that 'Boo' might have and you may not know what I mean. “It sounds as if your learning how to use it were different from your knowing its meaning. But the point is that we all make the SAME use of it. To know its meaning is to use it in the same way as other people do.”20 Thus meanings are established by conventions of use. Meaning is a public affair because to know the meaning of a word is to use

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20 *LFM* pp.182-183. 
Wittgenstein in the *PI* refers to the word "bububu" and points out that such a word can only mean something in a language it is already used and it makes no sense if I give it a private meaning: 
Can I say "bububu" and mean "If it doesn't rain I shall go for a walk?" — It is only in a language that I can mean something by something. This shows clearly that the grammar of "to mean" is not like that of the expression "to imagine" and the like. 
*PI* p.18e. Printed below the line.
the word similarly as others do. This reaffirms the claim that meaning connects be a private hidden activity.

Elsewhere in the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein says that the sentence is to be considered as an instrument and its sense as its employment (*Verwendung*).\(^{21}\) For Wittgenstein explanations of meaning are standards employed in determining the correct use of words; they function as rules in our practice for the use of expressions. Moreover, when a speaker understands a word or knows what it means, he must have the ability to justify his own use of it, he must have the ability to explain what it means, i.e., he must manifest the capacities characteristic of following the rules for using the word.\(^{22}\)

So the *TLP* conception of the logical structure between thought, language and world where meaning is assigned to simple names by virtue of objects they stand for, is replaced with the view that language encompasses all human activities generated through the use of words. Of course the early view was repudiated as early as 1929 when Wittgenstein had gone through an intermediate phase of verificationism. In the *Investigations*, he says:

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\(^{21}\) *PI* §421.
Consider the following in this connection.

One can say: whoever has a word explained by reference to a patch of color only knows what is meant to the extent that he knows how the word is to be used. That is to say: there is no grasping or understanding of an object, only the grasping of a technique.

Asking whether and how a proposition can be verified is only a particular way of asking “How d’you mean?” The answer is a contribution to the grammar of the proposition.\footnote{PI §353.}

Therefore we see Wittgenstein reducing verificationism to grammatical criterion which was his ultimate view in respect of meaning. For the Wittgenstein of the \textit{PI}: “The meaning of an expression is what one understands when one understands the expression. It is what is explained by an explanation of meaning. An explanation of meaning provides a standard or rule for the correct use of an expression. For one’s use of a word is correct, makes sense, when it accords with an appropriate explanation of meaning.”\footnote{Hacker, P.M.S. 1986. \textit{Insight and Illusion. Themes in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein}. Clarendon Press. Oxford, p.247.} In the \textit{TLP} reality was projected onto language, they stood out against each other and meaning consisted in denotation. In the \textit{PI}, Wittgenstein views meaning as praxis, as part of human action and conduct. Thought, language and reality are no longer conceived of as three realms projected on to one another but human action and behaviour interknit with language is the paradigm and span in our lives.

A.C. Grayling is of the opinion that the talk of ‘use’ is unspecific because the concept of ‘use’ is itself a various one. ‘Use’ may signify how something is used, of what it is used for, of when the use is appropriate and even of what it is used in. Grayling also points out that the connection between meaning and use is not so intimate and obvious as Wittgenstein makes it appear. We may speak of words being used effectively, insolently, or as an insult or as an inspiration. And in such cases we are
not saying anything about its meaning. ‘Use’ may be a part, but it is certainly not the entire and exhaustive story about meaning.\textsuperscript{25}

It may be pointed out that Wittgenstein has never claimed that ‘use’ is an all encompassing theory of meaning. ‘Use’ is very situational, depending on the occasion, the intention and the practical circumstances in which an expression occurs and is used. Therefore, there are as many meanings of an expression as it can be employed in the language of everyday life in accordance with the practice of a human community from time to time. So “words have meaning only in the stream of life” (\textit{Nur im Fluf des Lebens haben die Worte ihre Bedeutung}).\textsuperscript{26}

Some interpreters attribute the ‘communication-intention’ theory of meaning to the \textit{Investigations} because of Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the notion of purpose or aim to be added to the use of expressions in language. Baker and Hacker are of the opinion that this is an incorrect interpretation of the \textit{PI} in view of the fact that it is doubtful whether the speaker’s intentions are logically prior to and independent of the concept of meaning and moreover, Wittgenstein ascribes purposes (\textit{Zwecke}) to words (\textit{worte}) and not to speakers.\textsuperscript{27}

For Wittgenstein the concepts of meaning, use, rule-following and understanding are intimate.\textsuperscript{28} He points out that we have a general tendency to consider understanding and meaning as mental phenomena,

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\item[\textsuperscript{26}] \textit{LVI} 913.
\item[\textsuperscript{28}] Elsewhere, Wittgenstein says that to understand a phrase, we might say is to understand its use and one only understands an expression when one knows how to use it although it may conjure up images and pictures [\textit{LFM} pp.19-20].
\item[\textsuperscript{29}] He also says the grammar of the three words “intend”, “understand” and “mean” is very similar for in all the three cases the words seem to apply both to what happens at one moment and to what happens in the future [\textit{LFM} p.25].
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as giving life to otherwise dead signs. This is primarily because: 1) Prima facie we cannot observe the understanding of others. We tend to suppose that only the subject of understanding has privileged access to his understanding while others can at best surmise from his behaviour. 2) We have familiar experience of sudden understanding or 'understanding in a flash' where we say 'Now I understand', which seems to be a report of a mental phenomena. 3) We have experiences of understanding as distinct from not understanding, for example, a lecture, a piece of music etc. From this it seems to appear that understanding is a mental phenomenon accompanying the hearing and the accompanying process is lacking when we do not understand. 4) We often use pronouns to refer to a person, like in 'I meant A', 'I pointed at A'. The past tense of the verbs used appears to report specific mental events rather than physical ones. As a result we tend to think understanding is a mental process.29 Wittgenstein's account of understanding in the *Investigations* is a non-psychological one. He points out our quest for searching a hidden, inner, mental process of understanding as accompanying the visible expressions ends in failure.30 We tend to look at understanding as a queer mental process due to our failure to understand the use of a word.31 Wittgenstein vociferously criticizes the mentalist tradition and points out: (i) understanding is not an experience; (ii) understanding is not a hidden mental process or activity and (iii) understanding is not a mental state, i.e., a specific state of mind. Understanding is not an accompanying experience of any kind. Although one may have images, or say things to oneself, yet they are by no means necessary nor sufficient for understanding. One may understand even

30 *PI* §153.
31 *PI* §196.
without the accompanying images and one may have the accompanying experiences and still not understand. So such experiences can never be uniform, varying from case to case and person to person.

According to Wittgenstein “To understand (verstehen) a sentence (Satz) means to understand a language (Sprache). To understand a language means to be master (beherrschen) of a technique (Technik).”32 Knowing, understanding, being able to do something is very closely connected and are distinct from inner mental states.33 Therefore, understanding in its paramount use is akin to an ability. And it is misconstrued to suppose that understanding is a mental state or process.

Wittgenstein examines the case of sudden understanding or ‘understanding in a flash’.34 A person may understand and know how to complete a formula without any characteristic accompaniments or it may be otherwise. It may be that the formula occurs to him, but he does not understand. The utterance ‘Now I understand’ or ‘The formula ... occurs to me’ does not describe or report any inner mental on-goings but rather signify the ‘particular circumstances’ or the context in which the speaker is able to use the signs—“but for us it is the circumstances under which he had such an experience that justify him in saying in such a case that he understands, that he knows how to go on.”35 So understanding may be said to signify an acquired ability, the ability to operate with signs. Wittgenstein goes on to say that in the utterance ‘Now I know how to go on’ in respect of a particular formula, there is obviously a connection

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32 PI §199.
33 PI §148-50.
The grammar of the word “Knows” (“wissen”) is evidently closely related to that of “can” (“können”), “is able to” (“imstande sein”). But also closely related to that of “understands” (“verstehen”). (‘Mastery’ of a technique). [PI §150]
34 PI § 151-55; 179.
35 PI §155.
between thinking of the formula, saying it, writing it down and actually continuing the series. But that connection does not lie in any causal foundation. 'I can go on' does not mean that I have a special experience which causes the continuation of the series. What the speaker's utterance signified was that given the circumstances, he could employ the signs correctly. It shows that he has been able to use the expression 'Now I know how to go on' in the language game.36 And we judge whether a person is correctly able to use words by what he goes on to do.37 So correct use of words and expressions signifies an ability (Können).

Wittgenstein considers the familiar act of reading.38 By reading he means the activity of executing out loud what is written or printed, writing from dictation, writing from something printed, playing from a score, etc. First, Wittgenstein examines the case of a seasoned reader who reads attentively and also who reads without comprehension or attention. Second, Wittgenstein asks us to consider a beginner in reading, and distinguishes between one who has to read with a lot of effort and one who is merely pretending to read, and one who reads like a machine. Wittgenstein, points out the word "to read" is applied differently in the case of the beginner from that of the practised reader. Reading for Wittgenstein is the ability to convert written or printed words into speech, spoken words into writing, a score into sounds etc. It represents an ability, the ability to react to written signs in accordance with rule governed ways and have nothing to do with any mental mechanism whatsoever. The beginner only shows changes in his behaviour when he starts reading that

36 PI §179.
37 PI §180.
Rush Rhees points out that Wittgenstein emphasized that in order to understand what people are saying, one must understand more than the vocabulary and the rules of grammar [Rhees, R. 1970. Discussions of Wittgenstein. Routledge and Kegan Paul. London. p.83].
38 PI §156-57.
have no relation with any inner state or process. The transitions from
beginning to read to not reading with comprehension to reading with
comprehension signify changes in the acquisition of an ability. Reading is
a rule governed ability and does not correspond to any inner state or
process.39 Being able to read is an ability and reading is the exercise of that
ability. It is not a mental or neural state from which performances are
executed. Rather there are public criteria to determine whether someone is
reading or not, based on the ability to perform in accepted ways which is
manifest in his behaviour.

Wittgenstein’s view of meaning and understanding may be
summed up as follows. When we understand an expression, we
understand its meaning. Meaning is the use of expressions in the medley
of language games it occurs. And so understanding consists in the ability
to use expressions in accordance with the rules of its use in the various
arrays of language games, they occur. This brings us to the concept of
rule-following. Following a rule (Regel) is a practice (Praxis); it is not
possible to obey a rule ‘privately’.40 Although, we are inclined to suppose
that following a rule is a matter of mental on-goings, it actually displays a
custom.

... It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on
which someone obeyed a rule. It is not possible that there should
have been only one occasion on which a report was made, an order
given or understood; and so on.—To obey a rule, to make a report,

39 PI §169-78.
40 PI § 202.
to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs
(Gepflogenheiten) (uses, institutions).\textsuperscript{41}

So rule-following is a practice. It displays a mastery of a practice, technique manifested in the employment of a sign or responses to the use of signs by others. It is not something which is done only once but rather displays a custom, use or institution. Following a rule is manifest in the use of signs a person makes, what he does at a particular situation and context. If his actions do not conform to the practice in vogue, then he may not be said to follow the rule. ‘Obeying a rule’ and ‘going against a rule’ are dispositions or abilities to act in a certain manner. Rule-following is the mastery of a technique of use and response. It is not something private nor is it an inner process. But rather rule-following consists in conforming to established procedures and shared practices of a human community. Therefore, meaning and understanding rest on social conventions and are essentially public and can never be private. This also rules out the possibility of a language referring only to private sensations. Wittgenstein says:

Following a rule is analogous to obeying an order. We are trained to do so; we react to an order in a particular way. But what if one person reacts in one way and another in another to the order and the training? Which one is right?

Suppose you came as an explorer into an unknown country with a language quite strange to you. In what circumstances would

\textsuperscript{41} PI §199. The possibility of following a rule presupposes the existence of an established use or custom [PI § 198].
you say that the people there gave orders, understood them, obeyed them, rebelled against them, and so on?

The common behaviour of mankind is the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language.\footnote{PI §206.}

P.M.S. Hacker points out some important points between using rules and following rules. He says just as the relation between understanding an expression and its correct use is an internal one, so also is the case between a rule and what is regarded in accordance with it. Rules are used as standards of correctness in practice. The relation between rules and their correct application is manifest in our employment of them. The distinction between following a rule and acting in accordance with a rule is manifest in the explanations provided by the agent as to why he acted as he did, what are his justifications for it, and his possible reasons if countered.\footnote{Hacker, P.M.S. 1986. Insight and Illusion. Themes in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein. Clarendon Press. Oxford, p.250.} Thus Hacker points out:

A rule for the use of an expression and the acts that accord with it are not independent of each other, but two sides of the same coin, two aspects of a practice (which may or may not be a social practice), an activity of using symbols. There is no such thing as a rule without a technique of application that is manifest in action. It is this technique of using a rule that determines in practice what the rule follower calls ‘accord with the rule’ or ‘breaking the rule’. Hence also understanding a rule and knowing how to apply it, grasping an explanation of meaning and knowing how to use the word

\footnote{PI §206.}
explained are not two independent abilities but two facets of one and the same ability.\textsuperscript{44}

Wittgenstein’s discussion of meaning and understanding crystallizes in the rejection of private language at \textit{PI} § 243:

A human being can encourage himself, give himself orders, obey, blame and punish himself; he can ask himself a question and answer it. We could even imagine human beings who spoke only in a monologue; who accompanied their activities by talking to themselves—An explorer who watched them and listened to their talk might succeed in translating their language into ours (This would enable him to predict these people’s actions correctly, for he also hears them making resolutions and decisions).

But could we also imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences—his feelings, moods and the rest—for his private use?—Well, can’t we do so in our ordinary language?—But that is not what I mean. The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language.\textsuperscript{45}

Wittgenstein is here implying that there must be agreement among speakers in the terms they employ; there must be common techniques of application. This common technique of application is the rule-following. Wittgenstein is objecting to the fact that there can be “\textit{private}” rules,

\textsuperscript{44} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{45} \textit{PI} § 243.
(private in the sense that no one can understand or follow). So the possibility of unshared rules, concepts is ruled out. Wittgenstein points out: There is no use saying that we have a private object before our minds and give it a name. There is a name only where there is a technique of using it. That technique may be private; but this only means that nobody but I know about it. I might have a sewing machine that nobody else knows about. But in order to be a private sewing machine, it must be an object which deserves the name “sewing machine”. And it would deserve that name not in virtue of its privacy but in virtue of its similarity with other sewing machines, private or otherwise. So even to be a private sewing machine, it must resemble a sewing machine.

Following a rule, does not imply that the person has to go through any internal mental states or processes which constitute understanding the rule. Following a rule is part of training; we have been trained in that particular manner to consider certain actions as complying with rule following in question while others as going against it. Understanding a rule and following it does not imply that the person has an internalized cognition about it, by means of which he knows to apply the rule. As Roger Trigg points out: “Concepts are not based on individual private experience but are rooted in our social life which of its nature is shared publicly. Nothing I think or say about myself and the world is determinate until it has been mediated by the rule-governed practices of our shared life.” Wittgenstein’s private language argument is devised to show that there is not a language that is in principle private. “But that is not the

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47 PO p.448.
Also in RYM p.344.
same as thinking that thought and language require an actual public language, in which the individual speaker and reasoner engages in linguistic practices already established within a community."49 The possibility remains, as A.J. Ayer did, of conceiving of a Robinson Crusoe who was born on an isolated island away from mankind and devises a primitive language to refer to publicly identifiable objects. But there would not be anything intrinsically private in this. "The private language argument shows that any language speaker must exist in a world of publicly observable objects, but it leaves it open that a solitary individual by chance born and raised in isolation in a world whose objects could in principle be observed by others might, nonetheless succeed in speaking to and for himself about this world"50. This possibility dies a natural death by the introduction of Wittgenstein’s Rule – following. Wittgenstein stresses the view that all that we acquire, our concepts, thoughts is within the context of human life. They are out and out public property. We are human beings, creatures within the confines of a society and we learn to think and practice within the confines of a social practice. As participatory individuals in a society we do learn to use language and think in the manner we think. If our life was not the life we live, so would also not be our language and thoughts.51 Rule-following cannot be an individual issue because the concept is laid against a backdrop of socially accepted customs.

Following a rule does not simply mean complying by the rule, but complying is done because such is required by the rule. So following a

50 Ibid. p.44
rule involves both understanding the rule and grasping what is required of it. It is possible, that one can comply with a rule without understanding that unless one does so-and-so, he will not be following the rule. Grasping or understanding a rule does not mean giving a correct interpretation of the rule. According to Wittgenstein, grasping a rule is an ability, demonstrated by what we do and how we use the rule. “Understanding is exhibited in actual cases of rule-following behaviour. We have grasped a rule if we obey it correctly, and we have failed to understand it if we ‘go against it’ in actual cases. Thus the criterion of understanding a rule is actually following it (applying it correctly), there being no intermediary between the rule and its applications—such as an interpretation—which constitutes understanding it.”

Wittgenstein links the notion of rule-following to practice. Practice refers to repeated actions and therefore it cannot be that a person obeys a rule on a single occasion. Some scholars argue that practice is a communal affair while others say one single person can engage in a practice. It may be said that the actual use of the rule is the practice. Rule-following is the mastery of the technique of engaging in accepted ways of applying the rule. There are standardized correct applications of the rule and that is accorded by practice, by custom, by institutions. “We are trained to engage in this practice—we are taught this technique—and as a result of our training we apply (follow) the rule in a matter-of-course fashion, without hesitations or doubt and without necessarily engaging in any interpretation of it....Following a rule is

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53 PI § 199.
exercising mastery of a technique we have learned and participating in the practice of following this rule."\textsuperscript{55}

Therefore, for Wittgenstein, to understand a rule is to be master of the technique of its application, i.e., to possess certain abilities. Understanding is an ability to use a sign and respond to others use of it in accordance with rules that govern its use. These rules are part of human practice. Following a rule does not denote any inner process of grasping something; it is not an objective standard of right or wrong. To correctly follow a rule is to conform to the practice of a community. It is out and out public by virtue of the fact that it is embedded and ingrained in the customs and uses of a human community. Our acquisition of the ability to follow rules is acquired by training as members of that community. Wittgenstein concludes that language relates to a way of living\textsuperscript{56} and words have meaning only in the stream of life.\textsuperscript{57} Wittgenstein says that speaking a language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.\textsuperscript{58} And whether there is any causal foundation between our neural structures and brain processes can only be a matter of discovery.

B. Thought

Wittgenstein's main concern in the \textit{Investigations} is to bulldoze the assumption behind the mentalist view, that thoughts are psychic entities inhabiting the minds of people. But at the same time the linguistic alternative, that language expresses a distinct process, namely thought, is also crushed. Wittgenstein raises the question whether we are acquainted

\textsuperscript{56} RFM p.335.
\textsuperscript{57} LW I 913.
\textsuperscript{58} PI §23.
with incorporeal processes and in that case is thinking one such process. He answers negatively and points out that thinking is not an incorporeal process which lends life and sense to speaking and which would be possible to detach from speaking.\textsuperscript{59} Thought appears to be ‘queer’ only when we consider it in retrospect, not when we are thinking.\textsuperscript{60} Wittgenstein considers thinking in a ‘flash’ or ‘lightening like thoughts’.\textsuperscript{61} It may be that we may speak to ourselves inwardly, or images may flit across our thinking, but such accompaniments are by no means sufficient or necessary for thinking. Neither is silent speech mandatory for thinking. Wittgenstein points out that it is misleading to say that the expression of a thought is a proposition, just as we may say that the expression of pain is a cry (the two cases are not analogous).\textsuperscript{62} According to Wittgenstein the expression of a thought in language need not be accompanied by any corresponding process and even if such processes do occur they are redundant. So there are not two processes taking place: one the actual process of thought and the other the expression of thought in language. As Malcolm Budd points out: “Just as I can utter a sentence with or without understanding, I can speak a sentence silently with or without understanding. The difference between my engaging in inner speech on one occasion with understanding and on another occasion without understanding is not that a certain process occurs in my consciousness in the former but not the latter case. It is true that when I express a thought in words, my thought is what I mean by the words, not the words themselves; and when I speak silently, my thought is again what I mean

\textsuperscript{59} PI § 339.
\textsuperscript{60} PI § 428.
\textsuperscript{61} PI § 318-321.
\textsuperscript{62} PI § 317.

This notes a radical departure from the early days when Wittgenstein had said that a thought finds an expression in a proposition that can be perceived by the senses (TLP 3.1).
by the words, not the words themselves. But the difference between (internal or external) speech with and without understanding does not consist in a further process that accompanies speech when and only when it is understood. In neither internal nor external speech that I understand, does there need to be anything in my consciousness other than the words themselves".63 Therefore Wittgenstein says:

When I think in language, there aren't 'meanings' going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought.64

It seems from Wittgenstein's remark here that when I think in language, i.e., when I express my thoughts in language, there is no double process involved—one the thought process and the other the linguistic expression. The expression itself is the thought. Or in other words, there need be no distinction between the expressed thought and the thought. And here 'vehicle' may not be interpreted as the medium of transportation but 'is itself' the thought when considered as an expressed thought. Hence we may take the liberty to conjecture that thought cannot be distinguished from its expression. Capability of being expressed is a part of the inherent nature of thought.

Thinking may be said as not to require any visible sign either before I think or to run through my thoughts when I think. We do not 'read off' anything from our consciousness when we are thinking. Thinking cannot be detected or separated as something distinct in our consciousness. Budd points out that language is the vehicle of thought when I think in language. But it is also a case that I may think without speaking either to

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64 PI § 329.
myself inwardly or outwardly without being aware of linguistic or non-
linguistic signs. So I may think, but not think in language by virtue of
‘thinking out loud’ or ‘talking in the imagination’ and in such a case the
only description of thought is ‘I thought that P’ where ‘P’ specifies the
content of the thought.\textsuperscript{65}

Consider the following:

I can know what someone else is thinking, not what I am thinking.

It is correct to say “I know what you are thinking”, and wrong to
say “I know what I am thinking”.

(A whole cloud of philosophy condensed into a drop of grammar).\textsuperscript{66}

It is not required of me to know what I am thinking because thinking is
not a distinct process occurring in me. So I need not know what I am
thinking and then express it. \textit{I simply think}. There is no after and before
process involved. The question of knowing or doubting whether I think is
nonsense. My thoughts are known to me can mean nothing except that I
may be able to express them.\textsuperscript{67} My knowledge of someone else’s thoughts
are based on observation of his outwards manifestations like behaviour,
gestures etc. But I am not able to observe my thoughts like I can observe a
book, for example. I simply have my thoughts and can express them.
Expressing thoughts does not mean describing them. (I may describe a
book or a table but not my thoughts.)

\textsuperscript{66} PI p.222a.
\textsuperscript{67} In this connection consider \textit{RPPI}
‘My thoughts are known to myself alone’. But what that means is, roughly: ‘I \textit{can} describe them,
can express them, \textit{if I want to}.’ [\textit{RPPI} 563].
Let us consider PI § 427:

"While I was speaking to him I did not know what was going on in his head". In saying this, one is not thinking of brain-processes, but of thought-processes (Denkvorgänge). The picture should be taken seriously. We should really like to see into his head. And yet we only mean what elsewhere we should mean by saying: we should like to know what he is thinking. I want to say: we have this vivid picture—and that use, apparently contradicting the picture, which expresses the psychical.68

Wittgenstein is telling us that we often use phrases like ‘thinking in the head’. But this does not mean that the thinking really happens in the head. It is used only in a metaphorical sense to emphasize our eagerness to know the other person’s thoughts. So although the picture provided is of thoughts being psychical, the expression used shows that it is not so. P.M.S. Hacker points out that the metaphor of ‘the hidden’ is profoundly misleading when applied to thoughts. “To say that his thoughts are inaccessible to me because they are in his mind amounts to no more than saying that he thinks his thoughts, or that he speaks to himself silently, and that I cannot guess what he thinks. It does not mean that I cannot perceive his thoughts either, nor does he know them—he thinks them.”69

Hiding one’s thoughts, argues Hacker is not like thinking and not expressing one’s thoughts. This position could be misleading because it does imply that others do not know of one’s thought and hence which is hidden. But one may say one is hiding one’s thoughts if he writes them

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68 PI § 427.
down in a diary and keeps it locked away.\textsuperscript{70} Or if a person expresses his thoughts by means of a Morse code, for example, to his wife that the children do not know, one is hiding one’s thoughts.\textsuperscript{71} Hence thought as being something hidden and tucked away in a secret place, the mind, is misconstrued by grammar. “And to compare thinking to a secret process is as misleading as the comparison of searching for the apt word to the efforts of someone who is trying to make an exact copy of a line which only he can see.”\textsuperscript{72}

Thinking does not occur in a unique place called the mind. Rather it happens when I write on paper or on the work of art created by me. Thinking is manifested in our actions.\textsuperscript{73} The answer to the question ‘what are you thinking?’ is not the description of an inner process but merely the expression of my thoughts in words. And here the uniqueness lies in the fact that the thought cannot be distinguished from its expression, no matter whatever the expression is. Of course I do enjoy the autonomy of not expressing my thoughts. But this reaffirms the view that all thoughts must be capable of being expressed.

THINKING AND SPEAKING

We are normally inclined to suppose that we communicate our private thoughts through speech acts. Wittgenstein directs his polemic against this view. Speaking is the mastery of the technique of displaying moves and reactions to various language games in human practice.

\textsuperscript{70} \textit{LIR} 974.
\textsuperscript{71} RPP II 563.
Also consider “So someone can hide his thought from me by expressing them in a language I don’t know. But where is the mental thing which is hidden?” [RPPII 564].
\textsuperscript{72} RPPI 580.
Speaking is akin to the activity of playing a game. We tend to think that we translate our thoughts to the language of speech and so speaking is a distinct process. But Wittgenstein says all sorts of things could happen.\footnote{PI § 335.} It is not necessary, argues Wittgenstein that thinking is a distinct activity which runs parallel to and accompanies speech acts.

We often have the experience of speaking without thinking. But can we also think without speaking?\footnote{PI § 327.} We tend to distinguish between speaking with thought \textit{(denkendes Sprechen)} and speaking without thinking \textit{(gedankenlosen Sprechen)}—“Is thinking \textit{(Denken)} a kind of speaking \textit{(Sprechen)}? One would like to say thinking is what distinguishes speech with thought from talking without thinking—so it seems to be an accompaniment of speech. A process, which may accompany something else, or can go on by itself ... But what constitutes thought here is not some process which has to accompany the words if they are not to be spoken without thought.”\footnote{PI § 330} Wittgenstein goes on to point out:

Speech with and without thought is to be compared with the playing of a piece of music with and without thought.\footnote{PI § 341.}

It appears that meaningful speech does not imply two distinct processes where we can filter out a separate process of thinking. Meaningful speech is not like singing and accompanying it by playing the piano but is rather like singing with expression and speaking without thinking is akin to singing without expression. The difference between the two rests on what
the speaker is capable of doing and reacting. Thinking is not an incorporeal process which lends life and sense to speaking and which could be detached from speaking. We generally tend to suppose that thinking accompanies speaking because of the manner in which we use the verb "think". We very often say "He speaks without thinking". We can speak with or without understanding and also silently with or without understanding. The difference between with and without understanding does not consist of a particular process occurring in the former which is absent in the latter, but rather rests on an ability. Mental images and inner speech may accompany our thoughts but they are neither necessary nor sufficient for meaningful speech. Speaking with understanding is determined by what we sincerely say and do. We do not necessarily think in terms of some inner symbolism and then transpose our thoughts into utterances. In RPP II, Wittgenstein says we cannot separate 'thinking' from a person's activities because thinking is not an accompaniment of the activity, any more than thoughtful speech.

Wittgenstein calls thinking a widely ramified ('weitverzweigter') concept. The English word 'ramification' denotes branching or divarication. Wittgenstein is using it in the sense of 'branching'. Let us see what Wittgenstein says:

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78 Consider RPP II: By 'thinking while you speak' I really should mean that I speak and understand what I say, and not that I speak and understand it later. [RPP II 267]

In Zettel, Wittgenstein writes that what goes on in thinking practically does not interest us [Z 88]. So meaningful speech does not indicate some unique special process that is absent in meaningless speech.

79 PI § 339.

80 RPP II 184; Z 101.

81 RPP II 194; 216; 218; 220.

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You must never forget that “think” (“denken”) is an everyday word, just as are all other psychological terms.

It is not to be expected of this word that it should have a unified employment (Verwendung); rather it is to be expected that it doesn’t have it.\(^82\)

Elsewhere he says:

‘Thinking’ (Denken) is a widely ramified (weitverzweigter) concept (Begriff). A concept that comprises many manifestations of life. The \textit{phenomena} of thinking are widely scattered.\(^83\)

Thinking is like a ramified traffic network which connects many out of the way places with each other. Thinking may apply to all such widely separated cases.\(^84\) These remarks do not occur in the \textit{PI}. The remarks imply that thinking refers to diverse phenomena and may not be brought under a single use, such as the ‘mental’. It is latent in our day-to-day activities, in what we speak and react and do. In \textit{Zettel}, Wittgenstein points out that we derive the concept of ‘thinking’ from everyday language. But the use (\textit{Gebrauch}) is confused (\textit{verworren}). The employment of all psychological verbs in not so clear so as to give a synoptic view of the terms.\(^85\) And certain circumstances make us learn the use of the word “think”.\(^86\)

\(^{82}\) \textit{RPPII} 194.
\(^{83}\) \textit{RPPII} 216; 218; Z110.
\(^{84}\) \textit{RPPII} 216.
\(^{85}\) The word “thinking” may be used to signify, roughly talking for a purpose, i.e., a speaking or writing a speaking in the imagination, a ‘speaking in the head’ etc. [\textit{RPPII} 9].
\(^{86}\) Z 113.
\(^{86}\) Z 114.
Wittgenstein later went on to point out that though thinking and speaking are related concepts, they are categorically distinct. He says:

...It isn't true that thinking is a kind of speaking, as I once said. The concept 'thinking' is categorically different from the concept speaking'. But of course thinking is neither an accompaniment of speaking nor of any other process.87

In the *PI*, Wittgenstein points out that 'talking' and 'thinking' are not concepts of the same kind though they are in very close connection.88 And in thinking no one thing occurs, but rather all sorts of things happen.89 If thinking is a necessary accompaniment for speech, then they could have been said to belong to the same category. The fact that one is not required for the other shows that they are two distinct categories. So Wittgenstein points out:

The intention with which one acts does not 'accompany' the action any more than the thought 'accompanies' speech. Thought and intention are neither 'articulated' nor 'non-articulated'; to be compared neither with a single note which sounds during the acting or speaking, nor with a tune.90

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87 RPP117.
For the young Wittgenstein thinking was a kind of language (NB 12.9.1916). Thought was assimilated to language. For the middle Wittgenstein, thought and language were the same; thinking was identified with speaking, i.e., linguistic expressions ([VI 1930-32 pp.425; BB p.6].
88 PI p217e.
He also says:...
'Thinking' and 'inward speech'—I do not say 'to oneself'—are different concepts) [PI p.211e].
89 PI § 335.
90 PI p.217e.
It may be pointed out that speaking is an articulated process. Whereas thinking is not, it cannot be called a process at all. The concept ‘thinking’ is not a concept of an experience.\textsuperscript{91}

Glock points out that Wittgenstein later came to realize the obvious: saying that $p$ and thinking that $p$ are not the same and we do not express all our thoughts in words. And we often say that $p$ when we think that $q$. Further when I am asked to express the thought underlying my utterance, I do not look ‘inside’ to provide a description. I simply \textit{paraphrase}, i.e., restructure or reword my utterance. So language is the genuine expression of our thoughts. Moreover Glock also points out that all thoughts, though they need not actually be expressed, must at least be capable of being expressed.\textsuperscript{92} Arrington points out it makes no sense to say that I am either ignorant or know what I think.\textsuperscript{93}

Knowing my thoughts can only mean that I have the ability to express my thoughts but it is nonsense to say, I am ignorant of my thoughts. If I say I cannot express my thoughts, it means that I cannot adequately express it or I am dissatisfied with its expression. In that case this thought becomes nonsense for all thoughts must be capable of being expressed or manifested in whatever way. And we do not ascribe thoughts to creatures that are not capable of manifesting them Ascription of thoughts makes sense only where there is criteria for identifying thoughts.

\textsuperscript{91} Z 96.
Thinking is not a necessary accompaniment of meaningful speech. Still further, neither thinking nor speaking is necessary requirement of thoughtful actions and manifestations.

‘For the thinking is not an accompaniment of the work, any more than of thoughtful speech.’

In the *PI* Wittgenstein writes: “when I think in language, there are no “meanings” hovering in my mind, alongside the verbal expressions.” This shows that language is the verbal expression of thoughts and thought is not something accompanying the verbal expressions. Wittgenstein also repudiated the view that thought exists prior (as distinct from accompanying) to speaking. It is not a necessary requirement that thoughts must exist before they are expressed.

The diversification and variety of thought is also brought out in the example of slaves who do not use language.

They cannot learn to talk, but the cleverer ones among them can be taught to do quite complicated work; and some of these creatures work ‘thinkingly’, others quite mechanically. For a thinking one we pay more than for one that is merely mechanically clever.

The slaves in this example can work ‘thoughtfully’ but do not have the capacity of using language. That some of them are ‘thinking people’ can be determined in terms of their behaviour, as opposed to the merely mechanical ones. Thus thinking is a widely ramified concept. Consider the following:

94 Z 101.
95 *PI* §329.
96 *PI* §335.
97 Z 108.
Is thinking an activity? Well, one may tell someone: ‘Think it over!’ But if someone is obeying this order talks to himself ... does he then carry out two activities? Therefore thinking really can’t be compared to an activity at all. For one cannot say that thinking means: speaking in one’s imagination. This can also be done without thinking.⁹⁸

Here Wittgenstein is saying that thinking cannot be compared to an activity at all. I surmise that Wittgenstein is here implying that thinking cannot be classified as an activity only. It may be an activity; it may not also be one. He says thinking does not mean speaking in one’s imagination, because that is possible without thinking. Oswald Hanfling points out that may be Wittgenstein did not want to say that thinking is never an activity. What he probably wanted to say was that thinking is not necessarily an activity and that ‘speaking in one’s imagination is not necessarily thinking.⁹⁹ Consider the following.

Remember that our language might possess a variety of different words: one for ‘thinking out loud’; one for thinking as one talks to oneself in the imagination; one for a pause during which something or other floats before the mind, after which, however, we are able to give a confident answer. One word for a thought expressed in a sentence; one for the lightning thought which I may later ‘clothe in words’; one for wordless thinking as one works.¹⁰⁰

This passage is suggestive of the fact that thinking can be done variously, i.e., there are different forms of thinking. They may be enumerated as

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⁹⁸ RPPII 193; Z 123.
¹⁰⁰ Z 122.
follows: (i) Wordless or silent thinking, i.e., thoughts here are unexpressed in any form. (ii) Thinking that involves expressions. Firstly, in such a case the manifestations could be verbal and linguistic as when we speak about our thoughts. This can be performed by the mouth, by the hand, in writing, in drawing, in playing a piece of music and so on. Secondly, the manifestations could be displayed in one's actions and activities that he does. And here such activities may or may not take place with meaningful speech. For example, one can solve an intricate jigsaw puzzle and yet talk about something else, completely unrelated like what time of the day is it in Vienna at the moment. In such a case what does one call the thinking—the action or the speech? But here one must be cautious so as not to equate thinking with a bodily activity. At the same time we also have the following cases. (i) Speaking to oneself without thinking like counting before going to sleep. (ii) Having images without thinking (of the images). Obviously it must be kept in mind that one can think without images. All this suggests as Wittgenstein rightly pointed out that thinking is a widely ramified concept. That a person is thinking is generally identified by the thoughtful nature of the work or talk he is doing, by referring for example to the tone of speech, to the gestures he is using etc. P.M.S. Hacker endorses Ryle's claim that the verb 'to think' is a polymorphous one, like 'to try', 'to practice', and 'to obey'. We characterize A's tactless remarks as thoughtless not due to the "absence of an antecedent process of talking to himself, imagining certain things, moving his larynx or the absence of an inner process postulated by a theory, but the fact that he did not take into account the feelings of the addressee. We say that the watchmaker puts

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101 Z 123; "Thinking is not a bodily activity".
102 RPP II 216; 218; Z 110.
the watch together with thought, not because his movements are
accompanied by inner processes (which they may or may not be), but
because he does what he does with care, taking precautions against error,
breakage and damage."104 Therefore, mental processes need not be
regarded as characteristic marks of thinking.105

An article entitled *On Thinking* by Justus Hartnack106 may be
considered. Hartnack starts by pointing out that there are two kinds of
mental verbs – process verbs like 'to day dream' and 'to think'; and
achievement verbs like 'to understand', 'to mean', 'to identify', 'to
recognize', 'to infer'. On the other hand, in tautological expressions like
"No human being can help thinking when he is neither unconscious nor
sound asleep"107 thinking covers any mental activity. Hartnack points out
the impossibility of identifying thinking with any conceivable process,
although in fact it is a process. Generally thinking is identified with any of
the following three process – mental images, with speech-acts and with
neurophysiological processes in the brain. But the author argues that
thinking cannot be identified with any of these. Firstly, thinking is not
identical with mental images because a thought is either true or false but a
mental image is not. Thinking in the sense of speculating is pondering
attempts to find something whereas a mental image does not help us to
find out anything. Moreover, different people using different images may
think of one and the same thing. Secondly, thinking cannot be identical
with neuro-physiological processes in the brain because if it were then I
could not know when I was thinking and when I was not. There is a
categorical difference between 'thoughts exist' and 'brain-processes exist'.

104 Ibid. p.72.
105 Ibid.
107 Ibid. p.543.
And thirdly the view that thinking is identical with behaviour is misleading. This is so because it fails to distinguish between a thought and its expression. By behaviour is normally meant speech acts which may refer to physical occurrence of certain words as well as to acts by which something is said or expressed. But the problem is I do not listen to my own speech to be informed of what I am saying but this may well be the case when I listen to other people. There is a difference between saying something to somebody and saying something with one's own inner voice. The former conveys information unlike the latter. Acts of thoughts consist of acts as doubting a particular proposition, denying it, or regarding it as a possibility or rejecting it. The act of stating a thought is something different from a thought as an act. But they are not two acts. If they were so then one could be performed without the other and would make unexpressed thoughts nonsense. Thoughts are not identical with the formulation or stating of them. But whenever there is a thought it is also formulated or stated. A thought is therefore an application of knowledge. Thinking consists of thoughts — it "is the stream of thoughts."\textsuperscript{108} It is necessary that thoughts have to be expressed or formulated because otherwise there would be thoughts which are not, nor can be the content of our consciousness. So wherever there is a thought there is also an expression of it. Or in other words "there can be no thoughts and no thinking if there is no language".\textsuperscript{109}

Wittgenstein raises the question, 'can a machine think?' and proceeds to say 'we only say of a human being and what is like one that it thinks.'\textsuperscript{110} So if by a machine we mean something that does not behave

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid, p.550.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid, p.551.
\textsuperscript{110} PI §360.
and perform like a human being, we cannot ascribe thinking to it. P.M.S. Hacker points out that there is nothing as the mind/brain. Human beings do have brains but that brain cannot be said to intelligibly formulate anything, like theorising or forming a conceptual framework. Only people can do such things. People have minds but that mind is not an organ for formulating concepts and theories. Rather, having a mind, signifies possessing an intellect, will, memory and an array of faculties and capacities. Definitely one cannot have a mind without having a brain. But one will not be able to walk, run eat or drink without a brain also. Yet the brain is never considered the agent for such activities as walking, drinking, running etc.\textsuperscript{111} So why should the mind be considered the agent for thinking, willing and feeling?

In \textit{RPP}, Wittgenstein says that psychological concepts are everyday concepts and are not new ones introduced by science.\textsuperscript{112} Hacker\textsuperscript{113} points out that learning psychological verbs is learning the use of these expressions and they are far removed from theoretical concerns. First person present tense psychological verbs are used “to give expression or to manifest one’s beliefs, hopes, fears, and expectations, one’s likes and dislikes, one’s wants and intentions.” They are not reports or hypotheses about one’s inner states or processes underlying one’s behaviour. Rather to learn the use of psychological predicates is to learn the “Janus-faced employment” of a word. Therefore Hacker concludes “Psychological concepts are not concepts of imperceptible entities, like genes or viruses, or concepts of theoretical entities, like mesons or quarks. Indeed, they are

\textsuperscript{112} \textit{RPP} II 62.
not concepts of 'entities' at all."114 And "It is no theory that an utterance of
the form 'I V that p', where 'V' is a verb such as 'think', 'believe', 'fear',
etc. is a criterion for the speaker's V-ing. It is a rule of grammar that is
partly constitutive of the meaning of the relevant verb."115 Hacker points
out that there are criteria for the application of psychological predicates
which every normal human being uses and satisfies in his daily life
countless times. The function of psychological vocabulary is diverse and
manifold like that of human speech. It is as intricate and extensive as the
phenomena of life itself and the diversity of their use and signification
partly constitute human life. It makes us the 'kind of beings that we are'.

The question arises; where do we think? In our minds or in our
heads? We do many activities with our physical organs, like walk with our
legs; eat with our mouths and so on. This leads us to suppose that the
elusive process of thinking is done by some mysterious organ, the mind.
Wittgenstein, however, elsewhere says "to say that thinking is an activity
of the mind as writing is an activity of the hand is a travesty of the
truth".116 Actually, according to Wittgenstein we need not use the word
"mind" as denoting a particular organ or object. Confusions creep in
because of a misuse; although it does not stand for some object, the word
"mind" has a certain use in our language. In *Zettel* Wittgenstein writes:

... would thinking be a specific *organic* process of the mind, so to
speak—as it were chewing and digesting in the mind? In that case,
can we replace it by an inorganic process that fulfils the same end,

114 Ibid. p.74.
115 Ibid.
116 PG 106 [ cf. Chap-III].
using, as it were, a prosthetic apparatus for thinking? How should we have to image a prosthetic organ of thought?\textsuperscript{117}

This shows that the word 'mind' is not to be used at par with other organs. The other organs can have prosthetic replacement but not the mind. In this connection it may be pointed out that sometimes we say 'thinking is done by the brain' where obviously the brain is an organ unlike the mind. But the expression 'thinking is done by the brain' is not used in the same fashion and manner as we use, for example, expressions like 'eating is done by the mouth' or 'writing is done by the hand'. Wittgenstein warns "one of the most dangerous ideas for philosophers is remarkably, that we think with our heads or in our heads".\textsuperscript{118} I wish to point out that these expressions like 'thinking in the mind'; 'thinking in the brain'; 'thinking in the head' are used metaphorically and are not to be taken in the literal sense. They in fact help to show the multitude of ramifications of the concept of thought in accordance with human practices. Such uses testify that the concept of thinking is enormous in its range covering a wide array of reactions, responses and practices. This is supported by the claim Wittgenstein makes: The expression "to think" must be considered as a tool.\textsuperscript{119} So the question arises 'what is thinking'? An investigation and analysis as Wittgenstein does shows that there is no such thing or process that can be defined or identified as thinking. Thinking can be done in words, i.e., language, internal or verbal but words are neither necessary nor sufficient for thinking. In the case of meaningful speech, thought is not a process accompanying our speech. Neither is language the translation of a prior process of thinking. Thinking cannot be described as an activity

\textsuperscript{117} Z 607.
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid. 605.
\textsuperscript{119} PI § 360.
also because in some cases it is passive. So if thinking is none of these, doesn’t it appear to be enigmatic?\textsuperscript{120} Thinking is all and no one of these at the same time. It is a concept having myriad uses and diversifications. When we consider any one aspect, we are considering one of the many ramifications of thinking. It may be said to be an intricate branching system having interlocking facilities and comprising innumerable intersections, all within the way of human life. And if and when we consider whether animals and machines are thinking beings we fail to keep in mind that thinking is not a process but one which has innumerable ramifications.

We do ascribe thinking to animals – as Wittgenstein says that a dog may believe that his master is at the door.\textsuperscript{121} But he also raised the question whether the dog can think that his master will come tomorrow. There is room for reasonable doubt in such a case because the dog cannot express in any manner whether he believes that his master will come there tomorrow. From this we may take the liberty to conjecture that all thoughts must have the potentiality of being expressed, i.e., must be capable of being expressed in any of the accepted ways in line with human practice and within the sphere of human life. Regarding the issue whether machines can think, Wittgenstein points out: The question whether machines could think is not an empirical one. It is only of a human being and of that which resembles one do we say that it thinks.\textsuperscript{122}

And the trouble which is expressed in this question is not really that we don’t yet know a machine which could do the job. The question

\textsuperscript{121} PI p.174e; LW I 360.
\textsuperscript{122} PI § 360.
is not analogous to that which someone might have asked a hundred years ago: “Can a machine liquefy a gas?” The trouble is rather that the sentence, “A machine thinks (perceives, wishes)”: seems somehow nonsensical.\textsuperscript{123}

Generally, it is part of the history of mankind to ascribe thinking to human beings and often to animals but never to anything else, least of all machines and inanimate objects. The issue of a machine thinking and perceiving seems to be nonsense from this perspective. The concept of thought, no matter how widely ramified it is, is circumscribed and applicable within certain perimeters afforded by human practice. It is not in our practice to say of a machine that it thinks, so we don’t and any attempt to do so is nonsensical. So ultimately we come down to a point where we see that thought or thinking is circumscribed by human praxis.

SENSE AND NONSENSE

In the \textit{PI} the concept of sense and nonsense is related to use rather than to thought. Consider the following:

To say “this combination of words makes no sense” excludes it from the sphere of language and thereby bounds the domain of language.\textsuperscript{124}

And:

When a sentence is called senseless, it is not as it were its sense that is senseless. But a combination of words is being excluded from the language, withdrawn from circulation.\textsuperscript{125}

\textsuperscript{123}BB p.47.
\textsuperscript{124} \textit{PI} § 499.
\textsuperscript{125} \textit{PI} § 500.
From the above it appears that nonsense combination of words is considered to be nonsense because human practices do not allow them i.e., they are not in use and thereby excluded from language. So sense and nonsense have nothing to do with anything inherent in a sentence. Sense and nonsense language are to be considered from the perspective as to whether the language, sentence, word or combination of words are in vogue. Consider the following from RPP

"A contradiction doesn’t make sense" does not mean that the sense of a contradiction is nonsense—we exclude contradictions from language; we have no clear-cut use for them, and we don’t want to use them.126

From the above it seems that a contradiction like 'A round square' is nonsense not because it means an impossibility but it is an impossibility because such a syntax is not allowed (since it is not used) in our linguistic practices and we simply do not use such a combination of words. So we may infer that the distinction between sense and nonsense springs from the issue about use and has nothing to do with an inherent meaning, for the later Wittgenstein.

SECTION II: THE THINKING SELF

It is well known that the paramount importance in the history of modern philosophy, starting from Descartes has been ascribed to the certainty of the subject of experiences. According to Descartes the starting point of all philosophy is the cogito or the ego, whose existence is indubitable. Descartes' dualism gave rise to the inner-outer dichotomy, according to which the human mind is a private world to which only the

126 RPP II 290.
subject has privileged access and is distinct from a public physical world comprising matter. Hume gave us the 'bundle' theory and famously pointed out:

For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.¹²⁷

Kant on the other hand, said “I = the unity of all representations”. Wittgenstein’s sustained attack against this basic foundation of modern philosophy is ‘the swim against the tide’. For Wittgenstein ‘nothing is hidden’. He repudiates the idea that the concepts of thought, feeling, intention, belief, expectation, willing and others belong to an inner private realm to which only the individual possessing them has privileged access. First person present tense psychological utterances, like ‘I have a pain’, ‘I expect that ...’, ‘I hope that ...’, are not reports or descriptions of inner, private, hidden on-goings.

A. INNER-OUTER (Innen-Außen)

The prevalent view is that the subject of experience has access to his ‘inner’ mental objects which is ‘hidden’ from others. While I can directly observe the contents of my own mind, others can only surmise based on my behaviour and other external manifestations. So the content of my experience is ‘private’ which is inaccessible to any other being. This picture shows that we have perceptual access to the contents of our own

world of consciousness. In that case it may be argued that the subject has essentially a private language to refer to his private sensations. For if it is not a private language but a common one, the claim of such sensations and contents being 'inner' and hidden will not stand. But at the same time if I am to refer to my 'innermost' experiences and wish that others should understand me, I am obviously using a common language, following a rule to enable a common understanding of the words and expressions referring to 'my sensations' alone (unless I use a common language, I cannot be understood by others). But the paradox lies in the fact that in that case the common language cannot refer to something that is essentially 'mine'. If I am to be understood not only by others but also by myself when speaking about my 'inner self', the possibility of a private language is ruled out. Hence the 'inner self' is a misconception of our language; nothing can be hidden and a public, common language is used to refer to psychological concepts. Wittgenstein has given the beetle argument to show the impossibility of a private language.128 Everybody is given a box with something inside it which is to be the meaning of the word 'beetle' for that person. No one has access to anybody else's box; in fact even if the boxes were empty no one would know. In this situation if they talk of 'beetle' it cannot be about what is in their boxes. On similar grounds, if psychological predicates like 'pain' refer to each person's private matters, no one would be able to understand and there would be no common meaning of the word at all. That there are common meanings shows that a private language is not possible. If we do not use the kind of language that we do use, then our words would be different and meanings would be different. But this by no chance establishes the priority of psychological terms as referring to private sense-data. That there is a

128 PI §293.
common meaning for the word 'pain', by means of which we are able to communicate, establishes the fact that it is not the name of a private sensation.

The traditional belief about privileged access to the contents of our own private world of consciousness i.e., the 'inner' to which no one else can have access to implied that we can only infer about the contents of other people's minds based on observation of external manifestations. So the question of doubt never arises in my case but does in the case of other people, because the possibility remains that others could be pretending or shamming, for example, of pain. According to Wittgenstein this belief in the mind as a realm of hidden and ethereal entities, states and processes is due to a misapprehension of our language. The 'inner' facade is nothing but an illusion. In the PI, he writes:

How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states about behaviourism arise?—The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk of processes and states and leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we shall know more about them—we think. But that is just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process better ... So we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium.\textsuperscript{129}

We generally tend to suppose that the term 'I' in first person utterances refers to some entity since the third person utterances are about somebody. It is also held that 'I' in sentences like 'I have a fair

\textsuperscript{129} PI §308.
complexion’; ‘I am six-foot tall’ refers to my body and not to an immaterial soul. In utterances like ‘I am out of gas’; ‘I collided with a pillar box’, ‘I’ stands not for my body but for the car in which I am travelling. But first-person psychological utterances like ‘I have toothache’, ‘I am depressed’ do not refer to my body. In such cases the term ‘I’ is not replaceable by the term ‘my body’. So who is this ‘I’? Wittgenstein says: ‘I is not the name of a person, nor “here” of a place, and “this” is not a name’. Ashok Vohra points out the term ‘I’ does not have a stable referent. It only has a shifting referent. ‘I’ indicates me in my use of it; when you use it, it indicates you. So because of its changing referent, we may call it an ‘index word’. Vohra opines “So ‘I’ is not the name of a mysterious, concealed substance. The ‘I’ has a meaning and location within the contingencies of everyday experience. That is, ‘I’ turns up along with the world in concrete living. This ‘I’ can never be netted as an object because it is exhibited as I in company with events and things as they ordinarily occur ... but is something that is continually being manifested neither as an object, nor as a little ‘world’, but as something that accompanies the world. One cannot know ‘I’ or mind or self in isolation from the world. On the contrary, one knows it when one knows about the world”.

According to Wittgenstein first-person present tense psychological statements like ‘I have a pain’, ‘I expect that’, ‘I hope that’, etc. do not report or describe inner, private on-goings. Actually the problem arises because of the asymmetry between first-person present tense psychological utterances and third-person present tense psychological utterances. Despite the asymmetry, the first-person present tense psychological statements like ‘I have a pain’, ‘I expect that’, ‘I hope that’, etc. do not report or describe inner, private on-goings. Actually the problem arises because of the asymmetry between first-person present tense psychological utterances and third-person present tense psychological utterances. Despite the asymmetry, the first-person present tense

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131 PI §410.
utterances do not enjoy any special privileged position; this is the point
made by Wittgenstein time and again. When a man cries out in pain, there
is nothing behind the cry, or 'nothing is hidden' in Wittgensteinian
language. The idea of 'epistemic privacy' is repudiated by Wittgenstein,
according to which only I can know that I am in pain, while others can at
best surmise. One cannot be mistaken nor can one misperceive one's own
pain. When I say that I know that I am in pain, I am saying something
which is nonsense or just emphatically asserting that I am in pain. At the
same time, in the ordinary sense of 'know' others may, and often do,
know that I am in pain. Moreover, the sufferer does not know directly or
indirectly of his being in pain, he simply suffers it. Others know of his
pain by seeing him moan and writhe. We don't make an inference to the
fact that he is in pain, we see that he is suffering.133 Glock further points
out that according to Wittgenstein there can be no meaningful answer to
the question 'How do you know that you are in pain?' Since "I do not
observe, perceive or recognize my own sensations or experiences, I simply
have them".134

B. AVOWALS

Wittgenstein says expressions like "I see", "I hear", "I am
conscious" have their uses.135 They are avowals which are a common
translation of Äußerung or Ausdruck or Äusserungen the English alternative
terms being 'expression', 'manifestation'. They are substitutes for natural
expressions like cries, grimaces, and smiles. Avowals typically are not
used to convey information whereas third-person present tense

134 Ibid.
135 PI §416.
psychological utterances are generally informative and based on observation unlike the former.

Psychological verbs characterized by the fact that the third person of the present is to be identified by observation, the first person not.

Sentences in the third person of the present: information. In the first person present, expression.136

In the *PI* he writes "A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour ... the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it."137 So avowals like 'I have a pain', 'I have a toothache', are not descriptions. And verbal expressions like 'I have a pain' replaces the moans, the cries, which are natural expressions of pain. But when we refer to others we say 'He has a pain' or 'He has a toothache' which are descriptions. The difference in the two grammatical levels tends to make us suppose that the self-ascription of psychological predicates is to be explained differently from those that are ascribed to others. Consequently we tend to imagine 'inner' objects for explaining psychological predicates which are nothing but "grammatical fiction". When a man moans and writhes in pain and says 'I am in pain', there is nothing behind the utterance or the moaning. But the problem arises because a person could be faking the moaning. Despite the probability of counterfeit cases, it is absurd to suppose that there is anything behind the manifestations of pain. It is simply that I *have* pain. "The psychological

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136 RPPII. 63.
Also in Z 472.
137 PI §244.

In his notes for lectures during 1935-36 Wittgenstein wrote: We teach the child to use the words, "I have a toothache" to *replace* its moans [NFL p.295]. Later he wrote: 'Roughly, speaking: the expression "I have a toothache" *stands for* a moan but it does not mean "I moan".' [NFL p.301].
verbs to see, to believe, to think, to wish, do not signify phenomena [appearances].”

Consider the following:

In what sense are my sensations private?—well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it.—In one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense. If we are using the word “to know” as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know when I am in pain.—Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself!—It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain?

Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from my behaviour—for I cannot be said to learn of them. I have them.

The truth is: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself.

So in my case I have pain and it makes no sense to doubt it. This is reminiscent of the early transition years, where Wittgenstein had said the proposition ‘I have a toothache cannot be verified because that is the end of verification. Now Wittgenstein is saying that I do not learn that I am in pain, I simply have pain. This ‘having pain’ does not denote anything beyond it but is all in all, it is the pain. As a result the question ‘How do you know that you are in pain?’ is nonsense. Earlier Wittgenstein had said that ‘I have’ and ‘He has’ are on two different grammatical levels and ‘He

138 Z 471.
139 PI §246.
has...’ is open to verification. Now he is saying there is the possibility of doubt in: ‘He has pain’ but not when I say ‘I have pain’. There is a difference between the two cases, however slight it may be which may be said to grant avowals a different standing from third-person utterances. But Wittgenstein is in favour of considering contextual reference to remove such doubt and the possibility of shamming.

Wittgenstein points out that if pain is a private sensation then it could be possible that other people are shamming pain-behaviour; where nothing has happened he may be walking around and displaying as if he is in great pain. Moreover, an added possibility would also be that we could imagine inanimate objects like stones having pains.\textsuperscript{140} Wittgenstein says that we do often speak of inanimate things, as in fairy tales, of having sensations, but these are secondary uses.

“But in a fairy tale the pot too can see and hear!” (Certainly; but it can also talk.) ...

We do indeed say of an inanimate thing that it is in pain; when playing with dolls for example. But this use of the concept of pain is a secondary one.\textsuperscript{141}

To overcome such difficulties Wittgenstein speaks of taking contexts into considerations. For example, we do not doubt that a man is pretending to be in pain when he is lying in a pool of blood and moaning. Manifestation of what we call pain behaviour together with the context helps us to determine whether “He is in pain”. The criterion of saying “He is in pain” and the like is subject to change with the changes in the situation and the

\textsuperscript{140} Ibid. §283.
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid. §282.
context and the same may also be said of “I am in pain”. So at times we may be certain, at other times doubtful in our application of psychological predicates to others. And if we merely conceive doubt to know that another person is in pain, we could easily construct doubt for anything else, like 2+2=4, like the case of the malignant demon of Descartes. But according to Wittgenstein, doubt must have an end.\textsuperscript{142}

Wittgenstein answers negatively to the general supposition that sensations are incommunicable or inalienable. If ‘pain’ is a private sensation which is known or felt only by the person having it, then I may never know what it is to say that another person has a pain. But we often do know with certainty that ‘He is in pain’, for example after a surgery. If ‘pain’ denotes a private sensation, known only by me and present to me in the depths of my consciousness, ‘pain-talk’ in case of others becomes unintelligible. Moreover it is nonsensical to say that I have a pain which is going on all the while but I do not feel it because that would be a self-contradiction. So it is not possible that there is a pain which I feel and no one else can feel and also that there is a pain which I do not feel but another person has. I can know when others are in pain and others can equally know whether I am in pain. According to Wittgenstein there is no logical absurdity in supposing that one can in principle feel pain in another’s body. For Wittgenstein it is possible that another person might be able to feel a pain in my body or I may feel pain in another person’s body. (Of course this sounds ridiculous but we may suppose that the two bodies are wired in connection)

In so far as it makes sense to say that my pain is the same as his, it is also possible for us both to have the same pain. (And it would also

\textsuperscript{142} Ibid. §180.
be imaginable for two people to feel pain in the same – not just the corresponding – place. That might be the case with Siamese twins, for instance.)

So a pain as long as I could feel it, would be mine, no matter in whose body it occurs. So the question of ‘privacy’ of pain is ruled out. We tend to suppose that the statement “I can’t feel your pain” is the same sort as “I can’t put your shoes on”. But here we are making a mistake because the former one is not an empirical statement which is verifiable by facts of experience unlike the latter. Rather it is equivalent to propositions like ‘I can’t play patience with you’. It shows logical impossibilities. But according to Wittgenstein there is no logical absurdity in supposing that one can in principle feel pain in another’s body.

A.C. Grayling points out that there are not two sets of rules that govern the ascription of psychological predicates, one to myself and the other to others. I definitely can determine whether someone else is in pain only on the basis of his behaviour but this should go hand-in-hand with my grasping of the rules for the use of the word “pain”. Grayling points out that this is not any kind of a behaviourist theory. For Wittgenstein, the behavioural signs of groaning, whining in pain are only criteria for application of the word “pain” and he does not say that the meaning of pain consists in a set of bodily signs. Thus Grayling points out:

...understanding this is part of understanding pain—talk. But given this understanding, the way such behaviour enters into the web of our activities and practices, and the relation of these to our nature,

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143 Ibid. §233.
tells me when it is appropriate to say another is in pain (and also when to say, 'this is a case of pretence' and the like.)\textsuperscript{146}

Against the primacy of privacy, let us consider the following:

"But if I suppose that someone has a pain, then I am simply supposing that he has just the same as I have so often had."—That gets us no further. It is as if I were to say: "you surely know what 'It is 5 o'clock here' means; so you also know what 'It's 5 o'clock on the sun' means. It means simply that it is just the same time there as it is here when it is 5 o'clock".—The explanation by means of identity does not work here. For I know well enough that one can call 5 o'clock here and 5 o'clock there "the same time", but what I do not know is in what cases one is to speak of its being the same time here and, there.

In exactly the same way it is no explanation to say: The supposition that he has a pain is simply the supposition that he has the same as I. For that part of the grammar is quite clear to me: that is, that one will say that the stove has the same experience as I, if one says: it is in pain and I am in pain.\textsuperscript{147}

Here Wittgenstein is arguing against the view that pain can be a private sensation. If pain is a private sensation, then how can we say of another person that he has what I have or had on a previous occasion? (We do often say 'He has a pain that I have'). If pain is to be identified by being unique to someone then 'I have pain' and 'He has pain' would be analogically the same as 'It is 5 o'clock in Calcutta' and 'It is 5 o'clock on

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{147} PI §350.
the sun'. But we cannot say that it is 5 o'clock on the sun in the same sense as it is 5 o'clock here, because being 5 o'clock on the sun does not have the same meaning and is not used in the same manner as being 5 o'clock at a place on earth. When I say 'He has pain', what I mean is that I can imagine his pain as being similar to mine.

If we are to talk and effect a successful communication about our sensations like 'pain', then they must have meanings which can be understood by others and anything private that may accompany such sensations is beside the point. Therefore, Severin Schroeder points out firstly, identity of a private experience, e.g., 'pain' is immaterial in our public communication about it. And secondly pain is not a private experience because the meaning of the word 'pain' is not determined by the identity of a private experience.\(^{148}\)

Let us consider the following:

One has to imagine someone else's pain on the model of one's own, this is none too easy a thing to do: for I have to imagine pain which I do not feel on the model of the pain which I do feel. That is, what I have to do is not simply to make a transition in imagination from one place of pain to another. As, from pain in the hand to pain in the arm. For I am not to imagine that I feel pain in some region of his body (which would also be possible)

Pain-behaviour can point to a painful place—but the subject of pain is the person who gives it expression.\(^{149}\)

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\(^{149}\) PI §302.
Severin Schroeder points out that the difficulty Wittgenstein is highlighting here is how to move from ‘There is a pain’ to ‘He is in pain’. It is a contradiction in terms to suppose that someone else can have what I have i.e. ‘pain’. Therefore Schroeder says “what is required to make sense of the assumption that someone else is in pain is not having experienced pain oneself. It is not the pain needs, but the concept of pain (Z 547-8). And a grasp of this concept includes an understanding of what it means to ascribe pain to a particular person. One must know, in brief, that ‘the subject of pain is the person who gives it expression’ (PI §302)”. The whole meaning of the word ‘pain’ is jettisoned in the natural expressions and natural responses that the word sets in us. People who are not using it in the way we do (imagine aliens from a distant planet) would not know anything by the word ‘pain’ and would not behave in the manner we do in case of pain-behavior. Wittgenstein brings this out in the following:

“We see emotion”. — As opposed to what? — We do not see facial contortions and make inferences from them (like a doctor framing a diagnosis) to joy, grief, boredom. We describe a face immediately as sad, radiant, bored, even when we are unable to give any other description of the features—Grief, one would like to say, is personified in the face.151

C. PERSONAL IDENTITY

For Wittgenstein the criteria for identifying people cannot be an exclusive single criterion; it could consist of physical appearance, habits, behavior, etc. David Backhurst points out: “Rather, the term ‘person’ has a
‘composite’ use, governed by many overlapping criteria. Moreover, that we can deploy such criteria—that we have the concept of personhood we do—depends on certain contingent facts, such as the fact that a person’s appearance and characteristic ways of behaving tend to change only very slowly. Were circumstances different, Wittgenstein attests, our practices of naming and identification would likely be different too ... Our very idea of discrete persons who persist through time is thus premised upon certain contingent facts.”

The use of the terms ‘person’ and ‘personality’ is a matter of judgment. So there is no single criterion of personal identity either in terms of psychological or bodily factors; no strict necessary and sufficient conditions of personhood. It generally appears that the term ‘I’ is immune to referential failure nor can it mischaracterize the intention of the utterance. I do not mistake myself for anyone when I say ‘I am in pain’, for example. As compared to other personal pronouns, there is no presupposition involved in the use of ‘I’ of “identifying the referent through a name or description, or through a deictic gesture”. The term ‘I’ does not serve to identify someone; ‘I’ is not used to pick myself out from a group of people or things. The term ‘I’ can be used by anyone and its use can be understood by anyone without knowledge of any other identifying features. So for Wittgenstein, ‘I’ does not serve any identifying function, not even in cases of communication. David Backhurst points out ‘I’ is an indexical like ‘this’, ‘that’, ‘here’, ‘now’ and since there is no

153 Ibid. pp.227-228.

It may be remembered in the *BB* Wittgenstein had claimed that ‘I’ is immune from error only in first person psychological cases like in ‘I am in pain’. But in cases where ‘I’ is used as object, like in ‘I have broken my arm’, after an accident, there is no immunity (BB. pp.60-70) because I may mistake the arm of someone who is sitting closely to me to be mine. Here there is misidentification. But here it must be kept in mind that the misidentification is in respect of my arm for someone else’s broken arm and not misidentifying myself for someone else.
criteria of identification in the latter cases, 'I' should also be considered on
the same lines. Backhurst argues: "But why not conclude that 'I' is a super-
referring expression? If attempting to refer to something is like firing an
arrow at a target, we can think of 'I' as a magic arrow that cannot miss.
Wittgenstein rebuts this suggestion. Using 'I' is more like drawing a target
around an arrow already stuck in the wall. Where a term is used to refer,
some work must be done to pick out a particular object. This is not so with
the use of 'I', and thus, Wittgenstein concludes, we should not think of it
as a referring expression at all". Therefore, according to Wittgenstein 'I'
is not a referring expression and first-person psychological utterances are
neither descriptions nor reports of inner states. H.J. Glock is however of
the opinion that the issue of whether 'I' is a referring expression depends
on the use of the term 'referring', which has not been adequately
discussed by Wittgenstein. The term 'I' helps to determine the sense of the
propositions in which it occurs by saying about whom the proposition is
about (like in 'I broke a vase', I say who did it), but it is different from
other referring expressions in its contribution. David Backhurst is of the
opinion that just because 'I' does not serve as a device for singling out a
person when one is thinking, we need not conclude that 'I' does not refer for
two reasons. "First, no thinker is alone in the world. The first-person
pronoun is part of a public language and in communicative contexts the
function of 'I' is (at least in some sense) to indicate the individual who is
speaking. Second, the first-person pronoun is deployed in the expression
of thoughts, feelings and desires, and if I am to express myself I must, as it
were, establish a first-personal perspective. There is an indexicality to this
perspective that is ineliminable. It is mine. Of course, I recognize an

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equivalence between the statement, 'I am giving a lecture', said by me, and statement, 'David Backhurst is giving a lecture', said by anyone. But I recognize the equivalence only because I accept as true a further indexical thought—that I am David Backhurst. If the first-person pronoun is a critical ingredient in articulating such first-personal thoughts, then its use has a purpose, and one not somehow undermined by its immunity to referential error.”¹⁵⁷ Norman Malcolm points out that for Wittgenstein ‘I’ in ‘I am in pain’ does not serve to identify, designate or refer to a particular person.¹⁵⁸

Wittgenstein is emphatic in his denial of the self or subject of thinking and his resistance of the ‘I’ as an owner is continuous.

D. WITTGENSTEIN AND BEHAVIOURISM

It has often been charged that Wittgenstein endorses a version of behaviorism. Although many scholars have repudiated this allegation. Wittgenstein's views are very abstruse and knotty in this respect. Of course he does not equate thinking and behavior as Skinner has done. Rather his enquiry is a grammatical one. The middle Wittgenstein did give a behaviorist account of third-person psychological statements like 'N.N. is sad'. Knowledge of such propositions is to be based on behavioral evidence, considering that the meaning of a proposition is its method of verification. Therefore, the ascription of psychological predicates to others is to talk of their behavior. But how does one verify a proposition like 'I am sad'? Such a proposition cannot be verified by observing one's behavior. In the transitional phase Wittgenstein said that such

propositions can be translated as 'There is sadness' where the 'I' does not
denote an owner. The mature Wittgenstein went on to say that first person
present tense utterances are not descriptions of any kind. Rather they are
avowals and do not express behavior. And in such cases the contextual
reference as to be noted to overcome the possibility of shamming or
faking. For example, some expressions may be considered as
manifestations of sadness on one occasion but not in another.

Moore’s account of Wittgenstein’s lectures shows that by the early
1930’s Wittgenstein had cognized that first-person present tense
psychological utterances stand apart from others in the sense that
verificationism is not applicable to them. I cannot verify for example that I
feel pain, I feel hot or I am sad. But such sentences are nevertheless
meaningful. Behaviorism rejected the inner criteria of verifying one’s own
first-person declarations with mental states. Rather it recommended
comparing them with one’s own behavior. This was unilaterally rejected
by Wittgenstein. In the early 1930’s he writes:

If I say I believe that someone is sad, it’s as though I am seeing his
behavior through the medium of sadness, from the viewpoint of
sadness. But could you say: ‘It looks to me as if I’m sad, my head is
drooping so’?159

Moore’s lecture notes also testify this.

... In this connection he said later, first, that the meaning of
‘verification’ is different when we speak of verifying ‘I have’ from
what it is when we speak of verifying ‘He has’, and then, later still,
that there is no such thing as a verification for ‘I have’, since the

159 PR pp.89-90.
question ‘How do you know that you have a toothache?’ is nonsensical. He criticized two answers which might be given to this last question by people who do think it is not nonsensical, by saying (1) that the answer ‘Because I feel it’ won’t do, because ‘I feel it’ means the same as ‘I have it’, and (2) that the answer ‘I know it by inspection also won’t do, because it implies that I can ‘look to see’ whether I have it or not, whereas ‘looking to see whether I have it or not’ has no meaning.160

Glock161 points out for Wittgenstein the ascription of psychological predicates to other people is logically connected with their behavior. But the connection is not of logical equivalence between propositions that are psychological and those that are behavioral. Rather it should be kept in mind that it is sensible to ascribe mental phenomena only to creatures who can manifest them and psychological terms make sense only where they are bound up with some behavior, no matter how diverse. For example, “if we came across human beings who used a word which lacked any connection with pain—behavior and the circumstances in which we display it, we could not translate it as pain”.162 Glock points out “the relationship between mental phenomena and their behavioral manifestations is not a causal one to be discovered empirically, through theory and induction, but a criterial one: it is part of the concepts of particular mental phenomena that they have a characteristic manifestation

162 Ibid. p.12.
in behavior... And it is part of mental concepts in general that they have some such manifestation’.

It is true that the criteria for the description of psychological predicates except in cases of self-ascription are behavior. For such ascriptions are based on observations of behavioral manifestation. Yet Wittgenstein was not a behaviorist in the sense that he insisted that words like ‘pain’, ‘joy’, ‘belief’, ‘thought’ stand for forms of behavior. Sentences with psychological predicates are not always about behavior neither do they stand for states or processes that cause behavior.

Wittgenstein’s approach seems vulnerable to behaviorism because the use of psychological predicates for others can only be based on behavioral criteria. We can observe only the behavior of others and nothing else. But the use of such predicates in case of oneself is not based on observation of one’s own behavior. Wittgenstein was not a behaviorist in the sense of insisting that the words like ‘pain’, ‘joy’, ‘intention’, ‘belief’, ‘thought’ stand for forms of behavior. In answer to the question that there is no pain without pain behavior, Wittgenstein replies that only of a living human being and what resembles and behaves like one can we say that it has sensations, sees, hears, is deaf, conscious or unconscious. Wittgenstein, although he recognizes the distinction between propositions about physical behavior and propositions about psychological phenomena, does not explain them in terms of the inner-outer picture. Rather, for him, the differences lie the use of the terms in the language games they occur.

Hark points out the question ‘How can we verify

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163 Ibid.
164 PI §281.

313
what another person thinks?’ cannot be answered by empirical facts because it is not an empirical question at all. “The question is answered by describing the rules for psychological judgments about another person’s thoughts and hence is conceptual. That there are no definite (behavioral) criteria for establishing that another person feels pain, feigns pain or is thinking of a divorce while reading a book, is not an empirical shortcoming analogous to our being unable to enter a room in order to check whether there is a person there or our inability to discover the (viral) cause of a disease.”166 Wittgenstein is close to behaviourism:

...Is it not important that for me hope lives in the breast? Isn’t this a picture of one or another important bit of human behaviour? Why does a human being believe a thought comes into his head? Or, more correctly, he does not believe it; he lives it. For he clutches at his head; he shuts his eyes in order to be alone with himself in his head. He tilts his head back and makes a movement, as a sign that nothing should disturb the process in the head. Now are these not important kinds of behaviour?167

Wittgenstein has argued against behaviorism and has attempted to make the point that the use and meaning of psychological terms do not refer to inner states. ‘I am in pain’ is a natural expression of pain and does not describe an inner state. Wittgenstein does not like Ryle, maintain that a person knows about his or her own mental states on the basis of observing behavior. But he does accept that attribution of mental states to other people is definitely on the basis of behavioral criteria. And hence our psychological judgments of other people do have room for error.

166 Ibid, p.213.
167 RPPI. 278
Wittgenstein's point is the claim that one cannot know another person's thoughts directly but can only surmise them, refers to a logical impossibility and not a physical impossibility.

Wittgenstein's view of thinking and speaking is opposed to both behaviorist and cognitive science approaches. With them he agrees that thinking is intimately related to speaking. But how they are related has not been specified. "Talking is the expression of thought", as pointed out by Robert L. Arrington. Wittgenstein obviously did not equate thinking to behavior unlike BF Skinner. Rather Wittgenstein's enquiry is a grammatical one. Thinking may be expressed in behavior but the two are not identical. Behavior is a process unlike thinking. Psychological vocabulary is not used 'in order to comprehend, predict, explain and manipulate the behavior of humans'. Vocabulary has myriad uses and is a part of human life itself. Although we do also read human behavior by reference to their desires, intentions, purposes and goals.

Wittgenstein is therefore disputing the behaviorist's claim that psychological terms refer and are to be analyzed in terms of actual behavior. The inner-outer dichotomy is thrashed out by Wittgenstein. According to him present tense psychological utterances like 'I am in pain' are not descriptions of an inner state but akin to natural expressions like cries, grimaces, i.e., avowals. According to Wittgenstein I never 'identify my sensation by criteria'. I simply have a pain, a toothache. In case of

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168 They stand in closest connexion. Pp.217e.
170 Norman Malcolm points out that the word 'akin' denotes both differences as well as similarities; 'I am in pain' is a sentence whereas grimaces and groans are not. [Malcolm, Norman. 1986. Nothing is Hidden: Wittgenstein's Criticism of his Early Thought. Basil Blackwell. U.K. p.139.]
171 PI §290.
other people, the ascription of such predicates is done on the basis of behavioral criteria.

I infer that he needs to go to the doctor from observation of his behavior; but I do not make this inference in my own case from observation of my behavior. Or rather, I do this too sometimes, but not in analogous cases.\textsuperscript{172}

It follows from the above that I do not apply psychological predicates to myself on the basis of my behavior. I do not observe from my behavior that I have a toothache. I simply have it. The word ‘I’ in ‘I am in pain’ instead of being used to refer to someone or picking out someone among others, is used to draw attention to \textit{myself}.

‘But at any rate when you say “I am in pain”, you want to draw the attention of others to a particular person’.—The answer might be: no, I want to draw their attention to \textit{myself}.\textsuperscript{173}

This is confirmed in the following paragraph also.

‘When I say “I am in pain”, I do not point to a person, who is in pain, since in a certain sense, I don’t know at all \textit{who} is in pain.’ And this can be justified. For the main point is: I did not say that such-and-such a person is in pain, but ‘I am ...’. Now in saying this I don’t name any person. Just as I don’t name anyone when I \textit{groan} with pain, though someone else sees who is in pain from the groaning. What does it mean to know \textit{who} is in pain? It means, for example, to know which man in this room is in pain: for instance, the one who is sitting there, or the one who is standing in that

\textsuperscript{172} Z 539.
\textsuperscript{173} PI \S 405.
corner, the tall one over there with the blond hair, and so on. — What am I getting at? At this, that there are many different criteria for the 'identity' of a person.

Now which of them determines my saying that 'I' am in pain?
None.\textsuperscript{174}

So personal identity is not to be established on the basis of behavioral criteria. And the identity of a person can be established in diverse ways.

Therefore, Wittgenstein gives a powerful case against behavioral criteria for oneself. And the behavioral criteria for other persons are diverse, involving a number of factors like situation, custom, usage, etc.

CONCLUSION:

The 'ultimate' Wittgenstein makes a purely grammatical probe into thought as well as the thinking self. He concludes that thinking cannot be identified with anyone single process or a family of cases. Uniqueness lies in its variegated use in our life. Moreover, what we are accustomed to call the thinking self cannot also be pinned down to one such substantive. Rather the term 'I' as signifying the thinking self is also used as a part of our language, and depending on the way we are using our language, there are a great many criteria for personal identity. So we find the 'ultimate' Wittgenstein linking language with our everyday activities and his philosophical enquiry is covered, only in language. It is a fascinating exposition and perhaps this is what glorifies Wittgenstein to this day.

\textsuperscript{174} Ibid. §404.