Chapter 7

FINAL ESTIMATE

Sec. 1:

I have discussed the several idealist theories so far as they involve the conception of value. Now I shall try to develop, if possible, my own idea in the light of the foregoing discussion.

However, all the theories I have discussed are found to involve the concept of value, though most of them do not definitely concentrate on this concept. I also perceive that the concept of value in all cases evolves out of the idea of self or self-realisation. Now, according to certain idealist doctrines the world of nature involves a sort of self-realisation either directly for its own sake or for the sake of conscious beings. Yet they all refer mainly to the conscious life when they come to discuss value. Possibly this is due to the fact that the urge for self-realisation is expressly revealed in a self-conscious being.

Almost all these theories consider reality to be of the nature of a self, an idea which leads the exponents of these theories to consider the conscious selves to be the most significant elements in it. In fact, our ideals are the objects we value, and the ultimate motive behind considering anything as valuable is the idea of perfection that the self seeks to achieve. One's idea of an objective value is not indeed free from all sorts of reference to one's self. An object or an idea which I mind to be universally and necessarily valuable as independent of my subjective decision, is only found to refer to the universal and necessary aspect of my nature. I value a rational idea because it satisfies my reason. I determine to fight for a social good as it promises a satisfaction of the social aspect of my nature. We can also explain—
explain one's urge for the realisation of the nature of reality as such to be an urge for the perfect apprehension of the whole with which he identifies himself. In fact, for most of the idealists, as we have seen, the standard of value is reality itself, even when self-realisation in finite life has only an empirical validity. So, the judgment of value is not subjective, though it necessarily refers to one's self-realisation.

Sec. 2:

However, I find that in spite of the differences among them, all these theories consider the true initiative for value to be in one's will. So, almost all of them discuss the question of value with reference to our moral life. They cannot really avoid a reference to will even when they take the problem beyond the sphere of morality. Royce, Green, Bradley, Bosanquet, Spinoza and Kant obviously conceive will to represent the essential motive for self-realisation in human life. Plato makes no distinction between morality and metaphysics. He finds the philosopher to realise the Idea of Good in the contemplation of the moral life of man and the common man to realise his perfection by obeying the social duties fixed for him. For Spinoza, on the other hand, the ideal perfection of life consists in the absolute knowledge of the union of all things in the universe, but this knowledge evolves only out of one's urge for self-realisation, i.e., one's will for perfection. Certainly, even some interpretations, will, as he defines it, because mechanical in its nature, which if ascertained, is sure to negate all possibilities of the realisation of value in human life. But Spinoza by all means assumes that we are never beside the sphere of will so long as we seek to realise ourselves. The ideas of Hegel raise some questions. Hegel does not find our self-realisation to be fully accomplished with will and conceives it...
it to stretch over to the sphere of religion, art and philosophy. Now, philosophy or the speculative knowledge of the ultimate nature of the universe has been conceived as the goal of our life in other systems as well. We may refer for instance to Plato and Spinoza. But in those cases we are not to transcend will in our approach to philosophy. On the contrary, it is assumed that philosophy must evolve out of the final determination of the will—"for our own perfection. But I think that the distinction that Hegel makes between self-realisation in the sphere of will and that in the sphere which transcends it, is rather a distinction between finite and infinite will. For it is difficult to see how will is not present so long as there is the initiative for self-realisation, i.e., for the actualisation of the ideal in relation to one's self. I think, I should here refer to the idea that Green brings up in his *Ethics* that in human life there is no absolute distinction between will and intellect. According to Green, will is present even in what we take to be an intellectual apprehension.

However, I need to mention another of his contentions on which others are also found to agree. It is this, that the nature of a person as such expresses itself in his will. This is because will constitutes character and also reflects character. Certainly I do not mean that a man can form his character simply according to his will, for in that case there would have been no moral conflict. What I mean to assert is the obvious truth of the contention considered before, that several external and internal phenomena evolve our nature, and as a result of that we have various desires and dispositions which determine a man to form the habit of certain type of will that represents his character. As in any kind of action we cannot leave our character behind, the reference to will is never lost. Bradley truly finds that self-realisation in any sphere of life has a reference to moral life, for in the life we live we can never transcend our will, or, in the language of
of Green, the person as willing. The urge for my perfection must evolve out of my character, and so, in order to endeavour for the perfection, I must will the perfection first of all. I think, I should only mention that, a mere external fact cannot determine any ideal for us, as it is no ideal for the self and is thus incapable of involving any initiative on our part. Therefore, I agree with Spinoza when he says that, in order to determine a man towards something better, we must determine his will to be better.

Sec. 3

But the character of all men is not of the same order. Each one of us conceives of his self-realisation in a unique way. Yet most of the idealist philosophers want our particular selves to conform to some conception of ideal selfhood, which they assume to be true, even at the cost of the distinctive elements in our nature which constitutes our unique personality. Of course, this remark seems to be rather abrupt. These philosophers certainly try to provide a much scope to the freedom of the will and to the variety of human nature as their systems allow them to do. Yet in all cases, with the obvious exception of Royce, there is a type of self-realisation which is the absolute standard for all of us in spite of our fundamental differences from one another. This is possibly due to the fact that they have an idea of reality which in most cases cares more about universality and logical necessity than for the variety and specification we find in our life, and a particular self is required to realise his perfection by conforming his will to that notion of reality.

According to some idealists self-realisation is possible through knowledge alone. Plato, for instance, begins his philosophy with a promise to offer us a concept of reality which will provide
will provide scope for its realisation in every sphere of life. It appears that one is able to have the true perfection of one's life by honestly and sincerely performing the task set for him in the universe. But Plato comes to conceive of the virtues in a manner that, on reflection, they are found to be no other than the different forms of knowledge. Hence, it is to the philosopher that they should be referred. So, it comes about that either the ordinary man will not realise himself or he must be a philosopher in order to have a true knowledge of the ideal State and his own place in it, though it is difficult to understand, why in the latter case we should be any longer allotted our respective positions, why there should be any distinction among the classes. In fact, as I said, I do not object to the necessity of the consciousness of one's place and performance in society. My objection is to the reduction of all virtues to several forms of knowledge. For Plato morality and even beauty turn to knowledge, and if temperance is a perfect apprehension of the systematic character of the Idea of Good and courage is knowledge of what is and what is not to be feared, it is not possible for anybody to try to be virtuous unless he is capable of being a dialectician. But then the idea of the self-realisation of persons assigned to the different positions in the State with reference to the distinguished virtues must also lose its ground. So the question remains, what sort of perfection we may expect in our ordinary life which is incapable of the dialectic? If it follows from the analysis of virtues that either we must be philosophers, which most of us cannot be, or we must remain in darkness, life indeed becomes a burden. Moreover, human interest of every kind is not satisfied with mere knowledge or even with the idea of the nature of reality. Our distinguished personalities have their respective interests in which we live and rejoice and the perfection of the life.
life one seeks for oneself is obviously conceived with reference to one's distinguished interests. Plato leaves no scope for a man to realise his perfection in the concrete life of a variety of interests. For he finds the only way to perfection through knowledge and divests life of the various kinds of realisation in its different provinces.

Spinoza's idea of the different levels of self-realisation represents only the different grades of our knowledge. The absolute interest of our life consists in appreciating our unity with the whole of the universe and not in the realisation of those unique interests the world seeks to satisfy in us. Spinoza has an idea of the social morality, but for him our social morality is only a step towards our perfection which consists in the intuitive apprehension of the unity of the universe. In fact, Spinoza also conceives the ideal self in a way that it only meets the philosopher's thurst for the disinterested knowledge of the necessity of the world. It seems to me that in spite of its distinguished merits, his philosophy creates a rather negative and indifferent attitude of man towards the development of his self as an active and concrete being. He emphasises the universal elements of our nature more than those which make of each of us a fully determinate individual, though he is not the only philosopher to do so.

The abstractness and the subjective attitude of Kant's moral philosophy is well exposed by Hegel, but even his own contention has an abstract logical character, and except for McTaggart's interpretation, his philosophy is incapable of an effort for self-realisation in anybody but for the sake of mere speculative knowledge. For, the self-realisation of a particular person has no more value in the context of the absolute reality than it
it possesses as a transcended "idealised" moment in the infinite Whole. Though Hegel finds the self to realise itself to a certain extent in each of its actions, in sense-perception, morality, ethics, art and religion, its perfection lies in philosophy. Hegel does not conceive the ideal to be beyond our capacity, but nevertheless it consists in the logical apprehension of the nature of the Idea.

Green's theory, we have been, is vitiated by its inadequate conception of personality, though he rightly finds the true initiative for any action to be only a motive for self-preservation. Bosanquet, on the other hand, treats the relation between value and personality in a way that a person feels to realise himself. Royce's philosophy has the merit of asserting the Absolute to realise itself through the perfect development of ourselves as distinctive unique individuals, though his overwhelming urge for a religious philosophy and his conception of personal immortality introduce determinism and a good deal of imagination into his thought.

Sec. 4.

So problem is to have the concept of an ideal self in which we are not lost and which is able to make us see our own status in reality. Such an ideal will surely have the absolute obedience from all persons. We must see that this concept of the self is able to provide for the various interests and characteristics which constitute our unique personalities, for no ideal will initiate us to action unless it can promise a provision for the essential and unique features of our nature for the sake of which we live.

Now, we all presume to know that the necessity of our being, taken in terms of metaphysics, is expressed, however obscurely, through our nature, and the perfection we seek for ourselves implies the realisation of this necessity.
of the perfection of a human being is conceived in accordance with
the essential nature of his self. This point is one dispute. The only
object of absolute interest is obviously one's own self. The ideal
that he seeks to realise refers to it. Stated in terms of value
it comes to mean that, I consider something valuable, even objectively,
when it contains an element of my ideal self, or in any way refers
to it. The ideal self represents my true self in the sense that
embodies the realisation of that element in my nature for the sake
of which I consider life worth living, and which, I expect, will
free my existence from the limitations from which I suffer.

Opinion, however, varies on the true nature of the
self. The essential constituent of our personality is often explained
to be abstract, i.e. universal reason, and the nature of the ideal
perfection is conceived accordingly.

We have seen that the will or the ideas of a man must
express his nature. But the fundamental object of value for a par-
ticular person is not the existence of his self as an abstract and
universal entity. An abstract ideal of life, if assumed to be true,
will involve only our indifference towards any sort of progress in
action, even in knowledge, for the idea of self-realisation is
not absent in any sphere of human life. A theory of the abstract
nature of reality or of self proves its falsity as in most cases
it fails to have any response from our nature. The nature of a par-
ticular person has its unique characteristics. These characteristics
to which he cannot give life in his present state of existence
because of his limitations and several external determinations, reveal
themselves in the ideal existence he conceives for his own. The ideal
represents the true realisation of the person, so far as he is cons-
cious of himself at a certain stage of life, as an unique existence.
existence in the universe which he is, or is expected to be, by virtue of the distinctive features in his nature. Any object, however noble, can have a value for him only if it has a bearing upon this personality. The Absolute or the 'Reality' of philosophy can initiate his endeavour for it, if it is able to provide a place for the essential feature of his personality. I have dealt with this question with reference to Spinoza, Green and Royce. Here I refer to it only to emphasise that our self-realisation always means a realisation of our concrete personality.

It seems to me that I am not really free from all reference to my self-realisation even when I recognise the value of something like the law of gravitation. For it is an object of interest in the world of nature in which I am nourished and evolve. It has thus an indirect influence on my personality, though it is not that distinctive object with reference to which my personality may have its unique development. However, I shall have to refer to this when I will discuss the question of social good. Let me now pass on to some other point.

It is true that the ideal as it first presents itself to the mind is rather vague, and is an admixture of imagination and abstraction. Yet I would agree with Royce that it at least brings out the unique mode of one's nature and determines the way in which the personality is to be developed.

However, the ideal self of a person reveals itself in itself in the objects he values. The essence of the ideal self as such is not at once present either to the person himself or to others. We have an ideal indeed, but that does not imply the constant existence of a consistent plan of ideal life in our consciousness. We have some prominent interests which lead us towards certain
certain ideal objects, and the ideal plan of life as such is only an implication of these interests and is determined by them. Our concern is with our essential interests, and the ideal plan of life as a whole is only to provide these interests. Even a person who cares only for a calm and passive life, is determined in his idea by the love for peace and the fright of struggle and conflict. The plan as such is only vaguely or not at all consciously present to us in the beginning and is a product of careful afterthought which comes up along with the growing determinateness of the interests in the course of action. I differ from Royce when he says that our unique personality reveals itself in the unique life-plan, for if we could really begin with the planned idea of our life as a whole, we could avoid the conflict between desires at least to a certain extent. I am likely to be opposed by Green who finds the motive behind our action to be the preservation of the person as such beyond all desires and dispositions. But it is difficult to see what a person is when devoid of his essential modes and interests. I feel and love my own person, to be sure, and even come to form a picture of myself in an ideal state of existence, but that self is not known except by its interests and will. Indeed, I would really assert that the nature of the person as it evolves out of the universe is a unique entity—the uniqueness which is revealed in its unique aptitudes, existing in a mode of cooperation, each of which modifies and is modified by the others. As a result of this, the person has a distinctive character, which is thoroughly determined by these aptitudes and is reflected in the expression they have in will and action. My personality is indeed a unique existence, but its uniqueness consists
consists in the nature of its will and tendencies and not in the abstract self-consciousness. Hereby I reassert another contention of Green, which he himself contradicts in certain contexts of his works, that self-consciousness is not conceivable except in association with the particular habits, interests and thoughts which obviously make a unique creature of each of us. However, these inherent tendencies reflect themselves in their ideal objects. And we shall find that the nature of these ideal objects not only reflects one's character, but constitutes it.

Section 5: So the inherent nature of a person manifests itself in his will. Will is an urge to realise a certain value, that is, every will is a will for self-realisation. But will always seeks an objectification of its own. This is a point which is beyond dispute. For even 'good will' is not truly good if it is not sincere in its effort for objectification, though the actual achievement may not be the direct concern of morality. It is by virtue of this character that will is defined as active or as practical reason. But what is actually meant by the objectification of the will? Will is for a certain object that is calculated to satisfy some interest in man or in any way refers to it. But when a person wills an object, it is not the object as it exists in itself that he really seeks for. The object of the will is the object as conceived in relation to the person, that is, the object as modified by his will.

We know that a man as he exists is evolved out of several physical and psychical factors. Spinoza in his philosophy refers to this obvious fact that a man is essentially a physico-psychical phenomenon, his nature being determined both by his body and by his mind even when it aspires after the intellectual love of God. The universe in its physical as well as in its mental aspect determines him through his body and mind. Now, the evolution of the universe...
universe has created him as a unique entity which is distinguished from others by means of the distinctive nature of his modes and dispositions. But the universe which determines the nature of the person imprints itself on it in a way that his aptitudes and desires have a reference to the objects and ideas in the universe, and some of those aptitudes assume the form of conscious will on reasoned reflection and selection as determined by the character of the person as we have defined it. Royce’s theory of "selective attention" may be mentioned in this connection. We may say that the nature of a person wants to realise itself with reference to the "other" which exists in the world outside in the form of some object or idea. This obviously reminds us of the Hegelian conception of the realisation of the self in its other. The self seeks to realise itself in the other because the other contains an element of the self. But we have said that the interests of a particular person, though refer to the objects or ideas of the world, are unique in their nature. And so a desire is not the desire for mere consumption of some objects or ideas existing in the universe. When I will an object, I will it by means of my peculiar nature, as a result of which the ideal object I seek for is a novel creation in the universe, produced of my will reflected in the existing object. Therefore it comes about that, as there is no will which is independent of all reference to the existing phenomena, the object of will, or rather, the willed ideal object is at the same time something new, not known to the world before and is not likely to evolve except for this will. Even the evolution of a new thought or the composition of a verse has obviously a reference to some idea which exists in the universe either in an explicit or in an implicit form and calls for a solution or development. But the ideal object of the will contains something more than the object of reference. It has a unique character which, on analysis, is found to be...
be due to the reflection of the unique nature of the self. Will is not a will for mere consumption but for modification as well; may; even in its consumption the self creates something new of the object. This is true even where will appears to have no creative character, as in the case of a mere will to know something. For there we at least will to create the person as knowing, which of course did not previously exist. And in this sense, every will is creative as it involves a relation between the object and the agent.

However, we can explain the self-realisation of a particular self as the creation of a certain determination by the will with reference to some object or idea rather abstractly presented to it. I do not mean to say that our will is for some abstract phenomenon. On the contrary, I find it to be a fact that our interests always refer to something concrete. Yet the object with reference to which will wants to satisfy itself is comparatively abstract in the sense that the person seeks to give it a further determinateness by means of his distinctive character. An artist, for instance, loves the beautiful, and his idea of beauty refers to certain objects or ideas according to the characteristic tendency of the nature of the artist. Or, we should say, the inherent love for beauty needs to be self-conscious as being referred to those objects or ideas. But though the peculiar character of the artist is reflected in its selection of those ideas or objects, the ideal object which he wills to bring about is not indeed any of these existing phenomena. It is a unique creation of the self by means of them. Though a picture has a reference to some object in nature or some idea which may be explained in universal terms or with reference to some other ideas, it has also an aspect that implies the presence of a unique personality behind it.

So it comes about that every will is creative in its nature and the object of value is, in a sense, our own creation. Here we agree with Royce, though the will for modification in this case is not the same as Royce's conception of the "will to interpret" which is assumed
assumed on the presupposition of our social existence. The idea I want to bring about is a further development on the idealistic doctrine according to which, will is active, i.e. self-objectifying and is also ideal in its nature. Specially, I refer to the theory of Green that defines will as seeking to realise a relation between the object and the agent. It has been found that human mind, since the awakening of consciousness, has sought to modify the world around it either consciously or unconsciously. It seeks to mould the nature according to its necessity and creates objects and ideas which bear the mark of its own character. This spirit to modify we may define as the spirit of creativity and substitute it for Bosanquet's "Spirit of the whole", i.e. the urge for comprehensiveness as the essential mode of our nature. Indeed, it seems to me that this Spirit to modify is not peculiar to conscious selves. It is, in a sense, common to all things of nature as well as of mind. An object or an idea must have its influence on anything it comes in touch with. In man it is first present in the form of the instinctive urge to mould its circumstances according to its necessity, and as consciousness develops, it comes to be the will to imprint itself on its objects and becomes rational and selective. Hence it turns to be a definite attitude for the realisation of value, that is, for self-realisation in relation to its unique aptitudes which refer to distinct objects and ideas, and thereby creates novel entities in the form of ideal and in practice. When indeed the instinctive urge becomes the will for the realisation of values, we cannot say. But even in his primitive stage of existence man has a spirit to modify his surroundings, and so far as we can trace the history of the human mind in its present state of existence the urge for the realisation of some value is never absent in him. Sometimes it may happen that one's conscious will fails to represent the essential aptitudes of one's nature. But that is certainly due to the one's
one's confused knowledge of one's own nature which often follows from the
determination of the mind by several external phenomena. And in that case the artificiality is exposed in the constant conflict of this will with the other dispositions of the mind. The contradiction between the nature of the person and what he presents as his will to his consciousness also comes out as the will proceeds in action. There involve innumerable contradictions and complexities its way so as to make its realisation impossible. It may be contended that morality involves a contradiction between the moral will and the lower desires, but this conflict does not disprove the moral will. But without any objection to any moral criterion, I would only insist on the point which has been confirmed by all moral theories. I find that morality is not possible unless a man can identify his will with the moral will, and conflicts arise when his baser nature revolts against the dictates of morality. I shall refer in this connection to Spinoza's theory of active and passive emotions. Spinoza asserts that in order to achieve the truth, we must make it follow from our own will. In fact, it seems to me that it is because man is really moral that we expect the moral will to evolve out of his nature as soon as he removes from it the artificial influences. If morality had been in all cases impossible or would have been frickle, it would by all means prove its own falsity.

However, as I have mentioned before, that though we do not always correctly interpret our own nature and fail to represent it through our conscious will, the will at least bears a hint to the inherent character. It brings out the mode of our nature, with whatever confusion, and leads us to the direction of the actualisation of our essential interests when we reflect on it and press it to further
further determination. Royce develops his thought with reference to such ideas.

Sec. 6.: But the person is also modified by the nature of his own ideals, though he himself determines its nature. The person as he lives and as he seeks to live is to a large extent "created" by the nature of the value he pursues, though the nature of that value itself is determined by the person. The person wills the ideal which is created out of the characteristic features of his mind as referred to some object or idea or even some objects or ideas in their culmination and relation. But when the ideal is thus present before the mind, the agent seeks to make it actual in his life, i.e. to determine himself in relation to the ideal. And when he comes to do so, the person himself is determined by the ideal and the means he has to take for it. As determined by the ideal and the endeavour for its realisation, the person acquires some characters which had not been possible were it not for this influence.

The mind modifies the object to which the will refers in the light of the nature of its own aptitudes, and is also definitely influenced by the nature of that object. In the process of action and interaction, which is common to all things in the universe, the person and the object of reference of his will influence and determine each other. The natural inquisitiveness of a mind makes it seek for knowledge, but the particular science to which it is drawn by virtue of its peculiar interests, say, mathematical studies, also involves in it certain characteristics like the crave for mathematical exactness and figurativeness for instance. This much we presume to know.

But there is something more about it. I think, as I have mentioned, that the person is not only influenced by the nature of the object with reference to which he frames his ideal, but is essentially determined by the ideal as such and the way of its
its realisation. The ideal is born of one's own aptitude reflected on some idea or object, but as an ideal it is a new entity, distinct from oneself as well as from the object or the idea to which one's will refers, and as such it comes to mould the personality of the agent. Now this determination of the personality by the nature of the ideal evolves in the course of the actualisation of the ideal in the life of the person, a course in which both the person and the ideal proceeds towards determinateness or "individualisation" in the language of Royce. We have seen how the ideal becomes gradually determinate in its character as it proceeds in action. The ideal at first only abstractly represents certain aspects of our nature. But as soon as we endeavour to make it actual, i.e. to determine it as a real feature in the world, the contradictory elements in it begin to expose themselves and it becomes gradually developed according to its true implications. But the person himself is also determined in this process of self-realisation in view of the gradually determinated ideal. As we come to act in relation to the ideal, the ideal involves a comparatively exclusive attention and endeavour on our part. The person seeks to adjust himself to his own ideal and to mould and remould his present state of existence in relation to the ideal in its progressive determination. This obviously makes the more of a distinctive individual out of the person, as he comes to develop certain distinguished characters involved out of his relation to that ideal. Thus both the person and the ideal object in the course of the gradual "individualisation" of their nature determine each other towards further determinateness and ceaselessly intercommunicate in this process so as to determine the course of the universe so far as it possible through a particular human being.
their way that we can bring out the most out of our own person by taking ourselves and our ideal to the exact determinate form in which they are capable of being the unique constituents of the universe of idea or of fact. Moreover, the nature of a person as moulded by its ideal may acquire some fresh inspirations and habits that not only seek to offer some new turns to the realisation and evolution of that particular idea, but even mould the personality in a way so as to prepare a ground for other values.

However, I seek to explain this idea of mutual determina-

However, I seek to explain this idea of mutual determination with an illustration. The natural love for beauty leads a man by virtue of the nature of his aptitudes to music, art, painting, poetry or even to the study of aesthetics. Now, suppose that a poet tends towards an ideal of the glorification of a human sentiment, say, the joy about the simple matters of the world. The matters are there in the world, and the joy, though it may be defined as a general idea which assumes peculiar forms in different minds, is in its nature, as conceived by the poet, a unique reflection of his character. However, we have seen that, though the ideal is a creation of his own mind, the poet himself cannot at once adjust himself to it and must seek to realise the ideal. So, his nature comes to reform itself in the light of the ideal, though not always with a conscious effort, and seeks to live in this joy. Thus the ideal imprints itself on the nature of the poet and determines him as an individual by virtue of the distinctive character he acquires in this relation. Even the course the poet has to take for the realisation of his end leaves its mark on his character and so also on the ideal itself which gets further reflected and determinated by the individual in his progressive development.
It may be said that the nature of the poet is often found to inhere some characteristics which are most unlikely of a "poet". But we must see that one's personality is a constituent of various promising aptitudes, each of which though seeking for a satisfaction of its own, influences each other and determines the way in which the ideal may be actualised by the person. This unique composite effect of the personality as such recreates the ideal in a determinate and workable form, a character which it gradually assumes as it begins to be worked out in relation to the entire nature of the person.

Thus in the course of realising values we create and are also created by our ideas, both being drawn towards the ideal of individuality. Individuality is rather an ideal than an existing character within man and towards this end he is prepared only as a value-realising agent. And we are capable of being and doing something real only by developing ourselves and our ideas as truly individual phenomena.

It is useless to mention again that I have developed this idea with reference to Royce. But I feel that his concern is rather with the person himself and not so much with his creations though his philosophy contains all the implications I have tried to bring out in this connection.

Sec. 7: We have seen that the essence of a person reveals itself in the realisation of values. In this process he creates unique objects and ideas and is also created a determinate individual by means of them. So, his status in the context of reality is that of a value-realising being. The only way in which he can determine the course of the universe is by the pursuit of his values. It follows from this, and it has also been admitted by the idealists, that a man is partly ideal in his nature. That is to say, his nature and essence
essence is not fully exposed in his existing character unless understood in relation to the modes of his nature which are reflected in his ideals, even though implicitly or often. In fact, it seems to me that the nature of an object, be it of nature or of mind, is not truly known from its present state of existence, but comes out so far as its latent implications tend to be developed. So also in the case of man, we can appreciate his possibilities only with reference to the ideal implications of his nature which are expressed in the course of the realisation of his values.

However, we must agree that an object is real if it can enter as a determining factor in the chain of the evolution of the universe in spite of involving any apparent contradiction in its act. And we find that a man can do this only in his capacity for the pursuit of values. This he does by his own existence as a concrete personality and also by means of the objects or ideas he comes to evolve. Man, as he grows into an individual, progressively determines his ideas or the objects of his value. But he has also his influence on others as an existing personality either by virtue of his relations and actions referring to these relations, or even as an instance, in all these ways consciously or unconsciously entering into the minds of others and determining the nature of their interest and aptitudes. In this way he also comes to influence the evolution of values in the following ages and this becomes a link in the chain of the evolution of the world. A man exists in and by means of innumerable relations in the context of family, society, and state which, as we know specially from the Hegelian and Neo-Hegelian philosophy, determine his nature to a great extent, and obviously control the pursuit of values. But the man also influences society by means of his unique personality as it has evolved out of several phenomena of which society is certainly one, and as it is developed in the course of his life according to his ideals. The
The person acts in the various contexts of his life as a concrete and determinate person which he is of course in his capacity for the realisation of value. Indeed, he reacts as this person to all who are involved in any sort of relation to him, and thus determines their nature and action. Whatever course of action we take in our life, so long as we live in society, cannot be free from the influence of that person, even though we are not always conscious of it. This indicates the essentially social constitution of our nature which is the basis of a social morality.

But we do not determine the universe by means of our mere presence and our action with reference to the different social relations. The idea which reflects our self-realisation becomes a distinctive link in the chain of the evolution of ideas and determines it in a way which had not been possible except by it. The determination of the course of the world ideas by fresh ideas evolved out of the process of our value-realisation is thus the source of all progress either in the province of science, art or philosophy. And so we may say that value necessarily legis values. A man with his ideas which represent his unique personality determines the evolution of ideas to some further determinateness by modifying, developing, moulding, reforming and even by opposing the traditional course so as to make it review its own character and also to make it pass through a new channel and have some fresh developments.

Thus our personality determines the course of the universe both by our presence as a concrete existent acting and reacting in our several relations, and by means of our creations which directly refer to our value-realising faculty. I am indeed conscious that there is no absolute distinction between these two spheres of our life and both of these determine and refer to each other.
my only object is to bring out the different ways in which we determine the course of the world, and I find ourselves to do that directly in the course of realising the object of our value and by our relation to other individuals.

But not only do the person and his values mould one another, they are also moulded by the world in which they come to be developed. We have seen how the origin of the person and his ideas are affected by the universe. But the world of ideas and of objects also definitely modifies the nature of the person and his ideas so that it can work along with it. As I have said in my discussion on Royce, we work in the universe and the universe also works in us. However, this must not take us to affirm Bosanquet's contention that the values of our creations are absolutely determined by the Whole, i.e., according to the comprehensiveness of their nature. The universe determines the thought as well as the nature of the person, but only to see how it may be determined itself by the unique ideas and the being of the person and not to measure their capability for being absorbed in the Whole. In short, the universe works us so as to help us to bring out our inherent possibilities and to be "individuals." Its influence is not intended to destroy our essential character, and any form of control that may affect such loss is against the interest of the "living" progressive and creative nature of reality itself.

Sec. 8: Now I like to discuss a question which has so far remained unanswered. We have seen that our ideas prove themselves to be true as they come to be determined as the 'individual' features of the universe or as the determining factors of the evolution of ideas. It has also been found that a will, as it proceeds to be actualised, gradually strips off the artificial elements from its appearance and comes to focus one's essential character. But it
indeed takes time to see whether a certain will or idea is really capable of being a determinate factor in reality and so there should be some measures for our immediate moral decisions. Now it is indeed difficult to offer an immediate solution to a moral question, and though need to, so, our judgments are so often subject to variation. For, a true moral judgment depends on so many factors that it often surpassed our capacity to take all of them into account before we decide this way or that. Here I will discuss some moral criteria which, I should say, have our actions directly open to the decision of society. And though the other tests of our action, we have offered before, are objective in their nature, those we come to deal with here seem to make immediate moral decision possible to a certain extent.

It has been found from the foregoing discussion that we plead for the absolute freedom of a person to develop himself as a value-realising agent, for it is in this way that he can contribute his most to the universe. But it follows from this that he is never free to do anything against the right for the realisation of value. For, the person that denies the validity of this right only comes to deny the very world of himself in the world. If the principle of self-realisation by virtue of which I am a significant feature of the world is conceived to be false, how can I save my own status in the context of reality? Therefore, one should not be allowed to act in a way so as to oppose the self-realisation of another person. This contention sounds much like the dictates of Kant and Green and also seems to be rather abstractly stated. But when we come to reflect on it, we find it to constitute the basis of our practical moral life.

Possibly it will be contended that, one can realise the
the end of one's life even at the cost of others. How can we assert the above criterion in that case? In order to answer this objection I have to enter into the question of social morality.

We have found that the urge for self-realisation constitutes the essential motive of human nature even in the primitive stages of our life. Now, as we have said, individuality is rather an ideal than an existing character with man. And so, in those primitive ages we did not develop ourselves so much as distinctive individuals, as we were characterised with the consciousness of bare necessities which we found to be incapable of being satisfied except in an ascetic life. Now when this form of social life guarantees our provision and safety to an extent, our self-consciousness, which is the peculiar aspect of human nature begins to be further developed. We find ourselves discontented with the bare necessities and feel for the development of ourselves as "individuals" by virtue of our distinctive characteristics. But though peculiar interests constitute the essence of one's nature and one's idea of self-realisation has no meaning except for them, they have nevertheless a reference to our social existence. This is obviously due to this that, the social atmosphere in which we grew up leaves its mark on our nature in a way that though the desires and dispositions of a certain person are distinguished from those of another by their unique characters, they, even implicitly, presuppose the existence of other men. A poet, for instance, composed his verses which are unique in their own kind, or even in certain cases, yet the composition presupposes the existence of some minds which it addressed, and some ideas or problems to which it refers. It may be remembered as I said, that the unique attitudes of our nature seek to develop themselves with reference to the
to the objects or ideas in the world around us. This, not only for the self-realisation of a reformer with reference to a social cause the nature of whose essential desires is directly determined by the society in which he lives, but also the implicit assumption of a social atmosphere in all our thoughts and actions. Moreover, our constant co-existence develops in us some habits which we may describe as social habits. They evolve out of the necessity of our nature which has grown up in a social atmosphere, and we become more and more dependent on one another by the practice of these habits. We also develop the ideas of various social virtues which directly refer to our necessity for co-existence. It seems that, we must live a life of co-operation which makes our living fairly smooth and comparatively free from unnecessary conflicts so that we may sincerely devote ourselves to our respective missions. Our obedience to our parents, the duties to our friends and neighbours, the social obligations and also our obedience to the State belong to the category of social virtues. It is no use to ask whether we could have developed ourselves in absolute separation from one another. For, as Green says, so long as we have lived, we have lived as social beings. We know that even in our utter loneliness we cannot conceive ourselves as being excluded from all relations to our neighbours. Therefore, in a life of distinguished interests and ideas we, even unconsciously, presuppose the help of others. The essential interest of one is certainly unique in its own kind. But being born in social circumstances it is such as cannot be satisfied in an unsocial life. All these only come to show the essential social constitution of our nature, and it implies that if there is a will for the abolition of our social existence it must be due to a misinterpretation of one's own nature or is due to some perversion. For there cannot be a will to deny the very ground of its own possibility, as there can be no self-realisation based on the idea of the total denial of the world.
world of nature in which our body and so also our mind is brought up.

However, I do not deny the necessity of change and progress. Indeed, I feel that our concern is mainly with the individuals and all that we need to do is for the perfect development of the individuals as the value-realising agents. For it is only as such that they can do their best for themselves as well for the world. The existing forms of the society should be reconstituted with a view to provide the utmost scope for realising his possibilities. All the idealist philosophers are found to assert that we act most sincerely when we find ourselves to be free, and that we can bring the most out of ourselves by self-determined actions alone. Therefore, society should not exercise any external determination on us. All its control should only go to direct one's mind, with the help of education and culture, to understand the true essence of one's own, and the way in which one can develop oneself as a perfect individual. Perfect individual. We know that the self-development of persons with reference to their various interests admits of the necessity of competition. In fact, as we have said in relation to our discussion on Green's philosophy, the very nature of the objects we pursue involves this necessity. Therefore, I must say that society has to arrange for this competition in a way so that the fittest may have the best reward. The competition should be determined with a view to our capacity to the best of their outcomes, and to have our rewards according to our merits. The urge for competition serves as the most effective motive for self-realisation and so of our progressive achievements in the various spheres of life. The motive behind the action of an ordinary man is often found to be a will to realise his life better than his fellow men. Possibly a common man would not feel so much for his self-realisation except for this sense of competition to reinforce the spirit latent in him. I have mentioned this in
in the reference to Green. The urge for self-realisation is most keen and alive in a society which provides a fair scope for competition. But in all cases, we have to see that the competition is fair, and that it does not lead to the suppression of some in the interest of others, especially when anything that goes against the interest of humanity or of society as such goes against the interest of each one of us. However, I do not intend to further develop this point, for it is the task of the science of sociology to direct the way in which competitions may be properly arranged. However, the social laws, customs and atmosphere must provide as much scope to a man as he needs in order to determine himself according to his possibilities, but in no case should he be given to do anything that may effect the absolute denial of all sort of social existence. We may say that the common end before us is to develop each of ourselves as a unique distinctive feature of reality and so, to realise the universe as creative "living" and progressive. But we cannot do this except in association with one another. Indeed, the complex characteristics of human nature which have evolved in the course of time involve the necessity of a form of society which can provide for these variety of distinguished interests of distinct personalities. Society is a means to our self-development and its nature should be determined in view of that necessity.

Sec. 9: However, I will close the discussion with reference to a point I raised before. It is the problem of the destiny of the person and his values. I think the answer to the question has been already suggested, though I feel I must make it clear. The problem is raised specially in connection with Bosanquet, Royce and Green. It may be stated in the form of an enquiry, what is the destiny of the person in the context of reality who devotes his life in the search of values? He realises certain values and aspirations...
aspires more. But what happens to these actual and ideal elements when the persona is dead? Two answers have been suggested, the one by Bosanquet and the other by Royce. These we have discussed and criticised. My objection against Bosanquet is this, that the nature of the values cannot be realised except with reference to the entire personality of the agent. Our creations are valuable for their uniqueness which reflect the nature of the person as such and not for their capacity for being absorbed and explaining away a contradiction. By the personality of a man we understand, as I have said, the unique constituent of certain interests, habits and thoughts, which are unique in their nature as distinguished from those in other persons, and whatever value we seek as a fulfilment of any of our aptitudes, is determined by this unique constituent as such and cannot be understood except with reference to it. So, if values are real, they only come to prove the reality of the person himself. In no moment of our life we transcend ourselves in a way that our higher thoughts may be totally discontinuous with the baser ones, for the higher can be realised only as a development out of the lower stage of life, which contains the possibilities of the nobler achievements in some way or other. Persons are certainly temporal entities, but they live in the values they create and through the effect which their existence and association have on others. And we need not repeat that the values are marked by the essential features that constitute the person and cannot be realised without reference to them. The reality of the values of which Bosanquet speaks only implies the reality of the person himself.

I object to Royce's conception of the immortality of a person, who for this idea seems to involve only a wishful thought based on the presupposition of a moral necessity. The question of moral necessity, as we will see, can be solved even without the idea of personal immortality. Moreover, though the evolution of an idea in a certain province of thought is distinctively determined by the unique-
unique personality of a particular being, we cannot explain all the stages of its infinite determination with reference to a single person. The instance of the progressive development of the Hegelian philosophy which we have considered before may be mentioned in this connection. At each of the stages of its development the idea gets a distinctive turn as offered by a distinct individual. Therefore, the process of its development as a whole has reference to several minds and though a particular person has his unique contribution in the process, and the process could not have that development except for that person, the complete development of the idea is not possible by a single person in any way. In the course of time and as a result of further reflection the idea comes to have so many unique determinations that cannot be imagined by a single person who deals with it in a particular context of time and circumstances. This should not, however, cause despair, for it only shows the possibility of the infinite progress of our own cause with which we identify ourselves. And this indeed implies a sort of immortality of our person.

However, the destiny of an individual is to develop himself as a determining feature of reality in the sense we have mentioned, and herein lies the necessity of his being. In this sense he is indeed immortal without evolving any idea of continuity in time. I think this is the only destiny and the perfection of our life, and this is the only sort of immortality we may expect for ourselves.

In the course of the evolution of the world there have been occurrences, all of which are not present today. But all of them are certainly real, as they have determined the course of the universe by their distinctive actions and the present form of our life would be impossible except for each of them. An individual indeed realises his perfection so far as he is able to determine the course...
course of the universe in a distinctive way through the utmost manifestation of his capacity for values. The aim of our life is not to be absorbed in the "Whole" and only to reflect the uncontradictory nature of the 'Whole' through ourselves. The necessity of our life, on the contrary, consists in determining the course of the world with our unique acts and ideas which reflect the unique character of our personality. It is in these determinations that our personality continues to live. I think that the moral necessity of one's person is really satisfied when one comes to know one's own values and so the essential interests of one's personality to constitute the determining features of reality, and the values which a man leaves unrealised in this life to remain to be developed in the hand of posterity according to the element of possibility inherent in them. It is necessary, therefore, not to hanker after the idea of continuity in time, but to find the way for the fulfilment of one's urge for realising one's ideal. It is in this way, and in this way alone, that we can have the most of ourselves as human personalities.