Chapter 1.

The concept of value in Ancient Idealism.

Sec. 1. Ancient idealism in Western philosophy.

The first exponent of idealism in Western philosophy is no other than Plato. In fact, we should say that he had propounded a philosophical theory which was developed as idealism later. But here we are not to discuss the philosophy of Plato, for he offers us a theory of value to which he was in a way introduced by Socrates.

Sec. 2. This is quite sure that Plato deals with the problem of value. His work as a whole is mainly concerned with the problem of good. The terms "good" and "valuable" in their common use mean the same thing. That which acquires some significance by approximating to an ideal, attains value, and is called valuable or good. Of course, one may distinguish the two terms and use them in quite different senses. But Plato, so far as I have understood him, does not conceive of any such distinction. For, as we see, his Idea of Good is once the source of reality and value of every phenomenon in the world. Gurbe rightly states in the "Plato's Thought": The hopeless scepticism of the sophists abolished all values—moral, social, political and also metaphysical and physical. Plato comes to re-establish these values, and in order to do that the first thing he had to do was to find out an objective, universally valid reality, and this he found in "Forms" or "Ideas"
"Ideas" (and the Idea of the good is a representation of these).

Now this is a point which needs further explanation. And we can best explain it by reference to some Platonic texts. We have it in the "Philebus."—

"Socrates—And no one can deny that all percipient beings desire and hunt after good, and are eager to catch and have the good about them, and care not for the attainment of anything which is not accompanied by good.

Protarchus—That is undeniable.

The good which Plato speaks of here is no other than the highest good, i.e. the Idea of Good, a fact which is evident from the two characteristics he ascribes to it. The good is described not only as the most desirable, but as being complete in itself and perfect at the same time. There are also statements in the "Republic" which define good as an object of desire for all, though it is stated to be not being consciously followed by most people.

"Socrates—Of this then, which every soul of man pursues and makes the end of all his actions, having a presentiment that there is such an end, and yet hesitating because neither knowing the nature nor having the same assurance of this as of other things, and therefore losing whatever good there is in other things,—of a principle such and so great as this ought the best man in our State, to whom everything is entrusted, to be in the darkness of ignorance?

Certainly not, he said."
"Good is the universal object of desire." Everyone aspires in every action of his life after good as he understands it, though the approach may be unconscious as it is in most cases, even wrong due to ignorance of the agent himself. Now, the highest good in the Platonic treatment is the Idea of Good, and every sort of good that we aim at ultimately resolves itself into the Idea of Good. A passage from the "Republic" may be stated in this connection.

"Socrates—For you have often been told that the idea of good is the highest knowledge, and that all other things become useful and advantageous only by their use of this. You can hardly be ignorant that of this I was about to speak, Concerning which, as you have often heard me to say, we know so little; and without which, any other knowledge or possession of any kind of will profit us nothing. Do you think that the possession of all other things is of any value if we do not possess the good? or the knowledge of all other things if we have no knowledge of beauty and goodness? Adeimantus—Assuredly not."

While discussing the Idea of Good in the same context, Plato reminds us of an 'old story' that when there is a 'many' of a certain kind, there must exist along with them an absolute of that kind, which contains the essence of the 'many'. Let us look into the text itself.

"Socrates—The old story that there is a many beautiful and a many good, and so of other things which we describe and define; to all of them the term 'many' is applied......... And there is an absolute beauty and an absolute good, and of other things to which the term 'many' is applied there is an absolute; for they may be brought under a single idea, which is called the essence of each."
So, the Idea of Good or absolute goodness being the essence of all sorts of good is the highest good is the ultimate object for which we act either consciously as in the case of the philosophers, or unconsciously as in the case of common people because any kind of good we aim at derives its goodness ultimately from the Good. It is therefore an absolute ideal, and so, the Idea of Good represents the highest ideal of value. We will find in due course that, the absolute good and the absolute beauty are taken to be the source of all that are beautiful and good, and the standard of all beauty and goodness on earth, are no other than the Idea of Good itself in its different aspects. And so, the Idea of Good is the ultimate standard of all values, moral, aesthetic or any other kind.

Sec. 3. We may say that in Plato's philosophy there is no distinction between reality and value. In other words, according to Plato the highest reality embodies the highest value or the highest value is endowed with the supreme reality. The Idea of Good which is the source of all values also causes and sustains all phenomena in the world. In that part of the "Republic" which is specially devoted to a discussion of the Idea of Good, the Idea of Good is compared with the sun in the heavens. Here we are told that the sun in the heavens is the cause of everything in the world that is perceivable, and is its sustainer. The sun produces light which makes vision possible and also the eye that sees. Such is the Idea of Good. It is the final cause and the sustainer of all things knowable (Plato is not an agnostic), and at the same time it produces reason that realises. As light is nothing but the sun itself, so reason is a reflection of the Idea of Good. And so it is stated, "The soul is like the eye: when resting upon that on which truth and being shine, the soul perceives and understands, and is radiant..."
radiant with intelligence but when turned towards the twilight of becoming and perishing, then she has opinion only, and goes blinking about, and is first of one opinion and then of another, and seems to have no intelligence.

The Idea of Good is the highest reality. We have already found it to be the supreme value. It is that which "philosophers," the best of the mankind aim at through dialectic. The soul of a man is truly at home with this alone. As stated in the "Phaedrus": "The reason why the soul exhibits this exceeding eagerness to behold the plain of truth is that pasturage is found there, which is suited to the highest part of the soul.

Sec. 4. So far we have only an introduction to the Idea of Good. There is an elaborate discussion of the Idea of Good throughout the Dialogues. But it is not possible for me to consider the whole of it. I will try only to understand the essential characters which an object must be endowed with in order to be good. But before we do so we must know what spheres of our life contain ample scope for the appreciation of value. That is, in what contexts of life good is realised in some form or other. Now, the Idea of Good is the highest metaphysical value. It is the source of all value and reality in the world. The Idea of Good as such can be realised by pure intellect alone. This realisation is a knowledge of the bare "forms" or "ideas" freed from everything sensuous. This contemplation of the Idea of Good is called dialectic. But this sort of knowledge is possible only for "Philosophers", the wisest men in society. Plato deals with this question in the "Republic" and some other dialogues.

Yet there is a scope for the realisation of good in ordinary moral life. The ideal in moral life is happiness and the principle of action is justice. Plato does not distinguish between ethical and political life. So he conceives that our ideal in moral life is to live.

1. Republic.4, St. 508, Jowett. 209
ive in a perfectly organised State. A State is perfect, that is, just, only when the different communities which form its constituent arts perfectly perform the function attached to each and thus maintain the consistency and perfection of the whole. We may justify our statements by quotations from the author himself.

"But that our aim in founding the State was not the disproportionate happiness of anyone class, but the greatest happiness of the whole; we thought that in a State which is ordered with a view to the good of the whole we should be more likely to find justice, and in the ill-ordered State injustice,"

A State is perfect or just when its guardians are wise, soldiers are brave. The common people only need to submit to the rule of the superiors in the State. Temperance is a virtue which must extend to the community as a whole so as to produce harmony and order.

A State is "just" when it is organised with these virtues of wisdom, courage and temperance. We may conclude therefore that the moral ideal of man in the ordinary level of his life consists in working for the perfect maintenance of the State as a whole which is possible by the correct performance of the task attached to the position he occupies in society. Justice is the principle according to which we should act, and happiness would follow from justice. In a perfect State, as Plato says, justice and happiness will coincide.

It appears from what we have discussed that Plato maintains a distinction between a life of pure contemplation and ethical and political life. But as a matter of fact, the goodness of ethical life—the ideal of the perfectly ordered State is itself derived from the Idea of Good. This is also evident from this that a perfect State can be constituted and ruled only by philosophers or dialecticians. The dialectician, as Plato says, has the true knowledge of the Idea of Good, the perfectly ordered whole. With that notion he must come down and form the ideal system in the world accordingly.

"Until Philosophers are kings, or kings and princes of this world have the Spirit and power of Philosophy, and political greatness and wisdom meet in one, and those common natures who pursue either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities with never have rest from their evils, —no, nor the human race, as I believe, — and then only will this our State have a possibility of life and behold the light of the day." The Idea of Good cannot be perfectly realised in the world of senses and so remains far from us. Yet the ideal State can be formed after the pattern of this Idea, and the philosopher alone is competent to do that. The others are only to submit calmly to his rule.

So we see that the ideals of ethical (or political) and contemplative lives are not actually distinguished. The Idea of Good is the supreme reality and value which as the absolute standard of perfection ascribes value to our ethical life. Ethical or political Good is in fact a reflection of the Idea of Good in the material life of the world. We may find a gradation of value to exist according to Plato—the metaphysical concept of the Idea of Good as representing the highest value, while ethical goodness represents the lower and relative value in as much as is understood with reference to the former. And not only in the ideal State of Plato, but even in the imperfect society of ours, the element of goodness, however meagre, is ultimately due to Idea of Good. In moral life the ideal of a perfect state is our ideal and a community or any other element is good or valuable so far as it contributes to this ideal. Plato describes the ideal of moral life as happiness, which he thinks to follow from the perfect ordering working of the different communities of the State, and which is the object of desire for all in this stage of life. But an analysis of the concept of happiness in the true sense of the term, tends towards the conclusion that happiness, as defined by Plato, can be achieved by the philosopher alone, though it is stated in another context that the philosopher cannot be happy in this world.

The Idea of Good is said to have three characteristic features, and these are—Measure, Truth and Beauty. As Beauty is one of the fundamental features of the highest good, there seems to be a possibility of the appreciation of the ideal in our aesthetic life as well. Indeed, he dialogues like the "Phaedrus" and the "Symposium" strike such notes. Though in his "Republic" Plato discards every possibility for a poet or a painter to approach reality in itself, in the "Phaedrus" he considers the earthly sights of beauty to be capable of directing our soul towards the one Beauty which is the Idea of Good. As he admits, "But this is the privilege of beauty, that being the love-liest she is also the most palpable to sight." So we infer that the earthly sights of beautiful things have got a relative value, so far as they help us to know the Real. But these earthly beauties have not the appeal of eternity to every mind. A soul which is corrupted and has forgotten all about its experience in heaven, finds nothing but ensnusious glamour in them. It is only to a heart that contains (thoughtfully and unconsciously) the memories of the eternity Eternal that the worldly sights represent the supreme Beauty.

"Now he who is not newly initiated or who has become corrupted does not easily rise out of this world to the sight of true beauty in the other;......But he whose initiation is recent, and who has been a spectator of many glories in the other world, is amazed when he sees anyone having a godlike face or form, which is the expression of divine beauty." 3

Besides, the "Symposium" makes an approach to the Beauty (i.e., reality) through love. As in this Dialogue Socrates asks,—"Then in wanting the beautiful, love wants also the good?"

—"I can not refute you, Socrates, said Agathon:—Let us assume what you say is true." 4

So we conclude that the earthly visions of beautiful objects and love possess some value as they lead us in a way to the contemplation of the absolute value. Yet we must say that such values are relative by all means.

Sec. 5.

Now we will consider the nature of the Good, which is, to a considerable extent, realised in our moral life, and is perfectly realised in the Philosopher's contemplation of the Idea of Good, and which is also reflected in a way in the earthly sights of beauty and in love.

The Platonic concept of the highest good is in the first place the concept of a whole, which is at the same time a systematic whole. We have been introduced to this character of the Good in our discussion of the ethical ideal of the perfect state. That the Idea of Good is the concept of a whole is evidently clear from the sixth book of the "Republic," where it is described as the cause and sustainer of everything in the universe. The Idea of Good is not a mere whole, but is a systematic and perfectly organized whole, a fact which is clear from "measure" being defined as one of the essential features of the Idea. The "Philebus" defines "measure" to be the reality about things. We have reality only when the chaotic negative flow of the universe is organised through the organising principle of mind, or in other words, when measure is introduced into the chaos. It brings out in this way, the utmost possibility of every situation in order to spare not a single positive value. While discussing the perfect good life as a mixture of pleasure and wisdom, Socrates states, "That any want of measure and symmetry in any mixture whatever must always of necessity be fatal, both to the elements and to the mixture, which is then not a mixture, but only a confused medly which brings confusion on the possessor of it." God is described in the "Laws" as the most perfect measure.

The ideal State, as pictured in the "Republic," is a perfectly organised State. This we have already seen. Harmony is the essential characteristic of this State. In fact, a State, which is ideally conceived, is not only the constitution of its different parts, but is

1. See above, Sec. 4.

a system. That is, the different elements work for the whole, and
the whole works for the parts. Justice, which is defined as the highest
virtue, is the "all virtue", and is a character that grows in the
society out of the systematic performance of all its parts, as well as
in the individual soul when every part of its nature acts according
to its own perfection and at the same time for the perfection of the
whole. Justice as a standard of our happiness and activity is nothing
but a manifestation of the principle of measurement in our moral life.
Happiness, as defined by Plato, expresses an ideal harmony of several
virtues, pleasure and other elements of human life. This is directly
proved from the fact of justice being followed by happiness, for it is
said, in a perfect state justice and happiness will coincide.

So is Beauty, one of the essential features of the Idea of Good.
A single quotation from the "Philebus" will serve our purpose.

"Socrates—And now the power of the Good has retired into the
region of the beautiful; for measure and symmetry are beauty and
virtue all the world over."

The character of the Good as a system is further emphasised by
the recognition of mathematics as means to the realisation of the
Idea of Good in several dialogues of Plato. Mathematics is a science
of numbers, and deals with measurement and order. And so the highest
object of its contemplation cannot but be embodied with perfect
measure and harmony. Though Plato allows dialectic alone to take the
final step in our approach to the Idea of Good, mathematics is never-
theless competent to take us as far.

The "Philebus" describes the organising principle that harmoni-
ises the chaotic flow of the universe as a principle of mind. The world
is governed not by chance, nor does it move mechanically. It is
guided by mind or reason. The principle of mind is stated to be the
organiser of the universe, and also as the supreme cause of the World.

As Socrates says: "Should we not be wise in adopting the other view and maintaining that there is in the universe a mighty infinite and an adequate limit, of which we have often spoken, as well as a presiding cause of no mean power, which orders and arranges years and seasons and months, and may be justly called wisdom and mind"? And as none but the Idea of Good is Reality and the supreme cause of everything, we may easily draw the conclusion that the Idea of Good is of the nature of mind.

Yet this characteristic of the Real and its absolute desirability do not deprive it of its objectivity. The objectivity of the Idea is derived from the definition of it as the supreme cause and the sustainer of all things and from its eternity and absolute necessity. Objectivity, as we know, consists in universality and necessity. As regards the universality of the Idea of Good, there is hardly any doubt, and so also of its necessity, which is perfectly implied by the existents of the world, as it is the only source of all the worth they possess. A further evidence of the Idea of Good is deducible from the objectivity of the "ideas" of which it is an embodiment. The "ideas," as we know, are the universal "forms" of the objects and the beings in the universe. They are, we may say, the eternal concepts, as they exist apart from all their sensuous manifestations. Now, the "Meno" and the "Protagoras" (which are sometimes described as "Socratic dialogues") and also some other dialogues like "Phaedo" define knowledge as a process of recollection of "ideas" from a previous state of existence. This obviously implies the eternal existence of the "ideas" of which we are only reminded through the process of good teaching. And so the Idea of Good which is an embodiment of all "ideas" must necessarily be objective. The discussion of the "Phaedrus" about the capacity of earthly visions to remind a mind of the one Beauty is also based on the process of recollection. The worldly beauties represent the highest Beauty only to a soul whose memory of the eternal Beauty is fresh and has not been corrupted.

The universal desirability of the Idea of Good and its being of the nature of mind possibly save the Platonic theory of reality and value from being agnostic. These only indicate that the highest good is not anything indubitable, or something which the human mind can never approach, though the highest good cannot be fully realised in the world. The philosopher may know its nature, and may attempt, with some success, to manifest it through the formation of a State. Yet the ideal always transcends the actual. But the point is that Reality is not unknowable. Human mind is not by nature incapable of the knowledge of the Real. This is a fact, that may be derived from the statement in the "Philebus" which regards the supreme mind (the Idea of Good) as the cause of the minds in the minds in the world, though the former far surpasses the latter in purity, "greatness and power to an immeasurable extent.

So far we have found the highest value to be an ideal—a systematic and objective whole, which is of the nature of mind. But the most significant characteristic of the concept of value is yet to be found. It is the element of insight or knowledge in the Good. This, as we will see, is not only one of the fundamental features of the Idea of Good, but is, to be precise, the whole of it. Each of the features of the concept of Good and all means towards its realisation resolve themselves into it, for when analysed, they are found to be nothing other than its manifestation.

This intellectual attitude was peculiar to the ancient Greeks, and Plato deduced it almost directly from Socrates. Taylor in his "Plato" makes a distinction between the "Platonic" and the "Socratic" dialogues. "Ion," "Lysis," "Charmides," "Meno," "Gorgias" and some other dialogues are called "Socratic," while the dialogues like "Phaedo," "Symposium," " Protegorgos," "Republic," "Phaedrus," "Philebus," and "Laws" etc. are entitled as "Platonic".
is distinction may be due to the greater Socratic influence than the former group of dialogues is found to inherit. However, I am not to consider here the justification of this distinction. But the dialogues on the whole are found to be marked ultimately by one fundamental characteristic in spite of their differences. The mere intellectual tendency of the Socratic dialogues is not actually overcome in the "Platonic" ones.

It is true, that Plato, in order to exhibit the richness of the Idea of good, and to leave for a greater scope for the appreciation of the real, conceives several approaches to it, through beauty, justice, love, and music. But they are in fact mere manifestations of knowledge as such.

Of course, in the "Socratic" dialogues there is an open recognition of goodness as nothing but knowledge. The "Socratic" dialogues are mainly concerned with the concept of a moral Good. But virtue or moral goodness as it is conceived there is nothing but knowledge.

To state an instance from the "Meno"—

"If then virtue is a quality of the soul, and is admitted to be profitable, it must be wisdom or prudence, since none of the things of the soul are either profitable or hurtful in themselves, but are all made profitable or hurtful by the addition of wisdom or of folly; and therefore if virtue is profitable, virtue must be a sort of wisdom or prudence? Meno— I quite agree."

The "Charmides," another "Socratic" dialogue, which offers a discussion of temperance, resolves temperance into self-knowledge. The "Sophist" tells us that all life exhibits reason, while morality reflects it in one particular sphere. And from the "Lysis" we know that knowledge is the only thing which can make us useful and good.

Even in the "Protagoras" which Taylor entitled a "Platonic" dialogue, courage is defined as the true knowledge of what is and what is not to be feared. The way of the expression of the true nature of virtue is through the knowledge of what is our real interest, i.e. in good.
As it is given in the "Republic", the only way to the Good is through intellect. The discussion of the nature of the ideal State and its realisation is a case in point. The ideal State, as Plato says, must be just, and justice is an outcome of the perfect functioning of the different parts of the society. But a State to be just in this sense, ought to be ruled by the wise, while the rest of the people are merely to submit to the rule. It is insight alone, which is to guide us throughout our life. Philosophy or dialectic, as we have seen, is the true insight into the nature of the Idea of Good. Hence, it is only a philosopher who knows the reality as such, is competent to produce the ideal State, which is to be formed after the pattern of the idea so far as it is practicable. Unless kings are philosophers and philosophers are kings, the ideal State will remain unrealised forever. With all this we are already acquainted. It is truly true that Plato, in the so-called "Platonic" dialogues, suggests several other approaches to the Idea of Good, through beauty and love as we find in the "Phaedrus" and the "Symposium". But when these concepts are analysed, they are found to be nothing but mere modification of reason and knowledge, so far as the true Platonic senses of these terms are concerned. To take the case of beauty first, as he says in the "Phaedrus", to an uncorrupted mind the earthly sights of beauty appear with a shadow of eternity, for it finds in them something that directs the mind to the true Beauty which is Reality itself. One may tend to infer from this that an aesthetic appreciation is itself capable of conveying to us the nature of the Good. But as a matter of fact, the earthly sights take us to the realisation of the highest Beauty through the process of recollection, which is evidently a process of knowledge, as we learn from the "Meno".

The concept of love bears the same implication. As we are told in the "Symposium":

"And these two customs, one the love of youth, and the other the practice of philosophy and virtue in general, ought to meet in me, and then the beloved may honourably indulge the lover..... these capable of communicating wisdom and virtue, the other seeking to

acquire them with a view to education and wisdom; when the two flaws of love are fulfilled and meet in one—then, and them only, may the beloved yield with honour to the lover.

Plato not only traces the way to the Idea of Good through intellect alone, but the highest good or Reality as he conceives it, is an embodiment of reason. In the "Philebus" he defines Reality as a pure logical existence, open only to dialectic or reason. The Idea of Good is characterised by measure, which is nothing but reason itself.

The world of senses takes its form according to the Idea only when measure is introduced into it, i.e. as we have already seen, when the chaotic negative flow of the universe is harmonised by the organising principle of the Mind. This Mind, being the absolute mind, through the action of which alone the Idea takes place in the world, is necessarily embodied with the perfect reason. Several statements may be offered from the Dialogues. As Socrates enquires in the "Philebus":

"Whether all this which they call the universe is left to the guidance of a reason and chance medley, or on the contrary, as our fathers have declared, ordered and governed by a marvellous intelligence and wisdom?" The affirmative answer to the question is suggested throughout the Dialogues.

Again, as we have quoted before: "Should we not be wise in opting the other view and maintaining that there is in the universe a rightly infinite and an adequate limit, of which we have often spoken, as well as a presiding cause of no mean power, which orders and arranges years and seasons and months, and may be justly called wisdom and mind?"

"Other feature of the Idea of Good, viz. Beauty is also a modification of reason."

"For measure any symmetry are beauty," and so beauty is another for reason.

An approach to the ideal is possible through mathematics, a science of number and measure. Yet mathematics can not take me into the heart reality, as task for which dialectic alone is competent. Plato...
thinks this to be due to the lack of the power of reasoning in the mathematicians. As regards the astronomers, for instance, he says:

They investigate the numbers of the harmonies which are heard, but they never attain to problems—that is to say, they never reach the natural harmonies of number, or reflect why some numbers are harmonious and others not. 2

The ethical concept of the ideal State, which is a perfectly harmonious whole, is, as we have seen, the ideal of pure reason. The principle of justness, which is the highest of all virtues, and is defined as the "all virtue", is certainly a manifestation of Measure, and happiness follows from it. Even pleasure, to which Plato assigns a place in the ideal State is worth its name, when it is of any use to reason. 3

Hence we see that reason is the true nature of the Idea of Good, and it is realised through intellect alone. Reason determines the value of everything. It is reason which pertains to the real value of our life, for the ideal life is a life of pure contemplation. The philosopher is the ideal man in the State, and a philosopher is a person who lives in pure contemplation of the Good. He alone has the appreciation of Beauty and Truth. It is only through him that the ideal may be sought to be realised in the world.

To sum up, in fine, reason embodies the absolute standard of moral and aesthetic values. Our life in society, as we see, is perfect in measure to its determination by reason. And this, a fact which is expressed by the amount of order (harmony) it exhibits. A State is just so far as it is harmonised, and it approaches the ideal so far as it is just.

Also beauty is reason in its true sense. So an object is beautiful to the extent it is characterised with symmetry or measure, i.e. with reason.

The conclusion regarding the concept of value in Plato's Philosophy to which we are led by all this may be stated thus:
Occupies the highest place. The Idea of Good which is the absolute value and reality, according to Plato, is no other than pure reason. The highest value therefore is an ideal, objective, systematic whole, and is characterised with reason and is open to intellect alone. The Idea of Good being the absolute value, our moral ideal, the sights of beauty and also love and even mathematics possess a relative value so far as determined by it.

Sec. 6. Plato's theory of reality is a theory of value. Or, we may say, value is for him, the highest reality. The essence of reality is 'Good' or "Value". The Idea of Good, which is Reality, also signifies the highest value. It embodies the ideal perfection of everything in the world of facts and experience. Indeed, the very purpose of the universe is to bring out every positive value out of every single situation. As Plato states in the "Philebus," the rich details of the concrete life must be arranged so as to form a single harmonious Whole, if it is conform to the Idea of Good, so that no single positive value should be spared and come to conflict with other values. The true knowledge, he says in the "Gorgias", is the knowledge of good and evil, that is, of value. Plato gives us a theory of value, that has been pioneer in the field of philosophy of value. He introduced a new meaning into human life. We receive from Plato a concept of life and value which is rich with beauty, love, justice and reason. The world in its perfection lives in the realm of values, i.e. in the Idea of Good. It is a realm in which alone virtue and beauty are truly realised. As we have already seen, the way to the ideal lies through morality and reason, as well as our aesthetic appreciation, for our moral, intellectual and aesthetic actions drive towards the one end, and have all their worth in reference to that. Every element in the universe has a place in the ideal, as the Idea of Good represents a perfectly organised Whole. Of course, it is true that the highest value does not inhere the
Ideal perfection, and the facts are valuable only so far as they accord with the ideal. Thus we have in the place of the subjective, relative and pragmatic theory of value of the Sophists, a theory of eternal and objective value.

In the Platonic system the ideal State, as it is conceived, attaches a value to every community in society. Each of the classes has its particular virtue, which consists in the correct performing of its particular task, and the excellence of the community consists in attaining the virtue in question.

But the possibility of the realisation of the Idea in the concrete spheres of life at last evaporates into the absolute emphasis on intellect. This we have already discussed. Philosophy or pure rational insight which is peculiar to the wise men in the State, is the only way to take us to the heart of Reality. So the rest of the communities, in spite of realising the virtues attached to their particular positions, remain far from the appreciation of the Idea of Good.

Moreover, as the virtues like courage are truly realised through insight, it is doubtful how far a particular class can realise its own virtue without the help of a philosopher. But then all the credit of the attainment of that virtue will go to the philosopher, and there will be no point in saying that every class has its peculiar excellence. In short, as we have seen, for Plato, the ultimate value of excellence (as Plato says) of a particular class consists in the attainment of the particular virtue allotted to it. Thus temperance is the excellence of the commoners and courage is the virtue of the soldiers in the State. This we can express in another way by saying that value consists in self-realisation and a person can perfectly realise his own self by the correct discharge of the virtue demanded of the position he occupies in society or State. But the overwhelming love that Plato bears for intellect comes in the way of such an exposition. For, he reduces all...
virtues to wisdom, and so, a philosopher alone is capable of knowing what is one's good. But then a man, in order to know his good, whatever it is, must be raised to the level of a philosopher, and if it be so, there is no sense in saying that a man in his particular position realises his virtue in any way. If a man in order to realise his self (as he belongs to a particular position in the society) must be asked to transcend it and to become a philosopher, then either there is no virtue, i.e. self-realisation in the common level of life and all values are realised only in the life of the highest contemplation, or in order to realise the virtues, all men must become philosophers. Plato suggests several approaches to Reality and specially considers morality and beauty in this connection. But I think he needs to do so for the sake of consistency as he conceives the Idea of Good to have three main features as truth, beauty and measure. But the moral and the beautiful ultimately resolve into the intellectual, and so the apparently rich and concrete life of value is found to be a life of mere contemplation. It is true that the Idea of Good includes everything, even pleasure in itself. But in it they no more exist with their characteristic peculiarities, but are completely transformed so as to express reason alone. Of course, we will later come to face some wider conception of reason, which transcends the limit of mere contemplative knowledge. But Plato, as we see, understands by reason only a capacity for pure contemplation and ascribes it to the 'wise men' alone. Therefore, it seems, that he renders the Idea of Good destitute of richness and also curtails the different virtues of their peculiar excellences by reducing all of them to manifestations of reason.

Sec. 7: Our discussion of the ancient idealist theory of value will however, remain incomplete without reference to Aristotle. It is true that Aristotle is not an idealist, but a realist.
His metaphysics is by all means a theory of realism. Even his ethical ideal of happiness, so far as ordinary people of the world are concerned, is an empirical ideal, as we find it in the *Nicomachean Ethics.* It is an object of social science, and consists in fulfilling our moral duties. It has no reference to any ideal beyond the realm of our experience, and so there is no trace of idealism about it. But here we are not concerned with this part of his ethics or with this metaphysics. We are concerned only with those portions of his works which bear the Platonic tradition and definitely strike an idealistic note.

In the first place, we would mention the name of the "Protrepticus," a work of Aristotle, which is lost at present. Iamblichus has recovered a part of it. But as no English version of his book is available, I have to depend solely on Jaeger's "Aristotle." The book contains some important passages from the "Protrepticus" which the author has translated for his own use. The "Protrepticus," as Jaeger shows, is more in the line of Plato than the other works of Aristotle and exhibits the Platonic emphasis on the intellect. This work is, in fact, inspired by the faith in the absolute power of knowledge to raise the philosopher to the level unattainable by the common run of men. The whole philosophy of the "Protrepticus" turns on the concept of "Phronesis" which means here the same thing as it does in Plato. "Phronesis" in this context means the principle of pure contemplation, which according to Plato, is divine in us. It is in fact, as Jaeger suggests, the creative apprehension of pure goodness through the inner intuition of the soul, and is at the same time, the apprehension of pure being. Aristotle changed the meaning of the concept in his *Nicomachean Ethics* where it signifies the habitual deliberation of mind to deliberate practically about everything concerning human welfare or woe. But in the "Protrep-
metaphysical ethics of Plato, and indicated a unity of being and value.

In the "Protrepticus" Measure is one of the features of the highest good as it is for Plato. Aristotle ascribes here to his ethics a mathematical exactness, though his later ethical work (Nicomachean Ethics) apprds to it only a general rule. Like Plato's remark in the "Laws" that God is the measure of all things, there is a statement of Aristotle in the "Statesman" (another lost work) that "God is the most exact measure." What "What is" and "Ought to be" are identical, and human actions are done with direct reference to the highest value. But the Nicomachean Ethics denies the possibility of the highest good in our moral and political life, and leaves it only for the "wise men" to achieve. Of course this sole emphasis on intellect is a Platonic idea. But, unlike Aristotle in his "Nicomachean Ethics" Plato never conceived an absolute distinction between the spheres of ethics and metaphysics, and for Plato moral life derives its goodness directly from the Idea of Good.

The "Eudemian Ethics" of Aristotle, however, seems to be inspired by the "Protrepticus". Here happiness is of course the highest ideal, and depends, as we find in the "Protrepticus", on 'Phronesis' (in the Platonic sense of the term), virtue and pleasure. But 'Phronesis' is still the ruling principle over all, science and knowledge. It converts the eternal good to ethical activity and applies it to the details of practice. Morality is impossible without 'Phronesis'. The point on which the 'Eudemian Ethics' differs from the ethics of Plato is its idea of the contemplation of God instead of the contemplation of the "ideas" or the Idea of Good as is found in Plato. As the "Eudemian Ethics" conceives, the highest object of contemplation is not the Good, but God. The influence of the "Protrepticus"
from the texts, in both of which we will recognise the Platonic
tradition to work. As it is stated in the "Protrepticus".

"One part of the soul is reason. This is the natural ruler
and judge of things concerning us. The nature of the other part
is to follow it and submit to its rule."

Similarly there is a statement in the "Eudemian Ethics":

"Let it be assumed that the parts of the soul partaking of
reason are two, but that they partake not in the same way, but
the one by its natural tendency to command, the other by its
natural tendency to obey and listen."

The quotations are merely intended to exhibit the direct
influence of the "Protrepticus" on the "Eudemian". What we have
tried, in the manner of Jaeger, is to show that in both the
texts, Aristotle retains the Platonic trend of thought. Reason
is conceived to be the directive principle in an ideal life,
and ethics is to derive its ideal from the metaphysical concept
of the highest value. Even in the "Nicomachean Ethics" which
determines the moral to be an empirical one, and keeps it far
from the realisation of the absolute value, his conception of the
highest realisation accords with the conception of Plato. It is
only in a life of pure contemplation that true happiness is possi-
ble. And so in the end Aristotle comes round to his original
conception of happiness as we find in the "Eudemian Ethics".
Reason alone is capable of leading us to the heart of Reality,
i.e. to God (according to Aristotle) the contemplation of which
is restricted to the few 'wise men' in the State.

So we may infer that though Aristotle is a realist concern-
ing the morality of the common people in his "Nicomachean Ethics",
the highest value for him, is a transcendental metaphysical
ideal. And so far as the "Protrepticus" and the "Eudemian Ethics"
(which Jaeger and some others consider to be his earlier works,
"Eudemian Ethics") are considered, the metaphysical concept of reality determines morality, and human actions are done and judged in direct reference to the highest value. It appears therefore, that there is an idealistic trend in these works of Aristotle. And that he cannot completely overcome this tendency is evident from the transcendental concept of happiness to which he returns at the end of his "Nicomachean Ethics".

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