The Neo-Hegelian Theory of Value

Part. 1

Sec. 1. In the history of idealist philosophy, Bosanquet for the first time gives us an exposition of the concept of value. We may bring out his contention by the single statement that the values that evolve in the life of finite beings are the real phases of the Absolute. That is, the values that a particular being manifests in the course of his self-realisation, which is, in fact, a gradual realisation of his own nature as determined by the Whole, are real as an account of the mode of self-expression of the Absolute, while the particular existence of the self itself is nothing but a vanishing entity. The content of this idea will be clear as we proceed.

Bosanquet is, however, persuaded to this position by Hegel, on the one hand, and by Green, on the other. He seeks to answer the question regarding the preservation of the essence of our being, as it was raised by Green. Bosanquet suggests that man should eternally live through the values he creates.

Sec. 2. Bradley and Bosanquet together have often been described to constitute a single philosophical personality, and a discussion about any one of them must have a reference to the other. It is true that an elaborate exposition of the concept of value is found in the philosophy of Bosanquet. But Bradley's philosophy, which proceeds on the same line with Bosanquet, (or rather, for whom Bosanquet owes his theory of metaphysics) also finds our finite life to be a continuous search after some ideal of perfection, though it does not ascribe anything more than an empirical validity to this search. Bosanquet accepts the main scheme of Bradley's philosophy. He only develops some implications of it and modifies it in certain respects in order to emphasise the problem of value.

1. Metz, 'Hundred years of British Philosophy.'
Sec. 3.: For Bradley as well as for Bosanquet reality is the infinite eternal whole. Both of them, in other words, inherit their systems from Hegel. The finite world exists in the Absolute as a moment of its self-realisation. But this idea is interpreted differently by the two philosophers. Now, we have seen that the role of the evolution of finite consciousness with reference to the Absolute, as conceived by Hegel, admits of varying explanations. It has been conceived that reality is a self-accomplished whole and the finite world in all its manifestations is eternally present in it. While McTaggart finds the unique characters of selves to constitute the true differentiations of the Absolute Spirit, Bradley emphasises the character of infinity and absoluteness of reality to the extent that the pursuit of any ideal in finite life is conceived to be a mere appearance presenting itself as real to our inadequate consciousness. Of course, Bradley would admit that the ideal perfection we aspire after in finite life ultimately refers to reality. But due to the contradiction inherent in finite nature as such the ideal perfection, as we conceive it in our moral and intellectual life, necessarily presents itself as incapable of being achieved. The Absolute as such cannot reveal itself to a nature which is relative and finite in its essence.

Bradley makes an advance upon Hegel by defining reality not only as experience, but as the sentient experience—the immediate sentient experience of the perfect unity of the universe. Relation, succession and mediation have no place in the concept of reality. For him there is no self-realisation except for the finite selves. The Absolute is eternally complete and awaits no further realisation. So, the progressive self-realisation in finite life has no significance for the Absolute as such.
The idea of truth, as we conceive it, represents the unity of the ideal content of an idea and its existence, and goodness the realisation of the ideal in one's will and action. But a self has its perfection only as a moment in the life of the Absolute. So its finite experiences with all their excellences cannot satisfy it and constantly involves self-transcendence in the course of self-realisation. But the unity of the ideal and the existent, whether in knowledge or in life, is never realised in finite life. For not only does the finite nature fall short of the infinite, but the way it seeks to approach its ideal is itself defective, as it involves relation and succession which only takes it away from the immediate apprehension of the Whole. Now, as Bradley states, "Truth is the object of thinking, and the aim of truths to qualify existence ideally. Its end, that is, is to give a character to reality in which it can rest. Truth is the predication of such content, as, when predicated, is harmonious and removes inconsistency and with it unrest." But finite thought is necessarily relational. It makes a distinction between the ideal content of the predicate and the idea by means of which we want to define it. Thought relates the idea to the ideal content of its predicate, but it can never unite these two in a way so that the subject may be equal to the predicate, specially because the immediate unity which characterises the nature of reality cannot be recovered through relations which necessarily presuppose distinction among the related terms. But as Bradley says, "Thought is relational and discursive, and if it ceases to be this, it commits suicide, and yet if it remains this, how does it contain immediate presentation?" There is no answer so far as thought itself is concerned. For, as he contends, "The predicate must be always ideal. It must, that is, be a 'what' not in unity with its own 'that', and therefore, in and by itself, devoid of existence. Hence, so far 1.IBID. P.145. 2. P.150
far as in thought this alienation is not made good, thought can never be more than merely ideal. Of course, truth as the ideal unity of existence and content refers to reality itself, for this ideal unity exists only in the experience of the Absolute, which at once reveals to us the full meaning of what is implied by our idea. But our defect, as we have seen, lies in seeking the way to this unity through thought and truth as the ideal of thought is an impossible concept. Therefore Bradley finds it to be a fact that, “ Truth belongs to existence, but it does not as such exist. It is a character which indeed reality possesses, but a character which, as truth and as ideal, has been set loose from existence; and it is never rejoined to it in such a way as to come together singly and make fact. Hence truth shows a dissection and never an actual life. Its predicate can never be equivalent to its subject. And if it becomes so, and if its adjectives could be at once self-consistent and re-welded to existence, it would not be truth any longer. It would have then passed into another and a higher reality.

Such is also the idea of goodness. Goodness represents the ideal of moral life which consists in the achievement of the ideal state of existence for our will. But it obviously involves at the same time a contradiction between the ideal and the existing state of a man aspiring after the ideal. Let me see a little closely into the concept of goodness. Bradley begins with a general definition of good as that which satisfies desire. It implies like truth a unity of the idea and existence. But he says, “In truth we start with existence as being the appearance of perfection, and we go on to complete ideality of what really must be there. In goodness, on the other hand, we begin with an idea of what is perfect, and we then make or else find, the same idea in what exists. Goodness is the verification in existence of a desired ideal content, and it thus implies the measurement of fact by a suggested idea.” But later he comes to limit the

1. P.146. 2. P.147. 3. Appearance and Reality.
the idea of goodness to the sphere of will. In this sense, as he says, "The good, in short, will become the realised end of completed will". Morality, as Bradley conceives it, is co-extensive with self-realisation, but in order to avoid confusion, he defines it as the self-realisation of a person with reference to his will. Now, in a sense, there is no sphere of human life which is not the concern of morality, as there is none which has not been brought under the control of will. By this assertion Bradley does not intend to deny that the different realms of life have the peculiar excellences of their own. What he means is this that each of our actions can be explained as a case for morality if and when considered as the expression of will. An act is judged morally when we consider it by virtue of the nature of the will behind it. We may try to understand the point at issue with reference to Kant's theory of morality. Indeed, Bradley accepts the maxim that nothing is morally good save a good will and then proceeds. It follows from this that, "Strictly speaking and in the proper sense morality is self-realisation in sphere of personal will. We see this plainly in art and science, for there we have moral excellences, and that excellence does not live in mere skill or mere success, but in single-mindedness and devotion to what seems best as against what we merely happen to make. From the highest point of view you judge a man moral not so far as he has succeeded outwardly, but so far as he has identified his will with the universal whether that will has properly externalised itself or not... strictly speaking, it does not fall beyond the subjective side, the personal will and the heart. In a moral judgment we are only concerned with the personal character of the agent and with nothing beyond it." To put it in Bradley's language, "To be a good man in all things and everywhere, to try to do always the best, and to do one's best in it, whether in lonely work or in social relaxation to suppress the worse self and realise the good self, this is nothing short of this is the dictate of morality."

So, in a sense, morality becomes co-extensive with life, and goodness is "the willed reality of its perfection by a soul."\(^1\)

But Bradley makes an advance upon Kant. For, though he considers good will to be the highest object of moral life, it must be a concrete will at the same time. Morality is concerned with one's self-realisation, but it must also consider in what does consist the true self of a man. That is, we have to see what is the content of the self which seeks to realise itself. Bradley finds the contents of the ideal self to be two in number. These refer to one's existence as a social and as a nonsocial being. The moral obligation of a man in relation to society has its significance in this that a man is "the individual embodiment of a larger life."\(^2\) The larger life of society, State, nation or family in which a man lives, enters into his nature and constitutes his character. A man is what he is by virtue of his relations to other men in society or in family, and so he cannot realise himself without the fulfilment of the obligations involved out of these relations. Bradley makes an elaborate discussion of this point in his "Ethical studies" which it is not possible for me to consider here. I will only refer to the fact that for Bradley, moral duties of a man are to a large extent relative to the station he occupies in the society in which he lives and are therefore determined by it. He thinks that a little consideration will reveal to us the obvious fact that, throughout the most of the part of our life we find our good will to find its sphere of action mainly in our relations to those who are around us.

Yet our social duty is not always complete with the fulfilment of the existing moral obligations. Out of the lessons from the existing social traditions and obligations, not only in our own country, but all over the world, we sometimes come to form, by means of imagination, the concept of an ideal type of social

1. Appearance and Reality, P. 366. (2) Ethical studies, P. 226.
3. See P. 166
social morality, which is actually realised in no present society. This ideal social self we can consider to be the true realisation of ourselves as social beings as it is conceived to solve the contradictions of the present life to a certain extent. But in fact, the perfect social ideal is never realised because the actual is ceaselessly transcended by the constant urge of human mind to realise it itself better.

However, Bradley is aware that there are certain spheres of our life in which we truly realise ourselves but which do not involve any direct relation to society. To state in his words, "But there remains in the good self a further region we have not yet entered on; an ideal, the realisation of which is recognised as a moral duty, but which in its essence does not involve any direct relation to other men. The realisation for myself of truth and beauty, the living for the self which in the apprehension, the knowledge, the sight, and the love of them finds its true being, is a moral obligation, which is not felt as such only so far as it is too pleasant." It is true that science and art would not have arisen except for a social environment. But it is not true to say that society is the ultimate end for the sake which an artist must work. Yet his work is moral in the sense that it is an earnest attempt to realise himself in the best of his possibilities. As Bradley thinks, "It is a moral duty for the artist or the inquirer to lead the life of one, and a moral offence when he fails to do so," though he admits that it is a kind of morality past ordinary morality.

A conflict between the demands of these various selves may easily arise. But Bradley leaves such conflicts to be solved by those who are actually involved in them. As a general remark he only states that nowhere there should be a breach of the essence of morality. On certain occasions we may need to avoid an ordinary moral obligation for the sake of something in which the moral self expects a better satisfaction, but otherwise the slightest breach...
breach of a moral duty is really dangerous, because, as he says, "the will for good, if weakened in one place, runs the greatest risk of being weakened in all".

However, it comes about that, morality or goodness is concerned with self-realisation by virtue of good will. But in order to be truly obedient to one's good will one needs to have a harmony of one's desires, so that he can obey the imperative of the good self without any opposition from his own desires. Therefore, the moral idea is not of a number of distinct moments of goodwill, but of a consistent character. As he finds, "Our character formed by habit is the present state of our will, and though, we may not fully aware of its nature, yet morally it makes us what we are." So good will can only be the result of a good character. In his Appearance and Reality also Bradley defines goodness as the perfect realisation of an individual self must include both harmony and extent. For, on the one hand, it must present itself as an ideal which refers to all the sides of our nature, while on the other, it must harmonise them all with the idea of a perfect system which is not exposed to contradiction. But goodness, thus defined, refers to the Absolute itself. The Whole alone is capable of explaining the different spheres of human life, which appear to contradict one another, to be consistently and necessarily cohering in a perfectly systematic way. And in this sense the Absolute, as Bradley conceives it, may be defined to be 'good.' Non-contradiction is the only principle of reality, the positive implication of which is that reality is the Whole, and so harmony and extent can never come together in a finite life. Now, though he ascribes goodness to morality by way of analogy, Bradley at the same time asserts that "will implying a process in time, cannot belong, as such, to the Absolute; and on the other side, we cannot assume the existence of ends in the physical world." When harmony and extent come together, the ideal is indeed 1. P.227. Ethical studies. (2) P.345. (3) Appearance and Reality, P.364—65. (4) App. 364-65. (5) P.365.
indeed achieved, but there we are no longer within the reach of morality, for when the ideal actually realised, will has nothing to claim at and to realize. Morality, as we conceive it, necessarily involves conflicts. For, "a being not limited, and limited by evil in himself, is not what we call moral." A moral will is necessarily finite and have a natural basis which involves such dispositions which have a tendency to hold us back from our moral duties, and it is by subduing this 'badself' that the moral self establishes itself. It presupposes in this way the existence of the 'bad self', and though the value of a moral action is to be judged by its positive achievement, yet it must be understood as against the opposite element in our nature which it has subdued, and the moral strength of a character is revealed in this act of subduing. In this conquest, the good self will not only subdue the bad one, but will transmute the energy of the self concentrated on the 'bad self' to the service of its own. Morality aims at the cessation of the conflict between the good and the bad self, but when the conflict is over, morality also ceases to exist. Therefore, it may be said, as Bradley finds, that morality aims at the cessation of that which makes it possible.

Nevertheless, it is true, that though the moral ideal presents itself with contradiction, it somehow suggests that the perfection of the finite life lies in the Whole. In our constant but inadequate effort to realise our best, we transcend our limited self and have recourse to a wider conception of life. Therefore, Bradley asserts that, "All morality, all identification of the will with the ideal, demands the suppression of the self in some form; and so, though self-realisation, yet at the same time is self-sacrifice." Reflection on this contradictory nature of morality leads us beyond it. It leads us to see, in other words, the necessity of the

1. Ethical Studies, p.234. (2) P.233 (3) P.234. (4) P.304
The religious point of view. Religion is more than morality in the sense that, while for morality the ideal self is never more than an idea, religion conceives its object as really existent. The object of religion, as Bradley states it to be, is, "the ideal self considered as realised and actual". It must therefore find the self to be infinite, for nothing in the finite life can be above all contradictions. In fact, religion involves the idea that the ideal self which is the object of our moral life is the real self, and the part of our nature which is in conflict with this ideal is but an unreal appearance, an evil, which is to be arrested. Religion is of course a matter of will as it is an implication of morality, but the true nature of religious experience can be grasped when it is defined as an object of faith. Faith presupposes will, but as distinguished from the will which is the concern of morality, it assumes at the same time the absolute belief that the object of the will is real.

Thus religion gives us an idea of the infinite nature of the self. But it also implies a necessary relation to finite life, and therefore, the infinite self is never actually realised in this life as we live it, though we may know the infinite self to be the true being of ourselves. The evilness of our nature is not totally extinguished so long as we are finite. As Bradley puts it, "We find ourselves as this or that will, against the object as the real ideal will, which is not ourselves, and which stands to us in such way that, though real, it is to be realised, because it is all and the whole reality". The infinite self, though it is the true being of ourselves and is an actualisation of our moral ideal, is also a "not self" as against this or that particular self absorbed in contradiction/evil.

1. P. 319. (2) P. 353. (3) P. 320. (4) Ethical Studies, Ch. "Ideal Morality"
In fact, in finite existence contradictions are never finally resolved. This is on the one hand due to our fragmentariness and on the other hand to the fact that, we try to obtain the immediate Whole through relation and time. Our life as we live it, may be described as an endless search after the ideal of perfection as we conceive it in the different stages of our experience, and therefore, is definable in terms of value. But even if we take it to be so, the ultimate end must always lie beyond us. Our finite progress, in spite of its progress in several spheres has no more than an empirical validity, first because the Absolute as such is a self-accomplished whole which awaits no evolution or progress, and then because we are naturally incapable of realising the end.

Yet all our efforts are not in vain. For the consciousness of the contradiction and the urge for something beyond itself would not have been possible if man were not a finite-infinite being. As Bradley says, 'The reason of the contradiction is the fact that man is a contradiction. But man is more; he feels or knows himself as such, and this makes a vital difference; for to feel a contradiction is ipso facto to be above it. Otherwise, how would it be possible to feel it? A felt contradiction which does not imply, besides its two poles, a unity which includes and is above them, will, the more it is reflected on, the more be seen to be altogether unmeaning. Unless man has and divined himself to be a whole, he would not feel the contradiction, still less feel pain for it, and reject it as foreign to his real nature.' We are fragments, but are fragments of the Whole. We feel an urge towards non-contradiction and towards whole because we possess an element of the whole in us, though the infinite as such is never revealed to a finite nature. Whenever we aspire after an ideal, which, as we think, will solve the conflicts of our present state of life, it is to the
the Absolute that we actually refer, for it is only in the Absolute that all contradictions are finally resolved. Even in our crude consciousness we feel that contradictions cannot be real and so reality is of the nature of the whole. This consciousness, however, in its beginning, enables us, on further reflection, to estimate the value of our actions, and except for this consciousness, it would not be possible for us to make any estimate of the degrees of truth and reality.

Sec. 4 Bosanquet's exposition of the idea of the Absolute is marked by the recognition of the metaphysical significance of its self-differentiation in the finite world. Bosanquet, Bradley, seems to find 'appearance' to be necessary to the Absolute itself. He makes a statement in reference to that. He says: "It is not an imperfection in the supreme being, but an essential of his completeness, that his nature, summing up all that of all Reality, should go out into its other to seek the completeness which in this case alone is absolutely found. The other in question can only be finite experience; and it is in and because of this, and qualified by it, that the Divine nature maintains its infinity. Certainly, the finite existence belongs to reality by means of the values it evolves out of its attempt to realise itself and not by virtue of its existence as such.

Now let us see a little closely into Bosanquet's concept of value. Bosanquet being a Hegelian, sticks to conception of the absolute idealism. The Absolute is the Whole, the infinite, the nature of which he expresses by the terms 'world' or 'individual'. How all these ideas are really present in Hegel, but Bosanquet seeks to give life and concreteness to the concept of reality by defining the whole as a concrete universal. The 'world' suggests to him an idea of unity by means of differences. As he says, "It takes all sorts to make a world." The 'world', in other words, is the absolute whole.

1. The Principle of Individuality and value P. 243. 2. Ibid. p. 37 (2) IBID.
whole that explains by its nature all the varieties in the universe and is itself explained by them.

Bosanquet begins his philosophy with a view to put the central things in the centre, and to respect the claims of the obvious. But what is really central and obvious in life? Bosanquet does not consider the ethical life of human beings to be the only concern of the universe and finds the moral ends like 'justice' to be serviceable so far as we consider our acts from a particular point of view. As he says, "The world that conditions our goodness must not exist merely for our goodness' sake, but must subordinate it to some concrete need of nature. A world's excellence must include its members, and have a relation, or sort of kinship to it; but must be of the nature of greatness that goes beyond and sustains it." However, it comes about that the finite entities of the universe have their real being in the Whole. But the Whole, as we know, is the "world" made of all sorts, each of which has its unique function as representing one of the differentiations through which the Whole maintains itself. Bosanquet conceives that the world is a Whole, "whose members also are worlds". In other words, its members are distinguished by their distinctive characters as concrete wholes of differentiations, each constitution a type of self-existent entity though in a relative sense, with all of which the Absolute is a living organism and a concrete universal. Therefore, for Bosanquet, "What has value is the contribution which the particular centre - a representative of certain elements in the Whole brings to the whole in which it is a member. Its particularity, as we shall see, is connected with its special contribution. And he considers it to be the task of philosophy to determine the value of our different experiences. Now though the finite beings are

are not the only concern of the universe, they have their task to perform. And for Bosanquet, as he says, the universe "from the highest point of view, concerned with finite beings, a place of soul-making". It is confirmed by history, religion, culture and civilisation, that it is the greatness and the moulding of the souls that we really care for. To explicate this conception, by making and moulding of souls what is really meant is the making the most of what we have received. That is to say, a self is to realise out of the situation in which it has been placed, the true significance of the Whole as it reflects itself in its particular context or maintains itself by the distinctiveness of this quarter. Let us see how he explains this idea of self-maintenance.

The "spirit of logic" or the 'spirit of the Whole,' as Bosanquet calls it, is the characteristic principle of reality and is at work in the universe. It is, in fact, the principle of coherence and acts in a way so as to resolve contradiction in order to determine the given experience as a distinctive feature of the Whole. It removes the apparent contradiction of this experience with the other elements in the universe with which it was then found to co-exist in a perfectly harmonious way. The principle is also described as the principle of individuality as it characterises the universe as a self-subsistent and self-distinguished Whole of unique moments, which possesses a uniqueness by means of them existing in a perfect mutual coherence. This spirit, as it inheres in a finite self constantly tends to organise its own experiences in the light of the Whole. "It is this through which my perception of the earth's surface makes one system with my conception of the Antipodes, or the emotion attending the parental instinct passes into the wise tenderness of the civilised parent, and the instinct itself we are told to develop into the whole structure of social beneficience. And it is this,
only further pursued, that forces us to the conception of the Absolute. I am aware of no other point at which the arrest in the process may be justified. And this must be the spirit of value at the same time. For we can realize the value of any of the features of our experience only when we see its function and significance with reference to the Whole. The process of value-realization is no other than one of the gradual appreciation of one's own position in the larger context of life to which it necessarily belongs. However, the spirit of the whole causes no external determination. In a finite self it is at the same time the spirit of freedom, as it resolves all oppositions that present themselves to us in the form of contradiction. Thus Bosanquet conforms to the Hegelian conception of freedom as self-determination by the transcendence of all sorts of externalization. According to Bosanquet, what we call its (soul's) being moulded is but one side of the self-determination by which it transforms its partial world, eliciting the significance of externality.

However, the realization of value, as Bosanquet conceives it along with the other Hegelian Philosophers, is equal to the self-realization of a finite being. But according to the definition of value given so far, value is equal to the significance that an experience or fact possesses as a unique moment of differentiation of the Absolute. And so we must say that value belongs not to the ideal itself, but to the experiences, as determined by their relation to it. As Bosanquet says with reference to the moral good, "Strictly, you do not value it, you value all else by it. Its value is the unit, and all other values must be adjusted so as to amount it." The ideal, i.e., the individual or the Whole may be described as the source of the

1. Ibid. P. 267-68 (2) Value and Destiny of the Individual, P.16 ed.
2. Principle P. 310-311

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**For further details, refer to the cited sources.**
the ultimate measure of all values that we come to possess.

Now, the spirit of the Whole as it works in us is the spirit of self-maintenance, and it is active in the experiences that occur to us in the various contexts of our life. "It holds good, we have seen, of significant sensations as in beauty, and of feeling in the sense of emotion, or of pleasure and pain, no less than of strictly logical structures, such as science and philosophy, or of the ideas which operate in morality, in social behaviour, or in religion." Now, he continues, "All these types of experience are phases of individual living, stages in which the "individual" maintains himself in different modes and degrees, and with different achievements in the way of completeness and consistency. Thus in the course of their self-realisation the selves make several achievements—moral, aesthetic, intellectual and spiritual. But the spirit of the Whole as it works in us is not only comprehensive, but is creative as well. Bosanquet describes its action in us on the analogy of the creative form of art. Our acts and ideas follow from the world like conclusion from premises or like a poem from the author's spirit. They evolve, he says, out of the remoulding of the cosmos out of its own range for totality—the synthetic of the logical spirit, which has been sometimes described as the greatest initiative for a creative genius. Now, a self, as Bosanquet defines it, is the active form of totality realising itself in a certain mass of experience as a striving towards unity and coherence. And its self-determination as he says "is that of a logical world, ultimately, in the general type, one with the relation of a conclusion to premises, by which a new and transfigured whole emerges from a mass of data which in one sense contains it, but which in another it transcends." Now, the emergence of the "transfigured whole" out of the attempts of the selves to determine the utmost fulfilment of their own status takes the forms of the various achievements in the spheres of art, morality and religion. These are 1. Principle, p. 269. (2) Ibid. (3) Principle, 334. (4) Ibid. 5. Principle. P. 335.
the \textit{spheres of art, morality and religion}. These are phases of reality as such as they mark the process of the \textit{self-determination} of the \textit{Whole in and through the evolution of finite life}. They are the values achieved by a finite being, as it \textit{realised in them} as a significant feature of the world. And it comes about that \textit{values evolved in the life of a finite being are no illusion or appearance}. This is a fact which must have been clear from our above contention. The criterion of truth and reality is the same, and the degrees of comprehensiveness reflected in the experiences represent the degree of value they come to possess. Bosanquet understands by value that a man acquires his contribution to it (the \textit{Whole}) and his participation in it. He says, "In general, we know that what we care for, is safe through continuity with the Eternal". The relation between value and reality, I think is well expressed by the statement that, "The at-homeness in the Whole, the strength and vitality, which the very perils of the finite presuppose, and the fuller types of experience so persistently reveal, are not dwelt upon at large for theoretical purposes. But such experience, I hope, has been sufficiently indicated to exhibit the general nature of value— the perfection of the ultimate individuality— which the fragmentariness and conflicts of finite existence are the means of manifesting and sustaining, and his degree of identification with which constitutes the worth and destiny of every finite individual.\footnote{Principle. P.21. (2) Value and Destiny of the Individual. P.361} 

But though the values or the individuality of the finite life evolve out of the hazards and hardships of our life, Bosanquet regards the concept of personality, as we know it, to stand on such slippery ground that can provide no room for itself in reality. "What he call the 'individual'" he says, "is not a fixed essence, but
but a living world of content, representing a certain range of externality, which in it strives after unity and true individuality or completeness because it has in it the active spirit of non-contradiction, the form of the Whole. Certainly it has a body, which enters into it and becomes its instrument for self-expression in a certain way. A particular individual, as known to us, is a world of experience whose centre is given in the body and in the range of externality which is communicated by means of it, the limit of which depends on his power of comprehension. The limit of this range varies to the extent that he describes a single mind to be constituted by more bodies than one. To take the example Bosanquet himself cites in his text, we see that, "They are centred in excellence no doubt in a range of externality which a single body focuses for a single mind each to each; but this immediate centredness is no ultimate limit for their comprehension; and there are many conditions under which it might truly be said that a single mind is constituted by and controls more bodies than one". In fact, the idea of transformation that directs the entire process of our self-realisation explains that in our gradual apprehension of the comprehensive nature of reality and so of ourselves as elements in it, we transcend the limits of our formal personality. Bosanquet defines this self-transcendence to be the destiny of finite individuals. As he puts it: "What really matters—what alone in the main, the future can conceivably have to offer—is to begin with, no doubt, an increased wealth and harmony of finite existence, but further, because of along with this, a profounder sense of the worthlessness of the finite creature in and by himself, and a deeper union, through will and conviction, with the perfection of the Whole". This is obviously a religious attitude and as an amount of self-transcendence is involved in each stage of our progressive...
Progressive self-determination the entire process of value-realisation in a sense may be said to be religious.

Of course Bosanquet recognises persons in a sense to constitute the centres of value in reference to which we explain and evaluate our particular states of consciousness. Yet it is only so far as persons are 'individuals' that he conceives them to have a real status in the universe. They are good in so far as they are definable as the ends/explanations our particular experiences.

Bosanquet defines the concept of individuality thus: "It is all one whether we make non-contradiction, wholeness, or individuality our criterion of the ultimately real. It is something that must stand by itself. It has, in short, "nothing without to set against it and which is pure self-maintenance within." Uniqueness and originality maintained by profound comprehensiveness and exclusion of otherness, are the fundamental characteristics of individuality.

And in this sense there can be only one individual—the Absolute. Finite persons are individuals only in a limited sense. And he says "originality within finite conditions, is not in principle excluded by agreement or even by a large measure of repetition. Its essence lies in the richness and completeness of a self not in the non-existence of any other self approximating to it. The definition of the individual within the limit of a finitude, as a mere exclusive entity is untrue to the extent that finite natures obviously enter into one another in several respects. The finite self is an 'individual', as he says, only when his experiences constitute a stable content of his nature, i.e., when with them he forms a concrete and relatively non-contradictory whole that explains and becomes the point of reference for all his actions and as such represents a moment of determination of the whole in itself. In short, a finite

1. Value and Destiny of the Individual Chap. VIII.
2. Principle. 68. (3) Ibid. (4) P. 69.
finite being is an individual by means of the self-consistency of his nature and not by virtue of his originality and distinctiveness.

Moreover, Bosanquet does not consider this merging of one's personality in the larger Whole of the Absolute to be a great loss. For he thinks that, "what we really care about is not a simple prolongation of our "personal" existence, but, whether accompanying prolongation or in the form of liberation, some affirmation of our main interests, or some refuge from the perpetual failure of satisfaction". And, "when we are sure that things which we really care for are valued for us, and are by the very nature of the universe guaranteed as characters of the Reality throughout its appearances, it seems to me a mere want of consideration to deny the main problem of our continuance in principle solved". He refers in this connection to Green's statement that, "we may in consequence justify the personal life, which historically or on earth is lived under conditions which thwart its development, is continued in a society". And he thinks that what Green cares about is the preservation and continuance of what we cherish most and not the formal identity of ourselves as person. The greatest figures of history do not survive by means of their formal identities or the mere personal happenings of lives. They survive by virtue of their significance in the life of the universe. The incidents and activities of their lives which determine the nature of the society, State or the World at large are absorbed by their significance as the constituents of reality and come to determine our apparently contradictory experiences to a greater comprehensiveness.

Sec. 5: So we have had an idea of the Neo-Hegelian conception of value as it is developed by Bradley and Bosanquet. The concept has been focused mainly in the philosophy of Bosanquet. For Bradley, as we have seen, self-realisation belongs only to the finite level of existence which he defines to be no better.

4. Value and Destiny
better than appearance. He preludes his concept of reality of all sorts of relation and succession as a result of which the endeavour for realisation of a value in time and in succession, which is the essential feature of the realisation of an ideal in human life becomes absolutely impossible.

But it seems to me that Bradley's denial of relation in the constitution of reality not only abolishes the possibility of a concept of value, but also goes against the concept of reality as an organism or a system which obviously implies the idea of several elements cohering in a perfectly organised way.

Moreover, Bradley contends that in our moral life we realise our ideal self by accomplishing the books which are determined for us by virtue of our relations to others. But if relation itself is an unreal phenomenon and involves only contradictions, how is it that the ideal moral self comes to realise itself by the fulfilment of the moral obligations due to the self-necessity of relations? Is it not then true that according to Bradley our progress in moral life, in spite of the contradiction involved in it, is measured according to the degree of its approach towards the idea of reality?

We have seen that Bradley defines goodness to involve both harmony and extent. But harmony and extent in the true sense of the terms are possible in the Absolute. So he finds that the idea of goodness can be accomplished in the Absolute alone, though 'good' as the object of will cannot be really ascribed to it. But harmony certainly implies a relation between the terms which are distinct from one another. And if the Absolute possesses harmony, how can it avoid relation altogether? There is another point of serious objection against philosophy. I must say that not only does Bradley consider the pursuit of value in human life to be only empirically valid, but he abolishes all the initiative for such pursuit. If it is once ascertained that all our moral or even our intellectual achievements are only apparent and have no place in reality as such, why should we take pains to devote oneself to the realisation of such objects. Bradley's theory of reality hurts the possibility
possibility of a moral endeavour and thus may find in making us morally indifferent. Indeed, it leaves us indifferent to all sorts of values, for in spite of our most sincere efforts we will not be able to reach the goal. Our history, civilisation, the several achievements in the various spheres of life have no significance in reality. Even at our best we are involved in an unresolvable contradiction and can never rise above mere appearance. Therefore, it comes about that instead of explaining Bradley rather explains away this world with all its contents and values.

However, Bradley's theory of the degrees of truth and reality does not seem to be in conformity with this idea. For, if we are able to know the worth of our experience in relation to the real, how is it that we cannot strive to realise it truly in our life?

However, it is not necessary to deal with Bradley anymore, as our concern is with the concept of value to which he affords only an empirical worth. So we come to Bosanquet and try to see how far he is able to give us a consistent idea of value.

It seems to me that Bosanquet solves the problem raised by Green with a certain misunderstanding of the problem itself. The problem, in short, is to keep alive the main interests in which a person finds his essence to consist and for the realisation of which he persuades himself throughout his life. Bosanquet indeed attempts a solution with a suggestion of the survival of the values that evolve in the course of our self-realisation. But he affords no scope for the reality of the person himself. He modifies the idea of personality as an unreal empirical concept, the absolute identity of which he can neither define nor save from being merged in the wider context of the Absolute. Of course, Bosanquet contends that
that what we really care for is not the immortality of our formal personality as he finds it, but the preservation of the objects of our interests. But it seems to me that Bosanquet rather misinterprets Green's idea to a certain extent, which is of course somehow due to the inconsistency on the part of Green himself in working out his concept. Bosanquet seeks to prove with the help of some quotations from Green that Green is rather anxious for the eternity of the essential interests of a person than for the endurance of the person himself. Certainly in a sense there is such an implication in Green. Yet on the whole, Green finds the concept of personality to associate itself necessarily with the particular feelings and desires, and self-consciousness, which is the essence of personality never exists in a particular person apart from them. So, the preservation of the interests of a person cannot be conceived to rest on the unreality of himself as a particular concrete reality. If the very concept of person itself is an empirical illusion to whom do the interests should actually belong? And if persons are themselves unreal entities, as Bosanquet would say, how can the values that evolve out of their endeavour be real and eternal?

I do not understand how, there can be values unless they refer to a unique creative and self-existent being. An object of value can be realised only with reference to the esteem and endeavours of a being or beings. Indeed, Bosanquet admits that values are in a sense relative to persons so far as they are the individuals or wholes, to which experiences must refer. But at the same time he finds it difficult to conceive...
conceive of an identity between the different levels of the life of a person which constitute the several stages of the realisation of values. So the centre of reference of our experiences must be constantly shifting and I fail to see how one can conceive to form a whole with the experiences of one's own. In this also necessitates a rejection of the idea of the differentiations of the 'World' as 'worlds' by themselves, for we cannot hope to constitute a concrete system with the experiences we come to possess in the course of our progress. It may be suggested, that we with all our experience form a whole in the Absolute itself in which we find all our finite experiences to exist as transcended. Yet ideally present "moments!" But this only implies absorption of ourselves as particular persons with our distinctive interests and essence in the life of the Whole, in which they are indeed significant, but in a way that means nothing for us except for an intellectual understanding of the ultimate nature of things. It cannot reason for the initiative that a particular person should feel to realise himself as this or that concrete personality. It is not easily understood, how can the idea of self-realisation present itself as a concrete ideal of life and involve a regular determination of the entire life of a man for its pursuit, if there is no determinate being conscious of itself as such. It is true that we transcend our limits in the course of our progress, but that is no reason to deny the identity/our personality. A person welcomes changes and seeks for a better determination of his essence because he feels himself as enduring through the progress and enrich himself by it. If on the contrary, he knows that he, as he exists as a unique entity in the universe, will be lost and his experiences will be valued in so far as they are capable of being absorbed in the Absolute, nothing can persuade him to realise anything at all.
Bosanquet's conception of the gradual realisation of values in human life is, in fact, the idea of the gradual transformation of the self. This transformation he must consider as real and significant from the metaphysical point of view, as he finds the Absolute to realise itself in the experiences of finite life. But the idea of transformation seems to possess very little significance without reference to something which is transformed. There must be a self, identical in itself, that can be supposed to gain in richness of contents and in concreteness so as to become truly "individual". Transformation without reference to an identical entity would imply a series of changing states.

So, Bosanquet's conception of the individuality of finite beings to consist in stability and self-containment also must lose its ground if he fails to refer the experiences of a man to one particular centre which is constituted by their conjoined effect. As he says, "The efforts of the finite creature to achieve the infinite experience naturally fall into series. But it is not the culminating events of this series, but a character to be won and developed by their means, that can bring the finite mind in any way near the perfection which attracts it." But on the other hand, Bosanquet admits no stable personality which may develop its character by means of the series of events that occur to him.

It may be contended that, Bosanquet makes a distinction between the empirical concept of personality and the metaphysical existence of a self. According to the Hegelian idea, reality involves time and the finite self must evolve in time, though in reality as such, it does not exist as an occurrence in a temporal series. So, our temporal presence in the universe as a particular person has no place in the Absolute unless we are conceived as being "Idealised" and transcended and our creations are significant so...

1. Value and Destiny. P. 303
so far as they mark out this self-transcendence. Now, I do not intend to deny that persons as they exist are but temporal entities. I would only like to assert that this can make any point against their reality. Moreover, as we have seen, Bosanquet does not find the empirical world to be baffled from the real by any absolute distinction. He believes the finite world to be a true revelation of the infinite itself. But he says that the existence of the selves as particular persons are yet not real, as by a further analysis they are found to be resolved in the larger Whole, though the determination of the course of the universe through the process of their self-realisation are the real phases of the Absolute. Persons endure only in the values they come to create. The great names, as he says, are rather absorbed in significance than are particularly remembered. But the point is that, what is thus absorbed is not on that account unreal. It is true that our own creations in the spheres of religion, art or philosophy remain as the living factors in the universe when we ourselves cease to exist. To the question whether values do not exist except for persons actually continuing to enjoy their objects, we must answer that we realise ourselves far surpassing our temporal existence. The self endures in his creations which perfectly focus his the unique nature of his interests as reflecting the uniqueness of his character. There would have been no noble creation if man was not initiated by such an idea. But then the persons themselves, though they do not eternally survive, are nevertheless real, for the values that constitute the real phases of the universe are explicable only with reference to them. We have seen that, the values represent the quality of the mind one comes to attain, which we can appreciate in relation to the person as a whole. Therefore, the value of a particular experience, I think, is to be appreciated with reference to the entire personality of a man which determines the nature of that experience and should
should be taken account of in considering its quality or the quality of the state of the mind in which it occurs. If may happen that posterity fails to remember the distinctive persons by their names. Yet the nature of the creation definitely expresses the character of the agent. So, if values are real, the persons are also obviously real, if to be real, understand, as Bosanquet seems to do, to have the power to determine the nature of the Whole. The persons possess this capacity by all means as they are found to determine the course of the universe with the help of their creations. And with an idea like this we may try to solve the question raised by McTaggart regarding the status of the finite differentiations of the Absolute in the Hegelian philosophy. Bosanquet admits the content of what we say, for he conceives the distinctive values to be relative to the distinctive perspectives of the Whole, which are in a sense unique by themselves. And these must be perspectives of finite individuals. But how is the uniqueness of these perspectives consistently maintained in relation to the idea of their total self-transcendence? How can what is unique in itself give rise to the unique phases of reality be absolutely transcended? It may be objected that finite persons as they exist, are full of contradictions and therefore unreal. But then the values evolved and of their nature also unreal and contradictory. For all our appreciations of the Absolute are essentially incomplete, and involve contradictions in various degrees. Yet, as he admits, it is only through them that reality reveals itself and is realised and with them all. However, it seems to me that Bosanquet's definition of finite individuality as being repetitive to a large extent and not being so much counted for its originality and uniqueness is not in conformity with his demand for the uniqueness of values they should create. Of course, human natures see to a large extent resemble one another, but the elements of their nature which constitute their individuality, i.e., the capacity by means of which they create values that come to determine the course of the universe in unique manners are obviously the distinctive features in them. It is because a person is a unique
entity by himself that he creates

unique values out of situation which is mostly similar to all. In fact, the concept of finite self which Bosanquet offers us is responsible for this confusion. Bosanquet defines a finite self to be a result of the reaction of the spirit of the whole over a certain range of externality. But this involves a sort of contradiction similar to that we observed in Green. The spirit of the whole, which is the eternal principle of comprehensiveness works upon a certain sphere which, even according to Bosanquet himself is to a large extent similar for all of us. But if this is so, how and on what principle, is one person distinguished from the other, and how does one give a distinguished character to one's own creation?

I cannot but mention that the philosophy of Bosanquet loses its significance as a theory of value by defining the realisation of value only as an appreciation of the comprehensive nature of the whole. That is to say, an experience is valuable in so far as it represents a transcendence of contradiction. This suggestion we have already discussed. But there is an element of truth in it. A truly great creation is indeed universal in its appeal in spite of its uniqueness. This is the test of culture and progress. But it is also possibly true that mere universality is no test of value, though it is one of logical consistency. An experience or an object is valuable by virtue of the distinctive nature and effect and not by virtue of its capacity to be absorbed in a greater whole. It is valued, in other words, for the unique determination of reality through its nature. Of course Bosanquet affirms this in several of his statements. But his overwhelming urge for consistency and coherence does not allow him to develop this implication to its full extent and leads him to the abstract universality characteristic of the Hegelian school. An experience of a person is not valuable for its inclusiveness or originality but for the sake of its extensiveness.
extensiveness and non-contradiction. It seems that we should all live for the Whole so as to merge all the distinctive features of our nature in it rather than the Whole should include and explain them to their highest determination. We are valuable to the extent we are resolvable in a greater context and for what we are by ourselves.

In fact, as I find, that in spite of his sincerest effort to provide our life with concrete values and to find for our interests and objects a real status in the world, Bosanquet's attitude is one of speculative thinking which marks the entire process of Hegelian thought. He seems to care more for logic than for life, and instead of facing the facts of the world he only tries to make them fit in with the concept of a Whole which rather explains away our concrete existence and values than does it explain them. Though Bosanquet affords speculative thought a relatively lower place in human life, we find that, it is only a person who seeks to see how all the experiences of human life are absorbed and transcended in the nature of the Whole, that can realise himself to his content. And this sort of experience certainly rests on absolute knowledge, though the experience itself may be a sort of appreciation of the truth that transcends the level of what we know as knowledge.

I would end with the remark that, in order to develop the idea of the universe as the "world" or the concrete universal, Bosanquet should have sought to determine the particular features of the universe as the unique centres of value which alone can constitute it to be truly Individual.

Part II. — Part II.
Sec. 6. The insignificant and abstract notion of individuality that makes against a sound theory of value leads to Royce. Royce considers the individual selves to be absolutely real entities of the universe and takes them to be unique, determinate and concrete beings. According to him, "By an individual being, whatever
whatever one's metaphysical doctrine, one means an unique being, that is, a being which is alone of its own type, or is such that no other of its class exists. Rayce does not ascribe this individuality to the Absolute alone. For him the particular selves are also individuals, are at least capable of being individuals and are real only as such. But individuality does not imply a mere capacity for being coherent with the system of the universe as a whole, but a concrete determination of the unique purpose reflected through the will of a particular self. It is true that individuality, as it is conceived of a certain self, exists not so much as an existing character, but rather as an ideal to be achieved, yet it involves no merging of the selves in the Absolute so as to be transcended. For the ideal of a finite self necessarily consist in the complete determinateness of the purpose of one's life. The Absolute is a perfectly determinate Individual, which has been otherwise described as the community of "individuals". How does Rayce come by this idea?

Sec.7 Royce is an absolute idealist and it is convenient to begin by considering his philosophy from the point of view of the Absolute of the Whole. As he says: "The whole universe, precisely in so far as it is, is the expression of a meaning, is the conscious fulfilment of significance in life". But to be significant means to be unique and therefore individual according to his own definition. Therefore, the Whole or the Absolute is the Individual—unique as no other of its kind ever exists and is also perfectly determinate being the exact fulfilment of all the implications latent in the world. But as it is the unique determinate realisation of all finite purposes, it cannot absorb any of them in a manner that they are lost in it. The Whole, therefore, must realise itself in the

2. Ibid. P. 443.
the particulars of the universe and must include these particulars only as perfectly determinate- the complete realisation of the unique meaning of the whole differentiated in each of them. It is precisely in this sense of self-differentiation that reality or God as it is called, is described as a self.\(^1\) Thus, the first conclusion about Royce's philosophy we now come to is that reality is individuality, which means the uniqueness and perfect determinateness of the unique purpose expression of the essence of one's existence. Individuality is the standard of reality as well as of reality, and to be precise, reality for Royce is a realm of value, a fact which will be clear through our discussion. Here we may state by way of illustration that in the course of distinguishing the world of description and world of appreciation Royce seeks for a sort of experience that will not describe the external and universal character of objects but will take us to the heart of reality which is at the same time a world of value. The world of appreciation which he finds to represent the reality or the individuality of beings is the world of ideals or of worth, as distinguished from the world of mere description\(^2\). Indeed, to see into the reality of an idea or a being is to see into its value, that is to say, to consider it in connection with its internal meaning- the purpose of God embodied in it. To quote Royce, "In vain, then, does one stand apart from the internal meaning, from the conscious inner purpose embodied in a given idea, and still attempt to estimate whether or no that idea corresponds to its object. There is no purely external criterion of truth. You cannot merely look from without upon an ideal construction and say whether or no it corresponds to its object. Every finite idea has to be judged by its own specific purpose\(^3\). A person has to be judged by virtue of the internal meaning he represents in

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in his life. But it must not be thought on that account that 
the purpose of the Whole externally controls the life of a finite 
being. For, like other absolute idealists, Royce also would assert 
that we "are free so far as God wills in us." The determination of our 
nature by the Absolute is nothing short of our self-determination. 
The obvious conclusion from this is that the internal meaning or 
the purpose of reality manifests itself through our free will. 

However, freedom of will as the essence of human nature has 
been recognised by all the idealists. But Royce treats of it in a 
way so as to consider it to be the sole determining factor of 
reality from the Finite point of view. The internal meaning of a 
particular human life expresses itself through will. This is otherwise described as "selective attention" by means of which the person wills a certain purpose unique as an outcome of his own nature to achieve which he seeks to give a determinate concrete form throughout his life. The true individuality or the reality of a particular self consists in the complete determination of this purpose as a unique factor in the universe for which nothing can be substituted.

Now, there has been a dispute as to what Royce understands 
to be the fundamental feature of individuality. Is it found in the 
selection of a unique purpose, or does it consist in the realisation 
of a unique plan of life? Muirhead contends that Royce is 
inconsistent on this point. Here we must see how far this opinion 
is true. As Royce says, "If we look closely at the region of 
our consciousness where first we come nearest to facing what we 
take to be an experience of individuality, you find, I think, that 
it is our selective attention, especially as embodied in what one 
may call our exclusive affections, which first brings home to us

1. Conception of God.
us what we mortals require an individual being to be. But though each particular selection intends a meaning in it, Royce does never consider these distinct desires to be absolute by themselves. He always considers them in relation to the plan of life which brings out the meaning to which the life as a whole seeks to be an expression. He would rather assert: "Have a plan, give unity to your aims; intend something definite by your life, set yourself as an ideal. Or, as he says, "Form the Absolute point of view, as well as from our own, every individual life that has the unity of a plan takes its own unique place in the world's life." To say this is not to submit to the Hegelian absolution in spite of its conflict with his own position. It is rather an improvement upon Bosanquet who did not admit the finite individual to be a concrete reality. Royce, on the other hand, conceives an individual self to be a unique feature of reality and its perfection consists in the complete realization of the peculiar meaning of its life, in the form of a concrete ideal of life as such. The particular single desires are but the fragmentary reflections of this meaning or the different aspects of this central ideal.

Further, Royce, in spite of his inconsistent statements in certain contexts of his essays, does not actually leave us in doubt about the real meaning of individuality in the life of a person. He asserts that individuality consists in uniqueness, complete determinateness of the essence of one's existence and in being significant. Now, the unique internal meaning reveals itself in one's selective attention of the will, or so to say, the plan of one's life one undertakes to follow. But in spite of that he would never conceive a being to be truly an individual unless this meaning gets its fullest determination and until by virtue of this.

3. P. 289.
this realisation of the possibility inherent within his nature he becomes a true constituent of the universe.

In fact, he says, "Ideas as they come to us, in their finite imperfections, are first indeterminate, and for that very reason vague, general, or as technical language often expresses it, abstractly universal." So, as he says, "It follows that the finally determinate form of the object of any idea is that from which the idea itself would assume whenever it become individualised, or in other words, become a completely determined idea, an idea or will fulfilled by a wholly adequate empirical content, for which no other content need be substituted, or, from the point of view of the satisfied idea, could be satisfied."

Certainly there is an element of truth in this contention. Apart from the abstract idea on the part of a child that all women are its mother, even in our adult experience, we find that a mere will is abstract and indeterminate to a certain extent unless it takes its course through a concrete activity for its realisation. A purpose when stated only in the form of a subjective fact knows only a little of its own implication, i.e. of the exact form in which it is capable of being a unique determinate factor in the world. The internal meaning as such only expresses the significance which the being may acquire as a feature of reality, but it can actually acquire that significance only when this purpose gets actualised, that is, when the internal meaning is perfectly adjusted to the external one. To put it in another way, we see that the being wants to become a constituent of reality by virtue of its inner significance, but the universe must also determine the precise way in which it may influence the course of the universe. The partial determination of the internal meaning by the world external to it does not seem to make against its uniqueness."

1. Ibid. p.336. (2) P.337
For it is with this determination that it brings out a unique possibility otherwise impossible to be achieved.

I think, I should here refer to Royce's "fourth conception of Being". In *The World and the Individual* he conceives reality to be the implication of the final determinations of our will. "A will concretely embodied in a life, and these meanings—identical with the very purposes that our poor fleeting finite ideas are even now so fragmentarily seeking, amidst all their flickerings and conflicts, to express, this, I say, is the reality. We have seen that Royce conceives the significance of the life of a particular self is embodied in its will, the complete determinations of which constitutes its individuality. But an idealistic theory cannot conceive the ideal to be ever realised. As Royce contends that, "Owing to our finitude, will, in our own case, far anticipates its own fulfilment". This seems to be true not only because of our limited capability for realising the willed plan of our life, but also because the will brings out innumerable implications previously unknown to the mind as it proceeds to be gradually realised and so seeks to be determined in an infinite number of ways. Now this progressive determination of the meaning only proves the reality of the meaning itself, for otherwise it could not bring out these implications out of its own. But at the same it also shows that the meaning cannot come to its finality at any point in time. The Absolute, or reality, as such, as Royce conceives it, is the ideal completeness of this process i.e. the perfect determinate ness of the internal meaning of a Finite existence. He conceives this ideal individuality to be present in the mind of God. As he says, "But the Absolute experience and Will form, as we have asserted, one Unity of consciousness, one moment or instant of fulfilled life, over against which there is no external other where with this Whole would be contrasted."
In this sense the Absolute in Royce's philosophy seems to have a likeness to Plato's Idea of the Good, which has an ideal existence though this ideal is real as it embodies ideal of all finite things and being. The Absolute, as Royce conceives it, indicates the final determinateness of the will that proves itself to be real by evolving infinite possibilities out of itself and thus determining the course of the universe in a unique way, which we can apprehend only as the implication of the will. The ideal conceived in this way is being constantly determined by the progressive achievements of mankind. The only sense in which it is an Existing reality is that it embodies the conception of uniqueness and determinateness—the absolute goal towards which all our actions turn. It is possible to conceive of the ideal as a realm of value as it represents the perfection of all our endeavours and is also real considered in relation to the process of the gradual realisation of individuality. It also affords the standard of value as it embodies uniqueness and the complete determination of the implied meaning of one's existence.

But I do not think that Royce would agree to such an interpretation of his theory of reality. His conception of reality is rather a religious one, and he considers religious aspiration to be the only motive behind any true philosophy. So he thinks that the perfect determination of any finite will lies with God. That is to say, we inhere in God only as true individual beings—having all the implication of our meaning perfectly realised. As this ideal determination of the internal meaning of every life is real, it must exist, and it exists in the mind of God. Unlike the other idealist philosophers Royce does not think that God beholds the world of necessity. The world of individuals, as it exists and as it is destined to be, is a result of the free, indetermined will of God. How this he must have conceived from the point of view of the absolute freedom of
freedom of God on the one hand, and deduced it from the unique and
determinate character of the universe on the other, which presupposes
a symbolic or an actual (as Royce conceives) presence of a "selective
attention" in God. As he says, "The Absolute as Will is attentive
to precisely such arrest of the "unreal possibilities" of our former
account—precisely such wholeness of the divine experience—as shall
individuate and so complete, the data which are experienced, and the
world wherein the Thinker conceives and the Seer views, the fulfillment
of the Absolute knowledge in the data which are experienced. Here
obviously he makes a distinction between the Absolute as willing
and the Absolute as knowing. The Absolute as Will is the meaning
to which the universe is to offer a realisation, while the Absolute
as knowing perceives this fulfilment and involves the world as
realised. This only shows that the Absolute as such, from the point
of view of the whole, involves the idea of value. For the universe as
a whole, be it involved in the mind of God, embodies an ideal and
exists as the fulfilment of that ideal. Of course, in the Absolute
as such, the value exists as realised. Yet the two moments, the ideal
and its realisation are distinct in spite of their union. Moreover, it
is clear from the above statement that apart from the idea of some-
thing to be conscious of, that is, apart from the perception of an
idea of the mind to be actual, knowledge is not possible. This Absolute
is a self, because it is self-differentiated and is a self-conscious Being only on account of that. But as the essence of God con-
sists in freedom, he must differentiate Himself as by His free will.
Therefore, God must willing the universe as a differentiation of His own
self. And as God beholds the universe by means of His free will,
it must be a world of beings who exist by virtue of their free will.
Or, in other words, as a conscious self-determinate unique Self, He
wills the constituents of the world to be free, self-determinate
unique creatures, and to realise His purpose only as such.
However, the will of God as reflected in the finite world, which constitutes our individuality, presupposes a social existence for us. The world is an "Individual" of various individual determinations each of which embodies the meaning of the Whole in a unique way. Royce deduces our social existence from the obvious fact that we are conscious of our individuality in the first stage of our consciousness in our contrast from other individuals, and as fully determinate individuals our uniqueness implies a difference from one another. Royce conceives that, "While it is, indeed, true that for every one of us the Absolute self is God, we still retain our individuality and our distinction from one another, just in so far as our life-plans, by the very necessity of their social basis, are mutually contrasting life plans, each one of which reach its own fulfilment only by recognising the other life-plans as different from its own.\textsuperscript{1} As from the standpoint of the Absolute as such, its self-differentiation involves the idea of the world as a variety of individuals each realising the meaning of the Whole in a unique way, so also from the finite point of view, God is to be conceived as an ideal social existence, because it is only in a social existence that we can have ourselves as individuals. So, in the Problem of Christianity God has been conceived as a Beloved community of individuals, a Society of selves ideally conceived in their final determinations, and a spirit of absolute loyalty towards this community is due to us.

However, the social existence of man is a metaphysical necessity to our existence as individuals. So, Royce finds it necessary for us to bear a devotion to the society, though this devotion is to be determined in view of the loyalty due to us to the Absolute Society.

\textsuperscript{1} The World and the Individual. Second series. P. 289
Society of perfect individuals. In this connection we may refer to
his conception of the larger self-hood, which he finds to in-
clude and determine the nature of the including self and also to
determine it to a particular place in Being. Here Royce seems
to think of the social self to determine the status and nature of
the individual selves. This has been probably due to the influence
of the Hegelian trend of thought. It is true that we are determined
in the development of our nature by society, but later we have to
see how far the idea as it is conceived here is consistent with
Royce's position as a whole.

However, the social existence of man is obviously due to
his individuality. It is, in other words, an existence of man due to
the reflection of the divine will. Therefore, it comes about that,
we can appreciate our social existence by means of that aspect of
our nature which constitutes our individuality. The society as well
as the individuality of others is, thus, an object of appreciation
and not of mere knowledge by means of description. It is because we
live as individuals in a community of the divine will that we
feel a spiritual oneness with each other. Indeed, as Royce conceives,
the world of description, the world which we can define in terms
of universality and abstract logic, instead of giving us the
knowledge of what is unique in us, presupposes the community of
selves which they possess as the embodiments of the will of God.
For he thinks that the description of the world in universal term
would not be possible if there had been no spiritual oneness
amongst us.

In fact, Royce finds the presence of the "world of facts"
as a stubborn reality, to be an implication of the nature of will
which can realise itself only as transcending its "other". The
idea of the "ought" which characterises the essence of will needs
to present the will before something objective in relation to
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to present the will before something objective in relation to which it conceives itself to be realised better than it is at its present state. This is obviously an implication of the ideal nature of will and the self it represents. But it does not seem to me that the description of reality as a Society of conscious selves can be deduced from this conception.

I shall end my accounts of Royce's idealism with reference to his idea of personal immortality of selves. Royce asserts immortality to be a moral necessity. We are here to realise the purpose of God, and the divine purpose cannot remain unfulfilled. As he says, "For in this life the finite ego is only a seeker of its goal, as a knight of his quest. Yet, by our foregoing hypothesis, the goal of the Ego, its life-ideal, is one of God's ideals, actual and genuine, and for God there are no genuine possibilities unfulfilled; no true ideas that hover above reality as bare possibilities. God's ideas are fulfilled in His experience. The inevitable result seems to be that just in so far as the moral Ego really is unfulfilled in this life, there is another finite life in the universe, consciously continuous with this one, which, when taken together with this one, consciously reaches the here unattainable goal of this individual moral Ego, so that in the universe, the individual is perfected in his own kind. But as in finite life the ideal is never achieved, this search is eternal.

Sec. 8 - So far I have given an outline picture of Royce's philosophy. We can describe his philosophy as a philosophy of value whether we take it from the side of the finite or the infinite. Like Bosanquet, Royce recognises our creative faculty to be contributive to reality. But, unlike Bosanquet, he finds a finite being to be a concrete and eternal feature of the universe which it is by virtue of its creativity. A finite life is to be seen only in relation to 1. The world and the Individual. Second series. P. 28, 40, 4. 2. Conception of God. 3. Conception of God. P. 322-23.
to its ideal and the ceaseless urge of it for the realisation of the same. So also from the side of the infinite as such. The universe as a whole can be truly perceived as the expression and determination of a meaning.

This character of his philosophy is emphasised by the description of the conception of reality as an Ethical one and by the absolute recognition of the freedom of the human will. Reality is the ideal fulfilment of all finite wills. It is, in other words, a fulfilment of our moral necessities. Reality conceived in this way does not bring over us any external determination. It is something we may seek to achieve through our freedom. Royce conceives, "The free agents of a world are free only in so far as their essential moral relations ideally leave them free". That is, he considers a human self to be free to determine his will towards its individuation. The limitation imposed by the term "only" possibly means our incapability for controlling the world of facts. But Muirhead rightly remarks that for man to be morally autonomous is to be free in the true sense of the term, an idea which we inherit from Kant and the other great thinkers.

As we have seen, that on certain occasions Royce thinks of the larger self to include and determine the nature of the particular selves and also their place in Being. But if he here conceives of a control of the individual by society, we feel that his theory involves an oscillation between the priority of the individual and that of the society, which is, indeed, to my mind, an oscillation between the position of Green and that of Hegel. If it is said that the individual will can determine itself only through society, the question remains whether the individual must determine the society for the sake of his own development, or society, as conceived as a large self, must include and determine the individual in order to achieve the.

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the destination intended for its own. In fact, I do not dispute the contention that society as a whole determines the life of an individual to a large extent. Nor do I intend to protest against the idea that we are somehow self-conscious through our contrast with others and that our knowledge of ourselves as the distinctive personalities is largely due to our social existence. I only want to show that the statements that Royce produces here and there create a confusion about his intention. For, though he sometimes says that the larger self must determine the individual self, he insists that we must be loyal to the society in view of our absolute loyalty to the "Beloved community" which is an implication of the complete determinateness of individuals as the expression of unique meanings.

But the conflict between the power of society and the power of the individual as a particular existence does not seem to affect his theory of the relation between God and man. Though Royce is an absolute idealist, the overwhelming inclusiveness and absorbing attitude of the Whole, which characterizes the philosophy of the Hegelians has nothing to do with Royce. In fact, he offers us an idea of the Whole, which, except for the religious colouring of it, could give us a picture of the real, truly consistent with the progressive determination of human ideals. The Whole, as thus defined, embodies the ideal determinateness of our ideals. The distinctive values that we aim to achieve are progressively realized as we proceed. They become objective and determinate by wiping off what is vague, abstract and impossible about them, and thus naturally prove their own reality. Reality, if conceived as the Whole, only represents the ideal perfection of all our ideals. It only implies that our ideals in order to be real, must be "individuated." It is, in fact, a 'Whole' which we are to create and determine by

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by our will as free. It is thus nothing but an ideal value ever present before human progress in all stages. Royce defines God, as he conceives Him, as representing this ideal perfection. He is not wrong in defining God as Individual and Absolute, because the Whole represents the idea of perfect individuality and is the final goal of all process. The element of will or "selective attention" may be ascribed to God by virtue of the perfect determinateness of the world, and we have seen that Royce consents to this idea. The idea of the unity of will amongst us due to the reflection of the divine will has also a justification if the divine will is taken to represent our capacity for 'selective attention' i.e. the urge for determinateness. The Whole as such is the embodiment of the perfect individuality of all. It is also possible to define the Whole in this way as the Beloved community of individuals, love indicating the idea of will.

But the religious element in the philosophy of Royce is not negligible. On the contrary, religion may be said to be the main spring of his philosophical ideas. Though God is conceived to be a Self because of His self-differentiation, Royce describes this Self at the same time as the Eternal Father, to contain all individuals as ideas in His mind and creates the world out of love. He is not only free, but is indetermined in His will and is determined by no necessity. But the Whole which has been conceived as the final determinate form of all finite purposes is determined by the necessity of these ideas; and moreover, we cannot imagine how there can be perfection and determinateness as resulting out of "selection" (conceived symbolically or actually) without involving at the same time an idea of necessity. The Whole is indeed free as it has nothing to control it from without, but this only implies self-determination. The Whole exists by the necessity of its own, which it possesses as determining and being determined by its constituents.

Again, if there is already a Being, actually present in or above the universe, who contains all our perfections in Himself, our idea of the freedom of our will becomes definitely shallow. For in that case, we would feel no urge to exercise our will so much earnestly as in spite of all earnestness we would not be able to contribute anything but what is already there. Even if it is asserted that the will of God as it comes to me can be realised by me and by me alone, the course of the world is yet pre-destined and progress and creation in human life has no real meaning unless God is taken to be an ideal logical entity.

It is also difficult to consent to Royce's idea of personal immorality of selves. God's purpose, he says, cannot remain unfulfilled, nor is it possible to reach the ideal in finite life. So he conceives the self to be immortal in order to ceaselessly seek for the goal. In the first place, I fail to understand, why, if it is absolutely impossible in finite life to realise the end, should the finite self take pains to try for it. Moreover, in the nature of evolution of values as it occurs to us there is nothing to suggest the conscious continuity of a particular self in order to realise its purpose. The progressive determination of a particular trend of thought does not suggest that the same individual self has repeatedly appeared in the world to develop it. For in its different stages it brings out so many unique characteristics which cannot be understood with reference to a single self. It is indeed determined to a certain extent by the idea expressed out of a particular individual, and so the whole process must recognise the unique contribution of that idea towards its determination and cannot be understood except with reference to that. But then that single idea gets infinitely determined by other ideas and brings out innumerable unique characters, so that
so that the process in its continuity cannot be appreciated without reference to the latter as it cannot be without reference to the former. And if we consider Royce's contention that a new self means a new meaning, we shall find that the novel suggestions at each of the stages of the development of a trend of thought are not due to a single self. The particular ideas get determined in association with other ideas which it may influence but which have also their unique nature and cannot be realised only with reference to it. The absolute idealism introduced by Hegel, for instance, has been determined by his followers. The whole trend is indeed a continuous movement, but cannot be understood with reference to Hegel alone. In this connection I may refer to the idea of the eternity of values which I think may substitute the idea of personal immortality. I have referred to this suggestion in answer to McTaggart and Bosanquet, and I shall develop this point in the concluding chapter.

1. The world and the Individual, Second Series. P. 308