Section II

Appayya Diksita's Vedantic Writings.
INTRODUCTION

One of the most characteristic features of Appayya Dīkṣita's writings is that he has made significant contributions to almost all the systems of Indian philosophy. He wanted to popularise Śaivism and to consolidate its position. In order to be able to do so adequately, he seems to have studied all other schools of thought critically and from a comparative point of view. So far as Vedānta was concerned, he evidently had a special fascination for the works of Śaṅkara, which he studied very thoroughly. He even prepared a conspectus in verse of Śaṅkara's famous commentary on the Brahma-sūtras. Notwithstanding this special attraction for the kevala advaita, Appayya Dīkṣita pursued with equal zeal and devotion the study of the other systems of Vedānta such as those of Rāmānuja, Śrīkantha, and Madhava. As pointed out above, his Siddhāntaleśaṃgraha constitutes a veritable compendium of Indian Philosophy and and traces, in an encyclopaedic manner, the development of the various schools of thought up to his own times.1

This would make it abundantly clear that Appayya Dīkṣita's

1. Cf. S. Radhakrishnan, History of Indian Philosophy, 2,451 and Deegaṃaṭa, History of Indian Philosophy, 2,215.
own contributions in the field of philosophy were based upon perfectly solid foundations.

The present section will be devoted to a more or less detailed discussion of Appayya Dākṣita's works on Vedānta. Tradition ascribes to Appayya the following 19 works on Vedānta:

1) *Vedāntakāḷpataruparimala*¹,
2) *Siddhārītalasasamgraha*²,
3) *Nayamaṇiari*³,
4) *Sivārkamanīdīpikā*⁴,
5) *Śivatattvaviveka*⁵,
6) *Nyāyarakṣamani*⁶,
7) *Mātasārārthasamgraha*⁷,

1. Edited by Anantakrishna Sastri, and re-edited by Bhāgava Sastri with the *Brahmasūtras, Śāmkarabhāṣya, Bhāmatī, and Kalpataru*. pp.1022, Published at Bombay, 1938.
7. Journal of the Śāmkara Gurukulam, Srirangam. For further details see concluding note on p. 63.
8) Nyāyamuktāvalī, with Svopajña commentary¹,
9) Nyāyamukhamālīka²,
10) Manimālīka³,
11) Ratnatrayaparīkṣa, with Svopajña commentary⁴,
12) Śikharipīmalē⁵,
13) Madhvatantramukhamardana, with Svopajña commentary⁶,
14) Nyāmanimālā, with Svopajña commentary⁷,
15) Nyāyasamgrahamālē⁸,
16) Ramanujamatakahandana⁹,

3. This is not published nor is any manuscript of it available, it is known only through tradition.
6. Ānandasrama Sanskrit Granthāvalī, Poona, 1940.
8. This is not published, nor is any manuscript of it available, it is known only through tradition.
9. This is not published, nor is any manuscript of it available, it is known only through tradition.
17) Siddhāntaratnakara¹;
18) Viśnutaṭṭṭvaviveka²;
19) Śivakarnāmṛta³,

It is, of course not quite easy to ascertain
the authenticity of Appayya Dīkṣita's authorship in the
case of all these works. We can, however, think of three
principal criteria that we may employ in this connection
more or less fruitfully. Firstly, these works, in the
colophons of which there is a clear mention of Appayya
Dīkṣita, the son of Śrīranga-raja-dhvarin, as author⁴, may
be regarded as genuine compositions of our Appayya Dīkṣita.
Secondly, in some of the works which are definitely known

1. This is not published, nor is any manuscript of it
available, it is known only through tradition.
2. This is not published, nor is any manuscript of it
available, it is known only through tradition.
4. Cf. Colophon at the end of the Ratnatrayaparīkṣā and
the introductory verse in the Siddhāntalesasamgraha:
Ratnatrayaparīkṣā : भिदित्र श्रीमदनरावान्वाकुणजीखिकास्तुण सदत
श्रीश्रवणरावाचरत्रिवस्रुनः: अप्युष्यदिदोशि)तस्य कृतं रत्नभ्रमपरिसा
समाप्तः।
Siddhāntalesasamgraha : विद्वद्वारे विन्ध्यकक्षर्वश्चन्द्रस्य श्रीर्षाको
मुखःक्राणा मित्रमे।।श्रीश्रवणरावाचरत्रिवस्रुनः: अप्युष्यदिदोशि)तस्य कृतं
रत्नभ्रमपरिसा:।।
to be the works of Appayya Dīkṣita, the author refers to some other works as being his own compositions¹. Therefore, in spite of the fact that, the author's name is not specifically mentioned in the colophones of these latter works, they may be deemed to have been the creations of Appayya Dīkṣita. The third criterion would be that, if a particular work was referred to as that of Appayya Dīkṣita either by some distinguished successor of his in the Guru-parampara or by some later authentic writer, it might be regarded as a genuine work of the great Appayya. Even if one applied these three tests - whether collectively or individually - to the works mentioned in the foregoing list, only few out of them would have to be omitted from it as being of doubtful authorship. Such would be, for instance, the Viṣṇutattvarahasya, in respect of which none of the three criteria mentioned above is applicable. The works of the various Appayyas mentioned in the preceding chapter have to be particularly separated from those of Appayya Dīkṣita I. The drama, Vasumatī-citrasenavilāsa,

1. Cf. Madhvatantramukhamardana, p. 116:
   अतः यथा च समुद्रज्ञिद्व्रूपाप्रवृत्तीविश्वसनस्वत्त्वाय निमित्तिविभाविनि
   न भवन्ति तथा समर्थिचास्मात: सिद्धस्यविभेच्ये ।
for instance, is ascribed to our Appayya Dīkṣita. But the colophon at the end of it which reads: अय्यायादिक्षितत्मने अय्यायादिक्षितार्तिः । makes it quite clear that its author is not the great Appayya Dīkṣita, but is presumably his grand nephew.

On the basis of the criteria mentioned above, the following works on the Vedānta can be definitely ascribed to our Appayya Dīkṣita,

1) Vedāntakalpataruparimala,
2) Siddhāntaleśhasamgraha,
3) Nyāyanārāja,
4) Śivārkamanidīpikā,
5) Śivatatttvaviveka,
6) Nyāyarakṣāmani,
7) Matasārārthasamgraha,
8) Nyamayukhamalikā (with commentary),
9) Ratnatrayaparīkṣā (with commentary),
10) Madhyatantramukhamardana (with commentary),
11) Ramanujamatakhaṇḍana,
12) Śivakarnāmṛta.

3. See page -q and foot-note No.1
Out of these twelve works, works No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10 and 12 can be decided to have been the works of our Appayya Diksita, on the basis of the first criterion. Works No. 5 and 7 are referred to by him as his own works in his works, the Madhvantramukhamardana, and the Vedāntakalpatparuparimala respectively. So the second criterion holds good here. The remaining two works No. 8 and 11 can be ascribed to him on the strength of the third criterion.

Apart from these works, three are some other compositions by Appayya Diksita such as the Ramayana-tatparyasamgraha and the Bharatatatparyasamgraha which concern themselves, in an indirect manner, with Vedānta. However, in view of the fact that the central theme of these compositions cannot be said to be either Vedānta or Mīmāṃsā or Sāhitya, they are included in the list of miscellaneous works of Appayya Diksita.

Before proceeding further, it may be pointed out that all the twelve works on Vedānta by Appayya Diksita, which have been listed above, are not of equal importance. It is, therefore, proposed to take up for discussion only such works as have made some significant and distinctive contribution to Indian philosophical thought in general and to Vedānta in particular. These would be:
The Siddhāntaleśasamgraha appears to be one of Appayya Dīkṣita's early literary ventures in the field of the Vedānta. This work essentially possesses the character of a compilation rather than of an original treatise. And it is but understandable that the young Appayya Dīkṣita should have started his literary career with a work of this kind. Appayya Dīkṣita does not seem to have developed at that time sufficient self-confidence in respect of his philosophical views. That is perhaps, why he has generally avoided setting forth and establishing

1. S.S. Sūryanārāyaṇa Shastri, JORM, 9, pp. 280-281:

"The Siddhāntaleśasamgraha must be taken to have been a very early work of Appayya".

1) Vedāntakalpataruparimala,
2) Siddhāntaleśasamgraha,
3) Nayamaṇī,
4) Śivārkamanidīpikā,
5) Śivakarpāṃrtā,
6) Nyāyarakṣāmāṇi,
7) Ratnatrayaparīkṣā (with the author's own commentary),
8) Madhvatantramukhamardana (with the author's own commentary),
9) Nayamaṇimala,
10) Śivādvaitaniṃṇaya.
his own Vedāntic position in that work even though he could have had several occasions to do so.

The Aḍayapalam inscription, which is dated Śaka 1504 (that is 1582 A.D.), states that a Śaiva temple was built by Appayya Dīkṣita in or about 1582 A.D., out of the wealth received by him from Cinna Bomma on the completion of his well-known work, the Śivārkamanidīpikā. The date of the Śivārkamanidīpikā might, accordingly, be fixed a little prior to 1582 A.D. It has been already pointed out that this was the period when Appayya Dīkṣita had attained a more or less full maturity. At any rate, the Śivārkamanidīpikā can be safely assigned to one of the concluding phases of Appayya Dīkṣita’s literary activity. The majority of Appayya Dīkṣita’s works on Vedānta will, then have to be placed between the Siddhāntalesasamgraha on the one hand and the Śivārkamanidīpikā on the other.

In the Śivārkamanidīpikā, Appayya Dīkṣita refers to another of his works, namely, the Madhvatantramukhamardana. He does not mention it by the name Madhvatanatramukhamardana, he merely mentions the name Madhvamatavidhvidhvamsana, which is his own commentary on the Madhvatantramukhamardana. The context makes it quite

1. Śivārkamanidīpikā, pp. 90-91.
clear that what is intended here is the above mentioned work and Appayya Dīkṣita's own commentary on it. In the Madhvaṭantramukhamardana, we come across a reference to another work of Appayya Dīkṣita, namely, the Śivatattvaviveka. So the chronological order of these three works may be fixed as Śivatattvaviveka, Madhvaṭantramukhamardana with commentary, and Śivārkamanidīpīka. Of the same type as the Madhvaṭantramukhamardana is Appayya Dīkṣita's Ramānujamatakhaṇḍana. So both these works may be assumed to have belonged to more or less the same period. The Caturmatasarasmagrha, which is also known as simply Matasārārthasamgrha, is referred to in the Śivārkamanidīpīka and must obviously be earlier than the Śivārkamanidīpīka. But presumably it is earlier than even the Madhvaṭantramukhamardana. For, a work of the nature of a compilation like the Matasārārthasamgrha would normally precede a work involving dialectics like the Madhvaṭantramukhamardana.

In his Navamanjarī, Appayya Dīkṣita gives a summary, in verse form, of Śaṅkara's views as set forth in the Śārīrakabhaṣya. Accordingly it must also have been one of Appayya Dīkṣita's early works. Most probably, the

2. Cf. Śivārkamanidīpīka, p. 98.
Matasārārthasamgraha and the Nayamanjari belonged to the same period of Appayya Dīkṣita’s literary activity as the Śidhāntalesasamgraha.

We may broadly group Appayya Dīkṣita’s works on Vedānta under three main heads, namely, those which are of the nature of compilations, those which are dialectical in character, and those which constitute an original and positive contribution. As suggested above the order in which these three categories are mentioned here may be taken to correspond with the chronological order in which the various works in these categories were produced. The Adaiyapalam inscription of 1582 A.D. mentions, besides the Śivārkamanidīpikā, also the Vedāntakalpataruparimala and the Nyāyarakṣāmani. Like the Śivārkamanidīpikā, therefore, these two latter also may be assumed to have belonged to the last phase of Appayya Dīkṣita’s literary activity. The fact that the Śivārkamanidīpikā refers to the Vidhirasayana, which was completed under the patronage of Venkaṭa, would also confirm such an assumption. From the point of view of contents, the Vedāntakalpataruparimala may, indeed, be regarded as representing the apex of Appayya Dīkṣita’s achievement in the field of Vedānta. As for the remaining two works, namely, the Ratnatrayaparīkṣā with the Svopajñā commentary and the Nayamanimala, they might be assigned to a time a little before that of the Vedāntakalpataruparimala. The Advaitic view set forth in the Ratnatrayaparīkṣā is
elaborated and expertly established in the *Vedántakalpa-taruparimala*.

In the present section, however, for the sake of easy approach to and convenient treatment of the whole subject, Appayya Dīkṣita's works on Vedānta have been divided into the following five classes:

1) Works which are of the nature of summaries;
2) Works which are of the nature of compendia;
3) Works devoted to refutation;
4) Works on *advaita-Vedānta*; and
5) Śivādvaita - works.

1) The first class of works, namely, works of the nature of summaries, would include the following works of Appayya Dīkṣita:
   i) *Nayamāñjari* (on Śāṅkara-mata),
   ii) *Nyāyarakṣāmāni* (on Śāṅkara-mata),
   iii) *Nayamanāmāla* (on Śrīkāntha-mata).

2) The second class of works, namely, compendia, includes only one work.
   i) *Siddhāntaleśasaṃgraha*.

3) The third class is of 'Refutative works', and again includes one work only.
   i) *Madhvatantramukhamardana*.
4) Works on *advaita-Vedānta* constitute the fourth class, and the important works, namely, the *Vedāntakalpataruparimala* has been dealt with here.

5) The Śivādvaita works form the last, that is, the fifth class and it includes the following works:
   i) *Ratnatreṣaparīkṣā*,
   ii) *Śivakarnamṛta*,
   iii) *Śivādvaitanirṇaya*,
   iv) *Śivārkamanidīpika*.

The discussion of each of these works will normally follow the following pattern –

a) First of all, some general information about the work will be given. This will mainly include details about the external features of the work, such as the extent of the work, the form of the work (whether in prose or in verse), and the printed editions or manuscripts of the work.

b) This will be followed by a detailed critical analysis of the contents of the work. Such analyses will, indeed, constitute the main part of the thesis.

c) The discussion of each work will be concluded with a brief note embodying a critical evaluation of the work. An attempt will be made to form an estimate of the work both from the points of view of its form and of its contents.
An indication will be sought to be given of the special contribution which the work makes to Indian philosophical thought as also of its importance among Appayya Dīkṣita's works.
Section II

Chapter 1.

Nayamañjari.
SECTION II

Chapter 1.

The Nayamanjari

I

(The Nayamanjari by Appayya Diksita is a summary in verse of the Samkarabhāsya on the Vedanta-sūtras.) The printed edition of the work is divided into three parts. The first part which is known as the prastavāna and which covers 18 pages consists of an introduction in English by P. P. Subrahmanya Sastri and another in Sanskrit by Swami Saccidanandatirtha. The latter extending over 16 pages gives, among other things, a more or less full account of the personal life of Madhva and of Appayya Diksita. The second part of the book is the text proper, and it covers 110 pages printed in bold type. This is followed by an alphabetical index of the various metres used by Appayya Diksita.

The Vani Vilas edition of the Nayamanjari is based on the single palm leaf manuscript in Telgu script, which was available in the Tanjore Sarvasvati Mahal Palace Library No. 7628 of D. C. Volume XIII. The

1. Edited by P. P. Subrahmanya Sastri of Madras, and printed in the Sri Vani Vilas Press, Shrirangam in 1939 A. D. The editor in his prefatory note claims that this Nayamanjari has been printed for the first time.
editor also mentions the paper transcript of the
Tanjore manuscript in the Madras Government Oriental
Manuscript Library R. No. 7300. The detailed
introduction which the editor promised, would be
published at the end of the work, does not seem to have
seen the light of the day.

The *Nayamanjari* begins with the salutation
to the feet of Samkara whose commentary is to be
summarised and ends with the usual colophon which reads as follows:

| विष्णुपदम् रुद्राकुञ्जकारिकः सुमार्थमर्दद्वैतविचारः- |
| श्रीविश्वनाथिनीप्र्रमोतानाथविद्याध्ययनीरः |
| चतुर्वेदिরाश्रयेः न्यायमन्यायाः कुलपरिच्छेदे चक्रधान्यस्य |
| चतुर्वेदि पादः । |

But the colophon coming at the end of each
quarter is worded rather differently. For example,

| विष्णुपदमः दैवतेर्विनाथद्वितिये चतुर्वेदि न्यायमन्याये |
| चतुर्वेदि परिच्छेदे द्वितीयायायस्य प्रथम पादः । |

This form of colophon remains unchanged from
the first quarter of the first chapter up to the third
quarter of the fourth chapter.
The Nayamañjari opens with the salutation to Śāṅkara whose commentary on the Vedānta-Sūtras, with various sub-commentaries, has established itself as most meritorious and which is highly honoured like a holy river which purifies the regions through which it flows. Appayya Dīkṣita has composed this new work of his on the lines of the commentary of Śāṅkara, and that too for self-enlightenment (atma-bodhāya). As for the arrangement of the work, it may be said that, generally speaking, each topic (adhikarana) is given two verses – the first one setting forth the Pūrvapakṣa and the second one establishing the Siddhānta. A special feature of the Nayamañjari is that the verses in it are composed in a variety of metres, many of which are rare and not usually found even in the standard works.

After the introduction, Appayya Dīkṣita directly begins with the first section, known as jñānasādhikarana, which is made up of the well-known sutra: atha atakā Brahmanyājñāsa.

Here the Pūrvapakṣa raises an objection against starting an altogether new investigation (śāstra) about the Brahman and the Ātman. He avers that, if establishing the complete identification between the Brahman and the Ātman is regarded as the subject-matter and the aim (phala)
of this investigation, then this aim cannot be achieved even by thousands of Vedanta-texts, as such identification goes against the usual experience in the form " I am the agent " , " I am the enjoyer ", etc. Hence, this new investigation would prove to be entirely futile as it would have neither subject matter nor any particular aim.

This objection of the Purvapakṣin has been set aside by the Siddhāntin by pointing out that, even if there was such experience as indicated by the Purvapakṣin, still that experience was to be regarded as being due to adhyāśa. Moreover, some teachers identify this Ātman variously with entities like mind, sense-organ, etc., while, others assume that the Ātman is altogether different from the body and that it is both the doer and the enjoyer. Still others say that the Ātman is only the enjoyer and not the doer.

In this way there are divergent views about the Ātman. If one accepts any one of these views it is just possible that he may accept the wrong view, and as a result instead of attaining final liberation, he may continue to be involved in the cycle of birth and death. So, in order to avoid this confusion, this new investigation, which has the knowledge about the Brahman as its subject and the attainment of final liberation as its aim needs to be undertaken.
2. **Purva-paśa**: The creation, preservation and destruction of the universe cannot be said to be the activities of the Brahman. Such activities can be posited only of an entity which is either subject to transformation or is temporary. The Brahman is not subject to transformation, but is ever-existing. In short, the character of the Brahman is quite opposite to that of the phenomenal world. Moreover, the qualities like **satya**, **bodha**, **sukha** cannot be assumed to be the qualities of the Brahman as these are not known to be such.

**Siddhānta**: It is not correct to say that the creation etc. of the universe cannot be attributed to the Brahman, because the Brahman is essentially of opposite nature. As a garland of flower is apprehended as a serpent by a person (on account of his ignorance), in the same way, the creation etc., may be regarded as the outward (**tataśtatha**) attributes of the Brahman. Its true nature, however, is that it is perfectly real, perfectly sentient, and perfectly blissful. Indeed, it has been frequently described.
3. The next section presupposes the assumption that the Brahman is omniscient because all the scriptures have originated from it. Here, however, the Purvapakṣa raises an objection. Even if one assumes for the sake of argument that the Brahman is the source of the various scriptures, then, the most that one may claim is that the knowledge possessed by the Brahman is more extensive and of a higher degree. One cannot certainly conclude on that account that the Brahman is omniscient. The knowledge of a grammarian is more extensive that what is reflected in his particular work of grammar, but he cannot on that account be said to be omniscient. Moreover, it is the Brahman conditioned by avidyā which is the material cause (upādāna) karana; and as avidyā implies ignorance, the Brahman cannot be said to be omniscient, nor can the scriptures be said to have originated from it.

1. Taittiriya Up., II.7: त्तीर्यसै ब्राह्मणं वेष्यं सर्वं स भगवानं भक्तिः।
Ibid, II.8: स अभ्यासां ग्यानं आन्तं।
Ibid, II.9: आन्तं ब्राह्मणं विद्यानु न विकेति कुलेन।
Brhadāraṇyaka Up., VI.4.13: कृत्सना रस्त्रम अभक्षे वा रे मात्मा।...
The scriptures are not composed, says the Siddhāntin, in the manner in which we, human beings, compose some works by thinking about the chapters in some definite order such as 1, 2, 3, etc., and that too one after another and not simultaneously. All the scriptures have been composed simultaneously, with their order and meanings fixed at the same time. This is, certainly, possible only if their author is some omniscient being. As for the second objection concerning the material cause, it may be said that this upādānatva which is seen or implied by the effect cannot be proved by mere conjectures like the identification of the cause and the agent, without the help of the scriptures. The Brahman being supra-sensuous, formless, etc., cannot become an object of ordinary means of knowledge like anumāna, Pratyakṣa, etc. so there is no scope for any kind of guess-work here, and the only possible alternative is to depend on the scriptures.

4. After having established that the Brahman alone is responsible for the creation etc. of the universe and also that the scriptures have originated from the Brahman, the Vedānta-sūtras introduce a new section with a view to re-asserting that this Brahman can be known only through scriptures. In this connection the main
objection is that most of the scriptural passages are rendered purportless because they seek to describe the Brahman, which is already Siddha. The instruction about an entity which is Siddha may become useful if some fruit is likely to be obtained from that instruction. But no such fruit is indicated as resulting from the knowledge of the Brahman, as the attainment of heaven is indicated as resulting from the performance of the Darsa-Purna-masa sacrifices. It may also be pointed out that any kind of knowledge is achieved with the help of such means as pratyakṣa, anumāna, etc. Such means not being possible in the case of the Brahman, the knowledge of the Brahman itself becomes impossible. Though the scriptures repeatedly speak of the Brahman, it is not established by any other independent means of knowledge. Any talk about the Brahman consequently becomes only imaginary, as in the scriptural texts: 'O Gautama, man, veṣiḥy, is the fire', 'O Gautama, woman, veṣiḥy, is the fire, etc. Such sentences are obviously imaginary. The knowledge about the real fire is not dependent either on the scriptural authority or on human intellect, but on
such means as pratyakṣa etc.¹

This objection is ably set aside by the Siddhāntin. The knowledge about the existence of the Brahman is self-widient, for, everyone speaks of himself in terms of 'I am'. On the other hand, if the existence of the Brahman in the form of the Ātman had not been experienced, one would have said: 'I am not'. Further it cannot be said that the knowledge about the Brahman has no significance so far as its fruit is concerned, because that knowledge itself conduces to great bliss, and thereby constitutes its own purpose. This is clearly indicated by scriptural texts which unanimously declare the Brahman to be omniscient and omnipresent. So, in order to obtain the final salvation which is characterised by ever-increasing joy, the knowledge of the Brahman, which can be obtained from the Vedānta alone, is absolutely essential.

¹ cf. Śaṅkarabhāṣya on I. 1.4. : यथा च 'पुनःवश गौतमारिनः 'वशा वश गौतमारिनः' बिल्भ्य वेदार्थमेत्योरिनं बुधिदमासी नक्ति। केक्कलोदनान्यत्त्वातिक्रमस्य सा पुनःपत्तश्राच। या हु प्रक्ष्यद्यक्षानाभिन्नशुद्धिदृशि सा वेदानात्त्वः ॥ किं तरसः, प्रत्याविष्क्ष्टछुतनैवेदितसा।
5. The fifth section in this chapter is intended for the reputation of the doctriness of non-vedāntic schools such as the Sāmkhya. The Sākhya system of philosophy was very popular and much honoured. So its consideration is taken up first. The Sāmkhyas assert that the cause of this universe is the Pradhāna and not the Brahman, for, the Brahman cannot be logically inferred as the cause from the universe which is the effect. Moreover the reference to Brahman as the creator does not suit the context. (samgati-paricētya).

This is not correct, says the Siddhāntin, because the sentence तद्वेषत्र जैसतं जैसं सप्तं प्रमाणे where the sat (i.e. Brahman) is mentioned as the creator suggests through the word aiksāta that the sat is a sentient entity. The Brahman is sentient, while the Pradhāna of the Sāmkhyas is not. It cannot be said that this sentence conveys only a secondary sense, because the word Ātmā occurs in that context. Moreover, this reference cannot be said to be irrelevent, as the Brahman and the Ātmā are identical.

1. Chāndogya up. VI 2.3.
2. Sāmkarabhāṣya on Vedānta sutra I.1.5.

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It may be incidentally pointed out that the first four sections have only one sutra each, in the fifth and the following sections, there are more than one sutra. For example, the fifth section contains 7 sutras (sutras 5 to 11) in all. However, in view of the very nature of this work, Appayya Diksita summarises the contents of these sutras in just two stanzas, emphasizing only the more important points.

6. The scriptures speak about two types of Brahman - the one possesses attributes like name, form, etc, while the other is attributeless. The moksa is attained only by means of the knowledge of the latter and not of the former. But unless and until the saguna-brahman (i.e. the Brahman with attributes) is meditated upon, the nirguna-brahman (i.e. the Brahman without attributes) cannot be known. Hence, wherever there is the description of the saguna-brahman, it is to be regarded as being intended for meditation; and wherever the nirguna-brahman is described, it is meant to be known.

In order to establish this position, the author introduces the sixth section. The original adhikarana contains 8 sutras (i.e. sutras 12 to 19) and the sentence, तत्सर्वातः पूर्वपुरुषादिनेत्रां च द्रव्यम् ब्राह्मणम् आनन्दम...आनन्द ब्राह्मण पूर्व प्रतिज्ञा। forms the topic of discussion.

1. Taittiriya Up, II.5.
The prima facie view here is that, the above mentioned Upanisadic passage refers to the Jīva as the object of meditation. This is clearly indicated by the fact that limbs like head, face, etc. are referred to. The function of the sentence is over after it has expressed the sense of ānandamaya, so that the reference to puccha is not relevant.

The Siddhāntin insists that here the Brahman is alluded to and not the Jīva. Because in this context the word puccha is used in the sense of substratum (ādharma). The term ānandamaya does not stand for the Brahman, for the Brahman is often denoted by the word ānanda only and not by ānandamaya. So all these kosās, including this ānandamaya, are mentioned as the sheaths of the Brahman which is their innermost nucleus. Indeed it is this Brahman which is described in detail.

1. cf. Taittirīyā Up. II.7: रसे सुः स्वर्गपथवांशस्त्रं जन्मयात्।
   Ibid II.8: श्रृण्य ज्ञानवस्य मौर्यमयाः स्वतं।
   Ibid II.9: ज्ञानदेह ज्ञानमोक्षमुक्तिः स्वर्गम्।
   Ibid III.6: ज्ञानदेह ज्ञानो विद्विज्ञानो ज्ञानात्।

2. They are five in number e.g. ब्रह्म, प्राण, किंग, विद्विज्ञान & lastly ज्ञानदेह.
in the following passage 1.

7. This section consists of two śūtras, namely śūtras 20 and 21. The Upaniṣadic sentence "अर्थ य ज्ञेय न्तः यदित्वे "..... "स्त्रैलिङ्ग पापम्यित् वुद्रित जुदेति। समाध्यात्मपूर्व अर्थ य ज्ञेयां न्तःस्त्रिकिनिन युष्मणे दृष्टिः।" is under discussion. It is stated in this passage that the Puruṣa who is seen within the orbit of the sun as also in the human eyes, should be meditated upon. Who is this Puruṣa? This is the question. In view of such special features as golden hair etc., the substratum like the orbit of the sun, and the limited or restricted glory etc., the Purvapaksin assumes that it must be the Jīva. For these features go well only with the Jīva and not with Paramesvara whose unrestricted glory, formlessness, etc. are often mentioned.

According to the Siddhāntin the Puruṣa is the highest Brahman. He is also otherwise known as Paramātman. The attributes of being free from all kinds of sins, etc., are possible only in the case of

1. Taittirīya Up. II. 6: तद्यथेष ज्ञेय भवति।
Ibid II. 9: यत्र वाचे निर्विराग्यमि भवति।
Paramātman. As for the reference to his form and limited glory, etc., it may be said that, on account of his māyā, this Paramātman can assume any form, and that the description of such form etc. is for the sake of meditation only.

8. This section, which has only one sūtra, discusses the sentence अक्षय चौक्षय का गतिरित्वात्मानः विति हेवौँच। The term अक्षय here may mean either the अक्षय which is one of the five great elements, or Paramāśvara. The Pūrvaṇaśina favours the first meaning for two reasons, namely, 1) The word अक्षय is generally used in that sense, and 2) The word अक्षय directly expresses the meaning of the sky and only indirectly it denotes the Paramātman. Moreover, from the context, it appears that here the sky is referred to. The attributes like 'endless', etc., are mentioned only once, and that too at the very end; hence just on account of this single reference, अक्षय should not be understood in the sense of Paratmatman.

The reply to this is: Though the word अक्षय is generally used in the sense of sky, still it is found to have been used in the sense of Paramātman also.

Moreover, the qualifications like 'endless' etc. cannot be set aside as being solitary. They certainly do not fit in with the meaning 'sky'. The qualification that all universe is submerged in it, can be the qualification of Paramātman only. It is in order to avoid the possible mistake of the word ākāśa being interpreted as 'sky', that these qualifications are specifically stated. It is necessary to interpret the whole text as referring to Parabrahman. One should not contract the meaning as the Pûrvapâksin has done by referring to upakrama and upasamhrti. 1

9. In this section, which is formed of one Sūtra (i.e. sutra 23) only, the sentence from the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, namely, क्लम्बा सा देवता प्राण विदित होवाच 3 taken into consideration.

1. The Pûrvapâksin says that from the Upakrama it appears that the sky is intended in this context. The Paramātman is referred to only at the end (upasamhrti) but according to the Pûrvapâksin, this upasamhrti may not be taken into account. This means that the Pûrvapâksin is contracting (saṃkoca) the meaning of the sentence. This is not acceptable.

2. Chāndogya Up I. 11. 4-5.
The view of the Purvapakṣin is that the word prāṇa in the sentence under consideration refers to the physical prāṇa-vāyu, as it generally does. Even so, the statement that the five great elements are absorbed in the prāṇa would not be rendered meaningless. Because it is said in the śrutis that when a person sleeps all the sense-organs which are the essence of these five great elements are absorbed into the prāṇa, and that they again originate from the prāṇa when the person is awakened.¹

The retort of the Siddhāntin to this is that, here, not the prāṇa-vāyu but the paramātman is intended to be understood. It should be remembered that the scriptures do not state that only the five great elements are absorbed into the prāṇa, they state that everything is absorbed in it. And this is possible only in the case of the Paramātman. Moreover, both the upakrama and the upasamhṛti of the text indicate that this is the description of a sentient entity into which the earth etc. are submerged. This would be quite ununderstandable in the case of the prāṇa-vāyu.

¹ Satapatha Brahmana, I 33.6:

मदा वै पुरुषः स्वपिति प्राणं तह्मिः वाग्येति
10. The four sūtras 24-27, which constitute the tenth adhikaraṇa, take up the sentence: ज्योति दिवो ज्योतिः तिरिदम्ये विभक्तं वृहेष्य यथा वृहेष्य उम्मामुमु वेये। from the Chandogya Upanisad. Here the crucial word is jyotih.

The Purvapakṣa says that the word jyotih denotes some luminous body as the sun etc. There is, in this context, no mention of the Brahman, nor are the qualities of that Brahman previously stated. So the present text has to be regarded as an altogether independent and distinct text.

The Siddhāntin replies that, the description in this context namely, that it is above the dyu-loka, clearly indicates the Brahman; and the same Brahman is described in the previous sentence as well as next sentence. Obviously the sentence which is sandwiched between these two references must be understood to refer to the Brahman only. Similarly there is the super-imposition of the Brahman on the abdominal fire (jāthara jyotih) as it is

2. Ibid III. 12.6: तात्त्वान्त्व महिमा तोरव्याप्त यथा पुस्तर| 3. Ibid III. 14.1: क्वे सर्वप्रिद्ध ज्ञातन्त्रज्ञानिन्ति ज्ञानं व्याप्तित।
there in the case of Viṣṇu, Sūrya etc. Hence, only the Brahman is here referred to.

11. This is the last section in the first quarter of the first chapter of the Vedanta-sūtras. It contains four sūtras (28-31), and discusses the word prāna in the sentence स हृदावच यन्त्वैर्थिः प्राणस्य प्राणात्मा तं मामायुर्मृत्तिबिन्दु-पालस्य.

from the Kausitaki Upaniṣad III.2.

Here, says the Purvapakṣin, the word prāna refers to Indra, as he is the speaker. Ultimately he is to be known. Or it may refer to the prāna-vāyu as its qualifications such as "the speaker should be known", etc. are stated. Speak, really, is the attribute of the Jīva only. So by the word prāna, Jīva may have been expressed. This Jīva is identified with prajñā, since both of them live together in the human body, and also leave that body together.

This is not correct, says the Siddhāntin. Because, if prāna refers to three different entities, namely, Indra, Jīva and prāna-vāyu, then, it would naturally mean that three different meditations are here intended. But from the general context, and from the conclusion, it can be seen that the whole section deals with only one entity and that entity is the Brahman. The attributes
of the Jīva or of the prāṇa-vāyu may be the attributes of the Brahman also, since both of them are dependent on the Brahman. Moreover, the term prāṇa actually denotes the Brahman at other places. Again, even if it is taken for granted that three different meditations are here intended, still ultimately they would mean the meditation on the Brahman itself in three different forms, namely, Prāṇa, prajñā, and the Brahman.

In the last quarter, the Brahman is described as the cause of the creation, sustenance and destruction of the whole universe. From this it naturally follows that the Brahman is omnipresent, eternal, omniscient, etc. Till now such upaniṣadic passages in which the indications of the Brahman are clear and distinct, have been taken up for consideration. But there are other passages in the scriptures where there are no such clear indications. A kind of confusion exists about the meaning of certain words in these passages. In order to clarify that meaning, the second quarter is being started.

1. In the first adhikaraṇa of this pada, the sentence स्वै सत्त्वं भूता तत्तत्वानि निति ज्ञातं युक्तीयते | अभ India; प्राणारीमयेऽवमूप्यः सत्त्वकृत्य भाजानि यात्राणि सब्ज्ञाति: सर्वेऽव: सर्वप्रसः सर्वविद्यातृतः वाक्यादारः |
from the Chandogya Upanisad\(^1\) is under discussion. This sentence mentions the meditation on prāṇa. What is meant by this word prāṇa? Does it mean the Jīva or does it mean the Brahman? According to the Purva-pāksa, it is the Jīva which is intended here, for, the relation of the Ātman with the mind and the prāṇa as stated here, would suggest only the Jīva. On the basis of the Viśvajit-nyāya\(^2\) also, the Jīva has to be understood here.

The Siddhāntin declares that, here, the Paramātman is referred to, since the two special features namely satyasamkalpatva, and ākāśatmatva are neither desired by the meditater, nor are they possible in the

2. This nyāya is stated in the Jaiminiya sūtra, IV.3.5.7.  
   The injunction विवेचन्ति यदैं is not accompanied by the mention of any fruit. But there must be assumed some fruit; otherwise no one would perform that sacrifice. So the most commonly desired fruit, namely, स्वर्ग is regarded as its fruit. Thus, when no fruit is stated for some विवेच्य this nyāya is applied. Here it is applied in connection with the particular form of meditation.
case of the Jīva. Further, it is better to have a sentence without its fruit having been mentioned than to resort to the Visvajit-nyāya, which is dependent on something else.

2. This second section with two sūtras (9 and 10), deals with the sentence यथा जीवाः च शर्म वेदां देहं प्रस्तुतात्: । मृत्युण्योपासनेन क विश्व वेद यत्स यस: ॥ from the Katha Upaniṣad. It is stated here that the Brahman and the Kṣatra are its food. Now the question is; who is that eater of the Brahman and the Kṣatra? Is he Agni or the Jīva or the Paramātman? According to the Purvapakṣa, he must be either Agni or the Jīva, as both of them are known as 'devourers' from their usual practice as also from the scriptures, while the Paramātman is essentially a non-eater and a more passive spectator.

The Siddhāntin controverts this by saying that it is the Paramātman who is meant here. He is here described as a 'devourer' in view of the fact that he eats up or destroys the whole universe. The next part of the sentence will be properly understandable only if the first


द्वारा सूचना संताना संताना सुपर्णिकुमारिन्द्र विनिविन्द्यमानाने ।
कैराचरण: पिपिल्क्ष्यं स्वावलक्षणं मनस्यं विनिविन्द्यमानाने ॥
is made to refer to the Paramātman, for, it refers to
death in general. Only two social orders, namely, the
Brahma and the kṣatra are mentioned because they are the
topmost social orders. Besides, they are here mentioned
only by the way of illustration. This Paramātman is a
non-eater in the sense that he is not required to
experience the fruit of his actions.

3. The third section with two more sutras
(11 and 12), again, deals with the sentence — खंडोऽ यज्ञस्तधोऽ
युक्ताय तोक्के गुदा प्रकविष्टो परसे पराधेः । ज्ञात्याय ज्ञात प्रकविष्टो वदन्ति
पञ्चास्तो मे च जिनाचिकित्तः । ॥
from the same Upaniṣad wherein two persons
who have entered into a cave are mentioned. Who are they—
intellect and the Jīva or the Jīva and the Paramātman?
This is the question. According to the Purvapakṣin, they
are the intellect and the Jīva. Even though the attribute,
namely 'enjoyer', does not suit the intellect, still by the-
way of Laksana it may be applied to the intellect.

2. This is known as अपांश्चार्य where the primary sense is
not totally abandoned. For example, शिक्षो याति
This included persons without umbrellas. But the original
sense 'persons with umbrellas' is not at all abandoned.
Moreover, the descriptions like, 'in this world obtained through good deeds', 'dwelling in one cave', specify the same idea and not the idea of the Paramātman.

According to Siddhāntin, the pair referred to in this context are the Jīva and the Paramātman, for, both of them are described as sentient. Moreover, the scriptures describe this Paramātman as residing in the case. Though he is omnipresent, still he is described as above for the sake of meditation. The descriptions such as 'obtained through good deed' may not be proper in the context of the Paramātman; still by resorting to Lākṣaṇā such descriptions may be made applicable to him in their secondary sense. As for the reference that one of the two (birds) is the 'enjoyer', while the other is the passive 'witness', it may be said that here too the Jīva and the Paramātman are referred to. The term 'non-eater' is to be interpreted as 'not subject to the fruit of one's actions'. Moreover the next sentence directly describes the Jīva and the Paramātman. So the two birds are the Jīva and the Paramātman respectively. As this Paramātman is the cause of all, he should be regarded as being the agent - if not directly, indirectly.

1. Mundaka Up. III. 1.2.

समाने कृते पुनर्वा निमित्तादेवानीत्याजोवित मुद्रयात्
ि

मुद्रर्तः ददा परशुतण्यनीतिस्मात् महिमान्तिति वीतार्तः।

II
4. The next adhikarana consists of five śutras (13-17), and the subject for discussion in it is the sentence from the Chāndogya Upanisad. The Purvapakṣin assumes that the person reflected in the eye must necessarily be some other than the Paramātman. He may either be a person who is actually reflected or the sun who is the presiding deity of the eye. The forms, amṛta, and nirbhaya in this context have to be understood in a relative sense, as the sun is particularly immortal and fearless in comparison to human beings.

This view is wrong, says the Siddhāntin. The terms amṛta and nirbhaya can denote only the Paramātman and nothing else. Moreover, before and after this sentence, the Brahman itself is described. Even though the Brahman is all-pervading, the eye, the heart, etc. are mentioned in the śrutis as its substrata for facilitating meditation. The word drṣyatē in the sentence under consideration is used to indicate that an enlightened

person can visualise that Brahman.

5. The fifth topic contains three sutras (18, 19, and 20) and the sentence for discussion, namely,

is taken from the Brhadaranyaka Upaniṣad. The sentence speaks of some inner being which controls
the various entities. Now the question is: what is this inner controller? It may be some yogin having a body,
etc., or some deity endowed with body. Both of them can have the controlling power. But under no circumstances
can it be Paramasvara, as he is bodiless. This is the argument of the Purvapakṣins.

The view of the Siddhāntins is that the inner controller can neither be the Jīva nor any yogin. It must
be the Paramātman himself, as his special attributes like immortality, etc. are mentioned. The controlling power is
possible in the case of the Paramātman, even if he is bodiless, because the entity which is to be controlled
possesses body, sense-organs, etc. It may also be added

1. Brhadaranyaka U., III.7.3.
that the quality of being 'the seer' (dr̥ṣṭṛtya) does not go against the Siddhāntin's view. Though the attribute is usually applied to the Jīva, it can be made applicable to the Paramatman also, as the latter is not different from the former.

6. The next section deals with the sentence—

from the Mundaka Upaniṣad. In the Vedānta-sūtras, three sūtras (21, 22 and 23) are devoted to the discussion. The word bhūta-yoni, which occurs in the sentence under discussion constitutes the point of dispute. According to the Purvapakṣin, that word denotes either the Pradhāna of the Saṁkhya, or the Jīva. It is, however, better to take it in the sense of the Pradhāna, as all the parallel illustrations like a body of a spider, the earth, relate to non-sentient objects. It cannot be said that the Ātman of the spider or the man creates webs or hairs etc. It is the body, which is itself acetana, that creates them. The qualification of being omniscient, which is mentioned in

1. Mundaka Up., I 1.5.6.
this passage, does not apply to this acetana entity; it applies to the Paramātman who is described there as being next to aksara. Or, this term bhūta-yoni may refer to the Jīva, as he is the efficient cause (yoni) of all beings (bhūta).

To this the Siddhāntin replies. It is the Paramātman that is denoted by the term bhūta-yoni. He alone can be properly described as sarva-viś (omniscient) the Pradhana cannot be so described. The term bhūta-yoni is used in the sense of the basic cause. Hence that which is the basic cause and is at the same time omniscient, is intended here. The phrase 'next to aksara' is to be explained in the next sūtra. As for the Pūrvapākṣin's suggestion that on account of the parallel illustrations like the spider etc., some non-sentient entity has to be understood here, it is not at all valid. Because, when some parallel illustration is given, the perfect similarity between the drṣṭānta and the dārṣṭāntika is not suggested. If that were be so, one would have to accept that, since the earth etc., are sthūla, so the Pradhāna must also be sthūla. The Pūrvapākṣin certainly cannot agree to this. Hence only the Paramātman must be understood to have been intended in this context.
7. In this last section of this quarter, there are nine śātras (24 to 32). In the Chāndogya Upaniṣad the meditation of the vaśvānara is described. What does the term Vaisvānara denote? Does it denote the fire on the belly or the fire in general or the Jīva or the Paramātman? As the word ātman also is used in this very context, the word vaisvānara has to be taken in the sense of the Jīva. This Jīva can be called vaisvānara in secondary sense, for, he resides near the fire in the belly. Or, vaisvānara may denote the fire in general or its presiding deity.

This view of the Purvapakṣin is refuted by the Siddhāntin, who says that the context shows that this is the description of the Brahman and not of any of entities suggested by the Purvapakṣa. The phrase, 'he is within the body', does not refer to the fire in the belly, but it refers to the Paramātman only. Moreover, the term vaisvānara can be interpreted as "that being (nara) which is everywhere (vīśva)", that is to say the Paramātman; or as "the creator (nara) of all universe (vīśva)", or as "one to whom all these beings (vīśva-nara) belong". Similarly

1. Chāndogya MP, V.11.6:

and also

the word agni can be explained as "one who takes (ni) a person to the zenith (agra)". The pradesa of the fire is mentioned for facilitating meditation etc. or for favouring the meditaters etc. The term pradesa, again, is variously interpreted by ādari as that part of the face, from the head up to the chin. The same has been supported by the Jābala Upānīṣad\(^1\). All this leads to the only conclusion that the Paramātmā is here referred to.

(1) The first adhikāraṇa of the third quarter of the first adhyāya consists of seven sutras (1-7). It discusses the sentence:

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\text{Jābala Up. II. :}
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1. cf. Jābala Up. II. :

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\text{स हेवावच माक्षक्य सोरविवृक्त युपास्यो य बेतोहस्तोस्वस्थ्यक्त जात्मा सोरविवृक्ते प्रतिमित्त जिति। सोरविवृक्तः कर्मसः प्रतिमित्त जिति वरणायो नास्या च मयाये प्रतिमित्त जिति ——— श्रुतााः प्रार्थनया च मं संधि। स अग्र बोधोकप्य परस्य च संधिं विनिति। सेतु संधि स्वर्गमन्त्र अवतित सुमास्य विनित सोरविवृक्तः वामनाचैव स व लदेवेदेव वेदेदित।}
\]
from the *Mundaka Upanisad*\(^1\). In this passage the substratum of the heaven and the earth is described. Now the doubt arises as to whether the Paramātman is intended here or some other entity. According to the *Pūrva-pākasīna*, it must be something other than the Paramātman, for, this substratum is described as the bridge (*setu*) leading to salvation, and the bridge is always a limited thing. Or, Pradhana of the Sāmkhyas may have been intended here, since it is the cause of all, and can, therefore, be regarded as the substratum of the heaven etc. Or, it may be the Jīva. As the Jīva is the bhoktr, it can be treated as the substratum of all the experiences.

The *Siddhāntin* counters these views of the *Pūrva-pākasīna* by asserting that only the Paramātman must be understood to have been referred to in the sentence under discussion. The Śrutī, after mentioning the substratum of the heaven, etc., further adds that the same substratum is attained by the liberated or the enlightened persons, and it is well known that the Brahman alone is attained by such persons. The Pradhāna of the Sāmkhyas cannot be taken to have been referred to here, because there is not

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\(^1\) *Mundaka Up.* II.2.5.
a single word or indication to suggest this. On the other hand, the words like 'omniscient', etc. which can be applicable only to the Brahman are present. It can also not be said that the reference is to the Jīva, as there does not occur any word which points to it. Though the word ātman is there, still that Ātma cannot be said to be omniscient as the knowledge of the Jīva is limited on account of upādhi. As for the word setu (bridge), it does not signify 'end'. The genitive case (amrtasya) is used to denote that which is supported. The word setu means supporter - it being derived from the root si to bind. Thus, setu implies the Paramātman which supports immortality.

(2) The second section with two sutras (8 and 9) is devoted to the discussion about the word bhūman in the sentence:

చంధోగ్య చంధోగ్య సంస్కృతి దిద్దిత మూమాన్ మాన్ దిద్దిత మితిత

మదానాయంశానిత నామాయంశానిత నామాయంశానిత స మూమా

మదానాయంశానిత నామాయంశానిత నామాయంశానిత తద్వం తి మూమా తద్వం

యద్వం తమమిత స మాయ కర్పనాయంశానితి సంతమాయంశానితి సంతమాయంశానితి మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న మదా న 

The word may denote either the prāna or the Paramātmā.
Etymologically, it means 'greatness'. But the question is: whose greatness? According to the Pūrvapakṣa, it must be the greatness of the prāna, as the previous context indicates. It is said that speech is greater than name, that mind is greater than speech, and that ultimately this prāna is greater than all. Moreover, the prāna is identified with father, mother etc. in the smuti, wherein it is also stated that the prāna is the Ātman and that one who knows this Ātman can conquer grief. That means that

1. The order is continued as - dhyāna is greater than mind, vijnāna is greater than dhyāna, strength is greater than vijnāna, food is greater than strength, water is greater than food, lustre is greater than water, ākāśa is greater than lustre, smara is greater than ākāśa, āśā is greater than smara, and lastly prāna is the greatest of all. Chandogya Up., VII. 1-14.

2. Chandogya Up., VII. 15-1-4 : प्राणो द पिता प्राणो द माता ——— प्राणोऽथैतानि स्वीच्छि महति।

3. Chandogya Up. VII. 1.3. : श्राकं तत्ति अत्नवन्ध्य।
the knowledge of the prāṇa destroys grief; hence by
the bhūman, prāṇa is intended.

The Siddhāntin, however, does not accept this
argument. He says that here only Paramātmā can have been
referred to. This bhūman is described as being beyond
samprastāda that is to say, as being beyond prāṇa.
Samprastāda denotes prāṇa, because it means the condition
of deep sleep wherein only prāṇa functions. So, that
which is beyond this prāṇa must be the Paramātmā.
Moreover, the word satyā occurring in the sentence under
consideration refers to the Paramātmā, for, the
Paramātmā is characterised as satyā at other places also¹.
Again, the abundance of happiness which is associated with
bhūman, can properly be the attribute of the Brahman alone.

(3) This third section with three sūtras
(10 to 12) tries to determine the exact meaning of the word
aksara. In the sentence

कृष्णन्दन्त सत्यानां ब्राह्मणेऽप्रेतात्म। स हृदयानीति तद्वर गार्धिणेऽप्र

1. Taittiriya Up. II. 1: सत्ये यस्मानन्तरां भ्रम।
aksara is referred to. This word may mean either syllable or the Paramatman. Usually this word is used in the first sense. It can be shown that aksara is the support of all in the sense that the syllable om pervades all this, as it stated in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad.

The Siddhānta, however, is of the view that here the word aksara denotes the Paramatman, since all objects up to the sky are supported by the Paramatman only.

What the Chāndogya Upaniṣad means to say about the syllable om is that the Paramatman itself is to be meditated upon in the form of om. Similarly the attributes mentioned in this context, such as, 'supporter', 'controller of the universe', etc. are possible only in the case of the Paramatman.

(4) This section has only one sūtra (13) in it.

It concerns itself with the manner of meditation as described in the Praśna Upaniṣad. The meditation mentioned

1. Chāndogya Uś., II. 23.3 : खर्मण्गकर्म अबेद्वर्गम्।

2. Praśna Uś., V. 2-5 : तत्स्म हेतुवा चेतुः सत्यकाम परं च चापरं ब्रह्म यदाज्ञारस्तरस्मा शिष्येन्तर्तवायतमतमरमप्ति शः पुरस्तवं त्रिमण्डलितमिन्येन्तर्तवायतारर्वं पुरुषमिश्रित्यमि सः शः अतस्मान्तनात्मात्मातरात्मा परिशयं पुरुषमिश्रितेः।
is that of the Para-purusa. Who is this Para-purusa? It may be either Brahmā or the highest Brahman. According to the Pūrvapakṣin, it is Brahmā or Apara-Brahman, for, its meditator is said to obtain only limited fruit, namely, the Brahma-loka. If Para-purusa had denoted the Para-Brahman, the fruit of meditation on it would have been unlimited, namely, Mokṣa.

The Siddhāntin insists that the meditation on the Para-Brahman is indicated here. The Para-Brahman alone is connected with the act of seeing (Iksana),. Moreover, the attribute 'destroyer of sin' can be made applicable to Para-Brahman only. The purport of this passage is that whoever meditates on this Para-Brahman by means of om attains to the Brahma-loka in the first instance, but that he gradually becomes more and more enlightened and in course of time is completely liberated.

(5) This fifth section with five sutras (14-18) considers the sentence: अध यददिम अध पुरुष दहर् पुण्डरीकेः बेशम दहरोदिक्ष्यन्तात्रादस्तस्तस्तदस्तद्द्वे दद्व विनिष्क्यतिस्य म ।

from the Chāndogya Upanisad. In this sentence the term daharākāśa is used, and its exact significance forms the point of dispute. The term may denote the natural sky or the Jīva or the Paramātman. In

the śrutis it is stated that the daharakāśa resides in
the Brahmapura, that is to say, in the human body. And the
word Brahman in Brahmapura may stand for both the Jīva
and the Paramātman. Thus, it is not clear as to who is
referred to here. The Purva-pakṣin assumes that, here, the
natural sky is referred to, for, the term ākāśa is
generally used in that sense. The qualification dahara
(small) is applied to ākāśa, because its substratum in
the form of the heart is comparatively very small. Or,
ādharakāśa, may mean the Jīva. This body, which is called
Brahmapura, is connected with the Jīva only. The word
Brahman is to be understood in its gauna sense to mean
Jīva. Moreover, the word suksma in this context very well
suits the Jīva and not so the Paramātman.

The Siddhāntin replies to this by saying that
here the Paramātman alone can have been referred to and
not the Jīva. The concluding part of the above mentioned
sentence states that the ākāśa is within the heart, which
means that the ākāśa is small due to upādhi in the form of
the heart. In order words, it cannot be the real ākāśa.

1. Chandogya Upan., VIII. 1.3:
Again one ākāśa cannot be compared with the same ākāśa. Moreover, the attributes such as 'free from sin, oldage, death' etc. are not possible in the case of the natural sky. Hence it must be the Paramātman.

As for the Jīva, it may be said that by the word Brahma in the Brahmapura, only the highest Brahman is indicated. This human body is the place where Brahman can be known; hence it is called the Brahmapura. Moreover, this Jīva which is very limited on account of the upādhis like the intellect etc., cannot be compared with the unrestricted and unlimited ākāśa. Nor can the above mentioned attributes such as 'freedom from sin', etc. be made applicable to the Jīva. Therefore, too, the Paramātman only is here referred to.

(6) This section with three sutras (19, 20, 21) continues the discussion about the same Upaniṣadic passage as in the last section. In this connection, it may be pointed out that, though this occurs as a separate adhikaraṇa in the Śāṅkarabhāṣya, Appayya Dīksita regards it as a part of the previous section itself and summarises
it in only two lines. He reiterates that the Jīva is not at all intended in the passage under consideration; it must be the Paramātmā, for, the attributes like 'freedom from sins' etc. are not possible in the case of the Jīva. Moreover, in the speech of Prajāpatiⁱ, the pronoun 'this', though it refer to the nearer object (vyavahitaparamāsrī), does not refer to the Jīva but refers to the condition prior to enlightenment. The same has been further explained by the words such as 'free from sins' etc. So, it is the Paramātmā.

(7) The next section with two sūtras (22 and 23) takes up for discussion about the sentence :

न तत्र शून्यात्मः न छन्दर्तार्कः केवल विदुष्टे माति कुतः चमकितः।
लोकमा अग्निमुखः माति स्वर्गः तस्य गायता स्वाप्पपेतवेक्षितः॥

in the Mundaka Upaniṣad². In this sentence it is stated that by his lustre, everything is illumined. Whose lustre is intended here? Is it of some luminious body or of the Paramātmā? According to the Purvapaksa, it must be that of

1. Chandogya Upanisad, VIII. 10.11 : य खेल त्वागे .... etc.
2. Mundaka Upanisad, II.2.10, and also Katha Upanisad, II 2.15.
some luminary like the sun or the moon, at whose rise
no other luminary can shine forth. The statement, 'on
account of its lustre, everything else shines' suggests
some kind of imitation. Hence, must probably the sun must
have been intended here.

The Siddhanta, however, insists that the
statement under consideration already describes the
Paramatman. The Paramatman is lustrous, as is pointed out
by the Chandogya Upanisad. Moreover, there is no such
rule that one entity imitates another only when the
two entities are similar to each other. For instance,
fire and iron are not similar; still the heated iron-ball
is said to bum like the burning fire. It may also be
added that by the word 'his' in the sentence, 'by his
lustre, everything else is illumined' the Paramatman has
to be understood as being referred to. Otherwise, the
sentence would yield the strange meaning, namely, lustre
of the lustre. Again in the statement 'everything is
illumined', the word 'everything' denotes the whole univer­
se; and it can be only Paramatman who is capable of
illuminating the whole world.

1. Chandogya up., II. 14.2 : नोपण्यः प्राप्तयारः मार्गः सत्यस्वत्वः।
2. Brhadāraṇyaka up., IV. 4. 16 : तद्वाच्योनिन्त्रित्या स्मार्तिरसुहायकस्कृते।
(8) The next two śūtras (24, 25) which form the seventh adhīkaraṇa, deal with the sentence 

|Śūdra| Purāṇa | Purāṇa | | 1 |


wherein the puruṣa of the measure of a thumb is mentioned. Who is this puruṣa? The Purvapakṣin argues that he must be the Jīva, since his being of the measure of a thumb is specifically stated. The smṛti also speaks of the Jīva in the same terms. Hence, it must be the Jīva who is referred to in the passage under consideration.

The reply to this by the Siddhāntin is that the puruṣa is the Paramātman, for, he is here described as controlling the past and future. This Paramātman is said to be the measure of a thumb on account of the upādha of the heart. Moreover, the purport of this sentence definitely is to state that thin thumb like puruṣa is the Brahmaṇ. Or, hereby the Jīva and the Brahmaṇ are shown to be identical with each other. The same has been stated also in the sentence.


1 laukālia, II.*
2 Mahābhārata. III. 297-17. Here the story of Satyavān is narrated. From his body the thumb like puruṣa is said to have been taken out by yama.
3 Katha Upan., II. 3. 17.
(9) The topic for discussion in the next eight sūtras (26-33) is the right of the gods to study the Brahman-vidyā,

According to Bādarāyāna, not only men, but also gods, are qualified to undertake the study of this Vidyā. Here an objection may be raised, namely, that since the gods do not possess body, they cannot be said to be entitled to such study. The possession of bodies by the gods is not proved by the pramanās like pratyakṣa, etc. On the other hand, since histories and the Purāṇas are man-made, they cannot be said to have a validity of their own. Further, that the gods possess bodies is not proved even by the vidhis or the mantras or the arthavādās. So as gods are bodiless, they are not qualified to undertake the study of the Brahman.

The Siddhāntin rejects the above mentioned objection by pointing out that the main qualification for the study of Brahmanvidyā is the desire to know. Such a desire is possible in the case of gods. The Brhadāranyaka

1. cf. Brhadāranyaka Up. I. 4. 10 :

अभ्रपेदानं भाषियते तथा सत्त्वाद्वर्तमात्रं वेदां शास्त्रं
प्रत्यक्षाय घाँटकय तदर्भं

115
and the Chandogya Upanishads fully testify to this assumption. Moreover, since the Vidhi-sentences prescribe that offerings should be made to the gods, the gods must be assumed to possess bodies. There is direct sabda-pramāṇa in support of this assumption. It can be stated that the mantras and the arthavādās declare that that gods do possess bodies. And as gods have bodies they are entitled to the study of the Vedas.

(10) This section with five sūtras (34-38) opens with a similar question in connection with the śudras. Do the śudras have the right to study the Veda or not? According to the Purvapakṣin, the śudras certainly are qualified for the study of Brahma-vidyā, even though the śudras do not maintain sacred fires in their houses. The maintain sacred fires is by no means an essential condition for Vedic study.

The siddhāntin replies that the śudras are not entitled to Vedic study, for, the most essential samskāra in this connection, namely, upanayana is not possible in

1. cf. Chandogya U.p. VIII. 7.2 : य आत्मा — सौङ्केत्कस्य:
   ——तद्यथाय देवायुधं अनुभुविषये — समत्वार्थी प्रवत्तिकान्त्वमाचार्यः

2. Arthasastra
   जिन्नौ वृजाय कइमुदास्य
   तात्तिर्याय साम्हिताय, II.1.वायुस्य केपिष्ट्य देस्ताः
their case. It is well known that, without this saṃskāra, the Vedas are not to be studied. It is only if the śudras have performed some meritorious deeds in their previous births, that they may obtain knowledge. Such a person, for instance was Vidura in the Mahābhārata. But these are exceptional cases.

(11) This section with only one sūtra seeks to explain the meaning of the sentence

There it is stated that the world moves on account of the prāna; it is a terrible vajra, etc. Here the two words, namely, prāna and vajra are not easy to understand. According to the pūrva Dakṣa, the word prāna stands for the prāna-vāyu, by means of which the whole world breathes. Due to the wind, again, the clouds, lightenings, etc. are formed and become visible; and this phenomenon of the thundering clouds is described by the word vajra.

The Siddhāntin, on the other hand, suggests that the word prāna denotes the Brahman, for, the same has been

described in the preceding as well as the following sentences. The Brahman has the power of making the whole world tremble. The word vajra is to be understood as the upamana. The Brahman is terrible like vajra. In the sentence under consideration, the word prāna must be understood to have been used in its secondary sense, conveying the meaning of the Paramātman.

(12) The next section which consists of only one sutra (40), considers the sentence -

It is stated here that the enlightened persons attain the lustre (jyotiḥ). What does this jyoti signify? Does it signify the sun etc. or the Paramātman? According to the Purvapaksa, the obvious answer to this question is that the word jyoti denotes the sun etc. That is, indeed, the usual sense of that word. After death, this jyoti merges into the sun. It is this meaning which is suggested when it is said that, when this jyoti leaves the body, it goes upwards (i.e. to the sun) by way of the rays.

1. cf. Katha Up II. 2. 8:
2. Ibid. II. 3. 3:
3. Chandogya Up., VIII. 12. 3.
The view of the siddhāntin is that the word jyoti has to be understood in the sense of the Para-Brahman. The context shows that it is the description of the Ātman. Further, this jyoti is characterised as para (highest). The statement that one reaches the sun is not to be understood in the literal sense, but only in the secondary sense, for, so far as the real salvation is concerned, leaving the body etc. has no meaning.

(13) This section also consists of one sutra (41). The Upaniṣadic passage under discussion is from the Chandogya Upaniṣad, namely अभासो वे नाम नामृपमो निषिद्धिता ते मद्वत्तर लद्ध्रम।

According to the Purvapakṣin, the word ākāsa in this sentence denotes the natural sky. The description that it is the determined of name and form suits the sky very well, because it is due to space that all objects in the world are properly accommodated. On the other hand, there is no attribute mentioned in this passage which would indicate the Brahman.

1. The fourth pada of the second verse in this section (that is of verse 22) is not seen in the manuscript.
The *Siddhāntin* says that by *ākāśa* we have to understand the Para-Brahman. It is described as being within name and form. As it is said to be within name and form it must be different from them. So it must be the Brahman. The phrase, 'determined of name and form' implies that name and form are created first and are supported afterwords. This is the attribute of the Brahman only.

(14) The last section¹ in this *pāda* comprises two *sūtras* (42 and 43). It deals with the description of the *Ātman* in the *Brhadāraṇyaka Upanisad*² namely 

क्षम भात्मेति गे यथ विद्यानम् प्राणेऽधूतन्त्वाति पूर्ववः स समानः 

etc. The question now is: who is it that is described here, the *Jīva* or the *Paramātman*?. According to the *Pūrva Pāka*, it must be the *Jīva*, for, there is the mention at the beginning, the middle and the

1. In this section, the whole of the third *pāda* and a part of the fourth of the first verse (that is of verse 23) are lost.

end\textsuperscript{1}, of attributes which can be applicable only to the Jīva. No doubt, at some places the attributes of the Brahman are mentioned, but they are to be understood as being applied to the Jīva in secondary sense.

The Siddhānta, on the other hand, states that the Paramātman is obviously described in the passage under consideration. Though at the beginning, at the middle and at the end the attributes of the Jīva are mentioned, still they do not determine the purport of the passage. It is said that the Paramātman is different from the Jīva in deep sleep or the Jīva at the time of the death. Ultimately, however, the identity of the Jīva (i.e. prāṇa) and the Paramātman is intended.

1) The first adhikaraṇa of the fourth quarter of the first chapter contains 7 sutras. In the Katha Upaniṣad\textsuperscript{2}, the three principles, namely, mahat, avyakta

\begin{itemize}
  \item The beginning (4.17) and the end (4.35), do describe the Jīva but the purport of these śruti passages is not the description of the Jīva, but of Paramātman as the Jīva, is well known, and the general practice is that from known (Jīva) the unknown (Paramātman) is to be known.
  \item of Katha Up. I.3.11. नक्त: परमात्मकस्मस्य काण्डः परः । 
\end{itemize}
and purusa are mentioned in successive order; and the same order has been accepted by the Samkhya. So, according to the Purvapaksins, these three must be the three principles of the Samkhya. The pradhana of the Samkhya is also known as avyakta. Moreover, in the illustration of the charioteer, the chariot means the body both sthula and sukṣma; and by avyakta the sukṣma body is intended.

On this the Siddhāntin says that, the words avyakta and mahat do not denote the Samkhyā-principles. Merely the fact that the order in which avyakta, mahat, etc. are here mentioned is similar to the order of the Samkhya cannot prove that these principles also are of the Samkhya. The etymological meaning of the word avyakta is something subtle, that is to say, the subtle body. Ultimately, the highest Brahman which is beyond this subtle body is described in this passage. That is its purport.

2) The next section with three sūtras (8-10) discusses the so-called sabda-pramāṇa for the doctrine of the Pradhana of the Samkhya. According to the Purvapaksins, the sentence from the Śvetāsvatara Upanisad

1. cf. Śvetāsvatara Up., IV.5.
describes the pradhāna of the Sāmkhyas, as is clearly indicated by aja, the tricoloured one etc.

The Siddhāntin, however, says that there is no particular reason why the word aja should be taken to denote the Pradhāna. The reference here is clearly to the three elements, namely, the earth, water, and light, as would become clear from the Chandogya Upaniṣad. The word aja is used here, neither in its traditional (rudhi) sense, nor in its etymological (yoga) sense, but it is used in a metaphorical sense to indicate the pre-primary stage of the universe or the original cause of the universe, by which or through which the universe is manifested in visible form. The ignorant Jīva enjoys that, while the enlightened one leaves it.

3) The third section, with three sutras (11-13), deals with another pramāṇa brought forth in favour of the Pradhāna. It occurs in the sentence

from the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad²

1. cf. Chandogya Uп., VI.4.1. यदर्थे रोक्षिते पुर्ते तेषुक्तदम्

The word *panca panca janah*, in this passage, refer, according to the *Purvaksa*, to the twenty five principles of the *Sakhyas*.

The *Siddhantin* refutes this suggestion by saying that the number twenty five is not at all mentioned there. The text reads: *panca panca janah*. The word *panca janah* is a compound word as its accent suggests. So, the phrase means five *panca janah* and not twenty five as is supposed by the *Purva Paks*. The term *panca janah* stands for *prana*, *manas*, *caksu*, *srotra*, and *anna*. Moreover, the fact that both *akasa* and *Atman* are separately mentioned, though they are included among the twenty five principles, of the *Sakhyas*, also goes against the *Purvaksa*'s view. An objection may be raised that this may be so if the *madhyantidina* reading is accepted, but not if the *kanva* reading, which does not mention *anna*, is accepted. To this objection the *Siddhantin* may reply that the description of the *jyoti* is common to both the *madhyantidina* and the *kanva* versions. But in order to signify the term *panca-janah*, the *madhyantidina* version, being self supporting as the five entities, namely, *prana* and others are being stated in one single mantra, is not dependent on the word *jyoti*. The *kanva* version, on the other hand expects the help of the *jyoti*, as one entity, namely, *anna* has not mentioned in the
In order to fulfill the required number (i.e., five) the word *jyoti* from the previous mantra, has to be accepted. But this does not make any difference at all.

4) The next section with two sutras (14-15) establishes the point that the Brahman is the cause of this universe. According to the *Purva-pakṣa*, the Brahman may not necessarily be the cause, as the *sruti* are not unanimous in that respect. According to some texts, the Ātman is the cause, while others suppose that *Asat* existed before everything else, and still others maintain that this universe was self born.

The *Siddhāntin* retorts by saying that the contradiction stated above by the *Purva-pakṣa* is about the effect and not about the cause. Though, in some context, the *Asat* is said to be existing before everything else, still the statement is set aside in the very next part.

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1. cf. *Taittirīya Up. II.1.*
2. cf. *Chāndogya Up VI.2.1.*
4. cf. *Chāndogya Up VI.2.1.*

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**Notes:**

1. *Taittirīya Up. II.1.*
2. *Chāndogya Up VI.2.1.*
4. *Chāndogya Up VI.2.1.*
As far the world being self-born, it may be said that really speaking the world is not self-born. It is actually created by the Paramatman, but in the process of the creation the Paramatman had to make no special efforts - it was created so easily that it appeared as if it was self-born.

5) The fifth section with three śūtras (16-18) deals with the passage स होवाच यो वे बाहुक नेतृत्वशिच पुरुषोपपत्ति द्वम ब्रह्मवेदित्वय विचित्र। from the Kausitaki Upaniṣad. In this passage it is stated that Puruşa should be known. The question is who is this Puruşa? He can be either the prāṇa or the Paramatman. He is the prāṇa according to the Purvapakṣa; since there is a reference to his karman. This karman implies the movements of the body which are possible only when the Puruşa is taken in the sense of the prāṇa. This prāṇa is the creator also, as has been pointed out in the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. Moreover the description that, even in the sleeping condition, it is the enjoyer, etc., cannot be made applicable to the Paramatman. The words at

2. Brhadāraṇyaka Up., III.9.9: श्रेयं देव विचि प्राण विचि स ज्ञातिपदित्वाच्चाकिते।
the beginning of the passage, namely, "I shall explain what the Brahman is," are deceptive, for, the Brahman is not at all explained by the speaker. (i.e. Bālāki).

Against this, the Siddhānta asserts that the Purusā mentioned in the passage is the Paramēśvara. It will be seen that Ajātaśatru rebukes Bālāki for boasting that he would expound the Brahman to Ajātaśatru. After this rebuke Ajātaśatru refers to this Purusā. If this Purusā is not the Brahman, then Ajātaśatru himself may become liable to the rebuke which he has directed against Bālāki. As for the phrase, "whose deed is this", refers to this universe and not to the movement of the body. The universe is referred to by the pronoun elat on account of proximity (sānnidhyā). The objects near at hand imply the world in general. The word Purusā is purposely used in this context, as the other purusas mentioned by Bālāki are not to be mistaken for the Brahman.

2. Ibid. IV. 19:
6) The sixth section, with four śūtras (19-22),
deals with the sentence

\[ \text{न वा अरे सर्वस्य कामाय सर्व ग्रंथं महत्याक्षरं सतु कामाय सर्व ग्रंथं} \]
\[ \text{महति । जात्मा वादे श्रेष्ठं यो मन्तव्यं निदिश्यासिस्तवं} \]
\[ \text{नैपरिष्य} । \]

from the Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad\(^1\), wherein it is stated

that Ātmān, for whom everything becomes agreeable, should
be seen etc. Now the question is: what does this Ātmān
imply whether the Jīva or the Paramātman? According to
the Pūrvapakṣin, it must be the Jīva. The reference
"everything becomes agreeable" suggests enjoyment, which is
possible only in the case of the body and the sense-organs.
Moreover, the following sentence, namely,

\[ \text{विद्वं महत्याक्षरं यात्र विलिति विद्वेदं यो वृत्तं समुत्थेत्} \]
\[ \text{ता योंविनिक्षमंति न ब्रह्म संहाररस्तीत्वरे क्षीरमीति हेवाच} \]
\[ \text{मात्रवल्लेकः} । \]

says that the Paramātman transforms into the Jīva
characterised by the body and again disappears after it.
This shows the Paramātman in the condition of the Jīva.

The Siddhāntin replies to this argument by saying
that the Paramātman alone must be taken to have been

\[ \text{1. Brhadāranyaka Ṣप., II. 4.5.} \]
\[ \text{2. Ibid. II.4.14.} \]
referred to, as the purpose of Yājñavalkya is to instruct Maitreyī about immortality. Through the instruction of the Jīva, she was not likely to become immortal. Moreover, the characterisation, such as "from whose breathes the Rāveda, etc. are born", etc., can be deemed proper for Paramatman only. However, since there is non-difference between the Jīva and the Paramatman, the qualities of the Jīva can be assigned to the Paramatman, though the Jīva is the transformation of the Parmatman. The quality — "everything becomes agreeable", can indicate the Paramatman also, as the purport of the passage lies in knowing all by the knowledge of one single entity (i.e. Ātman). This is not possible if the Jīva is supposed as different from the Parmatman. As far the sentence, "the Paramatman is born along with the body, etc." it may be pointed out that the Jīva is not really destroyed; due to the loss of body, a particular aspect of knowledge is lost. That is why, the same text further mentions that this Ātman is never lost, but its relation with the body and the sense-organs is lost.

7) This section comprises five sutras (23-27).
It deals with the Brahman as the cause of the universe.

1. Brhadāranyaka Up., 4.13 : ए द्वाराय भाष्यस्यानि न वासरेधै
मेघः भृगवः । भविषयी वासरेणमात्मानुप्लतति । ॥
The cause is of two kinds, namely, upādāna and nimitta.
The doubt arises as to whether the Brahman is the upādāna or the nimitta-kārana, or both. According to the Purvapakṣa, the Brahman is the nimitta-kārana as the scriptures declare that, after thinking, the Paramesvara created the universe. Besides, since the Brahman is without parts, etc., it cannot have been the upādāna-kārana, like a lump of clay for the creation of an earthen vessel.

The Siddhāntin's position, on the contrary, is that the Brahman is both the upādāna and nimitta kārana of the universe. It is actually known to be such from the śruti-text, "when this Brahman is known, everything else becomes known". If the Brahman had not been the upādāna-kārana, then this statement would have been rendered meaningless. Because, even if the nimitta kārana, say the potter, is known, still, the jar, etc., cannot become known. From this it follows that the Brahman is the upādāna-kārana also. Indeed the effect is not at all different from the upādāna kārana. Moreover, from the sentence such as 'that desired let me become...

1. Prasna Up., VI.3.4: े भिसीताचे ।
2. Chandogya Up., VI.1.3. तेनाधृतं मन्यत्यथं मन्नविदार्थं विचारतमिति ।
multiform", etc., it can be seen that this Brahma is both the upādāna and nimitta kārāṇa of the universe.

8) The last topic in this quarter has one Śūtra (28). It seeks to establish that the doctrines other than Vedānta have to be supposed to have been refuted. The Purvapakṣin, however, avers that the theories like aamvāda are not refuted in the śrutis.

The Siddhāntin replies that, the Sāmkhya-doctrine is the most important one, it is specifically refuted. The other doctrines are not so important. When the principal adversary is defeated, the other minor adversaries are as good as defeated1. So when the Sāmkhya view is shown to be untenable, there is no necessity whatsoever to waste one's time for the refutation of other less important views.

1. This is known as the प्राचार्यमनस्कारंकृतिविधितयाम।
1) The first adhikarana of the first quarter of the second chapter contains two sutras (1, 2). The Purvapakṣin begins by suggesting that the Paramatma cannot be regarded as the cause of the universe, because the smṛtis such as that of Kapila set forth the Pradhāna as the cause. The sages like Kapila whose greatness is eulogised by the śruti themselves must be respected as authoritative persons.

The Siddhāntin counters this suggestion by pointing out that, if the Pradhāna was regarded as the cause of the universe, then, those smṛtis which mentioned the Paramesvara as the cause would be rendered invalid. The rule of the Mīmāṃsā is that, wherever there is a conflict among the smṛtis, only those smṛtis which conform to the śruti are to be regarded as authoritative. The great persons are to be regarded as reliable and authoritative as long as they do not go against the śruti-text. Besides this, it may be said that there is no proof whatsoever to suppose that Kapila, whose greatness is glorified in the śruti, is the same as the Kapila who is the founder of the sāmkhya-system.

1. Śvētāsvatara Up. V.2: 

चतुर्थि प्रत्यूति कपिलो यस्तमपि बन भास्नेविनिति
2) The second section has only one *sūtra* (3). According to the *purvapakṣa* the system of *yoga* is mentioned as a valid means of knowledge in the *śrutis*; it has, therefore, to be regarded as authoritative.

The *Siddhāntin* emphasises that, only when the knowledge of the oneness of the Ātman is obtained, *mokṣa* becomes possible. There is no other means than this for attaining *mokṣa*. It must also be remembered that the words *Samkhya* and *Yoga* are to be understood to have been used in the sense of the knowledge and the meditation of the Ātman respectively.

3) The next eight *sūtras* (4-11) consider the following point. According to the *purvapakṣa*, Īśvara cannot be regarded as the *uppādānakārana* of the universe, since he is *cetana* and *suddha* while its supposed effect, namely, the world is *acatana* and *asuddha*. It would, therefore, more advisable to accept the *Pradhāna* as the cause.

The *Siddhāntin* retorts by saying that there is no such rule that the effect must possess qualities similar to those of the cause. Do we not see that from

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1. *Ibid., II.8*:

> जिल्लेवर्त सम्बन्ध तन्य सूतिं दृढ़दीन्द्रियाचि मन्तरः येविन्देश्यम् ।
the animate human being, inanimate things like hair, nails, etc. are produced? And there actually does exist some common characteristic between the Brahman and the world, and that is sattva (existence).

4) This fourth topic consists of only one sutra (12). It will, however, be seen that Appayya Diksita has dropped all discussion from sutra 6 up to sutra 13, presumably in order to avoid unnecessary details. The twelfth sutra denies the validity of the doctrines such as that of the Naiyayikas, etc., According to the Purvapakṣin, if the Mahat, as the word itself suggests, cannot be regarded as the cause of small things, then, anus may be the cause. At any rate, the cause cannot be Paramēśvara who is endowed with the highest glory.

The Siddhāntin argues the logic of the Purvapakṣin is bad. It cannot be said that big things are not the cause of small ones. The sprout of grass is actually seen to be originating from the huge trees on the top of the mountain. These trees can certainly not be treated as anus.

5) The Purvapakṣa in the next section, which contains only one sutra (13), insists that the Brahman alone cannot be regarded as the cause of the universe as the pratyakṣa pramāṇa goes against such assumption. For example, the Jīva is the enjoyer (bhokta) while the objects
like the śabda etc. are meant for enjoyment (bhogya).
If the Brahman were to be regarded as the cause of everything, the enjoyer and the objects of enjoyment would be identical with each other, because both of them are identical with the Brahman. This is evidently falsified by the general experience.

The Siddhāntin replies that, if two entities originating from one single cause may appear similar in some respects and different in other respects. For example, the waves on the surface of the ocean. Are they not in a sense similar to one another? And, at the same time, are they not different from one another in another sense? And yet the cause, that is, water of the ocean is the same.

6) This section includes seven sutras (14–20)
Here the Purvapakṣin speaks of the plurality (anekatva) of the ultimate cause being valid. He says that, just as a tree, as a tree, is one, but as branches, it is many, similarly, the Brahman as the enjoyer, is one, but as the objects of enjoyment, it is many. This very idea has been supported by the sruti-text: कथा सत्स्येन मृत्युद्धिद्विदेव पूर्णम् सिद्धांत स्थाप्य तत्र नामकेयं मृत्युद्धित्वेव सत्सारः 
A lump of clay, as clay, is one, but as a jar or a vessel or a jug, it is many.¹

¹ cf. Chandogya Upan., VI.1.4.
The *Siddhāntin* shows this viewpoint of the *Purva-pakṣin* to be entirely incorrect. He emphasises on the authority of the *śruti*-texts, that the existence of many is not real, while the existence of the one cause (i.e. the Brahman) is real. Further, the term *āraṃbhana* in the passage from the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* itself suggests that all the effects are unreal, and that the *pramanas* like *pratyakṣa* etc., are not valid here.

7) The point at issue in the seventh section, with three sutras (21-23), is the *Purva-pakṣin*’s question: if the Jīva is identical with Īsvara and if this Īsvara is the creator of the whole *universe*, why was the world made so full of misery by him? Why, instead, did he not make it happy and full of pleasures?.

The *Siddhānta* agrees that the *cetana* Brahman is the cause of the world. But, according to it, the above questions are quite irrelevant so far as the Brahman is concerned. Nothing is good or bad for the Brahman, and so far as the Jīva is concerned, he has not created the universe. Further it needs to be emphasised that the *śruti*-texts do posit some difference between the Jīva and the Brahman from the practical point of view. From the absolute philosophical point of view, the world is unreal. If the face of a man looks distorted in the reflection in a mirror, the face itself is not to be regarded as ugly on
that account. The world is a reflection of the Brahman; the creation is its sport.

8) The eighth section with two sutras (24-25), again, deals with the cause of the universe. According to the Pūrvapakṣin, the Brahman cannot be the cause, because it is not helped by any one, nor has any means for the creation.

The Siddhāntin sets aside the Pūrvapakṣin’s view by pointing out that, as the Brahman is all powerful\(^1\) it needs no help whatsoever, in the matter of the creation of the universe. He adds that water is transformed into ice or vice-versa, without any help from out-side.

9) This section with four sutras (26-29) continued the same topic. The Pūrvapakṣin states that the Brahman cannot be regarded as the upadānakarāṇa. He says that there are two possible ways in which the Brahman can act as the upadāna-karāṇa of the world. If the whole Brahman is believed to be transforming into the world, the Brahman itself will have to be taken as vanishing after the world is created. If, on the other hand, only some part of the Brahman is supposed to be transforming into the world, then such supposition would go against the assumption that the Brahman is without any part.

\(\text{\textsuperscript{1}}\) cf. Śvetāśvātara Up. VI.8: पराठथयः सक्तिनिर्बिच्यो भूमये स्वामाविको ब्राह्मक किमया वा !
The Siddhāntin replies that the Brahman is the *upādana-kāraṇa* no doubt, but it is never said that the whole of the Brahman is transformed into the world. The *śruti* texts declare that the Brahman exists independently, and that it is due to *māyā* that this Brahman appears as multiform universe.

10) The next two sūtras (30-31), which constitute the 10th *adhikarana* have the Purvapakṣa that, since the Brahman has no sense-organs, it cannot be deemed capable of creating the universe at all.

The Siddhāntin again refers to his oft-mentioned view that, as the Brahman possesses an uncommon power, it does not need any extraneous help. Actually, from the absolute point of view, the world is a fiction, and the so-called powers of the Brahman also are a fiction.

11) This section contains two sūtras (32-33). According to the Purvapakṣa, the creation of the universe presupposes some purpose. No intelligent person does anything without some purpose in view. So the Brahman must be assumed to have had some purpose in view. If it had, it would be characterised by desire. If it did not, it would be rendered unintelligent.

The Siddhāntin’s reply to this dilemma is: Just as kings, ministers, etc. engage themselves in sports
without any particular purpose in view, and just as a living entity breaths without any special effort, the Brahman accomplishes this act of creation without purpose and without effort.

12) The 12th section has three sutras (34-36). The Purvapaksin accuses Isvara, the creator of the world, of being partial, because he has not made available equal opportunity or equal happiness to all. On the other hand, if it is argued that in the matter of creation of the world in this way, Isvara is guided by previous rules and regulations etc., then, he will lose his Isvaratva completely; for, he would be regarded as being unable to do anything independently.

The Siddhantin replies to the above accusation by asserting that Isvara cannot be held responsible in this connection. He only gives to every individual the fruit of his karman. It must be remembered that a king, even if he is all powerful, cannot have any freedom, when he is bound by law and has to pay wages according to the service of the servants.

13) The last topic in this quarter consists of only one sutra (37). The Purvapaksin, again, says that since the Brahman is without any attribute and since it is
incapable of thinking, it cannot be the cause of the world.

The Siddhāntin brushes this argument aside almost summarily by saying that what the Purvapakṣin says may be applicable to other theories but not to the theory of vivarta.

(1) The first section in the second quarter of the second chapter has ten sutras (1-10). It is devoted to the refutation of the Sāmkhya theory. The doctrine of the Sāmkhyas is that the Pradhāṇa which represents the equipoise of the three guṇas, namely, sattva, rajas and tamas, is the cause of the universe. For, the guṇas of the Pradhāṇa are reflected in the world which is also characterised by the three qualities, namely, pleasure, pain and ignorance.

The Siddhāntin refutes this doctrine by insisting that the above mentioned three qualities of the universe are the result of the māyā and are not due to the fact that the Pradhāṇa is its cause. Further, it cannot be said that the Pradhāṇa is possessed of knowledge and that it creates the universe deliberately by disturbing the equipoise of the three guṇas, sattva, and tamas. Because if such an assumption were to be made then the Pradhāṇa
would not be in any way different from the Brahman.

(2) This section has only one sutra (11). Here the objection raised by the Vaisesikas is set aside. According to the objector, the Brahman cannot be regarded as the cause of the universe. Because, if the cetana Brahman was its cause, the universe also would have been endowed with caitanya. But actually it is not so endowed.

The Siddhantin retorts that, even in the Vaisesika doctrine, the rule that the qualities of the cause are invariably present in the effect does not hold good. For instance, the Vaisesikas believe that a dvyanuka is created out of paramanus, but they do not accept that the qualities of the latter subsist in the former. The same is the case with the dvyanuka and the tryanuka. This being so, if from the cetana Brahman, the acetana world is supposed to evolve, there is no harm whatsoever.

(3) The refutation of the doctrine of the Vaisesikas, is continued in this section with six sutras (12-17). According to this philosophical system, the four elements, namely, prthvi, jala, tejas and vayu are formed by the combination of the corresponding paramanus, and the time of destruction, these paramanus are separated from one another.
The Siddhāntin refutes this by pointing out that there is no reason whatsoever why these paramāṇus should come together at the time of creation, and why they should be separated from one another at the time of the destruction. Moreover, the view that the paramāṇus are very subtle and hence invisible cannot be sustained because when water is frozen, the paramāṇus of water are seen. Nor can it be said that they are of multiform, since in the case of some solid substances, they are not seen to be so. Hence the Vaiśeṣika doctrine must be said to have been based on very weak foundations.

(4) The fourth section, which comprises ten sutras (18-27), is devoted to the refutation of the view point of the Bauddhas. There are three schools among the Bauddhas, 1) According to the first school, which is known as the Bāhyārthavādins, the whole world is real, and it is formed through two samudāyas - one of four great elements, namely, prthū, jala, tejas, and vāyu, and the second of rūpa, vijnāna, vedāna, samjñā and samskāra. 2) According to the second school, which is known as the Vijnānavādins, only vijnāna is real. And 3) according to the third, which is known as śūnya-vādins, nothing is real.
None of these theories of the Bauddhas can be said to be valid. So far as the Bahyārthavādins are concerned, they are unable to answer such questions as: who forms the samudāyas, which are themselves acetana? Or why are they formed? The protagonists of the second school may be asked; when everything is regarded as momentary, how is it that the first momentary thing will create another one which is born in the next moment? According to them, the cause is destroyed before the effect. And if there is no law of causation, then, a piece of cloth may be created from a lump of clay. But this is impossible. According to the Śunya-vādins, the non-existence is the cause of existence. But if this were really so, a seed cannot be regarded as being necessary for the growth of a sprout, and a former may get ample grains without any labour. In brief, therefore, the entire theory of the Bauddhas has to be taken to be wrong.

(5) This section with five sūtras (28-32) addresses itself specifically to the Vijnāna-vāda of the Bauddhas. According to the Vijnāna-vādins, in reality Vijnāna along exists. It is on account of Vijnāna that all mental functions become possible. No external objects exist in reality. As the knowledge in a dream is not dependent on any external object, so too is the knowledge
in \textit{jagṛtī} not dependent on any external object. As for the vividity of knowledge, it is due to the vividity of \textit{Vāsanās}.

While setting aside this theory of the \textit{Vijnāna}-Vādins, the \textit{Siddhāntin} asks: when the existence of external objects is proved by such \textit{pramāṇas} as \textit{pratyakṣa}, etc., how can it be rejected or denied? Moreover, there is much difference between the knowledge in dream and knowledge in \textit{jagṛtī}, because the former is in the form of remembrance while the latter as in the form of experience. Further, it can be pointed out that, without some \textit{viśaya}, \textit{Vāsanā} is not at all produced. There would be no possibility of the vividity of \textit{Vāsana} giving rise to vivid knowledge.

(6) The next section with four \textit{sūtras} (33-36) attacks the theory of the Digambara Jainas. According to these Jainas, nothing can be definitely described in terms of existence and non-existence. Because, existence and non-existence themselves are doubtful concepts. This theory of the Jainas in its fully developed form is known as
The Siddhāntin says that the Saptabhāṅgimata can be refuted by applying that very māta to it. It is full of contradictions, because one cannot have two fold knowledge as existence and nonexistence, of one and the same object, without any specification of time and place.

17) This section with five sutras (37-41) considers the view that Īśvara is the only nīmitta-kārana of this world. According to the Pūrva-pāksin, Īśvara is not the upādāna kārana of the universe, because he is referred to in the scriptures as the creator. A manufacturer of a thing is not seen to be also its material cause anywhere in this world.

In reply to this argument, the Siddhāntin says that the Vedānta does not accept such view of the ājivās and others. According to the Vedānta the highest Brahman

1. According to this view, any object can be viewed from seven points of view (saptabhaṅga), namely, that (1) a particular object, say a jar, may exist; (2) it may not exist, (3), it may or may not exist, (4) it cannot be described (anirvacaniya); (5) it may exist but cannot be described, (6) it may not exist and cannot be described, and (7) it may or may not exist and cannot be described.
is capable of appearing in various forms simultaneously. And as the Brahman functions of its own free will, there is no possibility of its being controlled by others.

(8) The Pāñcaratātra theory is the target of the last adhikaraṇa with four sutras (42-45). According to this theory, the work known as the Pāñcaratātra has been composed by the Lord Himself after proper and deliberate thinking. So it is more authoritative than the Veda, which are after all like alphabets carved by a worm (ghuṇākṣara) and which may be correct only to some extent.

This doubt about the absolute validity of the Veda is first firmly set aside by the Siddhāntin. He then turns to the main doctrine of the Pāñcaratātra. According to that doctrine, Śaṁkarṣaṇa, the Ājīva, is born from Vāsudeva. This being so, Ājīva has to be regarded as being non-eternal, since it is born. And, then, on account of this non-eternalness, it will not be possible for the Ājīva to attain salvation. Moreover, the Pāñcaratātras assume that the four gods, namely, Vāsudeva, Śaṁkarṣaṇa, Anniruddha, and Pradyāmaṇa are of equal nature and form. In that case, they cannot be related to one another as cause and effect. There are many other minor defects in this theory, which fact renders it unacceptable.
1. The first section in the third quarter of the second adhyāya has seven sutras (1.7). The question under consideration is: How is the ākāsa created? According to the Purva-pakṣin, the sky is not created, at all, because the śruti-texts do not say anything about its creation. Moreover, as the ākāsa is void of sparśa etc., it can very well be said to be without birth or to be self-born.

The Siddhāntin attacks this position by pointing out that the Taittirīya Upaniṣad actually speaks of the creation of the ākāsa. If the ākāsa was to be regarded as being self-born, then, the above mentioned statement in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad would be rendered void. And the śruti-texts are not be challenged.

2. This section contains only one sutra (8). The prima facie view is that the vāyu also is described in the same manner as the ākāsa; hence it is also to be regarded as being self-born. If, at any place, there occurs a reference to the creation of the vāyu, it should be treated as secondary.

1. cf. Taittirīya Up. II.1 : तत्साद्वा तैत्तिरियान्तः तैत्तिरियान्तः तैत्तिरियान्तः तैत्तिरियान्तः तैत्तिरियान्तः

2. cf. Brhadaranyaka Up. I.5.22 : तैत्तिरियान्तः तैत्तिरियान्तः तैत्तिरियान्तः तैत्तिरियान्तः तैत्तिरियान्तः
The position of the *Siddhanta* is: The statement, namely, 'through the knowledge of the Brahman, everything becomes known', will have some meaning when the Vāyu is regarded as the transformation (vikāra) of the Brahman. The terms *amṛta*, etc. are used in a relative sense; they do not denote absolute immortality. Hence Vāyu also is to be regarded as having been created.

3. The third section also contains one *sūtra* (9) only. The *Pūrvapakṣa* avers that even the Brahman will have to be regarded as having been created, like the sky, wind, etc., from some such entity as *sat*.

The *Siddhāntin* replies that the Brahman is not created. If the Brahman has the cause like *sat* then, since the Brahman also is *sat*, there will be no difference whatsoever between the cause and the effect. If it is said that the Brahman is born from *asat*, it may be asked: how can *sat* be born from *asat*? Moreover, the *śruti* does not mention anything as the creator of the Brahman. Hence the Brahman cannot be regarded to have been created.

4. This section, again, has one *sūtra* (19) only. The *Pūrvapakṣa* here is: The Brahman is the cause of the...
tejas, as has been said in the one of the śrutis. As against this, the Taittirīya Upaniṣad states that tejas is born from Vāyu, that is to say, agni is born after Vāyu.

The Siddhāntin agrees with the Pūrvapākṣin in this supposition that agni or tejas is born from Vāyu, that it is born after Vāyu. The karaka-vibhakti is certainly always more powerful than the upapada-vibhakti. But Vāyu is after all only a different form of the Brahman. Hence, in the ultimate analysis, there is nothing wrong in the statement that tejas is born from the Brahman.

5. We again have an adhikarana consisting of one sutra (11). The Pūrvapākṣin says that, according to the śruti, water is born from agni. However, in view of the mutually contradictory nature of these two entities, any causal relation between them is unlikely.

The Siddhāntin retorts by pointing out that, as the śruti says, water must be regarded as having born from fire. He further adds that the main purpose of this

1. cf. Chāndogya Up. VI.2.3: ॥ तस (तः) तेजः अनुभवत ॥
2. cf. Taittirīya Up.II.1.1: वायोरात्मनि: ॥ अग्नीरात्म: ॥
3. e.g. पुपपदितस्योऽक्षयिकिविक्रीयस्य: ॥
6. The sixth section also has one sutra (12). According to the Purvapakṣin, the word anna in the sentence ता आप कैसन्त ब्रह्म: स्थाम प्राणेभिति ता ब्रजनानुत्त १ must be understood in the sense of food-grains like rice etc. Indeed, that is the usual sense of the word anna. And we actually see that anna or food is produced from water.

The Siddhāntin remarks that, the word anna has to be understood in the sense of the earth (Prthvī) only, for, the topic discussed in this context is the creation of the five great elements. Moreover, the reference to the blackness of anna ² would properly suit the earth alone. At other places, again water is described as being the origin of the earth ³. It may further be added that anna

1. Vedānta Brahmā-sūtras, II.3.11: आप: ।
2. cf. Chandogya Up., VI.2.4.
3. cf. Ibid., VI.4.1. यतःप्राण (पूर्व) तदन्यथ ।
4. cf. Taittiriya Up., II.1.1: अत्म ब्राह्म: स्थित: ।
   ब्रह्मधुर्य: । वायोरसिंह: ब्राह्मेत: । अद्यय: प्रचिति ।
or food is the modification of this earth. So the statement that, due to abundant rain anna grows, is quite all right.

7. This section has only one sutra (13). The view put forth by the Purvapakṣin is that the creation of the five great elements takes place independently. The Paramātman does not play any role in that connection. The śruti-texts also do not refer to Paramātman in that context. These elements are by no means nonsentient, for, the dharma like Īkṣana, etc., are present in them.

The Siddhantin replies that the elements are created by the Paramātman who resides within them as antaryāmin. The śruti does not declare that everything is born from the Paramesvara only. As for the attributes like Īkṣana, etc., they belong to the Paramesvara who resides within the elements and not to the elements which are essentially acetana.

8. This section, with one sutra (14), deals with the destruction of the elements. According to the Purvapakṣin there is no definite order of destruction. One may, therefore assume that the order of the dissolution of

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1. ज्ञात्वेव अहंनामस्य औपयोग्यम् " तद्भविता स श्रौतसांतां ।
the elements is the same as the order of their evolution.

The Siddhāntin maintains that the dissolution has to be taken as occurring in the reverse order. He very appropriately gives the drṣṭānta of a stair-case. One goes up in one direction and comes down in the reverse direction. The reverse order is supported by the smṛtis also.

9. This section with one sūtra (15), again, deals with the same topic. According to the Pūrvapakṣin, the five elements were not the first to be created, the prāṇa, manas, etc., were created before these elements. This is what is mentioned in the Mundaka Upanisad.2

The Siddhāntin says that, sense-organs, mind, etc. are the modifications of the elements. Therefore, their origin and end need not be separately mentioned. Even if they are not regarded as the modifications of the elements, their origin and end may be either before or after those of the elements. It does not make any difference.

1. e.g. Śāmkarabhaṣya on II.3.14.
2. cf. Mundaka Up. II.1.3: अत्यतः केत्तमातृ । आत्मनः । जायते प्राणोऽनम: । स्मृतिमं सत्तिकारः । सृष्टिविश्वविश्व घारिणी ॥
10. The tenth section comprises only one sutra (16). The subject dealt with in it is the creation and destruction of the Jīva. The Purvapakṣin says that, since various samskāras are mentioned with reference to the Jīva, the Jīva must be regarded as being subject to birth, death, etc.

The Siddhāntin points out that the sruti states that the Jīva is not destroyed, so these samskāras relate to the body and not to the Jīva. The Jīva may be connected with the samskāras in secondary sense only.

11. The Purvapakṣa of this section, which consists of only one sutra (17) may be set forth as follows:

The Jīva may not be regarded as coming into existence along with the body. On the authority of the passage in the Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad, where the creation of the Jīva is described with the parallel illustration of the fire sparks, the Jīva has to be understood as coming into existence independently. This being so, the statement that the

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1. Samskāras like नात्कम्, शून्यम्, etc.
2. cf. Chāndogya Up. VI.11.3:
3. Brhadāranyaka Up. II.1.20: यथाप्रवेणेषु विश्वविज्ञु

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knowledge of the Brahman is the cause of all knowledge will be rendered untenable.

As against this position of the Purva-pakṣin, the Siddhāntin maintains that, in those śrutiś in which the creation of other entities is described, the creation of the Jīva is not at all mentioned. On the other hand, the Jīva is described as eternal (nitya). The statement in the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad referred to by the Purva-pakṣin relates to the Jīva with upādhi. Due to upādhi, the Jīva appears as if it is different from the Brahman, but really it is not so.

12. In this section, which again has only one sūtra (18), the Purva-pakṣa persues the subject of the Jīva. He says that the Jīva may be eternal, but its capacity of knowing cannot be said to be eternal because, at the time of sleep, the Jīva loses conciousness.

The Siddhāntin refutes this by reiterating that the Jīva is not different from the Brahman, and, so, it is doubtlessly endowed with eternal knowledge. In sleep, however, there is the absence of the object of knowledge; therefore there is also the absence of knowledge itself.
The actions etc. originate from the mind etc.\(^1\)

13. This section contains 14 sūtras (19-32). It continues the discussion about the Jīva. The Purvapakṣin insists that the Jīva cannot be Vibhu. If it were Vibhu, the actions such as leaving the body, going to the heaven, and again returning back, etc., would not be possible. So the Jīva must be regarded as being anu. The śrūtis claiming Vibhutva for the Jīva will, therefore, have to be understood in secondary sense.

The Siddhāntin refutes this by pointing out that, the śruti itself declares that the Jīva is Vibhu\(^2\). Its anutva has to be regarded as being due to upādhi. As for the going out of the body and coming back, etc., of the Jīva, it is merely an arthavāda and should not be understood in its literal sense.

14. This section covers seven sūtras (33-39). The Purvapakṣin says that it is buddhi which is the agent of action, and not the Jīva. At the time of action, this

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1. Here, the fourth line in the first verse is missing.

buddhi is attracted towards both good and bad things. If the Jīva had been the agent, it would have performed good deeds only.

The Siddhāntin asserts that the Jīva itself is the agent. This becomes clear from such vidhi sentences as dadyat (one should give away), yajeta (one should perform sacrifice), etc. If the Jīva is not the agent of actions, these sentences will be rendered meaningless. As for the performance of good and bad deeds, it may be said that the Jīva certainly is responsible for those deeds; but though these deeds are done with good intention, due to bad means their effects are bad. But in any case, one cannot say that the Jīva is not the agent.

15. This section has only one sutra (40). Here, the Purvapakṣin speaks of the character of the Jīva as agent being natural. In support of this, he adds that the śrutī does not say anything against it.

The Siddhāntin, on the other hand, sticks to the view that the agency of the Jīva is not natural but is occasioned by upādhi, namely, ahamkāra. If it had been natural, even at the time of mokṣa, the character of the Jīva as agent would have been persisted just as heat is
invariably present in the fire. The ahamkara originates from the adhyasa of both cit (i.e. Jīva) and acit (buddhi), and, in this sense, the agency is superimposed on the pure Jīva, which is essentially not different from the Brahman.

16. The sixteenth section with two sutras (41-42) has the following as its Purvapaksa. The Jīva is not dependent on the Isvara for the upādhis which make it an agent of action, because this fact is not mentioned in the srutis. The Jīva is endowed with anger etc., and is himself capable of actions. If, on the other hand, Isvara was regarded as being responsible for the good or bad actions of the Jīva, then the credit or blame for these will belong to Isvara.

The Siddhantin reiterates its position that the Jīva is dependent on Isvara so far as its character as agent is concerned. Isvara has to be looked upon as the common cause like the rain for food grains. Moreover, according to the deeds done by the Jīva in previous births, Isvara causes the Jīva to perform various deeds in this birth. If Isvara did not have any expectancy of the dharma and adharma of the Jīva, the vidhis and nisedhas in the vedas would have no value at all, and Isvara might be at liberty.
to give any to any Jīva. But actually this does not happen.

17. This section contains eleven sutras (43-53). Again pursuing the problem regarding the Jīva, the Purvapakṣa says: If Jīva was considered to be dependent on Isvāra, then, Isvāra and Jīva might be related to each other as master and servant. But, according to the Vedānta both of them are identical with each other. There cannot thus be master-servant relationship between them. If, the relation between them was supposed to be like that between the body and the limbs, it would go against the scripture since Isvāra is without parts. What kind of relationship is it then?

The Siddhāntin's view is that the reflection of the Brahman can be looked upon as the part (āmsa) of the Brahman. Moreover, on account of adhīṣṇa, the difference between the Brahman and the Jīva is felt, though it is really not there. From the absolute point of view, the Brahman and the Ātman are identical, and both of them are fideless.

(1) The first section in the last quarter of the second adhyāya comprises four sutras (1-4). In some
śruti¹, the prāṇa is said to have been in existence even before the creation so the śruti, where there is a reference to the creation by the prāṇa², will have to be treated as gaṇa (secondary).

This suggestion of the Purvapakṣin is set aside by the Siddhāntin who asserts that the prāṇa etc. are but the modifications of the Paramātman. Hence they are said to have been created like the ākāśa etc. He further adds that the reference to the prāṇa having been in existence even before the creation implies that the prāṇa existed before the creation of the objects created by the prāṇa. So the creation of prāṇa and the statements about it are not to be regarded as being secondary in sense.

(2) This section contains two sutras (5-6). According to the Purvapakṣa, the number of the prāṇas is not fixed. In some contexts it is stated to be seven while in others it is mentioned as eight. The Purvapakṣin prefers to stick to the lower number that is seven. In

¹- cf. Śamkarabhaṣya on II. 4.1.

²- cf. Praśna Up. VI.4: स प्राणसूक्ति प्राणावृद्धि रवि बायुः
the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad, seven prānas are said to be following the main prāṇa at the time of death. Hence the number of the prānas is seven.

The Siddhānta is that there are eleven prānas in all. They are made up of five organs of knowledge, five organs of action, and mind. The same number is mentioned in the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad also. So the number of the prānas is fixed as eleven.

(3) This section, which contains one sutra (7), continues the discussion about the prāṇa. The Purvapakṣa here is that, if the prāṇas are vibhu, the going out of the body will not be possible in their case. Hence, there would be some contradiction in scriptures.

The Siddhantin removes the apparent contradiction by pointing out that the prāṇas, which are different from the principal prāṇa, are anu and their activities are also limited. Hence they can go out of the body after death.

(4) The fourth section contains only one sutra(8). The Purvapakṣa repeats its view, namely, that even before the creation, the prāṇa did exist. In support

1. cf. Brhadaranyaka Up. IV.4.2:

प्राणमूलकमण्यते स्वः प्राणा अनूत्क्रामणिः
of this view, a reference is made to the śruti which says that the Brahman was breathing. The Siddhantin again points out that the creation of the prāṇa is referred to in several contexts. It cannot therefore be said that it existed before the creation. Moreover the reference to the breathing of Brahman does by no means indicate the existence of Prāṇa, for, it is clearly said that breathing was without air.

(5) The Purva-pakṣin proceeds with the same discussion in the fifth section which contains four sūtras (9-12). He suggests that the prāṇa is in the form of wind; or the prāṇa may be the function of various sense organs as is assumed by some. The function of body may be said like the Panjaracālananyāya.

1. Rgveda, VIII.7.17
2. Ibid. 129-2.
3. This refers to the Sāmkhyas.
4. This nyaya is explained as: when so many birds are caught in one cage, the whole cage is moved by the simultaneous movements of those birds. Similarly, the eleven prāṇas in the body may function simultaneously, and this common action may be called as prāṇa.
The Siddhāntin argues that, according to the Chandogya Upanisad, the prāṇa is altogether different from the wind. As for, the Panjaracālananyāya, it may be pointed out that this nyāya is not applicable here, because the support to the Jīva is not understood as a kind of vyāpāra (function) here. The function of each organ is different and it does not aim at common goal as it is found in the Panjaracālananyāya. The five different varieties of vāyu, namely, prāṇa, apāna, vyāna, udāna and samāna are actually the functions of the main prāṇa.

(6) This section has only one sūtra (13). The Purvapakṣin sets forth the view that the main prāṇa is vibhu as in the scriptures it is compared with the three worlds or with 'all', this being so, the out-going of the prāṇa has to be regarded as being aupadhika.

The Siddhānta counters the Purvapakṣa by pointing out that the vibhutva of the prāṇa mentioned in the śrutī relates to Hiranyagarbhā-prāṇa. The individual prāṇa possesses only limited power, and it can go out from and come back into the body.

1. Chandogya Up. II.18.4: प्राण अव प्राण-साहित्य: पाद: स वासुना यो दिष्टा माति।
2. In this section the Purvapakṣa and the Siddhānta are stated in two verses each.
This section comprises three śūtras (14-16). The Purva-pakṣin here introduces a new topic. He draws attention to the scriptural statement that the duties such as the sun, the fire, etc. control the sense-organs such as the eye, the prāṇa, etc. He further adds that, this being so, the sense-organs will have to be regarded as functioning on account of the power of these duties. And then the experiences obtained through these organs will have been enjoyed by these déities and not by the Jīva.

The Siddhāntin clarifies the position by pointing out that the déities are not subject to any kind of experiences, for, it is only the Jīva who is concerned, with good and bad deeds. The déities are passive in this respect.

(8) Continuing the topic in the next section which contains three śūtras (17-19), the Purva-pakṣa suggests that the eyes etc. are not independent principles, but are only some particular functions of the prāṇa. This is what is said in the Brhadārānyaka Upaniṣad.

   श्रवे रूपममवन्।
The Siddhānta, on the other hand, insists that they are independent principles, as mentioned in the Mundaka Upaniṣad. The Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad also differentiates between the prāṇa and other organs. Moreover, there is much difference between the main prāṇa and other organs, as becomes clear from the phenomenon of sleep. During sleep, this main prāṇa alone functions while other organs do not function at all.

(9) The last section in this quarter comprises three sūtras (20-22). According to the Pūrvapakṣa in this section, the Jīva is the real creator. It gives the illustration of the king and his spies. Actually a spy is the real observer of the deeds of the enemy; but the king says that he has observed them. In the same way, the Jīva is the actual creator, while the Brahman is like the king. The Siddhānta maintains that the Brahman itself is the creator, since it differentiates the objects through the Jīva. The Jīva does not do this. Similarly the trivṛt-karāṇa theory is named after elements (Āp, Tejas, etc., due to the majority of that element.

1. cf. Mundaka Up. II.1.3: जेतस्मान्ग्राहायो प्राण: मन: क्रियंद्यानिच ।
2. The trivṛt-karāṇa means the three-fold division of the three elements, namely, प्राण, आप, तेजस. This division is made by taking one half part of one element and one fourth part of the remaining two elements. For example, the trivṛt karāṇa of प्राण would be $\frac{1}{2}$प्राण + $\frac{1}{4}$आप + $\frac{1}{4}$तेजस.
1. The first quarter of the third chapter opens with a section which contains seven sutras (1-7). The Purvapakṣa in this section may be stated as follows: When the Jīva passes from one body to another, it takes with it Prāna, the sense-organs, etc., but not the five elements like water etc. which are easily available at any time. Moreover, after death, the new Puruṣa is born from the five different offerings (āhuti), out of which the first is śraddhā which has no relation whatsoever with water.

The Siddhānta may be stated thus: The five great elements do go with the Jīva, for, the Chandogya Upaniṣad does say so. It states that the new Puruṣa is born through five offerings. The word śraddhā there, means water, as these five offerings are made of water. This is confirmed by the context. The sense 'water' is secondary. Moreover, in soma etc. there is considerable quantity of water. So it is included among the offerings.

1. cf. Chandogya Up. V.33 : यथा फ़्रण्भामाहुतावापः पुरुषस्वयम्भवति।
2. This section contains four *śūtras* (8-11). According to the *Pūrvapakṣa*, when the Īva descends down from the heaven to the earth, it leaves no deed behind, as is said in the *śruti*.

The *Siddhānta* is that the Īva does carry some deed with it when it descends down. It is said in the *śruti* that, according to its *karmāṇe*, the Īva is reborn as a Brahmin or as some one else. The term *carāṇe* in this *śruti*-text is to be understood in the sense of *karmāṇe*. Bādāvī does not make any difference between *carāṇa* and *karmāṇa*.

3. The third section consists of ten *śūtras* (12-21). According to the *Pūrvapakṣa*, those who perform sacrifices and those who do not both go to the Candraloka. This is stated in the *śruti*. The only difference is that those who do not perform sacrifices come back from the Candraloka immediately.

1. In the printed text of the *Nayamañjari*, a couple of letters are shown to have been lost in each of the two stanzas making up the section.

2. *Chāndogya* Up. V.10.5: तत्स्मा यावत्स्मात्मात्मात्मक तु विद्याम 

3. *Ibid*, V 10.7: तत्स्मा यावत्स्मात्मात्मक तु विद्याम 

4. *Ibid*, V.10.7: तत्स्मा यावत्स्मात्मात्मक तु विद्याम 

5. cf. *Kausitaki* Up. I.2: स हृदयाचे मे ते के बास्मालोकः क्रामः ते के गळळः ॥
According to the Siddhāntin, on the other hand, those, who do not perform sacrifices, do not reach the Candraloka; they go to the Yamaloka and suffer torture. The śruti-text referred to by the Pūrvapakṣin describes only those persons who are qualified for the Candraloka.

4. The Pūrvapakṣin in this section, which has one sutra (22) only, adds that those persons who attain to the Candraloka come down by the path of wind, for, it is stated in the śruti-text¹ that they get the form of vāyu, ākāśa, etc.

The Siddhāntin contends that the śruti-text referred to by the Pūrvapakṣin indicates that those persons only resemble the wind etc., and not that they become identical with wind etc.

5. The fifth section has one sutra (23) only. The Pūrvapakṣin says that there is no time limit for the Jīva to assume the various forms beginning with ākāśa and coming down to food-grains², since no śruti-text specifies such time limit.

1. cf. Chandogya Up. V.10.5: तत्समाचार्यामाणुपंपत्तवार्यमायायां पुनर्विक्षिप्ते नेत्रवाका समाका गद्धायुः वायुपूर्वत्त्वा धूमेश मवति धूम वृत्त्रस्तु मवति

2. Ibid. V.10.6: अर्थ गृह्या मेयो मवति मेयो मूल्या प्रवर्तित त विह श्रीदिक्षाय श्रीयथविन्यानप्तवस्थिमवायु विविध जायन्त्वेतुम् वै दुर्मिलामशः शो ये: ....... ac.
The Siddhāntin, on the other hand, states that the word durnisprapatatara occurring in the passage referred to means release after great sufferings. This would indicate that in the condition of food-grains, release is very hard, that is to say, it occurs after long time.

6. This section has four sutras (24-27). According to the Purvapakṣin, the Jīva, which get the form of food grains like vṛīhi, yava, etc. are actually sacrifices only. But due to some bad deed like the killing of the victim in sacrifice, they are born as food-grains.

The Siddhānta states that those, who are born as vṛīhi, etc., are different from those who are born in the Čandra-loka. The killing in sacrifice is not a sin at all, it is violence through passion which constitutes a great sin those who commit sins are born as food-grains, etc. The śrutī-sentence, namely, "they are born as vṛīhi", only implies that those persons are related to that kind of food-grains which are immediately turn into food; this food is turned into semen, and then, the same person in the form of semen is reborn.

(1) The first section in the second quarter of this adhyāya has six sutras (1-6). It starts with the Purvapakṣa which assumes that the world produced in dream
condition is real, because it is created by the same 
Atman who creates the world in the waking condition.

The Siddhanta in this connection is stated as follows: In the waking condition the dream world appears illusory, because it is unreal. Though the dream world is in a sense created by the Jīva, still the Jīva cannot be said to possess unrestricted powers like the Brahman. Therefore, the creation by the Jīva cannot be compared to the creation by the Brahman.

(2) This section has two sutras (7-8). At the time of sleep, according to the Pūrvapakṣa, the Jīva either enters into the nādi or into the puritāt, or at times it rests within the Brahman. These are the three places mentioned in the śrutis, but the Jīva cannot be connected with all these three simultaneously.

The Siddhantin states that, at the time of sleep, the Jīva enters into the puritāt through the nādi and then rests within the Brahman. This is just like a person who goes up two or three stairs and then finally

enters into a room on the terrace. There is no option in this connection as implied in the Purvapakṣa.

(3) This section, which consists of only one sutra (9) continues the same topic. The Purvapakṣin now says that one may accept that the Jīva enters into the Brahman at the time of sleep. But one cannot say definitely that, at the time of waking up, the same Jīva comes out. When a drop of water falls into the huge ocean, it would be difficult to take out that very same drop from the ocean. The case of the Jīva entering into the Brahman is comparable to this.

The Siddhānta insists that the Jīva which comes out at the time of waking up is assuredly the same as the one which enters into the Brahman at the time of sleep, because it remembers almost clearly all its own deeds which were done or which had remained half-done on the previous day. A drop of water which falls into the ocean cannot be separated, because it has no distinctive mark. Here, however, the Jīva is endowed with its avidyā and karman and so can be easily distinguished. So the illustration of a drop of water is not relevant in this case.

(4) This section has only one sutra (10). According to the Purvapakṣa the Jīva can be thought of as having
four states of consciousness, namely, 1) wakefulness, 2) dream, 3) deep sleep, and 4) abandonment of the body. What kind of state is swoon?

The **Siddhántin** says that swoon cannot be the state of wakefulness, as the former is characterised by the absence of consciousness. It can neither be a dream nor sleep, as there is absence of dream and absence of regular breathing during the swoon. On the other hand, the body actually trembles. So the swoon is partly the condition of sleep and partly the condition of death, because the swoon is characterised by existence and unconsciousness.

(5) The fifth section contains eleven *sūtras* (**11-21**). It concerns itself with the question of the nature of the Brahman. The **Pūrvapakṣa** maintains that the Brahman is both *nirgūṇa* and *sagūṇa*, because it is to states in the *śruti*s.

The **Siddhānta**, on the other hand, insists that the Brahman is *nirgūṇa* only. The description of the Brahman as *sagūṇa* in the *śruti*s is intended only for facilitating meditation. Moreover, hundreds of *śruti*-sentences can be cited to prove that the Brahman is *nirgūṇa*. 
(6) The Purvapakṣin in the next section which has nine śūtras (22-30) asserts that the phrase na iti na iti, negates the nature of the Brahman or it negates the Brahman itself. It is said to be beyond the capacity of speech and mind.

The Siddhāntin, however, says that if that phrase were to imply the negation of the Brahman and the world, it would mean that the śrutis had accepted the śūnya-vāda (nihilism). But actually it is not so. If it were to imply the negation of the Brahman itself, the introductory sentence, namely, "may I expound the Brahman", would be rendered absurd. So, the negation implied by that phrase has to be understood as the negation of the abstract and the concrete only. On the other hand, the Brahman is actually visualised by the Yogins; therefore, its existence cannot be denied. The denial implied there is with the reference to the world which appears as if it is real.

(7) This section has seven śūtras (31-37). In the śrutī, the Brahman is referred to as a bridge (setu).

1. Brhadāraṇyaka Up. IV.5.15: श्रेष्ठ नैतिक नेत्यात्मा गृह्ये न दिम हृद्यते।
2. Chāndogya Up. VIII.4.: त्य व ब्राह्मण स शेषतथोऽविद्यात्मा त्य झोः नाम।
This would suggest that there does exist some other principle besides the Brahman. In that case, the śruti-texts about the identification of the Brahman and the Jīva may be treated as secondary. This is the Purvapakṣa.

The Siddhānta is that there does not exist any principle other than the Brahman. It is referred to as setu, because, just as the water-current is restricted by the setu, similarly, all objects are restricted by the Brahman. Moreover, the statement that 'through the knowledge of the one, everything else becomes known' will be rendered meaningless if something besides the Brahman is supposed to exist. So only the Brahman really exists and nothing else.

(8) This section consists of four śūtras (38-41). The Purvapakṣa holds that, since the desired fruit is attained through actions only, more knowledge of the Brahman will not be conducive to any fruit.

The Siddhānta, on the other hand, asserts, that the Brahman must be regarded as being capable of giving the fruit. As for the Karmaş, they are seen to be destroyed immediately after they have been performed. And as for the apūrva, it is only imagined. Instead of such imagination
it is better to suppose that Isvara is responsible for assigning the relevant fruits.

1. The first section in the third quarter of the third chapter consists of four sutras (1-4). The Purvakāśīṇa complains that the information about the Brahman is given differently in different texts. The context, the names etc. vary in each text. This state of things can be explained only on the assumption of the sagunatva of the Brahman.

The Siddhāntin replies to this by pointing out that the knowledge about the Brahman imparted in the different texts is the same, as is clearly indicated by the sameness of the efforts directed towards that knowledge as also by the sameness of the fruit (mokṣa) derived from that knowledge. Moreover, even though there may be some difference in minor things like the means, etc., the essential things need not be regarded as varying from text to text. So in all the texts the vidyā which has been taught has to be regarded as being the same.

1. The contexts like Agni-Vidyā, Madhu-Vidyā, etc. and the names like Taittirīyaka, Vājasenayaka etc. vary.
2. This section has only one sutra (5). Even though the Vidya may be the same, the so-called minor or subordinate things mentioned in one text cannot be adequately connected with another text, because, in that case, such defects as alteration of the adjective and kramabheda would occur. This is what the Purvapaksa says.

The Siddhantin replies that these subordinate things may be transferred to some other Vidya of the same type, since the fruit is the same.

3. This section comprises three sutras (5–8). According to the Purvapaksa, the Udgita-vidyas as set forth in the Brhadaranyaka Upinigad and the Chandogya Upinigad are the same, because there is similarity of arthavada-sentences and names in the two contexts.

The Siddhanta denies this suggestion. The Udgita-vidya of the Chandogya Upinigad is different from that of the Brhadaranyaka Upinigad, for, in the former the prana, drsti, and om are mentioned as avayavas of the Udgita,

while in the latter, the whole udgītha is stated and described to facilitate the meditation. Artvīg, Udgaṭa by name is said to be the kartr of that vidya. So only by the similarity of the language these two vidyas cannot be supposed as being the same.

4. This section, which consists of only one sutra (9) refers to the sentence आमिर्भेतज्ञरिथमुद्यमवाचसत्। On the strength of this text, the Purvapakṣin, contends that out of the two entities, namely, om and udgītha, the one is superimposed on the other as we find in the sentence, 'the sun is the Brahman'. Here, the Brahman is superimposed on the sun, still the first impression that it is the sun, is not denied.

The Siddhāntin objects to this by saying that, if there was to be assumed the superimposition of om an udgītha, the Udgītha would suffer from Laksana, suggesting the sense "like Udgītha". The same would happen in the case of the om also. So, the word udgītha should be regarded as qualifying (vīsesaṇa) the word om.

5. This section too has only one sutra (10). According to the Purvapakṣa, the prāṇa in the prāṇa-vidyā of the Kaṇḍātaka Upāṇisad cannot be regarded as being endowed with qualities like vāsiṣṭhatva, etc., since the word evam occurring there refers only to those qualities which are mentioned in that text.

The Siddhānta argues that the prāṇa in the above mentioned Upāṇisad does possess those qualities, because the deity mentioned there is not different from the one described in the Chāndogya Upāṇisad.

6. The sixth section has three sutras (11-13). The Purvapakṣa lays it down that the various attributes of the Brahman such as 'being ever-joy-ful', should be taken as being limited to the particular śrutī texts in which they are mentioned. They should not be extended to other texts belonging to some other śakha.

The Siddhānta can by no means accept this position. It is emphatically stated that the Brahman is everywhere the same, and that, therefore, the description of the Brahman in one text can as well be made applicable elsewhere. The only

2. Chāndogya Up. V.1.11. ।
exception would be the cases where *aupadhika bhedas* are imagined.

7. This section has two sutras (14-15). According to the *Purvapakṣa*, the sentence 

\[ \text{vibhramayā pyaśāpya aham samānyam tathā parah} \]

\[ \text{mn: } \]

\[ \text{prasādānaṁ pariṁśvajraś ca ātyaśa sā pari gati: } \]

\[ ^{1} \]

every succeeding entity is superior to every preceding one. Such an understanding of the texts would not lead to the defect of *vakyabheda*, for, it may be assumed that these are more than one sentences.

According to the *Siddhānta*, what the *Upanisadic* text under consideration emphasises is the Paratva. The whole verse must be understood as constituting one single sentence. Therefore, other entities are not expected to be described in terms of Paratva.

8. This eighth section contains two sutras (16-17). The *Purvapakṣa*, here, refers to a passage in the *Aitareya Aranyaka* which describes the ātman as the creator of the heaven. It is pointed out that the word ātman in this

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2. *Aitareya Aranyaka* I.1. ātma vā vibhaktaḥ ātaṣṭāḥ āśīvāḥ ā śiṣṭāḥ ![\text{vibhramayā pyaśāpya aham samānyam tathā parah}]

\[ \text{mn: } \]

\[ \text{prasādānaṁ pariṁśvajraś ca ātyaśa sā pari gati: } \]

\[ ^{1} \]

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I.2: स तूनाश्रयतेऽवृत्ताम्योऽन्यैर्चिन्मयायः
passage actually means Brahma, since Paramesvara is said to have created the five elements etc. Here in the passage under consideration, the creation of the worlds is stated first. Moreover, the word \textit{\^{a}tman} is at times seen as used in the sense of Brahma.

The Siddhānta is that, in that passage, the word \textit{\^{a}tman} means only Paramātman, for that meaning is well established. Moreover, such qualities as are implied by the statements like 'He thought', etc., suit only the Paramātman very well.

Another interpretation is given of this \textit{adhikarana}. The \textit{Purva-pakṣa} according to that interpretation is: In the \textit{Bṛhadāranyaka Upanīṣad} the Brahman is introduced with the \textit{\^{a}tman}, while in the \textit{Chāndogya Upanīṣad}, it is not so introduced. Therefore, the two \textit{upaniṣads} must be regarded as teaching two different doctrines.

The Siddhānta is: The \textit{Vidya} in both the \textit{upaniṣads} is the same. Even though in the \textit{Chāndogya Upanīṣad}, the word \textit{\^{a}tman} does not occur in the beginning, still the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item cf. \textit{Bṛhadāranyaka Up.} I.4.1.: \textit{विपदमयः ब्राह्मीं पुस्तिरिविधः}
\item cf. \textit{Bṛhadāranyaka Up.} IV.3.7,
\item cf. \textit{Chāndogya Up.} VI.2.1.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
statement, "through the knowledge of one, everything else becomes known," refers to nothing but the Ātman. So, the same Vidya has to be understood as having been taught.

9. This section has only one sutra (18). Here, the Purva-pakṣa states that the sipping of water before and after meals has been mentioned in the two upanisads, namely, the Chandogya and the Brhadaranyaka. There the ācamana-vidhi is clearly indicated, for, the verb ācamet certainly implies a vidhi in the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad.

On behalf of the Siddhānta, however, it is pointed out that here there is only bhāvanā. The term bhāvanā indicates merely action, that is to say, something may be done, while the term vidhi indicates that the particular action stated in that particular sentence must be done. Or it may be said that there is a bhāvanā-vidhi only. Moreover, according to the Kānya-vārṣaṇ of the Kanva-Bhāṣaṇa, the sentence is a vidhi in a sense that it implies the superimposition of a garment on water.

   1. ācamata, V.2.2: तत्सदृशा त्रितसविध्यत गृहोत्तुप्रतिविध्यते।
      पारिदद्यान्ति।

2. Brhadaranyaka Up. VI.1.14: श्रेष्ठा ब्रह्मण्यं ज्ञातिन्त्यद्वित्वाचा-मन्त्येदेशितं तद्निन्त्रानुकूलिता मर्यादते।

3. Here the word bhāvanā is to be taken in the sense of superimposition, that is to say, water is supposed as a garment (vastra) of the food in आपो अिष्टः (Brh. Up. VI.1.14). The sentence is a vidhi in a sense that it implies the superimposition of a garment on water.
Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad, the verb ācam does not occur in the potential mood. Hence, there is no ācamāna vidhi.

10. This section also has only one sutra (19). In the Agnirahasya Prakarana of the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, as well as in the Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad a vidyā known as the Śāndilya vidyā, is set forth, there being some difference in minor details in the two texts. On the strength of this difference, the Pūrvapāksa argues that these two texts must be understood as teaching two different and independent vidyās, and that some minor details mentioned in connection with one vidyā cannot be applied to the other.

The Siddhāntin asserts that both these vidyās are one and the same, as both of them aim at one common goal, namely, the Brahmanā. So the minor details of the one vidyā can as well be made applicable to the other also. The same vidyā has been set forth twice, because in one place the vidyā is explained and at the other place minor details are added to it. Some points, however, are common to both.

1. Satapatha Brāhmaṇa.
11. The eleventh section has three sūtras (20-22). In the satya-vidyā, the Puruṣa in the orbit of the sun is called ahar while the Puruṣa in the eye is referred to as aham. Now as the vidyā is the same, these two must be understood as different Puruṣas. So says the Purvapakṣinī.

The Siddhāntin says that, though the vidyā is the same, still, as the places are different, there is difference in the characterisation of Puruṣa on account of upādhi. Actually, however, the Puruṣa is the same.

12. The Purvapakṣa in this section, which has only one sūtra (23), is: The vibhūtis mentioned in the Bāṇāyaniya-khila of the Gāmaveda are the vibhūtis of the Brahman. The various vidyās (such as the Śāndilya-vidyā in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad) in the Upaniṣads are presumably derived from these vibhūtis; therefore these vibhūtis may be included in those vidyās.

The Siddhānta is: In some vidyās of the Upaniṣads different stations with reference to the Ātman (adhyātmya) are mentioned, while in others such adhyātmya-sthānas are

1. Brhadāraṇyaka Up. V.4.1:
not at all mentioned consequently there is no similarity whatsoever between the vibhūties and the vidyās. So the two cannot be regarded as constituting one vidyā.

13. This section contains one sutra (14). According to the Purvapakṣa, the Purusa-yajña mentioned in the Chandogya Upaniṣad1 is the same as that mentioned in the Narayana Upaniṣad2.

The Siddhānta, on the other hand, insists that the two Purusāyajñas are different. In the Narayana Upaniṣad, we find that some details about yajamana, his wife, etc., these are absent in the Chandogya Upaniṣad. Moreover, in the latter Upaniṣad the idea of sacrifice is superimposed on the Purusa, while in the former it is superimposed on the knowledge of the Purusa. Hence, the two Purusa-yajñas have to be regarded as distinct and different.

14. This section has only one sutra (25). Some Mantras are given at the beginning of some Upaniṣads. So they may be regarded as part of the vidyās taught in these particular Upaniṣads. This is the Purvapakṣa.

The Siddhānta is that these Mantras cannot be included in those vidyās, as there is no parity between them (that is, between vidyā and Mantras). The only reason why the Mantras are given there is that they are to be recited esoterically like the Upaniṣads.

15. In some sruti it is stated that the good deeds of the enlightened persons are shared by his favourites, while his bad deeds are shared by those who are disliked by him. But in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad only the abandonment of his good and bad deeds by the enlightened one is mentioned; the division of those deeds is not at all mentioned, nor is it expected. This is the position of the Pūrvapakṣin in the fifteenth section which as only one sūtra (26).

The Siddhāntin in that section says that the division of good and bad deeds of the enlightened one is implied, though not explicitly stated, in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, as the taking over of those deeds by someone else is a necessary part of the abandonment.

1. cf. Kaśītaki Up., I.14: स ब्राह्मणति विषने नदीं हि कल्याण्येति तत्त्वज्जातयुक्ते धृतुः। तत्प्रम्पो ज्ञातम्। हृदयसर्वत्त्विनिन्त्या हृदय।  
2. cf. Chāndogya Up. VIII.13.1: अः तत्र तित रोमाणि विष्णु पार्य चन्द्र ज्ञि राहुरुपयुक्तमुत्त्वा भुत्वा जयति समं आक्षोक्षमार्गितः।
Another interpretation of this adhikarana is also given. The Purvapaksa according to that interpretation is: the word vidhūnana in the sentence *स आन्तर्ज्ञि विजित्रा नदीं तो मन्न्यैवात्म्येति । तत्सुक्ष्मतुदृढ़ते चुन्ते ।* may mean suspension of the enjoyment of the fruit of action for some time.

The reply of the Siddhāntin to this Purvapaksa is that the word (vidhūnana) implies total abandonment (tyāga), as becomes clear from the division of good and bad deeds which is mentioned further. Such division is not possible unless the good and bad deeds are completely abandoned.

16. This section has two sutras (27-28). According to the Purvapaksa, the enlightened person, after death, abandons his good and bad deeds in the mid-way, that is, after crossing the river Viraja or Vijara by name. This is stated in the Kausītaki Upanisad.

The Siddhāntin explains that, at the very time of leaving the body, the enlightened Puruṣa abandons his

2. Ibid.
good and bad deeds, for, after leaving the body, he is not in any way concerned with them. Moreover, as stated in the Chandogya Upaniṣad, the vidya (i.e. Brahmana-vidya) instantaneously destroys the good and bad deeds. In the Kausitaki Upaniṣad, however, this is stated later.

17. This section has two sutras (29-30). The person who abandons good and bad deeds proceeds along the path, known as the Devayana. The Pūrvapakṣin says that this is stated in the Kausitaki Upaniṣad.

According to the Siddhantin, this may be so, so far as the Kausitaki Upaniṣad is concerned. After all, that Upaniṣad there speaks of the Saguna Brahman. But so far as the Nirguna Brahman is concerned, the enlightened one becomes the Brahman itself immediately; and so he is not required to go anywhere.

18. This section has only one sutra (31). The person, who follows the vidyas like the Paryanka or the Upakosal, must be regarded as proceeding along the

1. Chandogya Up., VIII.13.1: ज्ञेय जिज्ञ स्रोतायेण सिद्ध परं च ब्रह्म जिज्ञ रूपं निपुणवत्ताय चतुर्वृत्ति च क्षणवित्तारं भ्रमितं सिद्धान्तविवेकार्यस्य ।
2. Kausitaki Up. I.3: सब्जेत देखियों पर्यावरणविश्लेषणमादिकार्यकर्तव्याति ।
3. Ibid., I.3-4-5.
4. Chandogya Up. IV.10: भयोखोल जै गौमानम। अर्द्ध त्रिवृत्ति ।
Devayāna, for, that path is specifically mentioned there. But in other saguna vidyas, like the Madhu-vidyā, etc., this path is not specifically mentioned; and so the follower of the other saguna vidyas may not be regarded as proceeding along that path. This is what the Purva Pākaśīn says.

The Siddhānta is that the Devayāna is common to all the saguna-vidyas, for, it is stated accordingly in the Chandogya Upaniṣad and the Bhagavadgītā. Even in connection with the Madhu-vidyā, the same path may be said to have been prescribed. Otherwise the person following that vidyā will have to be supposed as going down, which is not to be expected in his case.

19. This section has only one sutra (32). According to the Purva Pākaśīn, here, the knowledge of the Brahman does not necessarily result into salvation for all the times.

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Chandogya Upaniṣad:
1. II.11, III.1: कौन वा ब्राह्मिकों देवमुख तस्मात्स्वरूप मित्रस्त्रोतां न-परिप्रभुतम् पुनः।
2. Chandogya Upaniṣad, V.10.1-2: वे ब्राह्मणाः मूलतः सर्वेऽब्राह्मणेऽपि पानवानः ग्यानन्यायां गमयान् ग्यानचिन्तित।
3. cf. Gītā, VIII.26: जुगुक्कुष्णे नतीजमेते जात: श्र्यो वाते सत्यम् सर्वात्मानं विस्मयमयात्मास्मात्माः पुनः।
Otherwise, the great sages like Apanāratamaś, Sanatkumara, etc., would not have been reborn, as has been stated in the Itihasas and the Purāṇas.

The Siddhānta insists that the Brahma-vidyā definitely leads to eternal salvation. As for above-mentioned sages, it can be said that they were entrusted with some mission such as giving instruction in the Vedas, etc., so they had to continue with their bodies. Moreover, the Prārabdhakarman is not destroyed by the knowledge of the Brahman; so until this karman is destroyed, a person, though enlightened, still has to continue his duties.

20. This section again has only one sutra (33).

In some śrutis, the anutva of the Brahman is negated, while in others the Brahman is described as being beyond the range of the sense-organs. So this negation should be restricted to that part of the śruti only; it should not be treated as a universal negation, for, the śrutis are different. So says the Purvapakṣin.

1. In both the verses of this section, some words are lost.
2. cf. Brhadārānyaka Up. III.6.8: स ह्रोताचैते तद्भसर्गर्गे गायिका ब्राह्मणान् अभिविद्यस्यप्रतन्नम्‌-हस्यम्‌
3. cf. Mundaka Up. I.1.6: महद्वद्यस्यप्रायमयोऽवस्थयमुक्तिः सो मुनि‌
The Siddhāntin replies that, since all the śruti-texts aim at one common goal, namely, the Brahman, the negation of the anutva should be understood in a universal sense. In this connection, he gives the following drṣṭānta: The Mantras to be recited at the time of offering the ātava are from the Śaṁveda, and yet they are recited by the Adhvaryu who belongs to the Yajurveda.

21. The Pūrvapakṣa in the twenty-first section which has only one sutra (34) may be stated as follows: In the Mundaka Upaniṣad and in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, the Jīva is described as enjoying the fruit of kārman while Īśvara is said to be a passive witness. As against this, in the Katha Upaniṣad, both Īśvara and the Jīva are described as enjoyers. This would indicate that two different vidyās are taught in these Upaniṣads.

The Siddhāntin does not accept this position. He emphasises that the vidyā is one and the same, and that

1. cf. ibid. III. 1.1: द्रशपणी द्रशपणी स्वामान समाने कृः परिपरित्रि त्यार्थः पिप्पल स्वाज्ज्ञन्ययान्नयो विभावक्षीति।
2. cf. Śvetāśvatara Up. III. 1.1: द्रशपणी द्रशपणी स्वामान समाने कृः परिपरित्रि त्यार्थः पिप्पल स्वाज्ज्ञन्ययान्नयो विभावक्षीति।
3. cf. Katha Up. III. 1.1: द्रशपणी द्रशपणी स्वामान समाने कृः परिपरित्रि त्यार्थः पिप्पल स्वाज्ज्ञन्ययान्नयो विभावक्षीति।
the description in the Katha Upanisad of Isvara as the enjoyer has to be understood in its secondary sense.

22. Two ātr̥s (35-36) make up the twenty-second adhikarana. In one part of the Brhadāranyaka Upanisad the Brahma-vidyā is set forth. A Brahma-vidyā is set forth also in another part of that Upanisad. Since the Brahma-vidyā is thus repeated twice in the same text, it would appear the two do not constitute one and the same Brahma-vidyā. This is the Pūrvapākṣin’s line of argument.

The Siddhāntin refutes it by pointing out that at both the places in the Brhadāranyaka Upanisad one and the same Brahma-vidyā has been taught. This is confirmed by the fact that both the contexts have the same aim. Mere repetition cannot be said to make one different from the other.

23. This section has only one ātr̥ (37). In the sentence "मेंदु हृद जीवाः जीवाः जीवाः" from the Aitareya Āranyaka, the meditation on the Jīva...

2. cf. Aitareya Āranyaka, II, 2.4.6.
as Īśvara is prescribed and not vice-versa, since Īśvara is superior to the Jīva. So says the Purvapaksin.

The Siddhānta is that there are two kinds of meditations one being on Īśvara as Jīva and the other being on the Jīva as Īśvara. These two kinds of meditation indeed confirm the identity of the Jīva with Īśvara.

24. This section has only one śutra (38) and the Purvapaksin in it says: In the Brhadāranyaka Upanisad two satya-vidyās are elaborated in two different contexts. These two have different fruits mentioned in connection with them. Therefore, they must be regarded as two different vidyās.

The Siddhāntin, on the other hand, asserts that these two vidyās cannot be regarded as being different from each other, because the object of meditation is the same in both. The different fruits are mentioned only in order to glorify some minor items in that vidyā.

25. This section too has only one śutra (39). The prima-facie view here is that in one passage from the

1. cf. Brhadāranyaka Up. V.4.5. and V.5.2.
Chāndogya Upaniṣad¹, and another from the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad². One and the same vidyā must be understood to have been taught, because the same abode of Īśvara, namely, the heart is mentioned in both the passages.

The Siddhānta is that these two passages speak of two different vidyās. In the passage from the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, the saguna Brahman is described, while in the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad passage the nirguna Brahman is the main theme. The attributes like svamitva etc. are mentioned in the latter passage only with a view to glorify the Ātman.

26. This section has two sutras (40-41). According to the Purvapakṣin, the Prāṇāgniḥhotra³ is obligatory even when one does not take food. Something else can be used in the place of food for such Prāṇāgniḥhotra.

The Siddhāntin asks as to how, in the absence of food there can be any Prāṇāgniḥhotra. The word agniḥotra

3. Prāṇāgniḥhotra means five āhutis given to five Prānas, namely, Prāṇa, apāna, vyāna, udāna and samāna in the body.
may have been used, still it is intended only for glorification and is not to be understood literally.

27. This section has only one sutra (42). There are some upasanas, such as the meditation on om, etc., recommended in the srutis. According to the Purvapaksa, these upasanas are invariably related to those karmas (such as sacrifices etc.), even as the juhu is related to parna-wood. The srutis no doubt prescribe some fruits in connection with these upasanas, but it should not be supposed that those upasanas are practised with the desire for those fruits only. Such srutis are to be understood as mere arthavadas.

The Siddhanta states that those srutis which mention specific fruits cannot be treated as arthavadas. Moreover, if the upasanas had been invariably related to particular karmas, they would have been included in that karna itself. The Chandogya Upanishad explicitly says that these upasanas are anitya.

1. Juhu is a laddle by means of which clarified butter is poured into the sacred fire. It is invariably made of parna-wood.

2. Here, in the first like of the second (siddhanta) verse some words are dropped.
23. This section has only one *sūtra* (43). In the *Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad*¹ and the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*², the *vāyu* and the *Prāna* are prescribed for meditation. According to the *Pūrvapakṣa*, since the essential nature of the *Prāna* and the *vāyu* is the same, these two are not to be meditated upon separately.

The *Siddhānta* asserts that though the essential nature of the two is the same, still, since they differ in status one (*Prāna*) being *adhyatma* and the other (*vāyu*) *adhibhautika*, they have to be meditated upon separately.

29. The twenty-ninth section, which comprises nine *sūtras* (44–52), reverts to the *Agni-rahasya*. Under this topic imaginary fires like *manas* etc. are mentioned. Though there are some indications (*linga*) that these agnis are not imaginary, still, from the context (*prakarana*), it becomes clear that they are imaginary. And according to *Mīmāṃsā Prakarana* is stronger than *linga*. So, says the *Pūrvapakṣin*, these fires must be regarded as imaginary.

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2. cf. *Chāndogya Up.*, III.3.3.
The Siddhāntin rejects this suggestion and says that these fires are not imaginary. The śrūtis directly speak of them, and the direct śruti is more authoritative than Prakarana. Moreover, the agnis are identical with the sacrificial fires; this fact rules out any idea of their being imaginary.

30. This section has two sutras (53-54). According to the Purva-pākṣin, the human body itself is the Ātman, for, he argues, if the Ātman had been different from the body, it might have been found in the body independently.

The Siddhāntin counter argues that after one's death his body becomes available, but not his Ātman, and so the body and the Ātman have to be considered to be distinct from each other\(^1\).

31. The next section has two sutras (55-56). The meditations upon the udgīthā etc., are stated only in the texts of some vedic sākhās. So these upāsanās are to be regarded as being restricted to that sākhā only. Actually the vedic sākhās are distinct from one another as for instance is shown by the fact in these sākhās have some words differently accounted. This is what the Purva-pākṣin says.

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1. In the second verse of this adhikarana some words are lost.
The Siddhanta in this connection, is that, since the śrutis mention the upāsanā of the udgītha etc. in a general way, those upāsanās are to be taken as being applicable to the other vedic sākhās also. In support of this, the Siddhantin refers to the Mīmāṃsā rule that, the śrutī-pramāṇa is stronger than the sannichī-pramāṇa.

32. This section has only one sūtra (57). The Chandogya Upaniṣad speaks of the vyāsta and samasta upāsanā of the Brahman. According to the Purvapakṣin, only the Vyāsta-upāsanā is actually intended there, for, in every case, the words used are, "Do you meditate". Similarly independent fruit is mentioned for each upāsanā.

The Siddhantin says that, in the Upaniṣadic passage referred to, the samasta-upāsanā itself is recommended. This becomes clear from the fact that the fruit of the samasta-upāsanā only is mentioned there. The words used, namely, "Do you meditate" are merely of the nature of an anuvāda. Further the Vyāsta-upāsanā actually appears to have been treated with contempt.

1. cf. Chandogya Up. V.11.1. The Vyāsta upāsanās mean individual upāsanās such as svarga, Āditya etc. are to be meditated upon as Ātman, while Samasta-upāsanā means svarga, Āditya etc., all these together are to be meditated upon as the Ātman.
33. This section also comprises only one ātṛa (58). According to the Purvapakṣa, the various viḍyās, which have been stated at different places in the Upaniṣads, are actually not different from one another, for, the goal of all these viḍyās is the same. The minor details, which appear to be different have to be treated as pertaining to one viḍyā only.

The Siddhānta is that, though these viḍyās aim at one common goal, still, since the statements differ verbally as well as from the point of view of qualities (guna), they should be regarded as different viḍyās. Moreover, every viḍyā differs according to each aspirant's desire; so there cannot be said to be any harmony amongst them.

34. According to the Purvapakṣin in this section, which has only one ātṛa (59), one may practise only one upāsana if he entertains such a desire. If, however, he desires for many upāsanās, he may practise many.

The Siddhānta insists that one may practise any one of the upāsanās. All these upāsanās aim at one single goal, namely, the knowledge of the Brahman. As even by means of one upāsana, one attains to this knowledge, there is no need whatsoever for his practising different upāsanās
35. This section has only one sutra (60). The Purvapaksa cleverly asks why the rule mentioned in the previous adhikarana should not be made applicable in respect of the kāmya-karmans also.

The Siddhāntin replies that the Kāmya-Karmans have fruits different from the knowledge of the Brahman. So the two cases are distinct from each other, and the rule which holds good in one case does not hold good in another.

36. This last section in this quarter comprises six sutras (61-66). According to the Purvapaksa, the upāsanās relating to the udgīthā etc. may be practised as much as they are expected, that is to say all those upāsanās which are stated in one particular karman are to be practised, as these upāsanās are prescribed in all the three vedas.

Moreover, according to the Čhāndogya Upaniṣad an upāsana prescribed in one veda is related to the upāsana prescribed in the other veda also. The basic element om is common to all the upāsanās.

1. cf. Čhāndogya Up., I.1.9:

तैन्द्रिक क्री विबार्त्ते वेदभिन्नात्मकात्म्येयतिःपरिचतमिति
बुद्धाल्प्मेतस्यवाहस्तवस्यापतिः महिम्ना स्वेयः
The Siddhānta in this adhikarana is that the upāsanās prescribed in one vedic text are not to be understood as being related to the upāsanās prescribed in other texts. The stotras may be so related, because they from parts of the sacrifice; but these upāsanās are meant for personal benefit. This is the difference between the two. One may say that, without stotras the upāsanās are not possible, but one cannot on that account insist that one has to practise all upāsanās. A person certainly has a choice in the matter of the upāsanās.

(1) The fourth quarter of the third chapter opens with a section which consists of seventeen sutras (1-17). The point considered here is the view of Bādarāyaṇa that for the knowledge of the Brahman the karmāṇa like sacrifices, etc., are not essential. Now, the Purvapakṣin maintains that the Jīva is the doer of various karmāṇa and so its knowledge is subservient to karmāṇa, like the vrīhiprokṣana for the sacrifice. The fruit of the Ātman-jñāna is not different from the fruit of the sacrifice. Hence, those.

1. The vrīhiprokṣana has no special fruit other than the fruit of the sacrifice in which vrīhiprokṣana is performed. Similarly the Ātma-jñāna is related to the Ātman who performs the sacrifice. So the fruit of the sacrifice is not different from the fruit of the Ātma-jñāna.
śrutis which describe some different fruit should be treated as arthavādas. This is the view of Jaimini¹. Moreover the ancient sages like Janaka etc. have performed various sacrifices. Further the śruti-texts themselves say that the karmaṇa together with knowledge of the meaning (of the vedas, and the Upaniṣads are included in the vedas) is more powerful². Hence, the Atma-jñāna (described in the Upaniṣads) is subservient to the karmans (i.e. sacrifices).

The Siddhānta is that the Upaniṣads describe the Paramatman which is higher than the Jīva. This Paramatman cannot be in any way connected with sacrifices etc. So the Atma-jñāna is by no means subservient to the sacrifices or karmans. On the contrary it destroys the karmans, Janaka etc. practised karmans for the sake of the solidarity of the people (lokasamgraha). Similarly the sentence namely "karmaṇa with knowledge is more powerful" etc. actually emphasises the importance of the Atma-jñāna. Hence the karmans have no relation whatsoever with the Brahmajñāna.

1. For example, according to Jaimini, in the sentence 

no separate fruit for  is mentioned as it is subservient to the sacrifice which has its own fruit like the heaven etc. So this sentence is merely an arthavāda.

2. cf. Chandogya Up.I.1.10: जदेव चिब्भ्या करोति प्रयोगोत्तिद्धा तदेव कीर्तिवार भवति।
(2) This section has three śūtras (18-20).

Here, according to the Purvapakṣin, the sentence only those three āśramas (that is Brahmacarya, ānāprastha and sāmnyāsa) which are free from any sexual enjoyment are excluded.

This is only anuvadā and not vidhi since there is no verb which suggests any vidhi about these āśramas. Moreover in the Taittiriya Upaniṣad all āśramas except the grhasthāsrama are negated.

The Siddhānta is that not only the grhasthāsrama but all the āśramas are prescribed by the śrutis. So all of them have to be observed properly. Of course, the sāmnyāsāśrama is the most propitious for obtaining the knowledge of the Brahman. This is what is said in the śruti.

(3) The third section has two śūtras (21-22).

The sentence speaks about the udgītha in the sacrifice.

It is udgītha in that sense which is being praised. This

2. cf. Taittiriya Up., I.11.1: आचार्यम् प्रियम् धन्माधुत्म प्रजातन्त्रू मा व्यवहेत्सि।
3. cf. Jābala Up. V. अथ परिव्राज्य विवेकानामुष्टोपरिप्रेष दुषिष्ट्रोहोैैैः ब्रमुन्माय भवति।
is the view of the Purvapakṣin.

The Siddhantin, on the other hand, maintains that the Upaniṣadic passage, which has been referred to, prescribes the upāsana of the udgīthā, for, some apūrva is mentioned there. Moreover, this passage occurs far away from the vidhi sentences which prescribe the sacrifice. Hence, it should not be connected with the vidhi-sentence of the sacrifice.

(4) According to the Purvapakṣin in this section having two sūtras (23–24), the legends of Yājñavalkya, Pratardana, etc. occurring in the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad are meant for the Pārīplava-prayoga in the Horse sacrifice, where vedic legends are to be recited.

The Siddhantin rejects this view of the Purvapakṣin. He points out that by characterising these legends as being intended only for the purpose of Pārīplava, the Purvapakṣin is unwarrantedly restricting the meaning of the śruti. Again, the vedic myths which are recited at the Pārīplava usually relate to Indra, Varuṇa, Yama, etc., and not to Yājñavalkya and such others.

(5) This section comprises only one sutra (25). The Purvapakṣin, here, argues that the vidyā may not be treated as an independent cause to the mokṣa, and may be said subordinate to the karmans stated with reference to various āśramas.

The Siddhāntin averts this by pointing out the first sutra of this section lays down that purusārtha (i.e. mokṣa) can be attained through the vidyā (i.e. ātma-vidyā). Hence this vidyā is an independent cause of mokṣa and so this vidyā is not a subsidiary thing to any āśrama-karman.

(6) This section comprises two sutras (26-27). The Purvapakṣin in this adhikaraṇa says that, since vidyā is not dependent on karmāṇa for its fruit, it cannot be said to be dependent on it for its production (utpatti).

The Siddhāntin points to the passage etc. from the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad², and concludes that vidyā is dependent on various āśrama-karmans. He adds that there may not be any Upaniṣadic

1. Vedānta-Sūtras, III.4.1.
passage which directly prescribes any karman for obtaining vidyā, but this point is often indirectly suggested. Moreover, the Gītā clearly states that the karmans like sacrifice etc. are necessary for vidyā.

(7) This section consisting of four sūtras (28-31) refers to the prohibition about eating. The primā-facie view is that such prohibition is directed towards ignorant persons so far as an enlightened person is concerned, he may eat anything.

The Siddhāntin points out that in the Upaniṣadic sentence there actually occurs no word which directly expresses the vidhi relating to eating. In times of distress, eating of anything is no doubt allowed in the śrutis. But what is really implied there is that when there is no such critical situation, even an enlightened person should not eat anything which is normally prohibited.

(8) This section comprises four sūtras (31-35). According to the Āyuḥapaksin, if the various āśrama-karmans are supposed to have been prescribed only as means to vidyā, than a person who has no desire for vidyā need not

1. cf- Gītā, IV.23: प्रत्ययमेव युक्तमेव शान्तिविषयते।
2. cf. Chāndogya Up., V.2.1: प्रत्ययमेव न हो वा अद्वितिदि चिंतनानन्तः

कविता।
practise these karmans, even though they are nitya. These karmans are related with the person concerned by way of either nitya samyoga, such as agnihotra which is to be practised upto the end of life or anitya-samyoga. But both of them are not simultaneously possible. So the samyoga may be either nitya or anitya.

The Siddhāntin in this connection is that these karmans are obligatory and must be practised even if one does not entertain any desire for vidya. This is expressly stated in the scriptures. As for the samyoga, it is of two kinds, namely, nitya and anitya. The first occurs when there is no desire for vidya and the second when there is such a desire. In any case these karmans must be practised.

(9) This section has four sutras (36-39). Here the Purva-pakṣin argues that, if vidya is considered to be dependent on the observance of the duties of the various āśramas then persons like a vidhura (that is one whose wife is dead) will have no right to vidya for, they will not be qualified for any āśrama-karmans.

The Siddhāntin explains that even such persons would have a right to vidya, as is examplified by Raikva and others

1. cf. see Foot Note 170 above.
who did not observe any āśrama and yet did secure knowledge. It is on account of austerities or good deeds, in the previous births, that such persons become entitled to knowledge.

(10) The tenth section has only one sutra (40). A person in the vanaprasthāśrama or in the samyagāśrama may revert to the grhasthāśrama, if he so desires. This is what the Purvapakṣin suggests.

The Siddhāntin rejects this suggestion. He points out that, according to the śruti one can pass from one āśrama into the next one, but one can never do so in the reverse order. He further adds that there is no such practise also.

(11) This section with two sutras (41-42) has naisthika brahmacarya as its topic for discussion. The prima-facie view in this connection is that if such persons as observe permanent celibary (naisthika brahmacarya) break their vow, there is no expiation for such violation. The smrta says that there is no expiatory rite.

The Siddhānta is that if the violation of the vow occurs in respect of the wife of the preceptor then there is certainly no expiation. But in other cases of
violation there may be expiatory rites. As for the
statement denying any kind of expiation, it is
intended just for emphasizing that special precaution should be taken against the violation of the vow.

(12) This section has only one *sutra* (43).
According to the Purvapaksa the expiatory rite must be considered to be washing off the sins of these persons; and so these persons need not then be treated as out-casts.

The Siddhanta is that the expiation is intended for purity in the next world. So far as the present life is concerned, the sin may be lesser or greater still it continues to be there. Hence, those who perpetrate such sin must be treated as out-casts during their present lives.

(13) In this section these are three *sutras* (44-46).
The *upasanas* relating to *udgitha*, etc., are prescribed for the sacrificer only. It is he who enjoys their fruit. Moreover he is qualified for them. This is the Purvapaksin's view.

The Siddhanta is the *upasanas* are meant for the Rtvig only. The sacrificer pays them for those *karmans*.

(14) This section has three *sutras* (47-49).
The Purvapaksin claims that the sentence

\[
\text{तत्प्राप्त: पाणिद्व: निर्विव बायैस्व: संविदित:}
\]
shall not be regarded as containing any *vidhi* about *mauna*. And this for two reasons. Firstly, both *pânditya* and *mauna* imply knowledge; and secondly the latter part of the sentence is of the nature of a recommendation.

The *Siddhântin*, contraverting this claim, state that, as the word *mauna* means knowledge *parexcellence*, the words 'after disdaining *pânditya*' have to be unders as expressing the *vidhi* for *mauna*.

(15) This section consisting of one *sūtra* (50), continues the discussion regarding the passage from the *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* referred to in the previous section. The *Purva-pakṣin* argues that the words 'after disdaining *bâlyâ* would suggest almost an impossible sense. He would like to understand it to mean that the enlightened one should behave freely. (*bālyena*).

The *Siddhântin* points out that, if the enlightened one was to behave freely, then the scriptural sentences implying *vidhi* or *nîśedha* would have no relevance so far as he is concerned. This would not be proper. The world

bālyā should, therefore, be understood here in the sense of "childlike innocence".

(16) This section also has only one sutra (51). According to the Purvapaksin, the vidyā which is to be acquired by means of śravana etc., should be acquired during this life itself.

This would be true says the Siddhāntin, only if there is no other obstruction of karman. If, however, there is such an obstruction, the fruit will be obtained in the next birth.

(17) The last section in the fourth quarter of the third adhyāya is made up of only one sutra (52). The fruit of the vidyā depends on the means. If the means like sacrifice, charity, etc., are without any obstruction, the fruit will be attained immediately in this very birth. This kind of fruit is superior to the one which is obtained in the next birth on account of interruption or obstruction. The same rule should hold good even in the case of salvation. The fruit in form of salvation may be of two kinds, namely, the superior one and the inferior one.

1. Most of the words in this stanza are lost.
That also depends on the means. If the means are good, the fruit in the form of salvation may be superior, and if the means are not so, the fruit may also be inferior. This is how the Purvapaksin argues.

The Siddhāntin sets aside the Purvapaksin's argument by pointing out that there are no stages in salvation. The Brahman is the same at all times. Really speaking, in vidyā also no stages can be thought of, because, the vidyā is ever beneficial. But due to the interruption, of the karmans, the mokṣa, may be a little delayed. In the saguna vidyā, on the other hand, there may be different stages and correspondingly different fruits. But so far as the Nirguna vidyā is concerned, the mokṣa is the same for all the times and everywhere.

1. The first adhikarana in the first pāda of the last chapter contains two sūtras (1-2). It refers to the Upanisadic passage Brhadāranyaka Up. IV.5.6.

mention any repetition of the process. The same is true of manana and nididhyasana also. If, by doing these three, namely, sravana, manana and nididhyasana only once, one becomes enlightened, there is no necessity of repetition. If, on the other hand, by doing sravana etc. once, one does not become enlightened, there is no guarantee that he will become enlightened even by repeating it. So in either case, no repetition is required. This is the Purvapaksa's line of argument.

The Siddhantin emphatically declares that repetition of sravana etc. is absolutely essential. Here, he gives the drstanta of the rice-grains which have to be polished continuously until they become clean. Even if one becomes enlightened by means of only one sravana etc., the repetition is necessary in order that he should have a clearer impression of the Atma-vidya on his mind. Actually, however, enlightenment through only one sravana etc. is quite rare. Generally, as the result of the deep misapprehension of the Atman, which has come down to the people from the remote past, the Atma-vidya is not easily acquired. Therefore, repetition of sravana etc. is essential. It is indeed for this very reason that the statement, "O Svetakatu, that thou art", is repeated nine
2. This section has only one sutra (3). As the Jīva is defiled by sin etc., the complete identification of the Jīva with the Brahman is not possible. The Brahman is sinless etc., so in the Ātma-vidyā, only the superimposition of the Brahman on the Jīva is possible. So says the Purvapakṣin.

The Siddhānta is that the complete identification of the Jīva with the Brahman is possible, because the Jīva is really of the nature of the Brahman. This is stated in the śrutis2. The superimposition cannot be thought of as if it presupposes the difference between the Jīva and the Brahman. The attributes like sin, etc., in the case of the Jīva are not real and the identification of the Jīva and the Brahman lies in abolishing the Jīvatva of the Jīva.

3. This section also has only one sutra (4). In the case of symbolic meditations, such as "Āditya is the Brahman", etc., the meditator has to imagine that these symbols (pratīkas) are identical with the Jīva, for, both the Jīva and the symbols are the effects of the Brahman. This is the Purvapakṣa.

1. cf. Chandogya Up., VI. 8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16.
The Siddhānta is that these symbols should not be imagined as being identical with the Jīva. In the process of meditation, the mind of a person functions as a human mind, the process of meditation is not possible if this human mind looses its mindness. Symbols are also not identical with the Brahman, because if they were so they would not remain symbols at all.

4. In this section there is only one sutra (5). According to the Purvapakṣin, while meditating upon Āditya, Prāna etc. Āditya etc. are to be meditated upon as the Brahman, or it may also be the other way round.

The Siddhāntin asserts that Āditya etc. are to be meditated upon as the Brahman and not vice-versa, because the superior entity is always to be imagined in the place of the inferior one, for the sake of the sublimation of the latter. The grammatical construction particularly the genitive case of Āditya, etc. in the Upaniṣadic sentence also confirms what has been said above. Moreover the Brahman is the fruit giver, as it is the lord of all.

5. This section has only one sutra (6). According to the Purvapakṣin in the sentences like अभायेन्द्रियं म भौसो तपसि तमसः गद्यांवनाति । भ्रमणे (पृथ्वी) वर्षिनि सात ॥

there is not any definite rule as the *udgītha* or the *rk* is to be superimposed on Āditya or Prthvī, the meditation in other way also is possible, Āditya or Prthvī can be superimposed on the *udgītha* or the *rk*.

The *Siddhānta* sets aside this view of the *Purvapakṣin* by pointing out that Āditya etc. are to be superimposed on the *udgītha* etc., because by such type of meditation, *apurva* can be attained, and through this *apurva* only, the sublimation of such *karmans* is possible. The *Upānisādīc* sentence confirms this.

6. Almost the entire text of the two stanzas in this section which comprises four *sūtras* (7-10) is lost.

7. There is only one *sūtra* in this section (11). According to the *Purvapakṣa*, there are definite rules laid down about the time, place and direction, etc. of the *upāsanā*. For instance, the meditator is required to face towards the East.

According to the *Siddhānta*, what is really important in this connection is the concentration of the

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1. Some words in the first stanza are lost.

2. cf. *Chāndogya Up*. I.1.10: 

नाना तु विषय चाविषयाः पदेव विषयाः 
कर्तर्ति श्रव्यसोपनिश्चता तदेव वीर्यस्तर्म भवति।
mind. The meditator is expected to take his seat in such a manner that his concentration is facilitated.

8. In this section, there is only one sutra (12). Some of the meditations are for the sake of knowledge only, so if that knowledge is attained, these upāsanās may be left out. So says the Purvapakṣin.

The Siddhāntin says that such upāsanās must be practised by a person up to death, so that he may not change mind at that time. It is according to the desire entertained at the time of death, that one gets fruit.

9. In this section, again, there is only one sutra (13). According to the Purvapakṣin, even through the knowledge of the Brahman, one does become freed from his sin, for, the knowledge is not intended for the destruction of sins. It is expiatory rites which bring about the destruction of sins.

The Siddhānta here is that, immediately after the knowledge of Brahman, one's sins are destroyed. This is what is said in the sūtras. Moreover, the purpose of

1. In the first verse of this adhikarana, some words are lost.
2. cf. Chāndogya Up., I.24.3: अस्य च शरीरं पापमात्रं प्रदूषिते
   Mundaka Up., II.2.3: भिक्षुनेषु हृदयप्रवन्धोलिनात्र स्वप्नस्य
   तस्यन्ते वास्त्वर्क्षिष्ठित्वा तत्स्ततः परावर्ते
the **Saguna-vidya** is the destruction of sins only. Even in the case of the **Nirguna-vidya**, through the knowledge, "I am the Ātman", all sins are destroyed.

10. In this section, there is only one **sūtra** (14). According to the **Pūrvapakṣin** in this **adhikāraṇā** by means of knowledge of the Brahman, only sin is destroyed, since it is alone obstructive; the **punya** is not destroyed, since it is beneficial.

The **Siddhāntin** asserts that even **Punya** is destroyed by the knowledge of the Brahman. It is true that in some **śrutis** only sin is mentioned as being liable to be destroyed. But there **Lakṣāna** is to be resorted to and **Punya** also is to be understood.

11. The eleventh section has only one **sūtra** (15). After the knowledge of the Brahman, all kinds of karmans - enjoyed and non-enjoyed - are destroyed, according to the **Pūrvapakṣin**.

The **Siddhāntin**, on the other hand, says that those karmans, whose fruit is being enjoyed, are not lost. On the contrary, even after the enlightenment, the karmans are left behind until they are enjoyed out. This is why the limit of the loss of body is stated in the **śrutī**.
12. In this section, which has two śūtras (16-17).
The consideration of the same topic is continued. As the result of the knowledge of the Brahman, the good deeds - both nitya and kāmya are destroyed. This is what the Purva-pakṣin says.

According to the Siddhāntin, the nitya-karmans, like agni-hotra etc., are not lost through the knowledge of the Brahman. The kāmya-karmans, on the other hand, are not useful for the vidyā. In the Saguna-vidyā alone, the karman unaccompanied by any desire for fruit, is useful for knowledge; and that punya-karman, which is done with a desire for fruit, is destroyed by the knowledge of the Brahman.

13. In this section, there is only one śūtra (18).
The Purva-pakṣin maintains that that karman, which is done with knowledge, is useful for the vidyā, because it is so known from the śrutis¹ and the smṛtis².

The Siddhāntin says that it is true that the karman with knowledge is more preferable; but it is certainl

1. cf. Brhadāraṇyaka Up., I.5.2: तत्रैद्वादुःशंक्तस्तर्य यमया 
   निन्दनप पुरुषैः न्याति।

2. cf. Gītā, II.39: एषा तेषामिति शास्त्रे बुद्धिमाने तिर्मगे जून।
   कुलদम युक्तो यमा पार्वं कर्मयन्ति प्राहस्यधि॥
not true that karman without knowledge is altogether useless. Any nitya-karman is useful for the vidya, as says the sruti.

14. This section has only one sutra (19). According to the Purvapaksa, even after enlightenment, the enlightened person is conscious of duality, for, he continues to take food, etc., just like an ordinary person. So, even after death, the consciousness of duality may persist.

The Siddhantin insists that no consciousness of duality persists. The misapprehension is the main cause of duality. This misapprehension itself is destroyed by the knowledge of the Brahman. Hence, there does not persist even the slightest hint of ignorance.

(1) According to the Purvapaksa in the first section of the second quarter of the forth chapter, which consists of two sutras (1-2), at the time of death, speech is merged into mind. This is what is said in the Chandogya Upanisad.

1. cf. Samkarabhasya on IV.1.18.
2. cf. Chandogya Up. VI.3.6: गाढः मनविच सम्पबले।
The *Siddhānta* is that it is not the speech itself which is merged into the mind, but it is the function of the speech which is so merged. Speech does not originate from the mind, and does not accordingly merge into the mind.

(2) In this section, there is only one *sūtra* (3). The mind is absorbed in the *Prāṇa*, says the Purvapakṣin, since it is so stated in the śrutī. It is also stated in the śrutī that mind originates from anna and *Prāṇa* from water.

As in the previous section, here too the *Siddhānta* is that it is not mind which is absorbed in the *Prāṇa*, but it is its functions, for, while sleeping, the *Prāṇa* functions, but not the mind. Moreover, as the mind is the modification of anna, it can only be absorbed in anna and not in water.

(3) In this section, there are three *sūtras* (4-6). According to the Purvapakṣa, the *Prāṇa* is absorbed in tejas, as is in the śrutī.

The *Siddhānta* is that the *Prāṇa* is absorbed in

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1. cf. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* VI.8.6: मनः प्राणे।
2. cf. *Chāndogya Up.* VI.8.6: प्राणस्तेजसः।
the Jīva. This is what is stated in the Brhadārāṇyaka Upaniṣad. Though in the sentence from the Chandogya Upaniṣad referred to by the Purvapāksin, it is said that the Prāṇa is absorbed in the tejas, the word tejas is to be there understood in the sense of entities like tejas etc.

(4) In this section, there is only one sutra (7). The situation at the time of death described in the previous section, may be applicable to an ordinary ignorant person. As for the enlightened person, there is no re-birth for him. Therefore, the five great elements will not be serving as substratam for his Jīva. This is the view of the Purvapāksin.

The Siddhāntin says that the situation at the time of death described there is common to both the enlightened person and the ignorant person, since there is no specification in the śruti. Though there is no reason for the enlightened to resort to the five great elements, still for the knower of the Saguna Brahman, salvation is not instantly obtained, and so he has to resort to the five

1. cf. Brhadārāṇyaka Up. IV.3.38:

उत्तमवन्मन्वतः च यव ग्राणं वनिश्चायति ।
great elements for going along the Devayāna path.

(5) The four sūtras (8-11) which make up the fifth adhikaraṇa, continue the topic of the preceding section. According to the Purvapakṣin, the five subtle elements, along with the Prāṇa and the organs, are absorbed in the Parabhrahman.

The Siddhantin denies this and asserts that these elements are not at all absorbed. As they are very subtle and clear, they are neither seen nor obstructed by any one.

(6) There are three sūtras (12-14) in this section. The prima facie view here is: It is stated in the śruti that the Prāṇas of the enlightened person do not go out, it therefore follows that they remain with the Jīva itself.

The Siddhānta is: In the earlier part of the same śruti, it is stated that the Prāṇas of the enlightened person do not leave the body. As the enlightened person becomes one with the all-pervading Brahman, the out-going of his Prāṇas is not possible, because the idea, namely

1. cf. Brhadāranyaka Up. IV.4.6: न तत्स्प्राणा बुद्धामन्निति।
2. cf. Ibid III.2.11: यथार्थं पुत्रं यथापि बुद्धामत्यप्राणा
   अनुभवा हो बुद्धात्मानि होमाच्छादनमयं।
'going away from something' itself indicates duality, which itself is the sign of ignorance.

(7) This section has only one sutra (15). Here, according to the Pūrvapakṣin, the sixteen kalās go to puruṣa and are absorbed in him.

According to the Siddhānta, these kalās are absorbed in the Paramātman only, since it is so stated in the Prasna Upaniṣad. Even if, these kalās are believed to be absorbed in their own sources like Prthvī, etc., as stated in the Mundaka Upaniṣad, it is also true from the practical point of view. Because these kalās are first absorbed in the Prthvī etc., and, through that medium, they are absorbed in the Paramātman.

(8) In this section also there is only one sutra (16). The Pūrvapakṣin argues that just as, in the

1. Kalās are the principles through which the human body is formed. They are sixteen in number, namely, Prthvī, udaka, tejas, vāyu, ākāśa, indriya, manas, Prāna, śraddhā, anna, vīrya, tapas, mantra, karman, loka and nāma.

2. cf. Prasna Up.ⅩⅥ:  खिले बासो नामूने प्रुत्तम जितमेव प्राम्यते स खेलो काठे भूलो माति।

3. cf. Mundaka Up.Ⅲ.Ⅴ७: पता: का प्रबद्ध प्रतिष्ठा देवाश्च स्वेप्रति देक्लासु।
case of an ignorant person, these kalās are not permanently lost even at the time of the total destruction, so too they must be regarded as not being lost in the case of an enlightened person.

The Siddhantin refers, in this connection, to the Prasna Upaniṣad¹. It is stated in that Upaniṣad that in the case of an enlightened person, the kalās are not to be thought of even in form of subtle energies. These kalās are the result of ignorance, which is permanently destroyed by the true knowledge.

(9) The ninth section comprises only one sutra (17). According to the śruti², the Jīva together with the energies of Prāna, resorts to the heart at the time of death, and then goes out of the body through an outlet like eye etc. This process must be regarded as being common to both the ignorant and the enlightened one, says the Pūrvapakṣin.

The Siddhantin seeks to establish that, in the case of an enlightened person, the Jīva leaves the body not through the eye etc., but through the head. Out of 101 nādis in the heart, the middle one proceeds from the

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1. cf. Prasna Up.VI.5 See foot-note No. 3 page No. 222
A hole in the head, just on the middle part of the head, there is one hole (randhra), it is known as Brahmanandhra.

1. In the head, just on the middle part of the head, there is one hole (randhra), it is known as Brahmanandhra.

2. cf. Chândogya Up. VIII.6.6:

नर स्वात्त्वः दृढ्यस्य नाथस्यत्तारी मृत्युनमात्मिनिः पृथक्...

तथोर्द्धविभावन्तस्तत्तन्तत्त्वत्मेति।
The Siddhānta is: Even the Daksināvāna gives the same fruit as the Uttarāvāna, in the case of an enlightened person. Bhīṣma waited until the Uttarāvāna only to follow the tradition, and to prove the power of a boon obtained by him from his father.

1. This first section in the third quarter has only one sutra (1). The knower of the Sagunā vidyā can reach the Brahman by different ways corresponding to different upāsanās. So, the way and its stages cannot be taken to be definite and fixed. This is what the Purvapaksa says.

The Siddhāntin replies that there is only one way known as arcirādi. Though there are different upāsanās, still all upāsanās aim at one and the same goal and that is the Brahman. In most of the scriptures, the stations on this path are common. The haste in reaching to the destination (that is the Brahman) indicated in the sentence suggests that the enlightened person has no other work to do.

1. Here in the second stanza, some words are lost.

2. cf. Chandogya Up., VIII.6.5.
2. This section also has only one sutra (2). If the arciradi is the only way, how can one account for the stage vāyu which is mentioned in the kausitaki Upanisad? This is the Purvapaksin's question.

The Siddhāntin explains that vāyu should be placed before Sūrya and after the varṣā as, according to the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad, vāyu goes through the ṣurya-mandala. The step Devaloka mentioned in the same upaniṣad may be placed after the varṣā; then there should be placed vāyu, and then Sūrya.

3. The third adhikaraṇa again consists of one sutra (3). According to the Purvapaksin in this adhikaraṇa, the order of the deities on the Devayāna path, namely, Vāyu, Varuṇa, Indra, Prajāpati etc. may not be correct. Because, there is no reason whatsoever to place varuṇa after vidyut and before Indra and Prajāpati.

The Siddhāntin lays down that Varuṇa is to be placed after vidyut as, he is related to vidyut, next to

1. cf. Kausītaki Up., I.3: स औरं देवयानं पन्यानमाणुवाहिन्योक- मान्यति स वायुमालौ।

2. cf. Brhadāraṇyaka Up. V.10.1: यदा वे पुन्तापस्माधेऽक्षात्रैति स वायुमाण्यति तत्स्य स तत्र विसंगहे । स कुर्च्यं वायुम् तत्र भाद्रिघमाण्यति।
Varuna are to be placed Indra and Prajapati as these two have no relation whatsoever to the deities previously stated. Hence the order is correct.

4. In this section there are three sutras (4-6).

According to the Purva-paksa, the Lokas like Vayu, Agni, etc., are meant as places for halting and resting; they may indeed be regarded as signposts indicating the proper road.

According to the Siddhanta, they are rather guides, and not resting places nor signposts. This is what is stated in the sruti. They are there because the enlightened persons are without body when they are proceeding along that way. But from the stage of Vidyut, up to the Brahma-loka some celestial deity accompanies them. This is pointed out in the sruti.

5. The fifth section comprises eight sutras (7-14).

In the sruti, it is said that some celestial being takes the enlightened one to the Brahman. Now the question is:

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1. See foot-note No. 2 on page No. 234.
2. cf. Brhadaranyaka Up. VI.2.15:
3. See above (2).
what does the word *Brahman* imply here? Does it imply only *saguna* Brahman or only *Nirguna* Brahman or both? According to the *Purvapakśin*, the word is to be understood in the sense of Parabhrahman.

The *Siddhānta* is that it is the *Saguna* Brahman only, because the word indicating Brahman in this context is in plural, and the *Nirguna* Brahman is free from such bheda. Moreover, this *Brahmaloka* is described as being full of trees, rivers oceans, etc. These are surely indications of the *Saguna* Brahman only.

6. In this section, there are two *śūtras* (15-16). According to the *Purvapakśin* here, those, who meditate upon the symbols like name, etc. of the Brahman, are also taken to the *Brahmaloka* by that celestial being.

The *Siddhāntin*, categorically states that such persons are not taken to the *Brahmaloka*, because the *upāsanās* of *Pratikas* have different fruits, as mentioned in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*¹. Further, in those *upāsanās* there is no *samkalpa* is indeed most important in this connection. for the attainment of the Brahman, and this *samkalpa*

(1) In the first section of the last quarter of

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the last chapter, there are three sutras (1-3). The Prima facie view here may be stated as follows:

Just as in the Devaloka the Jīvas assume some different forms so too at the time of mokṣa, they must be assuming different forms.

The Siddhānta is that there is no such assuming of different forms. The mokṣa is actually the realisation by the Ātman of its own nature. Even before mokṣa, the Jīva is of the nature of the Ātman, but due to nescience it entertains some wrong ideas or misapprehensions. By means of the knowledge of the Brahman, all ignorance disappears and illusions are destroyed. This is really mokṣa.

(2) In this section, there is only one sutra (4). The Upaniṣads emphasise the difference between the Jīva and the Brahman in the sentence, namely, घ तत्र वैति...

Therefore, the Pūrvapakṣin argues, even in the condition of mokṣa, the Jīva must be regarded as remaining different from the Brahman.

1. cf. Chandogya Up., VIII,12.3: Here in घ तत्र वैति ।

the word indicates adhāra, hence there is difference, while in परं ज्ञेतित्वपल्लव, the Jīva is the agent, and the Brahman is an object, so these two are different.
The Siddhantin retorts by saying that many more Upaniṣadic passages can be cited which emphasise that, in the condition of mokṣa, there is complete identification of the Jīva and the Brahman. The passages speaking of difference such as these referred to by the Pūrvapakṣin must be treated as subordinate.

(3) In the third section, there are three sutras (5-7). The Pūrvapakṣin asks: In the condition of mokṣa the Jīva is said to become identical with the Brahman in what sense? Does the Jīva acquires such attributes as being free from sin, omniscient, etc., or does it become identical with the Brahman only in caitanya-form, which is real?

The Siddhantin replies that both these things happen. The first view is that of Jaimini, and the second that of Audulomi. As both of them are based upon the sruti, they are correct views. From the Vyāvaharika point of view, Jaimini's view is correct; and, from the absolute paramārthika point of view, Audulomi's view is also not wrong.

(4) In this section, there are two sutras (8-9).
In the Chandogya Upanisad, it is stated that, immediately after the samkalpa, the fore-fathers of a liberated person meet him. According to the Purvapakšin, the word 'Samkalpa' indicates that the fore-fathers are of a mental form (manomaya) or of an emotional form (bhāvanāmaya). This being so, their visit will be only momentary.

The Siddhānta in this connection may be stated as follows: The words Samkalpa eva, indicate (1) that the liberated person has no need of other means and (2) that, if at all there was any need, it would be met through desire only. Besides, even though the fore-fathers are of the emotion-form, still, as the result of the will-power, of the liberated one, they will remain there as long as he desires. The Samkalpa of a liberated person never becomes futile, and he has no other superior authority over him.

(5) In this section, there are five sūtras (10.14).

In the last topic, it was said that, as the result of mere Samkalpa, the fore-fathers of a liberated person meet him. From this, says the Purvapakšin, it naturally follows that

1. Chandogya Up., VIII.2.1:

स यदि पितृतः कः पितरः
कैत्यातिरीयः पितरः समुज्जितः।
the liberated person possesses a body or at least has a mind.

The Siddhāntin says that, according to Bādari, the liberated soul has mind, but neither the body nor the sense-organs, as is said in the śrutis\(^1\). On the other hand, Jaimini holds that it has the body and sense-organs as well as the mind, for, the śruti states that "he becomes one, he becomes of three kinds, etc."\(^2\). Bādarāyaṇa concludes that both these views are correct, because the liberated one may assume the body etc., or may abandon them at any time. When the liberated one abandons the body, the fore-fathers meet him in the emotional form, and when he assumes body etc., the fore-fathers meet him actually as in the working condition. (Jāgrd-avasthā).

(6) In this section, there are two sutras (15-16). According to the Pūrvapakṣin, though the liberated Jīva can assume various forms according to his own will, only one out of them, can have the soul and the mind, as there is one soul and one mind, while the others are like wooden dolls.

2. cf. Ibid, VII 26.2:

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2. cf. Ibid, VII 26.2:
The *Siddhāntin* insists that all these forms can have *cetanatva*. In this connection, he mentions the *drṣṭānta* of many lamps being lighted from one lamp. On account of the *yoga*-power, one Jīva can enter in many bodies, and the same is the case with minds also. Moreover, one and the same Ātman can be understood as being divided into many, through *upādhis*.

(7) In this last section, there are six *sūtras* (17-22). The *prima facie* view here is as follows: Those who meditate upon the *saguna* Brahman become as if similar (*sāyujuya*) to it; they enjoy abundant glory like the Īśvara. This is what is stated in the *śruti*.

The *Siddhānta*, on the other hand, is: The liberated person can have all powers except those of creation etc. of the world. These latter belong exclusively to Paramesvara only. Moreover from the *śruti*:

\[ \text{तावानस्य महिमा ततों ज्योतिर्षष्ठ पुरुषः ।} \\
\text{पादोऽस्य विश्वा मृतानि निशादश्यामृते दिविः ।} \]

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   आप्नोति स्वारज्ञते । आप्नोति स्वस्तिते ।

2. cf. *Chāndogya Up.* III.12.6: incidentally it may be pointed out that the same passage occurs in the *Ṛgveda*, I.90.3 with slight variation:

\[ \text{केलात्वनस्य महिमादतो ज्योतिर्षष्ठ पुरुषः ।} \\
\text{पादोऽस्य विश्वा मृतानि निशादश्यामृते दिविः ।} \]
it can be said that the *Nirguna* form of the Brahman cannot be attained by those who meditate on the *Saguna*-Brahman. But such glory, as cannot be obtained even by means of rigorous *upāsana*, can be obtained by a person, through the grace and greatness of the Lord Śiva, the god of gods.¹

¹ In this section, some words in the last pada of the first stanza, and many words in the second stanza are lost.
This Nayamañjari of Appayya Dīkṣita is a poetic composition which summarises the commentary of Śāmkara on the Vedanta-sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa. The 386 stanzas contained in this work are composed in more than 182 met. Many of these metres are rare and are not usually met with even in the standard classical works. This must, indeed, be regarded as a distinguishing feature of the Nayamañjari. There is another note-worthy feature. Though this work is essentially philosophical in character, Appayya Dīkṣita has, as far as possible, sought to avoid language which would be difficult to understand and which would be full of many technical terms.

Though, as an abridged and poetical version of Śāmkara’s commentary on the Vedanta-sūtras, the Nayamañjari may be regarded as constituting an independent work by itself, still, as originally planned, it forms but one part of the author’s well-known work, the Caturmatasāra, which was intended to contain summaries of the commentaries on the Brahma-sūtras of the four eminent acāryas, namely, Madhva, Rāmānuja, Śrīkānta, and Śāmkara. One part is known as the Nyāyamuktāvalī and explains the dvaita philosophy of Madhva, the other is known as the Nayamayukhamālīka and explains the visistādwaita of Rāmānuja; the third is
known as the Nayamanimalā and explains the Śivādvaita of Śrīkantha; and the last is the Nayamanjari which presents the Kevalādvaita of Śaṅkara. All these four compositions are not found in one single work, but are separately published. Some of them are up to the end of the first chapter only while some of them are complete. It is very difficult to determine as to which particular school of thought Appayya Dīkṣita personally favours - whether it is the Śivādvaita of Śrīkantha or the Kevalādvaita of Śaṅkara - because he represents each school of Vedānta according to the most ardent expounder of that school, without even slightly disclosing his own personal inclination. One thing, however, is certain, namely, that Appayya Dīkṣita was thoroughly opposed to the Dvāita and the Visiṣṭādvaita systems. His opposition in respect of these is quite pronounced and very definite. At the same time all credit is due to Appayya Dīkṣita for having set

1. It is just possible that this Caturmatasārasamgraha may be the Matasarārthasamgraha, printed at Shrirangam, Journal of the Śaṅkara Gurukulam. But this, however, seems to be out of print now.

2. For example, the Nayamanjari is complete in this sense, while the Nayamanimalā is not so.
forth the main texts of these schools with the utmost sympathy and faithfulness — at some places perhaps even better than the adherents of those systems themselves.

It must be particularly emphasised that Appayya Dīkṣita has taken great pains to present a faithful summary of the Śāmkarabhāṣya. Though there are some sections in which all the points of the Śāmkarabhāṣya are not discussed, but only few of them. For example, the points explained in the sūtras 6-11 in the first pada of the first chapter are not at all taken into consideration by Appayya Dīkṣita in his present work. Most probably this may be the reason that the present composition being a work of summary-type might be concentrating itself on more important points only and the minor points might have been left out. From this it seems that Appayya Dīkṣita presupposes the close contact of his readers with the commentary of Śāmkara on the Vedānta-sūtras, and so only some main points are verified. Appayya Dīkṣita's main purpose in presenting the summary in the remarkable manner which he has adopted seems to be to facilitate easy memorisation and recitation of the main tenets of the Śāmkara-Vedānta for those who are interested in that system of philosophy. This must have proved specially helpful to students in that it made an easy access to the unlimited
field of the Vedānta possible for them. Works like the Nayamanājari, are, indeed, like pocket-editions of the most important commentaries to be used for easy reference to and quick comprehension of the essential teachings of the Dvaita and the Advaita systems.

It is just possible that Appayya Dīksita was very much impressed by the Vaiyāsikanyāyamālā of the well-known advaitin Bhāratī-tīrtha, which has been similarly devoted to the versification of the Śaṅkara-bhāṣya. Both these works, namely, the Nayamanājari and the Vaiyāsikanyāyamālā have one common factor, that in each adhikarana, there are two stanzas, one for the Purvapakṣa and the other as the Siddhānta. But this Nayamanājari has been versified in various metres, while the Vaiyāsikanyāyamālā has one monotonous metre, that is the Anuṣṭubha, the most easy and simple metre. The svopajña commentary on the vaiyāsikanyāyamālā is rather of the nature of sutras and at some places needs further explanation. The Nayamanājari is without any commentary. It seems Appayya Dīksita wanted to suggest that his composition

1. The printed edition of this book is available. It has been edited by Pandita Śivadatta of Jayapur; and has been printed in Pooha in 1910, in the Ānandasrama Sanskrit series Vol. No. 23. Bhāratī-tīrtha, the author of this work is supposed as the guru (preceptor) of Vidyāranyasvāmin.
is so simple and easy to understand that it does not require any other help, such as commentary etc., Appayya Dīkṣita might have had this Vaiyāsikanyāyamalā before his eyes, and he might have tried his best to avoid those drawbacks that would mar the beauty of such works.

From the literary point of view also, this Nayamañjari is a very important composition. The use of various metres, the number of which is not less than 183, indicates Appayya Dīkṣita's vast study of metrical works. Incidentally, it may be pointed out that Appayya Dīkṣita has no particular intention for using various metres, as Kālidāsa had some particular intention in using the Māndākrānta-metre in his well-known composition - the Meghadūta. Besides this, Appayya Dīkṣita's style is very easy and at times is characterised by figures of words and senses. For example, note the following stanza:

वौर्णवदात्तकत्व तद्विदं न किरिपिब्रम्भः काल्यायत्मायाः स्यात् सददुधनन्तरद्वै ।
तत्र न कृत्त्वात् न्यक्ति तत्परिप्रेक्षात्विक्षिति किंचुं मरीविको सत्यताः
सददुधनम् ॥ १

1. cf. प्राकृतव्यासस्य मन्दाकरंता विराज्ञे।

The Māndākrānta enhances the beauty of the style, specially when there is description of rainy season or voyage or any calamity. In the Meghadūta, all these three are combined.

2.II. 1.9 (18).
In this verse, it is stated that the Brahman appears as if transformed into the universe and still it is different from it, and for this two illustrations, namely, that of milk and mirage are given. The phrase शीतल्यु conveys आर्यै- पूणी - शुभमा. Similarly note the stanza in which Jain-mata has been refuted in very easy and pretty simple style.

In this verse, there is again a figure of sense, namely, Vyaghata, which enhances the original beauty of the verse. Similarly, the effortless and most natural alteration in the under-mentioned verse deserves notice.

1. II.2.6 (12).
2. This figure occurs when something has been made otherwise by someone by using some means, the same means is used by the third person for making that object all-right. Here in the above mentioned stanza, the Jaina-mata has been refuted by using the same Sapta-bhangi-nyaya, which was used by the Jainas to refute the advaita-mata.

cf. Sahityadarpana, X.75: भायायत: सु तु केनापि वस्तु भें त्र्याक्षराने त्वेन विवेकेदुपायेन कुलते व्यासदन्यायाः

3. III.3.13 (26).
Here, the syllables द, प and श are repeated in most beautiful and attractive manner. So many such illustrations can be cited from the *Nayamaṇjarī*. This indicates the mastery over the language.

It will be clear, from what has been said above that the *Nayamaṇjarī* cannot be regarded as an original contribution to the Vedantic thought. But there is no doubt that it gives great promise of more solid works which were to follow. Appayya Dīkṣita has amply fulfill that promise by offering works like the *Vedāntakalpataru parimal* and the *Ḍīvārkamaṇḍīpīkā*, which may be looked upon as master-pieces of philosophical composition.
**APPENDIX**

An alphabetical list of the various metres used by Appayya Diksita in the 'Nyamaniari'.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Metre</th>
<th>Sections</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>अन्नोंस्रोवश</td>
<td>II.4. 3-4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>ब्रुनच्छुपु</td>
<td>I.1.2. 3-4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>अपराष्ट्र</td>
<td>I.1. 7-8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>अपराजित</td>
<td>III.3. 45-46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>ब्रुन्दकासुम</td>
<td>II.3. 31-32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>बलिःशान</td>
<td>II.4. 17-18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>बलिःशानलि</td>
<td>II.2. 15-16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>बलिःशानिज</td>
<td>II.1. 3-4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>बलिःशान</td>
<td>II.3. 15-16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>बलिःशानलि</td>
<td>III.4. 19-20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>बलिःशानलि</td>
<td>III.5. 29-30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>बलिःशानलि</td>
<td>III.3. 37-38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>भिन्नन</td>
<td>I.1. 21-22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>भिन्नन</td>
<td>I.1. 15-16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>भिन्नन</td>
<td>I.4. 7-8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>भिन्नन</td>
<td>IV.1. 21-22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>भिन्नन</td>
<td>I.2. 3-4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>बुन्दस्यस्वयम</td>
<td>III.1. 1-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>बुन्दस्यस्वयम</td>
<td>II.4. 7-8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>बुद्धद्वारी</td>
<td>III.4. 23-24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>बुद्धस्वयम</td>
<td>IV.1. 13-14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Page Numbers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>शुद्धिति</td>
<td>III.3. 33-34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>शुपपौरिति</td>
<td>III.4. 27-28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>शुपिष्टता</td>
<td>IV.1. 17-18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>शुपिष्टता</td>
<td>III.3. 17-18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>शुप्रेमन्वया</td>
<td>I.3. 1-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>शुष्कता</td>
<td>II.4. 13-14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>ऋषमंगलराजसिद्धिः</td>
<td>III.1. 11-12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>जैपुरा</td>
<td>II.3. 21-22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>जेला</td>
<td>III.3. 35-36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>जैपञ्जुन्दविविधोऽः</td>
<td>I.3. 19-20, III.3. 17-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>जूनाविषिणी</td>
<td>II.1. 3-4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>कविराजसिद्धिः</td>
<td>IV.4. 13-14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>कांच-चन्दकाः</td>
<td>II.1. 25-26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>कुस्कमाण्डा</td>
<td>I.3. 3-4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>कुस्मौनिषिष्टि</td>
<td>III.1. 7-8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>कुस्मौनिष्टि</td>
<td>II.2. 5-6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>कृदिकिः</td>
<td>III.1. 15-16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>क्षमा</td>
<td>III.2. 5-6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>क्षेतरपुर</td>
<td>III.4. 5-6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>कूदिति</td>
<td>III.3. 25-26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>कुद्वीराक्षकोः</td>
<td>II.2. 3-4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>कुद्विक्ष्टतमा</td>
<td>III.3. 15-16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>कुद्विक्ष्टताः</td>
<td>II.4. 9-10-11-12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>कुद्विक्ष्टतमः</td>
<td>III.2. 9-10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>कुद्विक्ष्टती</td>
<td>II.3. 29-30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Text</td>
<td>Page Range</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>वनिरक्त</td>
<td>II.2. 11-12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>वचस्यकृत</td>
<td>III.3. 55-56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>चचित्रार्था</td>
<td>III.3. 39-40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>चर्मचक्रिता</td>
<td>III.3. 23-24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>चरणाकुश</td>
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<td>चिन्तयन्दा</td>
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<td>चपतचक्ता</td>
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<td>चपतचिपुषा</td>
<td>III.3. 9-10</td>
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<td>दुर्जयमा</td>
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<td>मुक्तचद्दा</td>
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<td>मृत्युदण्डता</td>
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<td>रघुचंद्र</td>
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<td>132</td>
<td>रघुदण्डता</td>
<td>IV.1. 11-12</td>
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<td>रघुविग्रहणित</td>
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<td>रघुराष</td>
<td>III.3. 49-50</td>
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<td>रघुराष्ट्रिय</td>
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<td>रघुविन</td>
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<td>विपुलार्थी</td>
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<td>विषयक</td>
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<td>वैशालीम</td>
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<td>स्नङ्गरासादृश्चिंचिन्दितोपनाति</td>
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<td>हर्षवीर</td>
<td>IV.4. 11-12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>180</td>
<td>हरिश्चन्द्र</td>
<td>I.3. 9-10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>181</td>
<td>हरिजीतु</td>
<td>IV.3. 3-4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>182</td>
<td>हरिपुजी</td>
<td>III.3. 21-22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The names of the metres of the following verses are not mentioned and cannot be identified.

- II.3. 19-20
- II.4. 15-16
- III.2. 13-14
- III.4. 33-34
- IV.2. 17-18
- IV.4. 5-6
Section II

Chapter - 2.

Nyāyārāksāmanī.
The treatise known as the *Nyāyarakṣāmanī* is another valuable work by Appayya Dīkṣīta. The printed edition of this book is available. It contains \$ + 365\$ pages in all. The first eight pages contain a scholarly introduction in Sanskrit by Pandita Čaṇḍakāśīpastri, the editor and a student of M.M. Rajugṛāstrī. The remaining 365 pages are devoted to the text proper. This whole work is in prose and is written in a *bhaṣya*-style. It is printed in Śrī Vidya Press of Kumbhakonam in the year called Parābhava.

In the introduction, the editor says that, in editing this work he has made use of six books (whether printed or in manuscript-form is not made clear) which he had obtained with great difficulty. There were abundant variant readings in all of them, but, considering them all critically, he was able to fix up the final text. However, he has not shown any variant reading in the foot-notes in his edition.

The text proper begins with ten introductory verses. Some of them are common to other works of Appayya Dīkṣīta. For example, verse I is common to the *Nyāyarakṣāmanī* and the *Madhvaṭantramukhamardana*, while verse VII is found in the *Nayamanjari* also. The verses are:
1) कुदाड़्यम धनेषु लक्ष्मिका दुर्मिथा समीतिकोर्ति चातुर्यवादिपि स्वास्तिक मृदुमाणः
   यः प्रस्तुतावतिर्विस्तः परिपूर्णः। श्रेष्ठः। २ ने दियु राष्ट्रिय कुलिनः।
2) गत्वानुरागविदः परिपूर्णकार्यस्य कियताम्यं निनिष्ठाम् प्रकाशम्
   तत्स्य लक्ष्याति भिक्षुपरक्ष्यवाय मनार्यणेषु माये विश्वाम
3) आपेक्षिकमुद्धारः तुपाक्षेऽन्यताराचरेऽरकित रिति सुनिदेशियखण्डम्
   गृहेत्वते सुकृतमचानः। यस्मिन्महाप्राचीर्मपराशरमपश्चिमवर् प्रमोदे।
4) यद ब्रह्म विजयसिद्धिः प्रमाणिन्ति घातकादर्शगतानन्तिविद्वादनम्
   तै सहस्रस्माप्राणभिमचतुर्वेदवर्गग्राहणग्राहणगुलमान्योद्विग्न
5) वेदनायकिनारी विवेकाय ब्रह्माण्यैतन नेतृ विश्वदूते ।
   सन्तल्पवधिसाधणमुमुक्ते सप्तवत्त्वनिशवितित्तमे।
6) अत्र नानामयसाक्षात्विद्विदस्तिनमिक्रोद्वारानासातमः
   वशिष्ठस्ये निगुण फलमधीलं स्वाहानुस्मृतमथूम्।
   यथा प्रेषित देवहृदनमुदग्रामाधृष्ठी विभेदकी
   मृदुमुक्तधिर्विकर्षनमिक्रोहनमेहन्त सळ्यालू।
7) नानामयाभूता त्रा संपुष्पगठात्वनिशवितिविक्षेपे-।
   स्तत्तेदेवानिर्माणाय सरिद्रम सक्ता यत्र मायुवस्मृतम्।
   तम्मिन्नानन्दनिर्माणविनिर्माणः। तस्याविभाजनानुसा शास्त्रवर्धितानः।
8) अधिकात्मदयु धर्माधारास्पृक्तम सहस्त्राण्यसिद्धिऽ नहिनागातु अप्रक्ष्यः
   वारियोद्विग्न।
9) मन्ति महानिपदग्राहपरमाणुस्मृतिक्षणो नमस्त्वती दूषितविद्वादविरागवर्
10) वैना पुराणपददशमुग्य सत्याभासादशेऽर भृतिमुपालयमानानम्।
    श्रावीकरणवाक्यो न यथार्थम् राहस्यमिन्मुद्देशिल्लामिभी।
11) भर्तु स्त्रावीर्वात्मकांक्षापरिसिद्धिँ।
    वहिष्ठत्तेदेवहृदस्य एवंत सन्निधिं।
From these verses, especially from verses III and IV, we can get some idea about the inherited scholarship of Appayya Diksita. As in the introductory verses, so too in the colophon, Appayya Diksita mentions the name of his father:

But the colophon occurring at the end of the first quarter of the first chapter gives some additional information, namely, Appayya Diksita himself had performed a sacrifice Mahavrata by name. The colophon runs as:

While the colophon occurring at the end of the second quarter is identical with that occurring at the end of the third quarter, it is different from the above-mentioned two colophons, since it omits references to the Mahavrata-sacrifice and to the authorship of 104 works. The colophon reads:
From all these colophons considered together, it may be confirmed, that Appayya or Appaya Dīkṣita was the son of Śrīragarāja, that he had performed a sacrifice called Mahāvṛata, and that he had composed 104 books.
In the first introductory verses, which is common to both the Madhvatntramukhamardana and the Nyāyarakṣāmanī, Lord Kṛṣṇa (Mukunda) is praised.

The second verse pays obeisance to Śiva accompanied by Nārāyaṇī.

In the third verse, Appayya Dīkṣita pays homage to his grand-father (Ācārya Dīkṣita).

The another salutes his father Śrīrangarāja, in the fourth verse.

Verses V and VI are in praise of Vyāsa and his sutras respectively.

Verse VII is, as pointed above, common to the Nyāamanjari and this work, and in it the commentary of Śāṅkara is praised.

Verse VIII praises the Śāṅkarabhaṣya.

Verse IX and X declare that the Nyāyarakṣāmanī seeks to preserve the various nyāyas occurring in the commentary of Śāṅkara on the Brahma-Sūtras, and that, as it will destroy ignorance, it deserves to be read by all.
1. The author now proceeds with the first sutra, namely, अत्याऽाः ब्रह्मनिपित्सा with the introductory remark that though the bondage (bandha) does not in any way go against the identification of the Jīva with the Brahman, on the authority of the Āruti-sentences, still those Āruti-s which speak of the advaita are contradicted by the means of knowledge like pratyakṣa. It is, indeed, this contradiction which more apparent than real, as it is, is to be removed in this treatise. Especially, the first section tries to prove that the Pratyakṣa, if it is based on illusion, cannot be regarded as validly contradicting the Āruti-sentences.

The śūrvapakṣa is this context is that this particular investigation (śāstra) should not be started at all, as it has neither any subject nor any purpose. The identity of the Ātman with the Brahman is said to be its subject as also its purpose. But such identity cannot be established even with the help of thousands of Āruti-passages, as the Jīva (i.e. Ātman) has qualities which are exactly opposite to those of the Brahman. Moreover, the sense-organs and the body are thought of as different from the Jīva, when a person says "this is my body," "this is my eye," "ear", etc; and this is direct perception (pratyakṣa). Hence, the Āruti-texts which contradict such powerful pratyakṣa-jnāna have to be interpreted in a different way.
The Siddhānta is stated as follows:

It is only the adhyāsa which makes a person say "I am fat", etc; here there is no similarity of qualities (gaṇa), as the Purvapakṣin avers. In gaṇatva there is differentiation such as that indicated by sentences like "I am not Caitra, nor Devadatta", etc. Again, this adhyāsa of both the body and the sense-organs is possible in one single Ātman. This adhyāsa is to be removed, and the identification of the Jīva with the Brahman is to be established; hence this śāstra has got both the subject and the purpose.

The word atha in the sutra, athato Brahmajijnāsa, means "after". "After" implies after obtaining the four means1. The term atah means "for this reason". The word Brahman indicates the omniscient and omnipresent Brahman, and the term jijnāsa is to be taken in the sense of "investigation", etc. So the first sutra means: After the four-fold means have been mastered, and an account of these, the investigation about the Brahman deserves to be undertaken.

1. These are called sadhana-catūṣṭaya. They are:

Nityānitya-viveka, Ihamutrabhogavirāga,
Samadāmisadhanasampat, and Mumukṣatva.
2. After the significance of the first sutra has been thus stated, the second sutra - Janmādyaśya yataḥ - is explained in the following manner: The Brahman has been described in the Vedānta as that from which all these beings are born etc. Here, the Sūrvapakṣa argues that the universe cannot be said to be born from the Brahman, as the latter is without form and free from any desire. On the other hand, Hiranyagarbha can be regarded as the creator, as it is described as such in the Brhadārānyaka Upaniṣad\(^1\). The correct view (rāddhānta) is that Paramēśvara is the creator of all, including Hiranyagarbha, as this Paramēśvara is said to have first created the sky etc., and, after trivṛtka-rāṇa, to have created Hiranyagarbha. All scriptures are unanimous on this point. The Brahman itself is the creator. This Brahman is, at some places, called Paramēśvara. Indeed, on the strength of the Upaniṣadic passages\(^2\), it can certainly be assumed that the Brahman alone is the cause.

The term janmādi in the second sutra denotes creation, preservation and destruction of the universe-collectively and not separately. It indicates the greatness.

\(^1\) cf. Brhadārānyaka Up., I.4,1.:
\(^2\) cf. यथा चुदीवर्त्तात्साक्षकाधिपुराणिद्विवृद्धिपि: सहस्त्रं प्रक्ष्यस्य सव्यास्तमा-सरास्वतिकृष्य:। शोभ्य नाना प्रजामन्ते वलिख चापिष्णित्।
of the Brahman, as such enormous task cannot have been accomplished by an ordinary person. The word \textit{yataḥ} refers to the Brahman which is characterised by \textit{māyā}, which is in the form of Paramēśvara endowed with qualities like \textit{satya-samkalpa}, etc., and which serves as the \textit{upādana-kāraṇa} of the universe. The word can be understood as \textit{hetu-pañcamī}, which suggests both \textit{nimitta-kāraṇa} and \textit{upādana-kāraṇa}. The word \textit{asya} stands for the whole universe. However, some teachers take it in the sense of Hiranyagarbha. This also is possible, as Hiranyagarbha is born from the Brahman. Hence that interpretation is noteworthy.

3. The next sūtra - \textit{Śāstrayonitvāt} seeks to remove the doubt, namely, that the Brahman is not the cause of the Vedas which are eternal, and that, therefore, the Brahman is not the cause of all. This doubt constitutes the \textit{Pūrvapakṣa}, while the \textit{Rāddhānta} (conclusive view) is that the Brahman creates particular \textit{vārṇas} (syllables) according to some definite order settled in previous creations, in order to help the person for studying Vedas.

According to some, the words - \textit{asya yataḥ} - in the preceeding sūtra indicate the \textit{anumāna} regarding Isvāra, as desired by the Naiyāyikas. But as the Brahman transcends all logic, the view-point of the Naiyāyikas cannot be accepted here.
The Brahman can be known only from the scriptures (Upaniṣads). The third sutra is to be interpreted in two ways: Firstly, the Brahman is both the upādāna and the kartr of the Vedas; and, secondly, the scripture alone is the pramāṇa, while the other pramāṇas lack any validity.

4. Though, in the last sutra, the Brahman is stated to be the cause of the śāstras, still the same point needs to be stressed by refuting other objections. For this purpose the next sutra, namely, Tattu Samanvayāt is set forth.

This sutra also has been interpreted in two ways. Firstly: The Pūrvapakṣa points out that the vedānta - texts cannot be said to teach the doctrine of the Brahman, as in it there would be absence of both pravṛtti and nivṛtti and as it would not lead to any fruit. In refutation of this position, it is urged that the doctrine of the Brahman is the subject-matter of the vedānta, as the indications like upakrama, etc; convey but one essential topic, namely, the Brahman. As far the objection that there is absence of fruit, it is not at all valid, for, the knowledge of the Brahman leads to the destruction of all ignorance like adhyāsa, etc. Secondly: The Pūrvapakṣa says that the Vedānta - texts purport to teach upāsana, and that mokṣa can be achieved by more instruction about the Brahman and the Ātman. The Siddhānta rebuts this by pointing out that
the Vedānta - texts do not teach merely upāsanā, for, by mere upāsanā, the knowledge of the Brahman is not at all obtained. Moreover, even if knowledge was obtained through śravaṇa, it would not be capable of removing avidyā. Mokṣa is attained only through the removal of avidyā. This removal is possible only when the Brahman is directly visualised. The Vedānta is the pramāṇa for such visualisation.

The word tat in the śūtra stands for the Brahman, while tu negates the Pīrvapakṣa; samanvaya indicates the tātparya or the essential subject-matter.

5. Appayya Dīkṣita introduces his comments on the next śūtra, namely जीवलेन्निवृज्ञद्, with the remark that the first śūtra sets forth the raison d'être of the śāstra, the second one states the nature of the Brahman, the third one rules out the possibility of the employment of tarka in case of the Brahman, and the fourth one establishes the authority of the Vedānta. From the fifth śūtra onwards, the doctrine of the Śāmkhyas has been refuted.

The Pīrvapakṣa, here, is : The pradhāna of the Śāmkhyas, and not the Brahman has to be regarded as the cause of the universe as the Chandogya Upaniṣad (VI.2), देव शामक्षे व आशीयः etc., speaks of sat. As the Brahman is

nirapekṣa, it cannot be regarded as the creator; for, being the creator implies some expectancy.

The Siddhānta refutes this by pointing out that the pradhāna which is inanimate cannot be the cause, for, the cause must be animate. As a matter of fact, Īkṣaṇa indicates omniscience. The term asābda in the sutra means absence of sabda, and, by sabda, the Brahman is denoted. The non-sabda, that is, the pradhāna (of the Purvapakṣin) cannot become the cause of the universe; indeed no entity other than the Brahman can be the cause. Nor can it be said that Īkṣati should be taken in secondary sense so that it may be applicable to pradhāna also, because the word Ātman in the following sentence: तन्न जीवेनात्मानाः गुरुविशय
cetc.², rules out this possibility of the secondary sense of Īkṣati with reference to pradhāna. Nor the term sat in सत्येष्व सृष्टियेष्व ग्राहीतुि etc.³, can indicate the pradhāna, as the knowledge of pradhāna does not result in attainment of mokṣa, while the knowledge of sat is said as leading to the

1. Commentary, p. 19:

2. Chandoga Up. VI.3.3.
3. Chandogya Up. VI.2.2.
the attainment of mokṣa. The sthūlārūdhati-nyāya also cannot be applied here, as in that nyāya every preceding object is denied and succeeding one is established, but here Ārusi does not deny anything like sat etc. It is said in the Chandogya Upanisad that when a person sleeps, the Ātman becomes one with the Brahman. Here the word sat is used with reference to the Brahman and not with reference to Pradhāna. Moreover in the sentence: स कारण कर्तारंगिनिः न चास्य कर्मचारिणी - etc., the Brahman is directly stated to be the cause. Generally in all scriptures, sat means the Brahman and not the pradhāna.

1. cf. Chandogya Up. VI.14.2:

2. This nyāya is applied when in order to show some smaller thing, a larger one near about that is shown first and after leaving it, the smaller one, which is intended is shown.

3. Chandogya Up. VI.8.1: सवेतास्युपात्र: स्त्रापिति नाम ...

The next topic in the Brahma-sūtras is known as the ānandamayādikārana. Usually a two-fold interpretation is given of this topic. The first interpretation is known as the Pucchabrahmavāda, while the second interpretation is known as the ānandamayabrahmavāda. Appayya Dīkṣita has discussed the first at some length, while he has dealt with the second only sumptarily.

According to the Pūrvapkṣa in the first interpretation in the sentence: तत्तात्र ज्ञात्त्वा विद्वृत्तानन्मात्वः
बन्धोस्तर ब्रह्मास्नन्दमः
the word ānandamaya refers to the Jīva, while according to the Siddhāntin, it refers to the Brahman itself. Śaṅkara, however, takes ānandamaya as not referring to the Brahman and interprets the whole section differently. According to him, all former kōsas, namely, prāṇa, manas, vijnāna, etc., do not refer to the Brahman as the suffix maya in all of them is used in sense of modification (vikāra). How can ānandamaya only occurring in the same context be taken as referring to the Brahman? It may be said that in each kōsa, except the ānandamaya everyone has another internal Ātma described by the words like ज्ञात्त्वा बल्मि द्वात्मा etc., but this ānandamaya has no such interior Ātman, hence, it must be the Brahman, otherwise,

1. Taittirīya Up. II.1.5.
if the Brahman is not referred to by this ānāndamaya, there is possibility of occurrence of two defects, first the discussion (of the Brahman) which has been already started is left, second: some new topic has been started. But this is refuted as: Though there is no such mention of another internal Atman in ānāndamaya, still ānāndamaya is not the Brahman because the Upanisadic sentence:

Now the same discussion about the Brahman which is described in the sentence: सत्यं ब्राह्मानन्तः ब्रह्म — has been continued upto this sentence and in order to give the exact idea of this Brahman, these five kosas, namely, anna, praṇa, manas, vijñana, and ānanda, are stated. Hence, the same discussion (about the Brahman) is continued and is not interrupted as the Pūrvapaksin supposes. Moreover, if ānāndamaya is taken as referring to the Brahman, then, the same Brahman which is the ānāndamaya Ātmā in ānanda ātmā will become identical with the Brahman which is called a tail in the sentence: Brahma Puccham Pratiṣṭhā. This will lead to contradiction as the same Brahman which is the main part of a body will have to be identified with puccha a part of body.

1. Taittirīya Up. II.5.
2. Taittirīya Up. II.1.
Hence ānandamaya cannot be taken as the Brahman. Moreover, the Brahman is identified with ānanda (that is प्रतिपद्धः and not with ānandamaya in the śruti - texts\(^1\)). So, according to Saṅkara, the sentence under consideration here, in अनुभ-पुच्छ प्रतिपक्ष, etc., and not तत्साध्या अन्तर्द्वारेऽक्ष्ठत्र गृहन्द्रम: etc., as it is supposed by the Vṛttikāra. Hence according to Saṅkara, the पुर्वपक्ष of this section would be; in the sentence: गृहन्द्र पुच्छ प्रतिपक्ष, etc., the word puccha denotes a part of body, hence the Brahman which is called as puccha here, is described as a part (avayavā) hence it plays subsidiary part while the Siddhāntin assumes that the Brahman is described principally as the suffix maya does not denote modification but praśurya (abundance), as many parts of body (like śiras, daksinā-pakṣa, etc.) are mentioned, hence the Brahman is mentioned as a puccha which can be called as substratum, or supporting the whole body, hence the Brahman is primarily described here. Moreover, if,

1. cf. Taittiriya Up. III.6 : ब्राह्मणेऽपि श्रेष्ठत्वं व्यज्ञानात्।
   " " II.7 : तत्स: वे स:। दस द्वैतानन्दो न्यातः।
   Ibid II.7 : यदेऽपि इत्य ब्राह्मणेऽपि न्यातः।
   Ibid II.8 : तत्स: ब्राह्मणेऽपि श्रेष्ठत्वं व्यज्ञानात्।

Brhadāraṇyaka Up. III.9.28 : विवाहान्नन्दो ब्रह्म।
as in the following upaniṣadic text... गाम्यः वा जिवः ...
ब्रह्मद्वारा तत्त्वावस्थितम् ...¹, the Brahman is described as
a subsidiary and not the main object, like that, here also in
ब्रह्म पुनः प्रतिष्ठिता etc. The Brahman is secondarily described.
This objection is replied as in the sentence गाम्यः वा जिवः
etc., Jyoti is secondarily stated, because it is an object
of meditation while in ब्रह्म पुनः प्रतिष्ठिता nothing is stated as
to be meditated upon. Moreover, the upaniṣadic sentence,
which describes the same Brahman as पीणास्साद्वृतः ज्योतः नौष्णेदिति
सूर्यः : ², indicates that the whole universe is controlled
by the Brahman. That is the universe is super-imposed on
the Brahman which is really beyond the capacity of both mind
and speech, as the statement 'this is silver' becomes
invalid when it is known that that is not silver but a more
conch-shell. Similarly, the statements like 'this is a jar'
etc., are rendered altogether invalid when this Brahman
becomes known. Hence herein ब्रह्म पुनः प्रतिष्ठिता etc., only the
highest Brahman is described and not the Jīva. Moreover,

¹ Chandogya Up. III.12.⁴³. Here, both at the beginning
and at the end the ब्रह्म is primarily stated, but in
this sentence: ब्रह्मद्वारा तत्त्वावस्थिति , it is secondarily
mentioned.

² Taittiriya Up. II.7.
the word kāma in the next sūtra - कमाच नानामालक्षणः
(Vedānta sūtra. I.1.18) means ananda\(^1\) and ananda is
directly described in the sentences like: अनन्दं तस्येति
व्यज्ञानात् 2 अनन्दाद्वयेश स्वर्गात्मिकः मूलानि जानन्ते
etc., there is no scope for inference with reference to
the pradhāna. Here, Appayya Dīksita boldly suggests that
the word kamāt in the sutra is wrong, it ought to be
anandat\(^4\).

Now the question is why Śaṅkara did not accept
the anandamaya brahmavāda? The possible answer of this
question is (1) The suffix maya is here used in the sense of
modification, as in the case of the words manomaya, etc.,
relating to previous kosas; (2) Part of the body like Siras,
etc., are mentioned; (3) The Brahman is stated to be puccha,
which is different from body; (4) The kosas like annamaya,
etc., constitute the main subject-matter, as is made clear
by the verses at the end of each section, while anandamaya

1. Commentary. p. 32 : कमाच निःसिद्धं मुक्तसृज्ञानतः ब्राह्मः
4. Ibid : यथाभूत सुविशेष दिति स्थाने ध्वस्तार्थममन्द्वदिति बन्धुं.
does not form the main topic; (5) From the following sentence: तस्येव भेव सारीर जात्मा यः पूर्वस्य तथा, etc. ¹ even ānāndamaya has got some other soul; (6) From the sentence: अनन्यमयक्षविक्षविक्षतान्नन्दनम्य तेन सुनाक्षताम् ² it seems that even ānāndamaya expects purity. While some others³ think that the suffix maya does not convey modification but prācyra (abundance) even in prāṇamaya, etc. The avayavitva expressed by शिर, pakṣa, etc., does not go against the assumption of the Brahman, otherwise, as the Brahman has no body, its parts are also not possible, and hence the puccha-Brahman cannot be the Brahman at all. Moreover, the description, namely, अनन्यदमयव पूर्व ब्रह्म [Taittirīya Up. II.5: अनन्य जात्मा। ब्रह्म पूर्व प्रतिष्ठा] also does not go against the description of ānāndamaya as the Brahman. Because, the various parts of the bodies such as the head (SHIRH); etc., of the ānāndamaya, etc., are not different from their souls, and as the Brahman in the form of puccha is not different from the body, the ānāndamaya


2. cf. Commentary p. 33.

3. Appayya Dīkṣita here, most possibly, may be summarising the view of those who support the वृत्तिकार्य, assuming अनन्यमय as the Brahman.
must refer to the Brahman. Moreover, this anandamaya is
described in the next verse, as from the context it
appears that the words Brahman, Ātman and anandamaya
are only synonyms. This anandamaya has some different
Ātman. This statement is wrong as it is clear from the
sentence that the Vijnanamaya and the anandamaya have one
soul, and the purification is not opposed to the Brahman,
as this Brahman might have accumulated some sins caused by
the faults of the various Jīvas. In such a manner, even
anandamaya can be taken as referring to the Brahman.

Moreover, the suffix maya in the anandamaya does
denote the vikāra. Because the term annarasamaya in the
upanisadic sentence does not refer to the body where there
is prācura (maya) of food and price as this meaning of
anna-rasa-maya does not make any sense, but by the term
annarasamaya the puruṣa, the vikāra of anna as it is said
in the śruti is meant. Moreover, if maya in the
anandamaya is taken in the sense of prācurya still at least

1. Taittirīya Up. II.6 : तथोष शेष शारीर आत्मा म: पूर्खस् । etc
2. Ibid. II.1 : स वा शेष पृवोषान्तस्माः ।
3. Ibid II.1 : बन्धात्तुपमः । etc.
some percentage of miseries does exist there, so ānādāmaya refers to the Jīva only, as the Brahman is full of bliss and bliss only. Again it is not that by the ideas of avayava like sīrah, etc., the Brahman should be regarded as avayavin, because, the word puccha is not to be taken in the sense of 'a tail' but in sense (though it is secondary) of 'substratum'. Moreover, it is not correct that ānādāmaya is mentioned in the succeeding verses. Because in the verse - vato vaco nivartante - etc., the pucchatva also is not mentioned. Moreover, another Ātman in the form of the puccha-brahman is stated, hence, the argument, there is no other Ātma is stated, has no sense. Similarly purity is possible when an object is impure. As the Brahman is everpure, it cannot be said as impure at any stage.

It may be argued that since the instruction beginning with - tasmād vā etasmāt - etc., ends with ānādāmaya, ānādāmaya must be regarded as denoting the Brahman. But such an argument is not valid. For in the passage: अध्येन्त्रि सत्व जिति हृदयशाद सत्तुमारे नारदस्तः हेमाचर तदेत्यल्य तेन नापशीद कलस्त कृद्व वस्मामीति स हेमाचर etc.¹

¹ Chandogya Up. VII.1
where Narada has been imparted the teaching about the \( \text{Atman} \), the teaching ends with \( \text{pra\-na} \), but \( \text{pra\-na} \) is not regarded as the \( \text{Atman} \). Again it is not correct to suggest that as, in the sentence: \( \text{सौभाग्यस्त} \), etc.\(^1\) the masculine gender is used, and as \( \text{ananda\-maya} \) is also masculine, \( \text{ananda\-maya} \) must be the Brahman. For, this masculine refers to the \( \text{Atman} \)\(^2\) and not to the \( \text{ananda\-maya} \). Moreover, the \( \text{ananda\-maya} \) topic in the \( \text{Bhrgu\-valli} \) is altogether different as there \( \text{ananda\-maya} \) does not refer to the Brahman\(^3\).

7. After this long discussion about \( \text{ananda\-maya} \), Appayya Diksita turns to the next topic, where the word \( \text{purusa} \) from the sentence: \( \text{वै ते कृत्तितादिन्द्री गिरिवनः पुरुषे} \), etc.\(^4\) is taken up for consideration.

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1. \( \text{Taittiri\-ya Up. II.6.} \)

2. \( \text{Taittiri\-ya Up. II.6.} : \text{तप्यसंह सारीर ब्रात्मा} \), etc.

3. \( \text{Commentary. page 39 :} \text{वेः मूलस्वात्मासये भ्रमेति नित्याधिगत्येऽवै} \) तद् विश्वाधिकरणम्। तात्त्वात् \text{विप्रातिमहासत्वधानमेव ब्रह्मायर्त्य विचित्रेण।} \)

4. \( \text{Ch\-ndogya Up. I.6.6.} \).
According to the Purvapakṣin, by the word puruṣa in the sentence the Jīva must be supposed to have been referred to, as it has got form. Though the Saguna - brahman also has got form, still it cannot be said to have been mentioned here. Because, if this Saguna - brahman is different from the nirguna- brahman, this is wrong conclusion (apasiddhānta). If it is not different, there is contradiction. Nor can it be characterised as unreal, because even then there would be contradiction with the śrutis which describe the Brahman as being without form and action. So the puruṣa in the orbit of the sun must be the Jīva. Now, the question is: How is this Jīva free from sins? By way of answer, it may be suggested that the term sarvapapmodita does not imply total absence of sins, but only scantiness of sins. Moreover, in the case of the liberated one, there cannot be any talk about either sin or pious deed¹. Or, the word sarvapapmodita may mean that previously the Brahman might have been screened by sins like the moon in the cloud, but afterwards it is free (comes out of) sins like the moon coming out of the clouds. But this explanation also is not correct as the Brahman is never darkened by sins.

¹ cf. Chandogya Up. VIII.3.1. : न चतुर्वन्द न चतुर्वन्द etc.
Moreover, the words 'free from sins' are used along with the word नाम (name), which indicates that where there is name there is freedom from sins; this is not possible in the Brahman as it is free from sin, etc.; hence the Jīva is referred to the words रक्त and समा in the sentence:

According to the Siddhānta, on the other hand, not the Jīva but the Brahman is referred to in the sentence: अथ ने वेदकत्तराजदिश्य हिरण्य: पुष्पवेष दृश्यते etc. 4 This is indicated by the तत्पर्य-लिङ्गा. Being free from all sins 5 is the तत्पर्य-लिङ्गा here and it is more

2. Rgveda, I.115.1.
3. Chandogya up. I.11.7.
5. cf. Commentary - p. 43 : सफलं तात्पर्यस्मात्मो दितत्वबिधिः जी बुद्धितं है व्रज्ञविधिः पायण्यः जिति भूतन फलितं। पतंजलिः तत्तत्वस्मात्मो निरोधतत्त्वम्बिधिः दृश्यते दृश्यते समादि पुष्पस्मत्वविदिः तदृशितुं।
powerful than all other minor lingas which describe form etc. Moreover, even the secondary meaning of sarvarāpmodita, namely, that it is not in any way related to sins, is not possible in case of the Jīva. The Brahman can have form also due to māya, and hence it can have the name etc. Moreover, the limited glory of the dīety cannot be understood as leading to its being taken in the sense of the Jīva, because, the limited glory is stated for the sake of meditation only. As, in the text: ॐ ब्राह्मणे तिष्ठन्तादित्यात्माद्वादन्ते शमादित्येऽ न वेद - etc.¹ The difference between the internal and outward dīties is stated, the dīties are to be regarded as different. But here it is not so; hence, here only the Brahman is referred to.

8. In this section the sentence: अष्ट स्तोत्रम् का मतिरिति ज्ञाकात्र जिति हैवाच | ² is under consideration. The question now is whether the ākāśa mentioned in this sentence is to be understood as one of the five great elements or whether it is to be identified with the Brahman.

The *Purvapakṣa* says that the word must be taken to denote the *ākāśa*, itself, as that *ākāśa* is directly mentioned. The context also shows that here the element *ākāśa*, and not the Brahman, is meant. For, this *ākāśa* is stated to be the refuge and recourse of this world. Again the description of the *ākāśa* such as that it is endless (*parovarīyas*) etc., would confirm the above assumption.

The *Siddhānta* is that the word *ākāśa* in the passage refers to the Paramesvāra, that is, the Brahman. Because at several other places in the śruti only the Brahman is regarded as the cause and recourse (*gati*) of everything. Similarly, this Brahman is free from any limitations of time and space, as is made clear in the sentence: *तत्र दृष्टं विद्यते तत्त्वं तत्त्वभूतं* etc.\(^1\), where the element *ākāśa* is mentioned as subservient. Moreover, the question that has been posed at the beginning relates to the *udgīthā* (i.e. the highest knowledge); hence the answer to this question must also relate to the highest knowledge, that is the Brahman. The *ākāśa* is said to be the cause of

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1. cf. *Chāndogya Up. III.14*: सब तत्त्वध म तत्त्वभूति तत्त्वात्म बुधासीति।

2. *Nyāya-Keśānti*. 
everything and to be without limitation etc., so it must be taken to mean the Paramesvara.

The word tat in the sutra, आकाशस्पिस्कार्त, [Yedānta sutra I.1.22] suggests that the Brahman cannot be established in any other way. The singular form lingat suggests that the description "being without limitations" is the one principal, and self-evident proof of the ākāśa being identified with the Brahman.

9. In this section, the sentence: कत्मा सा दैक्ता प्राण भिदि हृदाभ, etc., is under consideration. According to the Purvapaksin, the word prāṇa must be taken to denote the Jīva, because the prāṇa is described as the absorber of the 'dūtīes' like speech, mind, etc., when a person is awakened from sleep these dūtīes are said to be re-born from the same prāṇa.

1. Commentary p. 53: तत्स्साद्यम्याधिभिद्दान्तत्वविहितं मकरः पूर्वेऽनुरूपृयायां नृपमयायां युपकान्त्वाद्रश्नानुरूपाधावः प्राणाः परमेश्वरं कैतिषा।


3. Chāndogya Up. IV.II.3: प्राणे वायु वेयार्यं ह यदा स्तविष्ठे - etc.
The *Siddhānta* asserts that the word *prāṇa* stands for the Brahman and not for the Jīva. The *Catuṣṭalininga* which is stated at the conclusion, and the creation of all beings which is ascribed to the *Prāṇa* make it quite clear that the word *prāṇa* is used here in the sense of the Brahman. Further, in the passage under consideration, the words *sarvāṇi bhūtāni* should not be limited to mean 'some beings' only, as has been done in the sentence where the sun has not been praised by all beings (though the words *sarvāṇi bhūtāni* occurs there) but only by some animate beings only, as there is no other alternative, there. Hence the word *prāṇa* is to be taken as referring to the Paramēśvara.

10. In this section, the passage *अष्ट मद्दै परो दिलो...* etc. is considered. According to the *Pūrvapakśin*, the word *jyotih* used in this passage must be understood to refer to some well-known illuminary body like the fire, the sun, etc., because its substratum like the sky etc., is mentioned. Similarly, the belly of a person is stated to be the substratum of the physical *jyotih*.

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1. *Ibid. I.11.7-8* : ब्राह्मण भित्र हेतुवाच स्वारणि ह वा ब्रिमानि नूतनि ...
Moreover, the word yat in the passage is used to denote the well-known jyotih only.

The Siddhānta asserts that the word jyotih in this passage denotes the Brahman. The word yat does not mean 'being well-known', but it indicates the entity which has been previously described. For example, the word si in the sentence: संस्कृतम द्विधाराति सा वैश्वदेविभिन्न [Jaimini sutra IV.1.9] etc., does not have the usual meaning 'that taste of sweet and sour', but it stands for the amikṣa; and the manner by which it is to be brought, is stated there. Similarly, here also the word yat refers to the description of the Brahman occurring in the sentence: पादाङ्कम स्वल्प मूलानि त्रिरादस्यापूर्व दिवि ... etc.¹

Further the word jyotih is often used in the sense of the Brahman, as becomes clear from the āmuti- passages such as: तेन देवा ज्योतिष्ठ ज्योति: ², परं ज्योतिष्ठपरं ³ It should not be contended that this jyotih denotes some other lustrous object, for, the Brahman alone is truly full of

¹. Chandogya up. III.12.6.
². Brhadāraṇyaka up. IV.4.
³. Chandogya up. VIII.3.3.
lustre and illumines all other things\(^1\). The limitation of the sky etc., is for the sake of meditation only, and this meditation may yield some fruit.

The words *caraṇābhidhānat* in the *sūtra*:

\(\text{चरणाभिधानत्} \) refer to the Brahman indicated by the word *yat* in the sentence: *यदि यह दिवो ज्योतिः* \(^3\) and also to the Brahman in *सन्तपदश्चापूर्तं दिवि* [Chandogya Up. III.12.6].

In the next *sūtra*, namely, *चन्द्रोपिन्धानान्वेव हि दर्शनः* \(^4\), the *Siddhānta* sets out to refute the view of the *Pūrva-pákṣin* that it is not the Brahman which is intended to be described in the passage: *गायत्री वा विद्वे शर्मविवर्तितं महिमां ततोज्जयः ६ व पूर्वः* \(\ldots\) etc.\(^5\)

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1. *Kathā Up.* II.5.15.
According to the Purvapakṣin, the word gayatri in this passage denotes gayatri metre and not the Brahman, because the sentence: gayatri va idam sarvam bhūtam etc., directly describes the gayatri metre having four feet (having six syllables in each foot) and in order to support this the next sentence: tavāṁ asya mahimā, etc., is cited. This position of the Purvapakṣin is rebutted as the words idam sarvam etc., refer to the Brahman, the cause of all, while the gayatri metre cannot be regarded as the cause of everything, hence the word gayatri in its secondary sense (though not in primary sense) refers to the Brahman, and the word means the gayatri is the vikāra of the Brahman.

Incidentally, Appayya Diksita criticises the second interpretation of this śūtra by Śaṅkara. According to Śaṅkara (or to be more correct, according to the Vṛttikāra), the Brahman is compared with the gayatri metre on the basis of the common property of being four-footed. Appayya Diksita points out that the gayatri metre is actually three-footed (tripadā gayatri) with eight syllables in each foot, and not four-footed with six syllables in each foot as Śaṅkara says. It cannot be said that, at some

1. Śaṅkara quotes this as an interpretation given by others (i.e. वृत्तिकार).
place, the āyātri - metre with four feet is used, for, such cases are very rare and cannot be set forth as evidence. Usually every cow has four legs; but, because in some exceptional case a cow has two legs, a two-legged crow cannot be compared with that exceptional cow.

Returning to the view of the Siddhāntin, his additional argument is that, if the word āyātri is taken in the sense of the āyātri - metre, then the description that all beings constitute its one quarter would be meaningless. Hence the word āyātri has to be understood in the sense of the Brahman.

The next sutra: नृपदेशेण ज्ञेति केवलोम्यत्रिभुतमयविरोधादि first sets forth the prima facie view that the two different words, namely, divi and divah parah, occurring in ग्रिहदस्यामूर्तिदिविच, and अभ यद्य: परे दित्वा लोकतिर्दिन्नर्ते
cannot suggest the one and the same Brahman, for, divi, means 'in the heaven' while divah parah means 'beyond the heaven'. This objection is met with by saying that there is no harm whatsoever if two different words are here used. Because, the sentences\(^1\), 'the Śvēna bird is on the top of the tree' and 'the Śvēna bird is next to the top of the tree', do not change the intended sense. Some interprete these two words in a different manner. The word dyu means ākāśa. It is situated at the three places - outside of the body, inside of the body, and in the heart. Though the Brahman is all-pervading, still with reference to the outside of the body, it is described as being beyond the ākāśa, and that which is in the body is described with the word divi.

Here another objection can be raised. The sentence \(\text{वदत्र परेऽविद्वार} \)\(^2\) does not state only the relation of the jyotih with the ākāśa, but, through qualification like viśvataḥ prsthēṣu, also states the substratum of jyotih like the greatness of the great people. Moreover the sentence \(\text{किर्त्वन वाव क्षिप्रदिविन्द्रियम्} \)\(^3\) indicates that the Brahman is to be

1. e.g. क्षिप्र शेषे and क्षिप्रार्थपरस्त शेषे
2. Chandogya up. III.13.7.
meditated upon as the abdominal fire; the word *atha* indicates the *adhikāra* and it distinguishes the matter under consideration, and hence by the rule of the *sāmvānyadhiṣṭhāna*⁴, the Brahman which is under consideration is left out. This objection is refuted by the latter part of the *sūtra*: बुद्धिप्रसंगात्मेव तेनायामायमिण्यान्विते धातु,² As the words *divi* and *divah parah* convey the same meaning, so too the words *yad atah parah divah* and *visvasah prsthēsu* lead to the same meaning. The word *atha*, again, is not used in the sense of *adhikāra*, but it refers to the continuation of the same description about the Brahman and hence no new meditation is stated. Hence, only the Brahman is stated.

1. This topic is dealt with in the *Purva-mīmāṃsā, Jaimini-sūtraś*, II.2.8. There the *Pṛṣṭhāṇi* says that the words एस ज्योतिः: refer to the ज्योतिषम and a new sacrifice *sahasradaksīna* by name should not be started. The *Siddhānta* says that the word *esa* refers to an altogether new sacrifice namely, *Sahasradaksīna*, for, the word *atha* indicates a new topic and it has no relation to the previous *Jyotistoma*. Relying on this *Siddhānta* the *Pṛṣṭhāṇi*, here, assumes that the word *atha* in अथ यद्व: यद्व-धित्व: etc. *[Chāndogya Up. III.13.7]* opens an altogether new topic.

2. *Vedānta sutra*, I.1.27.
11. The passage taken up for consideration in the next section reads: प्राणेकर्तिस्म प्राणात्मा etc.1 Here the word प्राणा is used again. This passage forms the speech of Indra and contains a reference to Indra's characteristics. This is confirmed by the word प्राणा is, accordingly, to be understood in the sense of the Jīva and not in the sense of the Brahman. The fact that the freedom from sins also is stated as the fruit of this knowledge. As the word प्राणा means 'power', it suits Indra very well, for, he is the most powerful deity. So by the word प्राणा only Indra is implied. This the पुर्वपाक्षा.

As against this, the Siddhānta is that the Brahman is denoted by the word प्राणा. There are here many indications and characteristics of the Brahman, such as giving life2, giving solace to the sense-organs3, Lord of universe4, etc. As far the admonition, 'know me only': मैं एवं विज्ञानिहि, etc., it indicates the total identification

2. Kausitaki उप. III.1. : याबद्धहिः त्रिरो ग्राणे वक्ति तान्वदया:।
3. Ibid. III.1. : उष्ण प्राणानि निग्लासम् ।
4. Ibid. III.1. : श्य योग्म्पतिरेऽऽऽ शोक्पात् । etc.
of Indra with the Brahman. Further, it cannot be said here that the three, namely, the Jīva, the prāṇa, and the Brahman, are to be meditated upon, as the characteristics of the Jīva and the prāṇa are mentioned here. If the three are to be meditated upon, why not make it four by including Indra himself, as his characteristics are also stated, asks the Siddhāntin. The possibility of Indra is ruled out by saying that there is total identification of Indra with prāṇa, so there is no fourth alternative. Moreover, if this three-fold meditation is accepted, then there will occur the defect of Vākyābheda, as by the prāmaṇas like upakrama in ग्रामेश्वसिस्म प्रवाल्मा [Kausitaki Up. III.1] and upasāmhāra in प्राण क्रम प्रवाल्मा [Ibid. III.8] the Brahman is stated. Nor it can be stated that those meditations should be dropped as it has done in the पुत्रेश्व-विद्धि, because in the पुत्रेश्व, these

1. In the Taittirīya Samhitā, while discussing the पुत्रेश्व, it is said: गोरुरु ह्रा द्रादकार्य निश्चेष्टुद्धेनाते यस्मिन् नात गृहारिष्णु निर्माणदीपास्य पुत्रेश्व सप्तकारणास्य ॥

Here in order to have unity of sentence (वेवल्लवत्ता) established by the upakrama and upasāmhāra, the guna-vidhis like वेवल्लवत्ता बण्ड्यदकार्य निन्द्वेलु where the offering of 18 cups to Vaiṣṇava, are abandoned. Similarly, here in order to have ekavākyata, the three-fold meditation should be abandoned. This objection is met with by saying that the guna-vidhis is this पुत्रेश्व are not abandoned in order to achieve the वेवल्लवत्ता. 
gunavidhis like वेश्वानामकान्तकार्येनिष्ठेण are not abandoned for the sake of ekavākyatā, but in those sentences no vidhi is ascertained, nor any action suitable for a person qualified for vidhi is stated, hence the sentences वेश्वानामकान्तकार्येनिष्ठेण are treated as the arthavādas so, the ekavākyatā is not violated. But here in प्राणेशुर्म प्रसादत्या etc. the three-fold meditation is directly stated, and the ekavākyatā is violated. Now, if it is said that in order to achieve ekavākyatā, the urgency (vidhayakatva) of a vidhi can be abandoned as it is done in the 9th chapter of the Pūrvasūtra where the mantra चतुष्पदितेन ब्राह्मण is held as the vidhi while the urgency (vidhayakatva) of the mantra श्रृंगराण्तरतिते ब्राह्मण (though it is a vidhi) is

1. Jaimini - sūtra, IX.4.3. Similarly, in the same chapter of the Jaimini-sūtra, in the sentence त्वादाय पाल्नीकत्वाचरणं, the sacrifice पाठ्यक्ष्य by name is mentioned. In this sacrifice, on the authority of the sentence पर्यर्थिनारुपान्त्यमुद्युस्त्व भाज्येन श्रेष्ठ सज्जांग्रायति, the usual offering of a beast (pasū) is abandoned, and an offering of गायः is accepted. Here the words भाज्येन श्रेष्ठ establish a new sacrifice having त्वादाय as its deity which has been mentioned in the preceding sentence त्वादाय पाल्नीकत्वाचरणं. This assumption leads to क्वापेत् accepted by the Mimamsakas why then, here, क्वापेत् with reference to three-fold meditation may not be accepted - says the Purvapakṣin.
abandoned and that mantra is regarded as a more arthavāda, so here the vidhi of the three-fold meditation may be abandoned, then, this objection can be refuted by saying that in the above mentioned topic of the Pūrva-mimāṃsa, the sentence 

is really not a vidhi at all. Because the occurrence of the word EVA there rules out the possibility of its being a vidhi and it serves as a subordinate sentence to the principle sentence. But here no such word which can rule out the possibility of vidhi in case of three-fold meditation is used, hence here is ekavākyatā-bhaṅga. This is the Pūrvapakṣa.

As regards the Siddhānta, here, it is said that both the pramāṇas, namely, upakrama and upasamhāra lead to one and the same tātparya and it is the Brahman, and this tātparya-bhāga is the most powerful pramāṇa, hence the Siddhānta, namely only the Brahman is here described is correct. The meaning of the sutra: 

is:

even if there are indications of the Jīva and the

mukhya-prāṇa, still, only the Brahman is here intended, as the tātparya leads to the Brahman only. Appayya Dīkṣita, here, adds that the second interpretation of this sutra as given by Śāmkara is on the lines of the Vṛttikāra but that does not in any way indicates his own view.

l. According to Śāmkara, the sutra नीवपुर्ण ... ...etc. I.1.31, can be differently interpreted as; though in the part of the discussion of the Brahman the indications of the Jīva and the mukhya-prāṇa are stated, still, it does not become contradictory, as the three-fold meditation of the Brahman, firstly in the form of prāṇa, secondly in the form of prajñā and thirdly in the form of the Brahman itself, is stated. Out of these three, the first two are aupādhika while the last one is in its real form. As both upakrama and upasamhāra lead to one and the same discussion of the Brahman, and as the indications of prāṇa, prajñā and the Brahman are stated. The Brahman itself is discussed.
In the first quarter, the Upaniṣadic sentences in which there are clear indications of the Brahman were discussed, while in this quarter these sentences in which the indications are not so clear, are taken for consideration. Similarly, on the strength of the सूत्र जन्माद्यास्या (Vedānta Sūtra I.1.2) etc., the Brahman was shown to be the cause of the universe, while in this quarter the omnipresence and omniscience etc., of the Brahman which are suggested in those various sentences, are discussed. Thus this quarter is dependent on the first one, and represents, in a sense, the continuation of it.

In the sentence: च तत्र विविध ब्रह्म तत्प्रावित्ति प्राणात् बुधाभिः श्रोते मनोमयोऽजीवस्वरीय: etc.⁴ some kind of meditation is indicated. Now there arises the doubt, namely, whether the Brahman is intended to be meditated upon or the Jīva is so intended. According to the Pūrvapakṣin it is the Jīva. For, the word मनोमयो in this passage suits the Jīva very well, while, as pointed out in the sruti², the Brahman is without mind or प्राण etc., So too, the word सत्यासंकल्पa can be interpreted as

2. Mundaka Up.II.1.2 : अन्नात्र दृष्टवत्ता बुधः
as **sati asamkalpaḥ**, which would mean 'without samkalpa' (that is the knowledge about the Brahman).

The Siddhāntin, however, asserts that here the Brahman is intended to be meditated upon. Because in the passage: **sarvam khalu idam brahma**, the word Brahman is in correlative with the **sarvam**, and hence it (idam) can denote only the Brahman and nothing else (as the Purvapaksa supposes). Though Śaṅkara admits in his commentary that it is the **sama-vidhi** which is emphasised in the sentence under consideration, still that (sama-vidhitva of the sentence) does not render the Brahman subordinate in any way, on account of the word idam which refers to the **tripād** Brahman. This Brahman with its qualities like **manomaya**, etc., occurs to our mind and not the Jīva, and that too by the **Visvajit-nyāya** which is applied to cases where in the absence of the mention of any particular fruit, some general fruit is understood to have been stated. Moreover in all the Vedānta-works, the word Brahman invariably refers to the Para-Brahman. Further the compound **prāna-sarīrah** in the sentence under consideration has to be treated as a **bahuvrīhi**-compound, so that it would clearly refer to the Brahman. Again, the words like **sarvakarmatva** etc. have to be taken as referring to the same Brahman. For,
the word karman means karya (creation etc.). Hence, it is the Brahman that is intended here and not the Jīva. The qualities like manomaya, etc., are agreeable qualities (sprhanīya-gunāh) of the Brahman. For, in the case of the Saguna-brahman-upāsana, all the means to be used for the upāsana in the Brahma-loka, are to be thought of in the mind only. The term avākī cannot be understood as in any way referring to the Jīva; so only the Brahman is meant. In the latter part of the sentence, both the agent and the action by the same agent has been described though they are in the same situation. What is meant here is: the Atman is the upāsaka and the upāsya both and hence it must not be the Jīva as it is not to be meditated upon. The same thing is stated in the Smrīti also. It cannot be said that there is contradiction. So far as the size is concerned, for, the Brahman is all-pervading, while the anu-form of the Atman, residing in the heart is stated as

1. Chandogya Up. Bhāṣya : य विमेधुस्वादवन्त ब्रह्मद्वै-कर्मांक्षे संक्षम्या: -
2. Chandogya Up. III.14.4: अतिरिक्त: प्रेत्याभिनवंक्षितानि ...
3. Gītā, XVIII.61: श्रीशार: श्रेयस्तात्मा इत्येकृतं तिलकति।
so it cannot be said as the Brahman, as the all-pervading Brahman cannot be imagined as being accommodated in the tiny heart, and yet its presence is there. It is indeed with reference to the size of the heart, that the Brahman is said to be so of tiny-size. Immediately after this, the huge form of the Brahman is described. Again, it cannot be said that, like the Jīva, Īśvara too would be having enjoyments, etc., because on account of his supreme power Īśvara, though he is residing in the heart is not envolved in pleasures etc., just as a yogin entering into fire is not burnt on account of his supreme power of the yoga. In the present section, the quality, namely ānāmātmya has undistinct nature of the characteristic, because it cannot be easily taken with reference to the Brahman as it has got relation with the mind through which it can be said as related with the Jīva also, while the qualities like prāṇasārīra, anīyastva etc. distinctly refer to the Jīva at first instance. Hence, there is both distinct and undistinctness of the qualities.

2. The second topic in the second quarter of the first adhyāya concerns the Upaniṣadic passage, ज्ञानो च वर्ण भोजने मन्त्र ज्ञात:। मृत्यु-योम्य-पालनं के जित्या वैद्य कर्तव्य सः॥ ॥

According to the Purvapakṣin, it is the Jīva who is referred to in this passage. Because the action of eating rice is possible in the case of the Jīva only. The term odana can be taken in the sense of enjoyment, which is possible only in the case of the Jīva as the Brahman is the non-enjoyer as it is stated in the sentence, अनन्यनृत्य ब्रह्मेऽनिभावक्तीति...।

The Siddhānta, on the other hand, states that the eater mentioned in the passage is the Brahman itself. Both the movable and the immovable things are said to be its food. How can these things become the food of the Jīva? The word upasenca, again, indicates that all things, including mrtvuk, are consumed by the Brahman. Moreover, if one takes into consideration the whole context one will clearly see that the sentence under consideration can refer to the Brahman alone.

3. In the next section, the sentence: ॥३॥
पिबनौ भक्तस्य होके गुहा प्रविष्टते परमेपराय। भायायेत्र ब्रह्म बिदेह यदन्ति। फूलार्ये वे ब विज्ञापिते ततः ॥३॥
is discussed. According to the Purvapakṣin, this sentence refers either to the buddhi or to the Jīva.
The enjoyment of the fruit of good actions, the entrance into cave (guhā), etc., can be thought of only in connection with these two. The attribute of ṛtapāṇa may be taken in its secondary sense with reference to the buddhi, as this ṛtapāṇa is done by the Jīva directly and as buddhi is related to the Jīva, buddhi is indirectly connected with this ṛtapāṇa.

As against this position of the Purvapakṣin, the Siddhānta says that the Brahman alone can be understood as being referred to in the passage under consideration. The Brahman, it may be pointed out, is not different from the Jīva; so whatever is possible in the case of the Jīva, is possible also in the case of the Brahman. On the other hand, the ṛtapāṇa is not possible in the case of either the Jīva or the buddhi without the help of the Brahman; hence,

the Brahman is the real cause. The guhāpravesa also suggests the same Brahman. For, this is the description of two animate things, and if one of them is the Jīva, the second must be the Brahman and not the buddhi, which is not animate. As for the fruit, it is said that 'he goes to the other end of the way', that is to the Brahman which is indicated by emphasising the words atra (eva)
The Jīva and the buddhi always reside in the body, hence their being described as entering into guhā is purposeless. So the two mentioned here must be the Jīva and the Brahman only.

4. The passage which is next taken up for discussion is:

The doubt here is about the substratum of the eye, whether it is shadow-man (chāyapurusa) or the Paramesvara. The Pūrvapakṣa, maintains that it is the chāyapurusa. In the commentary of Śāṁkara the Pūrvapakṣa is represented as maintaining that the Jīva is the

1. Katha Up. I.3.9: सेवादेवकः पारमाप्प्यतिति तथितम: परम्य पदन्।

Ibid. II.3.14: यदा येव प्रमुन्यते कामा अश्वत्स्थ दृढिदिः सिद्धत:।

2. Commentary P.97. बुध्धड्डिकोऽधर्मो नानाविस्ते प्रसिद्धिद्विचािऽथो मुहावेशेऽ वर्णस्ति निग्रिश्यो नमः।


1. Katte Up. I.3.9: य सर्वोत्कारिष्य पुलिस्य दुस्कते वेष ब्रह्मति ह्यवैवेष्वरदृष्टः।

2. Katte Up. I.3.9: य सर्वोत्कारिष्य पुलिस्य दुस्कते वेष ब्रह्मति ह्यवैवेष्वरदृष्टः।
substratum. As in this passage the definite place of the purusa, namely the eye is mentioned, the purusa must be taken to denote the shadowman and not the Brahman which exists at all places at all times. Moreover, it is a matter of every-day experience that one actually sees a purusa inside the eye when one peeps into it.

The Siddhānta asserts that the substratum of the eye is certainly the highest Brahman. The qualities like amṛta etc. can by no means be posited of the reflection of a person in the eye; hence, the purusa must be understood to mean the Paramātman only. The sentence suggests that the matter under consideration in this context is the Brahman only, and the Brahman itself must be taken to have been indicated by the word va esah coming at the beginning of the next sentence. It cannot be said that the words praṇaḥ brahma, etc., do not describe the Brahman but the superimposition of the Brahman (Brahmadṛṣṭi) is intended, as it has been done in the words like nāma brahma, mano brahma etc., because after the instruction, Upakosala did know that praṇa is the Brahman.

It may be added that the instruction imparted by acārya to Upakosala does not in any way interrupt the discussion about the Brahman; on the other hand, as indicated by the sentence आचार्यस्तु ते गतिवक्ता,

etc, it is complementary to the previous discussion about the Brahman. The word gati in the above mentioned sentence is not used in the sense of devayāna but in the sense of the fruit of the Brahma-vidya. The word in the sutra, śrutopaniṣatgatayabhidhanāt indicates that the acārya-vākya includes all the fruits like, samyadvāma (rendezvous of all actions), Vāmanītva (conveyor of all actions to the people), bhāmanītva (which illuminates other things), anāvṛtti (without return), etc., and this has been supported by Śaṅkara3 and Vacaspati4 in their commentaries. The

2. Commentary P.104:
3. Ibid:
4. Ibid:
purusa in the eye cannot be understood as a shadow-man, because the reflection is possible only when some object is there it is not possible at all times. The purusa in the eye, however, is present; hence it cannot be the shadow-man. Moreover, the qualities like samyad-vamatva, etc., are not possible in the case of the shadow-man.

5. In the next section a sentence from the Brhadārānyaka Upanisad, namely यो श्रीमान्वि तिष्ठन्नाथिविभाव अन्तरायेऽऽ मुषिन्ह न वैद ... etc
is taken for consideration. According to the Pūrvapakṣin, the antaryāmi, referred to in the passage may be some yogin; it cannot be the Paramātma who cannot control (yam), since he is bodiless. A carpenter possessing a body can alone have a full control over his tools. In the commentary of Śaṁkara, the Pūrvapakṣa is represented as suggesting that the antaryāmi may be some deity. This is, however, immaterial; for, it is not the main point but a subordinate one. On account of the Upakrama and Upasamāhara, only one antaryāmi has to be understood.

The Siddhānta points out that it is in every way better to take the passage as referring to the Brahman. Brahman alone can be regarded as the true controller of all.

1. Brhadārānyaka Up. 7.3.
The Jīva can get power to control with the help of this Brahman only. The Jīva is also controlled by the other, that is the Brahman. Though such controlling is possible in the case of the pradāhana of the Sāṁkhyas, still it is not meant here. Because the attributes like being possessed of the knowledge etc., which are mentioned here, cannot be thought of in the case of the pradāhana of the Sāṁkhyas. As for the Jīva, it has only limited scope. Further, the Jīva does not reside in the ērthivī nor it can have the controlling power. The āmṛta again goes against the Jīva being intended here. As the Jīva is observed with ignorance due to which when the Jīva enters into a human body, it is called as 'born', while it comes out, the Jīva is called as 'dead', hence the Jīva is not āmṛta, and the context suggests that by the knowledge of this one everything is to be known, which is possible only the case of the Brahman. The kāyas and the Madyan-dīnas, again, read the sentences where the bodily Ātman is described as altogether different from the antaryāmi.

1. Brhadāranyaka Up.III.7.22 : Madhyandinas read :

   यह ज्ञात्मनि तिर्थनालम्बनि अन्तरा ज्ञात्मा न वेद यत्वात्मा जरीरे य
   ज्ञात्मानान्तरे यम्भाटि स्वेत त ज्ञात्मा बन्त्तस्यमुः।

   while kānva reading is : भो विभाने तिर्थन्न्व विभानादन्तरे य
   विभानं न वेद यत्व विभानं दरीरे भो विभानान्तरे यम्भाटि स्वेत त
   ज्ञात्मानान्त्तस्यमुः।
Even if the alternative reading as \[ \text{सत्ताः पूर्वोऽस्मिवमपि} \ldots \]

etc. \(^1\) is accepted, still, the word \( \text{भूता} \) \(^2\) can be taken in the sense of all being or vital elements like the \text{earth} etc. and it can be said that the \text{Brahman} which resides in them, is described here.

The word \( \text{सांत्रा} \) in the \text{sutra} \( \text{शारीरस्चर्मेषु} \) is in singular form and refers to the \text{Jīva} of the \text{Pūrvapakṣin} and the word \( \text{ca} \) is for negation (\text{nakāra}) stated in the previous \text{sutra}. The \text{Jīva} of the \text{Pūrvapakṣin} and \text{ca} is for negation (\text{nakāra}) stated in the previous \text{sutra}.

The \text{word ubhaya} refers to the two schools of the \text{Sukla Ya.jurveda}, namely, the \text{kāṇva} and the \text{Madhyandina}. The word \( \text{bhedena} \) is used to indicate the difference between the \text{Jīva} and the \text{Parameśvera} is unreal. The purport of the whole \text{sutra} would accordingly be:
The \text{antaryāmi} is not the bodily \text{Atman}, as both the schools of the \text{Sukla Ya.jurveda} describe this \text{antaryāmi} as different from the \text{Brahman}, though this difference is not real. In

\begin{enumerate}
  \item \text{Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up. III.7.15.}
  \item \text{Commentary P.113:} \hspace{1em} \text{सत्ताऽस्मिवमपिततिः सत्याये} \ldots
  \item \text{Vedānta Sūtra I,2.20.}
  \item \text{Ibid: I,2.19.}
\end{enumerate}
this section, the indications of the Brahman are not quite distinct.

6. The sixth adhikarana in this pada takes up for consideration, the sentence अथ परं यथा तद्दर्मिण्यमः ... भूतयोगि परिपक्वति धीराः। Here the word bhūtayoni is used. The word may denote either the pradhāna or the Jīva or the Paramātma; but what is exactly meant? It must be the inanimate pradhāna, says the Pūrvapakṣin, because the illustration given is that of an inanimate object. The position of the Siddhāntin is that the Brahman alone can be taken to be referred to here. The upakārama of the context is about the Brahman only. The cause of the universe is animate, as has been established in the Iksati section and not an inanimate entity like the pradhāna. It is contended that the puruṣa stated after the bhūtayoni is the Brahman and not the bhūtayoni itself, it may be pointed out that the same bhūtayoni is mentioned as the

2. Mundaka Up. II.1.7: संध्यानां: युक्ते हृद्देव यथा ग्रहिष्ठमीमांसः संवर्धित।
   मथया सत्: युक्तयानेष्टकोमानि तथादसर्वात्मक्कथी विश्वः॥
   अप्राणो हृद्यन्त: ज्ञै द्विप्राप्तप्यत: पर्: ॥
aksara and purusa also. The ablative aksarat occurring in तथासरसंबंधितं विषयः suggests that there is no difference between the bhutayoni and the purusa who is beyond aksara.

Though the Jīva is the sākṣi and on that account of sarvajña, still the sentence under consideration does not refer to him. The description which follows, namely that it is without body, colour, etc. does not suit the Jīva. Further the negation of the body, mind, etc. supports the assumption of the Brahman only. The word itara in the sutra, namely, विशेषणमेंद्रस्यद्वेगस्यo च नेतरो refers to both the pradhāna and the Jīva. The next sutra, namely श्रीपूर्वपक्षाचव states that where there is any description of body etc. in connection with the Brahman as is, for instance to found in the sentence

2. Ibid. I.1.5: विशेषणमेंद्रस्यद्वेगस्य श्रीपूर्वक्रमेण ज्ञातम् ...
3. Vedānta Sūtra, I.2.22.
4. Ibid., I.2.23.
5. Mundaka Up. II.1.4.
that description should be understood to be metaphorical and should not be taken literally. The word rūpa in that sūtra stands for rūpaka.

7. The sentence: तान हे कवाच ....

from the Chandogya Upanisad is discussed in this section. There the word vaisvānara is the point of dispute. This word denotes either jātharāgni, or the third great element (tejas) or the deity which controls tejas, and the word Ātman is common to both the Jīva and the Paramātma, so out of these five who is to be meditated upon is the doubt. According to the Purvapakṣin the word vaisvānara is to be understood in the sense of either the jātharāgni or the agni in general, or the deity agni, and the word Ātman is to be understood in the sense of the Jīva. The station of this Vaiśvānara is mentioned. The Brahman is all-pervading, and cannot be assigned to any one place. Therefore, this vaisvānara is not the Brahman. Moreover, this vaisvānara is described as having bodily form, as having lustre as his head, etc.².

2. Chandogya Up. V.18.2: तत्स्य हि व भेतत्सात्ल्लभो वैश्वानरस्य मृदूवेशुना।
The Siddhanta refutes this arguments of the Purvapakṣin, by pointing out that such description as having head etc. is possible in the case of the Paramēśvara also. Moreover, the upakrama indicates that the discussion in this passage relates to the Brahman. So by the word vaisvānara, only the Brahman is intended to be denoted.

By vaisvānara, again, the jātharāgni is meant, as generally this word is used in that sense, this statement of the Purvapakṣin, is not true, as the qualities of this vaisvānara as they are stated in the śrutis, are not possible in the case of the jātharāgni. For example, the description that 'the lustre is his head', etc. does not suit the jātharāgni, nor this jātharāgni is all-pervading. According to jaimini, by the word vaisvānara both the Brahman and the jātharāgni are meant, while Āśmarathya maintains that the word denotes the Paramēśvara and as the Paramēśvara is visualised in the head etc., so he is described being accomodated in the heart etc., though the Paramēśvara is immeasurable. According to Bādari this

1. Commentary P.125 : अमरिसर्षेवानरो श्रेष्ठमम् पुत्रसः ब्रेदम्न्त्रे पञ्चये! खित्यादिति वाक्मान्त्ते विनिद्व ब्राह्म्ने प्रक्षंद्वशंस्त्रार- जिल्लाढु
Paramesvara is called as prādesa as he is meditated upon in mind only. Jaimini thinks that due to the existence (bhavana) of Paramesvara in the place from chin to head, he is called as prādesa but the jabalas assume that the Paramesvara resides in midpart of the chin and the head.

In the second quarter, the Upaniṣadic sentences in which the indication of the Brahman were not so clear, were taken up for consideration, while in this quarter those Upaniṣadic sentences or passages where there is total absence of such indications about the Brahman are being discussed. The only distinction between this quarter and the previous one is that, this quarter mainly deals with the nirvīṣṣeṣa brahman, while in the last quarter the savīṣṣeṣa-brahman was dealt with. Thus, this quarter is, in a way, the continuation of the previous quarter.

1. In the first adhikarana of the third quarter, the passage

1. Commentary P.131: पूर्वः पदः सविष्णुप्रकाशः ।
अर्यं तु निश्चितप्रकाशं ज्ञितं एदः ।

2. Mundaka Up. II.2.5
forms the nucleus of the discussion. Here the Ātman is described as having the heaven and the earth etc. accommodated within it. So what is meant by Ātman is the question. It would be the pradhāna of the Śāmkhyas, it being the substratum of all. By the word Ātman, the Brahman is not intended as it cannot be called a bridge (setu) of immortality, as the bridge has an end while the Brahman itself being immortal is eternal or not having the other end (apāra). The word setu has to be taken in its secondary sense as a means of crossing, which has an end so it must be the pradhāna which has got an end, and not the Brahman which is endless. This is the Purvapakṣa.

The Siddhānta on the other hand states that here the word Ātman refers to the Brahman only. The word Ātman denotes something animate and not something inanimate like

1. The word setu has been derived from the root विघ्न to bind. So its primary sense is that which binds or obstructs. Even iron-fetters can be called as चेतु in this sense. Here by setu (dam) water is not only obstructed but it held in fact and पार्वकल्प (reading the other end) is also intended here. Hence Laksana is resorted to.
the pradhāna. The instruction given in the next sentence namely "know that, the only one" तन्मेवं नान्यः again, refers to the abandonment of all speech बन्धा वाचा निमुक्तम् As the Brahman is beyond speech etc., so the same is intended. The word sva in the sūtra: हुम्मािाष्यति संहत्तात् is used to rule out the possibility of the pradhāna.

Moreover, on account of the description as being approachable by the liberated (mukta-upaspya), and as being the substratum of the heaven etc, the Brahman is intended. Because this is the goal of the human life which can be achieved only by the knowledge of the Brahman. Moreover as a dam holds abundance of water, in the same way the knowledge (about the Brahman) being immortality, which is possible in the case of the Brahman only and not in case of the pradhāna.

Though the sentence मनाम् प्राणवरीत्वा establishes the relation of the Ātman with the prāṇa and the mind, still, the Jīva cannot be said to be intended here,

1. Mundaka Up. II.2.5
2. Ibid.
by the word Atman. Only the Brahman can be said to be referred to, as the description, "it is the meeting place (āyatana) of all including the heaven and the earth, etc," suits the Brahman only. Moreover the passage clearly distinguishes the Jīva the enjoyer from the Brahman, the non-enjoyer. As the Jīva is well-known, there is no propriety in describing it, while the Brahman being unknown is intended to be described. According to the context again, the Jīva is the know»er, and the knower is not to be known; something else is to be known. Hence, the Brahman has to be understood as the entity to be known here. The Jīva is really not different from the Brahman which has been described in the śruti-texts, but when this Jīva, supposes itself to be related with the upādhis like buddhi etc, through ignorance then it cannot be regarded as the substratum of all, and it, as if, appears different from the Brahman.

2. The next section takes up for consideration the sentence: 

The word bhūma in that sentence is the point for discussion. The word may indicate both the prāṇa and the Paramātma, hence what is exactly meant by that word is the question. According to the etymological sense, the word may mean either 'many' or 'having multiple forms', not in the numerical sense but generally. The prāṇa may be called bhūma as it is greater than asā, as pointed out in the sentence प्राणेण ब्रह्मा भूमान and the passage wherein this sentence occurs is under consideration. The phrase नान्यात्यास्तिति can be interpreted as 'abstains from seeing' etc. So that the description made there will suit the prāṇa, very well. This abstaining from seeing is possible in the case of prāṇa at sleeping time. Moreover, in susūpti-condition, the prāṇa enjoys the bliss, and as only prāṇa functions during the susūpti-condition, the description प्राणे वा अमृतम् does not go against the assumption of prāṇa being described here. So by the word bhūma, prāṇa is intended. So says the Purvapakṣa.

1. Commentary. P.142
The Siddhānta asserts that the word bhūma refers to the Brahman. The description of bhūma follows after the description of prāṇa. Naturally, the Brahman is described after prāṇa. The occurrence of the words tu and satya in the sentence थै तु वा अविद्यति मः indicates the presence of something else (tu) which is real and different from the prāṇa. The word satya is generally used with reference to the Paramātmā and not with reference to the prāṇa. The upakrama, again, indicates the continuation of the same topic, and the fruit stated in the sentence: भूतं हेमव मेय मयावदेम्यस्सतान्ति confirms that the description is of the Brahman only.

The word samprasada in the sutra: प्राणा हेमवादाद-ह्युपदेसात ³ is used with reference to prāṇa, being in susupti-condition, in its secondary sense and the words adhi upadesat mean 'on account of instruction' (upadesat) as being superior (adhi) to (the prāṇa). The ablative of the word upadesa indicates the hetu and that too to refute the Purvapakṣa.

2. Chāndogya Up. VIII.1.3
Again the word Bhūmā must be taken to refer to the Paramatmā, because so many qualities (dharma-thūmatva) like immortality, endless happiness, etc., are found to be mentioned there. These qualities are present in the Brahman only. When this Brahman, is known, nothing remains to be known, and hence the description like 'what is to be seen by what?' or the sentence: nanayat pasyati suit the Brahman. Hence the Brahman is intended here. The qualities na anyat pasyati etc. are taken with reference to the prāṇa, and therein lies the undistinct-nature of these qualities which are really used to denote the Brahman.

3. The passage is taken up for consideration in this topic. The word aksara which accommodates the sky gives rise to this doubt, for, the word may denote either the holy syllable Om or the Brahman. The Pūrvapakṣa assumes that, as the word aksara is generally used in the sense of syllable, the holy syllable Om is intended here.

This om is described as an object of meditation and is the substratum of all being identical with the Paramatman. Moreover, the sruti-texts declare that all speeches are covered by this om. The same om which is otherwise known as the sabda-brahman, is endowed with the sphota-sakti through which all words can manifest their meanings, hence om is the origin of all words. The same om is intended here.

The Siddhāntin refutes this by saying that by the word aksara the Brahman is referred to here. The assumption of the Purvapaksa that the words ota and prota are used to denote the superiority (utkarṣatva) of om, is not correct. They are used to indicate the substratum by which the sky etc are supported. The identification of the ākāśa with the Paramatman and om is the substratum of Paramatman, this assumption is wrong. Because, in supposing so, the usual meaning of the word ākāśa is

1. Commentary P.151: निदानधाव आकाः परमात्मा हृदयदित्यमभण्डलिं-
   दुपासन स्थाने प्रक्षे कोने विजि काममज्ञातातु ।
2. Sphota is an eternal power being responsible for conveying the meaning of any word. It is एक, नित्य, निरक्षयक्ष कणाटीत and अक्षण. Appayya Dīkṣita has discussed this theory at great length here, for some less important thing. For other details of this sphota, please refer to the pp. 299-300.
abandoned, and laksana is resorted to for no purpose and the secondary sense as the Paramatman is accepted. The context, again, clearly indicates that the Brahman is being discussed.

The word akāśa, again, does not convey the sense of the sky as this akāśa is not directly mentioned as the substratum of all universe including the real sky; this akāśa is again supported by aksara, hence the word aksara denotes the Brahman. On the basis of the etymological sense also, the Brahman is being denoted by the word aksara which means that which does not cause (na kṣarati) or that which is all-pervading (aśnoti). Though this etymological sense (yoga) is less powerful that the traditional one (rudhārtha om) still, on the basis of upakrama and upasamhāra, this etymological sense (yogārtha) is to be resorted to. This Brahman is the substratum of all as it is described in the sentence ब्रह्मक्षेत्रवाक्षरस्य प्रवाहाते

The whole universe is at the command of this Brahman which is intended here.

Appayya Dīkṣita, here, points out that Śaṅkara deals with the sphota-theory in the Devatā-section but that he should to have discussed it, here only.

4. This section considers the passage \( \text{पुरिसयम् पुरुषः इक्षते} \) etc. where the para-purusa has been referred to. This para-purusa can be taken in the sense of either Brahmadeva or the Paramātman. The question is: who is exactly intended here, The Purvapakṣa says that the Brahmadeva is, here, intended, as the fruit of this vidyā is the attainment of the Brahma-loka. Moreover the words \( \text{पुरिसयम् पुरुषः इक्षते} \) in this passage refer to the Brahma-loka, as the sentence \( \text{वेदन्यते ज्ञेयो धर्मं स} \) \( \text{श्रुत्वेऽत्तद्यक्षत्वं पुरुषस्य पुरुषाः} \) directly refers to the Brahma-loka, the residence of this parāt para puruṣa.

The Siddhāntin insists that the words \( \text{पुरिसयम् पुरुषः इक्षते} \) etc. are to be interpreted as *(after having the Brahma-loka) he (the enlightened or the meditator)*

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1. \text{Vedānta Sūtra I.3.26-33.}
2. \text{Prasna Up. III.5.}
3. \text{Prasna Up. V.5.}
sees that rurusa who stays (saya) in the body (puri), and this is possible after the attainment of the Brahmaloka only. So Brahman is the entity which is described by the word parat para. It cannot be said that the meditation being of two types, gives rise to the defect known as Vakyabheda. Because there, two different meditations, namely, of apara-brahman and para-brahman are not independently stated, but only one meditation, that is of the para-brahman is intended. This has been made clear by saying that if the syllable om is meditated upon in one or two matras, still it brings the fruit in the form of the attainment of the heaven. If it is meditated upon with all (that is with three) matras, it can bring about eternal salvation. This fruit is obtained by meditating upon the Para-brahman only. Hence the same is intended here.

5. This section, though known as dahara (small), has great importance. The passage: अथ यदिदमस्तिन् क्रमेनुहे दहरं पुनरं प्रेय दहरां यो निश्चलाकारः ..... ॥

1. They are: (1) Apara-brahman, (2) Parabrahman. If there is option for these two, the defect namely, vākya-bheda is inevitable.

2. Commentary P.169. नन् त्वाय सौम्ये मृत्युमका जोपापा विनिधि-सत्त्वाद्वाद्वां नमेदेन वस्तुमार्मणीशः ।

3. This om has three matras, namely ओ, ए and मू.

is taken up for discussion there. The point of dispute is the word $dahārakaśā$. It can be taken in the sense of the real sky as well as the Paramātman. The word $dahārakaśā$ refers to the real sky, as the word $ākaśa$ is prominently used in that sense. This $dahārakaśa$ cannot be called a reflection of the Brahman, because reflection is possible only when the objection, of which the reflection is expected, possesses body; but the Brahman is bodiless. Hence the word $dahārakaśa$ refers to the real sky. This is the view of the purvapakṣa.

The Siddhānta refutes this by saying that the word, $dahārakaśa$ refers to the Brahman, only, as the qualities like freedom from sins, amṛtava, etc. are mentioned in the sentence: $yā tēṣām ātma bhrūtātma$ $vimūḍhātiristotakā$ $...$. Having the same context, these are possible in the case of the Brahman only. The word Brahmapura in the same passage, again, is followed by the word $dahārakaśa$. The word Brahmapura stands for the human-body and as this $dahārakaśa$ is situated in this human-body, and that too in the heart ($pundarīkam"vesma$), it necessarily signifies

1. Chandogya Up. VIII.1.5.
the Brahman. The main purport of this topic is that one should meditate upon the Brahman in the form of the daharakāsā. This is made clear in the next part of this section where it is stated that all enjoyments are mental ones and are said to be enjoyed through mind and by mind only. Moreover, the sentence yāvaṁ va ayam ākāśah etc. describes vastness of the real sky, but that is only manovikāra which does not go against the subtleness of this daharakāsā, which denotes the Brahman.

A counter-objection is here raised. The qualities like freedom from sins etc. can very well indicate the real sky, since the word papman can be taken in the sense of old-age etc. as in the sentence:

That counter-objection is here raised. The qualities like freedom from sins etc. can very well indicate the real sky, since the word papman can be taken in the sense of old-age etc. as in the sentence:

The quality of being satyakama is not possible in the case of the Brahman as the Brahman is free from all desires.

1. Chandogya Up. VIII.2.1  
Similarly, the description "the people going out daily are not able to attain to this Brahma-\(ā\)loka\(^1\)", may be made to fit in respect of the real sky, since, during the time of sleep, all the Jīvas inter into this \(bhūtakāśa\) situated within the heart etc. This objection has been met with by saying that, on the basis of the context, the qualities like apahatapapmatvā etc. are the qualities of the Brahman only and not of the \(bhūtakāśa\). Because after description of all, that is the heaven etc. which are the means of enjoyments, the Brahmapura is again described. Ghee or curds held in a jar remains in fact even if that jar is destroyed. Similarly, as long as the human body is in fact, it can certainly hold this \(daharākāśa\); not only this even though this body suffers from old-age, etc, this \(daharākāśa\) does not suffer from that old-age etc. This description suits the human-body very well, when the word Brahmapura is taken in that sense. This \(daharākāśa\), again, is described as being the supporter of the heaven etc.\(^2\), and nothing other than the Brahman is capable of supporting the heaven. The words - \(tusmina\)

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1. \(Iś\)ād. VIII. 3.2: \(अ\)व्यवह\(े\)यमः \(स\)ब\(ी\)ः \(प\)्रना \(व\)ह\(र\)हरु\(च\)त्रन्तः \(क\)र्योऽर्धते \(न \)विद्यतिः ...

2. \(Chāndogya\) Up. VIII.1.1: \(बन्तः \)उदासे \(बुमे \)श्रस्म्यू \(शाब्याग्रूप्त्विः\)\ldots
yad antah tad anveśtavyam clearly indicate that the Brahman which resides inside the daḥarākāsa is to be meditated upon.

According to Rāmanuja, the author of the Śrībhāṣya, the daḥarākāsa itself is the Brahman. According to him, the sentence yavanvā ayam ākāśah etc. suggests that, just as this bhūtākāsa is all-pervading, similarly this daḥarākāsa is all-pervading, but its subtlety described in the passage under consideration, is due to upādhi of heart, and it is not its natural state. According to Śaṅkara, the sentence tad anveśtavyam means "he, i.e. daḥarākāsa) is to be meditated upon." Though the word daḥarākāsa is masculine in gender, the neuter, namely anveśtavyam refers to the kārya of the meditation. According to Vacaspati, the pronoun tad in tasmin yad antar ākāśah etc. refers to the hrdaya-pundarīka without touching the word ākāśa which comes after. In the explanation given by Śaṅkara, the defect, namely anuvāda-vaiyarththa is there, while the Bhāmati suffers from

suffers from the defect of pada-vaiyarthā. 

Moreover, the Brahman is compared with the ākāśa in the sentence yāvan va ayam ākāśah etc. to indicate that the Brahman has no limits. The quality apahatapapmapatva is also to be taken in the sense that sins do not touch this dāharākāśa, even if there is just the possibility of its being the cause of sins in general due to the human-body being its substratum.

The word gati in the sutra  etc. along with the word the word sabda, indicates that the ultimate resort (gati) of the people who daily enter into the ākāśa, is the dāharākāśa, and that the Brahmaloka mentioned in the same-context along with this dāharākāśa refers to the Brahman. The next sutra, namely  points out the peculiarity of this dāharākāśa, which is different from the real sky. The real sky merely supports,
but just as a dam on the water not only holds the water, but also does not allow the water to intermingle, dividing that water into two distinct parts, similarly, this Brahman (daharakāsa) does not allow any type of saṃkara of the features and nature of the animate and inanimate beings. At the same time the whole universe is supported by this Brahman, and no other entity than the Brahman is able to do this. The sentence स वा षेष गृहत्या दूरिद तस्येत्यदेव निस्तविन्कितः CEEDED again, makes it clear that the heart is the abode of the Brahman. So by the word, daharakāsa the Brahman is intended.

The word daharakāsa does not refer to the Jīva, and this is what the next three sutras: प्रक्षिद्येखा । जीतपमाब्रजापि ज्ञिति रेनासम्भवत्। ज्ञातार्भेदाविन्दुस्वप्पुष्टः seek to prove. The word daharakāsa may denote the Jīva as the sentence: स्तुतः न ज्ञेनास्तेष वात्तेषि हृदया वेदस्मृतमनःस्विद्य नभूति ... etc. 3 establishes the identification of the Jīva with the

1. Chandogya Up. VIII.3.3.
Brahman so far as the qualities like freedom from sin, immortality, etc. are concerned. This stand is nullified by pointing out that the description is not that of any ordinary Jīva, but of the Jīva endowed with the knowledge of the Brahman, as these three qualities, namely, immortality, freedom from fear (of sins), and identification with the Brahman, etc. are the three states of the Jīva, namely jāgara, svapna and the susupti where the Jīva is said to become the Brahman.

Moreover, satyakāmatva of the Jīva is described in the sentence: स यदि कविदाः न प्रविष्टि तत्सत्यात्वः.

But the fore-fathers are not seen here in this mṛtyaloka. The satyakāmatva of the Jīva is obscured by ignorance (avidyā) here on the surface of the earth, and the fore-fathers are seen in the Brahmaloka only. This objection is set aside as follows: Satyakāmatva is two-fold. (1) It is the

1. Commentary P.191: तत्र हि 'य ब्रेभोऽलो' (Chāndogya Up. VIII.6.4.) तथा दिचुतिक्षेपणम् जागरुस्तुविभाग्यं जीतेधातनिन्मन्तः प्रहो (३५२.) तिर च जीवस्य ब्रह्म मात्र श्रुते।

object of meditation a thing to be meditated upon, as is pointed out in the sentence श्रेष्ठ ब्राह्मण श्रव्यतापञ्चमा ... etc. (2) The fruit of the meditation to be obtained by the meditater as pointed out in ए यदि पितृलोकायनसे मक्ति .... etc. In the passage under consideration the second variety, that is, upāsanāphala is stated. This shows that daharakāsa possesses the capacity of giving such a fruit without much efforts, after the attainment of the Brahmaloka; and this is possible in the case of the Brahman only and not in the case of the Jīva. The word samprasāda, again, used in the same context, अध्य य श्रेष्ठ समप्रसादः refers to the Brahman as the word conveys the meaning of endless happiness which is possible in the case of the Brahman only. Or this word may refer to the Jīva, who being the enjoyer of external pleasures in the jagṛṭavasthā and the enjoyer of only imaginary pleasures (vāsanāmaya) only in dreams, after leaving both these states enters into the Brahman in the

2. 
3. 
4. śīṁ in the view of Śaṅkara.
form of *adharaġaka* अ, being free from any kind of sin.

In the same way the word *dahara* may be taken as referring to the anu-form of the Brahman, but not as referring to the Jīva.

6. The passage 

6. 

is taken up for consideration, in the next section.

There some object which illuminates other objects has been described. What possibly is that object? The Purvapakṣin argues that, it must be some luminory body like the sun or the moon on account of whose lustre other luminaries like stars etc. do not shine, as the former lustre is superior to all.

The Siddhāntin asserts that the Brahman is, here, intended. The lustre of the Brahman is all-powerful, and ever-powers all other luminory bodies. The assumption of the Purvapakṣin that when this luminory object is shining other objects do not shine, is wrong. Really

1. This view belongs to Ramanuja.

speaking only, when this Brahman is shining, others objects can shine, and the other objects cannot shine, when the Brahman is not shining. Only Brahman can have such power, and the same has been confirmed in the Gītā¹ and in the Mahābhārata² also.

Here, the word anu-bhāti implies the non-distinct nature of the Brahman; but it becomes more distinct when other sentences like...

7. The sentence: अंगुःठेऽप्रस्त: पुस्तो मध्य भात्मनि सिल्पितति ||
ब्रीणानो मृत्युव्यः न ततो विनुपस्ते ||³
forms the basis of the discussion in the next section. This angusthamatra-purusā may refer either to the Jīva or to the Brahman. But it is proper to take this as referring to the Jīva, because, the measure of a thumb as mentioned here is not possible in the case of the Brahman which is

1. Gītā XV.6: न तद्भास्यते सुभो न ह्यहुः को न पावकः ।
2. Mahābhārata : लापनी पावकपी बैव श्रेष्ठी च प्रकाशिनी ।
नेव राज्य रेव: शक्ति: शक्तिनारायणस्य सा ॥
3. Chandogya Up. VIII.3.4
formless. Though the word Īśana there can denote the Brahman only, still the first impression that the Jīva is referred to by the word angūṣṭamātra is more powerful. Hence the Jīva is intended here. This is the Purvapakṣa. The Siddhāntin refutes this by saying that the word angūṣṭamātra-puruṣa denotes the Brahman only. The quali-
being Lord of all' is expressed by the term Īśana and it can very well suit the Brahman only. Moreover, the subtle form indicated by the word angūṣṭamātra cannot be the characteristic of the Jīva, as it has been shown in the preceding topic, namely, dahara section. In that section the heart was shown to be the abode of the Brahman, and the same has been intended by the use of the words madhya ātmani tisthati. Moreover the Brahman is often described as the Jīva in the śruti's. Though the Brahman is all-pervading, still, its abode, namely, the heart is mentioned here for the sake of meditation. This, again, indicates that only those who possess heart (i.e. human beings) are entitled to meditate upon the Brahman.

8. The previous section declares that only human beings are qualified for the knowledge of the Brahman,

1. Śvetāsvatara Up. IV.3: त्वं जीवं दण्डेन वार्ष्ण्यं त्वं जातो भवसि विश्वंतेषु।

त्वं स्त्री त्वं पुरुषसचि त्वं कुमार कुल वा कुमारी।
Naturally, there arises the question whether gods are qualified or not. The Purva-pakṣa states that, as gods do not possess bodies, they are not qualified. The Siddhāntin sets aside this view by quoting the authority of Bādarāyaṇa. The gods are equally entitled to brahmajñāna as they possess bodies. The śruti-texts describe that Indra had been to his guru for the knowledge of the Brahman. It is also heard that gods were able to get salvation through this knowledge. Moreover, the gods are endowed with such an extraordinary power that they can simultaneously attend so many celebrations. This gives rise to another question: if gods possess bodies how can they said to be nitya? for bodies have end.

This question has been replied to by saying that terms like Indra etc. are used to indicate various offices like that of the Chief of army, etc. These offices are permanent though the individuals holding them may change. In this sense, gods are eternal. Moreover though the Īśvāra is the creator of all universe, Brahmadeva has been described, in the Itihasa and Purāṇas, as the creator, and it is said that after practising severe penances, he was able to create. From the Paramesvara himself, Brahmadeva studied

all the vedas, Puraṇas, etc. which are merely breathes of the Paramēśvara, and thus Brahmādeva created the universe. This indicates that the vedas are also eternal and even at the time of the total destruction (mahāpralaya). The vedas are not destroyed as they are born from the eternal Paramēśvara. The sentence ये अद्यां विद्याति पूर्वे ये ते वेदार्थ प्रहिलेन्ति तत्त्वे... corroborates the same assumption. The total destruction (mahāpralaya) again, is nothing but the sleeping-time of the Paramēśvara; so it does not, in any way, harm the eternality of the Paramēśvara.

But, according to Jaimini, gods are not entitled to possess some of the Vidyas like Madhuvidyā, in which gods like Vasu, Rudra, etc., are to be meditated upon. Vāyu is not qualified for the Samvarya-vidyā wherein he himself is an object of meditation. Moreover, as gods consume meat, wine (madhu), etc. at the sacrifices, how can they be said to be observing celibasy etc.? For mastering such vidyās, observence of calibasy is the

1. Brhadāraṇyaka Up. IV.5.11.
2. Śvetasvatara Up. VI.18.
essential condition. Moreover, those sruti-texts which describe that gods possess bodies may be treated as arthavādas, as there is no pratyakṣa-pramāna. The sun, moon, etc. are only luminary bodies, and they do not possess anything like the human-body. The statement, again, that gods must have bodies for, they bestow on the worshipper the desired fruit, is not correct. The fruit is obtained by virtue of the worship only, and gods cannot be said to be responsible for that fruit.

This foregoing view is refuted by saying that, according to Badari, the gods are qualified for all types of vidyās. Those gods, who are themselves to be meditated upon in some vidyās (for example, Vasu and Rudra in the Madhu-vidyā) and are thus excluded, are qualified for other vidyā (like Sanivarya-vidyā). The Brāhmaṇas are not qualified for the Rajasuya-sacrifice, but this does not mean that they are not qualified for any other sacrifice. The sentences देवा वे चारमास्त etc. do indicate that gods had performed various sacrifices. As gods are described as enjoyers of the offerings made to them, they must be taken to be capable of giving the desired fruit to the sacrificers. Naturally they must be supposed to possess bodies, and as they have bodies, they must be
entertaining the desire of getting the highest type of fruit, which can be obtained through the knowledge of the Brahman. This gods are, also, qualified.

9. The next section deals with the question whether the Śūdras are qualified or not. Like gods, the Śūdras also, may be entertaining a similar desire; and hence, they must be regarded as being qualified. Moreover, the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (IV.1-2) describes that Jānaśruti, the Śūdra, was enlightened by Raikva. The Śūdra, even though he is not allowed to study the vedas, can know the meaning of the vedas through some person well-versed in the vedas. This person or teacher of the vedas may, through compassion, instruct the Śūdra about the saguna on nirguna Brahman. Here, Appayya Dīksita enters into a lengthy discussion about the question whether the sentence, svādhyāyaḥ adhyetavyaḥ, implies the knowledge of the meaning of the vedas or only the recitation of the vedas. Ultimately he comes to the conclusion that, the sentence svādhyāyaḥ adhyatmyaḥ implies the knowledge of the meaning of the vedas. If the meaning of the vedas is explained to the Śūdras, they can develop the desire for knowing the Brahman. So the Śūdra are qualified, says the Pūrvapakṣin.
The Siddhāntin, on the other hand, argues that the Śūdras are not qualified. The Chandogya Upanisad wherein Jānaśruti is referred to as Śūdra, does not use that word in its usual sense (i.e. a low-cast-person). The word Śūdra is there used in its etymological sense (yogārtha). The word Śūdra, there means he who runs to him (Raikva) through grief. The next part of the story, again, refers to Abhiprārāna. This Abhiprārāna was a Ksatriya, while his teacher, Kāpeya by name was a Brāhmaṇa. The latter taught the former. The same procedure is followed in respect of Jānaśruti and Raikva. Moreover, the village wherein Raikva was living was given as a gift to Raikva by Jānaśruti. This would be possible only if Jānaśruti had been a king (that is a Kṣatriya). It cannot be said that there is no proof whatsoever to show that Jānaśruti is really grieved in his heart. Jānaśruti comes to know, through the conversation of the two kānsas, that he has not been able to get that excellent vidyā, which Raikva has got, it is just natural that Jānaśruti should feel sorry for that loss. And this is exactly the grief suggested by the word Śūdra. It cannot ------------

1. Commentary p. 254:

तथा सुजा हेण्णा रेकस्याड्रावनात् क्षिप्रार्थामिन्यात्।
be argued that, just as women are allowed to get this knowledge even in the absence of the study of the Vedas, the Śudras also may be allowed. Because in the case of women, at least one Samskāra, namely, the vivāha-samskāra, is properly gone through, as various mantras from the śrutis are recited at that time. No such samskāra, with the recitation of the Vedic mantras, is gone through by the Śudras. Especially the most important samskāra, namely, the upanayana-samskāra, is absent in their case. Hence Śudras are not qualified. Moreover, the Śudras usually adhere to falsehood. Satyakāma Jābala was given instruction by Gautama, though the former was unable to mention the name of his father. The only reason for this was that satyakama was telling the truth. The śrutis and the Āranyakas, again, do not allow the Śudras to hear or study the Vedic texts; hence in the absence of such study of the Vedic texts, there is no possibility of their having any desire for the knowledge of the Brahman, so the Śudras are not entitled to obtain the knowledge about the Brahman.

How then, asks the objector, were persons like Vidura etc. able to attain mokṣa? In reply, it is said that, due to the samskaras of their previous births, they could get the knowledge. Moreover, there is no prohibition in the case of the Śudras against listening to the itihasa or Purāṇa,
because such books or compositions are open for study by all the four social orders. But the study of the Vedas is not open to the Śūdras.

10. In the preceding sections, some incidental topics were discussed. Now resuming the main discussion, this new section takes up the sentence ——

मद्विद्यं व वाच्यं प्राणं वेदादि निन्दुलम्। महादृष्टेऽविध्युतस्य वायुस्यं नीतिः॥

etc. from the Katha Upanisad (II.3.1). The word prāna used there denotes the prāṇavāyu as the whole world is said to be breathing due to this prāṇa. Moreover, the cause of terror alluded to in मद्विद्यं व वाच्यं प्राणं --- etc. seems to be the wind which makes the lightening fall down. The knowledge of vāyu leads to immortality. This is accepted by the śruti-texts like वायुरेश्वर व्यपदिः। वायुस्मादिः। वप पुनः ज्ञाति य वेद वेद ...। etc. Hence, here prāṇavāyu or wind in general is referred to.

The Siddhānta asserts that the word prāṇa denotes the Brahman, as this mantra is sandwiched between two other

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1. Brhadaranyaka Up. III.3.2
mantras, which definitely describe the Brahman. So this mantra cannot be said to be referring to any other entity, than the Brahman. The word *asya* in *bhayaḥ asya agnih tapati* etc. refers to this *prāṇa* in order to indicate that this *prāṇa* is endowed with the supernatural power; and this is possible in the case of the Brahman only. Hence the Brahman is, here, intended.

If the Brahman is intended here, how is it that the verse describes the *samsāra-vrksa* prior to the passage under consideration? It can be said by way of reply, that though the *samsāra-vrksa* is described in the first line of the above mentioned verse, still the second line directly refers to the Brahman with the words .

Naturally, the description of the *samsāra-vrksa* plays a subordinate role. Moreover, the sentence

1. cf. *Katha Up.* II.1.18: इशुः गुरुमात्राः पुल्लेव महम्म ब्राह्मस्य जनाति

   *Ibid* II.1.8: तदेव शुक्ल तद्भ्रम तदेवानुकुल्यते।

   तात्पर्यं: भिन्न: स्वेच्छा तु नान्यप्रेमस्य किंविन।

2. *Katha Up.* II.3.2:

Prāṇa ṛṣitaṁ nityaṁ. "

directly refers to the fact that the whole world breathes (e.jāti) on account of this prāṇa and only the Brahman can have such power. The sense is corroborated by the svruti-text "

The remaining

part of the sentence under consideration, namely ṛtramāṇya

väroṣṭatam... etc. suggests that this prāṇa has got full control over this universe and all other deities including Indra etc. perform their duties through fear of it only. Only the Brahman can have such power.

11. The sentence: "

from the Chandogya Upanisad (VIII.123.) forms the subject of the discussion of this section. The word param jyotih refer to some illuminary body, most probably the sun as, in the sentence: "

3. Chandogya Up.VIII.6.5.
The meaning of the sentence under consideration is that just as the elements like wind, clouds, etc., perform their duties in the form of showering etc. and then, leave their visible form, and stay in the sky in their subtle form as they reach the sun (para-jyotih) and again are reborn in their usual form of storm etc., in the same way this samprasadā goes to the sun and is again reborn.

If the word, para-jyotih, refers to the Brahman, then the word ज्ञेन पृष्ठभिक्षणते in the sentence under consideration will have to be regarded as meaningless.

The context, again, is that Prajāpati is giving instructions to Indra about the saguna-upāsana of the Brahman. The fruit of this upāsana such as sporting etc., is stated.

Reporting the Purvapaksa stated above the Siddhānta says that the word para-jyotih denotes the Brahman. This para-jyotih is characterised as being free from sin etc. The intention of Prajāpati in giving this instruction is that, if this Ātman comes into contact with body, then only, the agreeable and disagreeable things cling the Ātman, and that if no such contact with

1. Chāndogya Up. VIII.12.3:

स तत्र प्रतिविश्लेषितमहनि रमण: स्येशिष्ठे नैऽदशः
हातिसिरी नापपति स्मर्तः ...

---
body is there, the Ātman is free from all kinds of worries. So the word samprasadā here implies the knowledge that the Ātman and body are two different entities. The qualities such as knowing all etc., again, characterise the Brahman only. So the Brahman is here intended.

12. The twelfth adhikarana section takes up the passage: बालकार्त्तेव नाम नाममूलमणिस्वरूपिला ये तदन्तर ... etc. for discussion. The Purvapakṣa states that the word ākāśa denotes the usual sky, as the words vai and nāma are generally used to denote the well-known object. The word ākāśa is very often used in the sense of the sky.

The Siddhānta in reply to this says that the word ākāśa is used to denote the Brahman. The argument of the Purvapakṣin that words like vai and nāma are used to denote well-known objects does not apply here. These words, namely, vai and nāma, are used to indicate that it (ākāśa) can disclose the name and form of the object. Moreover, the three words namely, brahman, amṛta and ātman in the sentence तद्भव तदन्तर तद्भस्मात्मा are clear indications of the Brahman. So by the word ākāśa, the Brahman is denoted.

In this section, the non-distinctness of the quality of the Brahman lies in the statement *ye tadantarā* where the word *ye* is rather vague. If it had been, *sarbāni bhūtanī*, the quality would have been more distinct.

13. The passage etc. from the Brhadāraṇyaka Upanisad (IV.3.7) is being considered in this section. According to the Purvapakṣa, the above-mentioned passage reveals the nature of the Jīva as the passage namely, *śvayam vihātya śvayam nirmaya* etc. and also next to it, namely, *sbatnāmāt brahmano vāpam brahmano rūpaṇaṁ tāvāt vihārya brahmano rūpam* etc. describe the nature of the Jīva, where the phrase *vihātya* in *śvayam vihātya* denotes the destruction of *jagṛtavasthā* while, the word *śvayam nirmaya* in the same passage indicates the dream-creation. Moreover, the beginning, the middle, and the end of the passage under consideration indicate that the *samsārin* is here referred to. For example, the passage which begins with the description etc. ...  

refers to the Jīva residing in the heart and prāṇa; in the middle it is said that this (Jīva) dreams etc. etc.1; and the end of this passage establishes its (Jīva's) relation with prāṇa, again. So a samsārin or the Jīva is here intended.

The Siddhānta controverts this by saying that the passage under consideration refers to the Brahman itself. Though the context indicates that the samsārin is here intended, still, it is not samsārin as such but the samsārin as identical with the Paramesvara. This is suggested by the words श्रेष्ठ भगवान श्रेष्ठ सर्वस्वापं निर्भरितं. . . . 3

The same has been confirmed by sentences like — पुष्पेन्द्राण्वाग्रं पापेन्तीर्णिग्रि तदा सर्वस्वापान् इतिहास्य न्याति. 3

Again the words like पति in स वा श्रेष्ठ महानात्मा — श्रेष्ठांश्च श्रेष्ठ सर्वस्वापं: सर्वस्वापं निर्भरितं तदा सर्वस्वापान्: पतिः. . . . corroborate the same assumption. Moreover, the mention that it is neither stained by sins, nor purified by pious deeds न स्व पुण्यथा मूर्तिणा महानात्मा गारियुक्तमा — गारियुक्तमा support the Siddhāntin's view. Hence the Brahman is here intended.

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1. इव 4.3.13.
2. Commentary P.289.
3. इव 4.3.22.
4. Ibid. 4.4.22.
5. Ibid.
The first three quarters of the first chapter seek to harmonise the vedānta-texts by establishing that they all relate to the Brahman. But this appears to be not quite sufficient for, there are some other sruti-passages in which the pradhāna of the Sāmkhyas is mentioned as the cause of the universe. So in this quarter the Sāmkhyas theory has been refuted, and an attempt is there made to reinforce the harmony which has been already established in the first three quarters.

1. After these introductory remarks, Appayya Dīkṣita starts with the first section in this pada. The sentence महत् प्रमथ्यामाय्तका तपस्या परः पुरुषां परं विभिन्नसः काण्डः परः गति: is up for consideration in this section. Here, the word, avyakta is said to be referring to the pradhāna of the Sāmkhyas, because it has been described as the cause of mahaḥ. Or this avyakta may be said to be referring to sarīra, which has been mentioned in between the buddhi on the one hand and the Ātman on the other, in the sentence आत्मानं राथिनं विचिद्ध यरौः सप्तेव तु। बुध्धि स ताराय्ति विचिद्ध मन: प्रधानं च | etc. which occurs immediately before the sentence under

2. Ibid. I.3.3
consideration. The order, namely, Ātman, Sarīra, and buddhi, is according to the śruti-text (śrauta-krama), while, mahaṭ, avyakta, and purusa is the order according to the smṛti (i.e. Saṁkhya), And the śrauta order is more powerful than the smṛti order. Hence the word avyakta refers to the Sarīra only. This is what the Purvapakṣin says.

The Siddhānta refutes this by saying that there is no proof whatsoever to suppose that the śrauta-krama is more powerful than the smarta-krama. So, the word avyakta cannot be taken in the sense of the Sarīra; nor can it be said to be referring to the pradhāna. The pradhāna of the Saṁkhya is never described as the power of the Paramēśvara. But this avyakta being the power of the Paramēśvara is dependent on him. Moreover, if the pradhāna is intended by the word avyakta, the knowability of pradhāna will have to be admitted, while the Saṁkhya do not accept this. Again, the context shows that the discussion here is about the Paramātman and not about the pradhāna. The story of Naśiketas, which is being narrated

1. Commentary P.293:

अव्यक्तं जनीरं पवित्रसूक्तिः स्मार्तक्रमं। ब्रजःमात्रम्य वद्यस्तवः॥
in this passage under consideration, aims at the knowledge of the Brahman, because all the three questions asked by Naciketas to Krtya refer to the Brahman. Similarly, the qualities like being self-born, being free from death, and having subtle form etc., suit the Brahman only. The word mahāt, used in the śrutī-texts may not be taken to refer to the Saṁkhya principle, mahāt. In the same way the word avyakta cannot be taken to refer to the pradhāna of the Saṁkhya. So the Brahman is here intended.

2. The passage अजातेऽगुणितुकाकृतिः बहुवर्ती: प्राण: सूयमानी सङ्गोऽि अजातेऽहतेऽमुष्माणोऽतः ज्ञातवेना मुख्यागगामस्वप्नव्यः।। etc.¹ is being considered in the second section of the fourth quarter. The position of the Pūrvapaksin here is: The words, namely, lohitā, sukla, and kṛṣṇa, in the passage under consideration refer to the three qualities, namely, satya, rajas, and tamas; and the word, ajā, refers to the prakṛti of the Saṁkhya. The sentence, अजातेऽहतेऽमुष्माणोऽतः etc., again, denotes that the ignorant person is addicted to these enjoyments but the enlightened one abandons this ajā and attains salvation.

1. Śvetāsvatara Upanishad, IV.5.
All this description conforms to the system of the Sāṃkhya system. Hence the passage under consideration refers to the three guṇas and the prakṛti of the Sāṃkhya system.

As against this, the Siddhāntin asserts that, the passage under consideration does not refer to the Sāṃkhya system, for, there is no specific reference to or mention of that system. It is just like a vague or wide definition of a camasa as having its face downwards and bottom upwards. Any cave of a mātañjī can easily be covered by this definition, as there is no specification of any kind. Similarly, here, in the passage under consideration, the term ajā is very vague and does not specifically refer to the prakṛti of the Sāṃkhya system. It will surely be more appropriate to take this word ajā as referring to the combination of the three elements, namely, tejas, ap and anna. The three colours, namely, red, white, and black mentioned in the sentence, ajām ekām lohita-sukla-kṛṣṇam, etc., are of the tejas, ap, and anna respectively.

1. Commentary P. 308:

"यथा हि 'अक्रितिक्रियस्य वृत्तिक्रिया' जिति मन्ये प्रसिद्धस्य चमसाचयो वर्णकरित्वं तिर्यगकुलस्य ... सवष्टे गिरिपुढ़ुप्पित्वेद्यादि न बहुन यथा रिकाल्यो छृणेन्द्रनस्मृणात्।"
This is mentioned in the sruti-text:

Moreover, these three elements together are metaphorically described as \( \text{aja} \). Such metaphorical descriptions are not new to sruti-texts. For example, the upanisadic passage

\[
\text{कुन्यों सस्मुष्य समाय समाने}
\]

--- etc., describes the body as a tree; or the sentence

\[
\text{क्वै विकस्यम् ज्ञर्तिकृतस्तिम्यक्षे}
\]

--- etc., describes the head as cowasa. Hence the three colours have to be understood as denoting, which together are metaphorically called \( \text{aja} \) that is a tri-coloured she-goat.

4. In the present section, the sentence

\[
\text{यस्मन् एवं यथावना आकाशश्रव प्रतिष्ण्ठः}
\]

--- etc., from the \text{Brhadaranyaka Upanisad} is taken up for consideration. The words \( \text{एवं यथावना} \), refer to the twenty-five (five into five) principles, of the \text{Samkhya-theory}.

\begin{enumerate}
\item \text{Chandogya Up. VI.4.1.}
\item \text{Mundaka Up. III.1.1.}
\item \text{Brhadaranyaka Up. II.2.3.}
\item \text{Ibid., IV.4.17.}
\end{enumerate}
The Siddhāntin controverts this by saying that the phrase pānca pānca does not denote the number 25; it may denote the number 10 (five and five) at the most. Those twenty-five principles of the Sāmkhyas are not dependent on the Ātman, while the sentence under consideration identifies them with the Ātman. The words pānca pānca jana are found in the sentence: 

त्वा पञ्चजनानाः यथाय धर्मम् गृहः।।

Here, on the evidence of the accents (the second member of the compound, word pānca-jana is anudatta), this compound must be taken to be either vyadhikaranā-tatpurusa or samanadhikaranā tatpurusa. According to the first solution (√मभी सूतै जम्भितम्), the word pānca does give rise to any suspicion about the number of janas, while, according to the second solution

1. Taittirīya Samhitā, I.6.2.2.
2. Commentary, PP.315-316:

किन्तु पञ्चभिप्रेतैन्वन्न्त्र बिति व्यधिकरान्तप्यते वा च च ते 
जनार्दनेति समानाधिकरान्तप्यते वा कवक्यः।। 
तवाधिकारे समस्त- 
पञ्चबलदेश जनान्यभिसंस्करणपर्वतवेव नान्दितः।।

दिक्षेत्रे संवादियः बिति सूत्रेण विभक्तसन्निविक्षिताः संवादियः 
सप्त्तन्त्रिष्णुक्षेत्रस्य समासस्य विधानातृ।।
it simply indicates the number 'five' as it does in the words sapta saptarsayah. Moreover the remaining part of the sentence under consideration, namely, prāṇa prāṇaḥ pāṇcaśāy in these pāṇca. Though the Madhyaminda school of the Sukla-Yajurveda includes anna in the above mentioned pāṇca, still the kāṇva school does not include anna. But this does not do any harm. Because the jyotih mentioned in the sentence prior to this passage under consideration can be included here, so the required number, that is five, will be made up.

Appayya Dīkṣita points out that according to some scholars, the sutra: prāṇadṛṣṭo vākṣyaṣeṣeṇaḥ

2. These five are: prāṇa, katuḥ, śreyo, nātū kālyeṣu anna.
3. Ibid. IV.4.16.
4. According to the Kāṇva school, these five entities are prāṇa, katuḥ, śreyo, nātū kālyeṣu anna.
is not particularly significant\textsuperscript{1}. Because, only when there is a doubt, recourse is to be had with the remaining part of the sentence (vākyāśeṣa). But here, in the present case, there is no doubt of any kind, for, the term pañca-jana conveys the meaning 'five men' through the tradition itself. The passage under consideration first conveys the meaning of the Brahma\textsuperscript{a}s being the substratum of the ākāśa and the five men (that is Brahma\textsuperscript{a}, Kṣatriya, Vaiśya, Śūdra, and Niṣāda). Then there is another meaning, namely that the pratya\textsuperscript{a}tman, has got full control over the five vital breaths (prāna) etc.

It is also suggested by some that the next sutra is wrongly worded. It ought to have read jñātiṣṭhī instead of jñātiṣṭha\textsuperscript{2}, because in the previous sutra the plural form, namely, prāṇādāyat\textsuperscript{a} is used, and the same ought to have been repeated in the next sutra also\textsuperscript{3}.

\textsuperscript{1} Commentary P.317: 'प्राणादयते वाक्योपेशत्' ज्ञाति सूर्य तावदुपन्।

\textsuperscript{2} Vedanta Sūtra I.4.13.

\textsuperscript{3} Commentary P.318: 'प्राणादयते वाक्योपेशत्' ज्ञाति सूर्य तावदुपन्।

पेश्वेनाय वै ज्ञातिरूपताय ज्ञातिरूपताय ज्ञातिरूपताय ज्ञातिरूपताय ज्ञातिरूपताय ज्ञातिरूपताय...
The two suggestions referred to above are set aside by the Siddhāntin. He points out that the sutra, प्राणाद्वाय वाच्यमेवादि; is intended to determine the meaning of the words, पाञ्च-जानाह्, what is exactly meant by these words—whether they mean five varnas and then the five objects by way of the secondary sense? This is the doubt. In order to remove this doubt, the Sutrakāra has introduced this sutra. It means: from the remaining part of the sentence, the phrase पाञ्च-जानाह् means प्राणा etc. and that too in the secondary sense (vṛttantara). As for the next sutra, औऽ च ज्योतिःस्मिन्सत्त्वम् it means: the required number (five) is to be made up by substituting jyotih for anna (if the kāṇva version is to be followed). The words, asati anna are purposely used. The purport of this sutra is: if at all the word anna is absent (that is, if the kāṇva version is followed), then, only the word jyotih is to be substituted.

4. The prādhāna theory of the Śāmkhya, which was sought to be represented as being directly based upon some śrutি-texts has been shown to have failed. The three

1. Ibid. p.319:
preceeding sections. Now the Siddhāntin shows that the attempt to derive support for the Śāmkhya theory from other sruti-passages by resorting to laksāṇā is also unsuccessful.

The sentence: "असत विद्यमानाः सातीत् । ततो ॥" from the Taittiriya and Chāndogya Upanisad mentions asat as the cause of the universe, while the passage "तद्वेक भाहस्दैवैर्माणाः सातीद्रोहन्ताय द्वितीयम्
तत्स्यादस्तः सन्नामतः ॥ ख्यमृतः सन्नामेऽति ॥
" etc. lays down that sat is the cause. From this it appears that the srutis are not unanimous on this point. So it is better to take pradhāna of the Śāmkhya as the cause of the universe. The Śāmkhya have proved pradhāna to be the cause of the universe, according to their rules and conventions. The act of thinking implied in the sentences like "तद्धेतः" etc. may be understood in secondary sense, so that it may be applicable to pradhāna also. Moreover, the sentence "त्रा सातार्सन्यस्तिस्मात् विशंकम्।"

3. Chāndogya Up. VI.2.3.
ments the aksara as the cause. This aksara means pradhana, next to which is the Jiva. So the pradhana may be supposed to be the cause of the universe.

So says the Purvapaksin.

The Siddhāntin controverts this by saying that the Paramesvara, who is endowed with such qualities as being omniscient, and being the lord of the universe etc, is the cause of the universe. All the vedanta texts unanimously declare that the cause of the universe is a sentient entity while the pradhana of the Samkhya is insentient. The Brahman was first avyakta, and then it became vyakta; this vyakta-Brahman has manifold forms like tejas etc., but the original cause is the Brahman only.

In the Sutra: कारणत्वे न चाकाव्यादिः गणाव्ययप्रदिष्टेऽति, the word, कारणत्वेन, is to be split as कारणत्वे and न. The meaning of the sutra is: though there is no definite order in respect of the effects like akasa etc. (कारणत्वे न रूप: लप्यायथ), still about the cause (कारणत्वे) there is no (न) difference of opinion as the Brahman is unanimously declared to be the cause (कारणत्वेन) of the

universe. Moreover, on the basis of the Upakrama and Upasamhara, the word asat in the sentence असद्वेदन्य ब्राह्मण is the cause of the universe. According to the Upakrama and Upasamhara, the word asat in the sentence असद्वेदन्य ब्राह्मण denotes the undifferentiated (avyakta) Brahman. Hence, the Brahman is the cause of the universe.

5. The sentence from the Kausitaki-brañña-Upanisad namely, भव वेल वै वालक वेलेन युद्धायाय कथा सत्य is being considered in this section. The sentence concerns the description of the creation. The creator referred to here may be Hiranyagarbha that is, prāna, since its attribute, namely parispandana, is indicated by the word karma, Moreover, the description in the passage under consideration is directed towards the Jīva, as his sleeping condition is mentioned in etc., or his jagratavastha in etc. The word prāna is used in the sense of Hiranyagarbha,

2. Kausitaki Upanisad IV.19.
3. Ibid. IV.19.
4. Ibid. IV.19.
as the substratum of the Jīva in the condition of sleep, in the earlier section of the same upaniṣad. So Hiranyagarbha or the Jīva is intended here. This is the Purvapakṣa.

The Siddhānta, on the other hand, assumes that the passage speaks of the Brahman. The phrase, yasya vā etat karma in the passage under consideration directly refers to the creation of the universe; the word etat clearly expresses the sense of 'this world'. No other entity than the Brahman can be supposed to have been the creator. As for the qualities of prāna, this much would be sufficient to say namely that the same attributes are present in the previous section of the same Upaniṣad (that is Pratardana-Section), and that in the Pratardana section, which has been discussed in the first quarter, it has been already proved that those attributes can apply to the Brahman only. According to Jaimini, the whole prakāra, which is under consideration now, deals with the substratum of the Jīva in the condition of sleep, in the earlier section of the same upaniṣad. So Hiranyagarbha or the Jīva is intended here. This is the Purvapakṣa.

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1. Ibid. III.1.

2. The last (i.e. eleventh) section in the first quarter.
with the Brahman. King Ajatasatru would not have asked the question, namely, do you know, Baläki, this much? And when Baläki kept quiet, as he did not know more about the Brahman, Ajatasatru said that Baläki, you spoke lie when you said that you know the Brahman. Ajatasatru would not have said like this if he had been firm in his mind about the non-existence of the Brahman.

Some ācāryas think that, in this prakarana, Ajatasatru knows the Brahman fully well, as he realises that the Brahman cannot be known through the knowledge about the sun etc., still other teachers think that the word ākāśa in the sentence य अष्ट विशालानामः पुलम: ...

... and the words prāna are the synonyms of the Brahman, and the Brahman is here intended.²

6. In the sixth adhikarana, the sentence न वाच्ये पत्यः कामाय पति: प्रियो भव्यात्मानस्तु कामाय पति: प्रियो भविते

2. Commentary P.336: 
etc. is taken up for discussion. The position of the Purvapaksa\textsc{in}, is this: The word \textit{Atman} in the above mentioned sentence denotes the \textit{Jiva}. The context indicates that husband, wife, sons, etc. are dear to the \textit{Atman} for the sake of enjoyment. To enjoy is the prerogative of the \textit{Jiva} only, while the Brahman is free from all such things. Moreover the word \textit{vai} which has been repeatedly used indicates that the entity which is here intended is well-known. Again, the reference to the creation and the destruction in the sentence \textit{कृत्वा \text{vai} \textit{रित्रहिती} \textit{क्रमः}} etc., is possible only in the case of the \textit{Jiva}.

This has been refuted by the Siddh\textsc{antin} by emphasising that the whole passage under consideration touches the Brahman. Yaj\textsc{n}avalkya is here expounding the principle of \textit{amrtatva}. This can be attained through the knowledge of the Brahman only. This is \textit{upakrama}; In the middle it is stated that through the knowledge of one, everything else becomes known. This again characterises

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{l. Ibid. IV.5.13.}
\end{itemize}
the Brahman. At the end of the passage it is said that the knowledge of the Ātman leads to the amrtatva. From all this, it will be clear that the Brahman itself is here referred to.

The illustrations such as of the drum, namely, etc. again confirm this very conclusion. Just as the sound of a drum in general does not differ from the sound of a drum in particular, similarly, this worldly existence (i.e. the Jīva) is not different from the cit-Ātman. Similarly, the passage etc. implies the same Brahman as the meeting place of all. Just as the water of a river becomes one with that of the ocean, and no name or sign of that water of the river is left, in the same way when all beings have entered into this Paramātman, no form or name of theirs is left behind. This is possible only in the case of the Brahman.

1. Ibid. IV.5.8-10.
But this should by no means be taken to mean that the Jīva and the Brahman are quite distinct from each other. The relation between the Jīva and the Brahman is like that between the sparks of fire and the fire itself. The sparks are not different from the fire and yet they are not quite, identical with it. This is the view of Āśamarathya. Auddülomi thinks that the Jīva first abandons its āpādhis by performing penance etc. and then only does he become one with the Brahman. The followers of the Pāṇcaratra school also hold this view. But both these views are unacceptable to the sūtrakāra. So a third view, namely that of Kāśakṛtsna is cited. According to this view, the Jīva is identical with the Paramesvara, but appears as if he is different due to ādhyāsa. This is like a rope appearing like a serpent, or like a young prince who is brought up among hunters, thinking himself to be a hunter through ignorance. So the Jīva and the Paramātman are identical. The possibility of their being separate from each other is

1. Commentary P.343:

कैदेव पर्व महाभारताविका अध्यासिद्ध - 'आमृशेतदैव स्मार्तीयवस्त्रे परस्त्र व। मुक्तस्थ तु न भेदात्तितं भेदेत्तौर्भावयते जितित ||
ruled out by the sentence: यद्व तत्स्म स्मार्थतेन मुलतेन

etc., Moreover, the sentence: केन्द्रे ज्ञ स्मार्थिति ते केन ज्ञानियांतु ।

etc. has this purport namely that the difference between the two felt in worldly affairs is not real. When everything is known to be Atman (yatra tu asya sarvam itma eva abhut...etc.), the duality disappears. This is true knowledge, and the same is confirmed by another sentence namely, by knowing the Brahman, one becomes the Brahman itself. This, indeed rules out the assumption that there is difference between the Jiva and the Paramatma even so far as the worldly existence is concerned. In the condition of mukti, the Jiva and the Paramatman become one. This Paramatman is the cause of everything; and this is known only when the Paramatman is known, and that too through the Jiva. This indicates that both Jiva and Paramatman are identical with each other even in the samsara-dasa. Moreover, if the apprehension of difference disappears at the time of salvation, it

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2. Ibid, IV.4.15.
3. Commentary P.345: 'ब्रह्मकेतु ब्रह्मचर्य भक्ति 'ति साख्यारणन्दन्तरेण ...
due to the knowledge of identification of Jīva with the Brahman or is it due to the knowledge of the Jīva itself or on account of the realisation of the Brahman? The first view is untenable, as the non-difference is to be accepted against one's own desire, as the difference is felt throughout. The second view is not acceptable, as it anticipates the knowledge of the Jīva with two aspects, namely, the Jīva, as the agent and the Jīva as the passive witness while in the third view, the Jīva which has been implied by the words such as 'being dear to pati etc.' is described as it is to be seen (drastavya).

Some teachers interpret the śūla, avasthitvā as follows: By the word avasthitī they understand that the Paramātman resides in the Jīva. But this sutra can be interpreted in an opposite way. The upasarga ava in avasthitēh conveys the simple meaning of sthiti. The upasarga ava is of no use here. In the śruti passage य आत्मनि तिष्ठति, this ava is not seen. Appayya Dīksita, however, does not agree with this and favours the first interpretation.

2. Commentary, p.347:

तत्सादिद्वादेवपरमात्मात्वादेव न्य अेव करिच्चयो विचित्रति: परमात्मन् अेव करिच्चयो विचित्रति: परमात्मन् अेव नीवात्मानावत्स्मानादित्येश्वरपुपुषं...
All this would show that the total identification of the Jīva with the Brahman is the aim of the sutrakāra.

One more objection is raised at this stage: In a section known as the mokṣadharma\(^1\), it is stated that the prakṛtipurūsa and the Paramatman are different from each other पश्चात् (?) चेतापरमात्मा परस्यत्वन्यस्तमानः। पद्धतिः परंपरितः च परस्यति \(\text{etc.} \) How is it, thus, that the word avasthitēḥ in the above mentioned sutra is not taken to denote the same difference? Can the upasarga, ava, not convey the meaning of 'difference'? This is replied to follow: the purpose of the mokṣadharma section is to explain the real nature of the Jīva as distinguished from the prakṛti. That section has nothing to do with the nature of the Paramatman, whose nature is altogether different from that of the Jīva as also of the prakṛti

But here, in the sutra under consideration, as well as in the two preceding sutras, namely प्रतिवासित्वंस्ते परंपरितत् च \(\text{etc.} \) and कुल्लक्षणतः सेवनार्थेऽर्थमिः \(\text{etc.} \) the nature of the Paramāsvara is intended to be described. Hence, the interpretation given above namely that the Paramatman resides in the Jīva is correct.

\(^1\) Commentary. P.348.
7. The last section in the fourth quarter describes the Brahman as the cause of the universe. In this connection a question may be asked as to whether the Brahman is the nimitta-karaṇa or the upādāna-karaṇa or both. It may possibly be the nimittakaraṇa, while the pradhāna of the Śāṅkhyas may be taken to be the upādāna karaṇa. Because, it is generally seen that the sacetana-kartṛ is the nimitta-karaṇa, as, for instance, the potter in the case of a jar, while the upādāna-karaṇa is some inanimate thing like a lump of clay. The statement by the knowledge of the Brahman, everything becomes known is not to be taken in its literal sense, for, the knowledge of a potter (nimitta-karaṇa) does not lead to the knowledge of a jar. That statement is to be understood in its secondary sense. It is like saying: "If Mr. X is known from the town, all may be said to become known”. This does not mean that is the whole town. Such is the tone of argument of the Purvapakṣa.

The Siddhāntin controverts this by asserting that the Brahman is both the nimitta and the upādāna karaṇa of the universe. The śruti-texts declare that the Brahman is to be known. The Brahman is the upādāna-karaṇa by means of the knowledge of which, everything else becomes knowledge.
If the Brahman had not been the upādāna-kāraṇa, there was no reason why the śrutis should have insisted upon its knowledge. In explaining the point of the Brahman being the upādāna-kāraṇa, the illustrations of gold, a lump of clay or a piece of iron, etc. are given. All of these latter are upādāna-kāraṇas; hence the Brahman must also be so. Even if some transformation is caused in the upādānakāraṇa, still it does not matter much.

Because, the seed is turned into a sprout or a flower or a fruit which latter are not seen in the seed. Similarly, though the qualities like sat or ananda are not seen, still, the Brahman can be regarded as the upādānakāraṇa.

Moreover the words khalu and vai used in the śruti-passages, अतावर्ते लक्ष्यम् and अभ्यास्य वै indicate the Brahman, the cause of all world. The sentence तदस्य न स्त्रयः प्राप्तस्य etc. confirms the upādānata of the Brahman. The Brahman itself was tejas; this is what is intended by the above mentioned sentence. Another śruti-text, तत्साद्वा अतस्त्य-दात्म: आकाङ्ख: समूहः directly mentions the Brahman as

1. Chāndogya Up. VI.2.3
2. Taittirīya Up. II.1.
both the nimitta and the upādāna-kāraṇa. The ablative
in Ātmanah in the above mentioned sentence denotes the
Ātman as the original cause. The grammatical sutra
lays down the rule that pāñcamī
denotes the original cause. This pāñcamī is not used
to indicate the cause in general, as in the sentence
putrāt pramodah jāyate. Because the sentence, यतो वा
किमानि भूतानि जायन्ते etc., again, emphasises the
Brahman being the original cause. The same is explained
in the Bhamati as पञ्चमी न कारणमात्रे १मे भास्ये अधि तु प्रकृति। etc. Again the statements that the Brahman itself
thought that it should be manifold, and that the Brahman
manifested itself in such manifold forms etc., clearly
confirm that the Brahman is the upādāna kāraṇa. In the
sentence, क्षेरमीर्ज गुर्ग्यं आपूर्योऽनि etc.,
the Brahman is called yoni. The word yoni conveys the
sense of being the upādāna-kāraṇa. Though that word

4. Chandogya Up. VI.2.3
5. Mundaka Up. III.1.3.
usually denotes the place of creation, still on account of the context etc., it is to be understood here in the sense of the upādāna-kāraṇa. The same word, namely, yoni, is purposely used in the sūtra, yonih ca gīyate. The purport of that sūtra is that the Brahman is both the upādāna and the nimitta kāraṇa of this upādāna-kāraṇa, as stated in the upaniṣadic sentence, māyā tu prakṛti etc. It is due to this māyā that the qualities like jādyā etc. are seen in the created objects. So there is no contradiction whatsoever even if the nirvikāra Brahman is accepted as the upādāna-kāraṇa.

8. The sūtra ऐतेन स्वेत स्वात्माता स्वात्माता winds up the first chapter. The sūtra means 'by this all other (minor) theories (like those of anuvādins) etc. are refuted. The last word in the sūtra, namely, vyākhyā, is repeated twice. That marks the end of the first chapter.

1. Vedānta Sūtra, I.4.27.
2. Śvetāśvatara Up. IV.10.
The Nyāyarakṣāmāṇi is a commentary on the vedānta-sūtras of Bādarāyana. This work is written by Appayya Dīksita on the lines of the commentary of Śaṅkara, nay, the commentary of Śaṅkara has served as a model for him. Appayya Dīksita has admitted this in one of his introductory verses:

The title of this work namely; Nyāyarakṣāmāṇi is very significant. The author explains as the jewel serving the purpose of an amulet for the preservation of the various maxims (nyāyas) set forth in the Ārāmaka-Bhāṣya of Śaṅkara. From this it will be clear that the present work is rather a commentary on the commentary of Śaṅkara. This does not mean that Appayya Dīksita has followed Śaṅkara in toto. (At some places, Appayya Dīksita has interpreted the sūtras of Bādarāyana in a rather different

1. Introductory Verse 7.
2. Introductory Verse 9: शारीराका भाष्याकल्पणे न्यायाना रसाकरे मणिष्णाकिंचित्वाकारं
manner). For example, the Ananda-mayadhikaranā has been explained by Appayya Dīkṣita is exactly the same manner as Śaṅkara has done, but in addition to this, Appayya Dīkṣita has tried to improve the stand of Śaṅkara that the word anandamaya does not denote the Brahman. That is why the editor of the present work had to pass a remark Appayya Dīkṣita appears as interpreting the sutras more emphatically so that Śaṅkara's stand had more safe position. Another example of this is the aksara-adhikaranā, where the sphota-theory has been introduced by Appayya Dīkṣita. Śaṅkara introduces this theory in a later context that is in the Devadādhiśhikaraṇā. Appayya Dīkṣita admits that Śaṅkara had explained this sphota-theory in the Devadādhiśhikaraṇa, but at the same time criticises

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1. Śaṅkarabhaṣya on the Vedanta-sūtras, I.1.19:

2. Introduction P.7:


4. Ibid. I.3.26-32
Netrakara by saying that Netrakara should have explained that theory in this section only\(^1\). This indicates that Appayya Diksita has used the commentary of Netrakara only as a starting point and guide for his own work.

Another noteworthy feature of the *Nyāyarakṣāmanī* is this: The order of the adhikarāṇas in it does not tally with the order of the adhikarāṇas in the *Śaṁkarabhāṣya* in one or two places. For example, the *daharadhikarana* in the *Śaṁkarabhāṣya* is divided into two separate adhikarāṇas, namely, the 5th and the 6th adhikarāṇas in the third quarter of the first chapter. The *Nyāyarakṣāmanī* combines these two into one, and consequently the total number of adhikarāṇas in the third quarter is reduced by one. At times, Appayya Diksita has criticised, Śaṁkara. For example, in the *Jyotiradhikarana*\(^2\), Appayya Diksita criticises Śaṁkara for the mention that the metre *gāyatri* has four feet with 6 syllables in each foot. Really speaking this is the view of the Vṛttikāra\(^3\) and not of Śaṁkara himself. Still Appayya Diksita seems to

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1. *Nyāyarakṣāmanī* P.165: भाष्ये तु ‘अन्यशास्त्रविवेचित्र’ ति सूक्ष्म-ः त्या वैदत्त स्पुष्ट क्षेत्रविन्दुतिनिराकरण देशतः विवेचिते कृतम्।
2. *Vedānta Sūtras* I.1.24-27
attack Śaṅkara with the simple remark, yat tu bhāṣye etc.
At one place, Appayya Dīkṣita has shown the courage of
making a bold suggestion, namely, that the wording of
the Sūtra: कामाच्छ नानुमानपैता is not correct,
and that, therefore, it should be changed

From all this, it will be clear that though
Appayya Dīkṣita, in his introductory verses, states that
his work aims only at preserving the commentary of Śaṅkara,
still, at times, Appayya Dīkṣita has criticised Śaṅkara,
and has boldly expressed his own views.

Incidentally, it may be pointed out that there
is much similarity between the Nyāyamañjarī, the poetic
summary of the Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, by Appayya Dīkṣita and
his Nyāyarakṣāmanī. However, this Nyāyarakṣāmanī is more
extensive and full of more information. The Nyāyamañjarī
being a poetic composition had to face some limitations
arising out of the poetic rules and conventions. The
whole summary of each topic of the Śaṅkara-bhāṣya had to

1. Nyāyarakṣāmanī P.60.
2. Vedānta Sūtras I.1.18.
3. Nyāyarakṣāmanī P.32: यथापि शून्ये कामाच्छिदिति स्थाने स्वप्ननाथं अनन्तदिक्ति ति बक्षिष्टमु ।
be briefly stated in the two verses only, one of which represents the pūrvapakṣa and the other which explains the Siddhānta\textsuperscript{1}.

Another important point which can be said as the additional qualification of the Nayānājari is that, Appayya Dīkṣita has made full justice to the views of Śāṅkara. These views are more explicitly explained in this Nyāyarakṣāmāṇi. Appayya Dīkṣita's commentary on the ānandamaya topic\textsuperscript{2} and his power and emphatic way of argument certainly makes the view of Śāṅkara more clear. This work being in prose, Appayya Dīkṣita could take the liberty of explaining the point to its full extent, so that there should not be any doubt or suspicion or any objection raised by the objector may not remain unanswered. In the Nayānājari, on the other hand, Appayya Dīkṣita had to restrict himself.

From the literary point of view, Appayya Dīkṣita has shown in the NRM his mastery over the Sanskrit language. Not only this, but his mastery over rhetorics, grammar,

\begin{itemize}
  \item 1. Nayānājari.
  \item 2. Ganapati Shastri, Introduction to the Nyāyarakṣāmāṇi, P.8.
\end{itemize}
and other sciences also becomes evident at many places. At some places, Appayya Dīkṣita has given the summary of a section in a poetic form. But it cannot be definitely said whether those summary verses are composed by him or are to be attributed to some other author, for, the summary has been given in verse, Appayya Dīkṣita has explained the same in prose. The Nyāyarakṣamāṇi does not belong to any particular school of vedānta, but the author’s inclination towards advaitism, is unmistakable. From the introductory verses, it appears that Appayya Dīkṣita had the intention of dealing with the four chapters of the Śāṅkara-bhaṣya; but unfortunately the portion covering the first chapter only has come down to us. It is now not possible to say whether the remaining three chapters had not been written at all or somehow or other they have become lost to us. Still, even the part which has become available namely, the first chapter of the Nyāyarakṣamāṇi, is more than sufficient to prove that Appayya Dīkṣita was a competent commentator, a grammarian, a mīmāṃsaka, and a rhetorician endowed with remarkable poetic genius.
Section II

Chapter - 3.

Nayamanimala.
The *Nayamanimala* (NMM) is an interesting composition of Appayya Diksita relating to the Śrīkaṇṭha school of Vedānta. This work is in poetic form, and has been printed along with the *Sīvārkanāṇidīpīka* (the commentary by Appayya Diksita on *Śrīkaṇṭhabhāṣya* on the Vedānta-sūtras). This *Sīvārkanāṇidīpīka* has been edited by Halasyanatha Sastri and has been printed at the Nirnaya-Sagar Press, Bombay, 1908. The *Nayamanimala* consists of 83 verses, most of these verses being in Ārya-metre. Appayya Diksita also employs *Srāgadhāra*-metrical for some verses. The work reflects in ample measure the author's poetic genius and mastery over the Sanskrit language.

At the end of this work, we find the colophon which reads as follows:

«कर्निकमन्यदयक्षमिदाश्च चरित्रसंपूर्णाणं स्मार्चितम् | कृत्यपरिच्छेदेप्रयाग्ध्वायस्य चुरुः पादः।»

1. आर्या Introductory verse, the fourth line of the verse contains 19 *Maṭras* while the remaining three have 18. Verses Nos: 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 57, 60 to 78, 81, 82, 83 = Total 60.

2. स्नानचर्गा Verses Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 19, 20, 21, 26, 27, 28 to 31, 33, 58, 59, 79, 80 = Total 23.
From this colophon it would appear that Appayya Dīkṣita had included or had planned to include in the Caturmatsarasamgraha the conspectuses of the commentaries on the Vedanta-sutras according to the four principal schools of Vedanta, and that the Nayamanimala formed the third part of that great compendium. It may be presumed that the Nayamanjari, which contains the gist of Vedanta as interpreted by Śāṅkara in his Śāriṅka-bhaṣya, forms the first part of the Caturmatsarasamgraha, while Rāmaduṇja's Viśistadvaita is summarised in the second part called as the Nayamayukhamalika, Śrīkaṇtha's Viṣistadvaita is briefly stated in this third part, namely, the Nayamanimala, and Madhva's Dvaita is set forth in short in the fourth part, that is in the Nyāyamuktavali. But all these four parts are not found in one single work, but are published separately. Some of these parts cover the portion of the Vedanta-sutras up to the end of the first chapter only, while some cover them completely.

1. It is possible that the Caturmatsarasamgraha is identical with the Matasārathasamgraha, printed at Shrirangam, Journal of the Śaṅkara Gurukulam. This, however, seems to be out of print now.

2. The Nyāyarakṣamani is complete in this sense, while NMM as it is, is not so.
It may be pointed out that, though Dr. Roma Chaudhari has published an English translation of the *Divārkanāṇidīnīkā*, (Dr. Roma Chaudhari, *Doctrines of Śrīkantha, Śrīkantha-bhāṣya*) Vol.II, Pracīvanī Research Series, XI, pp.1-466, Calcutta 1959), still she does not seem to have commented on the *Nayamanīmālā* of the same author, which deals with the same school of Vedānta.
The Nayamaniyalā is primarily based on the Sūtras of Bādarāyana, and so corresponds with the latter in the matter of the division in adhikaraṇas or topics, pādas, and chapters. Unfortunately only the first chapter of the work is now available. This chapter is divided into four pādas and each pāda contains the discussion of certain topics. The method adopted by Appayya Dīkṣita in this work is as follows: For each topic Appayya Dīkṣita has composed two verses. The first verse contains the prima facie view or the Pūrvapakṣa and the second one contains the conclusive view or the Siddhānta. This method is followed all through the work, though there are few exceptions. It may be pointed out that the general scheme of the Nayamaṇimala (NMvI) is similar to that of the Nayamaṇjadi (NM) of the same author. In the Nayamaṇjadi, Appayya Dīkṣita gives a summary of the commentary of Śaṅkara in verses.

The introductory verse of the NMvI gives the general idea about the nature of the composition. It runs as

रोपायनवंशिक्षणाय सोमामारणपदमानसाधायामावेच्छायां
किंस्य नयमाणित्वार्थो श्रीवण्णचायाप्राप्तिमारणिः

As has been already stated, the Nayamaniyalā is printed along with the Sivārakamaniśiripa. At some places, the text is unintelligible due to the omission of some words.
in the text proper\(^1\), while at one place, verses are wrongly numbered\(^2\).

It may be added that, in order to facilitate a comparative understanding of Śrīkaṇṭha's views, a brief indication is given in the foot-notes of the Purvapakṣa and the Siddhānta as thought of by other teachers in respect of each topic.

1. The first topic in the first chapter is called jñānasadhikaraṇā. The Purvapakṣa here is: If the individual is regarded as being identical with the Brahman, and if the latter is beyond the scope of knowledge, what is the use of sciences like logic etc.? Similarly how can the final release (mokṣa) be possible in this case, when the cycle of births and deaths (samsāra) is without an end. On the whole, therefore, it appears that the investigation proposed to be undertaken is purposeless. The Siddhāntin refutes this argument by saying that, the Brahman, as the very word implies, is characterised by un-limitedness and cannot, accordingly be present in the individuals. The Brahman, therefore, needs to be thought over, when it is meditated upon, even the worst kind of sins are destroyed.

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1. e.g. the fourth topic and the sixth topic of the first pada. The eighth topic in the second pada.

2. e.g. the first topic in the second pada.
So it is not improper to make it the subject-matter of investigation.

1. Šaṁkara: Pūrvapakṣa (SP): The Brahman is either known or unknown. If it is known, there is no necessity of its jiṁśā; if it is unknown, it cannot be known even by this śāstra. Šaṁkara: Siddhānta (SS): The Brahman is known, do doubt, but it is known in a general way; about its special (Visēṣa) nature, there is much controversy, for, some say that the body is Ātma, while others characterise mind as Ātma, etc. So this investigation gives the correct idea.

Rāmājuja: Pūrvapakṣa (RP): As the Brahman is Siddha, it should not be known; and it should not be thought over for nītya-phala, as any karman stated in the Veda like Cāturmāsya - yaga gives nītya-phala. Rāmānuja: Siddhānta (RS): The nītya-phala of the sacrifices does not indicate the eternal fruit like mokṣa. Hence this investigation is needed.

Vallabha: Pūrvapakṣa (VP): The Brahman should not be thought, as by the knowledge of the Veda, the knowledge of Vedānta also, is obtained: Vallabha; Siddhānta (VS): f.n. contd.
2. The second topic is known as the \textit{janmādyadhikarana}.
It is argued that the Brahman cannot be regarded as the
material cause of this universe, because, in different
passages, different entities are described as the cause.
In some passages, it is \textit{Ananda}^{1}, in others it is \textit{sat}^{2}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textbf{f.n.contd.}
\end{footnotesize}

Persons of high intellectual capacity may obtain such
knowledge, but persons of medium and low capacity of
intellect are not capable of obtaining this knowledge
by merely reading the Vedas or Vedānta-texts. Hence, at
least for them, this investigation may be started.

\textbf{Madhva : Purvapakṣa (MP)}: The Brahman should not be
investigated, as it is not different from the Jīva, and
the latter is known to all in the form of 'I am that' etc.,

\textbf{Madva : Siddhānta (MS)}: By the word Brahman, Viṣṇu is
implied, and this Viṣṇu is altogether different from the
Jīva. In the absence of the grace of Viṣṇu, attainment
of knowledge is not possible. Hence the investigation
about the Brahman (Viṣṇu) may be started.

1. \textit{Taittirīya Up. III.6}: जन्मादेशः ब्रह्मचर्यान् मनस्यात्।
2. \textit{Chāndogya Up., VI.2.1}: सदेव श्रामयंद्रम ज्ञाति।
while still is others, Śiva is mentioned as the cause. Are we to understand these entities as operating optionally (vikalpa) or collectively (samuccaya)? In reply to this, the Siddhāntin says: Whatever the cause may be, it is hereby proved that the Brahman is the material cause. The Upaniṣadic statement - eka eva Rudrah clearly points to Śiva being the material cause. The names Viṣṇu, Brahmā, and Śiva, are the names of one god, they are all present in Śiva only.

1. Śvetāsvatara U. IV.18: madāstamastan Śiva n rāṣṭrīya
2. Ibid, III.2: akeśa hi tatrā n dvīticāy tadāh
3. SS: The cause of the universe may be something different from the Brahman, as the Brahman is free from any desire, form, etc., while the universe is a production through desire etc.

SS: The Brahman is the cause, as the compound janmādi includes all the three stages - creation, preservation and destruction of all, and this is possible only in the case of that entity which is omniscient and all powerful, that is the Brahman only.
3. The third topic is शास्रयोनित्वाचिकरणः. The Brahman, it is submitted, can be known with the help of the

f.n.contd.

RP: The Brahman cannot be characterised by the qualities like जन्मदिः etc., as it is aprasiddha.
RS: The Brahman can be characterised, as the Brahman means something huge (brh) and hence it is not aprasiddha and it is characterised as the creator etc., This is the शास्रण ब्रह्मण (i.e. Viṣṇu) endowed with endless forms and qualities.

According to Vallabha, this and the next sutra (i.e. जन्मद्यायस्य यताह and शास्रयोनित्वात्) form one unit.

VP: The Brahman cannot be the cause of the universe as it is aprasiddha.

VS: The Brahman is the cause, because the Brahman has created the first thing, i.e. आकाश as pointed out in the sentence, तस्मात वा तस्मात् अत्मानं आकाशं सम्भवतः. (Taittiriya Up. II.1. (Here Vallabha splits the Sutra जन्मद्यायस्य यताह as जन्मा अद्यायस्य यताह (i.e. आकाश was created first as is stated in the above mentioned sentence from the Taittiriya Up.) Or the Brahman is responsible for the creation etc. The compound जन्मदिः is an atadguna ———-
science of inference; it need not be averred that it is known by the Vedānta alone. To this it is replied:

Lord Śiva, with the desire to create the universe, created everything according to the previous tradition, and this

\[\text{\textit{samviñjñāna bahuvrīhi}}, \text{ as opposed to the \textit{tadguna - samviñjñāna - bahuvrīhi}} \text{ of Śamkara as the creation made by the Brahman has no relation whatsoever with the action of birth etc.}, \text{ This means that the Brahman i.e. Viṣṇu is endowed with \textit{janma i.e. āvirbhāva} (to appear) and \textit{tirobhāva} (to disappear) etc.}

\[\text{MS : Though by tradition, the word Brahman may mean the Jīva, here there is an exception, \textit{yato va īmāni bhūtāni jāyante} (Taittirīya UP\textsuperscript{1}, III.1.), which states the cause of the universe, and this is possible in the case of Viṣṇu only.}\]
is stated only in the śāstra (sruti)\textsuperscript{1}

\begin{enumerate}
  \item SP: The Brahman can be known by inference.
  SS: The Brahman is to be known through the śāstras and not by inference. Because, the Vedas like the Rgveda etc., which are full of all kinds of knowledge can be created by the omniscient Brahman only and not by any other entity.
  RP: The Brahman may be the cause, and this can be known by inference as every effect has a cause. For this, the sabda-pramāṇa (sruti-pramāṇa) is not necessary.
  RS: The Brahman can be known through the śrutis only, as the knowledge of the Brahman is beyond other pramāṇas.
  MP: Viṣṇu only cannot be regarded as the cause of the universe, as the creation is a huge work which, like the construction of a huge mansion, requires so many agents. Hence Śiva being omniscient can be described as the creator. Similarly, Brahmadeva also is the creator.
  MS: As the śāstra describes that Viṣṇu is the only creator, he is regarded as the Lord, Here the word śāstra includes four vedas, the Bhārata, the Pāñcarātra, the Rāmāyaṇa, and all those smṛtis and compositions following these works. As Nārāyaṇa himself is the propounder of the Pāñcarātra, this work is more important. This Brahman (Viṣṇu) can be known through these works only (hence it is not known through inference). The same Brahman is the cause, as the śāstra is the only authority.
\end{enumerate}
The fourth topic is *samānvyādhi karāṇa*, and comprises only one verse. Besides, one word in the fourth line of that verse is illegible. The *puruṣapakṣa* says that the existence and nature of the Brahman can be comprehended through inference, and that the scriptures, which lay down only sacrificial injunctions or *vidhi*s have no scope in that connection. To this, the *Siddhāntin* replies by pointing to *śabda-pramāṇya* and the operation of the power known as *tatparyā-linga*.

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1. The *tatparyā-linga* means the purport of a particular passage or a piece of literature. When a particular point is stated at the beginning and the same is emphasised at the middle and also at the end, then, the point is settled by *tatparyā-linga*, it is said. For example, in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (VI.1.11), Śvetaketu has been instructed by his father. At the beginning, by the sentence *चेतनानुष्ठव भवन्ति* etc. the Brahman is introduced, the same has been emphasised at the middle by sentences like *स्वेतकेतु जीवनात्मानानुप्रमूखः* etc. and the same is stated in the concluding part as *य चेतनां च भवतात्मानान* etc. Hence the *tatparyā* of the whole passage is the discussion of the Brahman.

f.n.contd.
5. The fifth adhikarana is known as īksātyadhikarana.

f.n.contd.

SP: The Vedanta-sentences are purposeless as they do not say anything about karamans; on the other hand, they speak about the Brahman, the existence of which is already known (siddha). The sentences describing the siddha-vastu may be either accepted or not accepted, but the Brahman cannot be either accepted or cannot be rejected. Hence these sentences are without any purpose.

SS: Though the siddha-vastu is generally known through the pramanas like pratyakṣa etc., still the Brahman is beyond that pramāṇa and can be known through the Vedanta-sentences only. These sentences unanimously declare that the Brahman is the cause. Moreover, these Vedanta-sentences are significant and useful as they enlighten the person about the Brahman, by the knowledge of which all sorrows and sins are destroyed.

RP: The Vedanta-sentences do not describe the Brahman the existence of which is already known (siddha-vastu).

RS: The Vedanta-sentences are the authority, as the purport of these sentences lies in stating that the
This also consists of only one verse. The Purvapakṣa is that, the Pradhāna of the sāṁkhya is the ultimate cause of the universe. This has been refuted by saying that the ultimate cause must have been a sentient entity, as

f.n. contd.

attainment of the highest joy is the human goal which should be achieved by every one.

VP : There may be some samavayi-kāraṇa of this universe other than the Brahman, as the following three qualities of the Brahman, namely, asti, bhāti, priyatva are not seen in the world, while on the other hand, jadata, ajñānata and asukhata of Prakṛti are seen.

VS : The three qualities of the Brahman are present everywhere, but are not visualised due to the absence of means. At some places knowledge is seen while at others ignorance is seen. This is mere sports of the Lord, the samavayi kāraṇa of the universe.

MP : Viṣṇu abne cannot be regarded as the creator, since other gods like Indra etc. are also described as creators.

MS : All the śruti- sentences which describe any kārman are intended to refer to Viṣṇu only. The śruti always describes Viṣṇu in various forms, such as Indra etc.
is implied by such words as aikṣata employed in the context of the universe\(^1\), and that the Pradhāna of the Samkhyaśas is not so. The śruti-texts which speak of a sentient entity as the creator actually refers to Śiva who possesses both acit powers\(^2\).

6. The sixth topic is ānandamayādīḥkaraṇa. This topic contains eight verses; out of these the fifth verse contains an obscure word, namely, the last word, while the second line of the sixth verse and the last word of the fifst line of the seventh verse are illegible.

The Jīva is said to be the cause of the sky etc., as it is its substratum and modification of the Brahman {brahma-vikāra). The meaning of the termination maya in ānandamaya\(^3\) is 'having the abundance of' and the tail (pucca)

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1. e.g. Chāndogya Up., VI.2.1-3 : सत्वस्य सत्त्वेषदया भासीदेवेत्स्यथितः तदक्षत कृश्च्य प्राणमेवेशि।

2. SP: The Pradhāna may be the cause.

SS: The Pradhāna cannot be the cause, for, iksana is not possible in the case of the Pradhāna, which is insentient. Rāmanuja, Vallabha and Madhva follow Śaṁkara.

3. Taītirīya UP. II.1.5: तत्स्थात्तं श्लेष्मात्रेऽविचारनस्ता।

बन्धोष्कत्तु तत्स्थात् श्लेष्मा।
denotes either the Brahman or the holy syllable (pranava) Om, which is bright like the moon when the clouds are absent. This Brahman is full of bliss which can be experienced by every one who possesses the power. Some teachers (acaryas) assume that as ananda is situated in the sky and as it is not sakti, it is the Brahman itself. Our author obviously does not agree with the view that anandamaya is the Brahman. He says that the puruṣas described as anandamaya pranamaya, etc. are to be gradually attained by a person who is freed from the worldly life and who eligible for salvation. These Puruṣas are: Brahma, Acyuta, Rudra, Isvara, Sadasiva, ananda being of course, identical with the highest principle Śiva.

1. The Puruṣas are: ākāsa, anna, prāna, manas, vijnana, anandamaya.

2. SP: Anandamaya refers to the Jīva, since the Jīva and not the Brahman possesses body and parts. The suffix maya denotes modification which is not possible in the case of the Brahman.

SS: Anandamaya is the Paramatman as the word ananda denotes the Brahman. In order ultimately to point to the principal entity, other subordinate entities are

f.n.contd.
represents the same way; anna etc., which are not Brahman, are first stated and ultimately, the Brahman is stated. This is according to the Arundhati-nyāya. Moreover due to upādhis the Brahman can have parts or body.

But according to Śaṅkara, the real Purvapakṣa and the Siddhānta of this topic are as follows:

**SP**: In the sentence, Brahman puccham pratīṣṭaḥ, (Taittirῑya Up. II.5), the Brahman is not intended. If anandamaya is the Brahman, it is the whole; and again the same Brahman is stated as puccha, which is a part. The same Brahman cannot be represented as both the whole and a part. Hence, here the Brahman is not principally stated, but has to be understood in its secondary sense.

**SS**: The word anandamaya refers to the Jīva and not to the Brahman, because, even if the suffix maya denotes "having the abundance of", still it indicates the presence of sorrow in small scale, while the Brahman is always full of bliss. The word puccha is used in the sense of substratum. Brahman is the substratum of all. Hence, the Brahman forms the principal topic.
three verses, mentions the Purvapaksa as follows: The creator is said to have been born from it i.e. Brahman. Such description occurs at the beginning, in the middle and at the end. The view is controverted. The power of granting moksa belongs to Śiva only and no other character is attributed to him. Sentences such as the one referred to

f.n. contd.

RP: Anandamaya refers to the Jīva.

RS: Anandamaya refers to the Brahma. If the Jīva had been intended by the śruti, there would have been one additional sentence such as... on the lines of the previous sentences. But as this does not occur, hence Anandamaya refers to the Brahma.

VP: Anandamaya does not refer to the Brahma.

VS: It refers to the Brahma as it is full of ananda etc.

MP: Anna, prāṇa etc. are different from the Brahma.

MS: They are not different from the Brahma. The word Brahma invariably denotes Viṣṇu, and all these are described as Brahma, e.g. ānanda जिल्लि जुल्लिये...

1. Maha Up. I.4: यत: प्रकृति जगतः प्रकृति तदेवेन जीवात्मिकसर्व भूमिष्ठा।
   यत् आचार्यः पुराण-मूर्तिः दिखेत मूलानि चारावर्तिनि।
above have to be taken in their secondary sense only. For, Śiva though he is the creator remains apart from the creation. Sentences like, asya lokasya kā gatih, (Chāndogya Up., I.9.1) do not imply non-differentiation (abheda), they only emphasise the point that Śiva is the Lord of the whole creation\(^1\).

8. The eighth topic is antaradhistkaranā and has two verses. When it is said that Śiva is not different from the purusa, in the sun\(^2\), all that is meant to be said is that Śiva is the Lord of the sun. Similarly the words, "purusa with lotus like eyes", do not necessarily refer to Viṣṇu since even Śiva, whose eyes resemble the full bloomed lotus, can be denoted by that word\(^3\).

1. Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Vallabha, and Madhva do not treat this as a separated adhikarana.

2. Chāndogya Up. I.6.6. अथ य ते तत्त्वात् दित्वे दृष्टिकम्।

3. SP : This purusa in the orbit of the sun is the Jīva, being possessed of form, having substratum in the form of the sun or eye, and having limited power.

SS : It is the Brahman, because the attributes like 'being free from sins' etc. are mentioned. The Brahman

f.n.contd.
9. The ninth topic is अकाशचिकरण, with two verses devoted to it. In the चांदोग्य Upanisid the अकाश is described as the ultimate cause of everything, and according to the पुर्वपाक्ष, it is not proper to say that this view is wrong. The सिद्धांतिन agrees with this, but adds that the अकाश in this context has to be understood as the परमाकाश and it thereby refers to the Paramesvara who
can assume any form. The reference to the substratum is for the sake of meditation only, and the same is true with regard to its limited power.

RP : The पुरुष in the orbit of the sun and in the eye is the जीव.

RS : He is the Paramatman, being possessed of Brahma's qualities.

VP : Same as above.

VS : Same as above.

MP : Same as above.

MS : The पुरुष is Viṣṇu, as the qualities like 'being present inside of everything', etc., are present.

1. e.g. चांदोग्य Uप.1.2.1 : तत्त्व द्वारा तत्त्वका महतिरित्याकार विभित द्वाराच क्षीरिषिधा हि वा विभिन्न मृत्त्वा-कार्यार्थ समुल्लयने।
possesses the same qualification. The description that it is the creator of everything does not suit the ordinary ाका or bhūtakāśa.

1. SP: The word akāśa is used in the sense of the usual sky; elements like vāyu etc. are also born from this sky.

SS: The Paramatman is meant here, for, this akāśa is stated as the greatest of all, and is endless, while the bhūtakāśa has an end. Akāśa is used in the sense of the Brahma many times in the śrutis.

RP: Akāśa denotes the ordinary akāśa or the bhūtakāśa.

RS: It is the Brahman as the qualities like 'being the cause of everything', etc., are present.

VP: Same as above.

VS: Same as above.

MP: Akāśa is used in the sense of Viṣṇu, as his qualities such as being the cause of all etc. are present.
10. The tenth topic is prānadhiśkarāṇa, with one verse. What will be the situation, it is asked, in connection with the Upaniṣadīc statement which says that the world is created and sustained by prāṇa? To this the Siddhāntin replies that there too the highest God Śiva is intended to be mentioned. For that statement finally concludes with the mention of ānanda.

1. Chandogya Up. I. 11. 4-5: प्राण विद्यते हृदायात स्मृति हृ वा श्रीमानि नेयानि प्राणेऽमेव निनित्विनिन्नित्विः।

2. SP: Prāṇa means breath, as that word is generally used in that sense. Moreover, sense-organs are the main principles of great elements, and these organs are absorbed in the prāṇa only when one sleeps.

SS: Prāṇa refers to the Brahman, as all beings, including great elements, are absorbed in it only; prāṇa is also used in the sense of the Brahman.

RP: Same as above.

RS: Same as above.

VP: Same as above.

VS: Same as above.

MP: Same as above.

MS: Same as above.
11. The eleventh topic is *jyotiradhihkarana*, with two verses in it. According to the *Purvapaksa*, the word *jyotiḥ* in the sentence, *atha vadataḥ paro divo jyotir diipyate*, will have to be understood as referring to the sun or abdominal fire (*jātharāgni*) or the sky or the individual soul but not Śiva, because there is in the context a mention of feet (limbs). The *Siddhānta* controverts this by saying that the word "feet" refers to Śiva, since all beings are said to be born from this feet. The word *gayatri* denotes Śiva, and the *ākāśa* denotes the highest place, that is the abode of Śiva. The *ākāśa* is neither the usual sky nor the heaven.


2. SP: *Jyotiḥ* conveys the meaning of the sun, etc., as the sky is stated to be its abode. *Jyotiḥ* is generally used in the sense of lustre. The mention of *jyotiḥ* as 'in the heaven or sky', etc., limits the scope of *jyotiḥ*. The fruit of the knowledge of the *jyotiḥ* is also limited.

SS: *Jyotiḥ* is the Brahman. The context clearly indicates that this is the discussion of the Brahman. Its limited scope is intended only for the sake of meditation; so too, due to *upadhis*, the Brahman can have many so-called

f.n.contd.
12. The twelfth topic is the Indra-Pratardanādikaraṇa, and consists of one verse only. As Indra showers rain and as he is the ruler of the world, he can be regarded as prāna; he should be meditated upon for final release. This is the Purvapakṣa. It is, however, not correct. For Indra also is a created being. So he cannot be said to be free from birth and death. So when Indra says, 'meditate upon me', he is actually identifying himself with the highest

f.n.contd.

substrata. The limited fruit is stated as the result of the meditation of the Saguna Brahman.

RP: Same as that of Śaṅkara.
RS: Same as that of Śaṅkara.
VP: Same as that of Śaṅkara.
VS: Same as that of Śaṅkara.

MP: Jyotih conveys that the sense of agni, as in the following ṛk it is used in that sense: किमे वर्णि धर्मावते किविवंति जो महमे जय इहति ययुः। (ṚV,IV,5.11.65).

MS: Jyotih conveys the sense of Viṣṇu. In the above mentioned ṛk also, jyotih is used in the sense of Viṣṇu. He, being impossible to be realised by sense-organ, is described as unaccessible to senses.

1. e.g. Rgveda, II.12.1.: श्रेर्व ज्यात ैव निशोऽध्यातमेऽप्यत्वान्

देवो देवानाः करुणाम प्रभुः।
reality^1.

1. SP : Prāṇa denotes Indra as he is the speaker. The Brahman is formless, while Indra kills Tvaṣṭr and prāṇa conveys the meaning "strength", or prāṇa may mean prāṇavāyu, as it is that which sustains the body.

SS : Prāṇa is the Brahman. As Indra is an enlightened being, he identified himself with prāṇa. The qualities being substratum of all etc., which are mentioned here, are the qualities of the Brahman only. Nor the word prāṇa can be taken in the sense of prāṇavāyu, as there would arise the difficulty of three types of meditations (prāṇa, Indra, and Brahman). Moreover, the qualities of prāṇa are really the qualities of the Brahman.

RP : Same as that of Śāṅkara.
RS : Same as that of Śāṅkara.
VP : Same as that of Śāṅkara.
VS : Same as that of Śāṅkara.

MP : Prāṇa is used in the sense other than Viṣṇu.
MS : Prāṇa conveys the sense of Viṣṇu only as the qualities like 'being meditated upon by gods', 'being described by all the Vedas', etc., are present. The word anugama in the śūtra can be taken in the sense of repetition (abhyāsa) as prāṇa is very often described as the Brahman, i.e. Viṣṇu.
1. The first topic of the second pada is known as the sarvatraprasiddhyadhihikaraṇa. It contains two verses which incidentally are wrongly numbered. The text considered in this topic, according to the Purvapakṣa, describes the Jīva and the word satyasamkalpa occurring here is to be interpreted as it being the truth, there is absence of any thought or it is beyond thought (sati yathārthe asamkalpah). This view is not correct. The context clearly relates to the Brahman, for, all the qualities mentioned there are assignable only to the Brahman. So how can the Jīva be said to have been described in that passage?


3. Ibid.

3. SP: Here the Jīva is referred to, as Paramātman has no mind or prāna. The place and form mentioned there are possible in the case of the Jīva only.

SS: The Brahman is described here, as the context indicates. Moreover, the special qualities like satyasamkalpa etc. are possible in the case of the Brahman only.

f.n.contd.
2. The second topic, anupapattyadhikarana, has three verses. The *Purva-paksa* is that in the section known as *Nārāyanānuvākyopaksa*, the individual soul (*mūryatman*) is described, and its name and other qualities are mentioned. This, says the *Siddhāntin*, is by no means correct. What is

f.n.contd.

The same is true of *ākāsātman*. It is for the sake of meditation, that the description of the place and form is given.

RP : Same as that of Śaṃkara.
RS : Same as that of Śaṃkara.
VP : Same as that of Śaṃkara.
VS : The *śruti*-text under consideration refers to the Brahman. *Satyasamkalpatva* is possible even in the case of Jīva through grace of Viṣṇu. For, the Jīva does enjoy all the fruits including this *satyasamkalpatva* and its previous fruits.

MF : This sentence describes some deity other than Viṣṇu.
MS : Viṣṇu is described here, as the word Brahman denotes Viṣṇu, as the special qualities 'being beyond the capacity of speech and mind' (asrutatva) are possible in his case only.

1. *Maha Up.*, XI.3 : परि विश्वस्वात्मकेऽपि विश्वस्वात्मानं परायणम्

नारायणे महाराजः विश्वस्वात्मानं परायणम्: II
there intended is Lord Šiva with Maṛāyaṇa as his soul. This entity has three eyes and his complexion is white as well as black; obviously it is not the individual soul. Whoever is described there is all pervading and assumes body at his own will. He is Maheśa who is known to possess eight qualities like 'freedom from all sins' etc.¹

3. The third topic is known as the āttradhikarana with normal number of verses, namely, two. The phrase, 'eater of all' in the Upaniṣadic text² must be assumed to denote some one other than Šiva. How, asks the Purvapakṣa, can Šiva, who is always compassionate, be meant here? He cannot be described as performing such atrocious deed. The Siddhānta, as represented by Appayya Dīkṣita, is that the phrase does refer to Šiva. No one else is able to do such thing. As for violence, which is implied in this act, it may be pointed out that it is as in the case of a surgeon who undertakes an operation which is, on the face of

1. This a new and hence a separate topic. But Śaṅkara and others treat the sutras from 1 to 8 as one topic. Vallabha regards Hiranyagarbha referring to the ātīva, as his Purvapakṣa and in the Siddhānta, he supposes, the Brahman is indicated by the word, Hiranyagarbha, in the sutras 9-10 and 11.

2. Kāṭha Up. I.2.24: यथा प्रभु च क्षर्न च वा मया भवन्ति श्रीद्वेषतः ||
मृत्युपयोक्षेपनं क विठ्ठा बैद्यवसं ||
it, a violent act but which in the final analysis conduces to the relief of the patient.

4. The fourth topic is the guhādhikarana, with the

1. SP: The eater may be either agni or the Jīva, as both of them are known as eaters, while the Brahman is not so known.

SS: It is the Brahman, as everything including sentient and non-sentient, is finally devoured by the Brahman only. The context also confirms this.

RP: Same as that of Śamkara.

RS: Same as that of Śamkara.

VP: Same as that of Śamkara.

VS: Same as that of Śamkara.

MP: Viṣṇu is not the devourer, as Aditi is stated to be the devourer in स्व वा अज्ञाति तद्विधितेतदिलितत्वम्।

(Erh. Up I.2.5.)

MS: Viṣṇu is here referred to as both the context and the śrutī-texts describe him as the devourer.
normal number of verses. In the Upaniṣadic text¹ discussed in this topic, it is buddhi and the Jīva that are referred to and not the Jīva and the highest reality. The distinction between the Jīva and the highest reality cannot be represented as that between shade and light, nor can the highest reality be characterised as the enjoyer². Such the Purvapakṣa is refuted by saying that the reference is actually to the individual soul and the highest reality. The distinction between the two is due to the sinfulness and freedom from sins. (maltva and nirmalatva). So too the highest reality is described as the enjoyer of the highest bliss and as remaining in the cave³.

1. Katha Up. I.3.1.: युक्त पिबन्तः खुलतः गुहः प्रतिश्रेत्रे प्रथमे पराप्रे। जात्वयोऽश्च वदन्ति पराश्रयः से जित्वा विकेतेताः।

2. Ibid.

3. SP : That two are the buddhi and the Jīva, as both of these are enjoyer, Buddhi is the enjoyer in the secondary sense. Guha, here refers to body hence, not the Brahman, but buddhi and Jīva are referred to.

SS : These two are the Jīva and the Paramātman. For the sake of meditation Paramātman is here described as residing

f.n.contd.
5. The fifth topic is antaradhikaraṇa with one verse only. The Purvapakṣin says that the puruṣa in the eye has to be understood as the Jīva, as the word Ātman is very oftenly (prasiddhi) used in that sense, or as a shadow-man (chayā-puruṣa). The Siddhāntin refutes this view by saying that the puruṣa in the eye is Śiva because of that puruṣa, it is said that, is immortal. Further, Śiva

f.n. contd

in guhā (i.e. body) with the Jīva and this is in conformity with the śrutī and smṛti texts. The metaphor, light and shadow is in conformity with the Jīva and the Brahman, as the latter is free from bondage etc. and full of knowledge. Hence, it is called light, while the former is enveloped by ignorance, hence shadow. The adjective, the enjoyer can be taken as referring to the Brahman in secondary sense.

RP : Same as above.
RS : Same as above.
VP : Same as above.
VS : Same as above.
MP : Same as above.
MS : The Brahman is Viṣṇu, having two forms, as it is said in the śrutī.
6. The sixth topic in the second quarter is anavasthityadhikarana, and has the normal number of verses in it, namely, two. The word puruṣa in the Upaniṣadic sentence is known as residing in the eye.

1. SP: The puruṣa in the eye is the jīva who is present in the eye when one sees and the word Ātman is used in the sense of the Jīva in the śrutis.

SS: The puruṣa is the Paramātman, as the qualities like amrtatva, nirbhayatva etc. can be assigned to him only and for the sake of meditation, his place, namely eye is stated.

RP: Same as that of Śaṅkara.

RS: Same as that of Śaṅkara.

VP: Same as that of Śaṅkara.

VS: Same as that of Śaṅkara.

MP: Same as that of Śaṅkara.

MS: The puruṣa is Viṣṇu as the qualities like amrtatva, nirbhayatva are mentioned.

2. Maha Up.XV, 3: 

Maṇḍapamātrā: Prasthāṇa Maṇḍapāḥ samāhitah. 

according to the Purvapakṣa refers to fire and wind, for both of them are devourers and enjoyers. But the Siddhāntin says that characterisation of 

prāṇa, namely, that is the Lord and enjoyer of all, is suitable only in the case of Śiva. So puruṣa must be understood as denoting Śiva\textsuperscript{1}.

7. The seventh topic is antaryāmyādikaraṇa, and has two verses. The puruṣa in the heart mentioned in the Upaniṣadic text\textsuperscript{2}, must be virāt or pradhāna. It can certainly not be Śiva, who is beyond this universe. Such is the view of the Purvapakṣin, and the Siddhāntin sets it aside by pointing out that it is Śiva alone who is able to enter in the heart, and that the word amṛta is applicable

1. According to Śaṅkara and others, this is not a separate topic.

2. Brhadāraṇyaka Up., III.73. : 

ma: puṣṭīya līlāsū puṣṭīya

brahmāṁ puṣṭīṁ n bhed vasya puṣṭīṁ tārāṁ ma: puṣṭīṁnāmāṁ

manvantarī brahma te brahma-ntānīśvārī ārthāt: ।
only to Śiva according to Jabali.  

8. The eighth topic is known as adṛṣṭvādhiḥkarana. It has two verses in it. The first half of the first line of the second verse is illegible. The Purvapakṣa is that it is not clear whether the Mundaka Upaniṣad text refers to --------

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1. Jabala Up. III: 
SP: The word antaryāmin may denote some deity or yogin who can have the power of controlling, but not the Brahman as it is bodiless.
SS: It is the Brahman as it controls everybody and as the qualities like amṛtatva etc. are mentioned.
RP: Same as above.
RS: Same as above.
VP: Same as above.
VS: Same as above.
MP: Same as above.
MS: It is Viṣṇu due to the qualities like amṛtatva etc. are mentioned.

2. Mundaka Up. I.1.5-6:
prakṛti or pradhāna. The refutation of this view is as follows: 'That by means of the knowledge of which all is known', can be the description of the Brahman only, and not of either purusa or prakṛti.

9. The ninth topic is Vaisvanaradhirākaraṇa with two verses. In the text - ko nu ātma kim Brahma etc., the

1. SP: By the word, bhūtayoni, either pradhāna or the Jīva is denoted because the parallel illustrations given there are of insentient being (like the human body or the body of a spider). The qualities like adresyatva do suit with pradhāna.

SS: It is the Brahman as the qualities such as being sarvajña etc. are mentioned there. These are the qualities of the Brahman only. Moreover the knowledge of pradhāna does not lead to mokṣa but the knowledge of the Brahman does so, as it is mentioned there.

RP: Same as above.
RS: Same as above.
VP: Same as above.
VS: Same as above.
MP: Same as above.
MS: Same as above.

2. Chandogya Up. V 11.1-6: केवल ब्राह्मण नहीं ब्राह्मणप्रेमपर्यथा...ब्राह्मणप्रेमपर्यथा

केवल ब्राह्मण नहीं ब्राह्मणप्रेमपर्यथा...
fire which is mentioned as being present in the belly of
the person may, according to the Purvakasa, be either
fire in general or the fire in abdomen (jathara) of the
person. As against this, the Siddhantin asserts that, here
Siva is referred to. For the gods are said to be the fuel
of that fire. We do not find this kind of thing mentioned
in connection with either usual fire or jatharagni.

1. The first topic of the third pada, namely,
dyubhavdhikaranah has two verses given to it. In the
Upanisadic text 2 vayu is referred to as omnipresent. This
Purvapaksa is untenable. The Upanisadic text under

1. SP: Vaisvanara refers to jatharagni or the usual fire,
as the word is very oftenly used in that sense.
Jatharagni is situated within the human body.

SS: It is the Paramatman as the adjective purusa rules
out the possibility of Vaisvanara being jatharagni as
jatharagni cannot be called as purusa. Moreover
Vaisvanara itself means all-pervading, hence only the
Paramatman is intended here.

Ramanuja | All these have their Purvakasa and Siddhanta
Vallabha | Madhva

2. Mundaka Up. II.2.5: यस्मिन् कथा: पृथ्वी वातान्तिरिस्मे ।
मन: यह प्राप्तेषु स्वः ।
consideration obviously refers to Śiva, alone can it be said that he is attainable and not vāyu, by those who are enlightened. So it is neither pradhāna, nor vāyu (i.e. prāṇa) nor the Jīva.

1. SP: The substratum of the Prthivi etc. must be different from the Paramātman as it is called satu which has limited scope while the Paramātman is without such limitations.

SS: Paramātman is the substratum of all, hence this Paramātman is here referred to, while ātman can be called as mentioned with reference to Paramātman and not with reference to the insentient pradhāna. It is not with reference to the Jīva, as the Jīva is not omniscient.

RP: Same as above.

RS: It is the Paramātman as the word sva (denoting the Brahman itself) is used.

VP: Same as that of Śāmkara.

VS: Same as that of Śāmkara.

MP: Same as that of Śāmkara.

MS: As sva-sabda occurs in the śruti-text (sva-sabda means the Ātman. 'The words like ātman, Brahman, etc. are possible only in the case of Viṣṇu and not in any other cases', says the Brahmavivarta), hence Viṣṇu is here, referred to.
2. The second topic is known as the bhumadhikarana. There are two verses in it. According to the Purvapakṣa the word bhu-\textsuperscript{man}\textsuperscript{1} denotes the Ṣīva. This is, however, not correct. Because the word tu\textsuperscript{2} suggests that the previous discussion about Ṣīva is continued here\textsuperscript{3}.

1. Chāndogya Up. VII.23.24 : भूमाधिकरण विनिष्कितव्य ब्रति भूमानं नक्सो विनिष्कितव्य ब्रति।

2. The word tu\textsuperscript{2} occurs in tve\textsuperscript{2}va in the above sentence.

3. SP : The word bhu-\textsuperscript{man} denotes prāṇa as prāṇa is greater than āśā, manas, vānī etc. When one sleeps, except prāṇa all others do not function, hence, vatra nānyat pāsyati, is true in this case also. Prāṇa is also amṛta (prāṇa eva amṛtam-Kausitaki Up. III.2.).

SS : Bhūman is the Paramātman. The word tu\textsuperscript{2} denotes that the discussion about the Paramātman is being continued while other qualities are more suitable to Paramātman than to the Ṣīva.

Rāmānuja | Both the Purvapakṣa and the Siddhānta
Vallabha | of these three acāryas do not differ from
Madhva | those of Śaṅkara except Madhva, according to whom, Viṣṇu is Paramātman.
3. The third topic, aksarādhikarana, consists of two verses. The Purvapakṣa, here, is that, in the Upaniṣadic text - saha uvāca etad vai tad aksaram - etc., the word aksara stands for the sacred syllable Ōṁ, which is well-known. Or it may denote the Jīva which is the substratum of all. The Siddhāntin argues that aksara can denote Jīva only. For the substratum referred to in this context is dependent on Jīva. Moreover, Jīva himself is invisible, still he is described as visible to all.

1. Brhadāraṇyaka Up., III.3.7-8: स हृदयाकैतू तद्वर गार्भि प्राणम बन्धुदय वज्ञयमृत्तिकन्तु।

2. Jīva is visible in his eight forms like water, fire etc. This may be intended here. e.g. Sakuntala, I.1:

प्रक्षयामि प्रपन्नात्मकं वर्त्त निरुर्वद्यातरूपिणिः।

SP: The word aksara may mean Ōṁ, as it is generally used in that sense. Ōṁ is in all forms: सर्वोत्तमं अवेदन्तम् (Chandogya Up. II.23.3).

SS: It is the Paramātman, as it is the substratum of all The word aksara means eternal (na kṣarati iti) or all prevading (asunute iti). This is possible only in the case of the Paramātman.

RP: Same as above.
RS: Same as above.
VP: Same as above.
VS: Same as above.
MP: Same as above.
MS: Same as above.
4. The fourth topic is again called as \textit{I}ksat\textit{yadhikarana}, and has two verses. The \textit{purusa} with reference to whom the word \textit{iksate} is used in the \textit{Prasna Upanisad} is either \textit{Visnu} or \textit{Narayana}. This \textit{Purvaksa} is unacceptable. Because, here, \textit{Jiva} is referred to. \textit{Siva} transcends the \textit{Jiva} or even \textit{Visnu (visnoh parah)}.

1. The fifth topic in the first quarter is called \textit{Iksat\textit{yadhikarana}}.

2. \textit{Prasna Up. V.5}: स एततमानीवन्तमात्मरत्तरः पुनःगणिते.

3. \textit{Samkara} calls this topic as \textit{Iksatikarmadhikarana} in order to distinguish it from \textit{Iksat\textit{yadhikarana}} in the first quarter.

SP: Here the word \textit{parapurusa} refers to \textit{Brahmadeva}, as the fruit of this \textit{Vidya} is the attainment of the \textit{Brahmaloka}.

SS: It is the Param\textit{atman}, as it is said there, the meditater sees the \textit{parapurusa}. As Brahmadeva has \textit{up\textit{adhis}} he cannot be the \textit{parapurusa}.

\textit{Ramanuja} Vallabha: These two follow \textit{Samkara}.

MP: Same as \textit{Samkara}. But according to \textit{Madhva}, the \textit{sruti} text which is being considered is: \textit{सदेव शैव स्मृतिद्वार भासीत्} etc. in the \textit{Ch\textit{andogya Upanisad VI.2.1}}.

MS: Same as that of \textit{Samkara}.
5. The fifth topic is *daharadhikaranā*, and has the normal number of verses. The *dahara* mentioned in the Upanिषadic text may, according to the Purvapakṣa, either be the usual *ākāśa* or the individual soul may be indicated by it. To this the Siddhāntin's reply is: The characterisation, namely, that it *is* free from all kinds of sins, etc. does not suit the individual soul, nor can it be said to refer to *ākāśa*. What is intended to be denoted by the word *dahara* is obviously Śiva, who is beyond everything. It is his greatness which described by such words as are used in this Upanिषadic text.

1. Chandogya Up., VIII.1.1: अथ ददत्सिन्त् छड्मपुरे दहर पुण्डरीकः
वेश्म दहराधिकरन्ततराकामः

2. SP : The word *ākāśa* denotes usual *ākāśa* as it is generally used in that sense. Or it may denote the Jīva, as the body is called as Brahmapura, while the word Brahman conveys the meaning as the Jīva through laksāṇā.

SS : It is the Paramātmā as in the last sentence this *daharakāśa* is compared with the usual *ākāśa*, nor it is the Jīva as the qualities like controlling all etc. are possible in the case of the Brahman only.

Rāmatuṣāja | All, these three acāryas do not differ either in Vallabha
Madhva | their Purvapakṣa or in their Siddhānta from that of Śaṅkara.
6. The sixth topic, pramitadhikaraṇa, has one verse only. The Pūrvapaksin avers that in the Upaniṣadic text the being which is described as being of the measure of a thumb is the Jīva. The Siddhāntin replies that it cannot be so. The angusthamātrapuruṣā is Śiva. For it is Śiva alone whose richness is unlimited, who possesses real knowledge, and who lords over everything.

1. Katha Up. II.12: श्री-पुण्डरिकापुरुषोऽक्ष्य गत्य गात्मनि तिन्ति।

2. According to Śaṅkara (and also according to Vidyāraṇya) in the Adhikaraṇamāla and according to Śaṅkarāṇānda in his Brahma-sūtra-dīpikā there are two move topics between the dasaraďhikaraṇa and the pramitādbhikaraṇa. They are the uttarādbhikaraṇa and the anukṛtyadbhikaraṇa. But Śrīkaṇṭha, it appears, takes the same dasaradbhikaraṇa as continued up to the end of the sūtra. (II.3.23).
7. The seventh topic devatadhikarana has the normal number of verses. According to the Purva-paksa gods are not qualified to study this lore (i.e. Brahma-vidya) because they do not go through the sacrament of Upanayana, nor do they have any desire left. Because they are residing in the same place where the Paramesvara resides. To this the following reply is given: Gods obtain knowledge automatically (svayoni-bhana). They are qualified to study this lore by themselves (that is without the help of the teachers normally available after Upanayana) and they are entitled to the same prosperity in the next birth or future.

1. e.g. Śāṅkara-bhasya on the Brahma-sūtras, I.3.26.

2. Here Appayya Dīkṣita, however, avoids the discussion of the Sphota theory given in detail in the Śāṅkara-bhasya.

SP: Gods are not qualified for the knowledge of the Brahman.

SS: They are qualified.

Rāmānuja and Vallabha follow Śāṅkara in their Purva-pakṣa and Siddhānta.

MP.: Same as that of Śāṅkara.

MB: Human being even after they are born as gods are qualified. All gods were human beings first. If they would have been gods by birth then the question would have arisen.
8. The eighth topic consists of two verses is called apasūdradhikaraṇa. The Upaniṣadic text taken for consideration in this adhikaraṇa is the Chandogya Upaniṣad. In connection with this Upaniṣadic text the Pūrvaṇakṣa is: It would follow from what the Siddhāntin has said in the preceeding adhikaraṇa that even a low-caste person can be regarded as qualified to study the Vedas as he too may develop a desire for such a study through a perusal of itihāsa and purāṇas, as it is found in the Chandogya Upaniṣad where the king Jānaśruti has been addressed as śūdra by Raikva. This view is set aside as follows: The works other than the Vedas, like itihāsa, purāṇa, represent but an elaboration of the Vedas. They by no means be regarded as having independent validity. So the question of a low-caste person being qualified to study the Veda, which is based upon such an assumption, cannot at all arise. So far as the preceeding adhikaraṇa is concerned, gods are self照亮 and do not need external urge. Similarly, king Jānaśruti, referred to in the Upaniṣadic text under

1. Chandogya Up. IV.2.3: आक्षरेष्ठ: हुनि त etc.
consideration was a kṣatriya and not a śūdra.1

9. The ninth topic is known as kampanāchikaraṇa with two verses. The cause of the tremor alluded to in - yad idam kim ca², seems to be the wind which makes the lightening to fall down. How asks the Purva-ākṣaṇa, can Śiva, who is the giver of protection be the cause of terror? The Siddhāntin asserts that that cause is Śiva only. For, like a king who is the ruler, Śiva may be inclined to punish. Moreover, to think of the wind in the context of the highest reality would be quite unwarranted³.

1. SP : Śudras are qualified to study.

SS : They are not qualified. Janaśruti was a kṣatriya and not a śūdra. He is addressed as śūrda only because he was full of grief.

Rāmanuja, Vallabha and Madhva follow Saṁkara.


3. SP : Here, by praṇa, Vāyu is referred to, as the word vajra in the next line refers to showers of rain, lightening etc. By Vāyu again mokṣa can be attained as it

f.n.contd.
10. The tenth topic is \textit{jyotiradhikarana}, and two verses are devoted to it. In the Upaniṣadic text, the word Puruṣottama denotes Narayana who is described as the most imminant (uttama) person (purusa). So the form \textit{param jyothi}

\textit{f.n. contd.}

is stated in the sruti (Chandogya Up. IV.2.1) or (Bṛhadārānyaka Up. III.3.2)

Prāna is the Brahman, as according to the context, the Brahman only is being discussed. The Brahman is as fearful as vajra etc., One is liberated by knowing the Brahman only and not by knowing Vāyu. The Upaniṣadic text of the Brhadārānyaka Upaniṣad means to say that as compared with ordinary human beings, the knowledge of Vāyu gives temporary mukti and not eternal salvation.

Rāmānuja, Vallabha and Madhva follows Śaṅkara.

1. The eleventh topic in the first quarter of the first chapter is called \textit{jyotiradhikarana}.

2. Chandogya Up., VIII.12.3: \textit{केवलं तद्भवतां भवेत्तीतिद्दृढः स्वरूप्यमिनिन्द्यकेष्मेव तिमयम्} and also Mahābhārata, Anuśāsana parva, Viṣṇu-sahasranāma 3:

\textit{vāyu-sahasra-nāma:}
in this context refers to him who is obtained by those emancipated persons. This view, says Siddhāntin, is untenable. Those who have not attained to the abode of Śiva (i.e. Śiva-pada) are liable to return to this world; but, in the text under consideration there is a reference to such persons who are not liable to return. Consequently Śiva must be understood as having been referred to there. The word Puruṣottama can be taken to denote Śiva also.

11. The eleventh and last topic in the third quarter is arthaṃtara-vādī-vyapadeśadikarana, and consists of two verses. The entity referred to in the Upaniṣadic text may be

1. SP: The word jyotih refers to tejas.

SS: As the context shows, jyotih refers to the Brahman. The attainment of jyotih means of being without body. The word uttama-purusa again refers to the Brahman. The remaining three acāryas, namely, Rāmaṇuja, Vallabha, and Madhva do not differ from Śaṅkara.

2. According to Śaṅkara, there is one more adhikarana, namely, susuptyadikarana.

3. Chandogya Up. VIII.14.1: बाकाशे वे नाम नामप्रयोगानविविधाः।
the sky which provides space for all. Or it may be the individual soul which possesses name as well as form.

This is the view of the Purvapakṣin. It is, however, refuted by the Siddhāntin who points out that the characteristics such as 'eternal' etc. are not suitable either to the sky or to the individual soul. So one has to assume that the Paramesvara alone is intended in this passage.\(^1\)

1. The first topic in the fourth pada is anumānikadhikarana. There are two verses in it. The text to be discussed is, mahataḥ param avyaktāḥ, etc.\(^2\) The Purvapakṣa is that the entity described here may be pradhāna of the Sāmkhyas.\(^3\) For, pradhāna is after mahat and

1. **SF**: Ākāsa denotes the usual sky, as it is generally used in that sense and it provides space for all.

**SS**: It is the Brahman as it is different from name and form. By this, it is intended that the whole universe is created by this Brahman.

Rāmānuja, Vallabha and Madhva do not differ from Śaṅkara in their Purvapakṣa and Siddhānta.

2. **Katha Up. I.3.10-11**: बिन्दुकेम्या पृथाक्षे... महतः परस्मयानिन्यकालात्

    पुलकः परः। पुलकान्तः परं किंचित्सा कष्ट्या शा परा गति: ।

3. It may be pointed out that most of the characteristics of the Brahman can be made applicable to pradhāna also.
prior to purusa in the text under consideration, and the Sāmkhyas also follow the same order as mahat, pradhāna, and purusa. As against this, the Siddhāntin says that, here the highest soul itself is described. The relevant simile is from the chariot and the charioteer in the Katha Upanisad.

2. The second topic is called camasavadadhikarana, and has the normal number of verses. The Purvapakṣa is that in the text – 'ajam ekam' etc. some entity which possesses gunas is obviously described. It can, therefore, be no other than the prakṛti posited by the Sāmkhyas. The Siddhāntin controverts this view by pointing out that the prakṛti is described as being dependent on Īśvara (Īśvara-karanika), that, in the present context, some independent entity is clearly intended, and that, therefore, this text does not

1. Katha Up. I.3.3-4: 

2. SP : The word avyakta denotes pradhana.

3. Svetasvetatara Up. IV.5: 

The remaining three ācāryas do not differ from Śamkara.
refer to the prakṛti.  

3. The third topic, with the normal number of verses, is samkhyopasamgrahādikaraṇa. According to the Purva-pakṣin, the phrase, pāṇca pāṇca-janāḥ, in the Brhadārānyaka Upaniṣad denotes the twenty-five principles of the Samkhya. According to the Śiddhāntin, on the other hand, the five groups of things, such as, pṛāṇa, anna, etc., are referred to by that phrase.

1. SP : Here, the three colours, namely, red, white and black represent three guṇas of the Samkhya and aja is pradhana.

SS : These three colours represent tejas, jala and prthvi and one aja is the Jīva, the enjoyer, while the other one is the Paramātman.

Rāmanuja ||
Vallabha || Same as above.
Madhva ||

2. Brhadārānyaka Up. IV.4.17: यस्मिन्नयः पञ्चवेदना स्वाकाशां प्रतिष्ठितः

3. SP : The phrase, pāṇca pāṇca-janāḥ denotes twenty-five principles of the Samkhya.

SS : The phrase denotes the number five and not twenty-five. These are: Pṛāṇa, caksuḥ srotra, anna and manas, ākāśa, the substratum of all these must refer to the Brahman. Rāmanuja, Vallabha and Madhva these three ācāryas do not differ from Samkara either in the Purva-pakṣa or in the Śiddhānta.
4. \textit{Jagadvacitvadhikarana} is the name of the fourth topic in the fourth quarter, and it consists of two verses. In the \textit{Chandogya Upanisad}, there is reference to certain kinds of actions (\textit{karman}). By this, the Purvapaksa suggests that the individual souls must have been mentioned here, because such actions characterised by piety and impiety are not imaginable in the case of the Paramesvara. The Siddhantin's view is that the phrase, \textit{etat karma}, implies the creation of this whole universe, which can be attributed to Siva and to none other else than Siva.

1. \textit{Chandogya Up.,VI.2.3}: तदेवत .... तद्वेत्वायमुनद ।

2. Here one more topic, namely, \textit{Karanatvadhikarana} is dropped by Srikantha.

\textbf{SP}: Purusa in the text is \textit{prana}.

\textbf{SS}: It is the Brahman, as the words, \textit{etat karma}, in the text under consideration refer to the whole creation, and only the Brahman has got that much power.

\textbf{RP}: Same as above.

\textbf{RS}: Same as above.

\textbf{VP}: Same as above.

\textbf{VS}: Same as above.

\textbf{MP}: Same as above.

\textbf{MS}: Words like \textit{akasa} etc. denote these senses only (i.e. the Paramatman) as are well-known in the people by traditions. In some cases \textit{akasa} is used in the sense of usual sky, still it is dependent on the Paramatman.
5. In the next topic of two verses, namely, 
Vākyānvyādhikarana, the famous Upaniṣadic text, āmtma va are draśṭavyah¹, constitutes the viśaya. By the word, atman, the Purvapakṣin, understands the individual soul. For, he argues, this Ātman is described as being in love with wife, husband, etc. The argument of the Purvapakṣin is refuted by the Siddhāntin. He says that the characterisation of Ātman as possessing all kinds of knowledge, clearly shows that the word denotes the highest soul. He further adds that words like soul etc. are used in the sense of Mahēśvara also²

1. Brhadāraṇyaka Up. II.4.5; न वा अरे पत्युः कामाय पति: प्रियो मद्यातिमानस्तु कामाय पति: प्रियो मद्यस्तु --- गृह्या वा अरे श्रेष्ठयो मन्तव्यो निदिष्टायस्तित्वो मैदयि।

2. Śivārkamanidīpika on I.4.22.

SP : The word atman denotes the Jīva.
SS : It denotes the Brahman. As the context shows, there is discussion about amṛtatva which can be attained by the knowledge of the Brahman only. Moreover, further it is stated that everything is created by this Ātman and only the Brahman has that power.

All the remaining three ācāryas follow Śaṅkara in their Purvapakṣa as well as in their Siddhānta.
6. The sixth topic in this pada, prakrtvadhikarana, consists of three verses. The position of the Purvapaksa is: The creator of this universe is no doubt god, but he cannot be regarded as the material cause, because maya and puruṣa are described as the material causes of both animate and inanimate objects. This view is, however, unacceptable. For, the Siddhāntin says, the creator, is Śiva who is called prakṛti, and, when the cit-śakti is separated from hiṁ, the puruṣa with thousand eyes and thousand heads is born. Śiva is thus the material cause also as he is not different from the Virat. The maya is described as constituting his limbs. So except for Narayana who is free from maya, all the limbs of Śiva are maya. When it is said that everything is pervaded by Śiva, it is intended to say that all forms are forms of Śiva's maya. So this Virat is the material cause also.

1. Śvetāsvatara Up. IV.10:

   नाभा तु प्रकृति विभान्न्याधिने तु महेश्वराम् ।
   तत्षाव्यमोत्सतु व्याप्तं स्वीपरर्त नास् ।

2. SP: The material cause of this universe is something other than Brahman.
SS: The Brahman is the material cause as by the knowledge of the Brahman everything becomes known.
Ramanuja and Vallabha do not differ from the view of Śamkara.
MP: The material cause is different from the Paramātman
MS: Prakṛti, though feminine in gender denotes the Paramātman as all the names refer to Him only.
7. The seventh and the last adhikarana is sarvavākyākhyanādhisthanadhikarana, and it has two verses devoted to it. The Pūrvapakṣa is this, namely, that works like the Śrīsukta, Rudra, Puruṣasūkta, Smṛti, Purāṇa and Itihāsa, etc. do not describe Śiva as possessing various forms\(^1\), and any assumption to that effect would be baseless. The Siddhāntin, however, points out that in accordance with śruti-linga\(^2\) all these forms described in the Śrīsukta etc. can be taken in the sense of Śiva; so too the words denoting

1. These works mention various forms like Lakṣmī, Śiva, Śahasrasāiras puruṣa, etc. as the cause of this universe.

2. That is, as it is said in the śruti. For example the Śvetāsvatara Uप. IV.12:

\[\text{हे देवानी प्रमवलोचनाय विशारदिष्टे सद्ये महर्षः।} \]
\[\text{हिरण्यमथ वर्षत नाममाति (V-L. हिरण्यमथ नामाति पूर्वम्-} \]
\[\text{in the Śvetāsvatara Uप. III.14) स ना बुद्धया सृष्ट्या संयुक्तं।} \]
other deities can be taken in the sense of Śiva¹.

1. SP : Paramāṇus etc. are the cause of the universe.

SS : Such theories are refuted when the main Śāmkhya-theory is refuted. These theories have no direct proof in the Śruti, and the Pradhanamalla-nirbarhaṇa-nyaya is to be followed.

Ramanuja and Vallabha follow Śāmkara.

MP : The words like Śūnya, tuccha, abhāva, nāsa, asat, etc. do not refer to the Paramātm

MS : These are negative words, still they are dependent on Paramātm. As nisēdha is dependent on him, so the Paramātm is here referred to.
Appayya Dīkṣita was a staunch follower of the specific form of Saivism as preached by Śrī-Śrīkāntacārya. In the Nayamanimalā he seeks to expound in the popular manner the salient principles of Śrīkāntha's Saivism. The main principle underlying the teachings of Śrīkāntha is the principle of qualified non-dualism, i.e. Visiṣṭādvaita. Broadly speaking according to this view, the sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa, propound the doctrine of Saguna-Brahman though, in his commentary, Śaṅkarācārya insists that the ultimate teaching of the Brahma-Sūtras is that of Nirguna Brahman except in few cases.

As this work seeks to give but elementary knowledge of the system preached by Śrīkānta, only such topics as are important from the point of his philosophy are discussed, in the Nayamanimalā. That may, possibly, be the reason why some topics are omitted. We also do not find the topics or adhikaranas in the same order as in the commentary of Śaṅkara in the Nayamanimalā or in Appayya Dīkṣita's own Vedāntakalpataruparimala.

1. Of course, Śrīkānta's Visiṣṭādvaita is to be distinguished from that of Ramanuja.
Some of the important points from Śrīkaṇṭha’s system of Vedānta, as emerging from the Nayamanimalā are given below by way of recapitulation.

1. The Brahman is not absolutely identical with the Jīva,

2. Śiva is the material cause of the universe.

3. Cit-śakti, though a part of Śiva can be separated from him and when that Śakti is separated, the Virat-puruṣa is born. All these, namely, Śiva, Śakti, and Virat-puruṣa three together are the cause of this universe.
Section II

Chapter 4.

Siddhāntaśīlasamgraha.
Siddhāntaleśasamgraha.

The Siddhāntaleśasamgraha by Appayya Dīkṣita is a compendious work on the advaita school of Vedanta. The work has been published in two volumes. The first volume covers 414 pages in all, and can be divided into three main parts. The first part, namely, the introduction in English by S. S. Sūryanarāyaṇa Śastrin extends over 66 pages. It is followed by a gist of each chapter in English which covers 24 pages. The third part consists of an English translation of the Siddhāntaleśasamgraha. It extends over up to the last page. At the end an unnumbered page is devoted for errata. The second volume, having 345 pages in all, can be divided into five parts, namely, texts in Roman and Devanāgarī scripts, corrections notes, appendix, glossary, and lastly index with abbreviations. This second volume begins with the text in Roman characters, in Devanāgarī characters covering 166 pages. This is followed by the text with corrections, which extends over 118 pages. Next 21 pages are devoted to some important notes on each chapter. An appendix,

1. Edited by S. S. Sūryanarāyaṇa Śastrin of Madras, and printed by the Thompson and Company. The book has been published by the University of Madras in 1935.
containing extracts from some important works on advaitism, it contains 8 pages, while fourteen pages have been given for glossary which explains in English the meaning of some technical phrases or words from the Siddhantalesasamgraha. The index, which gives short biographies of well-known advaitins, and their works, and the topical index cover 14 pages, This has been followed by the scheme of transliteration and abbreviations extending over three pages.

This edition of the Siddhantalesasamgraha is based on five manuscripts and five printed texts.

1. A palm-leaf Manuscript in Granth characters, No.XXV B 10 of the Adyar Library.

2. A palm-leaf manuscript in Granth characters, No. XXVI. B of the same Library.


4. A palm-leaf manuscript in Telgu characters No. DC 4764 from the same Library.

5. A paper manuscript in Devanagari script, No. R 1885 from the same Library.
6. The Kumbakonam edition, Advaitamañjari series,
7. The Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series edition
8. The Chowkhamba Press edition,
9. The Jīvānanda Vidyāsāgara edition, Calcutta,
10. The Vāni vilāsa press edition, Śrīrangam. (incomplete)

The appendix devoted to the identification of untraced quotations and works, which the editor had promised, does not seem to have ever been published.

Another printed edition of this work is available. It is published in Advaita Mañjari series, Kumbakonam. But, the Madras University Edition is followed.

The Siddhāntaśasamgraha begins with the verse

which so pays homage to Vāṣa. The same verse appears in the Nyāyarakṣāmaṇi also. The Siddhāntaśasamgraha

1. This edition constitutes the basic text, adds the editor.
2. cf. Nyāyarakṣāmaṇi, 8.
ends with a colophon in verses. Its first verse occurs also in the Madhva-tantra-mukha-mardana.  

In his introductory remarks, Appayya Dīkṣita states that the doctrine of non-dualism has been interpreted variously by various ancient teachers. He has, therefore, brought together and briefly discussed these different views in order that one may have a clearer understanding of the whole matter. Appayya Dīkṣita then directly proceeds to the principal subject matter.

It is enjoined in the Upaniṣads that Ātman is to be seen, is to be heard. Now, the question is whether this injunction is to be treated as an example of apūrva vidhi or of niyama-vidhi or of Parisaṁkhya-vidhi. Appayya Dīkṣita gives the definitions and explanations of these three vidhis according to Purva Mīmāṁsā. He, then, sets forth the views of the author of the Prakarārthavivarana.

1. प्राचीन्याविन्यासाद्विलिपिमात्रामूलसिद्धां परं सन्न्यासिनेनात्मातस्मस्या नानाकविया दर्शिता।
   तन्नाशाश्च सहस्रवेण करिचित्तिश्च नदेयदानिः।
   गुरुर्देवं सहस्रवेणं तांतरव्यासैकां विविषितान्॥

2. cf. Brahadāranyaka Up. II. 4.5

3. "विधिरत्नान्तप्राप्तो निम्नम् निम ग्राहिको सति।
   तव चाच्च्य व प्राप्तो परिसिद्धात गीयते॥"

4. The author of this work is unknown. The work probably belongs to the 12th cent. A.D. An edition of this work is brought out by the University of Madras.
and some others that the Upaniṣadic sentence under consideration is an *apurva-vidhi*, since it enjoins the specific actions for the first time and since that action cannot be thought of without this precept. There is no other evidence than this precept to prove that the study of Vedānta leads to the direct realisation of Brahman. The Bhaṣya of Śaṅkara also supports the view that the Upaniṣadic sentence, ātmā vā are drastavyah..., is a *apurva-vidhi*. It is, however, pointed out that the idea of the study of Vedānta being the cause of the realisation of Brahman cannot be said to be aprāpta or non-established. Similarly the study of Vedānta and the rest, which culminate in the realisation, are processes which have to be repeated and have a visible result. Therefore, the Upaniṣadic sentence, ātmā draṣṭavyah, cannot be regarded as an *apurva-vidhi*.

Then there is, in this connection, the view that the upaniṣadic sentence under consideration should be treated as an example of a *hīyam-vidhi* or restrictive injunction. It is not that one's proceeding to the study of Vedānta for the direct realisation of Brahman follows only from the above precept. What the upaniṣadic sentence

1. cf. Śaṅkara's Bhaṣya on VS, III. 4.47.
actually does is just to specify the study of Vedānta, which, in the absence of this precept, would be optional. A person seeing a thing with his eye may not observe certain details about the thing, but when his attention is drawn to those details by some one else, he exerts his eye itself for grasping those details. In the same way, a person may think in his mind that the Jīva itself is the real self; but when he is told of the self being of the nature of Brahman, he exerts his mind itself for the comprehension of this identity of the self and Brahman and thereby renders the study of Vedānta optional. To avoid this contingency, the Upaniṣadic sentence, ātma va are draṣṭavyah——, specifies the study of Vedānta as the means of Brahman-realisation. Or, between the two alternatives, namely, the study of the Śastra embodying the consideration of the self as different from Brahman and the study of Vedānta, which teaches the identity of the self with Brahman, this niyama-vidhi prescribes the study of Vedānta as against that of the works in language (bhaṣa) even though those latter works might be non-dualistic in purport. Or it precludes the alternative of resorting to Itiḥāsa, Pūrṇa and similar other pauruseya (man-made) works. In any case, the Upaniṣadic injunction Śrotavyah is to be necessarily understood as a niyama vidhi. Incidentally,
Appayya Dīkṣita briefly considers, in this context, the views of the followers of Prakāśatman's Vivaraṇa and of the Saṅksepaśārīraka. It is further suggested by some teachers that this niyama-vidhi insists on the study of Vedānta as productive of immediate knowledge in conjunction with reflection and contemplation or that it insists on the study of Vedānta as productive of immediate knowledge in conjunction with reflection and contemplation or that it insists on the study of being instrumental to meditate cognition alone. Appayya Dīkṣita mentions two more senses in which this sentence may be understood to be a restrictive injunction. It may point to the option of śravana in cooperation with the mind being productive of immediate knowledge. Or, śravana may indicate the inquiry, which is insisted upon for the removal of doubt and error.

Finally it is suggested by some that the Upaniṣadic sentence, atma Śrotavyah, may be understood to be a parisāṁkhyā-vidhi, since its main purpose is categorically to exclude any means other than the study of Vedānta for the realisation of Brahman. Actually, even the study of Vedānta cannot directly lead to the realisation of Brahman; and the Upaniṣadic sentence is intended just to dissuade a person from the activity to which his natural inclination directs him. The author of the SLS also refers to the view
of the Varttika-kara, who wavers between the niyama-vidhi and the parisamkhya-vidhi with a leaning towards the latter,

Having set forth and discussed these views, Appayya Diksita points out that none of them is valid. There is, indeed, no vidhi in the sentence atmā srotavyah. The use of the potential mood in this context is intended only to emphasise the desirability of the intensiveness of the study of Vedanta.

Now the principal theme of Vedanta is Brahman, and this Brahman is defined as the cause of the creation of the substance and the dissolution of the universe. According to Rāmadvayācārya, the author of the Vedantakaumudi, one has here to do with three independent definitions. As against this, it is pointed out by others, including the authors of the Bhāmatī and the Kalpataru, that this is just one simple definition of the unitary Brahman, which is the material as also the efficient cause of the universe. At this stage, Appayya Diksita clearly sets forth the difference between the concept of Parināma (transformation) and that of vivarta (illusory manifestation) and says that, as the material cause, Brahman does not actually undergo any change like, for instance, Prakṛti, but, on account of nescience, it merely appears in various forms. The question, then, arises as to whether it is the Suddha
Brahman itself which is the material cause of the universe or it is Brahman in the form of Isvara or Jiva. The view of the Samkṣepaśārūkara is that the Pure Brahman itself is the material cause, as is clear from the Sūtra Janmādyasya yatāḥ (VS.I.1.2) and the bhaṣya on that Sūtra. The followers of the Vivarana, on the other hand, refer to the scriptural texts like the Mundaka Upanisad (I.1.9) and assert that it is Brahman having the qualities of sarvajñatva, etc., that is to say Brahman assuming the form of Isvara through māyā is the material cause. Then there is the view that the sky etc. is the result of māyā, while the mind etc., may be said to be the result partly of māyā and partly of avidyā, and that, therefore, Isvara is the upādāna with reference to the former, and both Isvara and Jiva are the upādāna with reference to the latter. Some teachers in this school assume that, with reference to the internal organ etc. only, Jiva is the upādāna. It is also suggested by some others that, just as Jiva is the upādāna of the dream world, so too Brahman can be the upādāna of what may be called the vivarta-world. Or, finally, Jiva, alone is the cause of all, since it is he, who posits in himself everything including Isvaratva.

1. cf. Mundaka Up. I.1.9:

म: सर्वेः सर्वविषय दानमर्य तपः ।
तस्मादेतेमद्वा नाम रूपमन्ये च नायते ॥
Now the following doubt arises. The scripture mentions मया as the primal cause of the universe. Similarly the inertness of the मया is seen to persist in the material world. Therefore, मया and not ब्रह्माण्ड, must be referred as the material cause. On this point, the view of अनांदानुब्हाय, the author of the Padarthatattvaniyānaya, is that both ब्रह्माण्ड and मया are the material cause of the universe, the former in the sense of विवर्त and the latter in that of परिनाम. Such a view is warranted by scriptures. And the 'beingness' (सत्या) of ब्रह्माण्ड and the inertness (जाद्या) of मया are both seen to persist in their joint effects, universe. According to the author of the Sankṣepaśāṅkrāka, ब्रह्माण्ड alone is the उपद्यान, मया, being only the subsidiary cause in the sense that it persists in the effect. वाचस्पतिमिश्रा modifies this view by stating that मया is not even the subsidiary cause which persists in the effect, but that is only the accessory cause. The author of the Siddhāntaśākūmūḍi, on the other hand, holds quite a different view and declares that only मया is the material cause and not ब्रह्माण्ड, as is indicated by several scriptural texts. ब्रह्माण्ड is

1. Svetāsvatara Up IV, 10: मया तु प्रकृति विवर्त । etc.
2. cf. Brahadrānyaka Up. II.5-19: तदेवद ब्रह्मपूर्वत्मय्यात्मप्यायत ।
Śvetāsvatara Up IV.8: न तत्स्य कार्य कर्ष्य च विवर्त ।
the substratum of *māyā* and is, therefore, figuratively referred to as the cause in the definition.

Appayya Dīkṣita leaves this discussion here, and proceeds to the next question, namely, the one concerning the nature of *Īśvara* and *Jīva*. According to the *Prakāśarāthavivarana*, the reflection of *cit* in *māyā*, is one, beginningless, and undescrivable is *Īśvara* while the *jīvas* are reflections of *cit* in the *avidyās* which are the many diverse parts of that *māyā*. The view of the *Tatttvaviveka* has a Śāmkhya tinge in it. According to it, the form of the *mūlaprakṛti* in which *sattva* is dominant, is *māyā*; that in which *sattva* is overpowered by *rajas* and *tamas*, is *avidyā*. And the reflection in the former is *Īśvara*; that in the latter is *Jīva*. Another distinction between *māyā* and *avidyā* alluded to by Appayya Dīkṣita, pertains to their respective functions: *māyā* is *prakṛti* in its projective function; *avidyā* is *Prakṛti* in its obscuring function.

Another view referring *Īśvara* and *Jīva* is that the former is the reflection of *cit* in *avidyā*, while the latter is the reflection of *cit* in the internal organ which is the product of *avidyā*. In all these views, *cit*, which is reflected in the forms of *Īśvara* and *Jīva* is identical with Brahman. Instead of the three-fold division, namely, the *Jīva*, *Īśa*, and pure *cit*, *Citrādīpa*; that is, the sixth
chapter of the *Pancadasī*, points a four-fold division, namely, *Kūṭastha* (that which never undergoes any change), *Jīva* (that which is reflected in the mind and is involved in worldly affairs), *brahman* (the undefined pure *caitanya*) and *Īśvara* (that *caitanya* reflected in intellect *dhi* and residual impression (*vasanās*) of all beings.) From among these four, *Jīva*, indicated by the term *aham*, is superimposed on the *Kūṭastha* which is eternal and unchanging.

Now the question arises: how can the *Jīva* which is denoted by the term *aham* and which is perishable be non-different from *Brahman*, which is imperishable? To this, the reply, as implied in the *Naiskarmyasiddhi*, is that the superimposed nature of the denotation "I" is removed by the cognition in the term of "I am Brahman." As for *Īśvara* who is described as being reflected in the intellect and residual impressions, he is of the nature of bliss at the time of deep sleep and he is omniscient and Lord of all etc. But, in the *Brahmananda* chapter of the *Pancadasī*, it is said that, on account of its association with sleep, the blissful being of the *Mandukya-Upanisad* must be regarded as being *Jīva*. But then, how can this blissful being, namely *Jīva*

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1. *Mandukya Up.* 5: सूपन्त्वान अक्षोभत: प्रकाशन अक्षानन्दकोऽ हं नानन्द मुक्तः

2. *Ibid*: श्रेष्ठ स्वेत्वर श्रेष्ठ वैश्वर अक्षानन्दकोऽस्मिनं स्वेत्व अक्षानन्दकोऽ हि मूल्यानामः
be characterised as the Lord of every thing? The reply as given by the commentator of the Gaudapada karikas is: There are three adhidaivata (cosmic) forms (namely, Isvara, Hiranyagarbha and Viratpurusa) and the adhyatma (personal) forms (namely, Prajna, taijasa, and visva) of one and the same supreme being (whose real nature, from the cosmic point of view, is pure and devoid of maya, and from the personal point of view, is turgya). Here, Prajna, who is described as blissful corresponds with Isvara and thereby gets the attributes of the latter.

According to the Drgdrsyaviveka of Bharatitirtha, Kutastha is to be included under Jiva, and the cit is accordingly to be thought of as being of three kinds, namely pure cit (Brahman), Isvara and Jiva. Again Jiva, itself is to be thought of as being of three kinds, namely, absolute, empirical and merely apparent.

At this state, Appayya Diksita refers to the view of the Vivarana that Isvara and Jiva are both reflections but that Jiva is the reflection of Isvara. It is only on this assumption that the freedom of Isvara and the dependence of Jiva on him become understandable.

A fundamental objection is, however, raised by some teachers against any theory of reflection. For one thing, there can be no reflection of what has no form and in what has no form. There are also some other points that can be raised against, the reflection theory. A better theory would, therefore, be that Jīva is the omnipresent cit limited by the internal organ. This is supported by the scripture and the Brahmasūtra.

And finally there is the view that Jīva is the result neither of reflection nor of limitation, but that Brahman itself attains the condition of Jīva through avidyā. It is just as in the case of Kārṇa, who was really a son of Kuntī, but who, through ignorance, regarded himself as being the son of Rādhā (his foster-mother). To bring out this very point, in his commentary on the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, Śaṅkara gives the illustration of the prince who was brought up in the family of hunter. Brahman through its own avidyā attains the condition of Jīva and, in that condition, it imagines of the entire universe.

1. This is set forth in the Bhāmatī.
2. cf. Brahmbindu Up. 11: घटसूक्तमानाकारास्वाभीमाने घटे यथा। घटो नीते तानार्य तद्भज्जिता ननोपणम्।
3. cf. VS. II.3.43.
4. cf. राजाने: मूलिक्राप्तो व्याधिमावो निक्षिते। यथेकालमः संस्करणम: नत्वमस्यादिवं ह्यति।
In this sense, Isvara, too, together with his attributes, is imagined by Jīva.

A new question is now mooted by Appayya Dīksita. Is Jīva one or many? In this connection the following different views are held by different teachers (1) Jīva is one; therefore, only one body has Jīva; that Jīva posits the universe through ignorance; as long as a-vidyā persists, the universe also persists. The entire basis of this view is the dream-analogy. (2) There is only one principal Jīva. It is Hiranyagarbha, the sole reflection of Brahman. Other Jīvas are reflections of this Hiranyagarbha. (3) There is only one Jīva who, without distinction, infuses life into all bodies. (4) Jīvas are many and have the limitations of the internal organ etc., it is only on this assumption that the distinction between the bound and the emancipated can be maintained.

As for ignorance, it is suggested that, though it is one, it has parts and that, consequent upon brahman knowledge, while it ceases in part, it also persists in part. Another view is that brahman - knowledge removes the mind and thereby destroys ignorance whose presence in cit is brought about by the mind. As against this, it is pointed out by some that ignorance is not present in
pure cit\textsuperscript{1}, but that it resides in Ī\text{\text{ī}}va and has Brahman for its content. Still others say that each Ī\text{\text{ī}}va has its own separate ignorance, which, when removed, leads to release. It is the ignorances of all the Ī\text{\text{ī}}vas which bring forth the universe, and, when the ignorance of the Ī\text{\text{ī}}va is destroyed, that universe is destroyed and a new one is immediately created by the surviving ignorance. Appayya Dīkṣita, further, mentions two other views in this connection, namely, the view that the ignorance of each Ī\text{\text{ī}}va creates a separate universe for that Ī\text{\text{ī}}va\textsuperscript{1} and the view that māyā, which resides in Ī\text{\text{ś}}vara and which is different from the collection of the ignorances of Ī\text{\text{ī}}vas is the cause of the empirical world\textsuperscript{2}.

Appayya Dīkṣita now proceeds to the next question, namely, the one about the nature of agency on the part of Brahman. Some say that this agency consists of the knowledge desire to act, and action which conduce to the production of the effect, while others declare that the agency of Brahman is limited to the knowledge favourable to what is to be done. There is the third view that the agency is the

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1. This view is generally attributed to Maṇḍana and Vacaspati.

2. cf. Samkṣepaśārīraka, II.5.33.
knowledge in the form, "something is to be created."

In these different views, the one common factor is that Brahman is omniscient. But how can Brahman, which does not possess the internal organ, be omniscient? Knower-ship is impossible without the antahkarana. It has, however, been already pointed out that according to Bharatītīrtha and others, Isvara is the witness of the Vāsanās of all contents and is thus omniscient. The view of the author of the Prakāśārtha is this: The various transformations of mayā, which is the upādhi of Brahman, take on the reflections of cit; and the universe becomes known through the flashes of cit reflected in that mayā. This is omniscience. The author of the Tattvasuddhi establishes the omniscience by pointing out that, in the manner described above. Isvara, knows the universe of the present through the impressions produced thereby there is the memory of everything past, and, by means of the transformations of the mayā prior to creation into the things to be created, there is knowledge of the future. Rāmādvaya Ācāryā, the author of the Vedāntakaumudi, opines that there is omniscience because whatever is related to the knowledge, which is the nature of Brahman, becomes manifested. Omniscience on the part of Brahman consists of being of the nature of knowledge relating to all and not of being the knower of all. For Brahman, there is no
knowership of the nature of agency. The scriptural text which declares agency in the matter of the generation of knowledge is to be understood, according to Vācaspati, in the sense that, though the knowledge arising as the result of the manifestation through cit is by its own nature not an effect, is still, in its nature as defined by what is cognised, an effect of Brahman.

If Iśvara manifests objects just by means of the cit, which is his nature, why does Jīva not do so by means of his nature of cit without any mental operation (Vṛtti)? The answer to this question, according to the Vivaraṇa, is that the cit of Jīva, unlike that of Brahman, is not the material cause of all things, is thus not in identity with them, and, cannot, therefore, manifest everything associated with it. But Jīva is in conjunction with the internal organ, and the Vṛtti of this latter goes out through the senses to the object, pervades it, and so manifests it. Or the Vṛtti manifests the non-difference between Jīva and the cit of Brahman limited by the objects, and then Jīva illumines the objects. Or the Vṛtti destroys the ignorance enveloping the Jīva; the Jīva in them manifested and illumines only that object which is in association with that Vṛtti.

Now some points about the above statement are clarified. (1) what kind of association does Vṛtti bring about between the Jīva-Caitanya and the Visaya-Caitanya which are already established and are devoid of activity? According to some teachers, it is the relationship of subject and object. Others say that when the Vṛtti is related to the object, there is an indirect relationship between the object and the Jīva-caitanya through the channel of that Vṛtti which is in identity with the Jīva-caitanya. Still others say that the form of the conjunction of the Vṛtti, which is an effect of the Jīva-caitanya, with the object, which is not such an effect, there results a conjunction between the Jīva-caitanya which is the cause of the Vṛtti and the Visaya caitanya, which is not such a cause. Some teachers belonging to this third school of thought, however, say that the manifestation of the non-difference between the cit which illuminates the object and the Brahman caitanya produces identity with the object. (2) what is the manifestation of non-difference? Some say that it is the identification through Vṛtti of the caitanya limited by the object and the caitanya limited by the internal organ. Others say that the Brahma-caitanya, which is limited by the object, causes in the proximate part of the Vṛtti associated with
the object a reflection that manifests the object, and thereby there results the identification of that reflection with the Jīva. Still others say that through there is difference between the caitanya which is the bimba and is the substratum of the object, and the Jīva in the former's character as really qualified by being the bimba, yet in its nature as caitanya there is identification; and this latter alone is the manifestation of non-difference.

(3) What is meant by the removal of obscuration? If it means the destruction of the enveloping ignorance, then with its destruction the universe also would be destroyed. It is suggested that the removal of obscuration implies the destruction of only a small part of ignorance which envelopes the caitanya. Or, it implies the non-obscuration of the caitanya limited by the object, this caitanya being associated with the vṛttis having the respective forms of the object. Or, what is destroyed by vṛtti is not primal ignorance but of a mode thereof and that is the removal of obscuration.

Now some teachers say that these modes of primal ignorance too are beginningless, while others, basing their argument on the analogy of sleep which causes dreams and the experience "I slept well," assert that they have a
beginning. In this connection, Appayya Dīkṣita further mentions the following views put forth by scholars. There is the view that each cognition destroys one ignorance alone. Another view is that all ignorance do not obscure all things at all times; when the *Vṛtti* which destroys one ignorance ceases, another ignorance obscures the object. Only when the Brahman-knowledge arises are all ignorances destroyed. Still another view is that, while destroying one ignorance, the relevant cognition drives away the other ignorance also in the sense of obstructing their obscuring capacity.

A reference is also made, in this context, to the objection raised by some, namely, that in the case of a continuous stream of cognition, there would be futility of the second and subsequent cognitions as not removing obscurcation, since observation in its entirety has been removed even by the first cognition. This objection is removed by it being pointed out that ignorance, though overcome by *Vṛtti*, begins to operate again on the cessation of that *Vṛtti*, but that it again becomes inoperative when another *Vṛtti* arises. At this stage, Appayya Dīkṣita mentions the view of the author of the *Nyāyacandrika*. The latter says that one particular cognition destroys one particular ignorance, that it does not subjugate other obscuring ignorances, and that, therefore, there is scope for the second and subsequent *Vṛttis* in a continuous
stream of cognition. Another way in which the above objection is sought to be set aside is to argue that the first cognition removes the ignorance which obscures only the essential nature of the object, but the second and subsequent cognitions remove the ignorances which obscure the space, time and similar other attributes of that object.

Another view implied in Akhandānanda's Tattvadīpikā is now referred to namely, that obscuring ignorance is of two kinds - the one located in the object and the other in the subject, and that in the case of mediate Vṛtti the latter alone is destroyed others assert that it is only the ignorance located in the person which obscures the objects; there is no evidence for the existence of any other ignorance over and above this ignorance. As Vācaspati has pointed out, the whole universe is an illusory manifestation of brahman which has been made the content of the ignorance located in the Jīva. As against this, there are still others who assume the presence of the obscuring ignorance in the object along. These teachers further point out that the objections raised against this position, namely that, because of its non-conjunction with the witness (akṣin) who is conditioned by the internal organ, the manifestation of ignorance will be unintelligible
and that its removal by mediate Vrtti will be impossible, are not tenable. For, though modal ignorance is not related to the saksin, primal ignorance is so related. Further, the preception of avidya is of the nature of the saksin and there is no deterrent to the rule that immediate cognition in the nature of Vrtti does remove obscuration.

Now who is this saksin who has been mentioned over and above the jiva?

Appayya Diksita mentions the following views in this connection. According to the Kutasthadipa (6th Chapter of the Pancadasi), the immutable intelligence, which is the substrate of the gross and subtle bodies, is the saksin, because that intelligence, directly sees the bodies that define it and because it is free from modification. It is well-known that indifference and direct seeing or knowledge are the two distinctive characteristics of a saksin. The Svetasvatara Upanisad IV.6 also clearly distinguishes between the indifferent saksin and the enjoyer jiva. Similarly, the Natyakadipa chapter of the Pancadasi shows, on the basis of the analogy of the lamp in the

1. लोकस्थः शोचयेः स्वात्तृति उन्मास्त्रयेः गमिनाक्षरति ।
theatre, that śāksīṁ is distinct from Jīva. As for the nature of Śāksīṁ, the Kuṭāsthadiśa further says that he is the intelligence untouched by the distinction of Jīva, and Isvara. According to Śitsukha, the author of the Tattvapradīpikā, the pure brahma which is the inner self of all, becomes the Śāksīṁ because of non-difference from Jīva.

The view of the author of the Vedāntakaumudī is quite different. He points out that what is called Śāksīṁ is but some particular form of the Supreme Lord, who is himself indifferent but who sees proximately the various activities of Jīva. In support of this view, Rāmādvaya cites the Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad, VI, II. In the condition of deep sleep he is called prajñā. This very view is supported by the author of the Tattvaśuddhi, who says that the Śāksīṁ, though really of the constitution of brahman, appears to be of the constitution of Jīva.

The third view is that the Jīva, conditioned by avidya is himself the sāksīṁ, for, he alone is the direct spectator. Sāksītva implies spectatorship without doership. Jīva in himself indifferent. A slight modification is made in this view by some teachers by suggesting that Jīva
is certainly the Sāksin not as conditioned by omnipresent avidyā but as conditioned by the internal organ.

Now it may be asked; if, in case of the Sāksin, obscuration by ignorance of intelligence is inevitable, how is the realisation of avidyā, ego, etc. by what is itself obscured possible? One reply would be that, like Rāhu, avidyā is manifested by the very light which it obscures. Another reply would be that ignorance obscures intelligence with the exclusion of the Sāksin-intelligence and that this latter is the manifester of avidyā, etc. If it be said that in the event of the Sāksī-caitanya remaining unobscred there would be the contingency of the manifestation even of bliss, which is of its essential nature. One may reply that it would be a contingency of the acceptable. Is it not stated in the Vivarana that "happiness, being the abode of supreme love, certainly becomes manifest"?

At this stage, Appayya Dīkṣita takes up for discussion the question: If bliss becomes manifest, even during one's life-time, what is the difference between sāṁsāra and mokṣa? One can not explain this by referring either to the 'undefined' character of the Brahman-bliss or to its unsurpassability or to the degrees of manifestation. The explanation given by the Advaitācārya is based on the analogy
of the very superior white light and its reflections in many mirrors possessing different degrees of impur:

When the essential bliss which is indeed unsurpassable and one only, becomes the bliss of the witness by being reflected in the internal organ, it has relative superiority or inferiority superimposed on it on account of the relative purity or impurity of the reflecting internal organ. Hence in the bliss, though manifest is the state of samsāra, there is no complete satisfaction as in the essential bliss, because, through the superimposed degrees of inferiority, the former is not perfect. Others, on the other hand, say that bliss is actually experienced as having remained obscure. In respect of one and the same sākṣīn, his intelligence aspect becomes manifest while his bliss-aspect remains obscured, wholly or partly.

Now another point, it pertains to the recollection of individualtion (ahāmkarā) etc. How can this recollection become at all possible? For sāṃskāra or impression, which is of the nature of cognition in its subtle state, is impossible when cognition exists, and its production by the sākṣīn, who is eternal, is also impossible. In this connection, some teachers say that ahāmkarā etc. are manifested by the sākṣīn having the
limitations of himself. Hence because of the non-eternity of this witness, the production of *samskāras* is quite possible, and consequently the recollection of *ahamkāra* etc. is also possible. Others recognise a *vṛtti* of *avidya* in the form of "I", in order that there may result recollection of *avidya* even during deep sleep. In the same way, they explain the *samskāra* whole object is "I", Still others say that the *vṛtti* in the form of 'I' is only a *vṛtti* of the internal organ (and not of *avidya*) but, that, like the *vṛtti* of contemplation etc. it is not of the nature of cognition because it is not generated by the settled cause of cognition. There is, however, also the view that the *vṛtti* in the form of 'I' is cognitive because one gets experience in the form 'I' know myself'. The mind itself is assumed to be the instrument for this cognition.

All this would lead to there being established the rule that the removal of obscuration belongs only to *vṛttis* directly relating to external objects. It may, however, be pointed out that there need indeed not be such rule. For, in the case of the delusion like nacre-silver, the *vṛtti* in the form of 'this' does not remove ignorance. If it did remove ignorance, the delusion would have no material cause. This objection may be set aside by pointing out that though the *vṛtti* in the form of 'this' removes the ignorance about the this element, the ignorance about the
specific element suktitva et al. is not thereby removed and this serves as the material cause for silver. The Saṁkṣepaśārīraka (I, 31.32) clearly states the distinction that the sukti- element is the support (adhīṭhāna) and the this element is the substrate (ādhara) of delusion. The foregoing objection is also set aside by pointing out that the ignorance of the this element may itself be the material cause for the silver which is cognised as identical with that this-element. Though the obscuring capacity along of that ignorance is removed by the vṛtti, in the form of 'this', that ignorance persists together with its projecting capacity. Hence it can become the material cause.

At this stage, Appayya Dīkṣita elucidates at some length the view of Kavitārkika-cakravarti Mrsimha-Bhaṭṭopādhyāya. According to this teacher, prior to the creation of silver, there is no vṛtti in the form of 'this' as different from the delusive vṛtti in the form of 'this' is silver; therefore, the inquiry as to whether the vṛtti in the form of 'this' has or does not have capacity to remove ignorance is utterly baseless. Against this position it cannot be said that, in respect of superimposition position in general, manifestation in general of the substrate is the cause. The vṛtti in the form of 'this'
cannot be assumed from the effect, since its causability of the delusion is not evidenced. Nor can the cognition of similarity be assumed as the cause of superimposition. Further, in the assumption that there is only one sense-generated \textit{vṛtti} whose sphere is the silver in identity with the this-element, and that, prior to it, there is no \textit{vṛtti} in the form of 'this', there is no violation of the supposed causal laws in respect of perception in general, perception of a substance, and perception of silver.

As against this view of Nṛsiṁha, there is the view which accepts the \textit{vṛtti} in the form of 'this' because the cognition of the substrate is the cause of superimposition. As a matter of fact, according to this view, the assumption of the \textit{vṛtti} in the form of 'silver' is superfluous. Then there is the view which assumes two \textit{vṛttis}; the one in the form of this is the cause of the superimposition, while the other in the form of 'this is silver' has the superimposed silver for content. And finally there is mentioned the view that, in a superimposition, the substrate and the superimposed need not appear in a single \textit{vṛtti}. Though there may be separate \textit{vṛttis}, they appear in the one sākṣin manifested by the \textit{vṛtti} in the form of 'this!'
Now there arises the question why is a vṛtti at all necessary, when the manifestation of all things occurs on account of the clarity of the Sāksin? One answer to this is: In the case of direct perception, the caitanya, limited by the object, alone manifested the object, since where a relationship of identity is directly possible it is impossible to assume a relation sui generis of some other relation; hence, for the sake of the manifestation of that identity, the admission of the vṛtti going forth stands to reason. In the case of mediate cognition, it is the caitanya, limited by the vṛtti that has not gone forth, which becomes operative. Some modify this answer by pointing out that the caitanya can manifest objects only in conjunction with them and that, for the manifestation of this conjunction, the going forth in a single vṛtti. Though there may be separate vṛttis, they appear in the one Sāksin manifested by the vṛtti in the form of 'this'.

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impossible to assume a relation *sui generis* or some other relation; hence, for the sake of the manifestation of that identity, the admission of the *vrtti* going forth stands to reason. In the case of mediate cognition, it is the *caitanya*, limited by the *vrtti* that has not gone forth, which becomes operative. Some modify this answer by pointing out that the *caitanya* can manifests objects only in conjunction with them and that, for the manifestation of this conjunction, the going forth of the *vrtti* has to be assumed. There is a further modification of the answer. The going forth of the *vrtti* is intended for creating lucidity (*spāṭata*) of the cognition through the removal of ignorance subsequent to reflection etc.

An objection is raised against this assumption of the *vrtti* going forth. The *vrtti*, it is said, need not go forth to remove the ignorance veiling the object, as this may be removed by a mediate *vrtti*. The reply to this objection is that, in order to be able to remove ignorance, cognition should have the same locus and content as the former. On this the objector would say: Having the same locus is not a necessary condition in the removal of ignorance by cognition; rather the cognition that is to remove ignorance should belong to the same person and refer to the same object as the ignorance, and this is
possible even without the vṛtti going forth. The reply to this is that the cognition which removes ignorance must have come into being through invariable conjunction with the caitanya that is the locus of that ignorance. For the sake of this invariable conjunction the vṛtti must go forth. According to some, the sameness of locus for the ignorance of the object and the cognition that removes it is prescribed by parsimony and is also established on the analogy of external light and darkness.

The last point set forth in the first chapter of the Siddhāntālaṇeśasamgraha (SLS) relates to the non-difference of the Jīva from Brahman. The evidence for this non-difference is the unanimous declaration of the Vedānta to that effect.
Appayya Dīkṣita opens the second chapter with the question: How can the Vedānta texts be regarded as having non-duality of Brahman for their purport? In this connection, Appayya Dīkṣita refers to the view of Jñānagahanapāda, the author of the Tattvasuddhi, that perception apprehends bare reality, the co-presence and co-absence of the sense-organ serves only in this apprehension being delusively presented. It cannot be said that this would not lead to the perception of the form 'the Pot is real', for, just as in the delusions, for the this-element, the substrate, there is apprehension through perception, and the presence and absence of the sense-organ are exhausted therewith, while for the imposed silver-element there is presentation through delusion, so too everywhere there is apprehension if bare reality through perception and the functioning of the senses is in respect of this alone, while the presentation of different things like pot is through delusion.

This may be objected to by saying that, since no sublation is seen here as in the case of the delusion, the admission itself is baseless. To this the reply is: though no sublation be seen, the very incapacity of diverse things like pot to be perceived, in the same way as things remote
in space and time; is at the basis of admission. Because pot etc. which are cognised immediately after the operation of a sense organ, are cognised as certainly different from everything else, since no doubt or error is then seen in respect of that difference of pot etc. Where in respect of post (Sthānu) etc., there is doubt as to its being a man and so on, even there, difference from those which are other than these does certainly appear; not being subject to doubt or error. Nor can it be said that the knowledge of difference be of the nature of memory, since it is dependent on recollection for the counter-correlate element, in the same way as recognition for element of thatness, because, even thus, there is no residual impression of the element of being qualified by the counter-correlate, which is present in difference. Nor is there the possibility of that impression as the conclusion of an inference in the form "The golden-hill is counter-correlate (Bhedā-Pratiyogī) of difference because it is a thing". The sphere of which (inference) is being qualified by the counter-correlate of difference.

According to the author of the Nyāyasudhā, perception does cognise the particulars as real, but only as interpenetrated by the reality of the one substrate, hence assumption of reality in the particular too is
superfluous, while Sarvajñātman, the author of the Samkṣepa-sārīraka, assumes that perception does cognise the reality of the particular but tījat as relating to external objects it has no authority in respect of the inner self, the sole reality, wherein scripture alone is authoritative. The imperative in drastavyāh does not indicate a command, but the worthiness of the object. Some other teachers assume that such reality as is cognised by perception is not inconsistent with illusiveness: for, perception relating to the present alone cannot apprehend non-sublatedness in all three times. Yet others say thus: When there is conflict, scripture is undoubtedly stronger than perception, since the former is free from defects and rises subsequently, as the sublate. The same view is supported by the Smṛti.

Now it may be said that, if sruti is superior to perception in the sentence like "The strew is the sacrificer (yajamānaḥ prastaraha)" one would not be justified in resorting to secondary implication because otherwise there might be conflict with perception. Vacaspati, in such cases, asserts that scripture is of force only where

1. SLS, p.51: "प्रावल्यमाणस्पृश्व जात्या तेनु निष्प्रीतम्।
स्पर्शान्तु।"
it is purportful and that perception is stronger where there is no purport for scripture, as in the mantras and arthavādās, for these latter, where they conflict with perception, secondary implication has to be resorted to. The author of the Vivaranavarttika, on the other hand, says that: Lack of purport is not the test in such cases, since purport exists even for what is understood by laksanā (secondary implication). Freedom from defect (nirdosatva) and supremacy (paratva) constitute the basis of the superiority of scripture. Perception though sublated should have a suitable content assigned to it, hence there is assignment of empirical contact capable of practical efficiency or adoption of secondary implication for what is declared in śruti. Or, the resort to secondary implication is not intended to make śruti conform to perception, but it is resorted to because of the incapacity to perform what is primarily signified by the words. Now, as suggested by some teachers, even on the basis of the principle of the section about the superior

1. S. S. Suryanarayana Śāstri (SLS, University of Madras Vol. I) translates paratva as "postpriority in time", because of the application later on of the apacchedā-nyāya.
force of the initial passage (upakrama-adhikaranaṇanyaya),
perception cannot be stronger, since syntactical unity
(eka-vākyatā) is needed for the application of the
upakrama-adhikaranaṇanyaya. But there is no suspicion of
syntactical unity between nondualist revelation and
perception, therefore, the capacity of the former to make
known its own sense without taking into account the latter,
though earlier existent, is unhindered. And in generating
the knowledge of the sense, the principle of apaccheda
alone applies and not the principle of Upakrama.

But, even thus, the superiority of perception
cannot be avoided, because, perception, as apprehending
the existence of letters, words, etc., is that which is
depended upon by the revelation teaching illusoriness. Such
a suggestion may, however, be counteracted in various ways: 1)
According to some, in valid knowledge through verbal
testimony, only such perception of letters words etc., as
is common to valid knowledge and delusion is needed;
consequently, non dualistic revelation depends only on
perception of letters, words etc., not the valid knowledge
thereof. 2) Others point out that, though in valid knowledge
through verbal testimony, the establishment of the existence
of letters, words, etc. be not needed yet since valid
knowledge does not arise from a sound that has not the
requisite capacity, there does exist the need to establish the existence of capacity. 3) Still others say: Scripture denies the reality, and not the existence, of the world, for, if a negation in respect of existence did not remove that existence, it could not be the negation of that, while, if it did remove that existence, there would be conflict with perception.

There are, however, some teachers who do not accept the three grades of reality consisting of ———-

a) absolute reality in Brahman b) empirical reality of the nature of an appearance of reality in the world, and c) a merely apparent reality inferior even to that, in macre-silver etc.; for, even because of interpenetration by the absolute reality of the subs-trate, Brahman, the concit of reality in objects like pots etc. and in macre-silver etc., is intelligible, and hence there is no evidence for assuming an appearance of reality. But the origination of an appearance (as of silver in necre) is admitted in order to account for the immediacy which would otherwise be impossible in the case of what is at a distance and not in contact. If so, a question may be asked: Does one accept the origination of an appearance of the face in the mirror other than the face on one's neck? The
The reflection cannot be merely apparent, as there the Jīva who is a reflection would also be so.

In this matter, the view of the followers of the Vivaraṇa is: The reflection is not other than the prototype, but there is merely the superimposition of the difference of position. Advaitācārya, on the other hand, opines that the reflection is illusory and different from the prototype. This is supported by Vidyāraṇya and others. Appayya Dīkṣita, further characterises as unsound the view that, the reflection is a variety of shadow cast by an object and, therefore, certainly real. Because, what is called the shadow of an object, is only that darkness which is produced on account of the light being obstructed by particular parts of that object. So, the contention that the reflection is real is not valid. But, the contention that it is illusory too does not stand to reason, for there is not demonstrated, in its case as in the case of nacre-silver, any ignorance which causes it or any cognition which dispels it. In this connection, some say: In the superimposition of reflection, which arises even of for the full cognition of the substrate, the ignorance which obscures the subject is not the material cause of the superimposition nor is the cognition of the substrate in its specific aspect
the dispeller of that delusion, yet, ignorance of the adhisthāna persisting in respect of the projective energy causes the reflection, while the knowledge of the substrate removes it when it is aided by non-proximity of the image. According to some others, the removal merely of obscuring energy is due to the obstacle posited by primal ignorance which alone is the material cause of the superimposition of reflection. In this manner, the dream superimposition, too, is the product of primal ignorance and hence is sublatable only, by the Brahman-knowledge, which alone has the capacity to remove the material of the dream; its merely apparent character is only because of generation by a defect, such as sleep over and above avidyā. Still others, however, say that because of the experience of the illusoriness of dreams by one who has woken up, waking cognition has the capacity to remove the superimposition of dream; so its merely apparent character is only because of its being sublated by cognition other than the Brahman knowledge. There are also teachers who assume that, not the primal ignorance itself but a distinct mode of it, which is of the form of sleep, and which when there is the quiescence (uparama) of the Karma that brings about enjoyment is waking, arises as veiling both the empirical Jīva, the spectator of the waking world, who is of the
nature of a reflection, as well as the waking world seem by him, that is the material cause of the superimposition of the dream-world.

But these views are objected to on the following grounds: The dream objects, since they occupy space different that that of the witness conditioned by individuation, cannot like happiness etc., be manifested by that, independently of relation to a psychosis of the internal organ; and the sense of sight etc. being quiescent, the rise of psychosis is impossible; hence, there cannot be manifestation by that, in dependence on the relation to that psychosis. This objection is removed by saying that intelligence undefined by individuation is accepted as the substrate of the dream world, not as outside the body, but only as within it. Hence, it is that absolute illusioriness is declared of the dream-object, since there is no space in the body corresponding to their perceived dimensions. And thus, the internal organ, having no freedom of action outside the body, has need of the sense of sight etc. in order to originate, in waking, a psychosis whose sphere is the external thus-element of nacre and so on, yet in the case of the internal organ, which within the body is free, a psychosis is possible of itself (that is, without dependence on any sense-organ etc.), therefore,
there is no unintelligibility whatsoever in the undefined intelligence, which is manifested by the psychosis of the internal organ within the body being the substrate. This view is supported by Bharatitirtha. Others, however, point out that the undefined intelligence is not the substrate of the dream world, as manifested by a psychosis. For, the origination is not possible of a psychosis where sphere is undefined intelligence except as based on verbal testimony, while the psychosis in the form of "I" is seen to raise only in intelligence as defined by individuation etc. This second view is further justified as follows as otherwise there would result the contingency of the experience 'I am an elephant': The substrate is the intelligence conditioned, not qualified by individuation and is of the nature of a reflection therein. So even nacre-silver is imposed on that reflection of intelligence which is defined by the this-element of the nacre and is present in the internal organ of which there is the psychosis. It is, however, sometime admitted there is the superimposition of that even on the prototype intelligence, and the failure to cognise by others is justified on the

ground that what has some one's ignorance as its material cause is perceptible by that one alone, not by another Jīva. The visibility of objects in dream cannot be explained on the assumption of the pratibhāsika indriyas, for, the pratibhāsika has no ājñātasattva, while indriyas are uncognised. It cannot also be said that the empirical sense organs go forth from their respective orbs, locate themselves in the dream body, and apprehend their respective objects. Similarly, no subtle sense organs are known to exist. Further, there is the scriptural text (BAU:IV.3.9) which teaches the self-luminosity of the self. Actually the internal organ does not find to function, because it cannot be instrumental to cognition except in dependence on an external sense and because through its transformation, it stands as the object of cognition. Or as is mentioned in the Kalpataru, there might be, even in dream, a psychosis of the internal organ, having the dream object for its sphere. Even admitting a psychosis of the internal organ, its distinction from the Jīva is not well-known,

Those, however, who maintain that perception is creation (dṛṣṭiśri-vadins) accept, for the whole world

1. cf. Kalpataru on III.2.1.
of waking creation contemporaneous with perception, since the uncognised reality of what is assumptive is unintelligible. Now, even if basing one self on the view of the drṣṭi-sṛsti-vādins, one admits of the whole world of waking that it is assumptive, who is he that posits it? It is the unconditional self or the self conditioned by avidyā?

It cannot be the unconditional self as transmigration would persist even after release; nor the conditioned self, because of reciprocal dependence. In reply to this, some teachers say that the stream of conditioning is beginningless and he who is conditioned by the earlier posited nescience posits the subsequent nescience. While others say that nescience etc. are beginninglessness, and that in respect of them perception is not simultaneous with creation. There is, however, another variety of the view of the drṣṭi-sṛsti-vādins, namely, that perception itself is the creation of the universe, since there is no evidence of the difference of the seen from the seeing. But some teachers prefer the view that perception is of the created.

Now, since on both these views, that perception

1. According to Advaita Vedānta, the following six are beginningless: Jīva, Īśa, pure intelligence, the difference between Jīva and Īśa, avidyā and the relation of avidyā to intelligence.
is creation and that perception is of the created, illusoriness is admitted, how is there practical efficiency for what is illusory by nature? It would be as in dream. The author of the Advaitavidya, however, says that, for dream objects, there is not merely such practical efficiency as is sublated by waking, for, in the case of objects seen in dream, there is seen the generation of happiness etc. unsublated by waking. While some others say that, in such practical efficiency as drinking etc., it is the bare existence of water etc. that serves the purpose, not the reality thereof, since for that reality there is neither causality nor the determinant of that causality, According to still others, the class like waterness etc. does not exist as otherwise activity in respect of mirage etc. would be impossible.

Appayya Dīkṣita now raises another issue if illusoriness as an attribute of the world be real, the doctrine of the non duality of Brahman will be adversely affected. To avoid this, that illusoriness itself will have to be regarded as but illusory.

To this, the author of the Advaitadīpikā replies: The illusoriness negates the reality of its substrate, that is the world. And in an attribute negating an attribute opposed to itself, it is universally agreed that what is
determinative is the possession of reality of the same grade as the substrate, not of absolute reality. Or that, attribute which cannot be removed by the intuition of its own locus, that is a negator of the attribute opposed to itself; for, there is seen the distinction that, in nacre, the identity with nacre, which cannot be removed by the intuition of its locus, is opposed to non-nacreness; while in that very nacre, the identity with sliver, which is removable by that intuition of the locus is not opposed to non-silverness. Hereby is also refuted the objection that the verbal testimony as the evidence for Brahman should be real, because practical efficiency having been established even of the empirical, the establishment of the real Brahman even from what has empirical capacity is possible, and because the reality of Brahman is established from the existence of such terms as 'real' in the Vedanta whose purport is Brahman.

Now it may be objected in this connection that though the illusoriness of the non/intelligent world may be established, such illusoriness is impossible in the case of non/intelligent beings, who are to experience moksa, therefore it does not stand to reason that there is harmony of the Vedantas in respect of the non/dual Brahman. To this,
it may be said that, it is not so, since, on their non/difference too, that distinction is intelligible even because of differences in the external adjuncts.

Here it may be further asked as to how there can be distinction, since their non/difference is not lost, even though there be differences in the external adjuncts. The difference must be in the loci, and not in the external adjuncts. Some teachers explain this by saying that the distinction of happiness, misery etc., does certainly result from differences in external adjunct, namely, the internal organ, as they are declared by Sruti to belong to it. According to others, it is not the internal organ but the reflection of intelligence therein that is the locus of bondage. Yet others say that, the enjoyer is intelligence as endowed with body and the organs and identical with the mind. Still other assume that, on the analogy of the redness of the crystal (Sphatika lauhitya nyāya), there may be the superimposition of agency etc. even on the intelligent being, resulting from the proximity of the real locus of agency etc., namely, the internal organ. A few teachers, however, state that the distinction (vyavastha) among conflicting attributes may be due to the

difference whose locus is assumptive, that is, external adjuncts.

It may be thus possible to explain distinction as being due to the influence of adjuncts. But now, the question arises: Which is the adjunct that accounts for the jīvas non-recollection of one another's happiness etc?

One answer to this question is that the non/difference and difference of the abode of enjoyment constitute the adjuncts that account for recollection and non-recollection. Another answer is that what accounts for the non-recollection is the difference of disjoined adjuncts. The third answer is that the identify and difference of bodies constitute the adjuncts that account for recollection and the absence thereof. The fourth answer to that the distinction between recollection and non-recollection results from the nondifference or difference of the internal organs. Some, however, adopt the manifoldness of ignorances; which are the adjuncts for the differences of the jīva, and explain the distinction between recollection and non-recollection to be resulting from the nondifference or difference of that ignorance. As regard this matter it is to be pointed out that, even on the basis of a plurality of pervasive selves, the distinction
is certainly difficult to explain. And in explaining it somehow, it is proper to recognise the unity of self because of conformity to scripture, and because of persimony, and explain it on that basis alone. Nor can it be assumed that the selves are atomic, for, if the selves be atomic, the rise of happiness in all parts of the body, when that happiness is actually located in only one part of the body, would be unintelligible. In this connection, it may be asked; Do the śrutī and the śrīrī not support atomicity? To this, the author of the Advaitadīpikā replies that even thus, the distinction is not established, for, one may recollect another’s pain even as one recollects the pain in different parts of his own body. Nor may it be said that pure difference accounts for ēkā recollection. Because the purity of the difference should indeed, consist in non-concomitance with the relation of member and whole or in nonconcomitance with non-difference. The first alternative is not acceptable because, since the Īśva is declared to be a member of the Brahman by various scriptural texts etc., there would result the confusion of enjoyment, as between the Īśva and Brahman. As for the second alternative, it may be said that,

1. cf. Vedānta Sūtra, II. 3.43.

Bhagavadgītā, IV.7
if difference nonconcomitant with nondifference accounts for nonrecollection, then, since, there is nondifference too between the Jīva and Brahman, and among the Jīvas, undue extension would be difficult to avoid. It cannot also be said that perception of nondifference account for recollection, because, even on the view of the self as one (aikātmyavāda), it is failure to perceive nondifference that accounts for nonrecollection. Further, it cannot be said that knowledge which is pervasive may be the substrate of all difference, because, the experience of happiness etc., which like knowledge is an attribute of the self, origination in dependance on knowledge is impossible. Even if it is said that experience of happiness etc., is an attribute of knowledge itself and not of the self, then, through their diversity, though difference may result for knowledge, which is an attribute of the self, difference does not result for the self, therefore, it is not possible through diversity of enjoyment and on to negate the nondifference of the self. Therefore, an explanation of the distinction on the basis of the assumption of the atomicity of the self does not stand to reason. Nor even does the establishment thereby of the difference of that Jīva from Īśvara stand to reason, because Īśvara too
is declared \textit{Sruti} to enter into creation and to be atomic. If it is suggested that, since other texts establish \textit{Īśvara} as all pervasive, the texts about atomicity etc. have to be explained only secondarily. Why can secondary explanation not be made applicable to similar texts about the \textit{Jīva}? 

Finally, Appayya Dīkṣita concludes this chapter by emphasizing that, because of the illusoriness of the non-intelligent world and because of the non-difference of the world of intelligence from \textit{Brahman}. There is no conflict whatever in the harmony of the Vedāntas in respect of \textit{Brahman} that can be attained by knowledge alone.
The third chapter deals primarily with the means (Sādhana) of the attainment of Brahman. Appayya Dīkṣita opens this chapter with the consideration of the scriptural declaration that knowledge is the sole path to the attainment of Brahman. It is pointed out, in this connection, that the Smṛti-texts also mention karma as a means for the attainment of Brahman. Therefore, with a view to reconciling the Śruti and the Smṛti on this point, it is suggested that the Smṛti may be understood as signifying the need for karma only indirectly. The question however, remains, namely, in what way is karma useful?

The followers of Vācaspati say that the utility of karma is in respect of generating the desire to know, which is a means of attaining Brahman through the acquisition of knowledge. This desire to know caused by karma is like the general inclination for food in the case of a person who has become thin through disdaine for food. The author of the Vivaraṇa and his followers, on the other hand, maintain that karma is useful in generating knowledge itself. The author of the Naiskarmyasiddhi holds the view that the fruit of karma persists, till knowledge is generated through removing obstacles and securing favourable conditions for study etc.
Now, the next question is: What kind of karmas are to be performed?

According to the *Vedanta-sutras* they are the duties prescribed for the various stages in an individual's life, such as *brahmaçarya*, *garhasthya* etc. While according to Amalānanda, the author of the *Kalpataru*, not only are the *āstamadharmaśas* here intended, but the duties outside the *āstamas* as well as the *varṇadharmas* also are of use. The latter, however, adds that the obligatory rites alone are potent to produce knowledge. As against this, the author of the *Śāṅkṣepaśārīraka* accepts the potency of both the obligatory and the optional rites. The statement in the *Smṛti* that Janaka reached perfection by *karma* alone does not indicate that the path of knowledge is open only for the *Brahmanas*. As pointed out by the Vārttikakāra, all the three *varṇas* are eligible for desire for knowledge through *karma*.

What about the Śudrā? Some teachers say that a Śudrā is not competent for such *karma*, because he has no knowledge of *Vaidikas* rites through *adyapāya* etc., while others say

1. cf. *Vedanta Sūtra*, III. 4.32.
that even for the Śudra there is competency of for such karma as subserve knowledge, for examples, meditation of pāṃcāksara, making gifts etc. It cannot be said that the apasūdra-prakrāṇa would be rendered void if the śūdras were given permission to practise such karmas. Because, the apasūdra-section denies competency for saguna-meditation or acquisition of nirgūṇa knowledge through the Vedānta. Practise of karma subserving knowledge may endow the śūdra with the body of a twiceborn in the next life.

Setting aside further discussion on this point, Appayya Dīkṣita then turns to the next point, namely: How does renunciation subserve knowledge?

There are three different views in this respect:

(1) Renunciation produces apūrva that alone destroys some of the sins which obstruct knowledge, hence renunciation is necessary at least in a past or future life. (2) The unseen potency resulting from renunciation is a special qualification of him who is competent for the means of knowledge such as hearing of the Vedānta. (3) Renunciation is useful in securing undistracted study etc. This last does not, however, mean that Brāhmaṇa alone is competent to renounce; even the Kṣatriyas or Vaisyās are equally competent to renounce, for, the term Brāhmaṇa is implicative
(upālakṣaṇa) of the three varṇas. But, according to some teachers, only the Brāhmaṇas are competent to renounce. In case of the knower who renounces there is no distinction of competency based on varṇa, but there certainly is such distinction in the case of the seekers of knowledge. Still others say that eligibility for study belongs only to him who has renounced. The Kṣatriyas and the Vaiśyas are entitled for such study as will bring about a brahmaṇa body in another life.

This raises the question as to how study in this birth can produce knowledge in another birth? The reply to this question is that, if there are obstacles in the present birth, the realisation is effected in the next birth through the generation of an apūrva or niyama adṛṣṭa by hearing etc., carried on in this birth. Apūrva due to previous sacrifices etc., leads to hearing etc. in present birth, or it may itself leads to realisation even in another birth. This explanation alone is acceptable where no injunction is recognised in respect of sravana. But, according to the author of the Vivarana, the above explanation may be valid even where niyamavidhi is recognised. It is, further, emphasized that though Vedanta-sravana has
a visible result, it has also an unseen potency of its own, through which it subserves the attainment of knowledge in the next birth.

Thus, though the attainment of knowledge is generally regarded as resulting from hearing, etc., Bharatītīrtha, in the ninth chapter (Dhyānadīpa) of the Pañcadasī, declares Yoga to be as much a means for such attainment as Sāmkhya. Sāmkhya signifies śrāvāṇa etc. and Yoga signifies contemplation of the nirguna-Brahman. This view is supported both by the Bhāsyakara\(^1\) and the Sutrakāra\(^2\).

Now what is the specific instrument (karana) of Brahma-intuition? According to some, deep meditation (prasaṁkhyaṇa) is the karana. This cannot be objected to by saying that deep meditation is not enumerated as pramāṇa. For, the knowledge of the oneness of Brahman and the self is based on the Vedanta, and so the intuition of that unity by meditation is well-based and deep meditation can be regarded as pramāṇa. There are also the views such as that mind alone is karana and that only the mahāvākyas are the karanās.

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1. cf. Śaṁkara on VS. I.3.13.
2. cf. VS. III.3.11.
It may be said that the generation of immediate cognition is not consistent with verbal testimony whose nature is to generate only mediate cognition. But such immediate cognition may be possible as in the case of the conjunction with the concentrated mind. Or it may be possible on account of the conjunction with intense contemplation. It may also be argued that the immediacy of cognition consists in the immediacy of the object, and Brahman is eminently immediate. The view of Advaitavidyācārya in this regard is that the immediacy of the object really means its non-difference from such intelligent as is helpful to empirical usage in respect of itself, immediacy of cognition is non-difference of such intelligence, as is helpful to respective empirical usages from the respective objects. Immediacy is an attribute of intelligence and not of a vṛttī. Hence immediacy is possible for happiness etc. which are witness revealed. Jīva in samsāra does not realise Brahman because of obscuration by ignorance, but it is not an obscuring agent forĪśvara, and only for him to whom it is an obscuring agent does it present difference from the object-defined intelligence. That knowledge which arises only as in conjunction with its own content, destroys ignorance, and Brahman-knowledge, though from verbal testimon
arises thus in conjunction with Brahman-intelligence, the material cause of all. Though adhyayana may give superficial knowledge, and sravana may give certitude of existence, still, ignorance is not removed, because of the defect of mental distration, for, the removal of which reflection and contemplation are necessary and the virtues of these may have been acquired by practise in a previous birth.

Why then should there not occur the removal of ignorance concerning Brahman, through the knowledge of pot etc., in the same way as through the knowledge of Brahman? It cannot be said that, when by the vṛtti in the form of pot etc., ignorance relating thereto is removed, the intelligence defined thereby shines forth as reality even by self manifestation and that this intelligence is not the content of a vṛtti in the form of pot etc. for, then knowledge would have the pot for content, while ignorance would have for content the intelligence defined thereby. Nor may it be said that though the vṛtti in the form of pot etc. has for content the intelligence defined thereby, there cannot result therefrom the removal of primal ignorance, since it has not the form of impartite bliss; for, that form is absent even from the intuition generated by the vedānta. It is, therefore, suggested in this connection that intelligence is not the content of a vṛtti of the senses. Model cognitions dispel model ignorances which have pot etc.
for content, and ignorance as relating to the inert has to be admitted indirectly, if not directly. On the strength of observation, primal ignorance can be removed only by that knowledge whose contents are not the products of that ignorance. Or it is suggested that, because of the restrictive injunction about the study of the Vedanta, that knowledge alone as aided by the niyamapūrva can remove ignorance about the Brahman. Or it is further suggested that the sphere of primal ignorance is oneness of the Jīva and Brahman and that this ignorance can be removed by the knowledge which has the same sphere and not by model cognitions teaching the bare existence of intelligence. The objection, that Brahman-knowledge cannot remove primal ignorance because the effect cannot be in conflict with its material cause, is not valid. For, such conflict is exemplified in every day experience. Similarly, one cannot accept as a dogma that the destruction of effect invariably presupposes the destruction of the cause.

It may now be asked; How is Brahman-knowledge itself destroyed? Some teachers explain this on the analogy of the cleansing-nut which precipitates the dirt in water and precipitates itself, while others mention the analogy of either water consumed by heated metal or of grass burnt up
by fire. In this connection, it has to be remembered that
destruction is not necessarily occasioned by something
other than the countercorrelate when illusoriness is said to
imply the movability by knowledge alone, what is intended
to be said is that illusoriness is removable by knowledge
but not by any accessory not conjoined with knowledge.
Appayya Dīkṣita, therefore, seems to accept the analogy of
the fire that has burnt up what was to be burnt up. He,
however, also mentions the view that ignorance and the
universe are removed not by the inert psychosis in the form
of Brahman-knowledge, but by the intelligence associated
with it; and the view that Brahman-knowledge removes
ignorance alone, and this the material cause being destroyed
the world too is destroyed along with Brahman-knowledge
which is a part of it. It is thus understandable that,
even after the direct realization of reality, there should
be the appearance of a body in the case of the jīvanmukta.
The trace of avidyā whose persistence is caused by the
prarabdha-karma is responsible for this.
Appayya Dīkṣīta continues in the next chapter the consideration of the concept of jīvanmukti by posing the question: What is this trace of nescience by means of the persistence of which, jīvanmukti is explainable?

According to some, it is an element of projective energy of primal nescience, while according to others it is the impression left behind by avidyā like the smell of garlic. Yet others suggest in this connection the analogy of a burnt cloth retaining its configuration. Sarvājñatman, however, avers—though it is not his final view—that no trace of avidyā remains after knowledge and that jīvanmukti is taught only by way of eulogising the injunction to study.

Now, what is the removal of ignorance? According to the author of the Brahmaśīrdhi, it is no other than the self, while according to Ānandabodhācārya, it is other than the self, and of a fifth mode which is not real, nor unreal, nor real and unreal, nor indeterminable. Advaitācārya points out that the removal of nescience is certainly indeterminable, but it does not persist and hence its mental cause need not persist. The removal of avidyā may be momentary, but mokṣa is not rendered impermanent thereby. The former is, of itself, not the goal of human life, it only results in the
manifestation of eternal, impartite bliss and the cessation of sorrow. In this connection, Gitsukha points out that cessation of misery is not the human goal, but is subsidiary to bliss which is not subsidiary thereto. At this stage, Appayya Dīkṣita also refers to certain other views relating to bliss and samsāra.

Now the question of the rise of true knowledge leads Appayya Dīkṣita to the consideration of the nature of the state that results therefrom. Is it the state of Īśvara or does it imply mere subsistence as pure intelligence? Those who adopt the Eka-Jīva-vada accept only the latter view; so do those followers of the Nāna-Jīnavāda, who hold Īśvara too to be a reflection. According to the view in which Īśvara is the prototype and jīvas its reflection, release, until the final release of all, is attainment of the state of Īśvara. This view alone is in conformity with sruti1, sutra2 and bhasya3. Here Appayya Dīkṣita elucidates that view of Śāṅkara by quoting relevant extracts from his

1. cf. Chāndogya Up., VII,1.1. or Ibid. VIII.7.3.
   or Kausitaka Up. III.8.
2. cf. VS I.3.14, II.3.43 etc.
3- cf. Dahara section, āmsa section, dream section, and section about the form of manifestation from the first second, third and fourth chapters respectively from his bhasya.
commentary, and further, add that the same is supported by the Bhamati and its followers. He also points out that it is not correct to say - as the author of the Samkṣepaśārīraka says - that the various aphorisms and the statements about the manifestation of Isvaratva from the commentary of Śaṁkara are assumptive and made only for arguments sake.

The view of the dualists is that, though because of difference being absolute there is not in release the attainment of the Lord by the Jīva, even then there is the possibility of the properties of freedom from sin etc., as for the Lord, and that thus there is no contradiction. This is unacceptable, for, if that were so, since freedom from sin etc. would belong to the Jīva also, they could not be distinctive marks of Brahman, hence there does not result an answer to the stated objection; consequently there is conflict with the scripture. If they are eternally established, bondage is rendered illusory. Hence, nondifference of the Jīva from the Lord is difficult to avoid. It may be said that apahatapapmatva, satyasamkalpatva, etc. can be conceived as special powers that obstruct the origination of sin, even when one performs acts that cause sin; hence, not through this being eternally established is
there the contingency of the illusoriness of bondage, similarly, even the possession of purposes which come true is to be defined as of the form of a power; consequently, there is not the contingency of non-difference from the Lord. Our reply to this is in the negative, for, there is no such authority for assuming such a sense for the words. In transmigration sin does attach and when knowledge arises, even because of knowledge, sin does not cling, hence the assumption of a power is in vain. Hence it is established that till the release of all released jīvas attain perfectly and in all respects and the state of the supreme Lord that is qualified by unrestricted Lordly powers.
There can be little doubt that the Siddhāntaleśa-
sagraha is one of the earliest, if not the earliest of
Appayya’s works. Though this work clearly reflects the
author’s undisputed mastery over the various aspects of the
advaita doctrine, it exhibits but in a small measure the
originality of his thought, except perhaps in his discussion
of sarvamukti at the end of the forth chapter. The prefatory
remark that the author is setting forth only what he has
learnt from his father, for the purpose of his own mental
clarification, may be taken at its face value, as indicating
the comparatively early stage of the efflorescence of his
genius. We do not yet have before us the vigorous polemic
writer; much less do we see the syncretist who blended,
with such eminent success, the system of philosophy which he
had inherited from his father with the system of thought
which he was required to sponsor, presumably under royal
command, infusing into both the devotion to Śiva which was
the result of his own natural piety. Indeed, in the SLS,
there is, yet, no distinct trace of Appayya Dīkṣita’s Śaiva
leanings; on the contrary there are indications of his not
having developed any sectarianism (if it may be so called),
as is perhaps evinced by his reference of the Gaṅgā as
flowing from the toe of Viṣṇu. When, later, his Saiva propensities become marked and he tries to establish the identify of Śiva with Saguna Brahman, not with saṁhāra Rudra, we find him elaborately trying to show that there were two rivers called Gangā - the one arose out of Viṣṇu's toe, fell down on the side of the Meru, and then flowed straight into the sea, while the other was borne by Śiva on his head and her fruitful waters course through different lands bringing joy and plenty everywhere before she finally joined the sea.

The Siddhāntalesasamgraha is certainly much more than a catalogue of the different views included under advaita doctrine. The author's mind has positively and constructively reacted to these views. Some evidence of this is found in the manner in which he arranges the views on each topic. The order in which these views are mentioned is not necessarily chronological, though it may be so in a few cases.

1. cf. Brahmātarkastava, verses. 35, 36, 37. The same prefatory verse about the Gangā flowing from Viṣṇu's toe is found in the Nyāyarakṣāmani too. This work is posterior to the Siddhāntalesasamgraha but prior to the Śivādvaita-nirṇaya, since in the discussion on sarvamukti, the former work is referred to, not the latter (see nyāyarakṣāmani p.192)
In the very first topic, for instance, the first view expounded, namely, the study of the Vedanta is an *apūrya-vidhi*; is that of the author of the Prakāśārtha, while the last view, namely, that there is no injunction at all relating to it is that of Vācaspati; and Vācaspati was certainly earlier than the author of the Prakāśārtha, who has abused the former in vile language for his alleged slavish adoption, of Maṇḍana's views. Appayya Dīkṣita's references to the Brahmasidhi are uniformly unfortunate from the point of view both of commission and omission. A verse quoted in the 3rd chapter¹ is ascribed to the Vārttika, while it actually occurs in the Brahmasidhi. Moreover, a view ascribed to the Brahmasidhi in the 4th chapter of ŚLS, as to the nature of the removal of nescience, is not distinctive of that work, and is not found stated there in the words used by Appayya.

It is often said that the Hindu habit of writing commentaries and sub-commentaries on given cryptic texts has not been conducive to originality or development of thought. A study of the Bhāntalasāmgraha will help to invalidate such a complaint. Bound as the writers no doubt

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¹ Brahmasidhi, III.140. e.g. स्वप्राण्यत्वाते वा etc.
felt themselves to be by the doctrines of the Vedānta-sūtras as interpreted by Śaṅkara, they yet showed considerable variation and originality in tackling the various problems in details. The questions, for instance, which Appayya Dīkṣita seeks to solve are not merely of exegetical interest, such as whether there is a vīdiḥ in respect of Vedānta study or not, but they also possess profound logical and psychological interest as well.

Considered from this point of view, the SLS though it fails to exhibit Appayya Dīkṣita true genius, is nevertheless a very important and valuable contribution in that it presents the development of philosophical thought relating to Vedānta in its proper perspective on account of this, as also on account of its encyclopaedic character, this compendium by Appayya Dīkṣita is very helpful to a student of Indian Philosophy in general and of Vedānta in particular.

The Siddhantālaśasāṅgraha, however, lacks the lucidity of style. It is most likely that this work being

the first or very earlier composition of Appayya Dīkṣita he might not have developed his style by this time. Being unexperienced in such literary activities the style of Appayya Dīkṣita has become involved, and hence difficult. He could have been more methodical in presentation of his topics. Another defect is that it presupposes knowledge of various Vedānta schools. Unless one is familiar to various differences in various thoughts, the Siddhāntalesaśāmgraha cannot be properly understood. It will be very difficult to follow this work for a lay-man. Lastly it may be added that though there are ample opportunities to indicate author's inclination towards a particular Vedānta school, Appayya Dīkṣita has kept quiet and calm and does not expose himself anywhere. Appayya Dīkṣita, being a new person in this field of Vedānta at this particular stage might have purposely avoided, it seems, to express his own views or inclinations.

Incidentally, it may be stated that though there is no trace of Appayya Dīkṣita's Śaiva leaning in the Siddhāntalesaśāmgraha, still the compendious character of this work must have attracted the minds of great scholars and philosophers Śrīdhasaśīnī in the author of eminent works like the Bhajadhikākara, must have been very much impressed
by this work which exhibited the intellectual spark of Appayya Diksita and must have then inspired Appayya Diksita to propagate the cause of Saivism. Though not in very clear terms, Appayya Diksita, seems to refer to this event in his life in the introductory verses of the Vedantakalpatirupatimala\textsuperscript{1}. The SLS may, in a sense, be said to mark the beginning of Appayya Diksita's future career as a philosopher and as a missionary.

It may be pointed out that the author of the SLS has nowhere attempted to harmonize the various views on the vedānta. Nor has he indicated his inclination towards any particular views, even when there occurs an opportunity for him to do so\textsuperscript{2}. The only exception to this is, his reference and refutation of the view of dvaitins\textsuperscript{3}.

\textbf{1.} cf. Vedantakalpatirupatimala. \textbf{1.:} e.g.

\textbf{2.} e.g. SLS pp.1-6. Here, there is discussion about the following sentence: आत्मा वा अर्थ भेदात्म; etc. as whether it is an anuvidyā or a niyamavidhī or a parisamākhyāvidhī. This discussion ends without his personal opinion.

\textbf{3.} cf. SLS p.113. The view of the dualists is that, because of the essential difference (between the Lord, and the Jīva) which is absolute, there is no possibility, even in the condition of mokṣa of the attainment of the Lord by the Jīva --, etc.
Section II

Chapter - 5.

Madhvatantramukhamardana.
Appayya Dīkṣita's work, which is known as the Madhva-tantra-mukha-mardana and which has a Svopaiṇa commentary, is mainly meant for the refutation of Madhva's view. An edition of the work prepared by K. Ramachandra Śastri Sūri is published at Poona in 1940 as volume No. 113 in the Anandasrana Sanskrit series. It contains 149 pages. The actual text, with Svopaiṇa commentary and the sub-commentary known as Tilpani, by Palghata Nārāyan Śastri, extends over 130 pages, while the Sanskrit introduction, of the editor covers in 9 pages. The first six pages preceding the introduction give a gist in Sanskrit of the various topics, while the last 4 pages are given for erratum.

In the introduction, the editor states that, for his edition, he has made use of a very rare copy of the Madhva-tantra-mukha-mardana printed in the grantha-script, in the Cola country. This copy was in the possession of P.R. Sivashubrahmanyā Śastri, head of the

1. Intro., P.8:

कत्ता-मृणता श्रीमती श्रीमन्नाथविलकुण्डराजास्थाननविद्वान्
महास्मृतवाङ्कानाथाध्यापकानां
प्रज्ञानकृष्णानाथसरस्वती निकटे प्रवक्तिभाषा
बेहोर्धे मुद्रिलक्ष्मिनाचार्यविनुभवम्


Dharmaśāstra Department in the Mysore Pāṭhasālā.

The main text of the Madhva-tantra-mukha-mardana consists of 66 stanzas, and embodies the refutation of the doctrine of Madhva by Appayya Dīkṣita, while the same has been vividly elucidated by the author himself in his own commentary known as the Madhvamatavidhvamsana or Madhvatantramukhamardanavyākhyāna. The text starts with the subject directly, but the Svopajñā commentary has the well-known verse, namely,:

\[ \text{Verse 1:} \quad \text{Verse 2:} \]

which the object of the Svopajñā commentary has been stated.  

1. Commentary. P. 1:

The actual text starts with the subject as:

\[ \text{Verse 3:} \quad \text{Verse 4:} \]
The colophon of the actual text is in the form of a verse which also appears in other compositions of Appayya Dīkṣita, and that verse is followed by the concluding verse. The colophon appearing at the end of the Svopajñā commentary is the usual one in the prose-form.


2. Commentary. p. 129 :

The text is in Sanskrit.
At the very outset, Appayya Dīkṣita makes it clear that he does not entertain any jealousy towards Vaishnavism. Without any prejudice in his mind, he begins the work in which the philosophy of Madhva is subjected to a critical examination. It is not that he is against this system because Śiva is not described in it as the highest Brahman. From the truly philosophical point of view, Appayya Dīkṣita does not make any distinction between Śiva and Viṣṇu. The Brahman in its bodily, personal aspect may be called either Śiva or Viṣṇu. He seems to ask, with Shakespear: What is there in a name? If Appayya Dīkṣita had no such anti-Vaiṣṇava intention in his mind, what then does he exactly seek to set forth in his book? This is the question. To this Appayya Dīkṣita replies: The philosophical doctrines of Madhva are not at all acceptable, because all the rules and the limitations relating to the interpretation of the Vedic texts are either violated or

1. Mahalinga Sāstrī, "Śrīmad Appayya Dīkṣita", in the Trivedi Commemoration Volume, pp. 31-38: 

or Madhyatantramukhamardana. 1:

किंचि तिष्ठते वा गणितिप्रगटिः स्रास्त्रस्य विषयः
तदिष्ठे ग्राम्ययः न: यथासायी तद्वर्त्यं समस्ताम् ॥
transgressed by him. And this is certainly quite unwarranted\(^1\). Proceeding to elucidate in what way the laws of Vedic interpretation are violated by Madhva, Appayya Dīkṣita points to some cases of such violation. Madhva has often interpreted the Vedic texts entirely according to his own inclination. Again the illustrations which he produces in support of his own views are not genuine but artificial; they also refer to very rare and mostly unknown phenomena. In order to remove any possible doubts regarding his being unauthentic, he himself has proclaimed on the strength of a text of questionable validity, that he is the third incarnation of Vāyu\(^2\). Moreover, the interpretation of the Vedic texts like Rgveda, III.2.8\(^3\), is utterly untainable. If these interpretations had been

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1. Madhvatantramukhamardana, 2:

\hspace{1cm} त्यामान्दर्तीर्षीयं मतमहासपेश्न \(\text{नूर्} \)

\hspace{1cm} मन्त्र बैद्धम्बिता मूलभाकुला \(\text{फ्ला} \)

2. Commentary, p. 11:

\hspace{1cm} प्रयोगे हृदान्तिन्म दुर्लक्षेषे भीम्वेनकः \(\text{श्र} \)

\hspace{1cm} पूर्णश्रोतीतग्नम गम्यतार्याणकः \(\text{श्र} \)

\hspace{1cm} ब्रिति स्वतिक्षमस्तीति स्वमेव लदुदाहरणम् \(\text{श्र} \)

3. Ibid, p.11:

\hspace{1cm} 'बिज्ञवे नदुपृण माथि दर्षतम' \(\text{नू} \) कृत्या \(\text{२.२.४} \)

\hspace{1cm} 'बिज्ञवे नदुपृण माथि दर्षतम' \(\text{नू} \)

\hspace{1cm} ब्रिति स्वतिक्षमस्तीति स्वमेव लदुदाहरणम् \(\text{नू} \)
based on sound logic they could have been accepted without any prejudice. But such is not the case. Whatever Madhva has said has arisen out of his own fancy and lacks any substantial logical foundation (nyāya). In this manner, he has spoilt the whole system of interpreting the Vedic text. Not only this, but he has also used some ungrammatical forms, and has thrown to wind the rules of

1. Commentary. p.11:

2. Ibid. p.11:

3. Ibid. p.12 and sub-commentary

and many others.

B.N.K. Shastri, however, defends Madhva by saying that the untraced quotations of Madhva should not be regarded as unauthentic or his own compositions. They may be from such books, as might have been available to Madhva at that time, but, which are unfortunately, lost to us. Similarly Madhva's usages, he adds, may be incorrect according to the grammar of Pāṇini; but Pāṇini's grammar does by no means possess the highest authority. There are other systems of grammar like those of Candara and others which are equally authentic. The commentator (F.N.3 contd. ---
the mimāṃsā. With a view to substantiating what he has said about Madhva, Appayya Dīkṣita, takes into account, in the Madhvaatantramukhamardana, Madhva’s commentary on only the first five topics of the Brahma-sūtras. He does not, however, explain anywhere why he has chosen only the first five topics. It would appear that Appayya Dīkṣita wanted to strike at the very root of Madhva’s teachings, the basis of which is the Brahma-sūtras and particularly the first few topics in them.

After this introduction, Appayya Dīkṣita starts with the first topic in the Vedanta-Sūtras known as the Jijñasādhikarana. He points out that the Pūrvapakṣa stated by Madhva is wrong. According to Madhva, the Pūrvapakṣa is: The discussion about the Brahman should not be started at all, as such a discussion has no subject-matter, we cannot say that savīṣeṣā-brahman can be the subject matter, for, the Vedānta-texts deal only with the

(F.N.3 contd. --
Jayatīrtha also has defended Madhva. For further details on this point, see B.N.K. Sharma, A History of the Dvaita School of Vedānta and its literature, Vol. I. pp. 111-112.
1. This Pūrvamimāṃsābhāṣaṇa, will be illustrated later in verse No. 25.)
Jīva without any characteristic. Nor can we say that the Jīva is identical with the Brahman and, that, therefore, the former can become the subject-matter. For the Jīva is well-known to all; and that which is well-known cannot be the subject-matter of investigation. As for the Brahman being void of characteristics, it is beyond the scope of knowledge, and so cannot become the subject-matter. But this view is defective. The defect lies in fact that the holder of this view accepts that the nature of the Brahman is explained in the Śrutis, but it is not explained in the Śastraś. But where is the harm in assuming that whatever is discussed in the Vedānta texts can also be discussed in the Śastraś? Further, according to Madhva, a work known as the Brahma-tarka, which represents an abridgement, by the Vyāsa-form of Viṣṇu, of a larger work by the Nārāyaṇa-form of Viṣṇu, truly embodies the science of logic, and not Gautama's Nyāyaśāstra. The aim of this Brahma-tarka is to establish the view that the Lord Viṣṇu, endowed with all qualities, is the main theme of the Vedas. If the validity of this work was to be accepted, the Purvapakṣa, according to Madhva would have to accept either the unknown Brahman as the subject-matter like the Advaitins, or the Saguna- Brahman as the subject-matter. In any case, he cannot speak of the absence of the subject-matter.
Moreover, according to Madhva, the individual soul (Jīva) is the witness (sākṣin), and this witness surpasses all other pramāṇas. Even the śruti cannot invalidate what is explained by the sākṣin. Similarly in the Brahma-tarka itself, it is stated that among the lingas each succeeding one has a greater probative value than each preceding one. This view is indeed strange and does not agree with any other view. According to Madhva, again, the Vedānta, which can be known from the pramāṇas like upakrama and upasamhāra, should be known from a worthy teacher even before thinking about the meaning of the Vedānta. Only after studying the whole of the Vedānta, should one ponder over that meaning for its clear impression on one's mind (sthirikarana) in accordance with the science of logic. This is manana according to Madhva. While the advaitins think that manana implies repeated

1. Commentary, p. 17: ‘केवल हि तव मद्व वदं ज्ञानिष्ठ च संबोध्येऽः।
   सासी च स्त्रिमार्गाधिकः।’
2. Ibid. p. 17: ‘अत: साल्युनमविविहितदेशेष्व न तु तिरंििय न प्रमाणम्।’
3. Commentary, p. 18:
   ‘अतो वाक्यार्थिनिष्ठप्रमाणणात्माबुपर्वकारे क्लीयान्तो
   विस्मिदुपरिष्ठचिक्षों मेस्त्रूरविचित्राये क्षाक्ष्विनामायापि
   तैसम प्रस्तिद्व:।
   ‘शुपरकार्यिविषिक्षनात्ता क्लीयोऽध्युत्कात्तसमयः क्षुद्राद्वृत्त्तीर्तिवः
   च श्रद्धार्थिनिष्ठमात्॥।’
   ‘क्षुद्राद्वृत्त्तीर्तिवः क्लीयोऽध्युत्कात्तसमयः क्षुद्राद्वृत्त्तीर्तिवः
   च श्रद्धार्थिनिष्ठमात्॥।’
hearing of the same thing (tad eva śravaṇaṁ), according to Madhva, the science of thinking is based on manana. By means of such manana, a student should know the exact meaning of each and every sentence in the Veda. Now, the difficulty is this: How will a person who has studied under the guidance of an excellent teacher or teachers, who are preaching about the Saguna-Brahman, abandon the meaning explained to him by an authoritative person, his teacher, and accept the view that the Vedānta-texts deal with the Nirvīṣeṣa-Jīva only? And if this is not possible, how can there arise the Prima Facie view suggested by Madhva?

Again it may be asked: Is it desired or not that there should be a śāstra which would, with the help of strong arguments, establish the nature of the Nirvīṣeṣa-Jīva as being the theme of the Vedānta? If it is not desired that there should be such a śāstra, then it cannot be proved that the theme of the Śrutis which are mutually contradictory, is the nirvīṣeṣa Jīva. If, on the other

1. Ibid, p. 19: विषारे प्रकटितमः शिष्यः ...... तं तथा परिश्चेत्य
2. Commentary, p. 19: श्रीवीर वेदान्तस्कारिन्न-निर्वीरवेदनीवधिमास्मेव खिति श्वर्ष्यस्थितिस्थितं केवलाय न च।
2. Commentary, p. 19:

श्रीवीर वेदान्तस्कारिन्न-निर्वीरवेदनीवधिमास्मेव प्रकटिताय: प्रारंभकप्रभावरतवेत न वा।
hand, it is so desired, then the Śāstra will have subject-matter and the Prima Facie view as posed by Madhva will be entirely baseless. It cannot be said that, under these circumstances, the Prima Facie view as set forth by Vācaspati, for instance, is also deficient. According to Vācaspati, the Pūrvapakṣa is this The Pratyagatman itself is the Brahman, but it is well-known that the Pratyagatman becomes evident in the form of "I"; this being so, there is no need for undertaking any new investigation in its nature. But the Brahman-nature of the Pratyagatman - its identity with the Brahman - cannot be established without the help of such kind of investigation. According to Madhva's view, on the other hand, the Pūrvapakṣa starts with an assumption which is unacceptable to the Siddhānta, namely, that the Brahman is identical with the undifferentiated jīva-cit.

It cannot be further argued that even in the Pūrvamīmāṁsā, the Pūrvapakṣa starts with an assumption unacceptable to the Siddhāntin, namely that the Mīmāṁsā-Śāstra should not be started, as the study of the Vedas does not aim at the understanding of the literal meaning of the words - as the sentence svādhyāḥ adhyetavyāḥ has heaven as its fruit. Here, the fruit in the form of heaven is not acceptable to the Siddhāntin. Appayya Dīkṣita sets aside this objection by pointing out that there the position
of the Purvapakṣin is that only one sentence is under consideration, that the heaven is desired by all, and that, therefore, one should not worry about understanding the literal meaning of the words. So far as the position set forth by Madhva is concerned, there is no particular intention (nyāya), not is there the consideration of only one sentence, but there is consideration of all the sentences. If it is accepted that there is another śāstra, different from the Śārīraka-Śāstra, which establishes the undifferentiated Brahman, and if the self-illuminated Jīva is the subject-matter of that Śāstra, then why is a new śāstra at all thought of? And if this new śāstra establishes the self-illuminated Brahman just like Vedānta, then what can be the special purpose of this new Śāstra? Because, a new Śāstra should either show some improvement over old siddhāntas or that Śāstra should establish some altogether new siddhānta.

This new śāstra neither improves the old theories not it establishes any new principle. Hence this śāstra is without any purpose. Further, if that new śāstra establishes the Sagunā-Brahman, then it will go against the

1. Commentary. p.22 : किन्तु वेदान्तानां स्वप्रकाशचिन्माण्यपरत्व- व्यवस्थापः तात्वकस्तर्तः, किदस्पि तथारूढः चेतेन भत्तर्थन् . . . .
Siddhānta. So there should not be any idea of a new śāstra at all. Incidentally, that śāstra has not been refuted anywhere nor it has been mentioned by name anywhere in the commentary on the Brahma-sūtras. So it can certainly be said that it is the Sariraka-śāstra only and nothing else.

It is generally accepted that the Jīva is endowed with eternal ānanda and is capable of getting salvation. This ānanda of the Jīva is manifested only at the time of salvation. At other times the ānanda is befogged (āvrta) by avidyā, according to Advaitins, while the Dvaitins think that it is screened by some power called Viśeṣa. Now the question is: Why is the existence of this new power, namely, Viśeṣa to be assumed at all? This Viśeṣa is believed to envelop ānanda though ānanda is essentially Prakāśāṇāmaṇa. This would be possible only on account of avidyā, which is endowed with tremendous power of doing and undoing anything. This position is actually accepted by Madhva in the Anuvvākyāhyāna, as also in the

1. Commentary, p.24: तत्सादनिरारात्राकायाः द्विदेशोऽविचारस्य नामन्यदिति।
2. Ibid., p. 25: प्रकाशाणामान्यन्द्रन्द्रवन्द्राण्मान्यन्त्रवं वाच्यमुः।
3. Commentary, p.26: न विद्यन्त्राम्त्रता चैव न्यानवत्वात्सर्गृह्यता। तत्सात्सर्गृह्यतं चैव न्यानवत्वात्सर्गृह्यत।

Nyāyasudhā. Accordingly the position of Viśeṣa is unwarranted. Thus the Pūrvapakṣa as set forth by Madhva, which assumes that the undifferentiated Brahman is not discussed in the Śastra does not have any firm basis.

Now, the Pūrvapakṣa of Madhva assumes that all the Vedic texts establish the undifferential Brahman. This view is based upon the view of the Advaitins, according to whom the mahatātparya of the Vedānta lies in preaching the undifferentiated Brahman. In order to refute this assumption, Madhva has taken resort to the one single word, brahman, in the sutra, ब्रह्मात्र अमृततन्त्र ज्ञातस्वरूपात्. Here it may be asked as to how this one single word brahman, can be regarded as being more powerful than all the other Vedānta texts, which, on the basis of firm nyāyas, like upakārama, etc., ultimately leading to mahatātparya, have to be taken as clearly referring to the nirviśeṣa-brahman. The superiority of the mahatātparya has been accepted by Madhva himself in the ubhayalingādikāraṇa where Viṣṇu is stated to be free from all impurities on the basis of the

1. Comment, p.26: लोकोपायातित्वं न ज्ञायथायाम्।
2. Vedānta Sūtras, I.1.1.
3. Commentary, p.30: दर्शितवचारचक्षुस्मरणिः 'न स्वान्तो धिः' (व. २. २.२४) विविधकरणे।
mahatātparya. It may be argued that the word brahman as indicating an unknown entity is utpattisthanīya (that which is not known previously, hence known as the origin- utpatti), while the character of being endowed with qualities propounded by that word is utpattisīṣṭa (that which specifies the origin). Usually the utpattisīṣṭa is more powerful than the utpattisthanīya. That is to say, the doctrine of the Brahman as distinct from the Jīva and as being endowed with qualities, etc. is more valid than the other Vedānta texts which teach the identity of the Brahman and the Jīva and the 'quality-lessness' of the Brahman. This position, however, is not acceptable. Because, if it were so, the words tad brahma (Taittirīya Up. III.1) would become the jñāpaka of the unknown brahman. But it is not so, for, as the word yad in the text, yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante (Taittirīya Up. III.1), describes the Brahman, and the word yat always implies anuvāda, that is to say, it describes what is already known. Moreover, the utpattisīṣṭa- nyāya does not do any harm in the present case. For example, the sentence, "one should immolate an
animal" (pasūn ālabheta) does not suggest that the whole body of the animal is to be offered. On the other hand, on the authority of sentences like, "one should cut the front part of the heart" (hrdayasya agre avadyati), the idea of offering the animal as a whole is abandoned. Similarly, here, the idea of gunapūrtimattva is to be abandoned.

Even if it is accepted that Paramēśvara is endowed with great qualities (gunabrhatva), still gunabrhattva is to be understood to mean only excellence of ānand etc. In that case; it may be further argued that, the Jīva must be considered to be different from Paramēśvara, as this ānand is not seen to exist in the former to that much extent as it is seen to exist in the Lord. But this is by no means a sufficient reason for assuming a distinction between the Jīva and Paramēśvara. According to the Dvaita view, the liberated persons suffer from the same defect, for the ānand is not the same everywhere, this being more or less dependent on the will of Viṣṇu. The advaitins believe that the excellence of bliss is present both in the Jīva and Paramēśvara; the only thing is that in the Jīva that ānanda is shrouded by avidyā. The dvaitins say that the ānanda in the Jīva is covered with Viṣēṣa. This means that between the dvaitins and the advaitins there is a difference only of words and not of
principles. Moreover, Viṣṇu, according to Madhva, can have many diverse forms, such as avayava, avayavin, etc. Similarly nothing either impossible or contradictory in the case of Viṣṇu who is endowed with immense power. This being so, it is not understandable why the dvaitins should object to the assumption of Viṣṇu's being identical with the Jīva, on account of the same power? The dvaitins may say that the difference between the Jīva and Viṣṇu is due to Viṣeṣa, that is, due to a particular power which differentiates (bhedapratinidhi)¹. But this would then be tantamount to saying Paramesvara is one but that He appears as being possessed of multiple forms on account of Viṣeṣa. And does saying this not amount to admitting that the Jīva and Paramesvara are essentially one and the same, but that they appear as distinct from each other on account of Viṣeṣa?

Actually such positing of Viṣeṣa serves no useful purpose. Because, in the topic Itaravyapadesadhikarana²,

1. Commentary, p.37: नन्वीशवरः स्वकीयम्यान्तयादूरतपरिवर्त्तितां पेप्प श्रविः

न नेक्त्यादिक्षिताद्यन्वितां घटनितिः म्या नेब्याटे।

किं तु मेन्द्रातिनिधिः विदेषणपेय्यां ते घटनि बिदिताः।

2. Commentary, p.38: त्याः - नीवस्त्र स्वतंत्रद्वृत्तिविनिराशायः

‘विलोक्यपदेशा विद्याकरणा विद्याग्रासिनः।

(ब्र.सू. २-१-१२) विश्वविकरणम्।
Madhva concludes that Paramesvara is the cause of the creation and the Jiva is the means only. Now if Paramesvara is all powerful, what is the use of Visesa? And, if Visesa is regarded as an independent power which differentiates, than Paramesvara cannot be regarded as being possessed of every kind of power. But all the Sruti-texts are unanimous in declaring that Paramesvara is possessed of all kinds of powers. Hence the Visesa theory of Madhva is absolutely unwarranted.

The dvaitins may now argue that even though Paramesvara is able to accomplish things which are of opposite nature, still, He should not be identified with the Jiva who is subjected to various miseries. To this it may be replied that, according to Madhva, Paramesvara is the Lord of all sense-organs, and it is the sense-organs which experience the miseries etc.; so, in the ultimate analysis, the "ownership" of these miseries etc. goes to Paramesvara and not to the Jiva as is wrongly supposed. Madhva further makes it clear in the topic Svamyadhikarana that the fruits of the various sacrifices—

1. Commentary, p.39: तत्साददित्त्वान्यथारूढः परमेश्वरसंक्रेयो विषयाविनिवधन्मयेण्डेशेन्कृतकृत्या ंर्द्ध ।
2. Ibid, p.43: परमेश्वरो विनिवधन्मयेन स्वरूपविद्धिः नीवमार्थनानुम्नतेऽव....
3. Ibid, p.43: परमेश्वरो विनिवधन्मयेन स्वरूपविद्धिः नीवमार्थनानुम्नतेऽव....
4. Ibid, p.44: त्वांविनिवधन्मयेन स्वरूपाः (भृ. १.२.४५) वित्सारितः...
the credit of the sacrifices - go to the gods who are the lords of the various sense-organs.

It may be pointed out that Madhva has, at many places, thrown the Mimamsa rules to the winds. For example, in the topic, namely, abhavadikarana, he says that the dvadasahavanayajna is two-fold in the sense that it is kratvamtaka and sastratmaka. As a matter of fact, however, it is twofold in the sense that it can be ahina or satra. At another place (Brahma-sutra, 3.3.44), the Tattvaparakasika says that in the matter of sacrificial killing (vajniya-himsa), itikartavyata, that is to say the necessity of doing a thing according to certain rules, prevails. But this is a baseless statement. In the Nyayasudha, the word jyotistoma in the anandamayadhikarana is explained as a jyotisam stomah; but the correct explanation is: jyotirnamakah stomah yasya.

1. Commentary, p.46: त्यां वि- 'द्वादशाङ्गनायज्ञं बाणायो' (ब्र.4.4.8, भित्ति रूढे मात्रययः. 'द्वादशाङ्गं क्रत्वात्मकः द्वादशाङ्गनायम् भित्ति।

2. Ibid, p.47: 'नानंदमयाधिनिताः' (ब्र. 1.1.12) न्यायसूत्राः- 'ज्योतिर्षम्य त्योऽऽम् नि ज्योतिर्नामकः' भित्ति।

", p.48: न्योतितीम्य: स्तोत्राः भवेति तत्त्वबंचने मौर्यास्मि प्रेमन्।
Many other instances of the non-observances of the *mīmāṃsā*- rules may be quoted.

However, leaving aside this more or less incidental discussion, Appayya Dīkṣita returns to the earlier point and says that if, according to Madhva Paramēśvara is the lord of all sense-organs, the "ownership" of all worries and miseries etc. of the beings will devolve on Paramēśvara. This being so, He would certainly prefer the Jīvabhāva to having this kind of Lordship.

By way of clarification, it might be put forth on behalf of Madhva that it is not the condition of being miserable etc. that is to be abandoned but it is the baseness (*nicatva*) resulting from miseries etc. that is to be abandoned¹. And such baseness is not possible in the case of Paramēśvara. But this is not convincing. In his commentary on the topic - *anistādikaryādikarana*², Madhva

1. *Commentary*, p.52: 

2. *Ibid.*, p.52:
also seems to suggest that Paramesvara cannot have any nīcatva. But then how is nīcatva to be established? It is said that nīcatva is indicated by cries of agony etc. and that such nīcatva is not seen in Paramesvara, it may be pointed out that such nīcatva is not to be seen even in some great and courageous persons. Does it mean that those persons do not suffer from miseries etc.? In the same manner, though Paramesvara does not show any nīcatva, he too will have to be regarded as suffering from miseries etc. as he is the Lord of various sense-organs. And then Paramesvara will not be distinct from the Jīva.

Appayya Dīkṣita now turns to another point. It may be said by the dvaitins that the difference between the Jīva and Paramesvara is sought to be established not on the strength of the word brahman, but on the strength of the tatparya that is the general purport of the Vedānta. But Madhva has tried to prove this difference in the topic, namely, utkrāntiṣatpāthādikaraṇā, with the help of tatparyaśānta. So, here, the word brahman has to be considered the decisive factor. Further, the dvaitins have stated that

1. Commentary, p.52: छोड़के हि मानी धीरोदोपस्थायादिशव महतिदुस्लेपिष्ठकरिति न रोदरिति न चास्य िंगिष्ठ लेखनिर्माणयकरिति।

the difference between the Jīva and Īśvara is directly perceived (pratyakṣaḥ), for, Īśvara is seen to be endowed with qualities like omniscience etc., while the Jīva is of quite the opposite nature. Appayya Dīkṣita sets aside this suggestion by pointing out that the assumption of the difference is based on the possessing of opposite qualities and that such possessing of opposite qualities is by no means unimaginable in the case of Paramēśvara who, as the dvaitins themselves assert, is endowed with miraculous powers. It may be further said by the dvaitins that the Śruti-texts directly describe the difference between the Jīva and Īśvara as, for instance, the Upaniṣadic text:

But this argument has no force whatsoever. Because according to the dvaitins themselves, the word anya, with reference to the Brahman, does not possess the capability of suggesting difference. For in connection with the ānandamaya-topic, they have said that though, in the Upaniṣadic text quoted above, the word anya is used with reference to the five Kōsas annamaya, etc., these Kōsas  

are not to be regarded as different from the Brahman. Why then should the word anya used here be understood as indicating the difference between the Jīva and Ṣiva?

It may now be further argued on behalf of Madhva that the mahatātparya of all the vedas is that Lord Viṣṇu is free from all kinds of blamishes and that this can be proved only on the assumption that the Jīva is different from Ṣiva. If, on the other hand, both the Jīva and Ṣiva were to be regarded as identical, then the blamishes attaching to the Jīva would also attach to Ṣiva. This argument, however, is quite lame. According to Madhva, Ṣiva has the power to do and undo anything. Why then should it not be possible for Ṣiva to have entertained a desire to show himself as different from the Jīva,

1. Commentary, p. 60: 

2. Ibid, p. 62: 

though He is not really different from the Jīva.

Even the view of some of the later dvaitins, that the pramāṇas like prakaraṇa (to come to some definite conclusion on the basis of the context) etc. establish the difference between the Jīva and Īśvara, is not acceptable. Because if the stronger pramāṇas like pratyakṣa etc. are not capable of establishing such distinction, how can these weaker pramāṇas be regarded as being capable of doing so? Moreover the Karmamāṁsakas (those who assign more importance to sacrificial deeds etc.) do not admit that pramāṇas like sabdāntara etc. have any validity in the

1. Comment., p.64: तत्त्वं देशेन जीवः यद्यमेव प्राप्तम्यति। अनुरस्त्रानेन बुद्धास्थितिः (वृक्षेण) विभिन्न धार्मिकमहतमन्मत्त्वापि द्विस्थिति। नित्यं, दृश्यमिति प्रमाणविधिः। यद्यपद विविधता काव्यमानयं शब्दाणि न विशेष्यगतिः।

2. Commentary, p.64: क्रृष्टिः श्रीम्बोधमपि शब्दाक्षरस्यादि विभिन्न धार्मिकमहतमम्। यद्यपदानि, यद्यपदानि जीवः। (वृक्षेण) विभिन्न धार्मिकमहतमम्। यद्यपदानि, यद्यपदानि जीवः।

3. Commentary, p.64: तत्त्वं प्रत्यक्षानामुपास्तितानि वेदप्रत्ययं अन्यं द्विस्थितिः। शब्दाणि न धर्मानि वियगतिः।
matter of main difference. Similarly, prakaraṇa etc. are not valid in this connection. For example, though the words, namely, Rāma and Kṛṣṇa are different from each other, and denote two different personalities, still in works like the Mahābhārata etc., the deeds of Rāma and Kṛṣṇa are portrayed in different contexts, but on the basis of this sabdāntara-pramāṇa (two different words are being used), that does not mean that Rāma is different from Kṛṣṇa. Thus, Appayya Dīkṣita reiterates, Madhva has not at all succeeded in showing that the Jīva as different from the Brahman. Indeed, Madhva's conclusion in the first topic (jñāṇa sadhikarana) is entirely wrong.

In the second topic, known as the Janmādyadhi-karana, the Purva-pakṣa according to the dvaitins is this: The word, brahman in the sentence tadvitvarājasastra. tadbhūt 3 is to be understood in the sense of the Jīva which is the sense sanctioned by usage (rūḍhi). The meaning of the word as Parabrahma is established only through etymology (yoga) 3,

\[\text{commentary}\]

1. *ibid.* p.64: कर्मिनामास्फूर्तिः सब्दान्तरादिकः पुस्तनेद्वे प्राणात्मका तौप्यन्त:।
3. Commentary, p.71: तत्स्य (ब्रह्म पद्धते) च जीववाचकत्वं पुस्तनेव। जीवे गुणपूर्वोऽद्वित्योऽस्मायः। परब्रह्मवाचकत्वं तु सोऽष्टेन।
and rūḍhi is stronger than etymology. Now since the Jīva and its nature are well-known, this new śāstra will have no proper subjectmatter. On this the Siddhānta according to the dvaitins, argues that though generally rūḍhi is stronger than yoga, still the present case has to be treated as an exception to that general rule, and consequently the word brahman has to be understood as referring to Viṣṇu only.

Appayya Dīkṣita questions the correctness of this position. He says that here in the Pūrvapakṣa, the assumption that the word brahman denotes the Jīva by rūḍhi is absolutely wrong. Actually that meaning is derived through yoga only. Secondly, the Siddhānta, as represented by Madhva, rejects the meaning of the word brahman as the

\[\text{1. \textit{Prabhava ca}, p.71:} \quad \text{तद्विविनिशासस्य तद्विविनिशासस्य (तैमुण, १.१)} \]
\[\text{ग्रिहि विचारविक्षणेऽव्रत्त भ्राम्येऽव्रत्त भ्राम्येऽव्रत्त भ्राम्येऽव्रत्त विचारस्य समर्पणत्स्विविक्षणमिद्यास्तः श्रास्तः। तत्त्व चतुर्वृत्त विनिविनिशासस्य ज्ञानविक्षणवादात्।} \]

\[\text{2. \textit{Ibid}, p.71:} \quad \text{राधान्न्व: सत्ये दूर्धृविक्षणसि। बिहु त्वस्य बाह्ये नान्ति। 'मतो वा विनिविनिश्यि ज्ञानसि!' (तैमुण, १.१) विचारादः श्रुते भ्राम्येऽव्रत्त भ्राम्येऽव्रत्त भ्राम्येऽव्रत्त ज्ञानविक्षणवादात्। तत्त्व विनिविनिश्यि।} \]

\[\text{3. \textit{Commentary}, p.71:} \quad \text{भ्राम्येऽव्रत्त ज्ञाने दूर्धृविक्षणसि। सत्यरूपहितवादिकृत्तमा गौत्तमेच तत्र भ्राम्येऽव्रत्त।} \]
Jīva, because the Jīva is not capable of creation, etc.

This being so, for that very reason, Madhva will have to reject the generally accepted meaning of brahman assigned to annu, prāṇu, manas etc. in the ānandamaya topic. These entities also, like the Jīva, are incapable of creation of the universe, etc. On the other hand, if there the qualification as the creator of the universe does not interfere with the assumption of anna etc. meaning brahman, then, in the case of the Jīva also, that qualification should not have any adverse effect as suggested by Madhva’s Siddhāntin. Moreover, in some sense the Jīva too may be said to be the creator, for, the dream-creation is exclusively the creation of the Jīva. Further, as Madhva

1. Commentary, p.72: 

2. Ibid, p.75: 

लक्ष्मणो न्यायश्रव्याम् - 'सन्यो बुध्याराध हि' (बु. १.२.१) जित्याधिकारे यथा मनोरधे देयानेव शस्त्रादेत्वा, नैव तत्त्वादं प्रिम्युपवन्नम्।

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524
himself said in the course of the preceding topic, the single word brahman used in the sense of the Jīva by rūḍhi is capable of negating all dvaita-srūtis.

And Appayya Dīkṣita finally says that, according to Madhva, there is no scope for any futile conjectures so far as Īśvara is concerned. But if this is so the question may be put to Madhva: If Īśvara thus transcends all logical consideration why do you yourself use logic to refute His non-difference from the Jīva? If it is argued on behalf of Madhva that what he has sought to do is not to put forth futile conjectures but only to strengthen the Vedānta-texts which establish duality, then, it is permissible for the advaitins to assert that these attempts of the dvaitins to establish duality are characterised by futile logic and may, therefore, not be considered at all. In order to establish duality, it is absolutely necessary to

1. Commentary, p.78: त्यसार्थ यथाविधिकर्ये श्रुत्वलव्यस्य जीवाकर्षितलावलक्तमार्थान्तर्य तेजेन पूर्वप्रशान्तस्रकार भूले भुवनी बाचो वर्धिति।

2. Commentary, p.80: बेदेशमेव खुण्डणि ... तेषाः खुण्ड्यानं न प्रतिकर्षितमिविद्येता।
meet adequately the arguments put forth by the *advaitins*. Madhva has not done this, and in so far as the arguments of the *advaitins* have remained unanswered, Madhva's position cannot be regarded as sound.

In the third topic, known as *Śastraponitvādhi-karaṇa*, the *Pūrvapakṣa* as represented by Madhva avers that Viṣṇu is not the only creator of this universe. The creation is a tremendous affair and cannot be attributed to Viṣṇu alone. Just as in the construction of a mansion assistance is commissioned from various sources, so in the case of creation also, Viṣṇu must have sought the collaboration of Śiva and Brahmā. So Viṣṇu alone cannot possibly be regarded as the only cause of the universe. The *Siddhānta* of Madhva refutes this by saying that only Viṣṇu alone is the cause, for, the *śāstra* describes Viṣṇu as the creator; and the *śāstra* is the only valid authority in this respect.

Appayya Dīkṣita criticised both the *Pūrvapakṣa* and the *Siddhānta* as set forth by Madhva. To begin with, according to Madhva, there is no definite rule that a Vedic sentence should convey only one meaning. This being so, the sentence यदेव सोम्भवदन्ध्र बासित् may suggest several meanings.

1. Commentary, p.82: यदेव सोम्भवदन्ध्र बासित् (छान्देपाय ६.२.२) बित्या दित्त्रिण्याक्षानामवदनेवप्रयत्नः संक्षिप्ति ।
creators. Even the Karmakanda is interpreted by Madhva as conveying the sense of Karman and brahman. For example, the sentence, vasante vasante jyotisa vajeta, may be made to mean "the creator of the universe can be attained by means of sacrifices". Many such examples may be given. If such far-fetched interpretations were admissible, then any Vedic sentence could be made to convey any sense.

Similarly it cannot be argued by Madhva that to say that there are many creators is untenable, because there may be among these several creators difference of opinion as to the nature and process of creation and this may ultimately lead to the giving up of the activity of creation. According to Madhva, even the liberated souls

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1. Commentary, p.83: तत्र (इ.धृ.१.१.) कस्तन्तवार्यं यथा- कस्तीति कसः।
   पञ्चाशः कस्तीतिति कसः। भोगा-दैवो बिध्रतम्। पूर्णदायक कारानम्।
   कस्मात्मात्रो दैवत्व व्यतिनिः। सवत्र व्याप्य कर्मानेन
   जन्मादी शैल्यः। तत्र संबुजित्वेतर्विन्नस्ते। हृदग्रीखितातिर्थियो।
   जिस्के-कैके। नार्त नन्दू, भोग्य घोर-प्रकियो मरिमें सभ्योत्ति।
   ध: प्राणः। घोर- ज्ञातवेदः। 'कार: प्राण बालःपैलु बुद्धिः।
   भोग्यायासो बलाव ज्योतिषः। तत्र संबुजित्वेतर्विन्नस्ते।
   घोरण्डेत्यैं संबुजितः। असमन्तातु येनै-निर्रितः।
   प्राप्त विश्वम्। 'मन्नेत्वैः काव्यवानम्। विशिष्ठ विधर्मः।
   सन्मशाश्चाप्नाभः। छान्दः।

2. Commentary, p.91: सत्तोऽवज्ञातोऽवज्ञाते वर्षस्मीश्चिबी दिविनेना
   वेंस्यन भ्रम्यादिपत्रिनिर्विदेषप्रक्षः गारदिति वेन्नः।
do not entertain any jealousy for one another. How then can gods be supposed to entertain any jealousy? It may be further argued on behalf of Madhva that, since every one of these gods is self-sufficient and possesses the power of creation, there is no necessity of assuming that creation is a collective activity. But this argument does not carry any conviction, for, according to Madhva, the creator has to create according to a fixed pattern and there is no scope for any plans of his free will. If it is said that among these three Īśvaras [Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Meheśa] he who is without beginning etc. is the creator, then, as the bruti-texts can have different meanings, it is possible to interpret these texts in favour of either Śiva or Viṣṇu as the creator. As a matter of fact, it is not better to suppose that in view of the uncommon power possessed by Paramēśvara, these three gods [Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Meheśa] are really one, though they appear as different? Finally, the dvaitins cannot insist that Nārāyaṇa alone is the creator because there are specific Vedānta texts to that effect. For, they must remember that many texts specifically referring to Śiva as the creator can be

1. Commentary, p.91: तदा परमेश्वरानामविन्ध्याधिकसिद्धिहिन्दु परस्पर- विन्दुनांविन्ंद्र्याध्वः संक्षेपिति किंचित व कस्य न ज्ञातम्।
adduced. Hence the conclusion of the dvaitins that Viṣṇu alone has to be regarded as the creator is not correct.

In the next topic, called the Samanvayadhikarana, Madhva states that, though Pasupati, Hirangagarbha, etc. are sometimes mentioned in the Vedas as creators of the universe, if the meaning of the Vedas was properly considered with the help of such means as Upakarma, Tatparya etc., one would come to the conclusion that only Viṣṇu can be regarded as the creator of the universe and that the assumption of any entity other than Viṣṇu as the creator is based on ignorance only.  Appayya Dīkṣit controverts this statement by pointing out that such consideration of
the meaning of the Vedas as suggested by Madhva may lead one to the assumption of Viṣṇu is the creator, but that consideration certainly does not help to negate the idea about either Śiva or Brahma being the creator. For, the dvaitins themselves accept that the Veda may convey more than one meaning. Moreover, to assert that the upakarma etc. lead to the only conclusion that Viṣṇu alone is the creator, is unwarranted, since, the Śavias and others seek to prove that Śiva alone is the creator by resorting to the same means as Upakarma etc. If it was said that, because in the Purāṇas like the Śaiva, the Vaiṣṇava, the Vairācya, etc., there was mutual censure of gods, and because the Vaiṣṇava Purāṇas were more authoritative, Viṣṇu alone had to be regarded as the creator, then Appayya Dīkṣita would reply that the so-called mutual censure was intended not for treating others with contempt, but for praising the worthy. In the Mahābhārata, for instance, the samnyāsa is censured, but that does not mean that samnyāsa is entirely unacceptable. Indeed, the

1. Śrīvatsa, p.95: अश्वमेधातः विज्ञेया ज्ञानसाधिता: स्नुत्स्वरुपं तेः
   शुद्धिनां विपुराविविवज्जनस्मानं कुर्विनं तु
   शिवविविष्णुयान्याराजमाय।

2. Ibid, p.97: न हि निन्द्रा निमित्तं निन्द्येतदं प्रकटो तं
   स्नुत्यं स्तोत्रः।
Dvaitins also accept this position. As has been said in the *Anuvyakhyana*, this is just like the anger of a father towards his son. Moreover, the praise or the censure of a god does not suggest the superiority or the inferiority of that god. We have to understand that the great sages have described any one god as being superior or inferior according to the particular context and incidents. Appayya Dīkṣita has elaborated the same point in his *Śivatattvaviveka*. Therefore, on the basis of *samānyava* as indicated by Madhva, one would have to accept that these three gods, namely, Viṣṇu, Brahmā, and Śiva, are not different from one another, and that all the three of them are the creators.

1. *Commentary*, p.98: तथा महामार्तेश्वर्वन्तः वान्तिक्षेत् --- मूविकी
   धन्यासनिम्नदा दृष्टे। केवल सत्यीपि तैत्तिक्षेऽ
   द्रमास्त्वतरा न काचन हानिपत्तय स्तो।

   यथा कुष्ठ: पिता पुत्रं मरेष्यासैपूर्वकः
   प्राक्षेात्ञायस्य कृत्यं कदाचेव पुराणमुद्रिति।

3. Ibid, p.99: यस्य तमतद्विभिधेयके ---
   व्यासदद्ध्रम क्षितिकुम्भः व्यासंहः प्रज्ञस्ये।
   नामेन मूर्ध्याधिविधिः चूत्तल्यं वा स्पन्दनम्।
   तत्र क्षेत्राः ब्रह्मान्नासि नामाभिवृत्तय महिमिः।
   पुराणानि प्रणीतानि निगुणस्तृत्र न सुहृदति।
Really speaking, however, none of these three

gods is the creator of the universe. This is the point

which Appayya Diksita makes out in the next topic, known

as Ṛksatvyadhikarana. He refutes the view that any Vedic

passages refer to Viṣṇu as the creator. According to

Madhva, the Brahman is not to be mediated upon, but it is

the reflection of the Brahman that is to be mediated upon1.

This would lead to another conclusion, namely, that the

Brahman is not upāsya. If the Brahman is not upāsya2,

then those Śruti-sentences which describe that the Brahman

is to be mediated upon may be describing some other

Brahman and not the Brahman intended by Madhva. This would

lead to another conclusion that the Brahman intended by the

dvaitins is not at all mentioned (vācyā) by the Śruti-

texts. But, everywhere, the description of the qualities

or the Brahman is intended to facilitate upāsanā. Now,

if the reflection of the Brahman is for mediation, then,

all these passages which describe the Brahman will have

to be taken as referring to the reflection of the Brahman,

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1. Commentary, p.101: तस्माहपासनानी हृदयस्य अभ्यासः प्रतितिनिथिविषय

ब्रह्मापासनार्थम्।

2. Ibid, p.101: ब्राह्मणपासनां भ्रमणस्य यथार्थस्यायामायता त्येषोपासनाभ्रमणेऽपि

पास्यार्थवस्तर्थम् शून्यवात्स्यान्तर्यमेऽ तद्वारचे न महत्त्वः

इत्यीतवर्गम्।
and not to the Brahman itself. This will amount to saying that the real Brahman visualised by those who are liberated or those who are to be liberated, after mediation of the avyakta brahman, is described only in few śruti-texts, and that real Brahman is not directly described or mentioned by those few śruti-passages, but by resorting to Laksāṇā only, and that the reflection of the Brahman is the creator. Such a position, however, is patently untenable.

In the last topic, which has been dealt with in the Madhvatantaramukhamardana, Appayya Dīkṣita shows how, in some of the remaining adhikaraṇas also, Madhva's interpretation is not at all sound. For example, in the ānandamayadhikarana Madhva understands the word brahman as referring to Viṣṇu. Since according to him, in other

1. Commentary, p. 104:

2. Brahma Śūtras, I.1.12.
Upaniṣadic texts, it is used in the sense of Viṣṇu who resides within. But, in order to counter this argument, it may be pointed out that Prajāpati also has been described as residing within. Why, then, should the Brahman not be equated with Prajāpati as well? Similarly the Upaniṣadic passages which Madhva understands as referring to Viṣṇu only, in the topics, ākāśadhikarana, jyotiradhikarana, Indrapratardanadhikarana, can be interpreted so as to refer to other gods also. For, the epithet or qualities on the strength of which Madhva understands these passages as referring to Viṣṇu, can as well be made applicable to other gods like Brahmā or Śiva. This possibility of the epithets denoting Brahmā or Śiva has

1. Commentary, p.108: 

2. Ibid, p.108:

3. Commentary, p.109:
not been refuted by the dvaitins. In one or two cases, Madhva has no doubt tried to explain how certain characterisations specifically point to Viśṇu. For example in the topic antaradhikaraṇa¹ the word antah has to be understood as alluding to Viśṇu who sleeps within the ocean etc., on the authority of the sentence - अन्त: सर्वेऽसत: नन्दनां पर्नां।²

This kind of explanation by Madhva is, however, by no means convincing, because such characterisation is possible also in the case of Śiva. And, since Madhva accepts that a Vedic text can have more than one sense, he should have no objection to accepting that the above-mentioned passage alludes to Śiva also.

In this commentary on the fourth pada³, of the first adhyāya of the Brahma-sūtra, Madhva has stated that all the words primarily express the meaning of Viśṇu,

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2. Ibid, p.115: अन्तरधिकारण:। (B. भ. १.३.११)

3. Brahma-sūtra, I.4.3: तद्वीन्तादयक्षेत्र।
because all the pravṛttis (i.e. power of expressing the meaning) are dependent on Viṣṇu. But can Śiva and Prajāpati also not be regarded as the cause of such pravṛtti?

Moreover, there is no such rule that if the pravṛtti of a word is dependent on something, the word must necessarily denote that some thing\(^1\). If a king causes injury to the enemy, the king himself does not suffer from the pains arising from that injury, though he is the cause\(^2\), of that injury. Similar is the case here.

In this manner, Appayya Dīkṣita has refuted the basic and representative views of Madhva. But in order to avoid the criticism that he has only found faults with Madhva, Appayya Dīkṣita also mentions some goods points of Madhva. For instance, he points out that Madhva is right in saying that the liberated attains to the Brahman free from all modifications. Madhva's assumption that the eternal bliss is screened by avidyā during the course of samsāra-dāsa is also perfectly valid. According to Madhva, Hiranyagarbha and others have attained sayujya-mukti, and

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1. Commentary, p.118: महत्र शरद्ध्य प्रभुप्रिनिमित्य गदाधिक्षतु तत्स्मावार्थसि स श्रवंद्र वाच्य क्षिति न निमयः।

2. Ibid, p.118: न कैसे निरुपितुः स्थन्यायमण्डलानाथानी ताराधीन्तमात्रे राजादुधिक्षितं बृहत्त क्षिति प्रस्तोतप्रमुखः।
have entered into the body of the Brahman, while, according

to the advaitins, Hiranyaagarbha etc. are not at all different

from the Brahman. These two views are, indeed are (?) not

essentially divergent. For in the ultimate analysis, the

principal teaching of all the Vedanta is the Brahman.

In the concluding verses, however, Appayya Diksita

re-assumes the role of a victorious combatant, and

triumphantly proclaims that the crown-jewel in the form of

advaita which was stolen by Madhva and his camp-followers

and which was concealed by them under blades of grass in

the form of the so-called nyayas, has been restored. The

good people are sure to abandon the misleading Madhva-mata

and to adhere to the Šamkara-mata. The latter is real and

eternal, and for this assertion Lord Šamkara himself stands

witness1.

1. Text, verse, 62: मद्यमंदिनिमूर्द्धसल्लगः प्रत्याहार्य-त्यदिनमाणम-

कौशिकलम्।

" " 63: बाल्यकाल गोपिनाथाः स्त्रेरीतम् तत्स्त्रलयुक्तव्यासपन्नश्चमन्तने॥

जैकर मन्त्र श्राद्वाल मात साधवः। भिन्न साहसुमास्थः॥

" " 64: अमुग्यार्थनिनाथोऽपि स्तव्यमात्रमेकर्त्तहारान्।

विशुद्धद्रुवं सरस्यो स्वरुप जिव जिव जन्तुज्ञे निम्ब्यः॥
The last two stanzas are of the nature of a colophon.

1. Text, Verse, 65: विद्वानं विदितं विश्वविद्याध्वरस्त्र
श्रीस्वति वर्णवर्तमात्राय सम्पूर्णः
श्रीरथं ग्राममविशवारोऽपि
रस्त्यम्पदं विशवारोऽपि

66: क्षितिय्यः भिति यमः भिति यमः
श्रीवर्णवर्तमात्राय सम्पूर्णः
प्रतिश्रु पुरासराय: श्रीवर्णवर्तमात्रः

The Madhva-tantra-mukha-mardana of Appayya Dīkṣita together with his own commentary on it contains a seething criticism of the main tenets of Madhva and the dvaitins. The main work consists of 66 verses in various metres.

The author himself has, in his commentary, expressed the fear that the contents of the poetic composition may be found rather difficult to follow on account of the very nature of the composition. The subject of the composition is philosophical, and such a subject is being presented in verse form, which fact naturally puts some stylistic limitations on the author. This may have possibly resulted in the poetic composition having become terse and heavy. This defect has, therefore, been removed to some extent by the author himself in his own commentary called the Madhva-tantra-mukha-mardana-vyākhyāna.

Though, the book is intended for the refutation of Madhva's doctrine, and that too with reference to the first five topics in Madhva's commentary on the Vedānta-sūtras, still in the concluding part (upasamhāra),

1. Commentary, p.1: भक्तिन्ययमुद्धार्यन्या वथा बलक्षब्रुशकर्षभिसारम्।

धर्मसमातिसुभाष्यं तत्कलावमि विविक्ष्यते॥
Appayya Diksita has referred to some of the other more important topics in the first adhyaya. Not only this; in the text itself, the author has referred to some topics from the remaining chapters of the Brahma-sūtras also. This would show that the whole commentary of Madhva was thoroughly examined by Appayya Diksita. It may also be pointed out that Appayya Diksita has carefully studied other works of Madhva, like the Anuvyākhyaṇa, Bhārata-tatparya-samgraha etc. Hence, it can be said that Appayya Diksita has tried to take a whole view of Madhva's philosophy before criticising it. Appayya Diksita's attitude cannot be said to have been either one-sided, or prejudicial as suggested by B.N.K. Sharma in his work on the history of the dvaita-school of Vedānta. Incidentally,

2. Commentary, p.111: यायत्त वा विदं श्रेर्यः (III.12.1) p.90: श्रेर्यः पि ते केवल तत्त्वाधिकारिणां (III.4.31)
3. Commentary, p.111: स्वेतदीर्घ्यायन्वयनमपरस्परत्वयाः स्वेतदीर्घ्यायन्वयनमपरस्परत्वयाः (III.12.1)
it may be pointed out that Appayya Dīkṣita was severely
criticised by Vijayāndra-tīrtha. In his works on the
dvaita-philosophy, but his criticism seems to be based more
on prejudice and jealousy than on scholarly refutation of
the powerful objections raised by Appayya Dīkṣita. For
example, Vijayāndra-tīrtha has wasted much of his effort and
time in showing how according to him, Madhva has not
violated the Mimamsā nyāyas, and how some rare quotations
can be found in the commentaries of Śaṅkara and others,
instead of effectively answering away the more serious
objections raised by Appayya Dīkṣita and thereby re-estab­
lishing the dvaita-doctrine on firmer ground. The modern
dvaitins also do not seem to be quite free from his fault.

As a literary piece, the Madhva-tantra-mukha-
Mardana is characterised by direct and forceful style, and
Appayya Dīkṣita may be said to have been successful in

1. This Vijayāndra-tīrtha is supposed to have flourished
said
in the 16th century A.D. (1514-1595) and is/to have been
the author of more than 50 works, including the work,
-अपमय-क्योऽ-चयेतिका in manuscript form. For other details,
see: B.N.K. Sharma, A History of the dvaita-school of

presenting his own viewpoint in a fairly systematic manner. In support of his statements, he has often quoted from works on Purva-mimamsa, grammar, etc., which fact further confirms his extensive scholarship and versatility. It also needs to be added that Appayya Diksita has nowhere done deliberate injustice to his adversary by misrepresenting his views. He has dealt with the rival school of philosophy with great care and full enthusiasm. Even after exposing deficiencies in Madhva's doctrine, he has been good enough to mention some of the good points of that doctrine. This is clearly indicative of Appayya Diksita's impartiality and systematic appreciation of the opponent's point of view.

1. Commentary, p.122:

बिल्यां कोण मध्यकर्त्तब्रन्तत्र व्राह्मणात्मकः वे रोमाञ्चित 
परिहर्दे तत् मुक्तागान पुरातत्व तैरिकृत्यान्यस्मिक्षिदिद- 
प्रकपक्षात्मकात्मानं तत्तत्त्वायत्ति वादस्य पुत्रस्य 
त्रिपादीय दर्शिति।

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542
The Vendāntakalpataruparimala by Appayya Dīksita is a commentary on the Kalpataru of Amalananda, which latter itself is a commentary on the Bhāmati of Vācaspatimisra. This Bhāmati again is a commentary on the Śāmkara-bhaṣya. Śāmkara, it is said, was born at kaladi in Malabar district. The generally accepted date of Śāmkara is 788-820 A.D. His preceptor was Govindayatin who was a student of Gauḍapādācārya. After finishing his studies, Śāmkara came to Vārāṇasi and started his literary activities. He has been said to be the author of various works. The most important works are his commentaries on the vedānta-sūtras of Badarayāṇa, upaniṣads and Gītā. Apart from those various stotras are ascribed to him. Śāmkara defeated Maṇḍana-misra the well-known Baudha-scholar of his time) and in such a manner he made Vedic religion based on firm bases. He visited all most all the parts of India for his religious mission and established mutt-system which afterwards proved to be very successful. His scholarship and mastery over language are beyond question. His teaching and principles were based on firm logical grounds and no one was able to defeat him. His commentaries are greatly honoured and respected even in modern days. Vācaspati is a disciple of Trilocana. He is junior contemporary of Śāmkara and his period of life falls in latter half of the 9th century.
Section II

Chapter - 6.

Vedantakalpataruparimala.
(approx. 841 A.D.). Vacaspati was patronised by king Nṛga. Vacaspati has contributed to almost every branch of philosophy. His work, namely, Bhamati on the Śamkarabhasya and the Samkhya-tattva-kaumudi on the Samkhyā-karikā are highly respected. Especially in Bhamati, it is said that, Vacaspati has made clear the meaning and purport of Śaṁkara in the Śamkarabhasya. On account of his mastery over philosophy, he was otherwise called as sarva-tantra - svatantra. Amalananda was patronised by Kṛṣṇa Yādava. He flourished in the second part of the 13th century (1247-60 A.D.). He was a student of Anubhavānanda. It seems that the guruparampara of Vacaspati, Amalananda and Appayya Dīkṣita was the same. Amalananda wrote a commentary on the Bhamati and this commentary, the Kalpataru, was very popular. Another work, Sastradarpana is ascribed to Amalananda. But he is famous for his Kalpataru than this Sastradarpana. All these commentaries, namely, Śaṁkarabhasya, Bhamati, Kalpataru and Parimala are in prose form and have been printed all together in one volume. The second edition of this work is published in

1. The first edition is edited by Mahāmahopādhyāya Ananta Krishna Ṣastri of Calcutta University and has been printed in the Nirṇayasagara Press of Bombay, 1938, pp.1-1061.
The second edition has 1121 pages in all. Out of these the first sixty pages are devoted to the introduction in Sanskrit, and the gist in Sanskrit of the contents of the four commentaries, namely, Śāmkarabhasya, Bhāmatī, Kalpataru and Kalpataruparimala. In the Sanskrit introduction to the first edition which covers 18 pages, the editor gives a brief summary of the main doctrines of different schools of philosophy such as Lokāyatika, Saṅgata, Naiyāyika, Viśiṣṭadvaitins, Advaitins, and Dvaitins. The editor also refers to the question regarding the date of Śāmkarācārya but avoids entering into any detailed discussion of it. Lastly the editor refers to only one edition of the Parimala printed in Vijayanagar. The date of its publication is not mentioned. In the introduction in Sanskrit to the second edition, the editor refers to another printed edition of the Parimala printed in Kaśi (Banaras). Here also, the date of its publication is not mentioned. The actual texts of these four commentaries spread over 1022 pages. These are followed by an alphabetical list of the names of various rśis referred

1. The second edition is edited by Bhargava Śaṅkātri and is printed in the same press at Bombay.
to in the Sūtras of Vyāsa. Then follows the alphabetical index of the Vedānta-Sūtras. Twelve pages have been devoted to this index. An alphabetical index of the various quotations from the upanisads occurring in the commentary of Śaṅkara is given in the last 28 pages.

The Vedāntakalpataruparimala begins with the verse

гуर्जितविनिष्ठानमः सिंहस्त्रास्य ततः भाषिन्ति प्रातः

अक्षरन्य निबधितान्विताज्ञ व्यासकरो दितिः कित्सणम् ॥

and ends with the usual colophon, namely,

त्रितिष्ठ ष्ठिद्वद्वेष्ठातुत्तुर्विष्ठधिकः स्तुतं-श्रीमद्व्रूतिशाखाय शास्त्रिष्ठविष्ठाम्

श्रीराम-गण्यानांविष्ठचिरं चौतमसंग्रहितो वैदा न्यालिबन्धिसंग्रहे

चुत्शिहृदयायस्य चकुर्वारामस्य चकुर्वारामस्य: पादः ॥ ५

Besides this, every पदा in the first chapter is concluded with a few stanzas. For example,

श्रीमद्व्रूतिः स्तुतिकोस्तुतं-श्रीराम-गण्यानांविष्ठाम चुत्शिहृदयायस्य: पादः

प्रणेत्रां वैदा न्यालिबन्धिसंग्रहे

वैदा न्यालिबन्धिसंग्रहे

पुरूष: पादेः नन्दिनीय: नन्दिनीय: पादः

पुरूष: पादेः नन्दिनीय: नन्दिनीय: पादः

2. Ibid. (VKP). p. 1022.
4. Ibid. (VKP). p. 269.
5. Ibid. (VKP). p. 370.
The Vedantakalpataruparimala (VKP), which is also known as the Kalpataruparimala, is the most important work of Appayya Diksita. Of course it cannot be said to be an independent treatise, for it is actually a commentary on the Kalpataru of Amatānanda, which itself is a commentary on the Dhamati of Vācaspati, which again is a commentary on Śaṅkaraśaṅkara's bhasya on the well-known Vedānta-sūtras of Bādarāyana. It would appear that the main purpose of Appayya Diksita, in writing this commentary was to expound in detail the Vedantic philosophy as propounded by Śaṅkara. Though, in more senses than one, the Vedantakalpataruparimala constituted the archstone of Appayya Diksita's philosophical thought, still it is not his first venture in the field of Vedānta. Nor can it be said that, before this work, Appayya Diksita had not written with a view to expounding Śaṅkara philosophy. For, we find that in the Vedantakalpataruparimala itself, the author has referred to some of his previous compositions like, the Siddhāntalesasamgraha¹ and the Caturmatasārasamgraha². There also occurs in it

1. cf. VKP p.552.
2. Ibid. p.596.
a reference to the Manidipika.

A significant point about the Vedantakalpataruparimala is that, at most places in that work, the term acārya has been used by Appayya Dīkṣita with reference to Amalananda, the author of the Kalpataru. Śaṅkarācārya, on the other hand, is usually referred to by him as either bhāsyakāra or bhāsyakṛd.

1. Ibid, P.575. It is, however, doubtful whether this Manidipika is the same as the author's Śivārkamanidipika. There are, indeed, indications that it must be some other Manidipika by some other author. The Manidipika is referred to in the last adhikaraṇa of the second quarter of the second chapter of the VKP. Appayya Dīkṣita's Śivārkamanidipika, on the other hand, is known to extend up to the end of the first chapter. In the VKP, the author refers to the Manidipika in connection with the refutation of the Pāncaratra-school, while in the Śivārkamanidipika, we do not find any reference to that school. It is, of course, not unlikely that the portion of the Śivārkamanidipika, after the first chapter, was lost in course of time.

2. It may, however, be noted that in a few contexts, the term acārya is used also with reference to Śaṅkarācārya. e.g. VKP. P.159.
Vācaspathimisra is invariably referred to as vṛttikāra.

Another term which Appayya Dīksita has used frequently but the exact implication of which is rather doubtful, is Gurumata\(^1\) or 'the view of the Guru'. It is not clear whether the word Guru is intended to denote Amalananda, who is often referred to as ācārya, or whether it stands for the author's father, Śrī-Rangarājādvarin. However, from the introductory verses in the Vedāntakalpataru-parimala, where the word Guru unequivocally refers to the author's father\(^2\), it would appear that the term Gurumata in the subsequent portion of the work implies the view of Appayya Dīksita's father, Śrī-Rangarājādvarin.

Another point which deserves consideration at this stage pertains to the purpose of this work. The traditional story in this behalf is as follows: Appayya Dīksita was born in a Śaiva family; so it was expected that he should propagate the Śaiva doctrine and the vedāntic philosophy. Actually, however, he did not do so. He was no doubt a famous author in Sanskrit, but his special field

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1. e.g. VKP. PP.139,192, etc.
2. cf. Ibid. I.1.: गुरुसम्बन्धदग्धम् विश्वसाधि तत् वैण्डित्व प्राप्तेः।
   अक्षरां शिखरविन्यासानि व्याकरणमीव कल्पतन्तु॥
was rhetorics. Therefore, in order that Appayya Diksita's great learning and scholarship might be more properly utilised, the renowned scholar-saint of the time, Nrsimhasramasvamin, personally went to him and urged him to do something for Saivism and Vedanta instead of wasting his literary labours in such barren fields as rhetorics. Appayya Diksita accepted this advice. In this connection, Ahotila Pandita says in his \textit{Isanastuti}:

\begin{quote}
वेदांतार्थिप्रकाशविलाससाहित्यसमाप्तिः

श्रीकण्ठचार्यकण्ठोदितमकारणिविद्वाकृतिः कृपितानि

विजेंद्र भिषिक्तसद्यतमसिद्धिर्निर्वातानि

देवीं मुहोरसिद्धो सौ भरतव्रतिः सद्य परिस्वरतिः
\end{quote}

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1. Translation: "That (Appayya) Diksita, who never stumbled in explaining the path of philosophy which itself came out from the threat of Srikanta\textasciitilde{\textacuted{c}}\textacuted{c}\textacuted{c}rya whose intelligence was not confused with the fear of the noise of insignificant disputes in Vaikuntha, stood, very alertly, on the side of Samkara\textasciitilde{\textacuted{c}}\textacuted{c}\textacuted{c}rya by his (i.e. Appayya's) composition known as the \textit{Parimala}, as he was instructed in such a manner by the preceptor of advaita-philosophy in the form of Daksinamurti. On this Ramesvara, who wrote in kali-age 4833 (Ramagnivasveda, this corresponds to 1731 A.D.) makes the following significant comment: अस्वयमप्रत्यक्षविद्वानभिषिक्तसद्यतमसिद्धिर्निर्वातानिमित्तिकृतिः निर्तिकृत्यपरिमकारणविद्वाकृतिः कृपितानि ज्ञातवृत्तार्थापनानिमित्तिकृतिः करणच्ययतः कार्यायस्मातः यथा चार्यस्मातः ज्ञातवृत्तार्थानि मूतुः."
So the first introductory verse supports this traditional story.

Incidentally, if the foregoing story was regarded as true, then the work mentioned by Appayya Dīkṣita in the Vedāntakalpataruparimala as the *Manicīpikā* must refer to some work other than his own *Sivārkamanicīpikā*. The *Sivārkamanicīpikā* is an important work on *Sivādvaita*, and it would have to be assumed that Appayya Dīkṣita wrote it only after he had been awakened to his predestined task by Nīrsimhāsramasvāmin.

1. See foot-note No.2 on page No.549
The first chapter of the *Vedanta-sūtras* is intended for establishing harmony (*samānyaya*) in various *Śastra*s. Though there are different *Upaniṣads* with different names and topics, still, all these scriptures aim at one and same goal and that is the Brahman. This has been made clear in this first chapter. The first topic in the first quarter of the first chapter is *adhyāya*.

Appayya Dīksita begins with a confession that he had unfortunately forgotten the teaching imparted to him by his preceptor. He was however, awakened in that respect by the learned persons and could, therefore, undertake to expound the *Kalpataru*. Continuing, he assures the readers, through the remaining introductory stanzas, that he would try his utmost to deal with the subject in a manner suitable to its profundity.

Adverting to the main topic of discussion, Appayya Dīksita points out that the proposition mooted by some, namely, that a person desirous of *mokṣa* need not ponder over the Brahman, cannot stand at all. The *prima facie* view is that the Brahman is *asamādīgṛha* (i.e. beyond doubt),

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1. See foot note No. 2 on page No. 551
2. The proposition is:  "पुष्पुलोकम ब्रह्म न विचारमयो।"
and one need not think about a matter which is beyond doubt, such as the existence of a pot. Similarly the Brahman which can be denoted by the term aham is beyond doubt, since no one entertains doubts about one's own existence. Moreover, the discussion of the Brahman is of no use, because, the aim of such discussion is to attain moksa (i.e. to become free from the bondages of worldly life), and the worldly life is due to the absence of the real knowledge of the Atman. If both of them (i.e. the real knowledge and the worldly life) are without beginning, there is no possibility of there being any ignorance, since there is no cognition except aham. So there is no necessity of such discussion.

The Siddhantin refutes this by saying that the Brahman is not 'beyond doubt' (asamdigdha). Because, the nature of the Brahman is uncertain from the point of view of a person who is desirous of moksa as much as it is uncertain from the view-point of a person who is not so desirous. This nature becomes distinct when adhyasa is removed. This adhyasa is caused on account of two reasons. Firstly, through the misapprehension and secondly through the reflection. Both these types of adhyasas are possible in respect of an object which possesses form. Naturally, there arises the question whether the Atman possesses form.
or not? If it possesses form, then it would be reflected in the mind. Here Appayya Diksita firmly states that, as the Atman does not possess form, there is no possibility of the illusion such as that of the sky in the water, where both the water and the light by which the reflection of the sky becomes visible, are seen. According to some other teachers, adhyāsa is apprehension of the properties of one object in another object wherein those properties are in fact absent\(^1\). This type of adhyāsa becomes evident in notions like 'I am a human being', etc. According to still others, adhyāsa is based on the absence of the realisation of distinction (chedagrahāna) still others think that adhyāsa is caused through illusion, such as is expressed in the sentences 'I am blind', 'I am weak', etc. Here the attributes (blindness etc.) of one object (i.e. human body) are superimposed on another (i.e. Atman, which is denoted by the word "I".)\(^2\). Some others, again, define adhyāsa as 'cognition of something which is previously seen in something else through remembrance (smṛti)\(^3\). This kind

1. cf. Śāmkarabhāṣya on I.1.1: अवस्तितस्तत्तत्त्वीति।
2. VKP. P. 18. अत्योन्न्यथितम् धर्मिणि अन्योन्न्यथितात् अध्ययनः।
3. Śāmkarabhāṣya on I.1.1: स्मृतिपु: परत्र पूर्वद्यस्तावर्भस।
of adhyāsa is based upon illusion, through which the properties belonging to one object are supposed to be belonging to another. If this is so, then, dreams also are, in a sense, illusions, because, the forefathers who were seen previously are seen in dreams, and that too through ignorance caused by sleep. In the same way the cases where there is wrong impression (amṛti-vibhrama) such as a bluish pot appearing as red etc., are instances of illusion itself. All these are instances of illusion, and these illusions are imaginary by nature, since the Ātman which is the substratum of all is alone real. Few more instances of such illusions are the miracle of mirage etc. This kind of illusion is otherwise known as asat-khyāti.

Commenting on all these views, Appayya Dīkṣita adds that in illusion one kind of knowledge is essential. For example, the knowledge of silver is essential when it is superimposed on a conch-shell. The same has been confirmed by the word tatra in the sentence,

1. Here, Appayya Dīkṣita points out that the Naiyāyikas do not consider this to be an example of illusion, as for, they do not accept the existence of the Ātman.

2. There are five khyāti's in all. They are: ज्ञेयस्यावतिः, अस्त्यावतिः, अस्मात्यावतिः, अन्यन्तरयावतिः, and अनिन्यन्तरयावतिः.
The question is whether akhyāti and adhyāsa mean the same thing or whether there is any difference between these two. The answer of this question is very simple. These two words do not indicate one and the same thing, but there is some difference. In akhyāti, there is movement, but it is not directed towards the object before our eyes. It is directed towards those objects which are not before our eyes, but are at some different place. In adhyāsa, on the other hand, there is physical motion with reference to the object, which is present before the person concerned. As has been already pointed out, in illusion, one-sided knowledge is essential. This knowledge is to be obtained either through self-evidence (svatah-pramāṇya) or through evidence of others (paratah-pramāṇya). Both these kinds of evidence are to be acquired, they are not born with us. Now the question is: If adhyāsa is based upon the object which is present before our eyes, how is such adhyāsa possible in respect of the Ātman which cannot be visualised? The answer to this question would be that there is no such hard and fast rule that is adhyāsa, the illusion.

1. VKP, p. 28.
2. VKP, p. 29.
in regard to the object before one's eyes should in every case occur. So there is no harm whatsoever in supposing that the qualities of the body are superimposed on the Atman which itself is partless (nirāmsa) and formless. This is the reason why the description of the Atman by the term aham is not quite correct. When one says, 'I am happy', that statement should be regarded as merely a formal description of the Atman. In a sense, it is a false description made through ignorance, and all the Vedānta-texts aim at removing this false notion.

2. After defining and expounding the form adhyāsa, the author proceeds to the second section known as Jñānasādhikarana. It consists of one sutra, अथातो ख्यातजित्वासा. The purpose of this sutra is to indicate the purpose that the Brahmān is to be explained in this āśāstra. It is suggested that thereby the desire to know the nature of the Brahman may occur. The word atha in the sutra is used in the sense of 'after'. It is not here used to indicate any vidhi, as in sentences such

1. VKP. P.39: Śāmkara-bhāṣya: न बायमुर्तनिम्नम् - पुरोवस्तितः क्षण विषये विद्यान्तरमधुसिद्धिमिति।
2. Vedānta-Sūtras, I.1.1.
etc., for, the desire to know cannot be a subject relating to any particular individual. The word *atha* in this *sūtra* is similarly not used in sense of continuation, as it has been used by Jaimini in the first *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-sūtra*, namely, *ātha-ṛtā karma-vidyā*. Because there also Jaimini has used the word *atha* in the sense of *ānantaryā* and the whole *sūtra* would mean: *after the study of the Vedas* (*atha*), for this reason *atah* (that is in order to know what is *dharma*) the discussion about *dharma* is being started. Here, the word *dharma* cannot be understood to include the sense of the *Brahman*. If it had implied the inclusion of the *Brahman* then it would have to be assumed either that the great sage Jaimini had forgotten to discuss this *Brahman* in his work or that there had been some obstacle. But both these assumptions are unwarranted. Actually these two sciences are quite distinct from each other. The first (i.e. *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* of Jaimini) describes and expounds the sacrificial system (*karma-kāṇḍa*), while the second (i.e. *Uttarāmīmāṃsā* of Vyāsa or Bādarāyaṇa) has for its theme the *Brahman* which is ever existent.
Now, even if these two Śāstras, namely, the Purvamīmāṃsā and the Uttaramīmāṃsā (Vedānta) are quite distinct from each other, can there be established some such relation as cause and effect between them, in the sense that the attainment of the Brahman becomes possible through the knowledge of dharma? The answer to this question is that there cannot be any such relation, since the desire for knowing the Brahman may be produced in a person even before the desire for knowing ritualistic procedure. Appayya Dīkṣita further adds that the knowledge of the Brahman is obtained through words; in that sense it may be characterised as śābda-jiñāna. This śābda-jiñāna may be with reference to an entity which is directly perceptible or an entity which is not directly perceptible. In the case of the Brahman, it is of the latter type.

Having this occasional discussion, the author now turns to the subject proper. It has been established that the word atha is used in the sense of 'after', that is after the consideration of karmans; but it may be asked which karmans? Are karmans such as Sagunopāsana etc. meant here? It is pointed out that karmas like the sagunopāsana.

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1. VNF. P.55: नन्द प्रमोद्वर्तक विद्वान संदर्भोपरासप्रमाहेतुत्वं न तन्य प्रत्यावर्त्तति श्रवणस्यापरो่ष्ठाने खल्लयपि।
etc. is an occasional one, and hence it is not intended here. Moreover actions are meant to produce the desire for knowledge and not the knowledge itself. The desire to know the Brahman does not anticipate anything except the knowledge of one's own duties. This does not of course mean that the Vedas are here not honoured as much as in the Purvamimamsa. This Sāstra assigns the same importance to the Vedas, and to the Nyaya Sāstra also. But in the Vedanta-Sāstra, the pramanas such as Pātha-krama, Pravṛtti-krama are of no avail, as these are prescribed for sacrificial purposes only and the Uttarāmimamsa is not connected with them. So, ultimately, the word atha means 'after realising the difference between the eternal and the non-eternal things etc.' In this context, the fruit of actions like sacrifices etc., is regarded as non-eternal.

The next word in the sutra is atah. This word denotes cause or reason. So it would mean 'for this reason!; that is to say, for the purpose of acquiring the eternal fruit etc.', one should entertain the desire to know the

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1. Ibid. P.64: पूर्वतन्त्र जिवायामप्र जाते वेदामामय्यन्तनि सुशिक्षान्येव
Brahman. This meaning is expressed by the compound word *Brahma-jiñāśa*, occurring last in the aphorism.

The compound *Brahma-jiñāśa*, can be dissolved in two ways - (1) It may be *Caturthī-Tatpuruṣa* meaning the desire for the Brahman; or (2) *Saṣṭhī-Tatpuruṣa* meaning the desire of the Brahman. Now the question is: which of these two ways is more acceptable? According to Appayya Dīksita, the first alternative is not acceptable, since *Caturthī-Tatpuruṣa* is allowed only in some specific cases. The only other alternative here is that the compound *Brahma-jiñāśa* is to be regarded as *Saṣṭhī-

1. cf. *Āstādhyāyī*, II.1.36:

The sutra means that *caturthī-Tatpuruṣa* can be formed when there is the relation of cause and effect, and the cause is the material cause (*tadṛśa*); e.g. *kuṇḍalalaḥ hiryaḥ, kuṇḍalalaḥpirayān* or the *caturthī-tatpuruṣa* can be formed when any one of the following words अर्थ, बड़ि, हिल, सुल and रसिल is the second member of the compound.
Tatpurusa. The genitive can be used in two senses, namely, शेष-शष्ठि and कर्म-शष्ठि. It may be said that, out of these two, the latter cannot be converted into a compound. As against this, it is pointed out that the sutra कम्पित च is meant for ruling out the compound of words which here तर्म termination, such as sastra nirmaṭṭa, etc., with their objects such as apaṃ, ghaṭānāṃ etc. This means that, in the sentences apaṃ sṛasta or ghaṭānāṃ nirmata, the words apa and ghaṭa are really the object of the verbal participles sṛasta, nirmata having the suffix tr. The saṣṭhi-Tatpurusa, compound cannot be formed with such participles. But in the word Brahmacijañāsa, jijnasa is not such a participle ending in tr. Hence, the saṣṭhi-Tatpurusa compound is permissible. The purport of the whole sutra would be: 'after realising the difference between the eternal and non-eternal things (atha), for the purpose of getting eternal fruit etc. (atah) the desire to know the Brahman should be entertained Brahmacijañāsa (kartavya).

1. Āstādhyāyī, II.3.50: पक्षी रेषे।
2. İbid., II.3.65: कृत्व।
3. VKP, P.76. कम्पित च शष्ठि तत्स्य: समासः 'कम्पित'। वितिभूतेः।
Now, if the Brahman is to be known, the question is: where and how is it described? The author replies: the Brahman is described in the vedanta-texts. The main sentence in the scriptures is: 'That thou art'. On the face of it, this sentence establishes the identity between the Atman and the Brahman; but it has been interpreted in various ways. For example, some interpret it as 'thou art for that', while others as 'thou art from that', while still others as 'thou art of that'. There are also others who interpret it as 'thou art a-tattva', and in support of this interpretation

1 Cha. up. IV 118-16.
2 VKP. P.80.
they cite the sentence from the ṣa|jurveda\(^1\). Hence, the meaning of the vedānta-sentences will have to be determined, with the help of pramanās like anumāna, etc. This has been so done while determining the meaning of the word, Śūdra in the Upaniṣadic passage wherein the Janaśruti-myth is explained\(^2\). From this it naturally follows that determining the exact meaning of the vedānta-texts is absolutely necessary, and the same has been done in the subsequent part of this work.

3. The third section is devoted to the description of the nature of the Brahman. The objector, here, argues that the Brahman must be either known or unknown. If the Brahman is unknown, it would always remain beyond the possibility of becoming known. If the Brahman is known, the investigation of the known would be unnecessary.

So, the new śāstra, namely the Brahma-mīmāṁsā need not be started at all.

The Siddhāntin sets aside this objection pointing out that the Brahman is not at all unknown. It can be

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1. VKP. P. 80: अथवा ‘अथोऽराज पापकाः स्त्रिया त्यः क्रृद्धा का रम्येषायत्। अद्बल्कमसि ज्ञिति चिदेत्। 'दु: धुपयेः' त्यास्मादश्चय युनस्रोधादिदिति।

2. This myth has been narrated in the Chandogya Up IV,1,2,3. has been discussed in the Vedānta-Sūtras I,3,34-38.
known from the Vedānta-passage such as  यतो  वा  ब्रह्मानि
भूतानि  जायन्ते। etc. These passages describe the
nature of the Brahman, says Āmalānanda. The Brahman is
said to be the cause of this universe, and the same has
been confirmed in the sūtra:  जन्मावस्थेऽयतः।

The Purvapāksin in this section, says that the
Pradhāna of the Śāmkhyas should be regarded as the cause
of this universe or asat may be said to be the cause, but
not the Brahman, since the śruti-texts are not unanimous
in declaring the Brahman as the cause. Moreover, the
Brahman is not perceptible by the senses.

The Siddhāntin rejects this view of the
Purvapāksin by pointing out that the Brahman is the cause
of the universe, and not the Pradhāna nor the asat. The
whole universe originates in name and form from the
Brahman itself, and this is confirmed by the Upaniṣadic
sentence  यतो  वा  ब्रह्मानि  भूतानि  जायन्ते। This sentence
not only states that the whole universe issues out the

2. Vedānta-Sūtras, I.1.2.
Brahman, but further adds that the whole universe is sustained by and, ultimately dissolves into the Brahman alone. No other entity than the Brahman can be thought of as possessing such power. As for the imperceptibility of the Brahman, it can be said that the Brahman cannot be independently grasped by the senses, without the help of the Śabda. In addition to this, it is pointed out that the Brahman is actually visualised by yogins; so it cannot be characterised as imperceptible.

The compound janmādi in this sutra is Tadgum-samvijñana-bahuvrihi in neuter gender and that compound indicates that the three stages, namely, the creation, the sustenance and the dissolution, are to be taken collectively and not separately. If, on the other hand, the compound, namely, janmādi was supposed to be Itaretara-dvandva, then the sutra would suffer from the defect of gaurava (being too wide). So the word, janmādi should be treated as Samahara-dvandva.

1. VKP. P.83: बितरेतस्योपधन्यदुर्ज्ञानमेव दि जन्माद्योपादित्योऽभाष्यमवीशथितिधिगृहसामायण्यकंविकारायणेति गौरवस्यतः।

2. Ibid: भिन्न दुःख्यो दुःस्य किभी दिग्धायमारूपक्येति परिभाषासंगतः।

मन्नादान्तदुःख्यतः समस्मिततः। ततः 'तत्त्वसुरस्य' भिन्न शिरसामय-विकारारूपंशान्तेण न्युनायक्त्योवं ज्वृत्तीति निग्वित्यः।
The author introduces the fourth section by mentioning its significance, namely, that it is intended to show that the Brahman is possessed of all powers.

It has been already stated that the Brahman is to be known from the Vedas and the Upanisads. But the Vedas and other scriptures are not eternal, as has been stated by the Sutrakāra himself. Moreover, the scriptures are not unanimous in saying that the Brahman is the only cause of this universe. Because, in some Upanisadic sentences, asat is described as the cause, while in others the Atman is mentioned as the origin. This clearly indicates that there is confusion or ambiguity in the scriptures themselves. So the Brahman cannot be said to have been described in the scriptures. This is the Purvapaksa.

The Siddhāntin sets aside this view of the Purvapakṣin by pointing out that the Vedas may not be

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2. Chandogya Up. VI.2.1: तद्देहक आहुरं देवं देवोऽन्सार ।
3. Aitareya Up. I.1. आत्मा वा विद्याम् जेवप्रं आसीत् ।
eternal so far as the Viyad-adhikarana is concerned. But this is not applicable here. The Brahman, which has been described in the previous sutra, has been again mentioned so that it becomes confirmed. Moreover the vedas etc. are the breathings of this Brahman. The Vedanta-texts, indeed, describe the real nature of the Brahman, so the Brahman can be known through the vedanta only. As for the confusion alluded by the Purvapakṣin, it can be said that really it is not confusion at all. Here the Siddhāntin gives a very fine drṣṭānta, namely of medicine given to children. Elder persons, very often, given an elaborate description of the advantages of some medicinal drug, so that a child may take it to be cured from some disease. Similarly, in order to enlighten the ignorant persons, such descriptions are given. This does not mean that there is any confusion or ambiguity. Moreover, though there are such descriptions of the Brahman, still it is the self-experience which really matters here. One cannot know the taste of

1. cf. Brhadāraṇyaka Up. IV.5.11:

अः वा वार्तेयं महतो मूलस्म मित्रविभित्तकब्रह्मदेवयुक्ते
सास्त्रोपदेशोऽस्तविधिपरस्परिबोधनः पुराणिं विद्या वृपुनिनिधः
श्लोकः तृतीयांविषयार्थानानि ....
sugar-cane unless one experiences it oneself. The knowledge of the Brahman can be acquired through the Upanisadic passages, and there is no need of going through each and every book explaining the Brahman, as the generality of a pot can be known through the knowledge of a single jar, without actually securing each and every jar on the surface of the earth.

5. The Purvacaksin in this section, says that the purpose of the whole Veda is to prescribe karmans, such as sacrifices, as has been said in the Sutra 1.1.1.1. The vedantic passages, on the other hand, do not say anything about the karmans (i.e. sacrifices etc.). Hence the discussion about the Brahman in the Vedanta-texts does not possess the sanctity and validity of the Veda.

This view of the Purvacaksin has been refuted by the Siddhantin by pointing out that what Jaimini has said in the above mentioned Sutra is his own personal opinion. Moreover, it is something which goes against

the *Nyāya-sāstra*, hence is not authoritative. The Brahman has been unanimously described as the cause of the universe, by all the scriptures. The principle which has been stated without any difference of opinion, cannot be said to have been wrongly stated. So the **vedānta**-texts have to be regarded as useful. Again the relation between the Brahman and the Atman is known through these scripture only. As these **Vedānta**-texts are not created by any human agency, they do not need any outside proof for their authenticity.

A **śāstra** can be regarded as beneficial only when it urges one to do some profitable karmās and prevents one from doing some karmās which are not regarded as good. From this point of view also, the **Vedānta-sāstra** is significant; it affords one very great pleasure, so that it is induced to entertain a desire to proceed further (pravṛtti). Further since that śāstra destroys illusion, it may also be said to lead one to **nivṛtti**. The latter is acquired by the study of the **Vedānta**, while the former (i.e. pleasure) is achieved by the **laukika** and **vaidika** rituals. The final goal of this knowledge to be derived from the **Vedānta**-texts is **mokṣa** which is both eternal and full of bliss.
Now the question arises: What sort of knowledge is it? The reply is: This knowledge is a mental action which is dependent on some object (vastu). This mental action may be presumed to be eternal, as it is not dependent either on any person or on any condition. The sentences which create the desire for immortality, may be regarded also as creating one's inclination towards the knowledge of the Brahman.

An objection is here raised: the Purusa, who is described in the Upanisads and who is mentioned as the Brahman, cannot have been already known, as it never existed before. This objection has been set aside by saying that Purusa is nothing but the soul itself, which can be known, and the existence of which cannot be denied at all. Moreover, the Upanisadic sentences, describing Purusa etc. are sentences which describe the established facts (bhūtartha). The question would then be: Are the sentences which describe the fact (bhūtartha) to be taken

1. Brhadāraṇyaka Up. III.9.26: ते त्वायोपनिषद्युज्ञपृष्ठभाषाम्।
Katha Up. I.3.11: पृष्ठभाषा परं बिन्दु-भाष सा काण्ठा सा परा गति:।
in their primary sense or are they to be understood in their secondary sense? Appayya Dīkṣita makes it clear that there is no necessity whatsoever of interpreting those sentences in their secondary sense, since the primary sense is very clear and full of expectancy (ākāmśa). As the knowledge of the Brahman destroys nescience (avidyā), the sentences or passages which give that knowledge can be supposed to be purportful. This knowledge is dependent on action, and action is that which expects some efforts on the part of a person (purusa-prayatnah). From this point of view, the sentences such as भविष्योऽविश्वास ज्ञाति | ब्राह्माण्डाधार्यति | etc. would have to be treated as Vidyavakyas as some vidhi (action) has been recommended there.

Here, Appayya Dīkṣita seizes the opportunity to explain the form Darsa-pūrnamāsa, and the whole procedure of that sacrifice. Now, if the sentences which prescribe some action are to be treated as vidyā-vakyas, then, how are the sentences, like ब्राह्मणोऽन हन्तव्यः | न हन्तातः न चित्तेता। etc., which prohibit something to be accounted for? It is said in reply that, in such sentences, the negation (na[j]) is to be constructed with the verbal meaning, that is to say with the dhatvartha, so that the
would mean that there should be an absence of killing a Brahmana (अह्नं कर्त्तां तथा).

Appayya Diksita here points out that, in this connection the gurumata (opinion of guru, that is Amalananda) is somewhat different. According to Amalananda, what is more important here, is not the negation related to a verb, but it is a kind of order (niyoga) in different words. But Appayya Diksita himself seems to be rather reluctant to accept this view. He only adds that the negation in such sentences should be taken only with the meaning of the root. After this incidental discussion, Appayya Diksita finally concludes that the knowledge of the Brahman is one and without a second, and that it can be obtained through the Vedanta-texts only.

This leads to another point: if the Ātman is not different from the Brahman, then, is the Brahman reflected in the Jīva or is it altogether different from the Jīva. According to Ācārya, the Brahman is reflected

1. VKP, p.145: "किं च गुरुपक्षे न हन्यादित्या दिनिनित्यः न भक्तिनिनित्यः।
हन्यादित्यायो निम्नयुगिनियो भिन्नेऽविनियो निन्योऽविनियः।"
in the individual soul; the Acārya clearly mentions this view. Still, adds Appayya Dīkṣāta, the second view, namely that the Brahman is quite distinct from the Jīva does not go against the sūtras. And if this view is accepted, then the view that the Atman is reflected in the Jīva, will have to be treated as a secondary one. If the Brahman is regarded as different from the Jīva, then, it naturally follows that the Śuddha-Caitanya, being avachchedaka, is different from the Jīvesvara.

6. All the sentences in the scripture have the Brahman as their ultimate aim. This is the central theme of this adhikarana. The position of the Pūrvapakṣin in this section is this: The Brahman has been described as not being subject to any change (a-parināmi), since it has no parts (niravayava), while the Pradhāna of the Śaṅkhyas is endowed with parts (sāvayava). The creation or any action is possible only

1. Ibid, p.157: अचार्याद्वितियमिश्रमयेतमभगुनः स्पष्टीकृतः 'विन्यप्रतिविद्धमन्-
मेघवदात्तत्त्वात्तत्त्वदिव्यवद्यत्त्वमात्त्वात्त्वात्त्वात्त्वात्त्वात्त्वात्त्वात्तत्त्वात्तत्त्वात्तत्त्वात्तत्त्वात्तत्त्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्त
in the case of an entity which has parts, and such an
entity can become an object of knowledge. As the Brahman
is without parts, no action or movement is possible on
its part; hence it cannot be regarded as the cause of
the universe.

The Siddhāntin refutes this by reiterating
that the Brahman alone can be regarded as the cause of
the universe. The śruti-sentence, तदैस बृह स्वयः प्राक्षेम, clearly indicates that the cause of the universe is
sentient. The Pradhāna of the Sāmkhyas which is
nonsentient cannot therefore be regarded as the cause.
The words तदैस (It reflected) in the above-
mentioned sentence cannot be said to have been used in
their secondary sense (Laksana), since the word ātman
occurs in that context. It is also not correct to
assure that the sutra स्वाभाविक has some reference to
the Pradhāna. Because, when one sleeps, the Jīva enters
into darkness by which the Pradhāna is characterised.
Darkness is a part (āmsā) of pradhāna. At the time of
sleep, the Jīva is enveloped by this darkness. Sleep

1. Chandogya Up., VI.2.3
2. Chandogya Up., VI.3.2: केवल देव्यजन हिष्मास्तिस्तत्र देव्यज
अनेन जीवप्रकाशयाविश नानूपे व्या कर्काणि।
3. Vedānta-Sūtras, I.1.9.
means that mode (vṛtī) which is dependent on the
cognition of absence\(^1\). It has no connection with
darkness as is presumed by the Purvapakṣin. Moreover,
the Upaniṣadic passages mention that the Brahman itself
was divided into three parts\(^2\). This clearly indicates
that the Brahman itself is the cause, and not the
Pradhāna of the Sāṁkhya. Appayya Dīkṣita further
points out that the root īkṣ in Upaniṣadic sentences
such as तद्भजत etc. is used in general sense, as has
been said by Jaimini about the general use of the root
yaj in the Śūtra ब्रह्मचर्यायती गिरोमैतै: पूर्वसत्त्वम्.\(^3\)

1. VKF, p.163. Bhāmati: अभाभभोष्यायाममना वृत्ति: निद्रा।
2. See foot-note No.2 on page 160. This is known as
Trivṛtkarana. The three deities, namely, पृथ्वी, बाप्प, and तेजस are to be divided into three-parts as \(\frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{4}\).
For example, the Trivṛtkarana of Prthvī would be
\(\text{पृथ्वी} + \text{आप} + \text{तेजस} \). When two other elements, namely,
\(\text{vayu} \) and \(\text{akasa} \) are added, then, this theory is further
developed in Pañcīkarana with \(\frac{1}{3}\) part of one element
and \(\frac{1}{8}\) to part of the remaining four. The Pañcīkarana
of पृथ्वी would be \(\text{पृथ्वी} \text{आप} \text{तेजस} \text{वायू} \text{आकाश} = 1 \text{unit}.\)
7. The discussion about anandamaya mentioned in the sentence, तस्मादा झैलमादिशानम्यावः अन्योऽस्तर आत्मानन्दमयः। forms the subject-matter of this section. The commentator introduces this topic by saying that ignorant persons regard this body, which is made of food etc, as the Atman. In order to abolish this wrong notion, this topic has been introduced.

The Purvapaksin, here, maintains that the suffix maya in the word anandamaya in the above-mentioned sentence suggests that the word denotes the Jiva, since the suffix maya implies 'abundance of joy' (anandaprācurya). As the Brahman is formless etc. it must be regarded as void of sensations, such as joy, etc.

This is rejected by the Siddhāntin who points out that the Sūtra of Panini, which speaks of the suffix maya, can be interpreted in two ways—

1. The maya may be added to a word without any

1. Taittirīya Up. II.5.
2. VKP, p. 178: अनन्यमं शरीरं जनात्मानं बन्धन्यन्तया आत्मत्वेन प्रक्षिप्यदम्
3. Āstādhyāyī, V.4.21: तत्प्रकृत्तवने मया।
significant change in the original meaning of that word\(^1\); or (2) the suffix *maya* may be used in the sense that a thing which is to be described or which is being described\(^2\) is under consideration. But, according to the *Vṛttikāra*\(^3\), both these interpretations are not correct. He suggests that the suffix *maya* has been used to indicate the 'abundance' of a thing under consideration. Amalānanda assumes that only 'abundance' is implied by the termination *maya*. Appayya Dīṅgita agrees with this view of Amalānanda and rules out the view of the *Vṛttikāra* by pointing out that the view of the *Vṛttikāra* does not tally with the interpretation of the *sūtra*.

\(^1\) p. 180: 
\(^2\) p. 180: 
\(^3\) p. 180: 
\(^4\) p. 180:

1. *VKP.* p. 180: 'स्वाभौ मय्य' ज्ञिति प्रयासारसीतु प्रत्यूष्ण प्रत्युपाद- शिल्प्येव वर्तमानत्वादित्वादेपि मय्यत्रत्वाय भक्तीतेषास्ते: ☛ अस्त्यान्यमेव यथागृहमस्वाहायुदाहरणम् ☛

2. *VKP.* p. 180: अपरस्तोपः प्रकृति प्रत्युपाव्यदेशिन्निति प्रकृतिवाचनम् ☛ तददिति प्रयासारसीतु प्रकृतिवनैकृतेषां मय्यत्रत्वाय भक्तीति ☛ अस्त्यान्यमेव यथा विपाकायुदाहरणम् ☛ प्रकृतिन्नित्वः वसं विश्वासितरयोः ☛

3. Who is this *Vṛttikāra*, whether a grammarian, or a commentator on the *Vedanta-sūtras* is not definitely known.

4. *VKP.* p. 180: वृत्तिकारमण्डितायेन स्वाक्षरणवृत्तितत्सूरूपायायानेन निमोऽवृः न वन्धेयम् ☛
Having thus fixed the meaning of the word *ānandamaya* as 'having the abundance of bliss', the author maintains that, such abundance of bliss is obtained by the knower of the Brahman, as has been stated at the beginning of the Upanisadic passage from which the sentence, *ब्रह्मोऽपि ब्रह्मानन्दम्* has been quoted. Naturally, there remains the expectancy as to what is that Brahman and how it is to be known? This expectancy is removed by the Upanisadic sentence, *सत्यं ब्रह्मानन्दस्तः* Still one question remains unanswered and that is: where is such Brahman placed? The sentence under consideration offers a reply to this question.

After discussing the sentence *ब्रह्मोऽपि ब्रह्मानन्दम्*, which, according to the vṛttikāra, constitutes the subject for discussion in this section, the commentator proceeds to the sentence *ब्रह्म पुनः प्रतिष्ठा* which is the main sentence to be considered in

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1. *Taittiriya Up. II.1*: ब्रह्मविदाप्रकृतिपरम्
2. Ibid.
3. This *Vṛttikāra* is certainly a commentator on the *Vedant-Sūtras*.
4. *Taittiriya Up. II.5*.
this section, according to Śāṅkara. The Purva-pākṣin here, avers that the sentence पुच्छा प्रतिपूर्ण does not describe the Brahman, since it is called पुच्छा (tail). A tail cannot be said to be the main part of the body, while the Brahman is the principal entity. Moreover, the word अनन्दामया, which means 'abundance of bliss', implies at least some part of pain or sorrow, while the Brahman is extensively full of bliss. Hence the Brahman is not intended here.

The Siddhāntin reiterates that, here, the Brahman itself is intended. As the tail of a bird helps it to support its body, in the same way the Brahman is the supporter of all the universe. So it has been described as पुच्छा. This supporter, as has been described, is full of bliss (अनन्दामया). This maya is अनन्दामया implies abundance of joy, as, for instance, the sentence 'प्रुःश्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नोभ्रान्नो�
possibility of misery. The sentence, "प्रजुःप्रकाशः सविता," (the sun possesses abundant lustre) does not imply even the slightest trace of darkness, but the darkness may be superimposed; similarly, the possibility of misery is superimposed, but in reality, it is not there. The assumption that मया indicates modification (विकार) when it is affixed to double-vowel-words, is also unwarranted. Because, the सूत्र which lays down that rule is not to be treated as establishing any universal truth. Otherwise, the words such as मयामया (made of clay) etc., will not be having मया, as there is only one vowel in मर्द. The possibility of लक्षणाः in अनन्दमयाः is also out of question. Because, the लक्षणाः is resorted to only when the primary sense (मुख्यार्थ) of the word becomes बधिता. But no such बधा is seen here, as the word अनन्दमया has been frequently used in the Veda in the sense of the Brahman. But so far as the sentence क्षण पुच्छे प्रतिष्ठा is concerned, the लक्षणाः can be resorted to, as the word पुच्छा indicates आधार through लक्षणाः.

1. Astadhyayi, IV.3.15 : द्रव वशदशिः। According to this सूत्र, मया is suffixed to a word with two vowels e.g. पर्यम्फाव (उद्द)
"The eighth section constitutes an exception, while the previous section was the general rule.\footnote{VKP, p.192: समन्वयस्य सर्वोपयोगानेन द्वितियो शिष्याजः।\
स्थापितः। विदिनीमपवादमित्यत्विषा शिष्यवादमित्यत्विषाद्विन्द्रयुक्तेण्युप्रहर्मृक्कवन्तः खंगतिमाहेन।}
It is with those words that introduces this section.

After this introductory remark, the author turns to the \textit{Pürvapakṣa} in this section. The \textit{Upaniṣadic} sentence, \textit{y dharmārthasya pustya dṛṣṭyate},\footnote{Chandogya Up., I.7.1-5} describes some \textit{Purusa}. The question is: Who is this \textit{Purusa}? He may be the \textit{Jīva}, since its substratum such as the \textit{āyē} etc., has been mentioned. On the other hand, it cannot be the Brahman, which, being the supporter of all, cannot have any such substratum.

The \textit{Siddhāntin} refutes this suggestion by saying that the attributes such as greatness or being the substratum of all, mentioned in the passage under consideration go against the assumption of the \textit{Jīva} being described here. Moreover the sentence, \textit{स श्रेय सैरेमय: पार्थेमय: जुदित:} suggests that the \textit{Purusa} in question is quite aloof (\textit{जुदित}) from all kinds of sins. This goes well with the Brahman alone. Appayya Dīkṣita here adds

\begin{enumerate}
\item VKP, p.192: समन्वयस्य सर्वोपयोगानेन द्वितियो शिष्याजः।\
स्थापितः। विदिनीमपवादमित्यत्विषा शिष्यवादमित्यत्विषाद्विन्द्रयुक्तेण्युप्रहर्मृक्कवन्तः खंगतिमाहेन।
\item Chandogya Up., I.7.1-5
\item Ibid, I.6.7-8.
\end{enumerate}
that from the sentence, स अभिषः स्वरूपः पापस्थितः विदितः: it is to be understood that the knowledge of the Brahman not only destroys the past and the present sins, but it destroys the future sins also.

9. In the preceding section, it was mentioned that the Brahman was to be meditated upon (in the form of Purusa). Now in order further to facilitate this meditation the new topic has been introduced, in which the sentence अक्षय श्लोकः का पतिरित्याक्ष जिति होतः वर्णिनि ह वा जिमानि मूलाद्याकाशातः समुत्पन्ने । is being considered. The position of the Pūrvapakṣa is: The word ākāśa is generally used in the sense of 'sky'. The same meaning immediately occurs to one's mind. As against this, the word ākāśa may indicate the Brahman only in its secondary sense. Or, in the present context, the word ākāśa may be understood in the sense of earth, for the earth supports all beings.

The Siddhānta controverts the Pūrvapakṣa, by pointing out that the attributes such as being endless (ananta-vastu-paratva) and being the end of all, can be suitably applied to the Brahman alone. Moreover, the

description that the ākāśa is the rendezvous of all\(^1\) confirms the same. Hence the Brahman alone is here referred to.

10. The sentence क्लया वा देवलता। प्राण जिति होऽ्याच।\(^3\) is being considered in the tenth section. The Purvapaksa\(n\) argues that the word Prāṇa in the sentence under consideration indicates wind, since it is the word which sustains life. It can enter into and come out of the body (sāmavesāna and udgama). Or when a person sleeps, the sense-organs such as speech, eye, etc., are absorbed in the Prāṇa. The word Prāṇa is generally used in the sense 'breath'. Hence, the Brahman is not intended here.

The Siddhāntin refutes this by saying that the word bhūta in the sentence under consideration implies all living beings. They have been described as being born from ākāśa, and as ultimately entering into the same ākāśa. This suggests the evolution and the dissolution of the whole universe, and no other entity other than the Brahman can possibly be connected with

1. Ibid, I.9.1: ब्राह्मण भूतानि आकाशः प्रत्यस्तः यन्ति।
2. Ibid, I.11.4-5.
these phenomena. Moreover, just as the word *anna* means 'boiled rice' and not the food *dīvī* in the same way, the word *prāṇa* may not be used in the sense of *dīvī*; but it may refer to the Brahman having the characteristics such as are mentioned in the passage under consideration.

Appayya Dīkṣita draws attention to another important point, namely, that the Brahman cannot be said to be referred to here in the sentence under consideration on the authority of the *vākyā-pramāṇa*, for, the word Brahman is not used anywhere in this sentence. This is not correct. Because, the *visaya-vākya* describes the Brahman, and this *visaya-vākya* itself is a *śruti*. The *śruti-pramāṇa* is more powerful than the *vākya-pramāṇa*. Hence, the Brahman is here referred to.

The eleventh section has the sentence, अथ यदि: परो दिया ज्योतिर्दीप्त्ये विस्तत: पृष्ठेथु कर्षत: पृष्ठेथु अनुमेयक्यमेव लोग्ये-चिन्मयं वाय तथ्यंदयक्षमि:न्ति: पुलचे ज्योतिः for consideration.

1. *Chandogya Up.*, I.9.10. प्रस्तोत्तर्ये देशता प्रस्तावनन्वायतः

The word *jyotih* in the sentence under discussion is to be understood as referring to some luminous body like the sun etc., because the description 'beyond the sky' (*divah parah*) suits such bodies. Again, the *sky* is here mentioned as the substratum of that *jyotih*. The Brahman, being the supporter of all cannot be regarded as being supported by the sky. This is the Purvapaksa.

The *Siddhāntin* emphatically asserts that the word *jyotih* refers to the Brahman alone, because the relative pronoun (*yad*) in the sentence under consideration refers to the Brahman described in the previous sentence\(^1\). The *Siddhāntin* quotes a similar case from the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*, where the pronoun *sā* in the sentence *तपस्ये प्रवक्ति द्वादशम्नदिक्योऽस बौद्धदेव्यानिषद्*\(^2\) refers to the curds (*दधि*) mentioned in the first part of that sentence. Amalānda, on the other hand, cites an illustration relating to the *Jyotiṣṭoma* and the drinking of the soma left in it. Appayya Dīkṣita explains the same by adding that the *soma*-juice left behind in the

\(^1\) *Ibid*, III.13.6.

\(^2\) *Jaimini-sūtra* (*Pūrvamīmāṃsā*), IV.1.9.
**Jotistoma** is not to be consumed (as Amalananda seems to understand), but it is to be disposed of. The sentence referring to the drinking of the Soma-juice is an *arthavāda*; so it is not to be taken in its literal sense. In the same way, the word 'lustre' is a glorificatory term, and should not be taken in its literal sense. It cannot also be assumed that the metre *gāyatri*, which has been mentioned in the earlier passage - गायत्री वा बिन्द फळफळम् - is indicated by the pronoun *yad*, because the greatness of *gāyatri* as described there is not to be understood as the greatness of the metre *gāyatri*—indeed, *gāyatri* cannot have such greatness—but it is the greatness of the Brahman alone. The description - *gāyatri va idam sarvam*—does not suit the metre *gāyatri*, since only the Brahman can be described as *idam sarvam*. Or, it may be presumed that the word *gāyatri* implies the Brahman in its secondary sense (*gauni-lakṣana*), because both of them have one common property, namely, being four-footed. Amalananda, while explaining this, refers to the sentence यथा व्रत विनिता-यागरेषा: *सम्पन्नित ।* from the *Samvarga-vidya*, wherein

2. Ibid., IV.1.4.
a throw in dice, known as caturayaka carries four points (that is, all of them are winning points). Appayya Dīkṣāta adds that this throw in dice is popularly known as a kṛta throw.

12. In the concluding adhikaraṇa first pāda of the first chapter the Upanisadic passage - स हृदावच प्राणोदित्वम् । प्रभात्या ते मामायुरपण्मित्युपस्व।' has been taken up for consideration. The Āśvamedhin says: In the sentence under consideration, the word prāṇa refers to the wind, as that word is generally used in that sense; or it may indicate the jīva which has been referred to in the same passage as - न वार्षिकिसोत कव्तापर विषात्। or Indra himself might have been denoted as 'माणेव बिनानीद्वि।' But in no case can it be the Brahman, which is formless, and which is without sense-organs.

The Siddhāntin reiterates that the Brahman alone is here implied, as the attributes such as amrtatva etc. can be justifiably applied only to the Brahman. Or it may be said that the three-fold meditation of the Brahman,

3. Ibid.
namely, in the form of Indra, as prañā, and as mukhya-prāṇa has been recommended here. Appayya Dīkṣita, here, adds that the sentence मामेव विमानीषिं (know me only) refers to the Prāṇa. As this Prāṇa (or Jīva) is identical with the Brahman, the Brahman alone has to be understood as having been referred to.

Amalānanda opens the second pada of the first chapter by pointing out its significance. In the previous quarter, those Upaniṣadic sentences, in which the characteristics of the Brahman are clear and distinct, were taken up for consideration. In the second as well as the third padas of this chapter are discussed those Vedānta sentences, in which the characteristics are not so clear or are rather indistinct. In this sense, these two padas, namely, the second and the third, form the continuation of the first pada.

After this introductory observation of Amalānanda, on which Appayya Dīkṣita has nothing to comment, Appayya Dīkṣita straight-way begins with the first section by giving the prima facie view. The
The sentence, अव विषयं श्री तन्मात्रामिति शान्तं बुधोसिन्, has been taken up for consideration, here. The Purusa described in that passage refers to the Jīva, since in respect of it characteristics such as being possessed of body, etc., have been mentioned: अथ बहु विद्यमान: पुरुषोऽयं।

The Siddhaṇtin, on the other hand, contends that, in that passage, the Brahman is intended to be described. The attributes such as sarvakarmatva, satyasamkalpatva, etc., can denote no entity other than the Brahman. The word तन्मात्रान् in the passage under consideration, again, confirms the same assumption. That word suggests that the whole universe is born out of it (i.e. Brahman, tat+ja+la+an). Or, according to Amalananda, the qualities of the Jīva are to be understood as having been superimposed upon the Brahman, the idea of the Jīva being identical with the Brahman is not at all abandoned.

2. Ibid.
3. VKP. p.232: अव विषयं श्री तन्मात्रामिति शान्तं बुधोसिन्। जीवकर्माणां श्रीहरस्वत्वमोक्षमायमि इति: तत्स्मिन्न्यमेतत्त्वास्तुविद्धं हात्मकं।
Appayya Dīkṣita points out that the qualities like manomaya, etc., are of indistinct nature. Throughout this quarter, only those sentences, which set forth the qualities of the Brahman in not so clear terms, have been taken up for consideration.

2. In this section, the sentence \textit{सर्वं ज्ञानं ज्ञातं ज्ञाताम्} constitutes the subject-matter. The \textit{Pūrvapakṣin} says that the Jīva has been described in the sentence under consideration, since there is a reference to the act of eating or of enjoyment. The \textit{śruti}-texts often describe the Jīva as the enjoyer.

The \textit{Siddhāntin} refutes this by pointing out that the Brahman itself is here referred to. The Brāhmaṇas and the kṣatriyas cannot become the \textit{ādāna} (food) of any Jīva. The sentence under consideration, again, cannot be treated as an example of the \textit{Parisamkhyā-vidhi}; it does not indicate abstinence (nivṛtti) from eating, as is the

2. \textit{Mundaka Up.},III.1.1 : कोरस्य: पित्तक्क स्वादुति।
3. \textit{VKP}, p. 239 : नान्निष्ठतेऽपि गुरुस्य गत्यशंकलो दिप्तात्मक-निवृत्तिः।
case in sentences like पञ्च धर्मावकाराः पश्या:। (Five five-nailed animals are to be devoured). In the latter sentence, the *vidhi* of eating the five-nailed animals is not indicated, but abstinence (*nivrtti*) from eating animals other than five-nailed ones (*अष्टाक्षरावलीश्च*) is indicated. This exclusion of other animals for eating, is there necessary, as otherwise there may arise some difficulty¹. There is no such urgency in the sentence under consideration. Hence, the idea of the *Parisamkhya-vidhi* is unwarranted. Thus only the Brahman can be said to have been referred to here. This indistinct nature of the Brahman has been made clear by describing the Brahman as an eater of all.

3. In the third section, wherein the sentence तत्सृणाशुक्लस्य शेषे गुहा प्रकटीयो प्रमो यथार्थः has been considered, the *Pūrvapakśin* assumes that, the two entities, namely, the *jīva* and the intellect, have been implied in the passage under consideration. The Brahman, being formless etc., cannot be referred to as enjoying etc. The Brahman

1. *VKP*, p.239: 梵न्ताओऽदिवाक्रेषु न्युष्मादिनिवृत्तिः प्रस्त्रावयपरिवर्धे अक्षुकतः। तिर्हु त न प्रमोण्यं पश्याम्।

is inactive, a passive witness, as has been stated in the \textit{sruti}.

The \textit{Siddhāntin} rules out the view of the \textit{Purvapakṣin} by saying that, here, it is the \textit{Jīva} and the Brahman that are referred to. The Brahman is at the root of the functioning of all sense-organs including the intellect. In the absence of the Brahman, not a single activity is possible. Moreover, the attributes like which have entered into the cave (\textit{guhāpravesa}) can be understood properly only in the context of the \textit{Jīva} and the Brahman.

4. The fourth section considers the passage \textit{yante \textit{Mundaka-Upanisad}}. The \textit{Purvapakṣin} asserts that the discription given in the passage under consideration is that of the \textit{Jīva}, or of the presiding deity of the eye, or of the deity that controls the sense-organs, since

\begin{itemize}
  \item[1.] \textit{Mundaka Upanisad}, III.1.1–4.
  \item[2.] \textit{Chāndogya Upanisad}, IV.15.1–4.
\end{itemize}
The substratum has been mentioned there\(^1\).

The Siddhāntin's view is that the Paramēśvara is here referred to. The word tu in आचार्यस्तु ते गति कर्ता\(^3\) indicates that the preceptor alone is able to guide a person. The word gati in the above-mentioned sentence as well as in the sutra - कलोपनिपत्तमत्तमिधानाच्यं \(^3\) implies the fruit of actions, says Appayya Dīkṣita\(^4\). Even if the word gati is understood in the sense of Devayana still it will not make any difference, for, that path leads to the Brahman itself. This latter point is confirmed by the Smṛti\(^5\), but, it may added, no specific order of the various stages in that path, such as, agni, jyotis, etc., is intended in that passage\(^6\).

1. cf. Śāmkara-bhāṣya on, I,2.13; किमम् प्रतिविद्यालयस्यविचारणे निर्दिष्टवे। अच्छवा विद्यानात्मा। कुते देशालेंद्र्दियन्याश्चिन्हाताता। अत्वेस्वर जिति।
2. Chāndogya Up., IV,14,1.
3. Vedānta-Śūtras, I,2.16.
4. VKP. p.250: वृद्धिपुरोपितवर्गः कृत्यपञ्चप्रय: फलवाचारा।
5. Gītā, VIII,24: अभिन्नत्यतिरित्र: मुक्तः पञ्चवार्तव:।
6. VKP. p.251: अभिन्नाज्येतिरिति स्वयो रुपे न किवसित जिति भव॥
5. In the fifth section, the sentence य: पृथिव्या तिजन्न पृथिव्या अन्तरो य पृथिवी न वेद मत्य पृथिवी शरीरः यः पृथिवीयान्तरो यथायत्येष त ब्रह्मानान्तरी स्थायिः।
is taken up for consideration. The view of the Purvapakśin is: some deity or some Yogin has been described in the passage under consideration. Such deities or Yogins are known to be possessing such high controlling power.

The Siddhāntin refutes this by saying that Paramesvara must be here understood as having been referred to, because the qualities such as being immortal (amṛta) etc., mentioned there point to Paramesvara alone.

6. The sentence गल्द्वशयमप्रायामन्तरसमक्षुः सौन्दर्यमन्तरसमक्षुः नित्यं विषु स्वरूपं स्ववृत्तं तद्विषु मद्वृत्तादेः परिपर्यक्ति धीरसः।
constitutes the subject-matter of this section. The Pradhāna of the Śāmkhyas or the Jīva should be understood to have been mentioned here, since the illustrations given in this context relate to non-sentient things, such as webs, or hairs from human body. The Brahman, being sentient, cannot accordingly be said to have been referred to here. This is the Purvapakṣa.

The Siddhāntin reiterates that the Paramēśvara is here referred to. The qualities such as being omnipresent (sarvagata), being all-powerful (vibhu) etc., can be adduced only in respect of him. The passage from the Mundaka Upaniṣad confirms this assumption.

7. The last topic in the second pada has the sentence - यस्तैवते यात्राध्रिमा त्रिभुविनमात्मानं वैष्णवगुप्तस्य for its theme. The Purvapaksin says that the word Vaisvanara in the above-mentioned sentence is to be understood in the sense of the abdominal fire (Jātharāgni). Or of fire in general, for, it is generally used in that sense.

The Siddhāntin, on the other hand, insists that the Paramēśvara is denoted by the word Vaisvanara, though the word Vaisvanara denotes various entities, such as Jātharāgni or fire in general or Paramēśvara, still in the present context, it must be taken to denote the

1. Ibid, II.1.4.
2. Chandogya Up., II.18.2.
proximity of that word with the word ātman in the sentence - तत्त्व ह ता सैंस्कारात्मानी वैभवानस्य मूर्तेऽङ्कऽङ्गः।'

Appayya Dīśita, here, points out that the indistinct nature of the characteristics lies in the fact that they can be regarded as being common to both, the Jīva and the Brahman. But, on account of the proximity of some such word as ātman etc., their application can be restricted to the Brahman.

1. At the beginning of the first section of the third quarter of the first chapter Appayya Dīśita speaks of the significance of that quarter. In the previous quarter, the Brahman was described as being with attributes, as though at some places the attributeless aksara. Here, in this quarter, though the qualityless Brahman is described. Still, the qualities such as dhāratva etc. have been stated in order to facilitate meditation.

2. VKP, p.270:

पुरीस्तिन्यायदे मनोभोधिता पाययितासिद्धस्वेच्छ坐त्तत्त्त्वायी वैभवान जिति श्रेष्ठ सत्यशेषवेदिपि यथासयः निर्विशेषम्, अवरस्त्तिन्यायदे हृद्याधायतेमुपासारे-हतिक्षादौनी निर्विशेषवेदिपि दहः सत्येष जिति प्रायिकत्वमात्रापि विशेषम् द्रव्यम्।
The sentence अमृतस्याः पृथिवी चान्तरितिके तत्त्वं नै-संध्यः। तवेवेन नामः अत्त्यानमम्मा वाचे विमुक्ताः मृत्युमृत्यूपेन चेतुः।

forms the subject-matter of the first section of this pada, the Purvapaksin argues that the words अमृतस्याः चेतुः describe some entity other than the Brahman. Because, the genitive अमृतस्य is related to the words esah setuh. But setu (bridge) has some limit, while the Brahman is unlimited; hence it cannot be said to have been implied here.

The Siddhantin asserts that the Brahman itself is here referred to, because the attributes such as amrtava etc. which are mentioned there can be the attributes of the Brahman alone. Moreover, the pronoun esah in the phrase, amrtasya esah setuh denotes the Brahman, which has been previously described. In support of this assumption, an illustration from the Purvaminëmsa is quoted by the author. In the sentence 

1. Mundaka Up. II.2.5.
2. Šaṅkarabhasya on I.3.1.
(dadhi) which has been mentioned in the first part of the sentence. The context\(^1\), again, confirms the same assumption about the description of the Brahman. The sentence कस्मनहनु मानो विज्ञाते स्वमित्रेदं विज्ञाते माधविति \(^3\) implies the knowledge of an entity by knowing which everything else becomes known. The knowledge of the Brahman, and of nothing else, comprehends the knowledge of everything.

Finally Appayya Dīkṣita points out that the entity which is expected to be known by a person seeking salvation cannot be visualised in the form of the Jīva; that entity must, indeed, be different from the Jīva. But this is not clearly mentioned\(^3\).

2. In the second adhikarana, which is known as the Bhumadākṣarana, the passage मूंगोऽ त्वक्तु विज्ञातात्मक्य जिति मूर्तान मानो विज्ञासात्मिति. यत्र नामात्मप्रकटति मायाचैषु नान्याचिन्तानाथि स मूर्तात् सृजनात्मप्रेक्ष्यताचैषु त्वमाचिन्तानाथि तदर्या.\(^8\)

\[\text{has been considered.}\]

1. The context is the desire to know the Brahman e.g. Muṇḍaka Up. I.1.3.
3. VKP, p.277. श्रद्धाशयः किष्ठि मुन्तकेश्वरे भास्त्रकेन जीवस्वप्ना न नन्वतति तत्त्वंेदन्यदेश सम्प्रेत, ततः तदपयत्तममित्त्वप्रेक्ष्यास्यः विद्धविति।
The Purvapaksin argues that the passage under consideration describes bhūman. By this word, the Jīva is meant, for, Jīva is superior to all, and bhūman implies being superior.

The Siddhāntin refutes this by pointing out that, the word bhūman, refers to the Brahman. The sentence यत्र नान्यत्पक्षति —etc. rules out the possibility of the knowledge, of any entity other than the Brahman. Only the knowledge of the Brahman can be described in such a way. Though the series of questions set forth in the earlier passages¹ and the reply given here to those questions, both together give rise to the līnga-pramāṇa and the sthāna-pramāṇa², still, the description of the Brahman as bhūman rules out those two pramāṇas, for, this passage can be treated as the śruti-pramāṇa which surpasses all other pramāṇas.

Appayya Dīksita adds that the fact that the word bhūman can be taken to denote the Jīva also, only implies  

¹. Ibid.VII.16-22.
². When the characteristics of a particular object are mentioned, it is a līnga-pramāṇa, and when the characteristics are mentioned as referring to any particular place, it is sthāna-pramāṇa.
the indistinct nature of the characteristics of the Brahman.¹

3. The sentence क्षस्मान्तु लत्वाकाश व्यातिष्ठ प्रातःस्वेति। स ह्यावाचैतु तदसय शारिर ब्रह्मण: अभिवद्य पृथममणवैहक्षमु ² constitutes the subject-matter of this section. The Purvapakṣin maintains that the word aksara in the sentence under discussion denotes the sacred syllable om, because the word aksara generally conveys that meaning. This is a vausika-word, derived from the root kṣar, and it means that which is not lost (na kṣarat iti. aksaram).

The Siddhantin replies that the word aksara denotes the Brahman only. The description that everything is accommodated in it, can apply to the Brahman alone. The Sūtra क्षस्मान्तु लत्वाकाश: ³confirms the same assumption. Moreover, the context clearly indicates that this is the description of the Brahman. That the whole world is accommodated in

1. VKP, p. 282; Brhadāraṇyaka Up.III.8.7-8.
the Brahman, is, in fact, accepted by the srutis\(^1\) and
the smritis\(^2\) also.

The indistinctness here lies in the Brahman not
being mentioned as the supporter of the sky etc. in the
passage under consideration. So says Appayya Diksita\(^3\).

4. The next section takes up the sentence न पुनरेति श्रिमाते-
नेत्रत्वे न नामाविवाहारिः परं पुत्रं नियामिन्यायीत \(^4\)
for consideration. Here the *prima facie* view is that in the
sentence under consideration the lower (saguna-apara)
Brahman seems to have been intended, since it has been
limited to some particular space as for instance स तेजसि

where the Sūrya-loka or the Brahma-loka has been mentioned.

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1. **Mandāka Up.** बोतर मनः सह प्राणेश्व यदवः।

2. **Gītā, VII.7:** मम संसारीमैत्रेयर्त चूर्ते मणिगण्या भिक्ष।

3. **VKP. p.286:** अम्बारान्तकर्त्ति: सौंगे हेतुमर्यार्ब्रह्मकर्ति थूलविंकोदव्र-भ्रूगित्वद्वादस्य वित्यास्यन्त भ्रूगित्वद।

4. **Praśna Up. V.2.5.**

5. **Ibid.**

6. **Ibid.**
The Siddhāntin retorts that the sentence under consideration refers to the para-Brahman. The next sentence directly mentions the Brahman. The Nirguna-Brahman does not need any kind of meditation. Here, the symbolic meditation (pratīka-upāsana) is mentioned, but it is not the final step, it is just the beginning.

The commentator adds that, here, the object of the root Ikṣati can be identified with the Brahman; this is the indistinct nature of the qualification. In addition to this, Appayya Dīksita points out a scribe's mistake.

5. The sentence is taken up for discussion in this

1. Ibid.
2. Kena Up., I.4-8: तदेव ब्रह्मस्व विचिद नदेशदिन्यापासले।
3. VKP, p.289: वीशितकमीतवहेतः ब्रह्मययत्तादपवलयमाविद्यता।
4. Ibid. प्राम्यते ज्ञिति प्राम्यते कर्मणि तिकारः। जैप्राबाद्धी फिलोप:। प्राम्यते ज्ञिति पाठस्तु वेल्प्रमादायादायात:।
fifth section. At the very outset, Appayya Dīkṣita points out that, as the qualities like sinlessness etc. are common to both the dāhara-vidyā and the praajapati-vidyā, it can be said the uttama-puruṣa has been described in these two vidyās. The Purvapaksin in this topic is of the opinion that the sentence under consideration describes either the sky or the individual soul. The word ākāśā is generally used in the sense of the sky; or the word brahma-pura can denote the human body in which the Brahman resides. Further, since the form of the entity concerned is mentioned in the above-mentioned sentence, that entity must be the Jīva, for, Brahman is formless.

The Siddhāntin refutes this by pointing out that the sentence under consideration refers to the Brahman alone, because it is described by such words as all these people daily go to it.¹ The body is called brahma-pura only for this reason, namely, that the Brahman can be found within the body. Moreover, the pronoun yād in तन्स्कयंदति तदन्तेवप्रयम् etc. refers to dāhara-kāśā as the object

¹. Ibid. VIII.3.2:

शिरः स्तवः प्रज्ञाव्याधिपतिव्यत अते अग्रुष्टोक्त्र न विन्दन्ति।
which is to be meditated upon. This symbol (pratīka) of the ākāśa (in the heart) is stated to facilitate the meditation.

Appayya Dīkṣita concludes by drawing attention to an error of omission, namely the omission of the sentence केषु विन्दु केत्याये फलीसमासो विद्याः in the commentary of Amalānanda. He further adds that as the qualities mentioned in the sentence under consideration could be attributed to the Jīva also, these qualities can be said to be indistinct.

6. The next section takes the passage न तत्र चिंता माति न बन्द्वतार्क नेमा विनिको भानित कुतोरमातिनः, तथेऽ मान्यमुण्याति स्वेत: तत्त्व माक्ता शरीरिन्द्र विमाति for consideration. The Purvapakṣa says that the passage under consideration is to be understood as describing some lustrous body; for, when the sun is shining, other luminous bodies like the moon etc. do not shine. Similarly when this lustrous entity is shining even the sun is not able to show its lustre. The

1. VKP. p.308. अन्त्र भ्रमित्विश्वास प्रज्ञापतिविज्ञानानुशासन रेण नीवविविक-गुत्तजस्य काक्षुपितिवादू भ्रमित्विविक-स्वभावाय ।

Purvapakṣin understands the use of the locative absolute here.¹

Appayya Dīkṣita emphatically retorts that the 'Locative Absolute' which, itself being an upapada vibhakti is inferior to karaka-vibhakti indicated by the causal construction in the sentence under consideration.²

The Siddhāntin refutes the view of the Purvapakṣin by pointing out that the word anu in the passage which is being discussed implies imitation. By this it is intended that everything is illuminated after it; that is, through its lustre everything else becomes illuminated; and only Paramātman can have such a power. The indistinctness of the qualities lies in the possibility of the quality of being shining being attributed to the Jīva.

7. The passage अङ्गुणमात्रः पुनः ज्योतिरिवालंकृतम्, जो ततः ज्योत्तमः सः प्रेषयति सः अङ्गुणमात्रः is being considered in the

1. The Locative Absolute is: यथिस्तिनः विभाविनः ततः ज्योतिः न विभावितः

2. VKP. p.309: धिश्यं प्रक्ष्यार्द्रमारसायेन तुहितमत्रेत्यपदविनिर्देरित भलैया निर्यात मूलम् न्येव


4. Ibid. II.4.13.
seventh section of the third pada. This passage must be taken to describe the individual soul, for the thumb-like measure of the Jīva is often mentioned. The Brahman being formless cannot be intended here. This is the Purva-pakṣa.

The Siddhāntin reiterates that the Paramātman alone is here referred to as the qualities like 'the Lord of all' (Īsana bhūtabhayasya), etc., are mentioned. Appayya Dīksita further adds that this puruṣa being of the measure of a thumb, can be identified with the Paramātman. For this, he quotes a parallel illustration from the Purvamimamsā where a Kṛtiya (Rājanya) is expected to perform soudasi-agnistoma instead of Utkhya-agnistoma.

1. VKP p.316: बलं मन्त्रयात्र-गुणमात्रः, पुनःगोपःन्तरात्मात्मन्तरात्म-रक्तः-हः-गुणमात्रमीतिन्तरात्मानुभवदेन तत्वं ब्रह्मात्रोदयवते भूतस्य-गुणपरिमाणस्यो-पमद्गुणान्तरात्मान्तरात्मान्तरात्मानुभवति गृह्यमन्त्र: करण्यार्थीतिकलाः-गुणमात्रः प्राप्तोनेवः स तथा न निरन्तरः। ज्ञेयंकृतिकृतिविश्वास्यतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृतिप्रसन्नविश्वास्यतिकृति
The statement about the ēkāsya-sacrifice nullifies the statement about the ukthya, similarly, the identification of purusa with the Brahman rules out the attribute of measurement. He concludes the section by pointing out that though the Brahman is described here, still the description may be considered to be implying the Jīva, and therein lies the indistinct nature of the qualities.

8. In the eighth section, the question whether the gods are qualified to study the Brahma-vidyā or not is being discussed. The Purvapakṣin thinks that the gods are not qualified for such knowledge, because they do not possess body, and also because they eat such prohibited things as honey, flesh, etc.

The Siddhāntin refutes this by saying that the gods are qualified to study, because they can entertain a desire to know the Brahman. Even in the absence of the Upanayana-sāṃskāra, the gods can have the knowledge of the Veda, because it is self-born in their case. Moreover, the Vedānta-texts do mention or describe gods as possessing

1. Ibid, p. 317: अन्तः सिद्धान्त नौदेश्यमप्रत्यास्प्रयो नीवलिहणेनाच्छिन्नतु
अन्तः सिद्धान्त नौदेश्यमप्रत्यास्प्रयो नीवलिहणेनाच्छिन्नतु
अन्तः सिद्धान्त नौदेश्यमप्रत्यास्प्रयो नीवलिहणेनाच्छिन्नतु
bodies, and these gods are endowed with such a power that they can present themselves at more than one place at the same time. The whole universe, including the gods, is said to have issued out of the celestial speech (Vaidika-Sabda). Hiranyagarbha also is said to have fashioned all these gods, as has been said in the Vedas, like an architect who prepares a model first and fashions the image on the lines of that model\(^1\). Here Śaṅkara refutes the Sphota-theory, and Appayya Dīkṣita, even though he is a grammarian and a rhetorician, accepts this refutation in toto\(^2\). While explaining the sutra समनाम-पूपत्वा-नामधात्वाद्विषणि दर्मान्तु स्मृतेषवा\(^3\) the point whether the Brahman creates this universe according to its own free will or whether it has some restrictions and limitations, has been discussed. The conclusion is that, though the Brahman is free from any kind of desire, still there have been spread some very small particles of avidyā. These particles move according to the will of god, and at the time of creation they resort to some entity.

This section is devoted to the interesting discussion about the Śudras. Are the Śudras qualified for the study and the knowledge of the Brahman? In the previous section, it was concluded that the gods are qualified for such study. Now, according to the rules of the Purvamīmāṃsā, the Śudras are not qualified to set up the sacred fires in their houses. Naturally they are not entitled to perform sacrifices. But the question whether the Śudras are qualified for the knowledge of the Brahman or not, still remains. The Purvapaksa maintains that the Śudras may be said to be as qualified for such knowledge, since they also entertain a desire for salvation.

The Siddhántin, on the other hand, says that the Śudras cannot be said to be qualified for such studies, since they do not undergo any saṁskāra, and especially the Upanayana-saṁskāra. The Sūtra supports the above-mentioned statement. The śūtra adds that the Śudras are prohibited from undergoing any saṁskāra. According to Amalānanda, not only this śūtra but the remaining śūtras in this topic also are to be

1. Ibid, I.3.36.
understood as referring to this point\(^1\).

Appayya Dīksita, here, invites the attention of the readers to the fact that the same topic has been already discussed in the Purvamīmāṃsa\(^2\). What then is the propriety of again taking it up for discussion here? The answer is: Though the same question about the Śudras has been dealt with in the Purvamīmāṃsa, still, that topic is restricted only to the question as to whether the Śudras are qualified for the performance of the sacrifices or not\(^3\). It has no relation whatsoever to the knowledge of the Brahman. Hence, it has been discussed here.

Leaving this occasional discussion, the Siddhāntin again reverts to the view that Śudras are not qualified for the Brahma-vidyā. Though in the Upaniṣadic sentence, जीिज्ञेत्रोऽत्र - दह लम्बेव शह गढ़रिल्म्स्य जनाश्रुति, who ultimately received the highest knowledge (i.e. Samvarga-Vidyā) from Raikva, is addressed as a Śudra, still, it does not mean

1. VKP, p. 351 : तद्भवाभिद्वापाच्चवेदेतदृशं ब क सत्ता रामहूँतनायनानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानारूङ्गी संसाकारार्मिन्दिश्योधिति बहुवचनादित्त्व जित्य तथ्याश्चातृ

2. Purvamīmāṃsa, प्र. 37.

3. Chāndogya Up., IV.2.3.
that the Śudras are qualified for such knowledge.

Because, the word śudra in the above-mentioned sentence does not denote the social order, namely, Śudra. It is a vaugika word derived from the words su and dru, and it means "one who runs to (his preceptor) through grief (суc)". In fact, Jānaśruti was a king and a kṣatriya. So he cannot be said to have been a low-caste person. Moreover, the Smṛtis laydown the rule that the Śudras can have sāmskāras without any recitation of the Mantras. That means the Śudras are qualified for some special sacrifices like the Pāka-vaññas. And, even if someone imparts the knowledge of the Brahman to a Śudra, both the teacher and the student are believed to go to hell. At the most, a Śudra can attain the knowledge through the

1. cf. Śaṁkarabhaśya on I.3.34 : शुचमहिद्रद्रव मुखा वामितुप्ले, 
   शुचा का रैक्मामहिद्रद्रवेति शुद्।

2. Manuṣmṛti, X.127 : ध्रमेऽष्कवस्तु ध्रमेङ्खः सतो वृत्तिमुनिष्ठतः।
   मन्नृत्युः न दृष्टद्वित्ति प्रमस (५ सद) प्राप्तयुविष्ठ च।

3. Ibid, IV.80-81
   न शुद्राय मर्य द्रा नेप्ने पिच्छिट्ट न हविष्कृत्तु।
   न चास्योपद्वित्तिः न चास्य क्रमाविद्वेदः।
   यो हुन्य ध्रमेन्च चक्षुर् गुरुः केवला दिवस क्रृत्तु।
   सोऽश्चेत्त्व नाम तस् खोऽश्चेत् गच्छति। (मन्वरति।)
hearing of the Purāṇas and Itihāsas; but mere hearing may enlighten him, if he has done some meritorious acts in his previous birth.

10. This incidental discussion is now concluded, and the commentator resumes the main discussion. The sentence -

is being discussed in this section.

The Pūrvapakṣin here argues that the word Prāṇa in the sentence under consideration denotes the wind, as the word Prāṇa is generally used in that sense. Or the thunder-bolt may have been implied by that word, because the whole world becomes frightened when it is struck by a thunder-bolt.

The Siddhāntin opposes this view by pointing out that the Brahmān alone is intended here. The qualities such as 'being the supporter of all', etc., have been mentioned in the preceding sentence. The succeeding sentence also describes the Brahmān. So the sentence

2. Katha Up., II.6.1: तत्सत्तल्लोकं: भित्ता: सर्व तदु नास्मेवति विभवं।
3. Ibid, II.6.3: भवादुस्मारित्विन्स्तयति भवात्तपति सर्वं:।
 भवादिद्वस्य वायुश्च मृत्युविवति भएऽम:।
under consideration has been sandwiched between two sentences describing the Brahman. It would, therefore, not refer to any other entity than the Brahman.

Appayya Dīksita here points out that the sentence under consideration may be interpreted as: 'all this world which has been born from Prāṇa, breathes in it'. But this interpretation may restrict the meaning, hence the second interpretation is avoided by Appayya Dīksita.

11. The eleventh section has the sentence - श्लोकः सम्मतादेहुः स्माच्छलारात्सुरुत्ष्टिः परें ज्योतिः परहृद्य भिन्नमिथिभ्युः - for consideration. The Pūrvapakṣin says that the word ज्योतिः in the sentence under consideration may be understood as indicating a luminary in general, for, that word is normally used in that sense.

The Siddhāntin refutes this by saying that the word ज्योतिः implies the Brahman alone, since the qualities

1. VEP, p. 361: ग्रहितं प्राणं ततो निःशृङ्खलं जानेतेः तत्वस्तत्तात्यत्वमविभृण्डके किना योगिशतुः ज्ञातव्रेत् तथा योगियों स्वरूपिणातन्त्रायान्त्रेयेके प्रत्यज्ज्वल्यनुवहेन्द्रस्वाभावत् स्वातः सर्वसत्त्वर्द्धित्तर्दद्धन्यत्वात् न्तत्वात् कर्मेष्ठ्वात् व्यास्यत्मम्।

2. Chāndogya Up., VIII.12.3.
such as 'being free from sins' (apahatāpapmatva), etc., have been mentioned previously in the same context. The same jyotih is again described as Uttama-Puruṣa. Hence, only the Brahman must have been intended here.

12. The next section considers the sentence - brahmaṇe bāe nāma nāma-rūpa-vidhādāra te adbhūta jadu mūrtāḥ sa ātma. The word akasa in the above-quoted sentence should be taken as referring to the element, slay, for, the two words, vāi and nāma, are generally used with reference to something which is well-known. This is the Purvapaksa.

The Siddhāntin, on the other hand, says that the word akasa denotes the Brahman, because the characteristics such as amrtatva etc., have been mentioned there. Appayya Diksita points out that the creation of the name and form is a clear and distinct indication of the Brahman; still the words vāi and nāma convey the suggestion that some commonly known entity has been described here. That is why word akasa can be misunderstood as being used in the

1. Chandogya Up., VIII.7.1 : y ātmaḥ jñānaprāptaḥ
2. Ibid, VIII.12.3 : prāryeṣṭiḥ : y ātmaḥ : pustyaḥ : 
sense of the element sky\(^1\).

Further, Appayya Diksita points out that the sentence under consideration may be interpreted in a different way. The word antara may be understood in the sense of 'within' (madhye), and the whole sentence would mean: 'Those forms and names are within the Brahman.'\(^2\)

But this is not acceptable, because when the word antara is to be used in the sense of 'within' or 'between', the two extremes have to be stated, as, for instance, in the sentence, 'this water-pot lies between you and me.'\(^3\) But even if this interpretation is accepted it will not harm the usual interpretation\(^4\).

1. *VKP*, p. 365: नन्त्र ब्रह्माण्य नमुनावर्त्तृत्वेऽस्मट ब्रह्माण्यममतिनिवित्तस्य निन्तर्गतिभाष्यो बोधयुल्लोकपत्र तत्त्वत्त्वेऽस्मट ब्रह्माण्यममतिनिवित्तस्य निन्तर्गतिभाष्यो बोधयुल्लोकपत्र

2. *Ibid.*, p. 367: ते नमुनावर्त्तृत्वं यत्थ ब्रह्माण्यं तत्समस्य महत्त्वं करेते भिनि लघुद्वैस्यविस्तरित्तियोनंतरेण नमुनावर्त्तृत्वं यत्थ ब्रह्माण्यं ममतिनिवित्तस्य निन्तर्गतिभाष्यो बोधयुल्लोकपत्र

3. *Ibid.*, : अन्तर्गत्य ब्रह्माण्यकोणां भविष्यो रूपविभिन्निर्लक्षणान्तरणः ब्रह्मविशेष न्ययपमेष्टं केव युक्तं | बुद्धास्तिधिगतिस्तवाकालः ब्रह्मविशेष न्ययपमेष्टं पौर्णाक्तकृत्यामहात्मकर्मपरिप्रभुत्यपन्त्य मयाय तथा व्याख्यातिः न क्रमूः

4. *Ibid.*, : तथा व्याख्यानेतरूपं न देखिः, 'तत्' कहर्ष्मकुम्भकम् रावणः कुरुविग्रहः औहोमन्त्रविष्टः कृत्यं कथी विनिः रक्षकः | 'भिनि भाव्यश्च िनाय परिप्रभुत्यपन्त्य मयाय तथा व्याख्यातिः न क्रमूः
13. The last topic in this pada has the sentence -

क्लम आस्त्योति मैतुष्क विश्वामस्तः प्राणेभुत हृदात्माः ततः पुरुषः।

has been taken up for consideration. The word Puruṣa in the sentence may be understood in the sense of the Jīva or of some liberated person. It is, however, better to understand that the Jīva has been intended there, because the context as well as the succeeding part of that Upaniṣadic passage describe the Jīva.

The Siddhāntin refutes this by pointing out that the Paramesvara alone is here intended, because the description, संवेदनं तत्तथास्त्यति मैतुष्क विश्वामस्तः प्राणेभुत हृदात्माः

etc., is applicable to Paramesvara alone, while the Jīva in deep sleep is not conscious of any outside happenings. The qualities such as being 'lord of all' etc., again, confirm the same assumption. So only Paramesvara can be said to have been referred to in this sentence.

2. Brhadaranyaka Up., IV.4.22 is the context. Ibid, छ वा ब्रह्म महाभावात्मा यो वेदाय प्राणेभुत हृदात्माः

is the end.
3. Ibid, IV.3.21 : अयं पुरुषः प्राणेनात्माः संपरिश्वक्ते न वाहायं किंचि वेद नान्तः
1. In the first section of the last quarter of the first chapter, the sentence - 'ौत्पत्तिः परम्पराविक्षिप्तात्मकः पर: ।' from the Katha Upanisad has been taken up for consideration. The Purvapaksa maintains that the Pradhana of the Sāmkhyas is to be understood to have been described in the sentence under consideration. The order of entities set forth here, namely, Mahat, A vyakta (Pradhana), and Purusa, is the same as found in the Sāmkhya doctrine. Here Appayya Dīksita takes the opportunity of explaining in detail the Satkārya-vāda of the Sāmkhyas, which has been only referred to by Amalānanda.

The Siddhāntin refutes the view of the Purvapaksin by pointing out that the word avyakta in the sentence under discussion denotes the Brahman, for, it has been described as being superior to mahat or as being superior to


2. According to this theory, the effect exists latently in the cause before its creation. That is to say, a stage of being a jar already exists in clay in invisible form. In the same way, the mahat is present in its invisible form in the Pradhana.
all. It cannot be definitely said that the mahat mentioned here implies the mahat of the Sāmkhyas. So the Pradhāna of the Sāmkhyas cannot be said to have been referred to here.

Incidentally it may be pointed that, while explaining the sūtra - "तद्वैटन्त्रिकान्तः" Appayya Dīksita adds that Paramesvara is said to possess some power, namely, avidyā or which is otherwise known as māya. According to some, this māya is an upādhi of god. The same māya is here indicated by the word avyakta. But both Amalānanda and Appayya Dīksita do not accept this. Appayya Dīksita, on the other hand, asks: Why should such an idea of an image be posited there? Though it is agreed that the liberated persons can attain the Nirguna Brahman, it would not be proper to assume that this māyāpratibimbata is also attained by them. As there is superimposition in māyāpratibimba, the assumption, through the knowledge of one, everything else becomes known.

1. Vedānta-Sūtras, I.4.3.
2. Śaṅkara-bhāṣya on I.4.3.
3. VKP., p. 379: मायोपाधि: किमेष कल्पनीयः
would not be correct\textsuperscript{1}, \textit{māyā} cannot be regarded as an 
upādhi of god. So the word \textit{avṛkta} has to be understood 
as referring to Paramēśvara and not to Pradhāna of the 
Śāṅkhyaśas.

2. The second section considers the sentence होतितुक्लक्र्मणां वद्वी: 
प्रवा: स्वत्तमो स्वरूपः। 
अनेको वेदात्मानां वर्गोऽवर्गे ज्ञात्वानेन पुत्रोऽन्नमोऽन्नमा:।

from the 
Śvētāśvātāra Upaniṣad. The word, होतितुक्लक्र्मणां denotes the three gunas, namely, Rājas, Sattva, and
Tamas which respectively have the three colours, namely, 
red, white and black. This is the Purvapakṣa here.

The Siddhāntin asserts that, by the term \textit{lohitasukla-kṛṣṇa}, the colours of the three elements, namely, 
tejas, water and earth are implied. These colours are

\begin{itemize}
\item[1.] \textit{Ibid.} निर्देशेण विवेक भावप्राप्तिः परमप्रतिश्रविन्द्रगीराः 
भावाप्रतिश्रविविश्वायामयित्वम् 
वुक्तप्रामाण्यं नैपर्यं; \textit{विध्वंसविद्वा} तत्त्वस्मात्त्व समयानात्त्वात्।

\item[2.] Śvētāśvātāra Up. IV.5.
\end{itemize}
mentioned in the śrutī. The three elements, namely, tejas, water and earth, are described as ājā, by way of comparison.

3. This section takes into consideration the sentence the word pāṇca pāṇca janaḥ refers to the twenty-five principles (five into five) of the Sāmkhyas. This is what the Purvapāksin says.

The Siddhāntin refutes this by saying that the phrase, pāṇca pāṇca janaḥ, can, at the most, be regarded as meaning ten (five and five) and not twenty-five. Moreover, the word pāṇca-janaḥ is a compound word and denotes the five entities, namely, prāṇa, caksuḥ, srotra anna, and manas. Those (i.e. Kanvas), who do not mention anna in the above-mentioned list, may include jyotiḥ in place of anna. The word jyotiḥ is used in the previous mantra of the Kāṇva-version.

4. This section discusses the cause of the universe.

The sruti-texts are not unanimous so far as the cause of the universe is concerned. According to some, the Atman is the cause\(^1\), while others say that the tejas is the cause\(^2\). Still others maintain that the Prana is the cause\(^3\). Since, there is thus no definiteness of view in the srutis, it is more convenient to regard the Pradhana as the cause, for the Sāmkhyas entertain no doubt whatever in this connection. They have proved the Pradhana to be the cause of the universe.

The Siddhāntin, however, insists that the Brahman alone is the cause. The universe was created by the Brahman so effortlessly that it appeared as if it was created by itself. When one has to describe such an easy and effortless action to be stated, one uses the karma-kartā construction\(^4\). The causes, namely tejas prana etc. stated by the Purvapakṣin are not the

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1. Taittiriya Up. II.1. आत्मन: भाकात्। भूत्।
2. Chandogya Up. VI.2.3. तीनसु चुन्त।
3. Prasna Up. VI.4. श्राणम्प्रति भागाचलसूत्रां ।
4. VKP. p.402: अयोध्ये क्षेत्रेन चुनाविलितावद (६० अवृत्त केदारः)
   भ्रातामाके वनस्पतिः शुभमेसते वशीते। भूतिस्त केदारः देवदतः। द्विधा-
   भस्मस्त द्विधा भावतीत्वम्।
causes but they are the effects which are liable to be different. Hence, the Brahman alone is the cause.

5. The sentence has been taken up for discussion in the fifth topic. The Furvapaksin argues that the phrase, यथा वैतत्त्वम् implies 'breathing' (the action of breathing). Hence the Jīva should be understood as having been described here. Appayya Diksita adds that, according to some teachers, Hiranyagarbha, the creator, is intended here. But Vacaspati believes that the Jīva is intended as the creator. For this reason, Vacaspati is criticised by both Amalānanda and Appayya Diksita.

The Siddhāntin refutes the view of the Furvapaksin by saying that the context clearly suggests that the Paramesvara is here referred to. The opening sentence of this section proclaims that the Brahman is to be explained. If the Brahman were not to be explained in the following section, the initial sentence would be rendered meaningless; and this would not be proper.

2. cf. Kalpataru: नीवाज्ञाने जगत्त्वृत्सकारणमिति तुम्। शिप्रक्षमन्नवें जीवे न हेघे वाच्यपतिः व्यपम्।
   VKP. p.404: जैव व वाच्यपतिमिथे जीव जैव समन्नवें पर्वक्ष्यपति। जैवीये जगत्त्वृत्सकारणप्रत्यन्ति नावाच्यपति। जैवे न लक्ष्याक्षातिनित्वः।
3. Kausitaki Up. IV.1. ब्रह्म ते क्राणिः।
Appayya Dīksita adds that, according to some, the view about Hiranyakārha as the creator is not properly refuted. But this suggestion is not correct, says Appayya Dīksita. Because the sentence मृष्य वेष स्तु

मा संवादस्याय 1 is intended for refuting this view.

6. The sixth section takes into consideration the Upaniṣadic sentence नवारे पद्धुः कामाय परि: ब्रियेण कवत्ताल्यनस्तु कामाय परि: ब्रियेण समति । Here, the word ātman may be understood in the sense of the Jīva, since kāma is possible only in the case of the Jīva. This is the Purvapakṣa.

The Siddhānta is, The word Ātman denotes the Brahman, because the whole passage is devoted to the discussion of amṛtavā and the way to attain it. This amṛtatva cannot be attained by the knowledge of the Jīva, Here, Appayya Dīksita narrates the whole story of Yājñavalkya and Maitreyī. He explains the illustration of the crum (dundubhi-drṣṭānta). Just as when a

1. Ibid.
3. Brhadāraṇyaka Up. IV.5.6: स यथा दुर्मुदेन्धवनानस्य न

बाहुमालयद्वयुः बकुमाद्यं सहस्रशयं दुर्मुदेन बहुश्रेयः दुर्मुदेन्धवनानस्य

वा रङ्गो गृहीतः स्वातः।
drum is being beaten, no one is able to grasp the sound of the drum unless that drum or the person who is beating that drum is got hold of, in the same way, mere external knowledge cannot lead a person to the real truth, but the knowledge of the Atman will lead to it. By means of this knowledge of the Atman, everything else becomes known. Moreover the characteristics such as vijnata etc. can denote the Brahman alone.

7. This section is devoted to the discussion about the cause of the universe. The cause is of two kinds: (1) The material cause (nimitta-karana) and (2) efficient cause (upadana-karana). The Purvapaksa says that the Brahman may be said to be the material cause of the universe; that is what is suggested in the sentence यतेष्वो निमित्तिः भूतानि जन्माते। The ablative yatāh has to be understood as indicating the origin, on the authority of the Sutra, जन्माति: प्रकृतिः।

The Siddhantin refutes this by pointing out

1. Ibid. विबालपरमें सन्तनीयायते।
that the Brahman is the efficient cause also, as is indicated by the sentence

Indeed hundreds of Upanishadic passages can be cited, in support of the assumption that the Brahman is also the efficient cause of the universe.

8. So far, all the principal non-Vedantic doctrines have been refuted. But there are some minor doctrines such as Paramāṇu-vāda, according to which Paramāṇus are supposed to be the cause of the universe. Why are these not refuted? That is what the Purva-pakṣin asks.

The Siddhantin replies that the principal doctrines like that of the Samkhya are refuted. When the principal doctrine is refuted, all the minor doctrines may be taken to have been automatically refuted. This is known as the Pradhāna-malla-nībarha-nyāya.

1. The first section of the first pāda of the second chapter is devoted to the discussion about the cause of the universe. The main purport of the first chapter was to establish harmony among the scriptures and thereby it

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was indicated that the Brahman is the cause of the universe and in the same Brahman ultimately the whole universe is submerged. This second chapter, now, intends to consolidate the same view by showing that the *nyāyas* and the *smṛtis* also accept the Brahman as the cause of the universe, and the principles of Sāmkhyas etc. cannot be accepted as the cause though they appear to be the cause outwordly. In short, the chapter tries to establish *samanvaya*, while the second chapter intends to refute *virocha*.

The *Purva-pakṣa* in this section can be stated as the Brahman cannot be said to be the cause of the universe, because the *smṛtis* such as those of the Sāmkhyas describing the insentient pradhāna as the cause will be of no avail. These *smṛtis* aim at *mokṣa* alone. Moreover Kapila, the founder of the Sāmkhya system and the propounder of such *smṛtis* is a highly honoured person. According to him pradhāna is the cause and this may accepted as being real. As for other *smṛtis* they are not unanimous. Hence pradhāna is the cause.

1. *Śaṅkara-bhāṣya* on Ṣ. 1.1.

The Siddhāntin rejects this by pointing out that all the śruti-texts unanimously declare that some sentient entity (i.e. Brahman) is the cause. The Pradhāna of the Sāmkhya is insentient, and, hence it cannot be regarded as the cause. Moreover, Kapila, who has been highly spoken of in the śrutis, may not be the same Kapila who founded the Sāmkhya-system. Here Appayya Dīkṣita points out that even Manu is described in the same manner, and that Manu preaches the sarvātmatva-doctrine which goes against the Sāmkhya-system. The same doctrine of Manu has been supported by the Mahābhārata. This clearly indicates that the theory of Kapila is not faithful to the Veda. The teachings of Kapila, again, are not known either to the Veda or to the Vedic teachers of that period.

2. The yoga-doctrine has been refuted in the second section. The Purvapakṣin argues that the yoga-doctrine can be said as being useful means of obtaining

1. Taittirīya Samhitā, II.2.10.2.
2. Śaṁkarabhāṣya on II.1.1.
the knowledge of the Brahman because this Yoga has been referred to both in the Vedas¹ and in the Upanisads².

The Siddhantin points out that the argument by means of which the Samkhya-system was shown to have not been taught in the Vedas can be made applicable also in respect of Yoga. Moreover, these two doctrines, namely, the Samkhya and the Yoga, constitute the means of the knowledge and not the knowledge itself. The doubt in the mind of the Purvapakšin is due to the mention of the Yogasastra in the Svetasvatara Upanisad³. But there also, the main topic (tātparya-visaya) is the Brahman itself.

3. The third section in this pada questions the validity of logic in connection with the knowledge of the Brahman. According to the Purvapakša here, the Brahman cannot be supposed to be the cause of the universe, as it goes against the logical thinking (tarka). The Brahman is sentient, pure, etc., while the universe is nonsentient.

1. Ibid, on II.1.2: सम्यगद्वारामध्ये दि योगे केवदं विहितः।
2. Brhadāraṇyaka Up.,II.4.5: ज्ञात्वा वारे श्रोतव्यो मन्त्रव्यो निपिन्दातिस्थित्वो भेजेदिया। Katha Up.,II.6.18: ता योगमिति मन्त्रस्ते द्वितीयतिर्मिन्दिवधारणाम्।
3. Svetāśvatara Up., II.8: कृपुनल्ल स्थायि समं मरीम्।
impure, etc. The relation of cause and effect does not exist between entities which are opposite in nature. Hence the Brahman cannot be regarded as the cause of the universe.

The Siddhāntin refutes this first by pointing out that there is no scope for the pramanas like logic so far as the Brahman is concerned. As for the Purvapaksin's argument mentioned above, the Siddhāntin says that it is seen that from animate things inanimates things are produced. For instance, hairs, nails, etc., are produced on the body of a person who is animate. This means, that the rule, namely, the effect must be identical in nature with the cause, is not true in every case. This assumption does not lead to the asatkārya-vāda. Amalānanda gives a fine illustration from everyday experience. When a pot

1. Samkarabhaṣya on II.1.4: नच विक्षणते प्रकृतिविकाररमावो दृष्टः

2. The asatkārya-vāda is a technical term. There is some sort of relation between the cause and the effect. But when such a relation is totally denied, then it is called as asatkārya-vāda. This asatkārya-vāda is the peculiarity of the Vaiśeṣikas first, and the Baudhāyas afterwards.
is kept on a burning fire the lustre of fire is reflected in it, and it is said that 'the pot is shining'. Really speaking, 'to shine' is a quality of an animate entity, and the pot is not regarded as an animate entity. This cannot be, again, called as an example of the asatkārya-vāda, as the lustre of fire reflected in a pot is the cause, while in asatkārya-vāda, the relation of the cause and effect is totally denied.

4. The fourth section of this quarter, again deals with the doctrine of the Śāmkhyas. According to the Śāmkhyas, the effect is present in the cause even before the creation. This rule holds good in every kind of creation, for example, a pot is present in a lump of clay, even before the creation of the pot. Appayya Dīkṣita explains this theory in detail while explaining the kārikā:

अक्षकरणाद्यपा दान्त्र्य-एक्षकरणमध्यमावाच सत्कार्यम्।
विकारं एक्षकरणात्कारणमावाच सत्कार्यम्॥

The Siddhāntin rebuts the Pūrvapakṣa by saying that, even before the creation of a jar, the clay or a pot-maker is present. So the main argument, namely,

1. Śāmkhya-kārikā - 10.
asadakaranat, by means of which the satkarya-vāda is sought to be established falls to the ground. So, according to the Vedāntins, the cause, namely, the Brahman, is real, it is sat; but the effect, namely, the world, is unreal. According to the satkarya-vādins, both the cause and the effect would become real, though they are not so.

5. The Śruti does not make any difference between the enjoyer (Jīva) and the objects of enjoyment (viśaya) as both of them are the effects of the same Brahman. But, actually, these two are different from each other, as is seen in every-day life. So the Brahman cannot be said to be the cause.

The Siddhāntin reiterates that the Brahman is the cause of the universe. Here, he gives the drṣṭānta of the water of the ocean. The water of the ocean is one and the same everywhere, even though its modifications, namely, to waves, or bubbles foam, etc., appear to be different from the water.

6. The sentence - yasya kāmyakāne mūrtiprakāreṇa śivam guṇam prabhāt śvadānāt, vācāraṃbhānāt viśāraṇa kāmyakāreṇa mūrtikākhyeṇa śvam vartamānāt - has been taken up for consideration, in the sixth section. The Purvapakṣin

argues that, from the sentence under consideration, it becomes clear that a jar is altogether different from a lump of clay. Still, as lump of clay, both of them are non-different. Similarly, the Brahman is in a sense different from the objects of enjoyment. This would mean that both the Brahman and the objects of enjoyments are real.

The Siddhāntin rejects this suggestion by saying that the existence of the Brahman is the only reality. The śruti-texts declare that only the Brahman is real. The plurality of existence is to be accepted only for the sake of laukika vyavahāra. But, since the laukika matters are really unreal, so the plurality of existence also is unreal. Moreover, as the śruti-texts describe that both the cause and effect exist together\(^1\), or that \(\text{sat}^2\) existed at the beginning, the śrūtis do not seem to be inclined to accept the asatkāryavāda. Appayya Dīksita further adds that the samavāya-relation also is not acceptable to the śruti, because, in order to prove one samavāya, another samavāya will have to be imagined, and this will go on upto infinity.

1. Sāmkaraśāstra on II.1.16.
2. Chandogya Up., VI.2.1. सदेश सम्प्रदाय बासीदेश्यान्तर्भितस्मृति।
7. In this topic, the identity of the Jīva with the Brahman is established. The prima facie view is that the Brahman created the Para devā, and the world was created by that Para devā. How can one imagine that the Brahman created such things as birth, death etc., which are not beneficial to it?

The Siddhāntin says that both the Brahman and the Jīva are identical with each other, and the Brahman itself has created the universe. This will be more clear by the śruti-texts such as 'that thou art' तू त्यस्मि etc.¹

8. In this topic, it is proved that the world is created with absolute case by the Brahman. The Purvapakṣin says the Brahman cannot be regarded as the cause of the world, for it cannot be supposed to possess the necessary means.

The Siddhāntin points out that the Brahman possesses such uncommon power, that it can create the universe without the help of any extraneous means and that too quite effortlessly.

¹ Chandogya Up. VI.8.7.
9. If the Brahman was without parts, the creation must be by the Brahman as a whole. In that case, nothing of the Brahman would be left behind after creation. If the Brahman is believed to have been left behind, it would mean that the Brahman has parts.

The Siddhántin refutes this by pointing out it is not said that the whole Brahman is transformed into the universe. What is said is that the apprehension of this world itself is unreal. The principal purport of the śruti-sentences which speak about the creation of the universe by the Brahman, is that the Brahman is the only reality.

10. The tenth section continues the same discussion. The Brahman cannot be regarded as the cause of the universe, because the Brahman is one and uniform, while the creation is manifold and has varied forms. This is the Purvapaksha.

The Siddhántin reiterates that as the Brahman is known to possess uncommon power, though itself uniform it can create the universe characterised by variety.

11. The Brahman cannot be said to be the cause of the universe, because, the Brahman has no purpose in view for
creating the universe. Even a fool is not seen to undertake any enterprise without some purpose in view. The Brahman is known to be free from such desire. Hence, the Brahman cannot be understood to be the cause of the universe. This is the position of the Purvapakṣa in this eleventh section.

The Siddhāntin refutes this by saying that the creation is a mere sport of the brahman. Just as breathing is done effortlessly and without any purpose in view, so too occurs the creation by the Brahman.

12. This adhikarṣaṇa continues the same discussion. The Paramesvara cannot be regarded as the cause of the universe, because it is found that there is considerable inequality in this world. Some people are rich and happy while others are poor and miserable. If the Paramesvara was the creator, such inequality would not have occurred. This is the Purvapakṣa.

The Siddhāntin refutes this by pointing out that it may be the case at the beginning if this world is regarded, as the first creation of the god. But the beginning of this creation is not known and this anāditva of the
universe is accepted by the śrutis and smrtis. So the bondage of the individual karmas is the cause of happiness or miseries. Īśvara cannot be held responsible for it. Īśvara is impartial.

13. This is the last topic in the first pada of the second chapter. The Purvapaksaśīna argues, that the Brahman cannot be regarded as the cause of the universe, because all the qualities of the Brahman are not present in the effect. (i.e. the universe).

The Siddhāntin refutes this by pointing out that all the qualities of the Brahman are actually present, but, due to the ignorance, they are not felt. The world is supposed to be real on account of the māya of the Brahman.

1. While opening the second pada of this chapter, Appayya Dīkṣita points out that in that pada the systems and doctrines which are not based on the Vedas are refuted. The Purvapaksaśīna in the first achikarana of this quarter is the follower of the Sāmkhya-system of philosophy. He says that the Pradhāna has to be accepted as the cause of the universe, because, like the Pradhāna, every created object is seen to be endowed with the three qualities,
namely, **sattva**, **rajas** and **tamas**. Happiness and misery which are found everywhere also point to the **Pradhāna** being the cause.

The **Siddhāntin** reiterates that the **Brahman** is the cause. All the scriptures unanimously declare that the cause of the universe is a sentient entity, while the **Pradhāna** of the **Sāmkhyas** is insentient. Moreover, the inanimate means are not turned into effects unless there is some sentient energy behind those means. But the **Pradhāna** of the **Sāmkhyas** does not have any such help of a sentient being. Hence, it cannot be taken to be the cause. It may be argued that there is no need of any sentient energy for the act of creation; milk, for instance, is turned into curds without any such outside help. This argument, however, cannot be said correct, because, according to **sruti**, there too some energy which is animate is present. Similar is the case when grass consumed by a cow is turned milk. The abdominal fire (the animate energy) operates there.

**Appayya Dīksita** adds at this stage that so far as self-contradiction is concerned, it exists also in the

1. **Brhadāraṇyaka Up. III.7.4.** शास्त्रमू तिम्मन्त्र शारण्यान्ति शम्माति ।
doctrine of the Samkhya. For instance, at one place it is said that enjoyment is the quality of buddhi, while, immediately after this statement, it is said that the enjoyment is the quality of purusa. So too, the Samkhya are not sure about the number of the sense-organs; in their doctrine. This number varies from seven to eleven.

Incidentally, it should be noted that the tapyanulka-bhava introduced by Saikara in this discussion has not been explained by Apayya Diksita.

2. This section has been introduced for the refutation of the Vaisesika doctrine of atomic pluralism. According to the Vaisesika theory, the whole universe is constituted of anus. When two anus come together, they form a dyanukas; three dyanukas form tryanuka. In this

1. VKE p. 496.99: नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन
   श्रीदशद्वराणां सारण्यविस्मयादमप्रक्षा नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन नन न
way, the whole universe is created. At the time of destruction, the opposite process takes place. Tryanukas, are divided in dyanuka and dvyanukas into anus.

The Śidchāntin refutes this theory counts. Firstly, there is no reason whatsoever why at the time of the creation, the anus should come together and why at the time of dissolution, they should separate from one another. There is, indeed no harm in supposing that the sentient Brāhmaṇ creates this universe and also brings it to an end.

Appayya Dīksita incidentally adds here, that in the sutra महत्वपरिमाणमथायुः 1 the word mahat is not changed into maha, because it is not a karmadharaya 2 compound where such a change necessarily takes place. The compound here is a dvandva-compound.

3. In this third topic, refutation of the atomic

1. Vedanta Sūtras, II.2.11.
2. If the word mahat happens to be the first member of the karmadharaya compound, then, mahat is changed into maha e.g. महापुरुष, महाराज etc. Astadhyāyi आस्तधायी: ।
According to Kanāda's theory, the relation of one dvyanuka to another is samavāya relation. Attacking this Vaiśeṣika view, the Siddhāntin says that this samavāya will have the expectancy of another samavāya, and there will thus occur regress ad infinitum. Again the Vaiśeṣika believe that āṇus are neither active nor passive. How then can they be regarded as being capable of creating something. Further, the fourfold division of the āṇus as, sthūla, suksma, suksamatara and suksmatama, is not warranted by the śāstras. Siddhāntin also points out that the atomic theory is not accepted by venerable teachers like Manu.

4. The doctrine of the Bauddhas is refuted in the fourth adhikarana. There are three principal schools of the Bauddhas. There are three different vādins in the Bauddha-system. Those who suppose this world as being real are known as the Saḥyārtha-vādins. Those who assume that there is total absence of the jñeya objects, and all objects are jñanarūpa and this jñāna is also monetary, are called as Vijnāna-vādins, and those who maintain that nothing is real are known as Śunya-vādins (annihilationists).

1. Śāmkaraḥbhasya on II.2.18: तत्ते धोे वादिने मवत्ति - कैकलस्यिस्तव्या दिनः, कैचिदिक्षानास्तित्वम्यादिनः, अन्ये पुनः स्वात्त्विक्यादिनः।
The principal views of the Baudhāyas are: the worldly existence is possible only on account of avidyā; the elements, earth, water, etc. are created from the four kinds of paramāṇus, and knowledge etc. is produced from rūpa, vijñāna, samjñā, vedanā and samskāra. These five form a skandha.

This is refuted in the following manner: It is not definitely known who forms these samudayas of paramāṇus and skandhas, because everything is momentary according to the Baudhāyas. Moreover, it cannot be explained how avidyā etc. can be regarded as samudaya. If avidyā etc. is to be the cause of samudaya, it will be difficult to understand how avidyā itself, being a samudaya, can also become the cause of samudaya. On the whole, therefore, the theory is not at all convincing.

5. The view of the Vijnāna-vadin-Baudhāyas is refuted in this section. Saṃkara adds that this is the only theory really favoured by Gautama Buddha. According to

1. They are of four-fold divisions -

2. Saṃkara-bhaṣya on II.2.23:  

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1. They are of four-fold divisions -

2. Saṃkara-bhaṣya on II.2.23:  

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this theory, the worldly existence has no cause as such. It is like a dream, in respect of which there exists no cause and effect relation.

The Siddhāntin ridicules this position by pointing out that, in the absence of cause and effect relation, a farmer would be able to grow corn without sowing any seeds. The erṣṭanta of a dream is, again not correct, because the knowledge in a dream is of a smṛti form, while the knowledge of jārgti is of anubhūti-form. The dream and the worldly existence cannot therefore be compared with each other. In a sense, the farmer is dependent on the latter.

6. The sixth adhikaraṇa in the second quarter is devoted to the refutation of the Jaina-mata. According to the Jainas, there are seven pāṭahrthas, namely, jīva, ajīva, āsrava, samvara, nirjarā, bandha, and mokṣa. Out of these, āsrava (influx of kārmanas) is the cause of the birth etc., while samvara leads to salvation. In epistemology the Jainas have professed the theory called
While refuting the Jaina doctrine, the Siddhāntin mainly attacks the saptabhānginyāya. If that nyāya was to be applied to any theory, that theory would not stand at all. That nyāya describes the knowledge of both existence and non-existence, simultaneously. This two-fold knowledge, at one and the same time, is not possible just as the coexistence of cold and heat in the same entity cannot be thought of. Hence the Jaina-mata is unconvincing.

7. In this section, the doctrine of the Nakūṭāsapasupatas is refuted. According to the Pasupata doctrine, kārya, karana, yoga, vidhi, and duḥkhaṇta are

1. This nyāya is as follows - 1) may be, existence of a pot may be there 2) may not (be existing), 3) may or may not (be existing), 4) cannot be described, 5) may be existing but cannot be described, 6) may not be existing and cannot be described, 7) may or may not be existing and cannot be described. Here, the form, 'may be' (1) indicates absence of determination, hence the existence of a pot cannot be definitely stated. Similarly non-existence of a pot cannot be firmly stated in (2) By (3) the pot cannot be definitely described. In such a manner, nothing can be definitely established.
The five great elements. Karmans are thirteen in number, five relating to the five jñanendriyas, five relating to the five karmendriyas, and one each relating to mind, intellect, and ahārmāra. Yoga means meditation etc., and vidhi denotes rituals. This vidhi has two subdivisions - i) upahāra with six subvarieties, namely, hasita, gīta, pṛttta, huddākkaraṇa, nanaskara and japa; and ii) vrata. Duhkhānta is again two-fold - anātmaka and sātmaka. The first one implies the total destruction of all kinds of miseries and eternal salvation, while the second one (sātmaka) implies mastery and superiority of sight, actions, physical and mental powers. Pasupati is the highest reality; he bestows fruits on persons according to their karmans.

The Siddhāntin attacks this doctrine by pointing out that, in this theory, Īśvara is regarded only as the nimitta-karaṇa, while, according to the śrutis, Īśvara is both the nimitta-karaṇa and the upadāna-karaṇa of the universe. Moreover, the Pāsupatas hold that Īśvara is different from the Puruṣa etc. But Īśvara cannot become the adhiṣṭhāna of Puruṣa, etc., unless he is in someway related to Puruṣa, etc. There are several other points in this doctrine which go against the teachings of the śrutis; hence this doctrine also has no sound basis.
8. The Bhāgavata-mata is refuted in the last and eighth section of the second quarter. According to this doctrine, Vasudeva is the highest god (Paramātma). The Jīva (Samkarṣana) is born from Vasudeva. Mind (Pradyumna) has the Jīva as its cause. From mind, ego (Aniruddha) is born.

This doctrine is refuted as follows: It is assumed that the Jīva is born from Vasudeva. If the Jīva is believed to be at all created, it will have to be regarded as being anitya. In that case, it will not attain mokṣa. Moreover, the Bhāgavatas believe Vasudeva, Samkarṣana, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha to be Īśvaras. It may be asked: when one Īśvara was capable of doing all that was required of him, what is the propriety in positing four Īśvaras? Further, this doctrine is avowedly anti-vedic.

1. Śāmkarabhāṣya on II.2.42: प्रतिलोपितवति चाचायो नीतस्यो- त्वातिन्य - नात्मायुदूर्निमित्तत्त्वाय तास्य: | (II.3.17) जिति
1. Appayya Diksita opens the new quarter by stating its significance. This quarter tries to remove the apparent contradictions in the Vedic passages. For example, some say that the ākāśa has created the universe, while others do not accept this; hence there is some contradiction. All such contradictions are removed in this pada, while in the previous pada, all non-Vedic pramanas were refuted.

After these introductory remarks, the commentator turns to the discussion proper. The ākāśa cannot be understood as having been created, because there is no reference in the Srutis to that effect; so says the Pārvapaksin.

The Siddhāntin points out that the sentence तस्मादैा जैतमादात्मन: आकाशः समूहः from the Taittirīya Upanisad does mention the origin of the ākāśa. At some places, the ākāśa is described as being self-born, but these passages are to be understood in their secondary sense only.

1. Taittirīya Up., II.1.
2. Brhadāranyaka Up., II.3.3: बायुरंवा न्तरिसं जैतमादैाः।
2. This topic serves as an atidesa. Vāyu is not created, according to the Chandogya Upanisad. But the Taittiriya Upanisad (II.1) describes the creation of vāyu from ākāśa. Hence there is contradiction. According to the Purvaśāṅkṣeṇa, vāyu is not created; it is eternal, because in the Brhadāraṇyaka Upanisad, vāyu is described as a deity without an end.

The Siddhāntin rebuts this by pointing out that vāyu is also created like ākāśa. Though the Chandogya Upanisad does not describe the creation of vāyu, still the assumption, 'though the knowledge of the Brahma, everything else becomes known', will be rendered acceptable only when vāyu is regarded as a modification of the Brahma. The amṛta-tva of vāyu is to be understood only in relative sense. Vāyu is eternal in comparison with the human being, but this does not mean that vāyu has no end.

1. Atidesa is a technical term. When a particular rule which has been already laid down is to be made applicable to some other part, then it is called an atidesa.

e.g. Jaimini Sūtras, VII.1.1.1: कुलिन्समायनत्वाचेयवानो मुख्यमेते
मद्याधिकारेन मावः स्वातः

2. Chandogya Up.

3. See Foot Note No. 2 on page No. 647
3. The Brahman also is created like ākāśa, Vāyu, etc., says the Purvapākṣin in this third section.

The Siddhāntin reiterates that the Brahman is not created because its creation is not possible. If the sat is regarded as the cause, the Brahman, the effect, will not be different from the cause. If the specific viśeṣa was to be regarded as the cause and the Brahman in general as the effect, then that assumption would be wrong, because, from viśeṣa, sāmānya is never created. Hence the Brahman is self-born.

4. In this section, the Purvapākṣin argues that tejas is born from sat (Brahman), as it is said in the Chandogya Upaniṣad.

The Siddhāntin points out that vāyu is the source of tejas. This is confirmed by the Taittiriya Upaniṣad. Vāyu is the modification of the Brahman, hence these śruti-sentences wherein the Brahman is mentioned as the cause of tejas, do not go against the Vedantic assumption.

1. Chandogya Up., IV.2.4: तत् (सत्) तेजोपमः।
2. Taittiriya Up., II.1.1. वायोरिविनः।
5. The same discussion about the creation is continued in the fifth adhikaran. The Purvapakṣin asks how water is created?

   The Siddhāntin replies that water is produced out of tejas, as is stated in the Śruti.

6. The same discussion continues here. The Purvapakṣin says that anna is produced from water, as is mentioned in the Śruti. Here, anna has to be understood in the sense of food-grains, as food-grains grow only when there is abundance of water.

   The Siddhāntin says that the term anna denotes the earth, because the context here is about the creation of the five elements. Moreover, the same Śruti mentions the black colour of anna. The food-grains, again, are known to be the vikāra of the earth. So by the word anna only the earth is intended.

7. The Purvapakṣin, here, holds that the five great elements are created by ākāśa. The Parameśvara is not in

1. Taittiriya Up., II.1.1. जगतः
2. Chandogya Up., VI.2.4. ता आप ब्रह्म ता वामस्वतः
3. इद वि.४.१: चक्रुण्यं तदमस्तः
any way connected with that creation. He is nowhere mentioned as such in the śrutis.

Contradicting this, the Siddhāntin, asserts that the Paramēśvara is connected with this creation, because Paramēśvara resides within ākāśa, etc., which are themselves nonsentient and hence unable to create anything. Moreover, the śruti does mention that the Paramēśvara has created everything.

8. The order of creation was discussed up to this time. The present section, now, discusses the order of destruction. The Purvapakṣin avers that the process of the destruction is the same as that of creation.

The Siddhāntin insists that the process is reversed at the time of destruction. For this, he gives the very appropriate drṣṭānta of a stair-case. One goes up on the stair-case in one direction, but, while coming down, he moves in an exactly opposite is direction.

1. Brhadāraṇyaka Up.,III.7.3 : य: पृथिविः तिष्ठति पृथिविः
वन्तरो यं पृथिविः न वेद यथा पृथिविः सतीरे यः पृथिविक्षमतृते कष्टाति ।

2. Ibid, III.7.23 : नान्येक सतीरस्तिः द्रष्टा ।
9. This section continues the same discussion. The Purvapakṣin complains that the order of creation and destruction in respect of ākāśa, etc., does not seem to be satisfactory, as it does not include the sense-organs, mind, and intellect. These ought to have been stated or referred to somewhere.

The Siddhāntin sets aside this suggestion by saying that the sense-organs etc. are merely secondary vikāras; they need not, therefore, be separately mentioned.

10. In this section, the Purvapakṣin supposes that the Jīva is born. Various samskaras are observed with reference to this Jīva, and so the Jīva should be regarded as being subject to birth, death, etc.

The Siddhāntin refutes this by pointing out that the śrutis declare that the Jīva is not destroyed; so the samskaras have to be understood to relate to the body and not to the Jīva. The Jīva may be said to be as connected with these samskaras only in a secondary sense.

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1. Chandogya Up. VI.5.4: अन्तमयं ते सर्वं नन्तमायमः
2. Ibid. VI.11.3.
11. The Purvaśāstra of this section may be set forth as follows: The Jīva cannot be regarded as coming into existence along with the body, as has been stated in the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad\(^1\). But it has to be accepted that the Jīva comes into existence independently. This being so, the statement, 'the knowledge of the Brahman is the cause of all knowledge', will be untenable.

The Siddhāntin encounters this suggestion by saying that, those śrutis which describe the creation of other entities, do not mention the creation of the Jīva. On the other hand, the Jīva is described as eternal (nitya). The statement in the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, cited by the Purvaśāstra, has accordingly to be understood as describing the Jīva with upādhi.

12. The Jīva may be eternal, but its capacity of knowing may not be eternal, as it loses consciousness at the time of sleep. This is the Purvaśāstra in this section.

As against this, the Siddhāntin maintains that,

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1. Brhadāraṇyaka Up. II.1.20: 

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really speaking, the Jīva is not different from the Brahman, and hence, it is doubtlessly endowed with the eternal knowledge. But in the condition of sleep, there is an absence of the objects of knowledge, so there is an absence of knowledge also.

13. In this section, the anutva of Jīva is denied. The Purvapakṣin argues that the Jīva cannot be vibhu, because, the Jīva is described as entering into the body and leaving the body. This would be possible only if the anutva of the Jīva was accepted. These sentences which describe the vibhutva of the Jīva are to be treated as conveying a secondary sense.

The Siddhāntin refutes this by pointing out that the śrutī itself declares that the Jīva is vibhu. The anutva of the Jīva is to be regarded as being aupādhika.

14. This section is meant for removing the apparent contradictions in statements such as Puruṣa is not attached to any action and 'A Puruṣa should perform sacrifices'.

1. Ibid IV,4-21: स वा अग्नि महान् ब्रह्म बाल्म्य योद्धवं विश्वास्य: प्राप्ये।
Here puruṣa is described as not being related with any action and at the same time, he is mentioned as a doer. Hence the contradiction.

This contradiction is explained away by the Siddhāntin as follows: When this Jīva is bound down in worldly life, it is expected to perform sacrifices; but after liberation, the Jīva becomes free from all attachments.

15. The Purva-pākṣa in this topic is that the kārtrtva of an individual soul must be considered to be natural, as the śruti does not say anything against it.

The Siddhāntin insists on his view that the agency of the Jīva is not natural but is occasioned by upāchā such as āhamkāra.

16. This section has the following as its Purva-pākṣa:

1. VEP p.613: जनासः गो हृदयं पुनस्तज्ञानविधिक्षत्वीनां विचित्राविधिक्षत्वीनां च वातमक्ष्या कर्त्तव्यदिनिनां बन्धमोहाविपक्षविविधष्टन विरोधः परिविहयते।

2. Ibid. p.619, Śāmkarabhāṣya: अर्थ नहि जीवे स्वपेतः रागाधारेणिदेशमणुक्तः कार्याचरनाचारमात्रीकरणः कृत्वा अनुमतिः हक्कौति।
The Jīva is not dependent on the Isvāra for the upādhis. The Jīva is naturally endowed with anger etc. and is himself capable of actions.

The Siddhāntin reiterates his position that the Jīva is dependent on the Isvāra, who is to be looked upon as a common cause just like the rain for food-grains.

17. The same topic has been pursued in this section. The Purva-pakṣin says: If the Jīva is dependent on Isvāra, then the relation between the Jīva and the Isvāra may be like that of servant and the master. But, according to the śruti, both the Jīva and Isvāra are identical with each other. Hence one has to think of some other kind of relation, for instance like that between the body and the limbs. But that too will not be correct, as it will goes against the śruti. So what kind of relation is there?

The Siddhāntin's view is that the reflection of the Brahman can be looked upon as the part (āmsa not in its real sense, but appearing as being āmsa) of the Brahman. Moreover, on account of adhyāsa there is felt the difference between the Brahman and the Jīva, though in really such difference does not exist. According to Amalānanda, the sentences wherein such difference is stated,
convey the svārtha, while the sentences wherein such distinction is not made, are to be treated as conveying a secondary sense.

1. The first topic in the last quarter of the second adhyāya has the following purvapakṣa. The prāṇa must be considered to have been in existence even before the creation.

The Siddhantin asserts that the prāṇa etc., are but the modifications of the Brahma. Hence, they are said to have been created like ākāsa etc. So the statements about the creation of prāṇa etc. cannot be treated in their secondary sense.

2. According to the Purvapakṣa in this second section, the number of the prāṇas is not fixed; but it may be assumed that the number is seven.

The Siddhāntin says that the number of the prāṇas is actually eleven, and is make up by five organs of knowledge, five organs of action, and mind. The same number is confirmed by the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (III.9.4.) also.

1. VKP. p.628: भेदनतः स्वार्थपरः ... भेदित्वमणस्तु भेदवत्स्या म्येकक- निबन्धका बुधविताणि:।
Here Appayya Dīksita points out that the propriety of this section lies in the tvam-pacārtha being distinguished from the sthūla as well as the suksma body.

Appayya Dīksita gives another interpretation of this section. According to this interpretation, the prima facie view is that, out of the eleven prānas, only seven prānas leave the body.

The Siddhāntin, on the other hand, insists that all the eleven prānas go out of the body and none remains behind.

This section continues the discussion about the prāna. The Purva-pākṣin maintains that the prānas are vibhu, and, hence, going out of the body will not be possible in their case.

The Siddhāntin says that the prānas which are different from the principal prāna, are ānu, and their activities are also limited; hence they can go out of the body.

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1. VKP. p.633: विश्वासात्मुक्त पुनरूपाकृति पुरुषार्थ प्राप्ति राजस्त्रीय्यम् च विवेकानन्द: ।
4. The Purvapakṣin, in this section, argues that the prāṇas did exist even before the creation.

The Siddhāntin, again, points out that the creation of the prāṇas is referred to in various contexts. It cannot, therefore, be said that they existed before the creation.

5. This section proceeds with the same discussion.

The Purvapakṣin suggests that the Prāṇa is of the form of wind.

The Siddhāntin points out that, according to the Chandogya Upaniṣad, the Prāna is altogether different from the wind. The five different varieties of Vāyu, namely, prāṇa, arāṇa, vyāṇa, udāṇa and samāṇa and actually the functions of the main prāṇa.

6. The Purvapakṣin, in this section, argues that the main Prāṇa is vibhu as it is compared with the three worlds or with 'all'. If it is so, the out-going of the prāṇa will have to be understood in a secondary sense.

The Siddhāntin points out that the vibhutva of

1. Chandogya Up. III.13.4: प्राण जेब्र ज्ञानसुखकः पादः स वायुना ज्योतिना क्षति।
the Prāna mentioned in the Ārūtis is with reference to Hiranyagarbha-Prāna. The other prānas possess only limited powers, and they can go out of and come back into the body.

7. The ēśeṣṭhas, like the sun etc, control the sense-organs such as the prāna, etc. Hence, the sense-organs will have to be regarded as functioning on account of the powers of these ēśeṣṭhas. Accordingly the fruits will have to be regarded as being enjoyed by these ēśeṣṭhas and not by the Prānas, So says the Purvapāksin in this section.

The Siddhāntin rejects this by saying that the ēśeṣṭhas are not liable to any kind of experiences, for, it is the Jīva who is concerned with good and bad deeds. The ēśeṣṭhas are passive in this respect.

8. This section continues the same discussion. The Purvapāksa is: The eye and other organs are not independent entities, but are only some particular functions of the Prāna, as has been said in the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad

1. Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad: Among they are already: ... t athavā ev sāvṛtān avamānaste...
The Siddhāntin insists that they are independent entities as is stated in the Mundaka Upaniṣad\(^1\). The Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad also differentiates between the prāṇa and other organs. There is much difference between the principal prāṇa and other organs, for, in sleep, the principal prāṇa alone functions, while the other organs do not function at all.

Here, Appayya Dīkṣita supports the Siddhānta on the authority of the Pāṇini-smṛti\(^2\).

9. In the last adhikarana in this quarter, the Pūrvapakṣa is stated as follows: The Jīva is the real creator. Just as, though a spy is the real observer of the deeds of the enemy, the king says he himself has observed them, in the same way, the Jīva is the actual creator, and the Brahman like the king, merely takes the credit for the creation.

The Siddhāntin maintains that the Brahman itself is the creator, since it differentiates the objects through the Jīva. The Jīva does not do this. Appayya Dīkṣita

1. Mundaka Up., II.1.3: अतेतस्माज्ञाते प्राण: मन: सङ्क्रिंद्राणि च |
2. VKP. p. 649: पाणिनिनिष्ठितिनक्तय (quotation is not cited) पूर्वपादिर्णिं तुद्द: ।
here, points out that the instrumental case jīvātmā in the sentence संयत्संत इन्द्राहिष्मासितस्य देवता येन जीवात्मनार्जनप्रियम्यानामूर्येव व्याकरणः, does not denote the agent, but merely the means of creation. This, he supports by quoting some grammatical illustrations.

1. As usual, Appayya Dīkṣita opens the first section of the first pāda of the third chapter by drawing attention to its propriety. In the second chapter, it was established that the Brahman can be known through the Vedānta-texts only. Now, in this third chapter, it is sought to be established that the knowledge of the Vedānta-text can lead to the realisation of the Brahman. Secondly, in the previous chapter, the contradictions among the śruti, the smṛti and the nyāya were removed. The third chapter concerns itself with the means of the Brahman-realisation and its first pāda sets forth the nature of vairāgya, while

2. VVP. p.653-54: अतः अद्व ग्राणायद्भाव शिक्षय प्रहस्तनिर्देश्य धिकारवस्त्रयाग्निगतिक्षणामिन्तिंत्यति। अधिकारिणिर्देश्य धिकारवस्त्रयाग्निगतिक्षणामिन्तिंत्यति। अधिकारिणीय धिकारवस्त्रयाग्निगतिक्षणामिन्तिंत्यति। अधिकारिणीय धिकारवस्त्रयाग्निगतिक्षणामिन्तिंत्यति। अधिकारिणीय धिकारवस्त्रयाग्निगतिक्षणामिन्तिंत्यति। अधिकारिणीय धिकारवस्त्रयाग्निगतिक्षणामिन्तिंत्यति। अधिकारिणीय धिकारवस्त्रयाग्निगतिक्षणामिन्तिंत्यति। अधिकारिणीय धिकारवस्त्रयाग्निगतिक्षणामिन्तिंत्यति। अधिकारिणीय धिकारवस्त्रयाग्निगतिक्षणामिन्तिंत्यति।
the second pada describes the nature of the grace of god. The third pada undertakes the discussion about the Saguna Brahman, and the last quarter deals with the nature of renunciation, etc. are the means of obtaining renunciation etc.

According to the Purvapaksin, in the first section, the Jiva migrates from the body to another along with the prana and the sense-organs. The five elements do not accompany it, as these elements are easily available at any time. Moreover, after death, the new purusa is born out of five different offerings (ahutis), out of which the first is sraddha which has no relation whatsoever with water.

The Siddhantin rejects the Purvapaksa by pointing out that the five great elements do go with the Jiva, for, the Chandogya Upanisad does say so. It states that the new purusa is born out of five offerings. The word sraddha

1. VKP. p.655: प्राधनायादेवैर यथसः, त्रिप्रायादान्त्याचिकिरणेऽपरमेश्वर-प्रसाददृष्टम्। यूहीतपादे सुन्नाक्षाराचिकिरणेऽसुन्नाक्षारापरिश्रीठनपुपम्, चुरूपादेः क्रयत्त सत्याशकसमस्तमादिदृष्टम् व तदुपायानात्विनिरपितमिति किलकः।

2. Chandogya Up. V.3.3: यथा प्राधनामाहुतिया: पुलक्षको मवनित।

3. Ibid
means water, as these five offerings are made of water and this is confirmed by the context.

Appayya Diksita, here, enters into a controversy about the nature of the body. According to the Naiyayikas, the relation of the body to the five great elements will have to be regarded as the samavaya relation, if the body is at all related to them. If it is so, then, the body would not be visible to us; but actually it is seen. This has been replied to as follows: The relation is known through inference only, as is done in the case the tryanakas. These tryanakas are visible, even though such samavaya relation of pratyaksa and apratyaksa is not seen.

Reverting to the topic under consideration, appayya Diksita adds that these sentences where food is stated to be going with the Jiva are to be understood in their secondary sense.

1. VKP, p. 659: अत्र नैयायिकाद्वयो विदद्यते । यदि देहः प्रभुपूत-समस्वायिकारणं ह्यात्तति ह द्रव्यं न स्यात् । यदि च प्रत्यायाप्रत्यक्षसमस्वायिकारणं ह्यात्तति प्रत्येको न स्यात्तमावस्यमोक्षेण । तत्त, त्रायुक्ते प्रत्यक्षसत्त्व दिखलो प्रत्येकसमस्वायिकारणत्वा भावामुखात्त ।

2. Samkarabhasya on , III.1.1-7: भाज्यं तमोमित्रत्वं न मुख्यम् ।
2. The Purvapakṣa in this section may be stated as follows: When the Jīva descends down from the heaven to the earth, it leaves no deeds behind, as is said in the śrutis.1

The Śiddhānta may be stated thus: The Jīva does take some deed with it, when it descends down. The Jīva is reborn as a Brahmaṇa or as someone else according to his own karmans. The word carana in the śruti-text2 is to be understood in the sense of karmans.

3. According to the Purvapakṣa, in this topic, those who perform sacrifices and those who do not—both go to the Candraloka after death. This is stated in the śrutis.3 The only difference is that those who do not perform sacrifices come back to the earth immediately.

The Śiddhānta, on the other hand, says that those persons who do not perform sacrifices do not go to the Candraloka; they go to hells like Raurava. This is

1. Chandogya Up., V.10.5: तत्स्मिन्यावक्ष्यात्मुपित्वा -- etc.
2. Chandogya Un., V.10.7: तथ दूह रमणीयवरणः अस्मात्शा ह यते रमणीयो यो निमायधें ।
3. Kausitaki Up., I.2: स हेयानम वै वै चाच्यास्तो काल्पणिन्ति चन्द्रभास्येच ते सर्वं गच्छन्ति ।
supported by the Mahābhārata also. After coming out from
the hell, they are reborn in one of the four classes of
creation, according to their karmans.

4. The Purvarakṣin in this section argues that those
persons who attain to the Candra-loka come down by the path
of wind.

The Siddhāntin contends that these persons only
resemble the wind; it is not that they become identical
with the wind.

5. There is no time-limit for the Jīva to assume the
various forms beginning with ākāśa and coming down to
Vṝhi - so says the Purvarakṣin in this section.

The Siddhāntin maintains that the word dūmnis-
prapata-tāra occurring in the passage - अद्य पूर्वा प्रापतिः पूर्वा प्रापति त जिज्ञ सृष्टयो ब्रह्मविदयं सर्वत्र स्थिति नरमन्तेतो वे दुर्जीयंतर ये चैत्यः
etc., indicates that, in the condition of Vṝhi liberation
becomes very difficult, that is to say, it occurs after a
long time.

1. Śāmkarabhaṣya on III.1.19.
2. These four categories are: आणवन, जीवन, बुद्धिमत्ता and च्छेद्यम.
3. Chandogya Up., V.10.6.3.
Appayya Dīksita, here, points out that the prima facie view as stated by Vacaspati and Amalānanda, namely, that the release from the condition of food-grains is very difficult is not correct, while the prima facie view as stated by Śaṅkara is correct.

6. According to the Purvapakṣin, in this section, the Jīvas, which obtain the form of food-grains like vrihi, yava, etc., are actually sacrificers. But due to some evil deed, like the killing of the victim in the sacrifice, they are reborn as food-grains. Appayya Dīksita, here points out that the immolation of the sacrificial victim does not constitute a sin. As the eating of kalaṅja (poisoned flesh) cannot have any effect on the sacrifice itself, similarly, if there is slaughter, it will not in any effect the sacrifice. This is how the objection of those (Naiyāyikas) who say that the sacrificial slaughter leads to sin can be set aside.

1. VKP, pp.678-79: 'दुर्मित्रात्म(त)स्यं जिति दुर्मन्त्र निधियर्थिने क्रूरे न चिन्हते नेति नम्नले पुर्वकथितो।' वस्तुसः आयायाप्रतिबंधित्वम् आयायार्थित्ववाल्क्याकारणानि अनुष्ठानं।
2. VKP, pp.681-85: 'यथा काल्यमस्यप्रतिबंधित्वम् आयायार्थित्ववाल्क्याकारणानि अनुष्ठानं।' अनेन हृदानिपपित्स्यम् अनुष्ठानवाल्क्याकारणोऽनुष्ठानं। अनेन ईश्वरस्याति स्तव्येदेवः प्रित्य जिति वद्यते। बृहस्पति। वृहस्पतिनिराकारात्मकः अनेन वैभवस्वरूपं हितिः न भवति परस्परार्थत्वार्थान्तः वद्यते। केवलेदेवोऽनि निरस्तः।
The *Siddhānta* states that these, who are born as *Vṛihī*, are different from those who are in the *Candraloka*. The killing in a sacrifice is not a sin at all. It is violence occasioned by strong passions that constitutes a great sin. Appayya Dīkṣita further adds that it is a general rule that one should not commit any violence, but wars and killing of thieves are exception to that rule. These exceptions do not invalidate the general rule.

1. Appayya Dīkṣita opens this topic of the second quarter by summarizing each topic in it. The first topic deals with the point that the pleasures in heaven are worthless. The second *adhikarana* points out that unless the knowledge of the Brahman is attained, the subtle body returns back. The third one mentions that the persons who are known as *anīstādhikārins* travel along an auspicious path but they do not attain the heaven. In the fourth section it is said that the *anusayin* - persons have more contact with the objects of enjoyments, that is today, these persons are not attracted by enjoyments. The fifth section declares that these persons do not live here for long time, and the last topic says that the *jīva* comes into contact with pleasures or enjoyments. Here it may be pointed out that all most all the topics from this topic unto the
end are mere repetitions of what has been said in the
Nayamanjari except few cases.

With this introduction, the commentator turns
to the Purvapaksa in the first adhikarana which can be
stated as follows: the world produced in the dream-
condition is real, because it is created by the same
Atman who creates the world in the waking condition.

The Siddhanta in this connection is stated as
follows: In the waking condition the dream-world is
created by the Jīva still it is unreal, for, the Jīva cannot
be said to possess unrestricted powers like the Brahman.
Though the Jīva is a part of Īśvara, still when this Jīva
comes into contact with the body and sense-organs, it loses
its knowledge-power.

In the course of this discussion, Appayya Dīksita
raises an interesting point. Even dreams sometimes prove
to be real, because the incidents seen in dreams actually
take place in future. Appayya Dīksita says that the creation in dreams
is to be understood in secondary sense.

Incidentally, it may be noted that Appayya Dīksita,
while commenting, refers to some ideas relating to mythological
geography and cosmography. 

2. In the previous topic, the dream-condition is discussed. In this section the state of sleep is considered.

According to the Purvapakṣa, in the sleep-condition, the Jīva either enters into the nādi or it enters into the purītat or at times it rests within the Brahman. But the Jīva cannot be connected with all these three simultaneously.

The Siddhānta states that, at the time of sleep, the Jīva enters into the purītat through the nādi and rests within the Brahman. The position of the Purvapakṣa,adds Appayya Dīkṣita, is vitiated by the defect, namely, vakya-bhedā which, again, gives rise to eight other defects.

1. VKP, p.691: इत्यादि नविनविश्लेषणानि रूपविविधताय खऽयो ज्ञाविद्वृत्ताय ज्ञानविद्वृत्तमिहै गद्यविद्वृत्तमिहै ... नैराम्य स्वभावमुत्तरस्तायतायानि श्रीचि वयाचि।

2. This defect, namely, vakya-bhedā occurs when one single sentence specified two or more actions. As all of these actions cannot be done simultaneously, this specification leads to option. For example श्रीहिरिम्यकत यस्वे - This sentence mentions either rice or barly as a dravya for the sacrifice. Only one can be used at one time. So there is option, and this option leads to following eight defects.
Appayya Dikṣita has to comment on this vakya-bhedā defect only because Vacaspati has given its elaborated discussion, though it has very little direct concern with the subject under consideration.

3. The Purvapakṣa in this section points out that one cannot say definitely that, at the time of waking up, the same Jīva as had gone to sleep comes out. When a drop of water falls into the huge ocean, it is difficult to take out that very same drop out of it.

The Siddhāntin insists that the Jīva which comes out at the time of waking up is assuredly the same as the one which enters into the Brahman at the time of sleep, because it remembers almost clearly all its own deeds which were done or were half-done on the previous day. A drop of water which falls into the ocean cannot be separated, because it has no distinctive marks.

F.N. contd.

If Vṛihi is used for sacrifice (1) yavapramānya is abandoned, (2) yavapramānya is accepted, (3) If yava is used; that yavasastra which was regarded unauthoritative is authorised., (4) That (yava) which was supposed as apramāna are being supposed as pramāna. These four are again repeated when Śrīdhvāstra is accepted.
4. According to the Purvapaksa, in this adhikarana, the Jiva can be thought of as having four states of consciousness, namely, (1) wakefulness, (2) dream, (3) deep sleep, and (4) abandonment of body. What kind of state is swoon?

The Siddhantin says that swoon cannot be the state of wakefulness, as the former is characterised by the absence of consciousness. It can neither be dream-condition nor sleep, as there is absence of dream and absence of regular breathing during the swoon. On the other hand, the body actually trembles. The swoon may be described as being partly the condition of sleep and partly the condition of death, because it is characterised by existence and unconsciousness.

5. This fifth section concerns itself with the question of the nature of the Brahman. The Purvapaksa maintains that the Brahman is both nirguna and saguna.

The Siddhantin, on the other hand, insists that the Brahman is nirguna only. The description of the Brahman as saguna in the srutis is intended only for facilitating meditation. The nirgunatva of the Brahman
can be known from the śrutis\textsuperscript{1} and the smṛtis\textsuperscript{2}.

According to some ācāryas, the sūtras 11 to 13 constitute one independent adhikarana and sūtras 14 to 21 constitute another adhikarana. In the first topic (i.e. sūtras 12-13), the point of dispute is whether the Brahman is of one single form or of multiple form, while in the second adhikarana (i.e. sūtras 14-21) the doubt is whether the Brahman has as its characteristic sat or tīrtha knowledge or both. Śaṅkara, however, thinks that there is no necessity whatsoever of two separate adhikaranās. Because, the first view has been already refuted by the sūtra न स्यान- - तो विरोधौ परस्पर्यन्त्यं यं बत्त्वकालवाचकं ह। ॥ while the second view is replied to in the sūtra - प्रकाशनवाचकायामि ॥

\textsuperscript{1} Brhadāraṇyaka Up., IV.5-13.
\textsuperscript{2} Gītā, XIII.12 : हैम वतप्रवचायिं। etc., or विस्तुपूर्वीयो नारायणो नामदयुक्ति स्फोटेत्। माया ह्येः भया चूष्टा मन्नो परमात्मा नारायण स्वेतेन्द्रः कैले भृगु शापमहिः। ॥

\textsuperscript{3} Vedānta-Sūtras, III.2.11.

\textsuperscript{4} Ibid, III.2.15 and Śaṅkarabhāṣya on III.2.21 : यदि तावं देशाधिकारात्मके परस्य अभ्रणे निराकृत्वामित्यम प्रायास्तुपूर्वकं न स्यान्तो विद्येनाधिकारेन निराकृतम् ... नापि वैधव्यविधेऽभ्रमे न सत्यार्थमिति यथे कथम् वस्त्तीत्येवोपलब्धिः। जित्यादिप्रदृशितः केस्यं प्रसङ्गं गरत्।
6. The Purva-pakṣin in the sixth section asserts that the phrase, na iti na iti\(^1\) negates the nature of the Brahman or it negates the Brahman itself.

The Siddhāntin, however, says that if that phrase were to imply the negation of the Brahman and the world, it would mean that the śrutis had accepted the Śnyavāda (nihilism). But actually they have not done so. If the phrase were to imply the negation of the Brahman itself, the introductory sentence, namely, "may I expound the Brahman" would be rendered meaningless. So, the negation implied by that phrase has to be understood as the negation of the abstract and the concrete forms (such as puruṣa on the orbit of the sun and objects names and forms) only. On the other hand, the Brahman is actually visualised by the Yogins; therefore, its existence cannot be denied. The denial implied there is with reference to the world which appears as if it is real\(^2\).

1. Brhadāraṇyaka Upanisad, II.3.6. अथात् ब्राह्मणं नेति नेति।

2. Appayya Dīksita, here, declares that the second quarter of the third chapter is over and so no commentary on the remaining two sections is found. Vacaspati and Amalananda have commented on those two topics, namely, the Parādhikarana and the Phalādhikarana. Why Appayya Dīksita has not commented on these two topics is not clear. Even in the synopsis given at the beginning of this chapter, only six topics have been mentioned.
1. The next pada opens with a statement about its relation to the previous pada. In the previous quarter, the non-qualified Brahman has been considered. The present pada is devoted to the consideration of those sentences wherein the saguna and the nirguna Brahman have been described. In fact, however, there is no scope for such distinction, as the Brahman is beyond such distinction.

The Purvaśānta complains that the information about the Brahman is given differently in different texts. The context, the names, etc. vary in each text. This state of things can be explained only on the assumption of the sagunatva of the Brahman.

The Siddhāntin replies to this by pointing out that the knowledge about the Brahman imparted in the different texts is the same, as is already indicated by the sameness of efforts directed towards that knowledge as also by the

1. The contexts like Agni-vidya, Madhu-vidya, etc., and the names like Taittiriyaka, Vajasaneyaka, etc., Appayya Diksita explains this as follows: kathaka, kalapa, etc., are the examples of namabheda, while the Darśapurnamasa, Agnisomīya, etc., are the illustrations of the kupabheda.
sameness of the fruit (mokṣa) derived from that knowledge. Incidentally it may be mentioned that the meaning of the term 'name' has been explained by Appayya Dīkṣitā in grammatic terms. For example, the word kāthaka means 'being said in the katha Upanisad'.

2. Even though the vidya may be the same, the minor things cannot be connected with another text, because in that case the defects such as etc., would occur. This is the in this section.

The Siddhāntin retorts that such subordinate things may be transferred to some other vidya, since the fruit is the same.

3. According to the Purvapakṣin in this section, the Udgītha-vidyas, as set forth in the Brhadāraṇyaka Upanisad and the Chandogya Upanisad, are the same, because there is similarity of arthavāda sentences and of names in the two contexts.

1. VKF., p. 748: कठबल्लकै तं प्राचे क्षणिकां तस्य कर्मोपयमानान्ते।
वासित्वश्चति सूक्ष्म कैस्मापमानान्ते वासित्वश्चति विनिर्ज्ञातः।

The Siddhāntin denies this. The Udgītha-vidyā of the Chandogya Upanisad is different from that of the Brhadāranyaka Upanisad, for, in the former the avayavas of the vidyā are mentioned, while in the latter the cause of the vidyā is stated.

4. This section considers the sentence - On the authority of this, the Purvapaksin contends that out of the two entities, namely, om and udgītha, the one is superimposed on the other.

The Siddhāntin objects to this by saying that if there was to be assumed the superimposition of om on udgītha, the udgītha would suffer from laksanā, suggesting the same, 'like udgītha'. The same would happen in the case of om also. So, the word udgītha should be regarded as qualifying the word om.

5. According to the Purvapakṣa in this section, the prāṇa in the Prāṇa-vidyā of the Kauśitaki Upanisad cannot be regarded as being endowed with the qualities like vāsiṣṭhatva, etc., since the word evam occurring there refers only to those qualities which are mentioned in that text

The Siddhāntin argues that the prāṇa in the above-mentioned Upaniṣad does possess these qualities, because the deity mentioned there is not different from the one described in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad.  

6. In the sixth topic, the Purvapaksin suggests that the various attributes of the Brahman such as 'being ever joyful', etc., should be taken as being limited to the particular śruti-text in which they are mentioned.

The Siddhāntin can by no means accept this position. It is emphatically stated that the Brahman is everywhere the same. The only exception would be the cases where aupadhika bhedas are mentioned.

7. According to the Purvapakṣa here in the sentence - परं दूर्विष्णु अर्थोपथरं परं मनः। कठस्तं परं वृंहितं... पुत्रवान्तं परं विनिवेश्या कङ्कना सा परं गतिः। every succeeding entity is superior to every preceding one.

According to the Siddhāntin, what the Upaniṣadic text under consideration emphasises is the paratva of the puruṣa. The whole verse must be understood as constituting one single sentence.

1. Chāndogya Up., V.1.1: अपेण्डच ह व भेदंतरच भवति प्राणः।
8. In this section, the Purvapaksa refers to a passage in the Aitareya Aranyaka, which describes the Atman as the creator of the akasa. It is pointed out that the word atman in the passage actually means Brahma, since Parameswara is said to have created the five elements, etc.

The Siddhanta asserts that, in that passage, the word atman means only Paramatman, for, that meaning is well-established, and the qualities mentioned there can be made applicable only to the Paramatman.

Another interpretation is given of this adhikarana. The Purvapaksa according to this interpretation is: In the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad, the Brahman is introduced with the Atman, while in the Chandogya Upanisad it is not so introduced. Therefore, the two Upanisads must be regarded as teaching two different doctrines.

The Siddhanta is: The vidya in both the Upanisads is the same. Eventhough, in the Chandogya Upanisad, the

1. Aitareya Aranyaka, I.1: आत्मा वा जिद्वके जेवाग्र जासीन्नायथ- रिक्ष्यन नियत्सृ भौतिक लोकानातु हुनें।
2. Brhadaranyaka Up. IV.3.7: क्षुद्र आत्मा योपर्य विषाणमयः।
3. Chandogya Up., VI.2.1: सदैव सृष्ण्येद्यमा आशीर्व।
word \textit{atman} does not occur in the beginning, still the statement, "through the knowledge of one, everything else becomes known", refers to nothing but \textit{atman} only.

9. The sipping of water after and before meals has been mentioned in the two \textit{Upanisads}, namely, the \textit{Brah\darr\anyaka}\textsuperscript{1} and the \textit{Chandogya}\textsuperscript{2}. There, the \textit{acamana-vidhi} is clearly indicated, for, the verbal form \textit{acamet} certainly implies a \textit{vidhi} in the \textit{Brah\darr\anyaka} \textit{Upanisad}. The \textit{anagnata} (not covering the food with water) though mentioned, is not clearly indicated as a \textit{vidhi}, So this \textit{anagnata} may be treated as an \textit{arthav\^a} glorifying the \textit{acamana-vidhi}. This is what the \textit{Pur\v{v}apaksin} in this section says.

The \textit{Siddh\^anta} is as follows: Only \textit{acamana} is implied as a \textit{vidhi} there, because if both \textit{acamana} and \textit{anagnata} were to be understood, then, the defect, namely \textit{vakya-bheda} would occur.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{Brah\darr\anyaka} Up.,VI.1.14: \textit{तत्‌त्रिद्रूढसः श्रीमा प्रित्यक्त अश्रुक्रः त्वचनम्त्विष्ट्वां वक्षणस्य वन्दनस्य च।}
  \item \textit{Chandogya} Up.,V.2.2: \textit{तस्माद्दा जैत्यसिद्धम् पुराणाधिपोप्रिष्ठा-}\textit{हादेष्टः परिद्राताः।}
\end{itemize}
10. In the Aitareya-prakarana of the Satapatha Brahmana as well as in the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad, a vidya, known as the Sandilya-vidya, is set forth, there being some difference in minor details in the two versions. On the strength of this difference, the Purvapaksa argues that these two texts must be understood as teaching two different and independent vidyas.

The Siddhantin asserts that both these vidyas are one and the same, as both of them aim at one common goal, namely, the Brahman. The minor details of one vidya may as well be made applicable to the others also.

Appayya Diksita, here, invites the attention to a scribal mistake.

11. In the satya-vidya, the purusa in the orbit of the sun is called abhir while the purusa in the eye is referred to as aham. Now, as the vidya is the same, the

1. Satapatha Brahmana : स जात्मानमुपासीत मनोर्म प्राणाध्याय भार्यम्।
2. Brhadaranyaka Up., V.6.1 : मनोर्मोद्धो पुद्वो भा। सत्यसत्यमिनित्सिद्वै \ यदाच्रेष्ठि वहे वा स प्रेष सर्वस्येशान। सर्वस्याधिपति। सर्वपिर्द प्रज्ञस्ति मदिर्द सिम।
3. VKP, p.778 : अभिनवः जिति जेलोभे प्रमादाभेलोवंद्वम्य जिति शिल्लिम्।
4. Brhadaranyaka Up., II.5.1 : तत्तत्त्वात्मिको स अदित्य। etc.
two purusas must be understood to be different from each other, says the Purvapakṣin.

The Siddhāntin says that, though the vidyā is the same, still, as the places are different, there is difference in the characterisation of Purusa. Actually, however, the Purusa is the same.

12. The Purvapakṣa, in this section, is: the vibhūtis mentioned in the Ṛṣabha Yajña Khila¹ are the vibhūtis of the Brahman. The various vidyās in the Upanisad are presumably derived from those vibhūtis. Therefore, those vibhūtis may be included in those vidyās.

The Siddhānta is: In some vidyās of the Upanisads different stations with reference to the Atman are mentioned, while, in others such adhyātmā-sthānas are not mentioned. Consequently there is no similarity whatsoever between the vibhūtis and the vidyās.

13. According to the Purvapakṣin in this section, the Purusa-vajña mentioned in the Chāndogya Upanisad² is the

1. Ṛṣabha Yajña Khila: ब्रह्मज्ञेष्ठा वीर्यसंपृक्तानि ब्रह्माण्यो न्येष्ठे विद्वानात्त्वानि।

same as that mentioned in the Narayana Upanisad¹.

The Siddhānta asserts that the two Purusa-vyākāna are different. In the Narayana Upanisad, we find some details about yajamana, his wife, etc; these are absent in the Chandogya Upanisad.

14. The mantras given at the beginning of some Upanisads may be regarded as part of the vidyās taught in those particular Upanisads. So says the Pūrvapakṣin in this section.

The Siddhāntin points out that those mantras cannot be included in those vidyās, because there is no parity between them, that is to say, between the vidyā and mantras. They are given there with the intention that they should recited esoterically like the Upanisads.

In course of this discussion, Amalānanda mentions that the relation of the kāmya sacrifice and the ējyakāṇa, in the Purvamimamsā is the viṣeṣa-sambandha and there should be some such sambandha between the mantras and the Upanisadic-texts - says the Pūrvapakṣin. But this is not admitted by the Siddhāntin on the ground that no such relation can be supposed.

¹. Narayana Upr., 80 : तस्येष्व बिनुपो यावस्थात्मा यजमान: भव्यदा पत्नी।
15. In some śrutis\(^1\) it is stated that the good deeds of the enlightened person are shared by those whom he favours, while his bad deeds are shared by those whom he dislikes. But in the Chandogya Upanisad, only the abandonment of his good and bad deeds by the enlightened one is mentioned. The division is not mentioned. This is the objection of the Purvapakṣin.

The Siddhāntin sets aside that objection by saying that the division of good and bad deeds of the enlightened one is implied, though not explicitly stated, in the Chandogya Upanisad.

Another interpretation of this adhikarana is also given.

The Purvapakṣa, according to that interpretation, is: The word vidhūnana in the sentence - विधूनाना विद्वान् राजा जनपदी तपस्या पार्थ च विध राजा जनपदी तपस्या शरीरसहित क्लोत्तर्मा क्रमाक्रमिष्ठिःस्वामि\(^{1}\) - may mean suspension of the enjoyment of the fruit of actions for some time.

1. Kausītaki Up., I.14: स औपचार खिनरा नदो ता समसाम्येकै।

The reply of the Siddhāntin is: the word implies total abandonment (tyāga). This becomes clear from the division of good and bad deeds which is mentioned further. Such division is not possible unless the good and bad deeds are completely abandoned.

16. The enlightened person, after death, abandons his good and bad deeds in the mid-way, that is after crossing the river Viraja or Vijara by name, as is stated in the Kausitaki Upaniṣad. So says the Purvapakṣin.

The Siddhāntin explains that, at the very time of leaving the body, the enlightened Purusa abandons his good and bad deeds, for, after leaving the body, he is not in every way concerned with them. Moreover, the Brahma-vidyā instantaneously destroys the good and bad deeds.

17. The person who abandons good and bad deeds proceeds along the Devayana path as is said in the Kausitaki Upaniṣad. This is the Purvapakṣa here.

1. See Foot Note No.1 on Page No.684.
The Siddhantin says that this supposition is not correct so far as the Kausitaki Upanisad is concerned. That Upanisad, there, speaks of the Saguna Brahman. As far the Nirguna Brahman, the enlightened one becomes one with the Brahman itself immediately.

18. The Purvapaksin in this section, says that the person who follows the vidyas like the Paryanka or the Upakosala, may be regarded as proceeding along the Devayana path. But in other Saguna-vidyas like the Madhu-vidya, this path is not specifically mentioned; and so the followers of the Saguna-vidya may not be regarded as proceeding along that path.

The Siddhanta is that the Devayana path is common to all the Saguna-vidyas, as is stated in the Chandogya

1. Ibid.
2. The Upakosala-vidya has been stated in the Chandogya Upanisad, IV.10.
3. The Chandogya Upanisad, III.1 explains the Madhu-vidya.
Upanisad\textsuperscript{1} and the Gita\textsuperscript{2}. Even in connection with the Madhu-vidyā, the same path may be said to have been prescribed. Otherwise the person following that vidyā will have to be supposed as going down, which is not to be expected in his case.

19. According to the Purvapaksin, in this section, the knowledge of the Brahman does not necessarily result into salvation at all the times. Otherwise, the great sages like Apantaratamas, Sanatkumāra, etc., would not have been reborn, as has been stated in the Itihasas and the Purāṇas.

The Siddhāntin insists that the Brahmavidyā definitely leads to the eternal salvation. As for the above-mentioned sages, it can be said that they were entrusted with some mission such as giving instruction in the Vedas, etc.; so they had to continue with their bodies.

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1. Chandogya Up. V.10.1-2: ये वेदेवरणे सुभद्रा तप जित्युपास्ते ब्रेष
   देशान् प्रथमः।

2. Gita, VIII.26: गुज्जकृमे गति हुये जगतः बाह्यकी पति।
   जेक्या मात्यनावृतिमन्यात् स्वते पुनः॥
20. In some śrūtis, the anūtva of the Brahman is
negated\(^1\), while in others\(^2\), the Brahman is described as
being beyond the range of the sense-organs. So this
negation should be restricted to that part of the śrūti
only, it should not be treated as a universal negation,
for; the śrūtis are different. So says the Pūrvapakṣīn.

The Siddhāntin replies that, since all the
śrūti-texts aim at one common goal, namely, the Brahman, the
negation of the anūtva should be understood in a universal
sense.

21. The Pūrvapakṣīn in this twenty first section may
be stated as follows: In the Mundaka Upaniṣad\(^3\) and in the
Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad\(^4\), the Jīva is described as enjoying
the fruit of karmās, while Īśvara is said to be a passive
witness. Against this, in the Katha-Upaniṣad\(^5\), both Īśvara

1. Brhadāraṇyaka Up. III.8.8: स हेवाचेत्तेपार्थिर्ब्राह्मणं बाह्यदानुपस्त्रयास्थितम्

and Jīva are described as enjoyers. This would indicate that two different vidyās are taught in these two Upaniṣads.

The Siddhāntin does not accept this position. He emphasises that the vidyā is one and the same and that the description in the Katha Upaniṣad of Isvāra as enjoyer has to be understood in secondary sense.

22. In one part of the Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad one Brahma-vidyā is set forth. Another Brahma-vidyā is set forth also in another part of the Upaniṣad. As the Brahma-vidyā is repeated at two places in the same text, it may be that the two do not constitute one and the same Brahma-vidyā. This is the PūrvaPākṣa.

The Siddhānta is that, at both the places the Brahma-vidyā in the Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad, one and the same Brahma-vidyā has been taught. This is confirmed by the fact that both the contexts have the same end in view.

23. In the sentence, लोकाः सोऽसऽस चोऽस चोऽसहृद्धः the meditation on the Jīva as Isvāra is prescribed and not

2. Aitareya Āranyaka, II.2.4.6.
vice-versa, since Isvara is superior to the Jīva. So says the Purvapakṣin.

The Siddhānta is that there are two kinds of meditations - One being on Isvara as Jīva, and the other being on the Jīva as Isvara. These two kinds of meditations indeed confirm the identity of the Jīva with Isvara.

24. The Purvapakṣin in the twenty-fourth section says that in the Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad satya-vidyās are expanded in two different contexts, and they have two different fruits. So they must be regarded as two different vidyās.

25. The Siddhāntin, on the other hand, asserts that these two vidyās cannot be regarded as being different from each other, because the object of the meditation is the same in both. The different fruits are mentioned only in order to glorify some minor items in that vidyā.

1. Brhadāranyaka Up. V.4.5 and V.5.2.
from the Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad one and the same vidyā must be understood to have been taught, because the same abode of Isvara, namely, the heart is mentioned in both the passages.

The Siddhānta is that these two passages speak of two different vidyās. In the passage from the Chandogya Upaniṣad, the saguna Brahman is described, while in the Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad passage the nirguna, Brahman is the main theme. The attributes like svāmitva etc. are mentioned in the latter passage only with a view to glorifying the Ātman.

26. According to the Purvapakṣa, in this section, the Prāṇagnihotra is obligatory even when one does not take food. Something else can be used in the place of the food for such Prāṇagnihotra.

The Siddhantin asks as to how, in absence of food, there can be any Prāṇagnihotra. The word agnihotra may have been used, still it is intended only for

2. Prāṇagnihotra means five āhūtis given to five прāṇas, namely, прāṇa, apāna, vyāna, udāna and samāna.
glorification and is not to be understood literally.

27. There are some upāsanas such as meditation on om, etc., recommended in the śrutis. These upāsanas are invariably related to those karmas wherein they are mentioned. The śrutis no doubt prescribe some fruits in connection with those upāsanas, but it should not be supposed that these upāsanas are practised with the desire for these fruits only. So says the Purvapakṣin in this section.

The Siddhāntin states that if the upāsanas had been invariably related to a particular karmā they would have been included in that karmā itself. But the Chandogya Upaniṣad explicitly says that these upāsanas are anitya.

28. In the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, the vāyu and the prāṇa are prescribed for meditation. According to the Purvapakṣa, since the essential nature of the Prāṇa and the vāyu is the same, these two are not to be meditated upon separately.

2. Chandogya Up. IV.3.3
The Siddhāntin asserts that, though the essential nature of the two is the same, still, since they differ in status - one (prāṇa) being adhyātma and the other (vāyu) adhibhautika, - they have to be meditated upon separately.

29. In the Agnirahasya imaginary fires like manas etc. are mentioned. Though there are some indications (linga) that these agnis are not imaginary, still from the context, it becomes clear that they are imaginary. And according to Mīmāṃsā, Prakarana (context) is stronger than linga. So these fires must be regarded as imaginary. This is the Purvapakṣa here.

The Siddhāntin rejects this suggestion and points out that these fires are not imaginary. The śrutis directly speak of them, and the direct śruti is more authoritative than Prakarana. Moreover, these agnis are identical with the sacrificial fires; this fact rules out any idea of their being imaginary.

30. According to the Purvapakṣin, the human body itself is the Ātman, for, he argues, if the Ātman had been

1. Jaimini-Sūtra, III.3.13.: भृतितिथिकर्ववा व्यापकप्रत्यानसत्मस्तिः न- सनवाये पारदे बल्मिक्यप्रकर्मः।
different from the body, it would have been found in the body independently.

The Siddhantin counter-argues that after one's death his body becomes available but not his Ātman, and so the body and the Ātman have to be considered to be distinct from each other.

31. The meditations upon the udgītha etc. are stated only in the texts of some vedic śākhas. So some upāsanās are to be restricted to that śākha only, on account of proximity and expectancy. This is what the Furvapakṣin says.

The Siddhānta is that, since the ārūdhis mention the upāsanā of the udgītha etc. in a general way, those upāsanās are to be taken as being applicable to other vedic texts also. In support of this, the Siddhāntin refers to the ānāmasa rule that the śrutī-pramāṇa is stronger than the sannidhi-pramāṇa.

32. The Chāndogya Upaniṣad speaks of the vyāsta and

1. Appayya Dīkṣita states that this is the view of the Lokāyatikas (Bauddhas).
samāstā upāsanā of the Brahman. According to the
Pūrvapakṣa, only the vyāsta upāsanā is actually intended
here, for, in every case, the words used are, "Do you meditate".
Similarly independent fruit is mentioned for each upāsanā.

The Siddhāntin says that in the Upanisadic
passage referred to, the samāstā-upāsanā is recommended.
This becomes clear from the fact that the fruit of samāstā
upāsanā only is mentioned there. The words used, namely,
"Do you meditate", are merely of the nature of an anuvāda.
Further the vyāsta upāsanā actually appears to have been
treated with contempt.

33. According to the Pūrvapakṣin, in this thirty-
third section, the various vidyās which have been stated
at different places' in the Upanisads are actually not
different from one another, for, the goal of all these
vidyās is the same.

1. Vyāsta Upāsanā means individual meditation, such as
svargaloka, Aditya etc. being separately meditated upon as
Ātman, while the samāstā upāsanā means collective meditation
such as svarga, Aditya, etc. are together to be meditated
upon as the Ātman.
Siddhānta is that though these vidyās aim at one common goal, still, since the statements differ verbally as well as from the point of view of qualities (guna), they should be regarded as different vidyās. This karmabheda is caused by the use of different words (sabdabheda).

34. The Purvapakṣin says here that one may practise one upāsana if he so desires. If, however, he desires to practise many upāsanās, be may do so.

The Siddhāntin rejects this suggestion by saying that one may practise any one of the upāsanās. All these upāsanās aim at one single goal, namely, the knowledge of the Brahman.

35. The Purvapakṣin asks why the rule mentioned in the previous adhikarana should not be made applicable in respect of the kāmya-karmāṇis also.

1. Śaṅkarabhāṣya on III.3.58: भवति दृष्टां जन्मदेशः
   वेद जुपासीत्व धैति ज्ञानवा बर्तिताः (Chāndogya Up. III.14.1)
The Siddhântin replies that the kâmya-karmans have fruits different from the knowledge of the Brahman. So the two cases are distinct from each other.

36. Appayya Dîksita opens this last topic in this quarter with a remark that the desire for the kâmya-karmans and its subsidiaries is not produced of its own accord. That is to say, it is dependent on the person (Āsraya-tantra).

After this, the Purvapakṣin argues that the upāsanās relating to udrītha etc. purusa-tantra, because the syllable om is common to all the vedas and hence it cannot be collectively meditated upon.

The Siddhântin asserts that this meditation of om is āsraya-tantra and hence the collective meditation is intended. Another reason for this is that the syllable

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1. VEP. p.865: स्वर्णीयवर्धन्तुष्टीयिवननेनूँ रक्षुं मयादापनलयों समुद्रित्यायुष्णित्वे ये: कैथन पदार्थशैलन नात्तोपीनिला चिंतित्वेनुभेन नामाएयनानानाय चरणाय स्वतं भव कामांदां संक्खायल।
om is common to all the vedas.

Here Appayya Diksita strongly criticises the view of Saṅkara. Not only this but he also criticises the view of Amalananda who agrees with Saṅkara in this respect. Appayya Diksita here in this particular

1. Ibid, p.867: अग्रे वक्तर्य - वेदाङ्काराब्रह्मस्य वेदृष्टिः साधारणेन तदाभिरापस्वा ब्रह्मात्मावर्गस्य भूमिकायपास्य जनानव जिज्ञासुपुरुषोपपुरुषोपपुरुषादेशे प्राचीन ब्रह्मात्माराश्च नानाभित्तिः ज्ञाति वेदसाधारणसहित्यादिति तदृशाः।

2. VKP, p.867: अभिसाधारणेऽवस्य अभिसाधारणमन्यको वेदाङ्काराश्रमभाष्याये अभिसाधारणबाहुपाल्य्तिरेकवाच्यम् भाष्येऽवस्य दृष्टिकृत विश्लेषः।

3. Ibid: यद्यावस्य दृष्टिकृतरूपमात्रेयें तदन्नुसारः, वेदाङ्काराब्रह्मपुरुषस्य न्यायस्य तद्विनिहारण अभिसाधारणोपपुरुषार्थोपपुरुषार्थोपपुरुषार्थो वेदाभित्तिः पूर्वप्राचीन ब्रह्मात्मार्थो वाच्यम् भाष्याये दृष्टिकृत विश्लेषः।
case, the syllable om cannot be regarded as being common to all the Vedas on the authority of the sutra, ब्राह्मण समाधिं।

Moreover, if this upāsana of om is regarded as being आस्रय-तन्त्र, then all those upāsanās which are common to all Vedas may be regarded so, and hence all these upāsanās will have to be performed in all sacrifices.

Appayya Dīkṣita begins by stating the significance of the new pada. In the previous pada the para and the aparā vidyās were discussed. In this pada, now, it is shown that these vidyās are not dependent on the karmāṇīs, but when the vidyās are said to be dependent on some karmāṇīs, then, these vidyās are to be understood to serve as means of achieving puruṣārtha. And this puruṣārtha is crowned with success by the knowledge of the Brahman, as is said by Bādarāyaṇa.

1. In this first topic of the fourth quarter, the view of Bādarāyaṇa is being considered. According to Bādarāyaṇa, for the knowledge of the Brahman, the karmāṇīs like sacrifices are not essential. Now the Purvapakṣa is:

The Jīva is the doer of various karmāṇīs, and so its knowledge

is subservient to karmāṇa, like vṛṣṇiprakṣaṇa for the sacrifice. Hence these śrutis which describe some different fruit should be treated as arthavādās. This is the view of Jaimini. Moreover, the ancient personages like Janaka etc. have performed various sacrifices. Hence, the Ātmajñāna (described in the Upaniṣads) is subservient to sacrifices (karmāṇa).

The Siddhānta is that the upaniṣads describe the Paramatman which is higher than the Jīva. This Paramatman cannot be in any way connected with sacrifices etc. So the Ātmajñāna is by no means subservient to sacrifices. Janaka etc. practised karmāṇa for the sake of solidarity of people (lokāsamgraha).

2. According to the Pūrvapakṣin, in the sentence only the three asramas are referred to. This is only anuvāda and not a vidhi, since there is no verb which suggests any vidhi about these āśramas.

The Siddhāntin says that not only the grheṣṭha-āśrama but all the āśramas are prescribed by the śrutis. So all

1. Chandogya Up. II. 23. 1
of them have to be observed properly. Of course the samnyāsāśrama is the most propitious for obtaining the knowledge of the Brahman. This is what is said in the śruti.

Both Amalananda and Appayya Dīkṣita vividly describe here the life of a person known as Paramahamsa, who is without sacred thread and tuft of hair on his head. He has a danda in addition to the usual vāgdanda. This state of being Paramahamsa is attained when a person is endowed with the knowledge of the Brahman. In support of this, Appayya Dīkṣita has cited various passages from the well-known works like the Mahābhārata and the Manusmṛti.

3. The sentence श्रेयोपां तत्र रूढमस्तम अपो विश्रवविवर्णकम् गुद्गितम् speaks about the udgītha in the sacrifice. It is udgītha in that sense which is being praised. This is the view of the Purvapakṣin in this third section.

1. Jabala Up. V: अथ परित्राह क्विच्चवासमुपेडोपरिमहूँ गुप्तद्रोहवं गैलाँग्रुम्भ्याय मन्त्रिण ।
2. VKP. p.390: अतसोत्त्त्वसालकारवत्त्वेन वृत्त्वा पारमहम्सपादनीयम्
The Siddhāntin, on the other hand, maintains that the Upaniṣadic passage, which has been referred to, prescribes the upāsanā of the udgītha, for, some apūrva is mentioned there. Moreover, this passage occurs far away from the vidhi-sentences, hence it should not be treated as a vidhi-sentence. Appayya Dīkṣita, however, regards this passage as a vidhi-sentence being helped by an arthavāda sentence.

4. According to the Puruṣapakṣīn, the legends of Yajñavalkya, Pratardana, etc., occurring in the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad1 are meant for pariplava-proyoga in the Horse-sacrifice, where these legends are to be recited.

The Siddhāntin rejects this view and points out that the vedic myth which are recited at the pariplava usually relate to Indra, Varuṇa, Yama, etc., and not to Yajñavalkya and such others.

5. The vidyā is dependent on karmāṇa, says the Puruṣapakṣīn. The Siddhāntin contradicts this by saying

that *vidya* is not dependent on any *karman*. It is the independent cause of the Purusartha.

6. The Purvapakṣin in this adhikarana say that since *vidya* is not dependent on *karman* for its fruit it cannot be said to be dependent on it for its production (*utpatti*).

The Siddhāntin points to the passage वेदानुकूलनः ब्राह्मणः विविधादिन्ति and concludes that *vidya* is dependent on various *āśrama*-karmans.

7. Here, the *prima facie* view is that prohibition of certain foods etc. mentioned in the *śrutī*² etc. is intended for ignorant persons, the enlightened one may eat anything.

The Siddhāntin points out that, in the Upaniṣadic sentence there actually occurs the *vidhi* relating to eating. In times of distress eating of everything is no doubt allowed in the *śrutis*. But it is implied that even an enlightened person should not eat anything which is normally prohibited.

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2. Chāndogya Up. V.2.1: प्रत्ययं न ह वा अख्यविदि किंचिंभीनभः मन्ति ।
8. According to the Purvapakṣin, if the various āśrama-karmans are supposed to have been prescribed only as means to vidyā then a person who has no desire for vidyā need not practise those karmans.

The Siddhānta is these karmans are obligatory, and one must practise them even if one does not entertain any desire for the vidyā.

9. Here the Purvapakṣin argues that, if vidyā is considered to be dependent on the observance of the duties of the various āśramas, then a person whose wife is dead would have no right to any vidyā.

The Siddhāntin regrets this suggestion and points out that even such persons can have a right to vidyā. For instance, Raikvā and others did not observe any āśrama rules and yet did secure knowledge.

10. A person in the vanaprasthaśrama or in the saṃnyāsaśrama may revert to the grhaṇaśrama if he so desires. This is what the Purvapakṣin says.

The Siddhāntin contradicts this by pointing out that, according to the śrutis, one can pass from one āśrama into the next one but one can never do so in reverse order.
11. The *prima facie* view in this section is that if such persons as have vowed permanent celibacy (*naisthika-brahmacarya*) break their vow, there is for them no expiation for such violation.

The *Siddhanta* is that if such violation occurs in respect of the wife of a preceptor, then there is certainly no expiation. But in other cases, there may be expiatory rites.

12. According to the *Purvakapaksa*, here, the expiatory rites must be considered to wash off the sins of these persons; so these persons need not then be treated as out-cast.

The *Siddhanta* is that the expiation is intended for purity in the next world. So far as the present life is concerned, the sin may be lessor or greater, still it continues to be there. Hence these persons should be treated as out-casts during their present life.

13. The *upasanās* relating to the *udgītha*, etc., are prescribed for the sacrificer only. It is he who enjoys the fruit. So says the *Purvakapaksin*.

The *Siddhāntin* maintains that the *upasanās* are meant for the *Ṛtviṅk* only. The sacrificer pays them for these karmans.
14. The Purvapakṣin claims that the sentence -

तस्यादः व्रजः पाणिद्वार्यं निरिक्षं यतहेऽवः च पाणिद्वार्यं च

निरिक्षायं युनिरौद्यं च मौर्यं च निरिक्षायं व्रजः स व्रजः।

should not be regarded as containing any vidhi, and this for two reasons, firstly both pāndīta and mauna imply knowledge; and secondly, the latter part of the sentence is of the nature of a recommendation.

The Siddhāntin, controverting this claim, states that as the word mauna means knowledge par excellence, the words 'after disdaining pāndīta' have to be understood as expressing the vidhi for mauna.

Appayya Dīksita interprets the word bālya in the sentence under consideration in two ways. Firstly, the word indicates strength or vigour, as the knowledge about the Atman is to be attained by a person who has sufficient energy. Secondly the word is to be understood in the sense of "childlike innocence" (bālasya karma).

15. This section continues the discussion of the same point. The Purvapakṣin argues that, the words 'after

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2. Mundaka Up.,III.2.4 : नानामात्मा क्रलोचनलयः।
dèsdaining bālya would suggest almost an impossible sense. So the word is to be understood to mean that the enlightened one should behave freely (bālyena).

The Siddhāntin points out that, if the enlightened one was to behave freely, then, the scriptural sentences implying vidhi or nisedha would have no sense. This would not be proper. The word bālya should, therefore, be understood here in the sense of "childlike innocence".

16. According to the Purvapaksin, the vidyā which is to be acquired by means of śravana etc., should be acquired during this life itself.

This would be true, says the Siddhāntin, only if there was no other obstruction of karman. If, however, there is such an obstruction, the fruit will be obtained in the next birth.

17. The fruit of the vidyā depends on the means like sacrifice, charity, etc. If these means are without any obstruction, the fruit will be obtained in this very birth. This kind of fruit is superior to the one which is obtained in the next birth, on account of interruption or obstruction. This is the Purvapakṣa in this last topic.
The Siddhāntin sets aside these arguments by pointing out that there are no stages in salvation. The Brahman is the same at all times. In vidyā also no stages can be thought of, because the vidyā is ever beneficial. But due to the interruption of the karmāṇa, the mokṣa may be a little delayed. In the Saguna-vidyā, on the other hand, there may be different stages and correspondingly different fruits. So far as the nirguna-vidyā is concerned, the mokṣa is the same for all the times and everywhere.

In the previous chapter, the para vidyā and the aparā vidyā were discussed. Now in this fourth and last chapter, the discussion about the fruit of such vidyās will be initiated. This significance of the fourth chapter is given by Amalānanda in a verse¹, but Appayya Dīkṣita directly begins by stating the prima facie view of the first section without passing any remark on the relevance of this chapter.

¹ VKP, p. 928:
1. The Śruti says that Atman is to be heard, that is, to be studied\(^1\). This 'hearing' of the Atman is to be done once only, since the Śruti does not mention any repetition of the process. The same is true of manana and nididhyāsana also.

The Siddhāntin emphatically declares that the repetition of śravana etc., is absolutely necessary. Here, he gives the drṣṭānta of rice-grains which have to be polished continuously until they become clean. Even if one is enlightened by means of only one śravana, etc., the repetition is necessary in order that he should have a clearer impression of the Atma-vidya on his mind.

2. As the Jīva is defiled by sin etc., the complete identification of the Jīva with the Brahman is not possible. The Brahman is sinless, etc. So in the Atma-vidya, only the superimposition of the Brahman on the Jīva is possible. So says the Purvaśāstra.

The Siddhānta is that the complete identification of the Jīva with the Brahman is possible, because the Jīva

\(^{1}\) Bhādaranyaka Up., IV.6.6 : अत्मं वाक्यं दुःश्च ज्ञातय: कृत्यो \\
मन्त्र्यो निदित्यासित्यो मेंेविष ।
is really of the nature of the Brahman. This is stated in the śrūtīs. The superimposition cannot be thought of as it presupposes difference between the Jīva and the Brahman. The attributes like sin, etc., in the case of the Jīva are not real and the identification of the Jīva and the Brahman lies in abolishing the Jīvatva of the Jīva.

3. In the case of the symbolic meditations such as "Āditya is Brahman", etc., the meditator has to imagine that these symbols (pratīkās) are identical with the Jīva, for, both the Jīva and the symbol are the effects of the Brahman. This is the Pūrvapaksa.

The Siddhānta is that these symbols should not be imagined as being identical with the Jīva. The symbols are also not identical with the Brahman, because if they were so they would not remain symbols at all.

4. According to the Pūrvapaksa, while meditating upon Āditya, Prāṇa, etc., Āditya, etc., are to be meditated upon as the Brahman, or it may also be the other way round.

The Siddhāntin asserts that Āditya, etc., are to be meditated upon as the Brahman and not vice-versa.

1. Ibid., III.7.3, III.4.1 and Chandogya Up., VI.5-7.
because the superior entity is always to be imagined in the place of the inferior one, for the sake of the sublimation of the latter.

5. According to the Purvapaksin in the sentences such as — "द्वाराभिन पंचको पितु " उपदेशकभिन धार्मिक । ॥ आदि, etc., are to be superimposed on Udgītha or other way round is also possible.

The Siddhāntin averts this by saying that Aditya etc., are to be superimposed on Udgītha, because in such a manner the karmans are to be sublimated. This karma-samprddhi is mainly expected in the vidyās.

6. According to the Purvapaksin in this section, there is no definite rule that one should sit down or stand up, etc., while meditating.

The Siddhāntin maintains that, being seated, one should meditate on the Brahman, etc. Because meditation

3. Ibid., I.1.10: मेव किंयां करार्ति ब्रह्मवणियादेव तद्वा स्वरूपस्य स्वतः।
means thinking which requires some requisites, such as purified place, etc.

7. According to the Purvapaksa, there are definite rules laid down about the time, place and direction, etc., of the Upasana. For instance, the meditator is required to face towards the east, etc.

According to the Siddhanta, what is really important in this connection is the concentration of the mind. The meditator is expected to take his seat in such a manner that such concentration is facilitated.

Appayya Diksita, here, adds that in the case of the rituals also, there are some such rules.

8. According to the Purvapaksa, some of the upasanas are for the sake of knowledge only, so if that knowledge is attained, those upasanas may be left out.

The Siddhanta says that such upasanas must be practised by a person up to death, so that he may not change

1. cf. Gita, VI.11.

2. VKP, p. 950: बुपासनासु विशिष्य दिगादिनिमिब्यययवण नास्ति वैदिक
कमीमाये प्राहु मिस्य指示मस्तत्तांतर्साधनिचित्त्रम ग्राविरोधादि वैदिक
कमी न्ततिविक्षियक्षुपावे: प्राहु व्यावृत्ति:।
his mind at that time.

9. According to the Purvapakṣin, here, even through the knowledge of the Brahman, one does not become freed from his sin, for, that knowledge is not intended for the destruction of sins. It is expiatory rites which bring about the destruction of sins.

The Siddhānta here is that, immediately after the knowledge of the Brahman, one’s sins are destroyed. This is said in the śrūtis. The Saguna-vidyā is for the destruction of sins only. Even in the Nirguna-vidyā, through the knowledge "I am the Ātman", all sins are destroyed. By the word pāpa in the above-quoted śruti, even good deeds (punya) are also indicated, says Appayya Dīkṣita.

10. By the knowledge of the Brahman only the pāpa is destroyed, because that alone is obstructive — says the Purvapakṣin.

1. Chāndogya Up., V.24.3: "अत्य खर्च पाप्मान: प्रदुःखेऽ "
   Mundaka Up., II.2.8: "निष्प्रक्ष्यिः ऋद्यवन्धिः श्रवणसमाः ब्रह्मसमां
   "श्रीमन्ते वास्तव कौष्ठिकि तथ्यम्भूतेऽपि दर्शवेदी"।

2. Vrķ. p.956: "न्यूहुः शब्द पाप्मानस्कुत्याः विष्णुस्त्वाच्यि श्रवणे म्यायिसिः
   श्रृण्युपकुश्याणि।"
The **Siddhantin** asserts that *punya* is also destroyed by the knowledge of the Brahman.

1a. After the knowledge of the Brahman, all kinds of *karmans* - both enjoyed and non-enjoyed - are destroyed, according to the **Purvapakṣin** in this section.

The **Siddhantin**, on the other hand, says that those *karmans*, whose fruit is being enjoyed, are not lost. On the contrary, even after the enlightenment, the *karmans* are left behind until they are enjoyed out.

1b. As the result of the knowledge of the Brahman, the good deeds - both *nitya* and *kamya* - are destroyed. This is what the **Purvapakṣin** says.

The **Siddhantin** reiterates that the *nitya-karmans* like *agnihotra*, etc., are not lost through the knowledge of the Brahman. The *kamya-karmans*, on the other hand, are not useful for the *vidyā*. **Appayya Dīkṣita** adds that all such deeds, though they are performed without any desire for fruit give their fruit\(^1\).

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1. *VKP.*, p. 961 : तात्त्विक फलानि एकत्रायमांवेदियोऽद्या स्वत्तः स्थायी फलायं निमित् (अं ति) तेन भाय गत्य विज्ञानविद्येति अस्य धर्मं ज्ञानमागमसिस्कन्तं अनूत्यथान्तरं विज्ञानपत्त्यस्मायाकन्तरं स्वत्तेषु।
13. The Purvapakṣin, in this section, maintains that the karman, which is done with knowledge, is useful for the vidyā, as has been said in the śrutis\(^1\) and the smṛtis\(^2\).

The Siddhāntin says that it is true, but it is certainly not true that karman without knowledge is altogether useless. Any nitya-karman is useful for vidyā; so says the śruti\(^3\).

Appayya Dīkṣita, here, adds that those who are not well-versed in the vidyā may perform such deeds without knowledge, but those who have made some progress may not perform deeds without knowledge\(^4\).

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1. Brhadāraṇyaka Up., I.5.2:  भाविदमाहुः संवत्तरं पमसा जुष्टदयु पुनर्ज्जु जस्ति।

2. Gītā, II.39:  ब्रजबोधितां संवत्तो बुज्जियोगं तिन्यान्तरं।

3. cf. Śāmkarabhāṣya on IV.1.18.

4. VKP, p. 962:  कर्मका रत्नादि मे प्रक्ष्यन्नकिधि चित्तेकलहितानि विद्याविधीनपार्थ यथासाच्यो विनित्यकर्मानुस्तानमन्त्रे नाम वैप्रक्ष्यन्नकिधिकिष्ठो दृष्टां यथासाच्योर्चित्वातः विनित्यकर्मानुस्तानविद्याविधीनपार्थ यथासाच्यो न न विद्याविधीनपार्थ संवत्तरं कर्मेः न कर्मकर्मपर्।
14. According to the Purvapakṣin in this last section, even after enlightenment, the enlightened person is conscious of duality, for, he continues to take food, etc., just like an ordinary persons. So even after death, this consciousness of duality may persist.

The Siddhāntin insists that no consciousness of duality persists. The misapprehension is the main cause of duality. This misapprehension itself is destroyed by the knowledge of the Brahman. Hence there does not persist even the slightest hint of ignorance.

The second quarter of the last chapter is opened by Śamkara by mentioning its significance thus: In this quarter, namely, the second, the Āṅgika wants to show that the other vidyās are also equally fruitful, and hence the Āṅgika now proceeds with the discussion of the way by which the enlightened persons go along. Appayya Dīksita however, does not pass any remark on this commentary of Śamkara, He directly proceeds with the prima facie view of the first section.

1. The state of the body at the time of death is being considered in this first section. According to the
Purva\textsuperscript{a}paksin, at the time of death, the speech is merged into the mind, as has been said in the \textsuperscript{sruti}\textsuperscript{1}.

The \textbf{Siddh\text{\textae}nta} is that it is not the speech itself which is merged into the mind, but it is the function of the speech which is merged. Speech does not originate from the mind, and does not accordingly merge into the mind.

2. The mind is absorbed into the \textit{pr\text{\textae}na}, says the Purva\textsuperscript{a}paksin, since it is so stated in the \textit{Chandogya Upanisad}\textsuperscript{2}.

The \textbf{Siddh\text{\textae}nta} is that, as it has been shown in the previous topic, here too, it is not the mind, but it is its function which is absorbed into the \textit{pr\text{\textae}na}.

3. According to the Purva\textsuperscript{a}paksin, the \textit{pr\text{\textae}na} is absorbed in \textit{tejas} as is said in the \textsuperscript{sruti}\textsuperscript{3}.

The \textbf{Siddh\text{\textae}nta} is that the \textit{pr\text{\textae}na} is absorbed in the J\text{\textae}va. This is what is stated in the \textit{Brhad\text{\textae}ranyaka Upanisad}\textsuperscript{4}. Though, in the sentence from the \textit{Chandogya}

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{Chandogya Up.} \textsuperscript{IV.8.6}: वाकः \textsuperscript{मनस्ििः संपप्ते}।
\item \textit{Chandogya Up.} \textsuperscript{VI.8.6}: \textsuperscript{मनःप्राणे}।
\item \textit{Ibid}:
\item \textit{Brhad\text{\textae}ranyaka Up.} \textsuperscript{IV.3.38}: \text{\textae}त्म\text{\textae}नम\textsuperscript{त्स्याः स्त्रोप्राणा} \textsuperscript{अभिमुक्तम}\textsuperscript{निः}।
\end{enumerate}
Upāniṣad referred to by the Purvapakṣin, it is said that the prāṇa is absorbed into the tejas, the word tejas is to be understood in the sense of the entities like tejas etc.¹

4. The situation at the time of death, described in the previous section, may be applicable to an ordinary person. As for the enlightened person there is no rebirth for him. Therefore, the five elements will not be serving as substratum for his Jīva. This is the view of the Purvapakṣin.

The Siddhantin says that the situation at the time of death described there is common to both the enlightened person and the ignorant person, since there is no specification in the sruti. Though there is no reason for the enlightened to resort to the five great elements, still for the knower of the Saguna Brahman, salvation is not instantly obtained, and so he has to resort to the five great elements for going along the Devayana path.²

1. Appayya Dīksita holds a different view. The word 'mind' is here used in the sense of the Jīva, he adds.

2. Ghandogya Up. VI.8.2.

VKP, p.971: वाहःस्मीत्याने वागुण्णहितानां वाहःस्मीत्यान जन ऊपप्प्रीते जीवों च बुध्वते जिति च ज्ञातंयम्। इष्टे धी नः ग्यायवयं ज्ञातंव: प्राणवन्धनं हि प्राप्तं मनः (Chandogya Up. VI.8.2.) जिति।

VKP, p.975: जीवनमहान्ते सत्यप्राप्तं जितिस्मि साधनांस्मुत्त्वा सकल-गुणविद्यानामपरं दिग्नतिदिदिदी. तेन: परस्थाभिज्ञानम् शुद्धगुणविद्याविशेषेण क्यों किं न त्याम्।
5. This section continues the same discussion. According to the Purvapakṣin, the five subtle elements, along with the prāṇa, and the organs, are absorbed in the Parabrahman.

The Siddhāntin denies this and asserts that these elements are not at all absorbed. As they are very subtle and clear, they are neither seen to be obstructed by any one.

6. Here, the prima facie view is as follows: It is said in the śrutis\(^1\) that the prāṇas of the enlightened one do not go out. So it follows that they remain with the Jīva itself.

The Siddhānta is: In the earlier part of the same śruti\(^2\), it is stated that the prāṇas of the enlightened person do not leave the body. This means that these prāṇas become identical with the all pervading Brahman. This is confirmed by the Mahābhārata\(^3\) and the Sūrti\(^4\).

1. Brhadāranyaka Up. IV.4.6: न तत्स्व प्राणा बुल्क्रामणि।
2. Ibid. III.2.11.
3. Mahābhārata: स्कर्ममृत्तमृत्तम मम्महमृत्तमनि पश्चातः।
4. तदन्तः प्रामाण्यम् स्वे स्कर्ममृत्तमृत्तमत्तत्तवः।
7. According to the Purvapakṣa, in this section, the sixteen kalās go to the purusa and are absorbed in him.

The Siddhāntin says that these kalās are absorbed in the Paramātman only, since it is so stated in the prāna Upaniṣad. If these kalās were believed to be absorbed in their sources like Prthvī, as stated in the Mundaka Upaniṣad, it would be true from the practical point of view, because they are first absorbed in the Prthvī etc. and then, through them, they are absorbed in the Paramātman.

Here Appayya Dīksita points out a mistake in the commentary of Amalananda, really speaking it is a scribe's mistake.

8. The Purvapakṣa, here, argues that, just as in the case of an ignorant person, these kalās are not permanently lost, even in the case of an enlightened person, at the time of the total destruction, the situation may be similar.

1. These are the principles from which the human body is formed. These kalās are sixteen in number—Prthvī, udaka, tejas, vāyu, akasa, indriya, manas, prāna, śraddha, anna, virya, tapas, mantra, karma, loka, nāma.


3. Mundaka Up.III.5.7: तत्ता क्रिया परमस्वपन प्रविष्टा देवाश्च स्वे प्रति क्रियते।

4. VKP.p.980: क्रिये विद्याय देवतानां विद्वान् क्रियैर्घन्तिनप्रायत्न: कार्यद्वयत्वायाद्वैत अन्त्ये।
The Siddhantin refers, in this connection to the Prasna Upanisad, where it is stated that, in the case of an enlightened person, the kalās are not to be thought of even in the form of subtle energies. These kalās are the result of ignorance, which is permanently destroyed by true knowledge.

9. According to the sruti, the Jīva, together with the energies, resorts to the heart at the time of death, and then goes out of the body through an outlet like eye etc.. This process may be supposed to be common to both the ignorant and the enlightened one. So says the Purvapakṣin.

The Siddhantin seeks to establish that, in the case of an enlightened person, the Jīva leaves the body not through the eye etc., but through the head. The nādi which directly reaches the brain from the heart is subservient to the Brahmavidyā, as is stated in the Chandogya Upanisad.

10. On account of the absence of the rays of the sun at night, a person who dies at night-time cannot go to

2. Chandogya Up. VII.6.6: सत्कै इव्यम प्रदृष्टादो भूयो नामभि
निद्रोऽवेका। कृपार्ध्यमायन्मृत्युश्वेति।
the Suryaloka. This is the Purvapakṣa.

The Siddhāntin retorts by pointing out that the human body is always connected with the rays of the sun—whether it is day or night. Just as in the summer, during the night-time also, there is excessive heat, so too is the case here. Moreover, the moon is also dependent on the sun.

11. According to the Purvapakṣin in this last topic, even an enlightened person should wait until the uttarayana to abandon his body, since it is an auspicious time to die. Bhīṣma is known to have waited in this manner.

The Siddhānta is: Even the Daksinayana gives the same fruit as the uttarayana, in the case of an enlightened person. Bhīṣma waited until the uttarayana to follow the tradition and to prove the power of the boon obtained by him from his father.

1. The first adhikaraṇa in the third quarter has this as its Purvapakṣa. The knower of the Saguna-vidyā can reach the Brahman by different ways corresponding to different upāsanās. So the way and its stages cannot be taken to be definite and fixed.
To this the Siddhāntin replies that there is only one way known as arcirādi. It is described in various manners. The fruit of all these is the same. The haste in going to the Brahmaṇ indicates in the sentence only suggests that the enlightened one has no other work to do.

2. If the arcirādi is the only way, how can one account for the stage vāyu which is mentioned in the Kausitaki Upaniṣad? This is the Purvapakṣin's question.

The Siddhāntin explains that vāyu should be placed before Sūrya and after Varṣā, as, according to the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. The stop Devaloka as is mentioned in the same Upaniṣad may be placed after the Varṣā; then there should be placed vāyu, and then Sūrya.

Appayya Dīkṣita here adds that there is pāthakrama according to the Purva pakṣin, while the Siddhāntin asserts

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1. Chāndogya Up. VIII.6.5: स यात्रलिप्यन्नस्तादादित्तमम गच्छे
2. Kausitaki Up. I.3.: स अते देशपानं देवात्माप्याग्निकोणामापन्नति स्या बायुदेवाः
3. Brhadāraṇyaka Up. V.10.1: यद्य वै पुनः स्मार्थेन काल्प्रेति स बायुमाण्यति तस्मै स तत्र चिनिहोते ... स शृद्धव्य आक्रम्यते स आदित्ययमाण्यति
that the serial order stated in the sentence is not directly stated (śrauta) but that it is indirectly stated (ārtha).

3. According to the Purvaśeṣṭha in this adhikarana, the order of the deities on the Devayana path, namely, Śāyū, Varuṇa, Indra, and Prajāpāti is to be understood to be fixed.

The Siddhāntin does not agree. He says that Varuṇa is to be placed after Vidyut, as he is related to Vidyut; next to Varuṇa are to be placed Indra and Prajāpāti.

4. According to the Purvaśeṣṭha, the lokas like Śāyū, Agni, are meant to be places for halting and resting; they may, indeed, be regarded as signposts indicating the proper road.

The Siddhāntin, on the other hand, maintains that they are rather guides and not resting places nor sign-posts. This is what is stated in the śruti. They are there because the enlightened persons are without body when they are proceeding along that way. But from the stage of Vidyut up to the Brahmaloka, some celestial deity accompanies.
them. This is pointed out in the sruti^.

5. In the sruti2, it is said that some celestial being takes the enlightened one to the Brahman. Now the question is what does the word Brahman imply here? Does it imply only Saguna Brahman or only Nirguna Brahman or both? According to the Purvapakṣin, the word is to be understood in the sense of Parabrahman.

The Siddhānta is that it is the Saguna-Brahman only, because the word indicating Brahman in this context is in plural, and the Nirguna-Brahman is free from such bheda. Moreover, this Brahmaloka is described as being full of trees, rivers, oceans, etc., These are surely indications of the Saguna-Brahman only.

Appayya Dīksita adds that the fruit for the knowers of the Brahman is the 'Heaven', still the word 'heaven'

1. Brhadāraṇyaka Up.,VI.2.15 : जादित्योऽर्धेऽज्ञानां तानृ पूरव्यो
मानसं ज्ञेत्यः भृगलोकानून गम्यति ते स्वेतः भृगलोकेन यतः पराक्वोऽवस्थति
ते त्या न पुनरावृत्ति:।

2. ऐधो- -धो-
does not convey the usual sense of svarga.

6. According to the Purvapaksins here, those who meditate upon the symbols like name, etc., of the Brahman, are also taken to the Brahmaloka by that celestial being.

The Siddhantins categorically states that such persons are not taken to the Brahmaloka, because the upāsanās of Pratikas have different fruits, as mentioned in the Chandogya Upanisad. Further in these upāsanās, there is no samkalpa for the attainment of the Brahman, and this samkalpa is indeed most important in this connection.

The last quarter of the last chapter is being started now. At the very beginning, Amalananda states the significance of each of the four quarters. In the first quarter it is stated that, through the nirguna-vidya, all bondages are destroyed. In the second, it is said that the salvation is obtained through the Nirguna-vidya alone.

1. VKP, p. 995:

The difference in fruits of the both, namely the\textit{saguna-vidyā}, and the \textit{nirguna-vidyā}, is set forth there only. The third quarter deals with the means that are helpful in obtaining the \textit{saguna-vidyā}. Now, here, in the last quarter, it is shown that the fruit of the \textit{nirguna-vidyā} is the knowledge of the Brahman, while a person knowing the \textit{saguna-vidyā} is liable to experience those enjoyments that are enjoyed by the gods\textsuperscript{1}. Appayya Dīkṣita, however, proceeds with the \textit{prima-facie} view of the first section without making any such introductory observations.

1. Just as in the Devaloka the Jīvas assume some different forms, so too at the time of \textit{mokṣa} they must be assuming different forms. That is what the Purvapakṣin says here.

The Siddhânta is that there is no such assuming of different forms. The \textit{mokṣa} is actually the \textit{realisation} by the Ātman of its own nature. Even before \textit{mokṣa}, the

\textsuperscript{1} VEP, p. 1005 : आधे पादे निर्गुणविद्याफलेक्षेत्रेण बन्धनिनिवृत्ति निन्दिता द्वितीये सणुनिर्गुणफलप्रमाणन्यथा भूलकन्तृतप्यम् द्वितीयोपयोगकार्य चिन्तिते। कृत्येऽव \textit{सणुनिर्गुणफलिर्द्वितीयम्} गलितमन्त्रययः नृथिष्ठेण निबिधायते। चिन्तु च च ज्ञाते \textit{सणुनिर्गुणविद्याफलोपयोगः} तत्तमावाच्छिन्नः श्रद्धामायाविभीमः लगुणविद्यात् च तत्तमायाविभीमः कथाचार्यार्थिले।
Jīva is of the nature of the Ātman, but due to nescience it entertains some wrong ideas or misapprehensions. But by means of the knowledge of the Brahman, all ignorance disappears and illusions are destroyed. This is really mokṣa.

2. The Upaniṣads emphasise the difference between the Jīva and the Brahman in the sentence - स तन्त्र चेतोति and पुरुषोत्तरसम्भव। Therefore, the Purvapakṣin argues, even in the condition of mokṣa, the Jīva must be regarded as remaining altogether different from the Brahman.

The Siddhāntin retorts by saying that many more Upaniṣadic passages can be cited which emphasise that, in the condition of mokṣa, there is complete identification of the Jīva and the Brahman. The passages speaking of difference such as those referred to by the Purvapakṣin must be treated as subordinate.

3. In what sense is the Jīva said to become identical with the Brahman in the condition of mokṣa? Does the Jīva...

1. Chandogya Up.,VIII.12.3 : In the sentence, स तन्त्र चेतोति, the word tatāra indicates ādāra, hence it is different. While in 'पुरुषोत्तरसम्भव', the Jīva being the agent is altogether different from the Brahman which is the object here.
acquire such attributes as being free from sin, omniscient etc., or does it become identical with the Brahman only in caitanya-form, which is real?

The Siddhāntin replies that both these things happen. The first view is that of Jaimini, and the second that of Audulomi. As both these views are based upon the śruti, they are correct views. From the Vyavahārika point of view, Jaimini's view is correct, and from the absolute paramarthika point of view, Audulomi's view is also not wrong.

4. In this section, the Purvapakṣa states that in the Chandogya Upanisad¹ it is stated that, immediately after the samkapla, the fore-fathers of a liberated person meet him. The word samkalpad indicates that the fore-fathers are of a mental form (manomaya) or of an emotional form (bhavanamaya). This being so, their visit will be momentary.

According to the Siddhāntin, the word, samkalpad, indicates that the liberated person has no need of other means, and that if at all there was any need it would be met through desire. Besides even though the fore-fathers ar

1. Chandogya Up., II.1: यदि पितृव्रत्कालं भवति संकल्पाद्वायस्य पितरं सुप्रियिष्ठन्ति।
of emotional form, still, as the result of the will-power of the liberated one, they will remain there as long as he desires. The \textit{samkalpa} of a liberated person never becomes futile, as he has no other higher authority.

Appayya Dīkṣita, here, adds that even on the part of Paramesvara, efforts are expected\(^1\), only samkalpa is not the sufficient cause.

5. In the preceding topic, it is said that, as a result of mere samkalpa, the fore-fathers of a liberated person meet him. From this, says the Purvapakṣin, it naturally follows that the liberated person possesses a body or at least has a mind.

The \textit{Siddhāntin} says that, according to Badari, the liberated soul has mind, but neither the body nor the sense-organs, as is said in the \textit{śruti}\(^2\). On the other hand, Jaimini holds that it has the body and the sense-organs as well as the mind, for, the \textit{śruti} states that "he becomes one, he becomes of three kinds\(^3\)" etc. Bādarāyaṇa concludes.

\begin{enumerate}
\item VKP, p. 1010 : \textbf{तदात्मन: स्वभावते } त्यादिदिशातृक्ते \textbf{व पारमेश्वरे} \textbf{मल्लेन साध्यत्वाय}।
\item Chandogya Up., VIII.12.5-6.
\item Ibid, VII.26.2 : \textit{स कृष्ण्या मध्यति, जिष्या मध्यति}।
\end{enumerate}
that both these views are correct, because the liberated
one may assume the body or may abandon them at any time.
When the liberated one abandons the body, the fore-fathers
meet him in the emotion-form, and when he assumes the body
etc., the fore-fathers meet him actually as in the waking
condition (jāgrad-avastha).

Appayya Diksita cites a parallel illustration from
the Purvamīmāṁsā in support of these two theories of
Jaimini and Badari. In a sacrifice known as the
ahinadvadāsa, the number of officiating priests is either
one or two or many, it is not definite; but in Satra-sacrifice the
number of officiating priests is definite as bahavah.

6. The Purvapakṣin argues that, though the
liberated Jīva can assume various forms simultaneously
to his own will, only one body out of them can have
cetanātva and the mind, as there is one soul and one mind,
while the others are like wooden dolls.

The Siddhāntin insists that all these forms can
have cetanatva. In this connection he mentions the
drṣṭānta of many lamps being lighted from one lamp\(^1\).

On account of the Yoga-power, one Jīva can enter in many bodies; the same is the case with minds also. Moreover, one and the same Ātman can be understood as being divided into many, through upādhis.

7. In this last section, the prima facie view is that those who meditate upon the Saguna Brahman become as if similar (sayujya) to it; they enjoy abandent glory like Ṣāvāra. This is what is stated in the śruti\(^2\).

The Siddhānta, on the other hand, is: The liberated person can have all powers except those of creation etc., of the world. These latter belong exclusively to Parameśvara only. Moreover from the śruti - तावानः महिमा
को ज्यायोर्वं पुनर्भ; पादोऽस्य विषया मूलानि ज्यादस्यमूर्त्ति दिविः
from the Chandogya Upanisad\(^3\), it can be said that the

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1. This drṣṭānta given by the Siddhāntin may remind one of Kalidasa who says in the Raghuvamsa:

cf. Raghuvamsa, V.37 : रूपं लोकोजालस्व तदेव कौर्यं तदेव नैसर्गिकोऽस्मात्माम।

2. cf. Taittiriya Up.,I.16.2: न कारणात्स्वत्वाडिवेद्यो योगस्य दैव

3. Chandogya Up.,III.12.6, incedentially it may be pointed out

F.N. contd..
Nirguna form of the Brahman cannot be attained by those who meditate on the Saguna Brahman.

The repetition of the words in the sutra —

\[ \text{सुत्रा} \]

denotes the end of the work.

F.N. contd..

that the same passage occurs in the Rgveda, X.90.3 with slight variation:

\[ \text{वेदांत-सूत्राः} \]

The *Vedāntakalpataruparimala* is, as has been already pointed out, a commentary on a commentary, namely, the *Kalpataru* by Amalānanda. The *Kalpataru* is a commentary on Vacaspati's *Bhāmati*, which latter again is a commentary on Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa. Still Appayya Dīkṣita's *Vedāntakalpataruparimala* seems to be more closely related to the *Śārirákābhaśya* of Śaṅkara. At the same time it should be noted that Appayya Dīkṣita has not hesitated to criticise the views of Śaṅkara in some cases. This no doubt shows that Appayya Dīkṣita was not merely a blind exponent, but also a keen and critical thinker. It is also not unlikely that Appayya Dīkṣita's criticism of Śaṅkara was indicative of his inclination towards the Śivādvaita of Śrīkaṇṭha.

While writing the *Vedāntakalpataruparimala*, Appayya Dīkṣita seems to have placed before himself the commentaries of Śaṅkara and of Mallinātha as models to

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1. *VKP*, p.867: अनेकेऽक्तव्यं - यदेकाणात्तत्त्वस्य वेदस्य साधारणेन
tदार्शितोपासनायास्तत्त्वसाधारणेन समुच्चये
किंतु गुणवत्तेः भाष्ये तदस्यक्तम्।
imitate. For, even in discussions about abstruse philosophical matters, Appayya Dīkṣita, like Śāṅkara, always seems to have aimed at perfect lucidity. Similarly he seems to have strictly adhered to the dictum popularised by Mallinātha, namely, nāmūlaṁ likhyate kim cīt nānapekṣitāṁ ucyate¹. Even a cursory reading of the Vedāntakalpataruparimala will make it clear that Appayya Dīkṣita has sought to explain the main topics in detail, as far as possible. In the course of his exposition he has exhibited his mastery of various branches of knowledge such as music². The drṣṭāntas employed by him again are indicative of his versatility and wide interests³. His partiality for grammar is seen at many places⁴ more

1. Samījivani (Mallinātha's commentary on the Raghuvamsa of Kālidāsa), 9.

2. VKP, pp. 58-59: वीणादिदु प्रथममुहाद्राध्यायम्यानुवानुप्रान्तका घण्ठादादुरुपन्नाद्रा: स्पत्तिः। तेषां स्वरा नापूषाया: बहुन-निध्यमण्यास्वरप्रम्भा: निध्यावर्तनीमृत्त्युक्त्याः शिरविभी श्रावणा: तेभु श्रीमेतु स्वरायामाराहायोहाहायो निवेदः: प्रतीक्रिया स्पत्तिः पिन्ना जेक्षितार्थिनानाः।

3. Ibid, p. 158: नु ब्रूहिना दर्षणानि पुरातात्त्विकप्रसादितम् वाक्यंस्नद्धस्य दर्शिषु पिन्नानि प्‌रच्छेदानामितः ... प्रतिबिभज्जो वाच्यः।

4. Ibid, pp. 376, 398, 742, 746, 748.
particularly in the discussion about the compound **Brahma-jiñāna**. The help of the **Puruṣārtha-sastra** also is very oftenly invoked. Appayya Dīkṣita has quoted extensively from the **Upaniṣads**, and **smṛtis** including the **Mahabharata**. He has also shown his easy familiarity with works such as the **Raghuvamsa** and also with figures of speech. All this confirms the characterisation of Appayya Dīkṣita by Keith as a polymatic writer in Sanskrit literature.

With his vast reading and comprehensive scholarship, Appayya Dīkṣita may be said to have fully prepared himself for the composition of this great commentary. He had made a deep and discerning study of the three commentaries, namely, the commentary of Śaṅkara, the commentary of Vācaspatimisra, and the commentary of Amalānanda. Besides this, he had mastered various other works on the advaita-philosophy. Appayya Dīkṣita must have made a comparative

1. Ibid, p. 385, *Raghuvamsa*, XII.  
2. *Raghuvamsa*, XII.  
study of all these, and that must have given him a special insight into the commentary of Amalananda. In this connection, it should be noted that at several places in Amalananda's commentary, Appayya Dikṣita has pointed out the mistakes of both commission and omission by the scribe.

Incidentally, it may be pointed out that Appayya Dikṣita has written three works, namely, the Nāyamanjari, the Nāyarakṣamani and the Vedāntakalpataruparamala on one and the same subject, that is, the Šāmkara-bhāṣya. A comparison of these three is possible. The Nāyamanjari merely summarises the main points in each topic of the commentary of Šāmkara and it is poetic form. In the Nāyarakṣamani, we find more extensive and elaborate explanation of the views held by Šāmkara. But in the Vedāntakalpataruparamala, Appayya Dikṣita goes a step further. In addition to the elaborate discussion of the principles of Šāmkara, Appayya Dikṣita, at times criticises the Šāmkara-mata. (By this he might be preparing or trying to find out some common ground for harmonising the two schools, namely, the Kevala-advaita of Šāmkara and the Śivadvaita of Śrīkantha.) Appayya Dikṣita's success in thi

1. VKP, p. 980, p. 778.
particular effort is seen in the Śivārkāmanidīpikā.

From the literary point of view, the present work is valuable. Appayya Dīkṣita has succeeded, to a large extent, in clothing profound philosophical discussion in a simple, fluent, and forceful language. One will be reminded, here, of the well-known subhāṣita:

शास्त्रेषु काव्यमिच्छ ज्ञात नाम्ये
काव्येषु कामशास्त्रितः क्षमेत नाम्ये।

which is aptly applicable to Appayya Dīkṣita.

Another noteworthy point is this. Appayya Dīkṣita has been bold enough to criticise the views of others. As has been already pointed out, Appayya Dīkṣita has criticised the view of Śaṅkara¹, the view of Vācaspati², and the view of Amalōnanda³. It is not unlikely that he was preparing the back-ground for his next work, namely, the Śivārkāmanidīpikā in which he has sponsored the Śivādvaita or the Viśiṣṭādvaita (qualified non-dualism) of Śrīkāṇṭha. (But in the present work, he does not make any specific reference to that effect.)

1. VKP, p.867.
2. Ibid., p.404.
3. Ibid., p.867.
This does not mean that this *Vedāntakalpataruparimala* is free from any defect. At times he has elaborated some points to such an extent that a reader gets tired of that discussion. Some important points such as synopsis of a new *pāda* or of a new chapter which is to be started have been neglected. But these are the minor defects. Appayya Dīkṣita has tried to avoid them in his next work, namely, the *Śivārkamāṇidīpikā*, which obviously has been superior and uncommon.
Section II

Chapter - 7.

Ratnatrayaparīkṣā.
The Ratnatrayaparīkṣā is a tiny philosophical theistic work in verse by Appayya Dīkṣita. He has himself commented on it. This work is said to have been printed and published at Madras several years ago, but the printed text is at present not available. It is, therefore, now critically edited and reproduced on the following pages.

The following critical text of the Ratnatrayaparīkṣā is based on the two manuscripts described below.

A) Poona, Bombay (now Maharashtra) Government collection (deposited at the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute), No.376 of 1895-1902. Folio - 1; written on paper in bold and legible Devanāgari characters, with eleven lines to a page and about 36 letters to a line; size - \( \frac{9}{2} \times 4 \frac{1}{3} \). The Manuscript, which is undated, contains only the text (that is, eight stanzas) of the Ratnatrayaparīkṣā.
It begins :  श्रीणैशाय नमः

It ends :  श्रीमद्दमा रघुजयनक्षको युगम श्रीमद्दैतिकस्नि

B) Poona, Bombay (now Maharashtra), Government collection (deposited at the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute), No. 665 of 1887-91. Folios 16; written on paper in bold and legible Devanāgarī characters, with 15 lines to a page and about 45 letters to a line, size - $12\frac{1}{2} \times 7\frac{1}{2}$. The Manuscript, which is undated, contains the text (only 1st verse) and a commentary by Appayya Dīksita himself.

This Manuscript is rather carelessly written¹.

1. p.1, याप्याकाश has been wrongly written as याप्याकाश.

p.2, अपनीबल्ती instead of अपनीबल्ती. Pages are Contd...
It begins: || श्री-गणेशाय नमः || तीव्राय नमः || अर्थं रत्नाकरपरीशा-
रूपं
व्याचाृत्तरको संतोषं व्याकुलंहि नित्यं निदिपपरं निरलिस्ममुक्तम् ....

It ends: जिवविनिति मृत्तिकश्रयं रत्नाशामरकश्च 
वचन्मूलिकश्चायत श्रेणी मूलत्ववशे तनुक्रय: २ शिवः

Contd. F.Note No.1 on page - 741.
wrongly numbered. For example, No. 5 is repeated twice while No. 7 is altogether dropped.
(continued)

1) B धर्मस्त्रा

1) B स्त्राच्छाल्वीपि।

1) Henceforward, no text has been given in B.MS.
तस्यैवाद्यः । परितिर्थिणीवोऽन्त्रितकार्यः ।
सत्योत्पत्ति विरूपमन्त्रादिविविक्षाः ।
प्राप्तं कृत्वा तस्य प्रमदस्मृतस्थाणानेदृश्यः ।
स्थानी भाष्यं ज्ञातं तदमुखः एवतेऽः ।
पुराणः ॥ ३ ॥

लघुः केवल नववादादानपरिवर्तः । स्थाणुकृष्णकेवः ।
शक्तीती शत्कृत्तासतिकृत्तकनिमित्तः । तृतीयच्य भाष्यः ।
याच विलयताः कृत्त्रिकुः । श्रृतीदियो संरङ्कितादित्राति ।
साधित्यं त्वाभावायां मन्त्रमिवन्मतः । शैक्षोपाणातः ॥ ६ ॥

श्रीमद्भगवं योिलक्ष्मेरसिद्धिवीक्षान्याया कृत्तीयः ।
चिद्ध्वनिप्रतिद्वायी प्रभुनार्या हरसिद्धिवीक्षान्याया ।
शैलेनाये मात्रे ते सत्सिद्धायानादित्राति ।
मन्त्रकारै महामात्रादिर्भवं च मुनि के ।
प्राणिभन्दे ते रु मताः । नामस्थापनेऽति शैलिकं स्वभावातः ॥ ५ ॥

विद्वानः । शैलाय भृत्यनंदितिष्ठितोपायसाधारताः ।
स्वात्त्रप्रतिच्छातः । शुमन्त्रमिठ्ठमाः ॥ ॥
शैलेनाये मात्रे शैलायानादिर्भवं ।
शैलेनाये मात्रे शैलायानादिर्भवं ॥ ॥

श्रीमद्भगवं मुकुन्दके रघुपुरूषः ।
श्रीमद्भगवं मुकुन्दके रघुपुरूषः ।

श्रीमद्भगवं मुकुन्दके रघुपुरूषः ।
श्रीमद्भगवं मुकुन्दके रघुपुरूषः ।

श्रीमद्भगवं मुकुन्दके रघुपुरूषः ।
श्रीमद्भगवं मुकुन्दके रघुपुरूषः ।
1. The Brahman, which is one, eternal and sentient is full of excessive Bliss and is void of faults and odours. It has been transformed into two forms, namely, dharma and dharmin on account of mayā. Out of these two forms the first, namely, dharma is the source of all experiences, while the second dharmin is the energy (sakti) in the form of desire etc., which is the effective cause of all functions. All the qualities are dependent on this sakti only.

Appayya Dīksita, here, states that the Brahman is eternal and free from defects, etc. Though it is alone and without any other, still on account of mayā, it is transformed into two forms, namely, the dharma and the dharmin. Out of these two, dharmin is the highest Brahman, while the dharma is described as the energy by which all objects are experienced (sakala-prapanca-visaya-anubhuti). This has been confirmed by the Kurma-purāṇa and the Svetāsvatara Upanishad.

1. Kurma-purāṇa: (Kurman 2: 32-34)  
2. Svetāsvatara Upanishad VI.8: (Appayya Dīksita, 12: 27-30)
2. Those who know the Vedas call this dharma as ākāsa which is expansive and is the substratum of all and the bliss of the dharmin (i.e. the Brahman) has been described as being beyond the scope of the mind and the speech. The existence, energy, and happiness these three called as being the parts (āmsa) of the dharmin and prāna, ākāsa etc., are said to be being dependent on the same Brahman.

The Brhadāraṇyaka Upanīṣad describes this dharma as being in the form of ākāsa, the substratum of all. The ānanda of the dharmin is beyond the scope of the mind and the speech. The existence (sattā) energy (sphūrti) and the happiness (sukha) are the parts of the Brahman (dharmin).

3. The dharmin is supposed as being the creator of the five stages but the energy which is otherwise known as the dharma assumes the form of a puruṣa and thereby serves as the upadāna kāraṇā of the universe. The same sakti assumes a female form and acts as a queen of her own substratum, the first creator. These two

1. Brhadāraṇyaka Up.,III.8.7: आकाष जेव देव देवतां च प्रेते च।
2. Taittiriya Up.,II.4.1: यतो वाचे निवृत्ते अप्राणय मनसः सुह।
forms, namely, puruṣa and stri of the dharma are the forms of the Brahman; say those who know the Vedas.

Here, the creation of the universe is explained. The creation of the universe includes five activities, namely, creation, preservation, destruction, concealment and mercy. The last two can be called as bandha and mokṣa. Dharmin (i.e. Brahman) is the nominal agent (kevala-kartṛ), but the energy which has been otherwise known as the sakti or dharma takes an active part in the creation as a female in giving birth. Still the cetanatva of the Brahman is independent of all as it is said in the Taittiriya Upaniṣad.

4. That which is called as dharmin is the para-Brahman or Śiva and that who is supposed as his queen should known as Ambikā. That puruṣa who is called as the upadāna-karaṇa should be understood as Nārāyaṇa. This can be known through the Kurma-purāṇa and from Nārada's words.

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1. The five activities are:

सूचि, पालन, चौहार, विरोधावन, अनुभव.

2. Taittiriya Up.,III.5. अन्येऽन्तर जात्मा 55नेमभमः।
The creative energy of the dharmin, who can be identified with Śiva, is Āmbikā or Umā, as it is said in the Kurma-purāṇa. The same purāṇa further adds that Nārāyaṇa is the Upādāna-kāraṇa of the whole universe. But Śiva is the main cause and both Umā and Nārāyaṇa are the parts of Śiva.

5. All the transformations such as the sky etc., are due to this highest reality. All the Jīvas and even Brahmā are the parts of Śiva. Having created the universe in such a manner, the Brahman which is full of bliss (ananda-mūrtiḥ) rests in that place full of lustre, which has been resorted to by ancient gods who knew immortality.

Like Nārāyaṇa, Brahmā and all the Jīvas are the parts of Śiva. So say the Harivamsa¹, and the Gītā².

6. Those crores of Saktis which are immeasurable and which belong to Sthāpu, Viṣṇu, Brahmā, with all

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1. Harivamsa: शत्त्वरजस्तमा विभोजो जगद्भेद जनार्दनः।
   लघु भार्गवादुस्तवौ सोल्चल्वत्वविद्वै हरे।

2. Gītā, XV.7: महेरवेदो जीवोर्जन: नीत्वपूर्वः सनातनः।
their parts can be enjoyed by Śiva. That well-known Śakti, Bhavānī by name, who is supposed as bestower of the knowledge about the Brahman, and who is called as the ocean of mercy, always cooperates with Śiva in medition of Śaṅkara.

Śiva is the lord of all Śaktis belonging to him as well as belonging to Viṣṇu and Brahmā. Out of these so many Śaktis, one, namely, Bhavānī or Uma directly leads to final liberation. Hence, the Śakti known as Bhavānī or Uma or Ambikā is to be meditated upon along with Śiva for absolute salvation. But according to the Kurma-purāṇa¹, there are three Śaktis, namely, Śambhavī, Vaiṣṇavī and Brahmī. Out of them, the last one (i.e. Brahmī) is endowed with qualities (sagunā) and it should be meditated upon along with Śiva. The fruit of such meditation is stated as the attainment of the Śiva-loka. This has been made clear in verse No. 7.

7. The third and last bhāvanā which has been stated in the Kurma-purāṇa, carries a person to celestial place but that Śakti being endowed with qualities is

¹ Kurma-purana
dependent on Śiva. The remaining two saktis, namely, saktis belonging to Viṣṇu and Śiva give the desired fruit and earthly happiness.

8. The wise persons with a desire of meditation as has been explained in the śrutis, can restrain their mind firmly and are able to visualise Śiva in their own heart. As a result of that they attain that place which is full of bliss, lustrous like the lustre of the crores of suns, and that which is beyond the go-loka and also which is beyond Vaikuntha.

Appayya Dīkṣita, here, adds that according to Śaṅkara para - sakti is the para ākāśa, as it is said in the dāharādhikaraṇa, while in the ānandamayādhikaraṇa, ānandamaya is the quality of the Brahman being denoted by the word puccha. This puccha - Brahman is not different from the para - Brahman; which is again identified with Śiva. According to the Linga-purāṇa, Śiva and Umā are inseparable

2. Śaṅkara-bhāṣya on I.1.12-19.
entities. The Kaivalya Upanishad, also, declares that Śiva and Uma can bestow the bliss on their devotees.

The commentary ends with the concluding verse -

अमोधाश्रय दुःशाश्रयमाप्नु रत्नकार ततः ।
श्रृंगेरी हृदिरवित तत्त्वं सन्तविपरिलितम्॥

1. Kaivalya Up., I.7. ॥ दुःशाश्रयं परमेशवरं प्रमुखंत्वचा ॥
मूर्तिनिषिद्ध दूरभोगिनं संस्त्वसहिं
तंसखः परस्तादु॥

2. After the usual colophon, following two verses are added.

श्रेयः - आस्त्याश्च श्रीनिमं पात्यद्वेत दृश्यं कैवधारर्वाच-
राख्याले भोक्तया निरहः संस्त्वसहिं श्रेयः ॥
आरसाश्रयं राजसाह्रयं श्रीणामानन्दर्लोक्यनी-
मानन्दरूपारिचिदिकसंधाक्ष्यायता धातु॥
शिखिन्धुमृतिपिष्टं (ततः) ॥ गच्च द्राक्षरामरणयम् मे ।
चान्त्रि-मृतिपावत (ततः) ॥ श्रेयः मृत्याभ्यासं तनुयः ॥

* These are conjectural readings.
In the Ratnatrayaparīkṣā, Appayya Dīkṣita has explained the Saiva-doctrine in general. The title, namely, Ratna-traya, itself gives some idea about the subject-matter of the work. The highest Brahman, is here identified with Śiva, Umā, and Nārāyaṇa. These are the three jewels drawn out from the vast ocean in the form of various (advaita) commentaries (on the Vedānta-Sūtras). This has been frankly admitted by Appayya Dīkṣita in the verse:

आभ्यामाऴ्य दुधाविधायागतै रत्नक्रमं ततः ||
सत्तुषरी हरिशेवलित तल्लय सम्ब्धश्रीशिलम् ॥

Out of these three entities, namely, Śiva, Umā and Nārāyaṇa, Śiva is the chief cause of the universe, but Śiva, being identified with the highest Brahman is a passive witness only, while his Sakti, which is otherwise variously known as Ambikā, Umā, Gaurī, takes an active part in creation, and Nārāyaṇa is the upādāna kāraṇa of the universe. Both Gaurī and Nārāyaṇa are inseparable parts of the body of Śiva. Hence, the world is said to be created by these

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1. Concluding verse of the text.
three together. As these three entities occupy most important places, they are called by Appayya Dīkṣita as Ratna-traya. These three jewels are properly examined and have been assigned due importance by Appayya Dīkṣita, so the work is properly named as the Ratna-traya-parīkṣā. The final liberation is attained through the grace of these three entities only and hence all other gods are only secondary in comparison to the three entities. In order to prove this, Appayya Dīkṣita has quoted not less than ten works in such a small book. That indicates his vast reading and careful study of the subject under consideration. As the Saiva - school has been mainly preached in this work, it is just natural that the author has laid more stress on the Kurma-purāṇa than any other philosophical work.

As from the literary point of view, it can be said, that this work also, though very tiny, still does not lay behind any other work as a piece of literature. The style is very simple and clear. Though the verse-form of any work naturally puts some stylistic limitation, still, in this work at least, Appayya Dīkṣita has surpassed all difficulties. The work is so simple and stylistic that it can be easily included in the list of those religious works meant for daily recitation. As this work is possessed of both literally and philosophical values, it deserved high honour.
Alphabetical list of the works and authorities quoted in the *Ratnatrayaparikṣa* and Appayya Dīkṣita's Commentary.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial No.</th>
<th>Work or authority</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1)</td>
<td>आयधर्म</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2)</td>
<td>बृहदारण्यक अ०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3)</td>
<td>कैवल्य अ०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4)</td>
<td>कृप्यापुराण</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5)</td>
<td>शिवपुराण</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6)</td>
<td>शंकराचार्यचित्रितःभ्रमोपदेशादि</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7)</td>
<td>सान्निधिः (probably कैयाकरणः)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8)</td>
<td>शिवपुराण</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9)</td>
<td>श्लेष्मचादपुराण</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10)</td>
<td>शेतदुस्कर अ०</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11)</td>
<td>गांगा</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12)</td>
<td>दृष्टिबेद</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13)</td>
<td>सांतूळः</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14)</td>
<td>लौकिकः (not identified)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Section II

Chapter 8.

Śivakarpamrita.
The main purpose of Appayya Dikṣita in writing the Śivakarnāmṛta seems to have been to controvert the Pāncarātra doctrine - particularly the belief held that Nārāyaṇa was superior to all other divinities. This small monograph is in prose. No printed text of the Śivakarnāmṛta was available. But a manuscript of the work was obtained for study from the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona.

The manuscript belongs to the Bombay (now Maharashtra) Government Collection deposited at the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute and is numbered 34 of Viśrāma, folios 92, written on a paper in bold and legible Devanāgarī characters, with 10 lines to a page and about 26 letters to a line; size 9½" x 4". The Manuscript is undated and contains the text of the Śivakarnāmṛta.

It begins:

॥ श्री चपेशाश्रय नमः ॥ निःस्वदद्याकेष्के शति नृषुमते॥
युक्तेऽवाचिति वेदयामदविदिशोभयुमयिन्या ॥ कस्याल्पाकाशि-स्वयंविदिशेः स्वयंविदिशेः गहाः प्रितलयानार्थ गर्वनम् ॥ ॥
The scribe of this manuscript is not very careful about his writing.

The word begins with salutation to Śiva with Uma (Sāmba). Śiva is regarded as the only resort and the destroyer of a disease in the form of the worldly existence. Śiva is again described as being the cause of creation, preservation, and destruction of the whole universe and this is his mere sport. This Śiva is accompanied by Aṃbika and can be visualised in one's own heart. The word ends with the usual colophon. This colophon occurs at the end of the first part also.

1. Śivakārnāmṛta, 1:
   निन्धाराहें यदि नृणामित्रे पुनःसत्तार्थिति बोधनादातिन्योगाद्वारम्
   कविः सर्वस्मायायाः पुरुषोपाध्यायः पुरुषोपाध्यायः पुरुषोपाध्यायः पुरुषोपाध्यायः

2. Śivakārnāmṛta, 2:
   जन्मस्थायनं समस्तज्ञता द्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्र�्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽद्रष्टेऽ�र्थसर्वस्मायायाः

3. Śivakārnāmṛta, pp.90-91: बिज्ञ श्रीमदवर्धनशुकुलशेषोक्ति श्रीमद्वैषाढ्यात्मार्यश्रव्यिका किरस्य रङ्ग नाध्यविवाहारणी सर्मसम्बन्धिततातो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो श्रेष्ठो
In the first two āngalasālokas, the author does obeisance to Lord Śiva.

The third stanza mentions the view of the Vaidikas that Sadāśiva is the Para-Brahman, Samba is the embodied Brahman, and the whole creation is constituted of parts of his lustre.

The Pāncarātra-doctrine is referred to in the fourth stanza. This doctrine is discussed to some extent in a major part of the work.

The fifth stanza states that an attempt is made in the Śivakarnāṁra to controvert the doctrine of the Pāncarātras. In the Śivatattvaviveka¹, the Pāncarātra-doctrine has been refuted at great length, and only a brief summary of that refutation is being given in the present work².

According to the Pāncarātras, Narāyaṇa is the creator of this universe, for, He has been so described

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¹ Appayya Dīkṣita himself is the author of this work.

² Śivakarnāṁra, 5 : तन्मितिरायत्राणि सिद्धस्य सत्संगं संस्कृतं ज्ञाता
स्मिन्तत्तत्त्वविद्येन मेय: प्रकृत्यानापापपादितः


in the various śrutī sentences, such as, अर्थेः है भेके नारायण जासिन्तु। न श्रोत्ता नेत्रान्त्र नाग्नीषयोभर्यो। or दिव्यो देव अर्थेः है नारायण। २.४ etc. The same Nārāyaṇa is identified with the Parabrahman in the Upaniṣadic passages like सदेव सोमचेतस्म जासिन्तु। ३ जात्मा वा बिद्यम जासिन्तु। ४ अर्थेः है बिद्यम जासिन्तु। ५ etc. It is thus established that Nārāyaṇa is the creator.

Moreover, in the Mahābhārata ६ and in the Subāla Upaniṣad ७, Nārāyaṇa has been described as residing in the heart of Śiva. The same Nārāyaṇa has been glorified in sentence - यदा तमस्तल्य दिसा न राष्ट्र। etc.,

2. Subāla Up., VI.
6. Mahābhārata, Karpā-parva: विज्ञुरात्मा मध्यो भवस्य नित्येन।
7. Subāla Up., VI: दिव्यो देव अर्थेः है नारायण।
in the Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad also. The well-known Puruṣasūkta clearly refers to Nārāyaṇa as the highest being. The word puruṣa in the Puruṣasūkta has to be interpreted as that person who resides (literally 'sleeps'-śayanat) in the body (puruṣasamīne sarīre); and this puruṣa within the human body is none other than Nārāyaṇa. The sentence, ये देवानामेविषोऽपरिमित्तेऽसीमिता in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad confirms the same view. Because therein also Hiranyagarbha is described as being born from the highest god. Hiranyagarbha is not different from Brahmā, and it is well-known that Nārāyaṇa is the source of Brahmā. The word Maheśvara occurring in that context, महेश्वरं तु प्रकृति विषयमात्मिनं तु महेश्वरम् can denote Viṣṇu, as īśvaratva is common to both Viṣṇu and Śiva. All Vedas are born from Om. Om is the source of all speech. All speech can be said to be included in the

1. Śvetāsvatara Up., IV.18.
2. Rgveda, X.90.
4. Śvetāsvatara Up., IV.10.
syllable a, as it is the first syllable. The word a also denotes Viṣṇu. Hence Viṣṇu must be regarded as having been referred to in the above-mentioned passage from the Taittiriya (?) Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad. The Atharva-śikha passage which speaks of the meditation of the 'cause' (kārana) must be understood as referring to Viṣṇu, the cause of all. Some Purāṇas like the Śivapurāṇa and the Lingapurāṇa no doubt proclaim Śiva as the cause, but these Purāṇas need not be regarded as authoritative. It has been said that some Purāṇas are full of tamas. The above-mentioned Purāṇas are of that type and so they should not be treated as authoritative Purāṇas. Even Vyāsa has admitted in his Vedānta-sūtras as well as in his Mahābhārata that Narāyaṇa is the creator of all universe,

1. Atharva-śikha: कारणे तु ध्येये स्वरूपसंपन्न स्वशर्म नरायणसमये।
2. Śivakarṇāmṛta, pp.16-17: केशुचितमं भवन्। वामस्तैशृष्टिस्वतः श्रवणे प्रणबोहे। शेषाधिकारणयेन न प्रहस्तु॥
3. Śivakarṇāmṛta, p.20: नमोऽदिकारणवे पश्चायाने भवे सुयस्ता ब्रह्मानीमासूर्यनेना नमस्ता बादलायेन ...
4. Śivakarṇāmṛta, p.20: महाभारते श्वामिन्द्यरक्षा यापनार्थ वत्से, क्षरितं प्रथम्या भावित्यां मुक्तसंन्निश्चयो ध्वनि स तु नारायण: प्रमुः।
and the same has been confirmed by Manu. Rudra and Brahma are born from Narayana, says the Mahā Upaniṣad. Hence Narayana is the most prominent deity. The whole universe is created by him alone.

Appayya Dīkṣita characterises these arguments of the Pāncarātras as _prattling of fools_ and refutes them as follows:

The cause of the universe is the Brahman itself, and nothing else can be regarded as the cause.

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1. _Manusmṛti_, I, 8-10.

2. _Mahā (?) Narayana Up._, :

    नारायणाद्र ब्रह्म नामते ।
    नारायणाद्र सदौ नामते ।

3. _Sīvakarpamrta_, p. 24 :

    तुरारखस्व बिहाया न्यथाकृति त्रिक्षुकिनि ।
    कंठ्रेयन निराकर्ष्य सारसुलिफ्सिलिप ।
For, the Vedânta texts such as "दहनेकः प्रथममास !" etc., confirm only this view. Especially the statement made by Śiva in the Atharva-śiras, namely, "I alone was at the beginning" etc., can be held to be purportful only when it is understood as suggestion that Śiva, being identified with the Brahman, is enlightening the gods about the Brahman. Śiva is within every substance, and this has been proved in detail in the Śivatattvaviveka. In such a manner, the whole Atharva-śiras can be understood as referring to Śiva as the root cause of the universe, and as referring to Śiva, who resides within every substance.

As for the statement in the Subāla Upaniṣad, wherein Nārāyaṇa is stated as being the creator, it will be sufficient to point out that there are several other passages in the Upaniṣads which speak of both Śiva and Brahma as the creators. All this would lead to

3. Sivakarpāmṛta, p.32 - न दुरासीलोक्चे दर्शन प्राप्तते
4. Ibid., p.32 - प्राप्ततिष्ठा खिदके बासिष्ठ ।
the conclusion that, at the time of creation, the creator was variously called as Śiva, Nārāyaṇa, or Brahma, through ignorance. But the inspiring deity behind all these is the same, and that is Śiva alone.\footnote{Śivakarṇamṛta, p.33}

As for the Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad, it can be said that that Upaniṣad is devoted to the doctrine of Śiva alone. Its concluding verses unequivocally glorify Śiva\footnote{Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad, III.5}. The concluding statement that 'there is no other path to go by'\footnote{Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad, III.5} reiterates that Śiva alone is the highest reality. The same has been emphasised in the Kaivalya Upaniṣad\footnote{Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad, III.5}. Even the Puruṣa-sūktā cannot be said to be describing Nārāyaṇa\footnote{Śivakarṇamṛta, p.37}. For, the word Iśāna, in the sentence, "moreover, He is the Lord of

\begin{enumerate}
\item Śivakarṇamṛta, p.33:
\begin{quote}
सतीयकालेन्नतोष्णम् सिद्धवन्दन तद्विध्वनातुः  
परमेश्वरं तेन्यं ग्राम्येण विद्यागति ।
\end{quote}
\item Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad, III.5:
\begin{quote}
गा ते सदृश्चित।
\end{quote}
\item Ibid, III.8. नामः पन्था निपतो समनायः
\item Kaivalya Upaniṣad, VII.1: बुद्धास्तयम् परमेश्वरं प्रभु रुप्ता कर्मो नीर्मिति स्वात्मनात् ।
\item Śivakarṇamṛta, p.37:
\end{enumerate}
immortality\(^1\), can denote no other deity than Śiva. It is true that the word Isana is derived from the root Is - 'to rule', and hence can be made applicable to Nārāyaṇa also. But, in the present context, that word should not understood merely in its etymological sense. Traditionally it has a specific sense and that too relating to Lord Śiva\(^2\). This traditional sense is clearly mentioned in the Abhidhāna-Kosa\(^3\). The principle, namely, that the traditional sense is usually more powerful than the etymological sense has been followed by Śaṁkara in his commentary, in the Pramīta-section\(^4\). There also, the word Isana has been treated as a decisive factor. It cannot be said that the word Isana has been traditionally used also in the sense of Viṣṇu, as it is found in the Viṣṇusahasranāma. For, according to the

\(^{1}\) Rgveda, I.90.2

\(^{2}\) Śivakārṅamṛṭa, p.37 : तत्र तस्य योगूर्तेः तस्य योगूर्तेः

\(^{3}\) Śivakārṅamṛṭa, p.37 : श्रवास्यं श्रवास्यं संकरसमुच्चारः

\(^{4}\) Śaṁkarabhaṣya on the Vedānta-Sūtra, 1.3.24-25.
statement of the Harivamśa, all the names of Viṣṇu are basically, the names of Śiva.

In the Vaiṣṇava-sūtras, the sentence 'thī and śrī are your wives' also indicates, Śiva. Because that sentence is used as a mantra in the Grahyāṇā, in honour of Gaurī. So Gaurī alone is to be understood to have been here referred to as the consort of Śiva. The Śivapurāṇa also speaks about Mahālakṣmī as being one of the Śaktis of Śiva.

Similarly, the sentence, 'वि कारण ब्रह्म' is from the Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad is intended ultimately to lead to the knowledge of Śiva as the root-cause of the world. The sages who had put

1. Śivakarpāmṛta, p.40: हरिवर्धने केशास्माजयामुनि
   नामानि तब गृहविन्द माणि थोके महान्ति ।
   लाभ्येक तम नामानि नात्र काम्य किषारण |

2. Ibid, p.44: -हरिय ते मंत्रम भूमे सोमा भिक्षुकायानि सैणी: पुजया विनिष्योपमय ।

3. Ibid, p.44: श्रीमतीहेष्वरी परा। महास्मृतिः स्वाता
   स्थाना सर्वसंहेस्वरे मित्रमुर्वे क्षतिक-दक्षिणपत्तिःवापवर्तम ।

4. Śvetāsvatara Up., I.1.
that question perfectly well knew that the root-cause of the universe was the Brahman, but they have here expressed the desire to know the specific deity behind this creation. As the whole of this Upanishad is in praise of Śiva, it naturally follows that, according to it, Śiva alone is the root-cause of the universe. Similarly, the Atharva-sīrās passage\(^1\), which speaks of the ultimate cause that is to be meditated upon, specifically refers to Śiva. Because therein also, Śiva has been described as the cause of all.

As for the objection based upon the tāmasatva of certain Purāṇas like the Śiva, the Linga, etc., it needs to be pointed out that the Purāṇas were, first of all, recited by Brahmā. These Purāṇas were afterwords abridged by other sages, and various specific deities came to be glorified in them in accordance with the time\(^2\).

1. **Atharva-sīrās**: कारण तु यत्रेष्यः शवीश्वरकारणस्यः
   शवीश्वरः समपुराणायमे

2. **Śivatattva-viveka**: क्षणिद्वया क्षणिद्वयायः क्षणिद्वयाय: प्रतात्माते
   तत्तत्त्वा न्यत्तत्त्वात्तत्त्वात्तत्त्वेश्च मद्धितमः
   ताति ताति प्रजोतानि चिरास्तेन न मुक्ति

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So all the Purāṇas have one common origin. Hence, the characterisation of some Purāṇas as sātvika and of others as tāmasa has no sense and is entirely unwarranted.

Even in the Smṛtis, such as the Yājñavalkya-smṛti, Śiva is glorified. Bādarāyana also glorifies Śiva in the Mahābhārata and in the Harivaṃśa, by stating that Śiva is the main cause of the universe. The same view has been again confirmed by the Pārāśara-purāṇa.

As for the sentence, ‘Nārāyanah param Brāhma’, it may be pointed out that, in the Padma-purāṇa,

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1. Yājñavalkya-smṛti: बिद्युधरूपः महादेवं व्योमाकारं शदा शिवः।

2. Śivakarpāmṛta, pp. 71-72: महवि बादरायणेन केशराविनि ... हरिण्यवक्तेर तत्वमस्य कारस्य स्माधितमः।

3. Ibid., p. 76: स्वितेव शदा शार्म्यमुद्दिता कृत्त्वा नामधिकं विद्वत्तादिनि पराजयपुरुषकर्मः।


5. Śivakarpāmṛta, p. 82.
Vṛṣṇi has been described as a part (āmsa) of Śiva. Hence Śiva and Vṛṣṇi may either be regarded as being identical or Vṛṣṇi may be regarded as a part of Śiva.

As for the sentence from the *Mahā-Upaniṣad*¹ wherein Śiva has been described as being born from the fore-head of Vṛṣṇi, attention may be drawn to the following legend in that connection: Śiva was pleased with Nārāyaṇa and bestowed upon him a boon that he would be born from the latter's body. This legend has been included in the *Kūrma-purāṇa*² and in the *Mahābhārata*³. Indeed, many other quotations can be cited to prove this point.

Appayya Dīkṣīta concludes this brief discourse on Śiva being the Supreme Divinity with the claim that the essence extracted from all Śrutis and tested by means

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1. *Mahā Up.*: तत्त्व व्याख्यातंम् कृपापि: पुज्योहेजनम्.
2. *Śivakarnāmṛta*, p. 86: बहुं च मयो व्याख्यातम्यान्ते धेरार्कुटः
of various tests has been presented in that discourse.

The work ends with a salutation to Śiva and the usual colophon.

1. Ibid, p. 90:

2. Ibid, p. 90:

3. Ibid, pp. 90-91:
The Śivakarnāmṛta is another small composition of Appayya Dīkṣita. As has been already pointed out, this work aims at the refutation of the Pāñcarātra doctrine, according to which Nārāyaṇa represents the highest Brahman. The whole work is in prose.

The Śivakarnāmṛta is divided into two parts. The first part which is called the Purvapakṣa tries to establish the greatness of Viṣṇu. The view represented here is also known as Viṣṇu-saṃvottama-vāda. In order to prove the greatness of Nārāyaṇa, the Purvapakṣa mainly relies on the Mahā Upaniṣad, the Narāyaṇa Upaniṣad, and the Mahābhārata. The main point which he has sought to establish is that Viṣṇu or Nārāyaṇa is the Para-brahman, and all other gods are subordinate to Viṣṇu. The Purāṇas, such as the Śaiva, the Skanda, etc., no doubt, do eulogize the greatness of Śiva. But these Purāṇas are after all tāmasa-purāṇas, and must not therefore be taken to be in any way authoritative.

Appayya Dīkṣita describes the various arguments of the Purvapakṣa as mere prattling of
fools, yet he undertakes to refute them. While refuting the view propounded by the Purva
apakṣa, Appayya Dīkṣita cites various passages from the same texts as adduced by the Purva
apakṣa and shows that according to the very works quoted by the Purva
napakṣa, Śiva alone has to be regarded as the highest Brahman. Even the works like the Hariva
ta, the Mahābhārata, etc., which are highly respected by the followers of the Pāncaratra school speak of Śiva as the highest Brahman. In addition to this, Appayya Dīkṣita quotes from various Upaniṣads, Purāṇas, and other important works.

As for the tāmasatva of the Śaiva Purāṇas, Appayya Dīkṣita points out that all the Purāṇas, including the Vaiṣṇava, and the Śaiva Purāṇas, have one common origin, and that is Brahma. Afterwards the Purāṇas were abridged by various sages so that they should be rendered

1. Śivakarnāmṛta, p. 24:

punarvaib vilahasa mohanurattānāni sthitam
sambhdnet niyamārthānām nāmāsūtrābhāśīnaḥ
suitable to the particular periods. This, according to Appayya Dīkṣita, clearly shows that the argument about the tāmasatva of the Śaiva Purāṇas is not valid at all. Appayya Dīkṣita adds that all these points have been explained in detail in his well-known work, the Śivatattvaviveka, and that only a summary of the points discussed in that work is being given in the present treatise. In other words, this Śivakāraṇāmṛta represents a kind of an abridged edition of the Śivatattvaviveka.

The prose style of Appayya Dīkṣita is simple, yet forceful. The arguments on behalf of the Pāñcarātras are stated in the first part of the monograph covering 28 pages, while the refutation of these arguments covers 62 pages. One does not, however, fail to think that both the arguments of the Purva-pākṣaṇa and the counter-arguments of Appayya Dīkṣita are of a very superficial character. They do not reflect any logical rigour or sublimity on the part of the author. Indeed, the impression made by this monograph is that it is not at all a production of

1. Śivakāraṇāmṛta, p. 67:

शिवाकारणामर्त, पृ. ६७ :

तारकमाण्डकृत्व त्वमहान् त्वमाविषयं कथितमिचि।
तामि तामि प्रभोत्तमि विहृत्तव्र न कुस्मिति॥
Appayya Dīkṣita's mature years. The theme is palpably sectarian and not purely metaphysical. The Śivakārnāṁrta perhaps only indicates the growing zeal of Appayya Dīkṣita for the doctrine of Śivādvaita. Appayya Dīkṣita spared no pains in refuting even the slightest objection raised against the Śivādvaita.
Section II

Chapter - 9.

Śivādvaitanirṇaya.
The Śivādvaitanirnāya of Appayya Dīkṣita has been printed and published by the University of Madras. The printed edition which covers 260 pages in all has been divided into six parts, namely, introduction, analytical table of contents, the text proper, English translation, and errata. The introduction which is in English deals with the life and works of Appayya Dīkṣita and also contains a discussion about the system of Śrīkaṇṭha and its presentation by Appayya Dīkṣita. It extends up to 45 pages. This is followed by an analytical table of contents and 19 pages are devoted to this. The Sanskrit text covers 96 pages, after which follows the English translation in 145 pages. The notes on some important points only extend over 16 pages. The book ends with errata (relating to text) which consists of two pages.

In his introduction to the Śivādvaitanirnāya, the editor mentions that he has utilised five manuscripts, one of which is incomplete. The manuscripts are:

1) A paper manuscript in Nāgarī characters, from the Library at Adyar, No. VIII, E.24.

1. This book has been edited by S.S. Surnanarayana Sastrī and has been published by the University of Madras in 1929. It is printed at the Śrī Vāṇī Vilāsa press, Srirangam.
(ii) A palm-leaf manuscript in Malayalam characters also from the same Library, No. XXXIV C.1.

(iii) A paper manuscript in Nāgarī characters, from the Oriental Manuscripts Library at Mysore, No. C. 1170.

(iv) A Nāgarī transcript (No. 454) of a manuscript in Telgu characters (No. 9768), from the Palace Library at Tanjore.

(v) An incomplete manuscript in Nāgarī script, from the Oriental Manuscripts Library, Egmore.

The work begins with the verse, which directly opens up an investigation of the Śivādvaita doctrine expounded by Śrīkanṭha. The author seeks to find out whether this Śivādvaita teaches qualified non-dualism or non-qualified non-dualism. The verse reads:

श्रीकृष्ण-स्वामार्याः। हिंद्रा-न्ते निन्नुः। शिवाधूळम् ।
तत्त्वं विशिष्टमयमिश्रितमविशिष्ट्वेति विन्यामात्र ॥

1. Śivādvaita-nirṇaya 1.
The work ends with the usual colophon, namely,

This has been followed by another verse in anustubha-metre.
But this verse is found only in one manuscript, which, according to the editor, is incomplete. The verse reads:

1. Śivādvaita-nirnaya, p. 96.
In the introductory verse, the author states that, an attempt is made in the work Śivādvaitanirnāya to consider the doctrine of Śivādvaita with a view to determining that doctrine, as preached by Śrīkantha, can be characterised as whether qualified non-dualism (Visiṣṭādvaita) or non-qualified non-dualism (aviṣiṣṭādvaita).

From the adhikaraṇas like āraṁbhāṇa¹, it appears that the principle of qualified non-dualism is favoured by Śrīkantha, while his commentary on topics such as aniyama² etc., it seems that he is more inclined towards non-qualified non-dualism. Both these views being mutually contradictory cannot be said to be equally acceptable. Hence, there arises a doubt. The present enquiry has been undertaken to remove that doubt and to arrive at some definite conclusion in this matter.

It is possible that when Śrīkantha refers to his Śivādvaita, he intends suggesting only qualified non-dualism. For, in the āraṁbhāṇa - section, Śrīkantha declares that he

1. Śrīkantha-bhāṣya on the Vedānta-sūtras, II.1.15.
2. Ibid, III.3.32.
does not side with those who accept absolute difference between the Brahman and the world, nor does he favour the view which establishes absolute non-difference between these two. Nor is he one of those who posit both difference and non-difference. He wants to maintain that between the Brahman and the world there exists that kind of qualified-non-dualism which exists between the body and the embodied, or between the quality and the qualified. The same has been confirmed by him in the Bhoktrapatti - section¹, wherein he says that Śiva alone, without a second is both the cause and the effect. This constitutes the doctrine of qualified-non-dualism.

In the Īkṣati - section², on the other hand, the theory of the absolute non-dualism is refuted as follows: By the term sat (existence), it is understood that the entity which is of the nature of existence is free from qualifications, as the sat is a second and it is one. The words 'without a second' declare the property of being the material cause of the word, and consequently omniscience and omnipotence. In the same section, qualified-non-dualism is established while the

¹. Ibid, II.1.14.
². Śrīkantha-bhāṣya on I.1.5.
primary significance of the word sat is being considered. Sat, which is of the form of both stem and suffix, denotes two entities, namely, Śiva and Śakti, as has been said by learned persons\(^1\). It is Paramesvara alone being qualified by Śakti in the form of the world, subtle and gross, intelligent and non-intelligent. The same has been denoted by the word sat. The use of the singular form of the word brahman in the same context is for the purpose of reminding one that Śakti and Śiva are not to be understood as being separate from each other; one has to understand that Śiva is alone and that he is only qualified by Śakti. The description, ‘they (Śiva and Śakti) ensoul all the world\(^2\), dispels the doubt that qualified-non-dualism does not result merely from the fact that the word sat means the Brahman and denotes Śiva qualified by Śakti, since there exists the inert world composed of ether etc.; and thereby it serves to show the inseparability

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1. Śivādvaitanirnaya, p.3: तथा अभियुक्तपूर्विकः
   ज्ञित: सिवरेव सत्प्रभृतिप्रत्ययो दिति।
   तौ श्रद्धा मरस्येन समस्तनगदात्मनः

2. The word – समस्तनगदात्मन in the above-mentioned verse quoted in F.No.1.
of that world from Śiva and Śakti through the element of Śakti. The same has been made clear in the subsequent part of the commentary. The meaning of sat as explained there applies equally to the word Brahman. For the very same reason, in the bhūman - section, while explaining the word Brahman along with bhūman all the worlds are shown to enter therein.

Here an objection is raised: If by the term bhūman is meant that in which nothing else is seen or heard etc., then, how can it be declared that where the bhūman is experienced, there is absence of all other perception. This objection is set aside by pointing out that, though the world is real it becomes an object of perception only as entering into what is signified by the bhūman, and not as separate therefrom. When a person becomes liberated, he is praised with the words, 'he attains independance, he attains lordship of mind', and so on. By 'lordship of speech' and so on, is to be understood the possession of speech and other senses, - pure, under his control, and untainted by matter. On his attaining such a state, this visible variegated universe becomes the Brahman itself embodied in light (ākāśa); this is the inner significance.

Similarly in the fourth chapter also, while commenting on the śūtra, नावे जामुद्रे | it is said that this universe is, indeed, perceived as being of the form of the Brahman by the released ones. Moreover, words like sat denote Śiva as qualified by Śakti, has been stated in the authoritative verse, cited above2. Similarly, in the Prakṛtyadhiharaṇa3 and the following sections, it has been made clear that the entire universe is the transformation of Śakti. Thus, qualified-non-dualism alone seems to have been expounded everywhere. How then can a doubt at all arise suggesting the acceptance by Śrīkantha of pure-non-dualism?

Further, in the section na sthanato'pi4 and the following one are set out only to establish the form of the Brahman is characterised by stainless auspiciousness and exists in relation to the world, and that it is not void of qualities.

This being the position, the prima facie view may be stated as follows: If the residence on the earth, embodiment,

2. See F.N. No. 1 on Page No. 779
4. Vedānta-Sūtra, III.2.11.
and so on were to be assumed in the case of the Brahman, then, just as, for a man there are defects associated with the subtle and gross bodily conditions in the states of waking, dreaming, deep sleep, swoon, and death, similarly would there be defects attached to the Brahman also, for, there would be no difference between the those two in respect of embodiment, etc. It has been declared in the śūtra, देहोगावः सा पिति.¹ that evils of transformation are dependent on the connection with the body. Further, it is admitted by all that residence in bodies is made filthy by presence of faeces, urine, flesh, etc. It thus becomes as distasteful as residence in the Raūrava and the like. The analogy of a king not being subject to his own orders does not apply here, because, in the case of evils experienced in the body, residence in the body is itself the cause. In this connection, it may be pointed out that the suffering connected with evil-smelling prison is caused by the presence in the prison itself, affecting him who resides there, of his own will, as the governor thereof, in the same way as him who is cast in the prison cell.

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1. Vedānta Śūtra, III.2.15.
Nor can it be said that the suffering is governed by karman and so, though the Brahman may reside in the body, for him who is free from karman, suffering consequent on bodily residence cannot come about. Even karmans endow different kinds of bodies like those of gods, man, beasts, etc., suitable to the varieties of suffering and thus cause the souls that enter therein to suffer.

Further, experience of suffering will certainly come to the Brahman, since being present in all bodies it becomes the object of denotation by such terms as Brahma and so on, which enter into injunctive and prohibitory statements, therefore, unavoidably affected by sins resulting from the disregard of injunctions, it becomes subject to the karman.

The Siddhanta here may be stated as follows: Since the Brahman is flawless, though it is present on the earth and so on, defects do not attach to it. The dual characteristics, namely of the absence of taint of any defect and of the presence of unsurpassed auspicious qualities, are well-known to belong to the Brahman from all texts of
the śrutis¹ and the smṛtis².

Even if the Brahman is connected with the Jīva, still the defects do not attach to it, for, the absence of any defects in it is declared by the term 'immortal' employed in the Upaniṣadic text, अपि तत्वान्वित्तम्: ।

In the Atharvaśīras also, Rudra is described as the lord⁴, and this is in conformity with the above-mentioned text. Further, though the Brahman and the Jīva are connected with the same body, the difference in the enjoyment of the fruit of that connection is stated in the Svetāśvatara Upanisad⁵.

As for the distinctionlessness which follows from the statements regarding the formlessness etc., it may be said that if two texts conflict, it is not proper to deny

1. Chandogya Up., VIII.7.1: य जात्वानपहतपत्माना ... सत्यकाम: सत्यकामः।

2. Sivādvaitanirnaya, p. 7: ज्ञानदिग्लांस्तेपेन: सक्तोक्त्स निन्मायता पुषुपाशिशत्त:।


4. Atharva-śīra Up., 1.2-3. यद वें स्थिरं तद महानं -- यथेच विच्छु: etc.

5. Svetāśvatara Up., IV.6. द्वादशीणैव भूना स्वाभ लभन्ते जैस विषयतः।
the true significance of one of those by suggesting that it has a purport which it does not really have. Rather, it is proper to uphold the principal that all traditional doctrine is equal in authority, by endowing both the statements with their true purport. The very texts which predicate the connection of the Brahman with bodies declare its non-connection with the defects resulting therefrom. Just as the akāśa etc., which are bodiless are not affected by the flaws due to presence in the body, so also the Brahman is unaffected. Moreover, the analogy of the governor of a prison does not hold good since suffering is due to the control by karmans and not to the intrinsic nature of things.

Moreover, the subjects of instructions and prohibitions are the various individuals connected with their respective bodies; the denotative function of terms like Brahman, etc., being thus fulfilled, they have no further reference to Īśvara whose immanence is known only from the srutis. Further the texts which declare omniscience, omnipotence of the Brahman are quite abundant in number. There is, indeed, no expression about the Brahman occurring in the Vedanta-texts which does not suggest the absence of some defect or the presence of some auspicious attribute in
the Brahman. The eminent sages do clearly recognise the
two-fold characteristics of the Brahman. This non-
attachment of defects to the Brahman is indicated by the
\textit{srutis} through two illustrations - one of the sky which
becomes manifold in jars and the other of the sun in sheets
of water. The first \textit{dr\textasciitilde{\text{st\textasciitilde{\text{anta}}}} teaches that the one self is
present in many, while the second teaches that, though this
self is present in many, there is no taint of defects
resulting therefrom. These two-fold characteristics of the
Brahman are stated in the \textit{Brah\textasciitilde{\text{d\textasciitilde{\text{ar\textasciitilde{\text{any}}\textasciitilde{\text{aka}}} Upan\textit{isad}}}}^1.

But there is a controversy about the negation\textsuperscript{2}
which occurs in the same passage of that \textit{Upan\textit{isad}}. According
to the \textit{Purvapaksin}, the negation relates to both the
sensible and the super-sensible worlds which are previously
declared as the modes of the Brahman.

The \textit{Siddh\textasciitilde{\text{antin}}, on the other hand, argues that,
if this negation is taken to apply to both the sensible
and the super-sensible worlds, then, as these modes are known
only from the \textit{srutis}, the other declaration made in the

\begin{enumerate}
\item II.3.1.
\item \textit{Ibid}, II.3.6 : \textit{अधात आदेश नैति नैति} \textit{etf.}
\end{enumerate}
śrutis would be rendered purportless. So it is proper to conclude that the mode of the nature of the declared this-muchness, which is entertained in the intellect because of the earlier statement about being qualified by forms, sensible and supersensible, is, here, denied. This is, again, supported by the subsequent passages. The final view would thus be that the Brahman alone is higher and greater than the sensible and the supersensible worlds, which are the correlate of the this-muchness that is negated. There is none other than this Brahman, which is superior to this world, and controller thereof. Or, there is another interpretation possible and this is: other than this Brahman, which is within the range of the negation of the declared this-muchness, there is no other great being superior to the world as its controller. In both these interpretations, there is this merit, namely, that the word "other" in the text (anyat) has not been rendered purportless.

If it is said that, the term 'thus' (iti) refers to the two declared forms, and that any other interpretation is unsuitable than, it might be replied that this would be the case if the Brahman could be an object of perception in the form of existence, like the 'thisness' of the rope. That, however, is not possible. According to the scriptural
texts, Brahman is unmanifest, and devout contemplation (saśrādhana) is declared to be the means of the realisation of the Brahman. Such devout meditation on the Brahman brings about not only knowledge of it, but also distinctive lordly powers as in case of Kṛṣṇa, Agastya, Visvamitra, etc.

Now, this world is declared to a form of the Brahman - देव ज्ञानेन रूपे मुख्यां वापृत्ते च ।. This can be understood in a way other than through the assumption of adhyāsa. The term rūpa occurring in this Upaniṣadic passage is indicative of statement, not of quality, and that sentence speaks of a multiplicity of states, like the multiplicity of postures of a single serpent such as being coiled, straight or crooked. Or, even if the difference between the world and the Brahman, is accepted, still as everything is related to the form of the Brahman as one genus, the treatment of the world only as of the form of the Brahman, is valid. Or neither of these two positions may be accepted, because, in the first view, two defects -

1. Katha Up., V.1.9.

2. Brhadāranyaka Up., II.3.6 :
transformation and inertness - may attach to the Brahman, and in the second view also, that may happen, since the world, dependent on the genus Brahman, is also admitted to be the Brahman. Therefore, as has been established in an earlier context, namely, in the section 'Aṁśo Nānāvyapadesat'[^1^], the class of intelligent beings is an aṁśa (element) of the Brahman. The same kind of relation as a particular mode of what is qualified, being of the same nature as inseparable attributes like light, genus, quality and the body, is taught here.

After this conclusion, Appayya Diksita turns to another point, namely, the embodiment of the Brahman. From the negation of old age, etc., of the Brahman, which is often declared in the Upaniṣadic sentences[^2^], the inference as to its embodiment in the world is necessitated. Only if the Brahman is regarded as being present therein, can be satisfactorily explain the declaration of the denial of the consequent objects, which would accrue to the Brahman.

Moreover, the section Ādarādalopah[^3^] is intended to

[^1^]: Vedānta Sūtras, I.3.42.
[^2^]: cf. Chāndogya Up., VIII.1.5; Brhadāranyaka Up., III.8.8. etc.
prove that the attributes, the physical form etc. of Śiva are true and eternal and not fictitious and impermanent.

Here, the Purvapakṣin argues that the only form of Śiva is that of Bliss.

The Siddhāntin refutes this by pointing out that the physical form and other attributes are true, because they are intentionally repeated by the śrūtis. One cannot ask how a re-statement due to the difference of Śākhās can amount to purportful repetition. Where there are differences of Śākhās, the purpose of a re-statement is its being properly understood by those who study the different Śākhās. Since the gunopasāṁhāra secures the contemplation of all qualities wherever mentioned, their repetition even in different Śākhās cannot but be purportful, and texts declaring the absence of qualities have to be understood as indicating absence only of undesirable qualities.

It is in this manner that Tadvacana-section\(^1\) shows that the Brahman is saguna, saprapaṇca, etc., and that there is no other higher Nirguṇa Brahman. Hence, the

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doubt which now arises is whether the Brahman which is to be attained by the liberated persons is identical with Śiva or different from him, and whether the salvation means the attainment of the condition of the Brahman without qualities or the attainment of the similarity to the Brahman with qualities.

As the Supreme Brahman is formless and attributeless, liberation is the attainment of that condition. This is declared in the text ज्ञान सन्त: ज्ञानमयेति or ज्ञानविदं ज्ञेति महति. so says the Pūrvapākṣin.

The Siddhānta is: Śiva, as he is described above, is the Brahman, and only the attainment of similarity with him is the supreme release. For, after the devotee has attained to him through meditation as being present within the small lotus (dahara pûndarîka), and so on, these comes about the manifestation of his own form. It is only as a consequence of this that these ensue his enjoyments, such as laughing etc. The texts, which deny any qualities in the Brahman, in contradistinction with the texts which declare Śiva the presence of qualities in

1. e.g. ज्ञानविदं ज्ञेति श्रवणमयेति or ज्ञानविदं ज्ञेति महति. etc.
Siva, the Supreme Brahman have the purpose of only negating objectionable qualities in the Brahman. The participle eva in such texts as "becoming Brahman alone, he attains Brahman", actually means iva (like or similar to). The participle eva is seen to have been often used in the sense of iva. Or the sentence may mean: "he attains only after obtaining Brahman's nature through the expansion of knowledge." Thus the Brahman is only that being which is endowed with attributes, possessed of physical form etc., Śrīkaṇṭhācārya has, thus established qualified-non-dualism as the final doctrine. The view that the journey along the arcirādimārga is unnecessary for nirānvayopāsakas, which is introduced by the words 'some say', does not represent Śrīkaṇṭha's own final position. Similarly the identity with the Supreme Brahman suggested in the Sūtra is but imagined like that between Garuḍa and him who incants the Garuḍa spell. Even Sudarsanācārya, in his Tatparya-Samgraha cites only this illustration.

1. Śrīkaṇṭha-bhāṣya on III.3.19.
2. Vedānta Sūtra I.1.31.
3. This Tatparya-Samgraha is the Catur-Veda-tatparya-samgraha, known as the Śruti-Sūkti-mālā. The verse

Contd...
If it was agreed that Śrīkaṇṭhācārya states the doctrine of qualified-non-dualism and accepts the difference of the finite self from the Brahman, then, there would arise some difficulty from the statements in the sections about the Brahman being the object of perception in the form of such as 'pot exists', and the Brahman not being regarded as the efficient cause (upādana kāraṇa) of all. Such a difficulty may be removed by accepting that those statements are made for the purpose of giving room for the inferential conclusion as to the illusoriness of the world on the ground that the variable pot etc., are imagined in the continuous existent Brahman. The same has been, again, supported by Śrīkaṇṭhācārya in his commentary on the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad in section IV.11., which is otherwise known as the Yada Tamo hymn.

This has been refuted by the Siddhāntin by saying that the Brahman is not the object of perception. This is

Contd..

is the verse No.42 which runs as follows:

हृददासवकैसिकत्वदन्व्यावघा:मन्द्री मथा मुद्रावक्ष्या गतत्मान्

हुट्ट्वनाचार्य is also known as Haradatta.

stated in the commentary on the Sūtra - तद्वप्पक्तमाह हि।

Hence, the above-mentioned description in sections 'Janmādyasya' and 'Vācārāmbhāna' relates to the attributive aspect of the Brahman, that is cit-sakti.

This position is further objected to. In the abhāva-section it is said that the form of the supreme goal enjoyed by the liberated ones is the unlimited Bliss of the Brahman. This means that the bliss of that liberated one and of the Brahman is equal. How is this consistent with the view of the difference between the Brahman and the finite selves?

In setting aside this objection it is pointed out that there is no inconsistency whatsoever, since cit-Sakti which is the Supreme Energy and Transcendent Bliss of Śiva is of the form of the entire world, intellegent and non-intellegent, and is non-different thereof in essence from the finite selves, from which these results blissfulness. Therefore, even if the finite self is different from the Brahman, the Bliss of the Brahman may appropriately be the goal in respect of finite selves. The same has been

1. Vedānta Sūtra III.2.22.
2. Ibid, IV.4.10.
confirmed even in the amsa section\(^1\) wherein the prima facie view that the Brahman itself attains the form of the finite self has been refuted by establishing the final conclusion that the finite self is an element of the Brahman, being of the nature of a particular attribute of the qualified Brahman. So the view of Śrīkanthācārya is that, the Brahman is qualified by energy of the form of the worlds, intelligent and non-intelligent. He does not sponsor the view of Pure-non-dualism – namely that the Brahman is attributeless, formless and unrelated to the world.

Though this is what appears from the beginning to the end, yet, on a careful examination of the implications of the commentary, pure-non-dualism alone is seen to be the final conclusion. For the commentary on the Sūtra – अन्यिन्यमः सर्वामविरोधः गृह्याणानामस्याम् \(^2\) is directed towards the refutation of the view that the journey along the path of light etc., is to be understood only in such meditations as the Upakośala-vidyā. There the conclusion seems to be that there is no such restriction as to the journey along the path of light etc. Still Śrīkāṇtha further adds that there is no objection even to that interpretation, since, for devotees of that which is non-related, there is no need

\(^1\) Ibid, II.3.42. \(^2\) eg. Vedānta Sūtras III.3.32.
of that journey along the path of light. Hence, it has
to be inferred that both interpretations are recognised
as expressing Śrīkantha's own position.

Similarly, another view is put forth in the
Tadapiti-section also for the enlightened one. The Purvaśākha
there is as follows: There is no journey; the text about
the departure, etc., concerns those knowers of the Brahman,
who seek liberation by degrees. The Siddhāntin rebutes
this position by saying that the attainment even of the
ever-present Brahman can come about only by stages; there
is thus no difficulty in respect of this going since, a
subtle body continues to exist. The text - न तस्य प्राणा
सुक्तकामिनि २ really means that there is the departing of the
Prānas from the embodied one, not from the body, since the
words "of him" (tasya) relate to the finite self of the
context, spoken of as one who has no desires.

Now, the finite self is indicated by the possessive
'of him', as that which is related to the Prānas, not as
the basis of ablation (apādāna). The apādāna is certainly

1. eg. Ibid, IV.2.6.
the body. There being no question of the departing of the Prānas from the finite self, the denial thereof is inappropriate.

This view is, however, shown to be not correct. If a basis of ablation be needed to complete the sense, in preference to the body that is not mentioned, the finite self which is mentioned as related to the Prānas should be understood. Further, since of the Prānas are understood to be related to the finite self, the statement of their relatedness would be unfruitful. The possessive which mentions bare relationship should be preferably interpreted to connote the specific relationship of ablation, as in - "He listens to (the singing) of the actor" and so on, where the bare possessive 'of' means 'proceeding from'. That the finite self alone is the apādana is clear from the text N tatha Prāṇa stūkhaṃnī. Still, in order to remove the doubt that the attainment of the Brahman by those who know it as being without attributes may have been denied here, the other view set forth at the close of the aniyama section is mentioned again. Here, at the end, in the words,

1. e.g. Madhyandina Sākha reads as: N tatha Prāṇa stūkhaṃnī.

2. Śrikantha-bhāṣya on III.3.32.
some say that for the devotees of what is non-related, there is liberation here, even with the falling off of the gross body, passing along the path of light etc., not being obligatory on all. The Ācārya who holds the above view. 'Now, thinks, that the text - 'of him, the vital airs' etc., is intended to state some special feature of the enlightened soul and is hence inconsistent with the rising and departing from the body which is possessed of unenlightenment. The principals of interpretation do not demand a different sense, the sense is determined by the upakrama. For example in the legend of Prajāpati's gift of horse, wherein it is stated Prajāpati gave a horse to Varuṇa. He caught the disease. He suffered much. He thought of a sacrifice to Varuṇa. He performed that sacrifice on four potsherds (catuskapāla). Thereby he was relieved of suffering caused by the bonds of Varuṇa. From the drift of this introductory passage, it appears that the performance of a sacrifice to Varuṇa on four potsherds is about to be enjoined on him who makes a gift of horse. But the sentence — वस्त्रणेव वा भैरवं ग्रहितं यों प्रतिगृहितं यावलोक्यं शवान् प्रतिगृहित्यायत् तावलोक्यान् कुम्भकरान् निर्वेष्ट्व | directly prescribes

1. Śivadvaitanirṇaya, p. 30.
the sacrificer, though there is the expression, येहेच्छेप्रतिमुद्धाति, it is not thought that the duty to sacrifice belongs to him who accepts. The identification of the enlightened soul with the Brahman is again established by the Upaniṣadic sentence - ज्ञोऽव स्नः ब्रह्माम्पेति।  where the word अपयस्य does not necessarily imply distinction. The कण्या-version - न तत्प्राणा बुल्कामान्ति confirms the above assumption and it is in conformity with the further part - जन्मंग्र समस्तं। hence, the मध्यवैष्णव-version - न तस्यात् प्राणा बुल्कामन्ति is to be interpreted in light of this कण्या-version and not vice-versa. For the non-departure of the vital airs is made clear of by words, 'they remain ever here', uttered in reply to Ārtaṇgha's question. It cannot be said that Ārtaṇgha's third question relates to the unenlightened one. His fourth and fifth questions make this quite clear. Mere proximity of questions relating to the unenlightened ones cannot counter-act the clear indication of the characteristic marks pertaining to the

1. Ibid.
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
5. Ibid
Vidvān (the enlightened one). Nor is there unity of context, as seen from the diversity and indirectness of the questions which are designed to perplex and humble Yajñavalkya.

Similarly at the close of the following section, the view of pure-non-dualism is established. That section runs thus: To the enlightened one, whose prānas have departed through the artery in the head, does the attainment of the Brahman come about only by the path of light or by any other path?

The prima facie view in connection with this doubt is this: The attainment of the Brahman is possible even by another path, the stages of which are the palates, the organ hanging down between them, the root of hair, and the halves of the skull as are mentioned in the Vyāhrti-vidya.

The Siddhānta is: It is well-known that the path of light etc., is common to all modes of meditation,

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as is said in the Chāndogya Upanişad¹ and in the Brhadāraṇyaka Upanişad².

Similarly the commentary on the ānumānika-section³ shows indirectly that this non-difference is acceptable to the bhāsyakāra (i.e. Śrīkanṭha). The Śāmkhyas cannot claim that the katha-text - ⁴ declares of the unveiled that is to be known, since that verse relates to Prajñā. This is seen from the previous sentences - ⁵ where Prajñā refers to the Jīva, and its citation would be inappropriate except on the basis of identity of the Jīva and Paramēśvara.

This has been objected to by the Pūrvapakṣin as follows: Even on the hypothesis of identity there is a recognition of distinction of topics as relating to the finite or the Absolute. Hence, the reference to the Jīva,

2. Brhadāraṇyaka Up., VI.2.15.
3. e.g. Vedānta Sūtras I.4.6.
4. e.g. Katha Up., III.15.
5. e.g. Ibid, III.13.
in any case, is inappropriate. This objection is set aside by pointing out that the śrutī has examples of a reply being given about the Brahman, when the question is about the Jīva. An example is to be found in Yama's answer to the third question of Naciketas, which latter certainly relates to the departed Jīva. It equally relates to the Brahman. There would be lack of congruity between the question and the answer, but for the non-difference of the Brahman with the Jīva. Even if it is so, still the question does not relate to the finite self, since Naciketas already does have faith in its existence. Even on the basis of non-difference, the reply should not go beyond the terms of the question. In truth, the question relates to the released souls, that being the sense of Preta. Here, the difficulty about a question being barred by prior knowledge applies even to the released souls, about whose existence and nature Naciketas does have knowledge, as is seen from his question about the fires. If partial knowledge alone be admitted, that may hold good in the case of the mṛta-Jīva, also. The reply goes beyond the question on either interpretation of the word Preta. Even, the commentary on the first section¹ rests on the assumption of non-difference.

1. e.g. Vedānta Sūtra, I.I.I.
Moreover, in the commentary, it is definitely asserted that the Cit-Śakti of the Brahman is non-different from the Brahman. This being so, is it possible to avoid the non-difference of the finite self and the Brahman?

Here, an objection can be raised: Cit-Śakti is non-different even from the inert world, but the Brahman is not non-different from the latter. Hence, the non-difference from Cit-Śakti can establish not pure but only qualified non-dualism. Further, Brahman's non-difference from the Cit-Śakti is only figurative, the two being really different, just like the support and what is supported, the abode and what abides in it, etc.

This objection is rejected as follows: The doctrine of the attributeless Brahman is not apposed to the doctrine of transformation. The latter is, on the other hand, helpful to the doctrine of illusion, as is seen from the Śāṅkara-bhāṣya and also the Samkṣepa Ṣārīraka. Śrīkanṭha, too makes the judgements like 'san ghataḥ' rest on reality not of the world but of the Brahman. Further, the non-difference of Cit-Śakti from the Brahman is declared in
many places\(^1\). Especially in the \(\text{ādhyāna}-\text{section}\)\(^2\), where, according to the \textit{prima facie} view, the sheaths of \textit{ānāma}, \textit{Prāna}, etc., should, in all cases, be contemplated, since they are not imaginary, while, according to the \textit{Siddhānta}, the sheaths of \textit{food}, etc., are not to be so understood, since no purpose is thereby served. They are not useful for liberation, which can be secured by meditation on \textit{Śiva}, after abandoning everything else. They are mentioned only to indicate Brahman's superiority to all. Moreover, these sheaths of food, etc., are not to be thought of as caves wherein the Brahman is present, because each of them is spoken of as a self; and no other self but \textit{Śiva} is to be meditated upon for release.

This has been objected to on behalf of the \textit{Purva-pāksa}n: It is said, if this be so, even the companionship of \textit{Umā} may not be meditated on, as it is opposed to the injunction\(^3\), 'having abandoned all else'. It cannot be argued that, because of the non-difference from \textit{Śiva} of \textit{Umā}, who is of the nature of \textit{Cit-Śakti} referred to

1. \textit{e.g.} \textit{Ibid.}, I.1.23, I.3.16, I.2.1. III.3.11-14.
2. \textit{e.g.} \textit{Ibid.}, III.3.14.
3. \textit{e.g.} : 'भाषणमन्यत्परित्याज्य'
by the expression 'Self of Bliss', there can be no possibility of that being the object of the injunction concerning the abandonment. For, the expression 'self' used in the case of the sheath of food, etc., being common even to the 'Self of Bliss', it is preferable to understand finite self-hood of the 'Self of Bliss', as of those others.

The Siddhāntin's reply to this is: the 'Self of Bliss' is the Supreme Self. The expression is used in that sense elsewhere even in the Ananda-Vallī in the following statement¹. Thus Uma being non-different from Śiva, the Supreme Self, the meditation upon the former is not contradicted, when one thinks of the meditation on the latter. It, however, cannot be said that the Cit-Sakti being identical with the entire world, both cetana (animate) and acetana (inanimate), and the other intelligent beings like Brahma etc., are also non-different from the Brahman, and should be so meditated upon. Because then the exclusion enjoined by the sruti² would have no relevance at all. In this sentence the abandonment is enjoined not of

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1. e.g. अत्यन्त: आकात: संभूतः।
2. Atharvasikā Up., 2.

शिव जेको ध्येयं सिवहः: स्वन्ममन्तपरिपल्लभ।
what is really different from Śiva but of what appears to be different from Śiva is not to be abandoned because the appearance of the difference of the selves of food, etc., both from Śiva and among themselves, as seen from the declaration of the śruti in each hymn, their exclusion cannot be helped. As far Uma, though she is spoken of in terms of relationship of abode and what abides as the supreme ākāśa, and in relationship with attribute and substance in the text, the difference is mentioned only of the form of abode and of the form of the unsurpassed bliss, not of the intelligent being of the nature of Ambikā; of that form, non-difference alone is declared. For, in the anandādhikaraṇa, the understanding is established of the 'person, dark and twany' in all meditation. The expression 'dark and twany' is to be understood as indicating Śiva alone - the dark colour suggests the form of Ambikā, and the twany colour, the male form. The whole section thus becomes pregnant with the

1. Taittirīya Up., III.  अन्योऽक्त्वत भात्मा ।
2. Ibid, VII.
3. Vedānta-Sūtra, III.3.11.
non-difference of Śiva and Śakti. Hence, it follows that the selves of food, etc., are not to be contemplated in the same manner as Umā, at the time of the meditation on Śiva.

Here an objection may be raised on behalf of the Pūrvapakṣa as follows: According to Śrīkāntha, the self-bliss of Śiva is not Cit-śakti. This objection is rebutted by pointing out that the self is Cit-śikti, according to the second interpretation given, and it is this interpretation which is acceptable to Śrīkāntha as appears from his commentary on the Vedānta-Sūtras I.1.2. Further the identity is evident from the first chapter, and there is no need to reiterate it in the third chapter. Similarly its non-difference from Śiva is established in another section also, where the Pūrvapakṣin assumes that the loka attained by means of the saman-chants is the Viṣṇu-loka and that the person seems Viṣṇu, while the Siddhāntin controverts this position by pointing out that the reference to the 'supreme abode of Viṣṇu', does not create any difficulty, for there is no contradiction in holding that, that which is other than the form of the

world, of the nature of bliss unexcelled, of the form of Supreme abode of Visnu, that itself is the supreme Brahman, called Siva. Between Visnu and Siva, there is no essential difference other than a difference of state, as between the material and efficient cause.

Again an objection may be raised that the above-mentioned hymn refers to the Sivaloka only and not to Siva himself and that it is not possible to show that this hymn refers to Siva, holding to the present commentary. It is, indeed, not the commentator's conclusion that Siva is directly of the nature of Visnu who is of the form of the universe. Visnu is but a mode of Siva-śakti or Cit-śakti. This objection has been replied to as follows: Even if the supreme abode of Visnu is taken in the sense of Siva-cit-śakti, it is the identity of this with Siva that is asserted. Even another interpretation is possible. As expressions like the 'supreme abode of Visnu' etc., refer to Siva, proceeding on the basis of non-difference between Visnu and Siva, as it has been stated in the Puranas, Itihāsas, like the Mahābhārata etc. Thus, the, non-difference of Cit-śakti from Siva is established. No doubt

1. cf. etc.
the Cit-Śakti is described as being non-different from the Brahman in works like the Saṃkṣepa-Śarīraka and the Pañcapādikā. At the same time, the Cit-Śakti possesses the property of being an attribute. So, though the Cit-Śakti is non-different in essence, the teaching regarding the difference from the empirical point of view, as between substance and the attribute and so on occurring in the Gārgi Brāhmaṇa, the Dahara-vidyā, etc., is quite consistent. As for the statement in the Jamādi-Sūtra, it is made as to the figurative application of Self of Bliss to the Brahman and also of the word denoting knowledge as an attribute to the substance itself in the utkrānti-gatyāgati section. All these arguments lead to the conclusion that for Śrīkantha, Brahman is attributless (Nirguna), formless (Nirūpa), and unconnected with the world (Nisprapaṇca). So too, there is not, in the system of the Śrīkantha, as in that of Madhva, the acceptance of Viśeṣa. Indeed, such a principle would not help, for, if it did, the work of difference it would be the difference itself, and difference is not acceptable to Śrīkantha.

1. cf. Vedānta Sūtra, I.1.2.
2. cf. Ibid, II.3.29.
So, too, through the acceptance of the non-difference from the Brahman of Cit-Śakti, which is of the form of the entire universe, it follows that the world of ether etc., is an illusory manifestation of that Cit-Śakti. Empirical difference should necessarily be admitted, for, only then would there be consistency in the distinction which is made between the Brahman and the Cit-Śakti as non-changing and changing, in spite of the property of transformation admitted of the Cit-Śakti. Though the Cit-Śakti is said to be of the form of the entire world of intelligence, as of the form of the whole non-intelligent world, it does not follow that the world of intelligence is an illusory manifestation like ether, etc., for, if that were so, that world, ceasing through the realisation of the reality, there would result non-existence of the experience of the fruit of release.

Here, in the last few lines of this section (3.1922) Appayya Dīkṣita is rather obscure. A similar explanation is found in less work known as Ānanda-lahārī; but there too, he is not very clear. The main point of discussion, here, concerns the identity as that of illusory manifestation with their substrate. Though from the statement of doctrine of transformation in the Prakṛti
section¹, namely, that the Cit-Śakti transforms itself into beings intelligent and non-intelligent, there follows the doctrine of illusion; still, it does not signify that intelligent beings are not eternal; it only signifies that there is transformation for them in the way of contradiction and expansion of knowledge and happiness. The eternity of the intelligent beings lies in their own nature. This has been established in the Ātmādhikarana². It is, therefore, confirmed that it is acceptable to Śrīkantha that the Brahman is attributeless unconnected with the world, non-different from the finite self, and of the form of pure non-duality.

Now, if, both from the empirical standpoint and that of moksā, the ācārya's system does not differ from the doctrine of pure non-dualism, why should a separate commentary have at all been undertaken by him? The reply to this is: The attainment of the nature of the Brahman results, verily, from the intuition of the non-specific Brahman. This intuition can be gained only through concentrated meditation which itself is gained by the

¹ cf. Vedānta Śūtras, I.4.23.
² cf. Ibid, II.3.18.
Grace of God, through worship. The excess of devotion is required for the concentration on Śiva for a long time. Śiva alone is the Supreme Brahman, and there is no true form of His other than this. For these reasons, a fresh commentary is undertaken by Śrīkantha. He wants to demonstrate that there is complete agreement between the Vedānta-texts on the one hand and the Brahma-Sūtras on the other, on these points. An objection is here raised on behalf of the Śrutis. In order to secure excess of devotion, it would be proper only to proclaim His distinctive glory as is understood from the Śrutis, the Smṛtis and the Purāṇas, and not to condemn His other form. This objection is answered away by pointing out that such condemnation is justifiable as seen from the procedure of sages like Āpastamba who has condemned Samnyāsa in the Kalpa-Sūtras. The main object of that condemnation is to secure dull-witted people in the practice of house-hold virtues, so that they may thereby acquire the strength of mind which is necessary for renunciation. Similar condemnation inspired by a similar purpose is found in the Mahābhārata, also ¹; and the same explanation may be suggested for the condemnation of the

1. e.g. Mahābhārata, Śanti-Parva Ch.XVIII.
early renunciation seen in the Manusmṛti\(^1\).

The reconciliation of the Vedānta-texts with the doctrine of the Brahman with attributes has been sought to be established by Śrīkanṭha, so that grace should be bestowed on the dull-witted person by turning him away from the pursuit of what is attributed etc. His interpretation has the merit of not giving against the truth. He only expounds an intermediate aspect of the final truth. It cannot be argued that, if Śrīkanṭha acknowledged Nirguna Brahman, he should have recognised that alone to be the purport of the Sūtras, as Śaṅkara has done. For, Śaṅkara himself has shown that some Sūtras do refer to Saguna Brahman\(^2\), some exhibit synthesis with Nirguna and some others with Saguna Brahman.

Again, an objection is raised on behalf of the Śaṅkara has already exhibited the Saguna leanings of the Sūtras, where was the necessity for Śrīkanṭha’s commentary? The answer to this is clear. Śrīkanṭha’s

\(^{1}\) e.g. Manusmṛti VI.5.

\(^{2}\) e.g. Vedānta Sūtras, I.1.24, 10-11, and introduction to I, 1.12.
commentary goes further than Śaṅkara's commentary in determining the form and nature of the Saguna Brahman. Moreover, Śaṅkara himself gives clear indications of his own view that Saguna Brahman is Śiva, a being other than Viṣṇu, or Saguna Brahman is Śaṅkara Rudra, and Vācaspati Miśra, who knew that Śaṅkara had, at heart, identified Saguna Brahman with Śiva, has denoted Śiva by the word Bhava, in his preliminary invocation. All such indications are far too subtle for the average devotee. The specific nature of the Saguna Brahman should be determined by examining and discounting references to deities other than Śiva. This is what Śrīkāṇṭha has done.

It should not, however, be imagined that the above argument establishing the need for a fresh commentary shows that Śaṅkara's discussion of the Saguna

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1. e.g. Ibid, Śaṅkara-bhāṣya on I.3.14.
2. e.g. Ibid, Śaṅkara-bhāṣya on III.3.32.
3. e.g. Vācaspati in the introduction to his commentary says—

पद्भिमर्त्तेश्वरेयाम विविधकारथैरथि।
श्रीकाण्ठाय नमस्कृतेऽवेदाय च भवाय च॥
interpretation has been futile. It is certainly not so. For, these implications had necessarily to be recognised in demonstrating that the śruti references were to the Brahman and not to the finite self or Pradhāna, and in exhibiting the nature of the fruit of Brahman-knowledge. This fruit is the attainment of the nature of Isvara that is the Saguna Brahman. Moreover, that Śaṅkara holds release to be of the nature described above, until the final liberation of all, is seen from the following sections, namely, the Dahāra-section\(^1\) of the first chapter, the Jagadvacītva-section\(^2\), the Aṁśa-section of the second chapter\(^3\), and the Śaṁḍhyā-section of the third chapter\(^4\). In fourth chapter\(^5\) too, he has expressed the same view.

There is again an objection: If the enquiry into the Saguna implications is necessarily involved in the other enquiry, why promise it, as it were, by so

\(^1\) e.g. Śaṁkara-bhāṣya on I.3.19.
\(^2\) e.g. Ibid, I.4.16.
\(^3\) e.g. Ibid, II.3.43.
\(^4\) e.g. Ibid, III.2.1-5.
\(^5\) e.g. Ibid, IV.4.7.
framing the definition through the statement in the commentary "Brahman does exist\textsuperscript{1}, etc., that it applies to both forms? The reply to this is: The object of the promisory statement is to show that there is a Saguna interpretation for the Sūtras, in their entirety. This is indicated clearly in the Sāstrayonitva-section\textsuperscript{2} itself, on the Sthālipulāka nyāya\textsuperscript{3}, and the same principle has been followed by Āmalānanda. The author of the Vedānta-kalpataru in commenting on the Sūtra

\begin{quote}
वारिन्द्रोश्रादितु्त तत्‌तृत्यायेऽन्ति तत्त्वेनात्。
\end{quote}

\begin{enumerate}
\item e.g. Ibid, I.1.2.: अस्ति तात्विक - etc.
\item e.g. Ibid, I.1.3.
\item The analogy of the single rice from the pot to find out whether rice is boiled or not.
\item e.g. Vedānta-kalpataruparimala on IV.1.16.
\end{enumerate}
Even if it is so, the objector further points out, Śrīkaṇṭha does not rely only on the Saguna contexts for his Saguna interpretation, but draws on Nirguna context also, making it appear that the Nirguna doctrine has no basis at all; hence, his commentary is opposed to the doctrine of Nirguna Brahman.

This objection is set aside by indicating that even Śāmkara has to speak of the Brahman's characteristic marks in establishing his doctrine of the characterless Brahman. The texts about the latter have an intermediate reference to the former.

This may be true in the synthesis with the Nirguna. There are texts relating directly to the Nirguna; and an account of the identity of construction with these texts, the Saguna texts occurring in the Nirguna contexts are shown to refer, in the end, to the Nirguna Brahman as their ultimate significance. A Saguna interpretation is seen to be offered of those Nirguna texts with much effort. For instances, in यथा साम्येन मृत्युधातन संधि मूल्यन्य विद्वार्त स्थात् two interpretations are

1. e.g. Śāmkara-bhāṣya on I.1.5, I.1.28, I.2.9, I.2.18, I.3.8-9,11, I.4.16, 19, etc.

2. e.g. Commentary on II.1.15 : यथा साम्येन मृत्युधातन संधि मूल्यन्य विद्वार्त स्थात् etc.
given: (1) modification (form) and name become the cause of speech (Vacarambhana), of the nature of designation and utility. The mode pitcher, etc., and the name pitcher, etc., which become the producers of experience, of the nature of designation and utility, are only of the substance clay. In reality, pitcher etc., are true, that is, veritable, only as clay, the existence of the pitcher not being seen apart from the clay. The sense of this interpretation is this:

'Modification' means the property of being a pitcher, that is, having a large rounded belly and so on; 'name' means a word like pitcher etc., whose functioning is conditioned by that both these are Vacarambhaṇa 'Vāk' is 'speech' such as 'bring the pitcher', thereby is indicated also the utility arising therefrom. Arambhāṇa means 'begun', 'originated' that is, 'cause'. The cause of speech, that is, modification and name are respectively the causes of utility and designation. The word Arambhāṇa is applied to both vikārah (in the masculine) and nāmadheyaṁ (in the neuter). Now the ultimate meaning is: of the lump of clay, and its modifications, though identical in substance, there is difference in respect of utility and designation, due to
difference of form such as lumpiness and the possession of a large-round belly, as also to the difference of name, whose functioning is conditioned thereby. This difference is not like that between different substances like the cow and the buffalo, as the clayiness alone is true; of the pitcher, basin, etc., clayiness alone is veritable, it being proved by recognition, "that very lump of clay is now of the form of pitcher", and the test of the absence of difference, between them in respect of heaviness. Having thus established their proved identity, it is proper to postulate of the difference and practical utility that they are of the nature of limiting adjuncts of name and form. This is what is meant.

(2) The second interpretation is this: change is the object of statement 'This is a pitcher'. It (the pitcher) is another mode originated from the substance clay for practical purposes, it is not a substance other than clay. The name is true only in respect of the clay; all names like clay, pitcher, etc., are true - truth is what holds good of sat, that is, veritable object - when pitchers, etc., are considered to be but clay, not when they are considered to be another substance; this is because the pitcher is afterall nothing
but clay. This means that modification originates in speech that the modification, pitcher, etc., is an object only of the judgement, 'this is a pitcher', and not a substance other than clay.

A doubt may be raised here: If pitcher is not a substance other than clay, how do the names pitcher etc., not applicable in the stage of the lump of clay, come to be applied later on? The reply to this would be: The name is true in respect of clay; even the names pitcher etc., apply to an existent veritable substance, only when considered to be that substance clay, and not when considered to be another substance. For another substance is unprovable, being opposed to recognition and so on. This doctrine of difference is expounded in various sections¹. And the declaration of non-difference is explained as referring to the non-otherwise as between the pervader and the pervaded. This explanation is certainly not inconsistent with the acceptance of pure-non-dualism. For, the Arambhana section² implies that the bonds of agency etc., are illusory.

¹ e.g. Vedānta Sūtras, III.2.11, I.3.44, II.1.22, III.4.8.
² e.g. Ibid, II.1.22.
The next Sutra in the same section — and the commentary thereon would imply that, in virtue of their ignorance, etc. the finite selves too, like a stick, a stone, or a clod or a wisp of straw, are declared to belong to a class entirely different from Isvara, who is associated with omniscience etc., and that, therefore, the identity of the two is inappropriate. It appears from this that by refuting the non-difference of the finite self and the Brahman, their difference is established. Though it is so, yet its real significance lies in the refutation of the non-difference of the class of inert beings from the Brahman by the 'a fortiori' argument. When non-difference does not hold good even of the finite self, which, to some extent at least, belongs to the same class as the Brahman, what then of the non-intelligent, which is entirely of a different class? This position is rebutted by pointing out that even the inert world is non-different from the Brahman. Similarly the Sutras, namely, and refer to the superiority of the Brahman and not His

1. e.g. Ibid, II.1.23.
2. e.g. Ibid, I.3.43-44.
difference from the finite self.

Though in the commentary on the *āmsa* section\(^1\), there is an interpretation of those *Sūtras* as favouring difference, yet, that interpretation being negativated by the commentary on the *Sūtra* - *वै नानाव्यपदेशाद्वयम् चापि दाशस्तिनादित्वबोधकः*\(^2\) is not capable of expressing their inherent meaning. It is clear that, by the emphasis here on the non-dualistic sense of texts like 'that thou art', the sense of inseparability declared earlier, on the basis of the relationship of the body and the embodied, is negativated. Such negation, being self-contradictory, is inconceivable, and through texts like 'that thou art', the sense must be taken to be that texts like 'that thou art' refer to the meditation of non-difference and not to the real non-difference. For, difference and non-difference are opposed to each other. This may be refuted as follows: The interpretation offered in the *āmsa* section\(^3\) is opposed to the *Jābala śrutī*\(^4\) cited in the *Ātmatvopāsana* section\(^5\), which is

2. cf. *Vedānta Sūtras*, IV.1.3.
4. cf. *Jābala Up.* : त्वं वा अद्वैतस्य भवायोदिहते etc.
intended to establish that there is no release except by the meditation of non-difference from the Brahman. Further, it is not proper to hold that the sense of difference declared in the \textit{amsa} section\footnote{cf. Vedānta Sūtras, II.3.42.} being accepted, another sense of the nature of non-difference in meditation is also accepted by the commentator, because the two senses of the single context, 'that thou art', would be contradictory like difference and non-difference of the finite self from the Brahman.

Now one may here say: "Let not its sense be that of the relation of the body and the embodied; there is only one sense, that of the nature of the meditation of imagined non-difference." But this can be easily controverted. It cannot be held that the contemplation of non-difference has but an imagined object; since the knowledge of non-difference with the Brahman is declared to persist even in the released one, as shown by the commentary on the \textit{Jagadvyāpāra} section\footnote{cf. Vedānta Sūtras, IV.4.19.}.

\footnotesize

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There is a further objection: The notion of the relationship of the body and the embodied is of no value either in the knowledge of the Nirguna Brahman or in meditation on the Saguna Brahman. Why then should it have been propounded?

This is replied to by stating that, that notion is for those of the least capacity, those who are qualified only for the dasa-marga.

As for the different interpretation of the Vacarambhana Sruti, it can be said that it is helpful for the purpose of strengthening ātīta in the Saguna Brahman, and hence, is to be understood only in a figurative sense. Further, the asmādi Sūtra makes it clear that, according to the commentator, the inert world is not non-different from the Brahman as it is declared in the Ārāmbhana section, and that, consequently, it is to be understood as fictitiously imposed on the Brahman.

1. cf. Vedānta Sūtras, II.1.16.
2. cf. Ibid, II.1.23.
3. cf. Ibid, II.1.15.
This view of the Sūtrakāra (that is, Vyāsa) is made clear in his own work, the Mahābhārata, through the narrative of Suvarcalā and Śvetaketu, set out in the Mokṣa-Dharma of the Śantiparvan, where the question is discussed as to why the Brahman, the abode of the universe is not perceptible like the ether. The answer to this question is that there is experience only of air etc., as present in the ether, not of the ether as distinct (from them); if that be the case with ether, though an object of experience, what more need be said of the Brahman, of the form of Existence which is more subtle than the ether. Therefore, everything is imagined in the Existential Substance; that alone is true and pervasive, and all words applicable to what is limited by qualities do not apply in their primary sense to that which is distinguished from the qualities, and is understood by means of knowledge which makes known the real. In this series of questions and answers of Śvetaketu and Suvarcalā it becomes quite clear, through the citation of the example of the appearance of pot,

1. cf. Mahābhārata, Mokṣa-Parvan.
2. cf. Mahābhārata, Mokṣa-Parvan:

\[\text{मृण्मयो हि घटाभास: तास्यभाव जित्तेये। अहंभावः परेरविन्ये श्यात्मभावः परो महान्।} \]

eetc.
that the finite self of the context is of the form of Existence\(^1\), etc., and that the sense of the \(\text{Vacārambhāna} \text{ text}\)\(^2\) and of the \(\text{Upaniṣad text}\)\(^3\) are shown to favour the conclusion that the Brahman is unrelated to the world is non-distinct from the finite self, and is free from qualifications. Further, in another context in the \(\text{Mokṣa-Dharma}\)\(^4\) itself, non-difference is set forth and the same is supported by the \(\text{Viṣṇu-Purāṇa}\)\(^5\).

The qualified non-dualism as taught by other teachers cannot be so interpreted to make it agreeable to pure non-dualism. The only commentary that should be accepted by those, who have regard for the means of correct

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1. cf. आकाशाल्प्याभावार्थ सदृशत्वत्ति निरिडितम्। etc.
2. cf. \(\text{Ghāndogya Up.}, \text{VI.9.4.}\)
3. cf. \(\text{Ibid.}, \text{VI.9.4.}\) : \(\text{अक्षतस्वत्वमिद सूक्ष्मं --}\) etc.
4. cf. \(\text{Mahābhārata, Mokṣa-Dharma} : \text{सदृश्य कल्पत स्वयतत्त्वं विभूषितवं निग्रेश्य परं देव ... देहवानिष्वा विभूषितो मायाप्रेयो हरिः।}\) etc.
5. cf. \(\text{Viṣṇu-Purāṇa} : \text{प्रत्यत्तं घे द्वस्तामार्गमेवचरम्।} \text{विकसामाल्यात्तत्त्वस्य वत्सारे इंद्रसौभाग्यम्।}\) etc.
knowledge, is that of Śrīkanṭhācārya. That commentary envisages the following three grades of capacity:

1. for the purpose of the true comprehension of the non-qualified Supreme Brahman by one who is of a very high grade of capacity; (2) for the purpose of the meditation of non-difference, to be performed by one who is of middling capacity, in respect of the being who has taken on the form of the qualified in order to show grace to His devotees, and who is characterised by the entire multitude of auspicious qualities and a resplendent auspicious form; and (3) for the purpose of the meditation of the relationship of one-self and one's Master, to be carried on by one who is of least capacity. All these are appropriately distinguished, and thus everything becomes consistent.

In this manner, Appayya Dikṣit has condensed the essence of the entire system of Śrīkanṭha.

1. cf. : सदा ज्ञिनादन्यान्यास्त्रियोंपदोपितं।
श्रीकण्ठाभिमित्तं स्वी सारभिभं समप्रहीत॥

This couplet occurs only in one manuscript.

Contd...
This treatise ends with the following colophon:

(An incomplete paper manuscript in Nagari script from the Oriental Manuscript, Library, Egmore) out of five referred by the editor, and that too after the colophon. Its authorship probably belongs to some person other than Appayya Dīkṣita.
The Śivādvaitanirṇaya is written by Appayya Dīksita with a specific purpose in view. The author sets forth this purpose as follows:

This work is entirely in prose, and concerns itself with the discussion of one central topic, namely, whether the Śivādvaita of Śrīkantha implies the doctrine of qualified non-dualism or non-qualified non-dualism. Appayya Dīksita has emphatically stated that this Śivādvaita represents the doctrine of qualified non-dualism; indeed, it is nothing different from the doctrine which has been concisely indicated and provided for by Śaṅkara. Śrīkantha has only elaborated it.

The view of Appayya Dīksita can be briefly stated as follows: The universe can be identified with the Brahman, through the Git-śakti. The philosophical problem of the one and the many, the permanent and the changing, is sought to be solved by the introduction of a third factor, which itself is one and many, permanent

1. Śivādvaitanirṇaya.1.
yet changing, and it is the Cit-sakti. In order to have this concept of Cit-sakti clear in one’s mind, one is required to treat the non-intelligent world as an illusory manifestation, not as an evolute of the same grade of reality as the alleged cause. This Cit-sakti is of the form of the universe, and the Brahman is of the form of Cit-sakti; hence, the universe is non-different from the Brahman. But the non-intelligent universe is bound to be an illusory manifestation\(^1\), for, how otherwise can the Cit-sakti which is intelligent evolve into what is non-intelligent? This theory of Śrīkanṭha is not altogether different from the assumption of illusoriness on the part of the advaitin. The doctrine of Parināma-vāda which ultimately results in the illusion doctrine is accepted by the advaitins, like Śaṅkara and others. According to this parināma-vāda the world is the effect (parināma) of the Brahman but this effect is illusory that is not real. Only the Brahman is the reality and the effect (i.e., the world) is māyā (i.e., illusion). But according to the system of Śrīkanṭha, māyā is not unreal, hence, \(\text{Śrīkanṭha-bhāṣya on II.1.23.}\)
world, the effect also is not unreal. Further
Śaṅkara accepts that the Vedānta-Sūtras are capable of being interpreted as referring to the Saguna Brahman. This Saguna Brahman is no other than Śiva, as the term Paramēśvara generally denotes Śiva. There are some other indications which are very subtle and cannot appeal to the hearts of devotees. Śrīkantha has elaborated this, what was implied by Śaṅkara. Hence this theory of Śrīkantha is according to Śaṅkara, mere expansion of the theory of Śaṅkara.

This Siddhānta has been set forth by Appayya Dīksita in a fairly lucid manner. The arguments set forth by Appayya Dīksita have the merit of being generally logical and effective. His style in this work, as in his other works, is direct and forceful. While reading this work one conjures up before one's mind's eye a picture of some Pandita sabhā organised for the discussion of Vedāntic doctrines.

This does not, however, mean that the Śivādvaitanirnayā is free from defects. Perhaps its

1. Śaṅkara-bhāṣya on I.1.3.
main defect is that Appayya Dīksita frequently labours his points to the extent of being tiresome. Similarly, the Śivādvaitamāyā is not likely to be adequately understood by itself, that is, without a sufficiently solid background of the study of the bhāṣya of Śrīkanṭha. This difficulty is further increased on account of the fact that certain doctrines of Śrīkanṭha, such as the atomicity of the self etc., are not mentioned or discussed by Appayya Dīksita.

The system of Śrīkanṭha can be briefly stated as:
There are three principles, namely, pāti (the lord), pāsu (the bound soul), and pāsa (the bonds). The impurity of the bound soul is beginningless like the presence of verdigris in copper. The impurity can be got rid of only by getting the souls to engage in action and enjoy the fruit. The creation of the world is for this purpose. The lord has no objects of his own to gain by creating the world. He does it, however, in the interest of the bound souls, in order to purify and to redeem them.

The lord is both the material and the efficient cause of the world. The world is, thus, the result of the transformation of the Brahma. But transformation would imply change, that is, defect in Brahma. Hence Brahma's transformation (paripāram) has to be understood as holding
only of this Cit-sakti. This Cit-sakti is the material cause, which takes on the form of the worlds, intelligent and non-intelligent. The Brahman himself (whom Śrīkanṭha identifies with Śiva) is the efficient cause. But these are distinguishable aspects of Brahman, not different entities; for between Cit-sakti (energy) and the possessor thereof (Śiva) there is non-difference. Because of the relationship to the lord, through Cit-sakti, the world partakes of the existence, intelligence and bliss of the lord. The existence of a particular thing is a fraction of the existence of Brahman, individual knowledge and bliss are fragments of the knowledge and bliss of Śiva. All this is taught by the Vedānta.

Release comes through meditation on the lord, after the acquisition of the necessary preliminaries of tranquility, faith, non-attachment, to fruit whether in this world or the next and so on. The meditation should take on any one of the forms prescribed by the Upaniṣadic seers. The lord may, for instance, be contemplated as the small ākāśa with the heart. In all cases, the distinctive qualities of Śiva will have to be understood, such as blissfulness, freedom from sin etc., and blue-throatedness, companionship of Uma and so on; for, the lord
is the abode of all auspicious qualities, and the texts, which make him out to be attributeless, intend to deny only objectional qualities.

In meditation, the lord is to be thought of as the self, for, so have contemplated sages of yore, saying, "I am, verily, thou, O lord, O Divinity, Thou, Verily, art I". Release is the abandonment of the condition of bondage (pasutva) and the attainment of the state of bliss (śivatva). This cannot come about until the bonds are destroyed in the torrent of continuous meditation of identity with the supreme. It is this identity that ancient seers have taught their disciples through texts like 'That Thou Art'.

As the fruit of meditation, properly performed, one goes unto the Brahman, after death, along the path of the gods. For those, who go along this path, there is no return. Some say, however, that there is no need for all to travel along this path, since for the devotees of the non-related (presumably what the pure-non-dualists call nirguna Brahman), there is attainment of release even here, that is, with release from the physical body.
Incidentally, it may be pointed out that SudarśanaČaryya has been referred to by Appayya Dīksita as Haradatta. With reference to a verse quoted by the dialectical opponent from this author's Śruti-sūkti-māla, it is said that Śrīkanṭha came after Haradatta. This, combined with very definite suggestion in the Anandalahari to the effect that Rāmānuja followed in the foot-steps of Śrīkanṭha, seems to be of great help in fixing the period of Śrīkanṭha. If the date is still uncertain, it is because Haradatta's period is not known; for, the obituary verse, whereon reliance used to be placed as giving the date of his death, proves to contain conflicting astronomical details and is inaccurate or spurious.

1. Śivādvaitamīmāṃsā, p. 20, also see Foot-Note No. 3 on pages 712–713
Section II

Chapter 10.

Śivārkamanidīpikā.
The Śīvārkamanidīpikā, a commentary by Appayya Dīkṣita on Śrīkanṭha’s Bhaṣya on the Vedānta-Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa, is one of the most valuable works of Appayya Dīkṣita. A printed edition of this work is available. The edition extends over 599 pages, the first twelve page of which are devoted to an introduction in sanskrit by the editor. This is followed by a brief preface by the editor in which he has promised the publication of the second volume within a short time. This first volume covers only the first chapter of the Vedānta-Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa. After the editorial note, the proper text begins and it extends over 587 pages. The orders of the text is as follows: The Vedānta-Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa are given first. Then the commentary of Śrīkanṭha on those Sūtras is given, which is followed by the Śīvārkamanidīpikā of Appayya Dīkṣita. This is followed by the Navamāṇimalā which summarises the views of Śrīkanṭha in poetic form and the author of which is

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1. Edited by Halasyanatha Sastri and is printed at the Nirmaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1908.
Appayya Dīkṣita himself. This Nayamanimālā is given at the end of each topic. The Sūtrārtha-candrikā, a commentary by the editor, follows this Nayamanimālā. In his Sūtrārtha-candrikā, the editor gives a gist of the views held by Śāṅkara, Śrīkānta, Rāmānuja, and Madhva. The work ends with the concluding verses by the editor.

In his introduction, the editor claims that this work has been printed for the first time and states that he has utilised five manuscripts. They are:

1) A palm-leaf-manuscript extending up to the first section of the Śivārkamānīdīpiṅkā. This was in possession of Ayya Śrīvāsa of Kumbhakonam.

2) A paper-manuscript written up to the Guhādhikaraṇa of the second quarter of the first chapter, with Nāgari character. This belonged to Śivarama Subrahmanya Gāstrī of Madhura.

3) A paper-manuscript of the same nature and type as mentioned above (that is 2). This was obtained at Gomuktī-kṣetra of the Taṇjavā (? Taṇjavāra) State.

1. For the Nayamanimālā, see Ch. IV in Section II of this thesis.
4) A palm-leaf-manuscript extending from Anandamaya dhikaraṇa up to the third quarter of the third chapter was handed over by Nilakantha Vaiṣṇavaṇīn of Tiruval.

5) A palm-leaf-manuscript of the same type as mentioned in 4 was handed over by the same Nilakantha Vaiṣṇavaṇīn.

The Śivārkaṇḍaṇidīpikā begins with salutation to Śiva. This introductory verse itself indicates the identification of Śiva and Viṣṇu, and of Lakṣmī and Pārvatī or Śakti, which, indeed, is one of the main principles of Śivādvaita. The verse reads as:

The work ends with the usual colophon with some additions as:

The same colophon occurs at the end of each quarter.

1. Śivārkaṇḍaṇidīpikā, 1.
The Śivārkaṃaṇidīpika, which is the only extant sub-commentary on the Śrīkaṇṭha-bhāṣya is written by Appayya Dīkṣita, the celebrated philosopher, grammarian and rhetorician. It constitutes an independent treatise by itself, and is very scholarly, and greatly helpful in interpreting Śrīkaṇṭha's views properly.

In this treatise, Appayya Dīkṣita, who is celebrated for his universal outlook and spirit of accommodation, makes no distinction between Śiva and Viṣṇu as two mutually contesting sectarian deities. Indeed, in the introductory stanza, he pays homage to Śiva, the consort of Narāyaṇa. Though A.B. is a staunch follower of Saivism as becomes clear from this commentary of his, he has never treated the Vaiṣṇava sect with contempt.

Nor has he criticised the views of his opponents with undue harshness and antipathy. From the philosophical point of view, Śiva and Viṣṇu are identical with each other, and it is found that this view has been emphasised by A.B. throughout the present work.

2. Śivārkaṃaṇidīpika, Verse I: नारायणीसहसराय नमः पिवायः
Appayya Dīkṣita, as is well known, was also an ardent advaita vedāntist. In the present work he has tried, with commendable impartiality and straightforwardness, to establish a compromise between the advaita vedānta and the Śivāgama or Śivādvaita, by pointing out that Śiva himself, and none else, is responsible for all knowledge including the knowledge of the advaita. And this point he has often stressed, though the advaita-vāda is not the doctrine of the Śaivas of the Śrikantha school.

It must also be noted that the śivādvaitadīpikā properly signifies Appayya Dīkṣita's scholarly career. It is said that because of a dream which he dreamt on the previous night, Appayya Dīkṣita undertook to write this commentary. In his dream, the Lord (Śiva), in his ardhanārīśvara-form, but in the disguise of the king Cinna Bomma, appeared before Appayya Dīkṣita and commanded him to explain and expound the faultless...

1. Śivārkamanidīpikā, verse 7:

तथा प्रभुप्रहादेऽऽः तस्मानेव‍ शिष्यामः ।
श्रीसन्तानं न भूतानामविभूतं नान्यथा ॥
commentary of Śrīkaṇṭha. This claim of divine inspiration is justified to a large extent, by Appayya Dīkṣita's learned, yet devout, literary, performance in the Śivarkamāṇidīpikā.

The Śivarkamāṇidīpikā opens with a few introductory verses. Though most of these verses glorify Lord Śiva, still, the identification, from the philosophical point of view of Śiva with Viṣṇu, is duly adumbrated. After paying obeisance to Śiva, Appayya Dīkṣita bows down to the great teachers of the Śaiva sect, who are 28 in number. Then he pays tribute to his grand-father and father, for Appayya Dīkṣita has always been conscious of the great debt which he owes to his revered ancestors. But eventhough Appayya Dīkṣita belongs to an illustrious learned family and eventhough he is himself a great scholar and a competent writer, he humbly says that the commentary of Śrīkaṇṭha is not easily intelligible.

1. Ibid, verse 12.

2. Śivarkamāṇidīpikā, verse 1:

नारायणीसहचराय नमः सिवाच।
to persons like him. Then he narrates the dream episode. Lord Śiva in his ardhanārīśvara-form, but in the disguise of the king Cinna Bomma, appeared in his dream and commanded him to explain and expound the faultless commentary of Śrīkantha. Lastly Appayya Dīksīta states that, commensurately with his own intellect and according to his capacity, he has tried to explain, to some extent, the intended meaning of the author, namely, Śrīkantha, with the hope that the wise persons will be satisfied with what little is being offered to them as with a few gems collected from the ocean.

After these introductory remarks, Appayya Dīksīta proceeds straightaway to the main part of the commentary. The etymology of the word Śiva is first discussed. The word is derived from the root vas which

1. Śivārkamanidīpikā, verse 11:

śriśivānandaśūri māṁśya yadvad bhūṣyate sāyaṁ
pratipadmaśīmśīṁ n stavaṁ mādānāyaśṭūṇu

2. Ibid, verse 16:

tatmādbhut vyanām kṣīṇaśaktvyārtham śvaṁ kṣīṇayate
tuṣyatā tu tuṣyatā kṣīṇaśaktvāt prathādivaṁśवनिधय:
means to desire. So the word Śiva ultimately means 'one who desires'. Naturally, the question may arise as to what possibly the desire of Śiva can be. Śiva, being the highest Brahman, must be free from all desires. The only desire of Śiva, according to the commentator is to make all persons happy - happy in the sense that all people should be free from the worries of worldly life. And, from this point of view, the appellation Śiva is very significant. The same Śiva is identified with the sacred vedic syllable om. This syllable has been derived from the root av - to protect. As it protects the whole world, it is called om. According to another view, the syllable om is derived by joining together the three sounds, namely, a, u, and m. These three sounds represent the three Vedas, namely, the Rgveda, the

1. Śivārkamāṇidīpiκā, p.2:

वरू - कान्तो वर्ग्यत्त्मेन सिद्धं: शिवशस्त्र: पूर्वोदरादि:।
तदा हि: हिंसा धारता: सिंहज्ञक्रो वश कान्तो शिव: स्मृत:।
वर्ग्यत्त्मात: सिद्धदे पारम्प: कर्षणयो यथा:॥
शिव जिञ्ज्ञावान:। शिवनिर्विद्य्यपुष्पाणाम्।
Yajurveda, and the Samaveda, respectively. Siva is identified with this om, and is described as being of the nature of sat-cit-ānanda. On the authority of the Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad Śrīkantha states that Siva is the material cause of the whole universe.

Appayya Dīkṣita adds that the main work of Śrīkantha begins from verse 3 onwards. The first two verses are of a benedictory character, and are introduced to confirm to the tradition which lays down that a work should be started either with āśīth, or salutation, or the subject under consideration directly. Hence Siva accompanied by Gaurī, as has been stated in the anandamayādhiśkarana, has been saluted by Śrīkantha.

1. A stands for the Rgveda as it comes in ब्रह्मिनान् पुरोहितम्. u represents the Yajurveda. It occurs in मोनि: समुद्रो बन्धुः.

m indicates the Samaveda. It occurs in समाने वरम्.

2. cf. Śvetāsvatara Up., IV.10:

माया तु प्रकृति चिन्वलयिणि तु महेस्वरम्.

3. cf. Kavyādāsā: अक्षरमस्मिन्न्याचावस्तुनिद्राय वापि तन्मुखम्.
Appayya Diksita, then, proceeds to indicate the propriety of this new commentary of Srikantha on the Brahma Sutras of Vyasa. These aphorisms of Vyasa are really the eyes through which a wise person can see the Brahman. But these aphorisms have been misinterpreted by former teachers, and now they are being 'purified', that is to say, they are being correctly interpreted by Srikantha. The Sutras of Jaimini suffer from the defect of being too difficult to interpret. The aphorisms of Vyasa are free from such a defect.
Appayya Diksita incidentally explains the significance of the name Srikantha - as a personal name, as well as, as an epithet of Lord Siva. Especially Srikantha, the commentator, most appropriately, bears this name for, he does not indulge in finding faults with other commentators, but only appreciates their merits. This commentary of

1. The particularly difficult Sutras are:
   VI.4.1, VI.4.2, VI.4.4, VIII.1.8, etc.
2. Siyarkamandihipika explains the term Srikantha as:
   
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2. Siyarkamandihipika explains the term Srikantha as:
Srikantha excels all other commentaries in that it gives faithful and correct interpretation of the Sūtras of Vyāsa. Appayya Dīkṣita addresses both Vyāsa and Srikantha as śrimat - the element śri in that epithet denoting the knowledge of the three Vedas. In addition to this, the commentary of Srikantha is as sweet (madhura) and delicate as a pārijāta - flower. Though this commentary is a great treasure (maha-nidhi), still the Vaiṣṇavas do not respect it properly. But it is their fault and not of the commentary.

1. In the first section, the question about the propriety of the Brahma-śāstra has been raised. The Purvapakṣin is of the view that there is no necessity of this śāstra which undertakes an inquiry into the Brahman. The Brahman is either known or unknown. If it is known, this śāstra would seek to investigate what is already known. If it is not known, then, it cannot be made known by this very śāstra. In either case, the investigation would have no valid purpose - it would be futile.

1. Śivārkamanidīpikā, p.13.
The first sutra of Jaimini, namely, atha atah dharma jnana along with the first sutra of Vyasa, namely, atha atah brahma jnana rejects the above-stated view of the Purvaksin. So says the Siddhantin.

The word atha in the sutra atha atah dharma jnana stands for the curiosity which arises in our mind after studying the Vedas. The term atah denotes hetu (reason), while the word dharma is to be understood in the sense of religion in general. The Sutra will thus mean:

Because the curiosity (about the religion) arises in our mind after studying all the scriptures (i.e. Vedas).

This, however, does not include the study of the Upanisads or the curiosity about the Brahman, because the word dharma is defined as 'that which is indicated by vedic injunctions'². So a new sastra which seeks to inquire into the nature of the Brahman needs to be initiated. In this connection, the following four questions must be first of all taken into consideration.

2. Jaimini-Sutras, I.1.2. चैदनालसपेतथः धर्मः।
1) What is the necessity of this new discussion?
2) Who is entitled to study this Śāstra to be newly taught?
3) What is its subject matter?
4) After what is this new Śāstra to be studied?

In order to answer these four questions, Vyāsa has set forth his first sutra, namely, atha atah Brahmajñāna. And this sutra itself constitutes the first adhikarana. The word adhikarana, incidentally, has been explained by Pāṇini in the sense of 'substratum'. An adhikarana consists of five parts, namely,

1) the topic to be considered,
2) the doubt in respect of it,
3) the prima-facie view,
4) the conclusive view, and
5) the final verdict and the establishment of consistent relation.

3. cf. Sivārkamanidīpikā.

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1: Brahma-Sutras. 1.1.1.
2: Astadhyayi, I.4.45.
Examined in this manner, the word *atha* in the *sūtra* under consideration implies 'immediate succession' (*ānantaryā*) and not the beginning (*prārambha*) as it does in the *sūtras* like 'Atha Yogānusāsanani'. It is not used either in a paranthetical sense or as an auspicious word like *om*, because it is impossible that the desire to know the Brahman can here, have any connection with auspiciousness. Nor does this word *atha* refer to any other view stated by the author himself previously, as no such view has been set forth before. Nor is the word used here in the sense of a variable antecedent, such as in the case of eating and going (*bhakṣayati atha gacchati*) and like. For, the word is intended to refer to something that is an essential and invariable antecedent. It indicates something, the previous attainment of which entitles one to this investigation into the Brahman, and which, as such, serves as a means to it. Hence, it is proper that the study of the Veda, which is preceded by a proper initiation etc., is eternally undertaken in

1. *Yogasāstra*, I.1. : अथ योगानुसासनम्।
accordance with the injunction: 

\textit{svādhyāyaḥ adhyetavyaḥ}. Here the word \textit{svādhyāya} (study of the Vedas) does not mean the study of the Vedas alone, but it includes also the study of the Vedāṅgas, such as grammar, logic, etc., in the absence of which study the meaning of the Vedas will not be very clear. It cannot be said that the enquiry into religion may occur to one's mind before or after the study of the Vedas, and hence the enquiry into Brahman should be started only after the enquiry into religion. The followers of the Śrīkāṇṭha school do not accept that these two, namely, the Dharma-śāstra and the Brahma-śāstra, are two different and independent works. On the contrary, they are of the view that these two are parts of one and the same treatise, since it has been said that all the Vedas give instruction about this very Brahman\textsuperscript{1}, which includes religion.

If this is so, it may be asked: why has Jaimini not discussed this in his sutras. This may be replied to as follows: Jaimini did not know anything

\textit{Katha Up.},II.15: \textit{कथा वेदाय यत्पदमास्मिन्ति}
about the Brahman, otherwise, he, who has composed
twelve chapters and four more for some additional
discussion, could not have composed any *sutra* on the
Brahman - such as assumption would be wrong. Though
the purport of the *sūtras* of Jaimini lies in indicating
the Brahman as the highest aim, still in order to
establish harmony between the Vedas and the Vedāntha-
texts, Badarāyana has started this investigation into
the Brahman by laying down the first *sūtra* :अभासते ब्रह्मविस्मयः।

Moreover, it is impossible to maintain
that Jaimini has forgotten about this. Because such
great persons are not expected to forget such an
important discussion. Vyāsa, on the other hand, did
go through the treatise of Jaimini. Eventhough, in
many places, Vyāsa differs from Jaimini, still somehow
or other, it is accepted that there is harmony in these
two treatises.

1. cf. e.g. : The views of Jaimini in the

Dharmasūtras : I.2.1., I.2.7., and
those of Badarāyana in the

Brahmasūtras : I.2.3., and I.1.4.
Still there is one more question which needs to be answered, and that is: Is there any proof to show that the enquiry about religion occurs first and then the enquiry into the Brahman follows? If there is any such proof, why is it not given now? This point has been dealt with by the commentator in the next part of his commentary.

According to Śrīkaṇṭha, the knowledge of religious (ritualistic) duties gives rise to an urge for the knowledge of the Brahman. This does not mean that only religious actions are the means of the knowledge of the Brahman and that, therefore, there is no necessity of undertaking an enquiry into the Vedic text. For, when the actions are being undertaken with no selfish desire for results, they purify the mind, and this purification of the mind is the essential condition for salvation. It cannot be said that all actions are meant for such a sāṃskāra or purification, for actions done with a definite desire for meritorious worlds are of a separate special kind. But when these are done by a man without any such desire, they lead to a sāṃskāra in the form of the purification of the mind and the rest. This may lead to another question as to
what a man achieves through the knowledge of the Brahman, if the same salvation is got through actions (like sacrifice etc). This has been replied to as follows: It is not the case that even sakāma-āśrama-karmans like sacrifices, etc., are saṁskāra-karmans in relation to the main acts of knowing and meditating which lead to salvation. The selfish acts cannot purify the mind and hence these acts do not result in salvation. The question then may be asked here as to how one and the same karman can be both sakāma and nīskāma. The answer is: There are such karmans which can be treated both as sakāma and nīskāma. For example, the sacrifices, namely, the Sautrāṇā and the Brhaspati are enjoined by some texts as directly leading to some special results such as getting a wife and securing the power of Brahman respectively. But the same Sautrāṇā and the Brhaspati sacrifices have been enjoined by other texts also as subsidiary parts of some other sacrifices such the Agni-cayana and the Vaiṣaṇeṣa. So the actions are to be performed till the urge for knowledge arises. Hence, first there should be an enquiry into the karmans that bring about the urge for the knowledge of the Brahman; after that, the treatise
that brings about the knowledge of the Brahman may be started. This is the correct view.

The above-mentioned sequence, namely, first the enquiry into karmans and then the enquiry into the Brahman, is justified by the śruti-texts wherein it is stated that both actions and knowledge lead to the same result, that is, salvation. This point may raise another question: What is the exact meaning of the injunction, svadhyāyāḥ adhyetavyāḥ, in relation to the Vedic study? According to Appayya Dīkṣīta, at some places, the above-mentioned injunction would imply that only alphabetical knowledge or knowledge of mere texts (aṃkara-jañāna) is intended as there are some meaningless syllables such as hum, vausat, phat, etc. But such cases being very rare, the general meaning of the injunction, svadhyāyāḥ adhyetavyāḥ, would be: One should study the Veda of one’s own

1. Isāvasya Up., I.11: किंचि चाविषो च मस्तुद्वेदान्मयं स ह। अधिकाः घृत्यूऽ तील्वृ विध्यामृत्तमर्तुते ॥

2. Brhadāraṇyaka Up., IV.4.9: अथ वन्ध्य भ्रमण हानुविधास्तेतां भ्रमरित्वमृत्तमर्तुते ॥
school only\(^1\). Though the word *svādhyāya* does not include the Upaniṣadic texts, still these Upaniṣads are to be studied, since the sentences like, *Ātma va are śrotavyaḥ mantavyaḥ nididhyāsitavyaḥ Maitreyi*\(^2\), are treated as *vidhi* - sentences.

The sentence, *Ātma va are śrotavyaḥ* - etc., does not indicate that the study of the Vedānta should be started without a previous study of the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā*. This *svāvana-vidhi* is not an *apūrva-vidhi*, since the act of hearing (*svāna*) can be known through other sources like inference, etc. Nor can it be a *niyama-vidhi*, as there is no other alternative means perceived to produce the same result. Nor can it be an object of a *parisamākhya-vidhi*.\(^3\) For, then it would follow that the Vedāntas were to be heard only. This is not correct for two reasons. Firstly no detailed investigation into the Brahman would be possible if the

\(^1\) *Sivārkamanidīpikā* (*SMD*) p. 433

\(^2\) *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.*, IV.5.6.

\(^3\) cf. *Tantravārttika*: विधिर्वचन्तन्त्रप्रमाणे निम्नः पार्श्विके सति।

तत्रभवत्वाणि च प्राप्तु च परिसम्पेति गीयते॥
Upaniṣadic texts are not properly studied. Secondly, it would prohibit the hearing or study of the karmakāṇḍa. However, according to Appayya Dīkṣīta, the sentence svādhyāyatādhyetavvah has to be treated as an apurva-vidhi.

Thus, an investigation should be undertaken into the scriptures that establish the Highest Brahman which possesses supreme powers, whose supreme glory is manifested by such names as Bhava, Śiva, Paramēśvara, Samba, and so on, and which by its sublime grace is capable of leading all the individual souls.

Thus, it is now settled that the word atha means "after enquiring into the dharma". A investigation into the Brahman is to be undertaken after the enquiry into dharma has been duly accomplished.

Next comes the word atah (therefore), which implies the reason, namely, this enquiry into dharma mentioned above. As an enquiry into dharma is undertaken by one who has studied the Vedas, so too the Brahman, the cause of limitless excellence, should be enquired into by one whose mind has become purified by a proper performance of those dharmas, and who has come
to attain supreme devotion.

Then follows the phrase or compound word, Brahma-jiñāsa. It means the desire for the knowledge concerning the Brahman. According to the Purvapakṣin, this Brahman is not investigable, as there can be no doubt with regard to it. The scriptural passages teach that the Brahman is self-luminous and is known through direct perception. So how can there be any vestige of doubt in respect of it?

The Siddhāntin, on the other hand, states that, as the texts like 'This self is Brahman', designate this very soul as the Brahman, and for that very reason there is ample scope for doubt. The possession of supreme power and glory etc., is the main characteristic of the Brahman. On the contrary, ignorance, sufferings, limitless miseries, etc., are the marks of the Jīva. This being so, the question naturally arises: Why do the scriptural texts declare the identity between these two, namely, the Jīva and the Brahman, when they are mutually opposed? By way of such questions, the Brahman

becomes an object of doubt. For the removal of such doubts, this treatise embodying an investigation into the Brahman is to be started.

The term Brahman can be applied to Śiva, for, the quality of being the Master of all is common to both Śiva and the Brahman. On the authority of the Upaniṣads, some say that since the Brahman is the highest abode place of Viṣṇu. Viṣṇu is the highest principle. This is not correct. Because, the word pada in the sentence - तत्त्वं परमं पदम् - is not used in the sense of 'place' or abode'; it is used in the sense of that being who should be attained (prapya-purusa). Then this sentence may not refer to Viṣṇu at all. It would refer to "that purusa, who is beyond Viṣṇu and who is to be attained". Who is that purusa? The answer to this question is very clear, and it is that that purusa is either Śiva or the power possessed by Śiva (Śaivī-sakti). Or the sentence, तत्त्वं परम...
may be interpreted in still another way. The word pada itself may be understood in the sense of Śiva, on the authority of the Skanda-purāṇa, and the form Viṣnoḥ may be taken as an ablative, so that the whole sentence would mean, 'that Śiva who is beyond Viṣnu'. This means that Śiva is the highest principle in the whole universe. Though there are some other sentences which refer to other gods as the highest principle, still Śiva has to be regarded as the highest god.

The compound word brahma-jijnāsa is regarded as sāsthi-tatpurūṣa compound. The genitive (brahmanah) is used as karmani sāsthi (genitive in the sense of object). So the word, brahma-jijnāsa, would mean, the meditation on the Brahman (should be undertaken). It may now be argued that knowledge implies the limitedness of the object of knowledge, the Brahman is unlimited, and so the unlimited Brahman cannot be an object of knowledge. But such a question only betrays one's sheer ignorance. Though it is impossible that the Brahman can be characterised and can have any limit, yet, it can have a limit only in the sense of differentiated form from

1. Skanda-purāṇa:

śiva ca satam mahādeva
dvārakāḥ brahma samyotman
others by means of special characterising marks. Limitation by such special characterising marks always gives us a knowledge regarding the object, whose marks they are, as distinct from others.

There are two kinds of limitedness: (1) that belonging to the object itself, such as a fruit held in the hand and known to be such and such fruit. (2) That belonging to an object known by means of certain characterising marks, to be distinct from others. The first kind really limits the objects, and not the second. For, in the latter case, we do not claim to know all characteristics of that object, but only what it is not, that is to say, only a few marks that enable us to distinguish it from others. For example, in a battle field, it is impossible for one to know the king as he really is. But when someone tells one that a king always carries a white umbrella, then, though this special characterising mark of having a white umbrella over the head, of course, does not give a full knowledge of the king, yet it is something, as it enables one to distinguish the king from others. In the same manner, when one knows the Brahman, it does not limit the Brahman; for, one cannot know it fully, but can know only a few special marks that enable one to distinguish it from other entities.
What is the aim or fruit of this enquiry?
This is the next question. The scriptural texts mention various purposes (prajñāna). According to some, it is salvation\(^1\), while others state bliss as being its fruit\(^2\), and so on. But the main purpose is the attainment of mokṣa.

2. Appayya Dīkṣita opens the second section with the observation that, in the previous topic, it is shown that the Brahman is either a knowable thing or that it can have a limit (paricchedya) only in the sense that it can be distinguished from other entities (itaretara-vyāvṛtti). Now, here, in this second topic, the determinative quality or the characterising mark (niscayatmaka guna) of the Brahman is stated. What is the characterising mark of the Brahman which is the object of this enquiry here? In reply to this question, the next sutra, ज्ञानाध्ययः यतः\(^3\) has been set forth.

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2. Taittirīya Up., II.8.: भैया आनन्दस्य मीमांसा भवति।
3. Vedānta-sūtra, I.1.2.
When an object is already known, then the statement of its characterising mark becomes meaningless; and when it is not known at all, then also any urge for knowing its characterising mark is impossible. This being so, how can there be any statement of the characterising mark of the Brahman? This is how the Purvapakṣin puts forth his objection.

The Siddhāntin sets aside this objection by saying that, as the Brahman is known from the Vedas only in a general way, one may desire to know it in a more particular way. Hence a statement of its special marks becomes possible. For instance, when there is the moon in the sky, some one asks: What is that moon? Then the characterising mark of the moon is stated, and the questioner obtains the knowledge about the moon. A similar, purpose is served by the sentences in the Upaniṣads.

If the Brahman is described in the Upaniṣads, then, with whom is it to be identified— with Śiva or with Viṣṇu? So asks the objector on behalf of the Purvapakṣin. To this the Siddhāntin replies: In the
Upanisads, this Brahman is identified with Śiva and is regarded as the ultimate cause of the world. It is also emphasised in the Upanisads that salvation can be attained through his grace (anugraha).

The termination, tas, in the word, yataḥ, in the sutra जन्मावस्थ यत: is not used in the sense of prakṛti, though the ablative denotes origin (prakṛti) according to the sutra, जन्मावस्थ यत:। Because, if it is taken in the sense of origin, the agent of the action of creation (jani karta) will be the cause. This will not be correct. According to the tradition and according to the Nyāyaśāstra, when there is inseparable inherence (samavaya) between the cause and the effect, then the word denoting this relation (samavayi-pada) is stated as the cause of it. Similarly in the sentence under consideration, the ablative is used to indicate the cause and the remaining part of the sutra denotes the Brahman as the creator, protector, and destroyer of the universe. Śrīkanṭha Cārya, further, adds that, really speaking, the universe emerges out of

the Śivatattva, and all the qualities like bliss, etc.,
which are attributable to the Brahman are equally
attributable to Śiva also. Because this Brahman is
designated by following eight names of Śiva, namely,
Bhava, Sarva, Iśāna, Pasupati, Rudra, Ugra, Bhumī, and
Mahādeva. Although the Brahman or Śiva can be denoted
by all names, yet he is primarily designated by these
names, namely, Bhava and the rest, which clearly
manifest his supreme excellence. The significance of
these eight names is explained as follows:

The Brahman is called Bhava because it exists
(bhu) at all places, at all times.

As the root Sr means 'to kill', the word
Sarva indicates that the Brahman is the destroyer of all.

As the Brahman is endowed with limitless and
supreme power (lordship), it is designated by the
word Iśāna.

The Brahman is designated as Pasupati, with
particular reference to the objects controlled by the
lord. The term Pasupati, if interpreted strictly
literally, might imply that the Brahman is the lord of
only pasus or souls and not of matter or the physical
world. But really speaking here the term *pasu* means both *pasu* (souls) and *pāśa* (matter).

The Brahman is designated as Rudra, because it puts mundane miseries to flight.

The Brahman is designated as Ugra, because it is not overwhelmed by the powers of others.

The Brahman is designated as Bhīma, because, being the controller, it is an object of fear to all the souls.

The Brahman is called Mahādeva, because it shines on account of its greatness.

According to some, Narāyaṇa, who is mentioned in the Chandogya-Upaniṣad, is the ultimate cause. But this Narāyaṇa is not different from Śiva, as pointed by

1. By Gauni-Lakṣana, which is defined as - (Tantravārṭtika), the term *pasu* means all the creatures which are bound down by means of nooses (*pāśa*) in the form of māyā and which Śiva ultimately sets free.

2. Here Appayya Dīkṣita is presumably referring to the Pañcarātra-doctrine.
Similarly, though Virinci, etc., are outwardly different, still, Śiva is at the root of all them, as can be asserted on the authority of the Kurma-Purāṇa. So Śiva is the beginning (ādi), middle (Madhya) and the end (anta) of the whole universe.

Śiva is known from the scriptures to be free from all mundane blemishes and to be a repository of all auspiciousness. And being possessed of the above-mentioned attributes, he is responsible for the origin, etc., of the whole universe. For, such a great being alone can possibly be both the material and the efficient cause of the universe. As he possesses such a greatness, Śiva is called Brahman (the great being). That very being is the Śiva, being possessed of bliss etc., and it is futile to imagine that bliss etc., stand apart from him.

The Brahman, that is, Śiva, possessing the souls and the matter in a subtle form, is the ultimate cause. Its effect is the gross universe consisting of the souls, and the matter. Hence, it is concluded that the Brahman has the special characterising mark of being the cause of the origin, etc., of the universe.
In the previous section, it has been asserted that the Brahman is the material cause of the universe. But other pramanas like pratyaksa, anumana, etc., were not adduced in support of that assertion. So it may be asked: What is the proof for the Brahman being the cause of the universe? In reply to this, the Sutrakara has laid down the sutra: शास्त्रोपनिल्याय ।

According to the Purvapakṣin, this world is an effect which must have some appropriate cause. The Brahman may be its cause, but it cannot be said that it can be known through the scriptures only. For, the scripture is concerned only with such objects as cannot be known through other means of knowledge.

This position of the Purvapakṣin has been controverted by the Siddhāntin by pointing out that the Brahman is the ultimate cause and that it can be known only through the Vedānta-texts. Because, the knowledge of the Brahman is impossible without the Vedānta-texts. This has been declared by the scriptural passage, नाबदेवदिन्मनुष्ये ते ब्रह्मतम ।

1. Vedānta-Sūtra, I.1.3.
2. Śrīkantha-bhāṣya, on I.1.3.
It cannot be said that the Brahman can very well be known through inference, to be the sole cause of the world. The Brahman is beyond the range of inference, etc., and can, therefore, be known only through the Vedānta-texts. It has only that as its proof.

According to same{	extsuperscript{1}}, the sūtra, सास्त्रोनित्वात् proves the omniscience of the Brahman. The omniscience of the Brahman follows from the very fact that the Brahman is the cause of the Vedānta-texts.

So, according to the first interpretation, the sūtra under consideration would mean: The Brahman cannot be known through any other means of knowledge as it has scriptures for its only source. That is to say, the Brahman can be known through scriptures only. While, according to the second interpretation, the sūtra would mean: The Brahman is omniscient because it is the source of the scriptures (that is scriptures issue forth from it). This does not lead to any logical fallacy of

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1. Śrīkantha does not make it clear as to who are meant here.
equivocation, which occurs when a word, which ordinarily denotes one meaning, is used to convey more than one meaning. But when a writer or a speaker himself intends to convey more than one sense by the same word, in his poetical composition full of puns, etc., then, there is no such fault. Here the author himself wants to convey two different meanings by the same sutra, so, no logical fallacy of equivocation or ambiguity is involved.

Another objection on behalf of the Purvapaksin has been raised as follows: It is not proper to regard the Brahman as the author of the Vedas for that would contradict the statement - ऋग्वेद ऋवाण्विजनात् यकुःदैव वायो: साम्वेद अदित्यात् etc. Further, if the Vedas are to be taken as the effects of the Brahman, or if they are believed to have been composed by Brahmadeva, then, there being imposed a human origin on them or their being regarded as having been created (pauruseya), they (i.e. the Vedas) will cease to be the authoritative, for, human beings are liable to commit mistakes.

1. Taittirīya Samhitā, II.6.11.2 and also Rgveda, V.8.75.6.
The **Siddhāntin** contests this by saying that the Brahman can properly be regarded as the author of the Vedas, because the Upaniṣadic passage, अस्य महतो पूर्वस्तानि
निन्दतिदित्रयुतपौदेद्: etc., declares that all the Vedas have issued forth from the Brahman without any special efforts having been made for this purpose. They were as if breathed forth. The same has been corroborated by the passage, ज्ञाधारणामेतेव संकि शास्त्रीय निन्द्वल्लभास्।
आदिकाली कथि: साशाश्च ब्रह्मप्रियिति बुलति:। Prior to creation, the omniscient supreme Lord again creates the Vedas which had merged in his own self. He fashions them just as before, according to their prior compositions, as has been said in the sruti. Hence the Vedas are not created by any human agency – they are *apauruseya*, and are like the breathings out of the Brahman. The words of those, who are subject to worldly passions like love and hate, may or may not be authoritative. But the words of the Brahman or Śiva, who is free from blemishes from all imperfections, who is unobstructed and unlimited,

3. *Ṛgveda*, X.190.3. : ध्याता भयापूर्वकप्रतः।
and who has the direct intuitive knowledge of all the objects existing in the past, the present, and the future; who is self-proved, and the supreme lord; who has attained the supreme, and who has all his desires fulfilled, are always authoritative. That Śiva is declared in the śrutis\(^1\) as being the author of all loves and the cause of all auspicious smṛtis\(^2\). Hence, the Vedas revealing all the things are due to Śiva on the Brahman who is omniscient.

It may be argued that the supreme lord's omniscience implies his knowledge regarding all the objects mentioned in the Vedas. Then even great sages, who know the meaning of the Vedas, may be said to be omniscient. This is, however, not so, because the Lord who composed the Vedas must necessarily be presumed to possess more knowledge than that contained in the Vedas. Although the Veda manifests the meaning of everything, it does not manifest all things directly, but it manifests some only indirectly - some in a general manner and some specifically. It is the supreme Lord alone who

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1. Maha Up., XVII.5: श्रीशुद्धिज्ञानाम्।
2. Maha Up., X.3: स ना देव: श्रुत्या स्मृत्त्या संयुक्त।
can perceive all; the great sages are not able to do this. As the Vedas existed even before the origination of Prajāpati and the rest¹, only the Supreme Lord, and not even Prajāpati, has to be regarded as the author of the Vedas. Prajāpati or Brahmā desired for creation, and this desire of Brahmā for creation is the efficient cause, and his power or prakṛti is the material cause.

It is thus established that Lord Śiva is the author of all the Vedas which are themselves eternal on account of the authorship of the lord. This does not lead to any self-contradiction. For, the Vedas are merely manifested, and are not created, at the time of each new creation. During dissolution, the Vedas do not become destroyed, they are only merged back into the Brahman. At the time of creation, they come to be revealed again. So they are eternal and their creation simply means 're-manifestation' in accordance with their old form. The Vedas owe their origin to the Brahman, since they issue forth from it anew each time; and yet

1. Śvetāsvatara Up., VI.18.: गा ब्रह्माणे चिदगातिः पूर्वं ये वेदाः श्रव्य प्रहिणेनैति तथमेव।
they are eternal since they remain in the Brahman at all time, when they are not manifested.

4. The new section starts with a short summary. In the first topic, Śiva, the Supreme Brahman, is proved to be the entity which one desires to know. In the second section, it is stated that the creatorship etc., are the special characterising marks of the same Brahman. The third adhikarana establishes that the scripture is the only proof with regard to the Brahman and is its source. A thing that is proved by something else always without an exception, is said to have that something as its proof. How can the Vedānta-texts be taken as establishing the Brahman? By way of an answer to this question, the next sutra, namely, तत् समन्वयात् । has been set forth.

The word tat in the above-mentioned sutra stands for the Brahman, while tu stands for all the Vedānta-texts collectively. The term samanvayat means connection in respect of meaning. So the whole sutra would mean: The Vedānta-texts being all connected with

1. Vedānta-Sūtra, I.1.4.
marks of meaning, all give us the knowledge regarding that, that is, the Brahman.

The view of the Purvapakṣin, here, is that it is not proper to hold that the Vedānta-texts inform us about the Brahman. Because, firstly, in all cases, the word can indicate an object or can have a meaning only when the relation between that word and its meaning is known. In the absence of such a relation, a man can have no idea about the meaning of that word; and this relation depends on the usage of the elders. This usage enables us to know that words indicate actions only. As words denote actions, they can never refer to the Brahman, the eternal one, since actions are possible only in respect of such objects as are subject to changes. Secondly, the world being a particular kind of effect, a particular kind of cause, namely, the Brahman, can be established by inference also. Thirdly, the Vedānta-texts are concerned only with injunctions and not with the Brahman. If they are concerned with both, then, a diversity or contradiction amongst texts will result.

The Siddhāntin refutes this view by pointing out that it is perfectly reasonable to assume that the Vedānta-texts are capable of giving us the knowledge about
the Brahman. For, the first argument about the words denoting only actions is wrong. For, in a sentence such as, "a son is born to you", the words are, indeed, found to have connection with the established objects too. Because, here, in the sentence, 'a son is born to you', the listener gets an idea regarding an object, namely, a son, from those words but no idea about any action whatsoever. So words do refer to mere objects. There is no necessity of mentioning the usage of the elders, here. For, one can get the knowledge of the words through other means also. For instance, the mothers can point out by her fingers different objects like children, animals, etc., to their own children, and then apply those words to those objects respectively. Thus, being trained in various ways, these children come to know the meaning of all these words. Those, who know nothing about poetic and dramatic treatises can approach a person who knows all these, can separate the words, and can have a knowledge that this particular word which is rarely asked has this particular meaning and in such a manner they can know the meaning of the sentences in that particular poetic work. Hence, as words can give us the knowledge regarding the established
objects, they can be proofs with regard to such objects like the Brahman. As far the second statement that the Brahman can be known through inference, it is not possible. For, it is found that chariots, palaces, etc., are the result of many causes, so that it is impossible to prove by inference that the world is the result of a single cause. The third objection, namely, that the Vedānta-texts contain injunctions only is also not correct. For, it can be said that through tatparyārtha, the Vedānta-texts are concerned with the Brahman. This tatparyārtha is based upon the following seven marks: (1) upakrama (beginning), (2) upasamhāra (conclusion), (3) abhyāsa (repetition), (4) apūrvatva (novelty), (5) phala (result), (6) arthavāda (explanation), (7) upapatti (fitness or non-contradiction). On the ground of these seven factors, the Vedānta-texts can be said to be referring to the Brahman. The determination of the meaning through these seven factors is called 'hearing (śravana)'. So the Vedānta-texts have double purport (tātparya). They refer to the Brahman itself as well as to its meditation (upāsana); and on the ground of these seven factors it can be said that the Vedānta-texts refer to Śiva, the Brahman.
Moreover, the Vedānta-texts are connected not only with the Brahman but also with injunction regarding the knowledge of the Brahman. This does not result in diversity (vākyabheda), as, through the eye that enables us to know colour etc., the object too, is known. So through the Vedānta-texts, concerned with injunctions regarding the knowledge and meditation of the Brahman, the Brahman itself becomes known.

The Vedic texts can be regarded as being in the form of various Vidhis. For example, the sentence - can be treated as an utpatti-vidhi, which requires calmness etc., on the part of the meditator, while the sentence, etc., can be treated as prayoga-vidhi. The sentences like etc., instruct us about the meditation as well as about the result. Similarly from the Upaniṣadic-texts such as (Taittiriya Up., II.1.) it is known that the worshippers of the Brahman can attain the desired objects together with the attainment of the Brahman.

1. Taittiriya Up., II.1.: 

केषांनुते श्रवयो क्रामान् सह ब्रह्मण विषयविचि.
This Brahman is obtained at any time (nitya-prapta).
This is known through the Vedanta-text only.

5. The fifth section considers the passage -
   सदेव से स्थितम् जासमि etc., from the Chandogya-Upanisad. (VI. 1)
   According to the Purvapakṣin, here, the pradhāna of the
   Samkhya is being described as the cause of the universe.
   The same pradhāna is again described as the creator at
   other places also. Moreover the nonsentient pradhāna
   alone can be appropriately transformed into the form of
   the world, and not the sentient, unchangeable Brahman,
   Śiva.

   The Siddhāntin rejects this position by pointing
   out that the pradhāna is not the cause. For the
   scriptures state that 'the cause of the world perceives
   or thinks.' This perceiving or thinking can be an
   attribute of a sentient entity and not of insentient
   pradhāna.

1. Śvetāsvatara Up., IV.5. :
   अनादेव जानिन्युक्तकृष्णि जाध्योऽपि: प्रज्ञ: सूजनानी सहृप्यः।

2. Chāndogya Up., VI.2.3. :
   तदेशल नहुं स्योऽपि प्रज्ञाप्येति।
Moreover, the view that the unchangeable lord cannot be transformed into the form of the world indicates sheer ignorance. Because, the Supreme Lord, who is free from name and form, is the cause, while as possessing the power of gross cit and acit divisible into name and form, it is the effect. This creation really speaking is not a new production, not a change in the Brahman. This creation implies only the manifestation of the subtle powers of the Brahman into gross forms. In the process of creation, these powers manifest themselves in the form of the gross universe of souls and matter. Then, they come to have different names and forms, can be distinguished from the Brahman, and are called its effect.

The Purvapakṣin raises an objection here:

Just as in the sentence, ता ज्ञाप अक्षितः etc., perceiving is to be understood in a secondary or metaphorical sense, so it may be secondary in the case of the pradhāna also.

The Siddhāntin sets aside this objection by pointing out that the term, atman, which designates a conscious being is mentioned in the text, so the pradhāna is not intended there. The word atman cannot be

1. Chandogya Up., VI.2.3-4.
understood in the sense of the Jīva, because the sentence -  तत्स तात्देव चिरं यावन्त विमोक्षेयं संकुल्प्ये। ¹ teaches that one who relies on the reality designated by the term sat attains salvation. This salvation cannot be attained by the knowledge of the Jīva or of the pradhāna. The Śaṃkhyas, also, who take pradhāna to be the cause, do not hold that one who relies on pradhāna attains salvation, for according to the Śaṃkhyas pradhāna is to be abandoned. Moreover, by the knowledge of the pradhāna, everything else cannot be known; but by the knowledge of the Brahman everything else becomes known². Moreover, the sentences - प्रसन्न वेदः सत्सम्बः ³ and आत्मन: जेवेदं सक्षम् ⁴ declare that the conscious soul, united with sat, enters into its own self. Here the word enters 'implies dissolution'. So the dissolution of the conscious soul into the unconscious pradhāna does not stand to reason. So the conscious Brahman is the cause. As has been said in the Upaniṣads, all things originate from the self.

1. Ibid, VI.14.2.
2. Ibid, VI.1. :  चेन्नैन विज्ञातन वर्मिमिदं विज्ञातं स्यात्।
6. In the previous section, it has been stated that the nonsentient pradhāna cannot be the cause of the universe and that therefore the Brahman must be taken to be the material cause. Now it is but natural that some description of that Brahman should be given. Hence this sixth section is introduced.

In the Upaniṣadic passage, तस्माद अतिस्मादनिर्गम-म्यात्स्योदेतत्त्तर आत्मांसन्नसस्य: 1 there is the description of the soul consisting of food etc. What is meant by this soul? This is the doubt. The Pūrvapakṣin argues that it must be the individual soul. Because the phrase 'consisting of food' in सत्वा श्रेष्ठ पुनः साध्यसत्ताः 2 denotes body etc.; and ultimately the individual soul, the substratum of all, is denoted by the phrase 'self consisting of bliss' (anandamaya). It may be asked as to how this individual soul, merged as it is in the ocean of suffering etc., can be characterised as 'consisting of bliss'. The reply to this is: The term bliss (ananda) in the above-mentioned passage denotes the Brahman and the suffix maya denotes

1. Taittirīya Up., II.5.
2. Ibid, II.1.
modification (*vikāra*) and the phrase *ānandamaya* means 'the individual soul which is the effect of the Brahman'.

The Siddhāntin rebut this view by saying that the self consisting of bliss is none other than the Supreme Brahman, because the word 'bliss' has been repeated many times as being unsurpassable¹. On account of expectancy, proximity (*yatejñate*), only Paramēśvara is meant here. The suffix *maya*, here, means 'abundance' and not modification, as is supposed by the Purva-pāśkina. In the case of selves consisting of food, etc., this *maya* may mean modification, but in the case of the self consisting of understanding (*vijnāna-maya*) and of the self consisting of bliss (*ānandamaya*), this *maya* means abundance, since the Brahman being full of joy makes others joyous.² An objection is raised here on behalf of the Purva-pāśkina. Even if the supreme Lord, having abundant bliss was understood as the self consisting of bliss, there would be some difficulty. It is, known that such a self is different from the Brahman, for, the Brahman is known to be the foundation of this *ānandamaya*,

1. Ibid, II.8-9. : शैवा आनन्दमयी मामोसा भवति।
2. Ibid, II.7. : शैव हृदेयानन्दमयी।
as is said in the sentence -  

The Siddhāntin refutes this by saying that the very Brahman is celebrated as self consisting bliss, because 'being possessed of abundance of bliss' can be the attribute of the Brahman alone. In the text, the word brahman, means pranava. As this pranava stands for the supreme lord, it can be taken as the foundation.

Then, an alternative interpretation of this Śūtra is given. According to the Purvapaksin, here, the word ānandamaya stands for the paramākasa, the primary material cause of the whole world. It is also designated by the word ānanda in the śruti-sentence such as, "ānanda ākasa.

The Siddhāntin states that the term ānanda has been applied to the Brahman - ānandatītātyājya. ānandatītātyājya. ākasa stands for ākasa stands for

1. Taittirīya Up., II.5.
2. Smp I.1.6
4. Ibid.
ananda and ananda for the Brahman, the word anandamaya indicates the Brahman alone. That the Brahman is the substratum of the paramākāśa is also stated in the sentence - तत्सार्था तत्सार्थात्मां आकासः संपूर्तः।
So the support and the supported being identical, a word designating the first may very well denote the second too. The suffix maya again is applied on the authority of the sūtra, तत्सार्थात्मां मयाम् and it does not make any change in the sense. The term puccha means om, the sacred syllable. It seems that Appayya Dīksita favours the second interpretation.

Still one more interpretation of this Sūtra is given. According to this interpretation, the passage refers to the cit śakti. This is the Pūrvapakṣa.

1. Ibid, II.1.
3. Śivārkamanidīpikā, p. 221.
4. According to this view, the Vārunī-vidyā explained in the Taittiriya Up.,III., ends in the paramākāśa. This paramākāśa stands for the cit śakti. So the cit śakti is here referred to.
This view has been rejected on the ground that it is true that Śiva being accompanied by sakti creates this universe, but Śiva is independent while sakti is not so, as she operates according to Śiva's inclination.

Still another view is stated. According to this view the five kosas, namely, anna, prāna, manas, viññāna, and ananda represent the five divine persons who are the causes of the five elements. They are: Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Rudra, Īśvara, and Sadāśiva. This view is not accepted, because there is another cause, known as Parama Śiva or Brahman, which is stated as substratum (pratiṣṭhā). So only Śiva or the Brahman must be understood to have been referred to here.

7. The seventh section takes up the sentence -

यतः प्रसूत्त जगतः प्रसूती तो योगेन भीतान् व्यक्तान् पुरुषां ।

यद्रेष्ठानि: या पुरुषां पद्मेश्वर्ण विशेष भूतानि चराचरणि॥

for consideration. In this sentence, it is stated that some being has created this universe. This may be Hiranyagarbha. Because there are marks like laying down on the ocean as - यस्यः सपदे क्षणो व्याप्तिः। etc. In the concluding part of the same text,


2. Ibid, I.3.
the word dhata (creator) occurs\(^1\). Hiranyagarbha is known as Prajapati also\(^2\). So Hiranyagarbha is the creator.

The Siddh\=antin sets aside this view by pointing out that the attributes of the supreme lord, such as, being the cause of procreatress of the world (that is prak\=rti) and so on, do not go well with Hiranyagarbha, because from the sentence — अत: परं नाम्यदातः परात्यार्य वन्महतो महान्तुः \(^3\) it is known that this being, the creator, is the cause of the prak\=rti, the best among all, etc., and this is not possible on the part of Hiranyagarbha, who himself is included in this creation.

Moreover, the Upani\=sadic texts do distinguish the Lord from Hiranyagarbha\(^4\). Not only this, but the

\begin{enumerate}
\item Ibid, V.7 : धाता यथापूर्ववस्थयत्
\item *Sivarkamani\=nipika*, pp. 233-34 :
\begin{quote}
प्रजापतिः हिरण्यगर्भः । जिति श्रवणात् ।
\end{quote}
\item *Mah\=a Up.*, I.5.*
\item Ibid, X.3. : ये देवानां प्रयं पुरस्तात्तिथिवाचिकेष्ट खद्द्रे महर्षिः । हिरण्यगर्भं पञ्चमं नामयमन्ते । देव: सुमयम् स्मृत्या स्मृतकः ॥
\end{enumerate}
authoritative works like the Kūrma-Purāṇa, the Mahābhārata, the Skanda-Purāṇa, the Linga-Purāṇa also mention them separately.

This Prajāpati, again, has no independent power to create the universe. Hiranyagarbha or Prajāpati depends on Śiva so far as the act of creation is concerned. This is what is said in the Maha-Upaniṣad. So the Supreme Lord, that is, Śiva, alone is the cause of the world, and Hiranyagarbha is only his part.

8) In the seventh section, it has been established that Śiva is the Supreme Brahman. He is the two-fold (material and efficient) cause of the universe. He is bliss in essence. Now, the eighth section is being opened for indicating the form in which Śiva is to be conceived by his devotees.

The sentence - अथ य अवेयोन्तरादित्ये हिरण्यम्: पुरस्यो दृष्ट्ये । describes a golden person on the orbit of

1. Ibid, XVII.5: श्रेयोधिपायोधिपाय: हिरण्यम्: । etc.
the sun. According to the Purva-Pakṣa, it is not the supreme Lord who is the substratum of all. Being present in all, the supreme lord cannot be understood as being on the orbit of the sun alone. Even if it is supposed that Śiva assumes this form voluntarily, still, Śiva has three eyes, while this purusa has only two eyes. Again, when one possesses body, one becomes subject to all physical worries, while the Supreme lord is known to be free from them. Hence, this golden person must be some other divinity.

The Siddhāntin reiterates that the golden person is none but Śiva only, because the qualities like "lordship over all worlds and desires" have been mentioned in the Upaniṣadic-text, श्रीर्वेत ज्ञेयां लोकांमोह्ने कर्माद। These qualities can be thought of only in the case of Śiva, the Brahman. This Śiva can assume a golden form for favouring the devotees and can assume inside the orbit of the sun. The mention of two eyes is intended only for indicating the similarity of the eyes with the lotus and not for denying the third eye. As the third eye is

1. Chandogya Upan., I.6.8. But this is a wrong quotation.
   Vide see Roma Chaudhari, Doctrine of Śrīkantha, II. p.68.
always closed, it may not have been described here.
There is the description only of those eyes that are open. For the term kaprāsam punḍarīkam in तस्य यथा
कप्यासं पुण्डरीकेश्वरिणीः is to be interpreted as "his eyes are like the lotus, bloomed by the Sun". Moreover,
though Śiva is possessed of body, yet he is free from all sins and worries etc., as is stated in the śrutis.

On the authority of the laukika sentence,
the Purvapāksin argues that Nārāyaṇa is here referred to as the puruṣa on the orbit of the Sun. The Siddhāntin
brushes aside this claim of the Purvapāksin by pointing out that the Maha-Upanisad describes Śiva, the husband of
Uma, as being within the Sun and having a form like gold.

2. Śivārkamanidipika, p.256 ; कुम्भकर रक्षमिति: भिक्तीति
कपिरादिविन : तेनासितं विकिरितं पुण्डरिकेश्वरिणीं यथा स्युतसन्त तथा।
This interpretation as accepted by Śrīkaṇṭha, is the interpretation of Rāmānuja.
3. Śivārkamanidipika, pp.258-259.
4. Mahā Up., XII.2; XIII.1. : य जेनेन्तःन्तताडिभािे हिरण्यम्:
पुरुषः …… सर्वं वै स्तद्:।
The *Agni-Purāṇa*, again, states that Śiva is to be meditated upon even after the worship of Viṣṇu. This indicates that Śiva is the highest reality. So, the *purusa* on the orbit of the Sun, is Śiva alone.

9. The ninth and the tenth sections open with the *Purvapakṣa* which can be stated as follows: In the sentence -

\[
\text{स्मृतिः ह वा जिमानि मूलान्याकारादेव समुद्भवते}.
\]

from the *Chandogya Upaniṣad*, the word *ākāsa* refers to the elemental ether as the same has been stated as being the cause at other places also. In the same way, the word *prāṇa* in the sentence, -

\[
\text{स्मृतिः ह वा जिमानि मूलानि प्राणमेवाभिविशिष्टः प्राणमन्युनिहते}.
\]

stands for the vital breath.

1. *Agni-Purāṇa*: ध्येयः सदा सदासिद्धः।
2. Śrīkantha combines the ninth and the tenth sections into one.
4. *Taittirīya Up.*, II.1. : आकासाभासः। वायोरसिद्धः।
The Siddhāntin, on the other hand, asserts that, by these words, namely, ākāsa and prāṇa, the Supreme lord, Śiva, alone is denoted. Because the attributes like 'the cause of all' can be applied to Śiva alone. The Taittirīya-Upaniṣad confirms this. The elemental ether is distinct from the supreme ether, which is nothing but the supreme prakṛti. This prakṛti is the cause of all, but as it is non-different from Śiva, this ether is described as the elemental ether.

11. In the eighth section, it has been said that Śiva is on the orbit of the Sun. Now, here, it is said that Śiva is inside other places also.

1. Taittirīya Up., II.1. :

तत्स्मादृ जैत्स्मादाल्पमः आकाशः समूतः ।
Here the word ātman refers to Śiva only.
In the Chandogya Upaniṣad - passage -

it is said that the light than which there is no higher light is the same which is within this person. What is this light? This is the question. The Purvapakṣin is of the opinion that as the word 'heaven' occurs in the sentence under consideration, the light must be the sun. Or, as the light is said to be within a person, it may be the fire within the belly (jātharāgni).

The Siddhānta in this connection may be stated as follows: The word jyotīḥ in the passage under consideration refers to the Supreme light, as the statement, 'nothing is higher than it' can be applied to that Supreme light only. Moreover the description in the preceding sentence, namely, 'all beings are but one part of this light', corroborates the same assumption.

An objection, on behalf of the Purvapakṣin, has been raised here. In the previous part of the same

text, Gāyatrī is referred to as the soul of all. So the metre Gāyatrī must have been meant there. The Siddhāntin rebuts this by saying that the sentence is not intended to state that the metre Gāyatrī is the soul of all. What is actually meant is that, as Gāyatrī has four-feet, so the Brahman too has four feet, and that, therefore, there is similarity between the Brahman and the Gāyatrī. The same type of similarity is found between the Virāj-metre and the Brahman in the passage about the Sāmvardha-vidyā. Bhūta, prthivi, sārīra and hṛdaya, again, are the parts of the supreme lord and not of the Gāyatrī-metre. Nor can it be said that there is difference of teaching in the texts, निवादनस्याश्च दिविः and परो दिवश ज्ञाति, since the word div is in the locative in the first sentence, and in the genetive in

the second. This results in the difference of case endings, and so two different things are meant here. This is not so. For, as by the two expressions, 'a hawk in the top of a tree, (Vṛksagre śyenah)' and 'a hawk above the top of a tree (Vṛksagrāt paratah śyenah)' only one thing is meant, namely, that the hawk is over the tree, similarly, the supreme lord is over and above all, and this is meant by these sentences.

12. The last section in the first quarter of the first chapter intended to prove that Śiva is the soul of everything, and that nothing besides him is to be worshipped.

In the Kausitaki Upanisad¹, Indra asks Pratardana to meditate on him as immortality. Now is Indra to be worshipped or the Supreme Lord? This is the doubt. The Purvapakṣin argues that Indra is meant here, since Indra is directly referred to by the term mām in tam mām āyur amṛtam iti upāsva². Indra can be called

1. Kausitaki Up., III.1. :

2. Ibid.
prāṇa as he is the preserver of all, through rains. Indra is described as being the master of the universe in the śrutis. Hence, Indra is here referred to.

The Siddhāntin rejects this position by saying that the supreme lord is here referred to and not Indra. Because the special qualities like bliss, immortality, etc., belong to the supreme lord only.

An objection by the Purva-pakṣin has been raised here. Both the introductory and the concluding part of this section refer to Indra alone. Hence Indra must be taken to have been described here. The Siddhāntin of this section controverts this by pointing-out that from the very beginning of the section of the Kuṣṭikā Upaniṣad there are multitudes of references to the self.

1. Rgveda, VII.27.3.  जिन्द्रो राजा नग्नशर्कर्णीनाम्।
   Artharvaveda, VIII.4.21.
   Rgveda, I.32.15.  जिन्द्रो यातो सबस्तिन्य राजा।

2. Kuṣṭikā Up., III.1. :
   मामेव विजाननीमि निस्तीपीयार् त्वाष्टुमहनम्।

3. Ibid, III.8.  स केश प्राण केश प्रातित्वम। This is to be taken as referring to Indra, says the Purva-pakṣin.
Similarly the text describes that the entity is the lord of all universe, and the same is the substratum of all as has been said in the sentence - तुष्ण सत्स्थारे नेमिरंधिता नामावला अर्पिता।

All this is possible in the case of the supreme lord only. Though Indra is describing himself as the killer of Tvastr etc., he is identifying himself with the supreme lord, as Vamadeva has done. Or Indra is completely absorbed in meditation, and hence he is speaking in that manner being one with the supreme lord. Kṛṣṇa also did the same in the Gītā. It is not correct to say that eventhough these released persons teach ownself as an object of worship as has been said in the Gītā. For, the supreme lord is to be worshipped in three ways, namely, (1) in His own nature, (2) in the form of the sentient, and (3) in the form of the non-sentient.

2. Ibid.
3. Gītā, X.41. : यदौ यदौ विमृतितत्स्तत्व श्रीनृतितत्व वा ॥
   ततेवदेववागवङ्ग तवं मम ते मोहस्तेऽस्तेऽमवः॥
Out of these three types of worship, the first type of worship brings about salvation without delay, while the other two bring the salvation after a little delay. Hence, here the supreme lord alone is intended to be described.

1. The second quarter of the first chapter is opened with a remark that, in the preceding chapter, those sentences in which there were clear indications of the Brahman were discussed. In the second quarter, now, those sentences in which there are no such clear indications of the Brahman are being discussed.

In the passage - स्वर्लक्षितं ज्ञातं नोन्याजिज्ञति सान्ते बुधासीत । अथ वसू जनवर्त्तमानमः पुरुषोऽपि यथार्थसिद्धांती कृत्येके पुरुषस्य मनोत्तरे प्रेत्य भवति सः कार्तु कृत्येक । मनोम्यः प्राणशरीरस्य मारूपः सत्यसंक्षेप: आकाशात्मा सर्वकाम: सर्वसन्धः सक्तसं: सक्तिमिति भयंतातो स्वाम्यायनादः - from the Chandogya Upanishad, the soul is described as consisting of mind, etc. The doubt is whether the puruṣa described in the passage under consideration denotes the supreme lord or the Jīva. According to the Purvapakṣin, it must be the individual soul (Jīva), as

the sentence, अथ पूर्व कालमयि: युस्तचः | etc., describes it so.
Moreover, 'consisting of mind' etc., are the characteristic
marks of the Jīva.

The Siddhāntin controverts this view by saying
that the supreme lord alone is here referred to. For,
the attributes such as being possessed of satya-
saṃkalpatva, etc., can be applied to that supreme lord
only. In the introductory part of the text सर्वस्वाति जिद्धर्म अरस्त
etc., the supreme lord alone is described. He alone
is the cause of all. The same has been confirmed again
by the sentence — सर्वस्वाति जिद्धर्म अरस्त: प्रथममातीदृढारमि ब परिप्रेयमवि च
नात्मक: कष्टिचन्दो: अपितारित सिद्धि। The Brahman, having
the entire universe of souls and matter, is the body of
Śiva. So Śiva can be designated by the word 'all'.
Thus by the sentence — सर्वस्वाति जिद्धर्म | Śiva, the Supreme
Lord is intended.

2. In the previous section it has been proved in
a general way that the individual is not an object of
worship, but only a worshipper. Here, in the second
section, it is proved that even Narayana, the material
cause of Hiranyagarbha, the sum total of all individual
souls, is the worshipper of the Brahman, Śiva.

1. Atharva-sīra Up., I.
In *Mahanārāyaṇa-Upaniṣad*, it is stated that

Nārāyaṇa is the lord of the universe, and also denoted here by Nārāyaṇa - the supreme soul or something else? This is the question. The Pūrvapakṣin says that the Jīva must be understood to have been denoted, since the special characteristic marks, namely, 'lying down on the seal' etc., have been used.

The Siddhāntin reiterates that, the word Nārāyaṇa implies Mahēśvara, the soul of Nārāyaṇa, because, the attributes such as being the lord of the universe and the rest, are the attributes of Śiva alone, and the same has been confirmed by the *Svetāśvatara-Upaniṣad* which says:

![Sanskrit text]

An objection on behalf of the Pūrvapakṣin has been raised here: Śiva cannot be said to be the soul of Nārāyaṇa. For, Nārāyaṇa is identified with Śiva in

2. *Ibid* : समुद्रेन्द्र विश्वसुप्रकृति।
the Upaniṣadic texts, an objection on behalf of the Purva-pakṣa has been raised here as Śiva cannot be called as the soul of Narāyaṇa. For, Narāyaṇa is identified with Śiva in the Upaniṣadic texts, such as Narayanaḥ brahma । etc. The Siddhāntin sets aside this objection by saying that Śiva alone has been designated as the soul, as has been said in the sentence, tattvāt. The sentence, Narayanaḥ brahma । again, may mean "that Brahman which is beyond (para) Narāyaṇa". This would refer to Śiva. By the term 'next to Narāyaṇa (Narayana-parām)' it is suggested that Śiva is accompanied by Uma, and the same Śiva being accompanied by Uma has been described by the word Kṛṣṇa-pīṅga in śvetāṣṭra pariṣṭhāṇa brahma pūsṭan ādhyātma-pāṇiḥ । The supreme lord, namely, Śiva does possess the bodily form, but he cannot have physical worries. Because Śiva can assume this form at his own will, while, in the case of the human beings, the bodily form is due to their karmās. This Śiva is to be worshipped by all.

1. Śivārkamaniḍīpika, p. 321.
3. The third section takes up for consideration the sentence - मर्यम्म ऋष्ट्र चालिय वोपे मूर्ति प्रेतन: इ मृत्युर्मुख्योपसेवने क खल्चा वेदय यत्र सः॥ wherein some entity which brings about destruction has been described. This entity may not be Śiva since he is reported to be of compassionate nature. The destruction which has been described in the sentence under consideration is more or less a form of violence, the cause of which is anger. This anger springs from the tamoguna which itself implies ignorance. How can that omniscient and ever-pure Brahman be described in such words? So the sentences under consideration must be referring to something else. This is the line of argument followed by the Purvapakṣin.

The Siddhāntin asserts that the Brahman alone is described here. The sentence under consideration implies the total destruction, and no entity except the Brahman can have the power for such total destruction. For, only the Brahman survives when there is total destruction. As for the tamoguna, it can be said that the attribute of tāmas which is the cause of anger is an earthly attribute. The Supreme Lord is higher than

such attributes. Moreover, this destruction cannot be treated as an action full of violence; it is a sort of punishment. There are three types of punishment:

(1) punishment intended to favour or improve the guilty person (*Nīgrahyanugrahārtha*). For instance, punishment made to one's own son; (2) punishment intended to favour or improve the persons other than offenders (*Taditaranugrahārtha*), such as the killing of a tiger which is the cause of fear to others; and (3) punishment intended to improve both (*Ubhayānugrahārtha*). The sentence or punishment meted out thieves represents this third type. Destruction brought about by Paramēśvara falls under the first category. The father punishes his son in order to improve him and not to harass him. As the father has in his heart some soft corner for his son, the main aim of punishment given by father is the improvement in the behaviour of his son. Similarly, Paramēśvara punishes, through such compassion, in order to afford repose to those souls that are moving through various births. Śiva destroys the universe through such compassion only. Who is able fully to comprehend the greatness of Śiva? Hence Śiva is implied here.
The significance of this fourth section lies in underlining the intimate connection of the Supreme Lord with the Jīva. The sentence, 

\[\text{[ Relevant Sanskrit text]}\]

is being discussed here. According to the Purvapakṣin, the two entities that have been described in the sentence under consideration are the buddhi and the Jīva. For, only these two, namely, the buddhi and the Jīva, can be properly described as enjoyers. The Brahman being non-enjoyer cannot have been referred to here. Moreover, the distinction between the buddhi and the Jīva may be described as being similar to that between the shadow and the light. Buddhi is non-sentient while the Jīva is sentient. The Jīva and the Brahman being identical with each other cannot be so distinguished.

The Siddhāntin controverts this view by reasserting that the two entities mentioned in the sentence under consideration are the Jīva and the Brahman, since they have been described as entering into the cave in the form of the heart. As the supreme soul enjoys

2. Mundaka Up., III.1.1. :

\[\text{[Relevant Sanskrit text]}\]
the bliss of its own nature, both the Jīva and the supreme soul (Brahman) are described here as enjoyers. This is analogous to the eating of food by the king and his servant, though actually the food is different in the two cases. These two, namely, the Jīva and the Brahman, are like shadow and light in the sense that the Jīva is ignorant and dependent, while the Brahman is full of knowledge and independent. Hence the Jīva and the Brahman must be taken to have been referred to in this passage.

5. Another place where the Supreme Lord is seen has been indicated in this fifth section.

The Chandogya-Upaniṣad describes a person inside the eye - येसिस्थि पुरुष पुष्पम दृष्टे। Who is this puruṣa - the Supreme Lord or someone else? The Purvapakṣin argues that it must be some one other than the lord, since its substratum in the form of the eye etc., has been mentioned. The Supreme Lord himself being the substratum of all cannot have another substratum.

The **Siddhāntin** rebuts this argument by pointing-out that the *purusa* mentioned in the sentence under consideration can be the Supreme Lord only, because the qualities like being fearless, being immortal, etc., are mentioned in respect of him. The scriptures also mention that the supreme lord resides in eyes\(^1\). It cannot be the person reflected in the eye (*chāya purusa*), since the qualities like pleasure, etc., are not possible in its case. The *Chāndogya-Upanisad*, again, states that the path which has as its first stage, the light to be traversed by those who have heard about the nature of the Brahman belongs also to them who have heard about the person inside the eye\(^2\). Hence, the *purusa* is the Supreme Lord alone.

6. The sixth section considers the sentence,

\[ \text{अंगुलमात्र: पुरुष पृथ्वी-पृथ्वी च समाप्तिः। जीव: सर्वस्वरूपः प्रपू: प्रोणाति विस्मुकः।} \]

The *purusa* described in this sentence must be the Jīva, as it is said to be very small in size.

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1. **Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.**, III.7-18 : अंगुलमात्र तिलितन्
2. **Chāndogya Up.**, IV.15.1 : य अनेक-सिविम पुरुष-पृथ्वी दृष्टि अन्यान्यनिति। वेदांक वा सिद्धति वर्गान्तु अन्य गच्छति।
3. **Maha Up.**, XVI.3.
and to be an eater, the Supreme Lord, on the other hand, is immeasurable and non-enjoyer. This is the Purvapaksa.

The Siddhāntin refutes this by saying that the puruṣa mentioned in the sentence under consideration must be the highest Brahman, for, the attributes like 'being the lord of the entire world' cannot belong to any one else except the supreme lord. This lord is said to be worthy of being worshipped as vital-breath as well. The size of a thumb attributed to him is intended for facilitating meditation only. Hence, the supreme lord has to be taken to have been meant here.

7. This section proves that the supreme lord is inside everything. The Brhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad describes some entity as being the inner controller residing in the heart of everybody, यः पृथिवीयो तिलङ्गे पृथिवीया अन्तरे वर्षिकाः पृथिवी सरोरे यः पृथिवीयोत्तरे यमस्ति अति त आत्माः सर्वायामासृतः।

Who is this who controls from within? It may be either the individual soul entering

2. Brhadāraṇyaka Up., III.7.3.
into all elements, or the Virat-puruṣa which is the material cause of all sentient beings and which enters into all elements, or the pradhāna of the Sāṃkhya, which is transformed into mahat and the rest pervades all. If it cannot be the Supreme Lord who is beyond all the effects.

The Siddhāntin asserts that the entity described in the sentence under consideration is the Supreme Lord only. For, the qualities like 'being present in all' are mentioned here. And, on the authority of the Atharvasīra-Upaniṣad, Śiva or the Supreme Lord is declared to be of the form of the universe (visva-rūpa).

As for the pradhāna, it can be said that the pradhāna cannot have been the inner controller here, for, the attributes of the pradhāna like changeableness, non-sentiency, etc., are not mentioned in the sentence under consideration. It cannot be the virat-puruṣa, since this virat-puruṣa is nowhere characterised as the governor of all. Again, the sentence under consideration cannot be said to be referring to the jīva, because both the Kāṇvas and the Madhyāṃdinas
describe the Jīva as being different from the inner controller. Hence, the supreme lord alone must be understood to have been described here.

8. This eighth section establishes that though the supreme lord is of the form of the visible earth, etc., still he himself is not visible like them.

In the Mundaka-Upanisad, it is stated that aksara is to be known - अथ परा मया तदस्तरमिः प्रित्येकः।
This aksara may be the pradhāna which is subject to transformation as Pradhāna is transformed into mahat and the rest or it may be the individual soul as aksara is described as imparishable one - सत्य प्रधानामृतात्मार्म।
This is the view of the Purvapaksin.

The Siddhānta is: The aksara is the supreme lord alone on account of the qualities like omniscience etc., being mentioned in respect of it. This aksara can neither be the pradhāna nor the Jīva, because neither of them can be taken to be the source of beings. The former is non-sentient and the latter is non-omniscient and

1. Mundaka-Up., I.1.5-6.
2. Śvetāsvatara-Up., I.10.
and cannot have such a power. Hence, the supreme lord alone is denoted by the term akṣara.

9. In the sixth section the supreme lord has been described as an object to be mediated upon as the support of vital-breath. In this section it is stated that the lord is to be mediated upon as the fire in the bālī. Though the supreme lord is invisible, still he is to be meditated upon. How he is to be meditated is explained here.

In the Chandogya-Upaniṣad, about Vaiśvānara it is said: ।

Here, the stand of the Purvapakṣin is that the word Vaiśvānara implies the gastric fire (jātherāgni) as this word generally denotes that. Or it may imply the elemental fire, as Vaiśvānara usually means elemental fire. Or it may be the fire-god as he is also the giver of the desired fruit.

2. Amarakosa अविनयवानरे बल्लिवालित्वा ग्रीन्तिर्मे: ।
3. Taittirīya-Samhitā, II.2.5.: वैश्वानरे द्वादशगळे र्विपिपेतुः जाते।
The Siddhāntin rejects this by pointing out that, although the word Vaisvānara is a common term, still, on account of the context this word denotes the supreme lord only. For, the attributes like being all-pervading, which are mentioned there, cannot be applied to any antity other than the supreme lord. Even Jaimini says like that. The measure of a span (prādesāmātra) is meant for the sake of meditation only. The same is true in respect of the imagination of a body from head to foot. This supreme lord is to be worshipped as the ātavaragni, by means of the offering to the prāna (prānagnihotra).

1. The third quarter of the first pada considers such Vedic sentences as are partly clear and partly not clear. Hence, this quarter is in a way continuation of the previous pada.

The sentence - श्रेष्ठसस्म भोः प्रथिभो बान्तरसिमोर्ष मनः सह प्राणायां श्रेः । तत्थेकं जानन्त्य आत्मानामया वाचो विन्यम्यामृत्स्येष केतुः। describes a person who is the substratum of all.

1. Mundaka Up., II.2.5.
This may be the *prāṇa*, since the *Brhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad* describes *prāṇa* as the support of all. So says the *Pūrvaṇāksaṅgīn*.

The *Siddhānta* may be stated as follows:

It is the supreme lord who is implied in the sentence under consideration for, the term *ātman* is present there. In addition to this, it is described as the object to be attained by the freed souls. As this is not possible in the case of *vāya* or *prāṇa*, it must be the supreme lord. Though the attributes like support of the heaven, etc., are possible in the *pradhāna*, still, the *pradhāna* is not meant here, because the lord is here designated by the term 'self'. Moreover, the context suits only the supreme lord.

2. The second section considers the sentence —

The word *bhūman* in the sentence under consideration must be understood as denoting something other than the supreme lord; probably it denotes the *prāṇa*, since this

1. *Brhadāraṇyaka Up.*, III.7.2. :

prāna is superior to the entities beginning with name, speech, etc. This is the Purvapakṣa.

The Siddhāntin brushes off this view by saying that the word bhūman in the sentence under consideration stands for the supreme lord only. For, bhūman is here glorified as being higher than samprāsāda, that is the individual soul. Moreover, it is said that when bhūman is seen, a person does not care to perceive any other object; for, the bhūman itself is the Brahman. So by the word bhūman, the supreme lord alone is indicated.

3. The Brhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad describes aksara as ऋषिकेयां गीता ब्रह्मणं जित्यथा तत्स्वाभ्यां ब्रह्मणं तत्र ब्रह्मणं।
By this word aksara, the holy syllable om may have been implied. For, the word aksara is generally used in that sense. Or the Jīva may be said to have been indicated. This is the view of the Purvapakṣin.

1. Ibid., VIII.3.4: अथ य हेष सप्तसादिकोस्माचर्याः सस्मृतिः करस्मिन्।
2. Ibid., VII.16.1.
3. Ibid., VII.24: नान्यन्तरश्च नान्यत्तेऽपि।
The Siddhāntin asserts that the word aksara stands for the supreme lord alone. For, it is described as being the supporter of all including the sky. This supporting is due to an unrestricted command, which is possible only in the case of the supreme lord.

4. The propriety of the fourth topic lies in proving that, though the supreme lord is beyond perception, yet through his supreme grace, the lord makes himself perceivable to his worshippers.

In the Upanisadic passage, some purusa has been described. According to the Purvapakṣin, this purusa must be Hiranyagarbha, for, the term para is applicable only to him since he is higher than the jīva. Or this purusa described in the sentence under consideration may be Nārāyaṇa, as the word om denotes him.

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1. Brhadāranyaka Up., III.8.9 :  

2. Prasna Up., V.5.
According to the Siddhāntin, on the other hand, the puruṣa stands for the supreme lord, because, the special qualities like peacefulness and the rest have been mentioned in connection with him. These qualities cannot belong to Hiranyagarbha. Similarly, the qualities such as being ever free do not fit in in respect of Narayana. The sentence - तद्विन्द्राय: परमेव पदम् - does not indicate that Viṣṇu is the highest reality. That sentence means "that place which is beyond (param) Viṣṇu (Viṣṇoh)". Ultimately that sentence indicates the supreme lord.

5. In the preceding section it has been said that the supreme lord is perceptible. In this fifth section, it is stated that the same Paramesvara, being accompanied by the supreme power, that is, Uma, is visible to his devotees.

The word dahara in the sentence, अय बद्धदमस्मिन् ब्रह्मपूरे दौहरे पुष्परोक्ते वेशम् दौहरे ज्ञेधिन्नान्नत्तरं आकाशस्तिमिन् यदन्तस्तिद्वेषेः नाव विनिहारितव्यम् - stands for ākāśa.

Or as the word *dahara* indicates a small size, it may denote the atomic soul and not the all-pervading supreme lord. This is the line of argument of the *Purvapaksin*.

This view has been refuted by the *Siddhāntin* who points out that the word *dahara* in the sentence under consideration denotes the supreme lord. For, the qualities such as being free from sins, etc., which are mentioned in the concluding part of the text[^1^], are possible only in the case of the supreme lord. The small size, which is suggested here, is intended to facilitate meditation. The *Maha-Upaniṣad*[^2^] and the *Kaivalya-Upaniṣad*[^3^] confirm that the supreme lord, the companion of Uma, resides within the small lotus (that is the heart). So the supreme lord alone must be taken to have been denoted by the word *dahara*.

[^1^]: Ibid. VIII.7-1. य आत्मापहतपापमा विजयो विमृत्युविन्देन्तः
[^2^]: Śivārkamanidīpika, p. 438: 'दन्त्वो किंवद्यो न वदन्तस्तदुपासितक्षेत्रात्' जिति महोपायमिदि ।
[^3^]: *Kaivalya Up.*, I.6.7: हृद्युपागरं विररेन किंवद्यो ... युमास्सायं परमेश्वर र्म्प्तायल्या मुनिन्यछिंति मूल्यमूर्ति समस्तकार्वित तमसः परस्तातः ।
An objection on behalf of the Purvapakṣin has been raised here. Even the Jīva is described as being free from sins, etc., in the sentence - अथ य ज्ञेष्ट
सम्मतादिकत्वाध्याया ज्ञेष्टसम्मतादिकत्वाध्याया ज्ञेष्टसम्मतादिकत्वाध्याया ज्ञेष्टसम्मतादिकत्वाध्याया ज्ञेष्टसम्मतादिकत्वाध्याया ज्ञेष्टसम्मतादिकत्वाध्याया ज्ञेष्टसम्मतादिकत्वाध्याया ज्ञेष्टसम्मतादिकत्वाध्याया ज्ञेष्टसम्मतादिकत्वाध्याया ज्ञेष्टसम्मतादिकत्वाध्याया ज्ञेष्टसम्मतादिकत्वाध्याया ज्ञेष्टसम्मतादिकत्वाध्याया ज्ञेष्टसम्मतादिकत्वाध्याया ज्ञेष्टसम्मतादिकत्वाध्याया
So the individual soul may have been referred to by the word dāhara in the sentence under consideration.

The Siddhāntin sets aside this objection by pointing out that the individual soul comes to have a body, through his own beginningless karmas, and the qualities like being free from sins, etc., are not present initially but they are attained by practising piṇāṇe etc. The supreme lord, on the other hand, is always free from sins, etc. Hence, the supreme lord alone must have been denoted by the term dāhara. This lord is to be worshipped as being inside the small-lotus. So says the smṛti.

6. Another form in which the supreme lord is to be worshipped has been stated in this sixth section.

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1. Čhandogya Up., VIII.3.4.
2. Ṣivārkamanidīpikā, p. 445.
In the *Katha-Upanisad*, a person of a size of merely a thumb is described in the passage, अहं-गुण्डमात्रः पुस्तो मध्य आत्मनि तिम्पति। सिर्णानां मूलम्वक्षस्य ॥ ततो विजुण्यस्ते जेतुः॥

The *Purva-pakṣin* suggests that this *purusa* may be the *Jīva*, since the *Jīva* is of that very size as has been described in the scripture - अहं-गुण्डमात्रे रत्नोदयः संस्क्या ईकारः। समन्विते यः ….. मायेः जीवः स विषेः स चानन्धःय ज्ञाते॥

The words, मध्य आत्मनि तिम्पति in the passage under consideration imply that this *Jīva* dwells inside the body.

The *Siddhāntin* rejects this suggestion by stating that the *purusa* described in the passage under consideration is the supreme soul, because the special marks like "lord of the past and the future" suit him only. Although this supreme lord is unlimited, yet he assumes a limited form for facilitating meditation, and the form is suitable for the size of the hearts of men.

Though the mark of the *Brahman*, namely, 'the size of just a thumb' is quite distinct, still the *Purva-pakṣin* regards it as both distinct and undistinct,

as that mark, namely, 'the size of just of a thumb' can be applied to the supreme lord and to the Jīva.

7. In the preceding section it has also been indicated that men alone are entitled to worship the supreme lord. This section says that even gods are qualified to worship the lord.

Though the sentence, ते देवस सदैव एवायन्ति, states that gods meditate on Rudra, still, according to the Pūrvapakṣin, gods are not entitled to worship the lord. He says that only those persons who are well-versed in the scriptures and who are entitled to the Vedic rites and rituals are so qualified. As gods do not possess bodies, they are not capable of meditating.

Though, at same places, gods are described as being possessed of bodies, still they are not seekers after the Brahman. For their place is the same as that of the supreme lord. Moreover, the Upanayana-sāṃskāra is absent in the case of the gods, and hence they have no right to study the Vedas, etc.

1. Atharva-sīra Up., I.
2. Rgveda, II. 12. 13. : य: तामुर्व निपितो व्रजमात्रेः वक्ष्यते;
   स जनानु जिन्दुः!
The Siddhantin controverts this position by asserting that the gods are entitled to worship the Brahman. The gods can become seekers after the Brahman. For, eventhough gods live in the heaven, still their pleasures are limited, while the pleasures of the supreme lord are unlimited. The place of the supreme lord is said to be characterised by unsurpassable bliss. It does not lead to any return. So the gods can very well be the aspirers for the place of the Brahman.

Eventhough the Upanayana-samskāra is not gone through by the gods, still, the meaning of the Vedas becomes automatically revealed to them. So the Upanayana-samskāra, which is meant for such knowledge of the Vedas, is not necessary in the case of gods. The gods again are described as being possessed of bodies, so they possess the requisite power to worship the supreme lord. Moreover, the words such as Indra, etc., stand for particular forms or prototypes, and not for particular individuals. So when one particular individual like Indra etc., is destroyed, his form is never destroyed. In this sense, the gods are eternal. The Vedic words are also eternal as they are not meant for any individual.
The eternal Vedic mantras were not composed by the sages but were revealed to them. Even after the total destruction, the supreme lord remembers the previously established orders, including the Vedas, and he fashions all those things as they existed before.

According to Jaimini, gods like Vasu etc., who themselves are the objects to be worshipped in the various Vidya, such as Madhu-vidya, are not entitled to that particular Vidya. But Badarayana thinks that Vasu etc., are entitled even to the Madhu-vidya as the Brahman alone in the form of Vasu, etc., is to be worshipped by the present Vasus, etc., who strive for Vasu-hood in the future age. The gods can attain the Brahman, as has been stated in the Upanisadic passage, न हूँ ता भस्म शुद्दित न निन्दे विजन्यति सबूदिविः हृत्वासैः मवति य जेतामेच्छ ज्ञानपायिन्यद्वेद ह ।

8. In the sixth section, the right of men to study the Brahmaidya has been indicated in a general manner. This section, now, points out a special case.

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2. Chandogya Up., III.11.3.
In the Chandogya-Upanisad, there is a reference to a Śūdra in connection with the Brahma-vidyā. As the Śūdras can be aspirers for salvation, they may be regarded as being qualified for this Vidyā. Though the Śūdras have no direct knowledge of the Vedas, etc., they can have that knowledge indirectly through hearing the Purāṇas, etc. There is, indeed, no fixed rule that only those belonging to upper social orders can have such a knowledge. This is the Purvapakṣa.

The Siddhāntin rebuts this by saying that the Śūdras are not qualified for Brahma-vidyā, as they have not studied the Vedas, and they do not have the right of studying the Vedas etc. The knowledge obtained through the hearing of the Purāṇas, etc., has only the effect of destroying the sins of the Śūdras and not the effect of giving them immortality.

The word, śūdra, in the Chandogya-Upanisad is not used in the sense of a social order. It actually indicates the grief of Jānasruti arising through not

1. Ibid, IV.2.5. : जनास्रुति मुक्ताला शुद्धारी में : त्रिमित्रतितियर्थस्य: ।
attaining the knowledge of the Brahman. As this word Śūdra has no reference to the caste of the Śūdras, Śūdras cannot be said to be qualified for Bhrama-vidyā.

Further, Jānasruti was a kṣatriya and not a Śūdra. His kingship, richness, generosity, etc., indicate his kṣatriyātva.

In the latter portion of that Upaniṣadic passage, where the Śāṁvarpa-Vidyā has been explained, there is a reference to a Brāhmaṇa, Kāpeya the priest, and a kṣatriya, Abhipratārin, a student of Kāpeya. As there is no reference to a Śūdra, the Śūdras cannot be said to have been intended here.

It is said by the Pūrvapakṣin, here, that Satyakāma Jābala, though he was not either a Brāhmaṇa or a Kṣatriya (that is to say, though he was a Śūdra), was able to get the knowledge about the Brahman. The Siddhāntin explains this by saying that it was only when it had been ascertained that Satyakāma Jābala was not really a Śūdra, since he had told the truth, that Gautama proceeded to initiate, instruct, and impart him the knowledge.

1. Śāṅkara-bhāṣya on I.3.34: शुचमभिदुःखश्च सुचा व न भिदुःखश्च, सुचा वा रेवव्यभिदुःखश्चेति शृङ्गः।
Though some part of the Vedas can be studied even before the Upanayana-samskara, still, the Śudras are not allowed to study that part of the Vedas, because, even studying of the Vedas in the vicinity of a śūdra is prohibited. Hence, the Śudras are not allowed to study the Brahma-Vidya.

9. After this incidental discussion, the original topic is being resumed in this section. A sentence from the Katha-Upaniṣad, यदिं विन्न जनात्स्त्रां प्राण जनाति निंवृत्तम् । describes prāṇa as being the cause of tremour. By the word prāna, the vital-breath is implied. Because, the merciful supreme lord cannot become the cause of fear. Or by prāṇa, the thunder-bolt (aśani), the cause of great fear, may be indicated. Or Vāyu, from whom the immortality results, may have been indicated. This is the prima-facie view.

The Siddhāntin asserts that the supreme lord alone is the cause of the trembling mentioned in this passage. Being the controller of all, the lord can.

2. Brhadāraṇyaka Up.,III.3.2. वाशुदेव व्याधिभिःस्युपरीष्व समिद्धि: अयु पुनः।
produce fear in all. It is stated in the *sruti*, that, through his fear only, the wind, the sun etc., are engaged in their respective duties.

10. The passage from the Chandogya-Upanisad, namely, श्रमस्वते अविरामतः पुत्रस्य परं क्षेत्रितकसः स्वेत रूपेणामनिपठते describes the highest light. This highest light is further, described as uttama purusa. According to the Purvapaksin, this highest light must be Narayana, the embodied soul.

The Siddhantin controverts this view by emphasising that the highest light is the supreme lord. For, those who attain it do not return back. This has been stated by the words, स्वेत रूपेणामनिपठते, in the sentence under consideration. This characterisation can be appropriate only in respect of the supreme lord. Moreover, the word uttama purusa is applicable to the supreme lord, as he alone is superior to all individual souls. The special marks like being 'free from sins', etc., clearly indicate the supreme lord only.

1. Taittiriya Up., II.8.1: मौषस्माहातुः केलि। मौषेदेवले दूर्य:। etc. 2. Chandogya Up., VIII.12.3.
The mark, uttama puruṣa, can be applied to both the supreme lord and Nārāyaṇa, hence there is undistinctness of qualities; but the characterisation implied by स्वेन पूणेश्वर्निधिपक्षेः and अवहत्तपात्मत्व is quite distinct.

11. The sentence, आकाशे एव नाम नामुपप्यात्मिच्छिलिते ते यदुरात्म तदमूलस्त आत्मा " describes the ākása as being concerned with the manifesting of the names and the forms. As the names and the forms are manifested, the word ākása may be understood as denoting the individual soul. Or it may denote the sky, since it affords space to everything. This is the view of the Purvapakṣin.

The Siddhāntin refutes this by saying that, by the word ākása in the sentence under consideration, the supreme lord himself is indicated. For the attributes such as being immortal which are not possible either in the case of the Jīva or of the sky, have been mentioned. Moreover, the supreme lord is in a way different from the Jīva which has no knowledge of any external or

internal objects. The supreme lord, again, is well-known as the lord of whole world, but the Jiva is not so. Hence the supreme lord is here denoted by the word ākāśa.

1. The last quarter of the first adhyāya, which is now to be started, discusses those Vedānta-sentences which are of indistinct nature.

The passage, महतः परम्परान्तस्यात्मात्यम् पूर्वमेव द्वितीयम् प्रथमम्: परः। पुस्तकाणि परं गव्यित्स्थ प्रकटाः स्वप गतिः। says something about some avyakta. This avyakta may be the pradhāna of the Sāmkhyas, as mahat and puruṣa are Sāmkhya categories. The order of these categories, namely, mahat, avyakta and puruṣa, tallies with the Sāmkhya order of the three principles, namely, mahat, pradhāna, and puruṣa. So by the term avyakta, the pradhāna of the Sāmkhyas is implied. This is what the Purvaṇakṣin says.

1. Brhadāraṇyaka Up., IV.3.21:

2. Ibid, IV.4.22:

The Siddhāntin refutes this. He says that the *avyakta* in the passage under consideration refers to the body. For, the soul, the body, etc., are metaphorically described in the passage - आत्मानं रथमेव विधिर्द शरीरं रथमेव हु। बुधिः तु सार्थिः विधिः मनः प्राधेन स इति जिन्द्रियां इत्यादिपर्यङ्गप्रत्येकं गोचरन्त्। जात्मेनात्मेनोत्सन्नं भक्तिलोकायांतः।

Moreover, the text, जिन्द्रियां यथा अथवा इति etc., mentions them that are successively higher in order that they may be controlled. The same is shown by the latter part of the text, गोक्षेत्रमेव नासिन्स्य गोक्षेत्रमेव ज्ञात्मनि। ज्ञात्मनि महति निप्राधानिः साधारण आत्मनि। Hence *avyakta* refers to the body.

Eventhough the word *avyakta* means something subtle, still by that word, *pradhāna* cannot be said to have been implied. For, in this subtle form the body, not being differentiated from the undifferentiated Brahman (*avyākta*), can be identified with the Brahman, the cause. Hence this *avyakta* can become an object to be known. But *pradhāna* can never become an object to be known. Hence *pradhāna* is not implied.

1. Ibid, III.3-4.
2. Ibid, III.10.
Further, this section deals with the three classes, namely, the object of worship (upāsya), worship (upāsana), and the worshipper (upāsaka). As the pradhāna cannot be included in any one of these three, the pradhāna is not implied by the word avyakta. The term mahat, again, does not represent the Sāmkhya principle; it is an adjective qualifying Ātman, as in the sentence, मुद्रेष्टत्मा महान् परः।

The undistinct nature of the sentence lies in the statement of the Pūrvapakṣin who introduces the Sāmkhya-system which has no faith in god.

2. In this section, a passage from the Svetāśvatara-Upaniṣad, namely, अजातेको से हि दुक्कान्य वहीः: प्रजा: हृतमानी सपूया:। अजातेको जुष्माणि 5 नरटेत जहृत्येनै मुल्भेधाम यस्यभान्यः is being considered.

According to the Pūrvapakṣin, the word, ajā refers to the prakṛti of the Sāmkhyas. For, this prakṛti is the cause of all creation and is possessed of three colours, namely, red, black and white,

2. Svetāśvatara Up., IV.
representing respectively the three guṇas, rajas, tamaś and sattva. The second aja, in the masculine, stands for the purusa, the non-enjoyer, while the first aja (in the masculine) is the Jīva as it has been described as being the enjoyer.

The Siddhāntin rejects this explanation and states that since there is no special mark, it cannot be firmly said that the word aja stands for the prakṛti of the Sāmkhyas. This description of aja is a general description which can be applied to any object, like the wide definition of the object Camasa with its face downwards. This definition can include the caves of mountains, also. At first, the term Camasa means 'some kind of cup' (camyate anena iti). But in the complementary passage, it is known that the word Camasa means one particular object. But in the above text, about aja, there are no special marks which can definitely denote the Sāmkya-prakṛti.

Moreover, the three colours, namely, red, black, and white, do not represent the three guṇas, namely, rajas, tamaś and sattva, but they indicate the three elements, namely, agni, earth, and āp being respectively possessed of the three colours, red, black, and white.
as is said in the śrutis\(^1\). The word, ājā indicates the prakṛti having supreme lord as its cause. The Śvetāśvetara Upaniṣad describes this prakṛti as unborn and having the Brahman, Śiva, as its cause\(^2\). This prakṛti is unborn in the sense that, at the time of the dissolution this prakṛti or acit sakti abides in a subtle form as the body of the great lord Śiva. Again at the time of creation, it becomes endowed with name and form; in this sense, it has the Brahman as its cause. It is exactly in the same sense that the sun is described both as the cause and the prakṛti is unborn, and yet is an effect of the supreme lord.

3. This third section takes up the sentence यस्स्मिन् पवन पवचनं आकाशश्च प्रतिपन्नितः\(^9\) for consideration. The phrase पवन पवच in the sentence under consideration

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1. Chandogya Up. VI.4.1:

2. Śvetāśvatara Up. IV.8.9:


denotes the twenty-five (five into five) principles of the Śāmkhyas. This is the Purvapakṣa.

The Siddhāntin, on the other hand, points out that the phrase पञ्च पञ्च may, at the most, denote the number ten (five and five) and not the number twenty five. Moreover the word, Yasmin, indicates that these (principles) are based on it, which is the substratum and the supreme lord is known as the substratum. The word, पञ्च-जानाह, again is a compound word like the word Saptarśi, and this compound word पञ्च-जानाह denotes a सामिज्ञा. So the whole phrase पञ्च पञ्च जानाह denotes only five objects in all and they are the five sense-organs. The Kāṇya version does not mention अन्नa, along with प्राणa, मनस, चक्षु, and स्रोत्रa. In order to fulfil the required number (i.e. five), the word ज्योतिः has to be added. Hence the sentence under consideration has no whatsoever to the twenty five principles of the Śāmkhyas.

4. The fourth section seeks to establish the difference between the supreme lord and the Jīva.

1. Astādhyāyī, II.1.30: दिन्क्षेल्ये संपत्ताम्।
The sentence, प्राण्य प्राणाः, is intended to explain the Brahman. The word Brahman, here, implies the Jīva, for, the phrase, मस्त्य वैतत्त्वम्, in ये वे जानात एवेव पुराणाणां क्षण मस्त्य वैतत्त्वम् ये वे वैदिक्यः, denotes karmāṅkṣ like sacrifices etc. which are possible in the case of the Jīva alone. This is the Purvapakṣa.

The Siddhāntin, on the other hand suggests that, the supreme lord alone is intended here in the passage under consideration. For, the phrase, मस्त्य वैतत्त्वम्, refers to the creation of the universe, and not to the ritual, as is supposed by the Purvapakṣin. Moreover, the beginning and the end of this passage establish the Brahman alone. Even in the Pratardana-vidya, though there is a similar type of description, the prāna, has been shown to be denoting on the supreme lord. Hence, the supreme lord alone has been described here.

5. In the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, the sentence,

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid. III.
4. The twelth (Indraprāṇādhikarana) section in the first quarter of the first chapter.
describes the Atman. As this Atman has been described as being liable to enjoyment, it must be taken to stand for the Jīva. That is what the Purvapakṣin thinks.

The Siddhāntin, on the other hand, asserts that the supreme lord himself is intended here. For, in the beginning, Atman vartāt tātāt sāyātāt vā Hām 2 in the middle, ātman vartāt mātyāt mātyāt dharmātāt dharmātāt 3 and in the end, namely, cassetas pītāt vijñānātāt tāt cassetas vijñānāyāt. 8 The supreme lord alone is described. For the special attributes as such as "by knowledge of this one, everything else becomes known", "being immortal", and "leading others to immortality", etc., are not possible in the case of any other entity. According to Āśmarāthya, the supreme lord has been denoted by the word Ātman (the individual soul) in order to show that the individual soul, the effect, is non-different from the supreme lord.

1. Brhadāranyaka Up. II.4.2.
2. Ibid. II.4.2.
3. Ibid. II.4.5.
4. Ibid. II.4.14.
the cause. Añjulomi thinks that the Ātman is used to indicate that the freed soul attains the nature of the supreme soul. Kaśākṛtṣna supposes that as the supreme lord abides in the Jīva, the word ātman is used in the sense of the Supreme Lord. This view of Kaśākṛtṣna is accepted by Bādaśāyaṇa. Srikanṭha supports the same view by quoting the Atharvasīra Upaniṣad.

6. In the second section of the first quarter, it was established, in a general way, that the supreme lord is the material cause. To confirm this specifically, the sixth section is started.

The Taittirīya Upaniṣad passage describes the Brahman as the cause of the universe. But, according to the Purvapaksīṇī, the Brahman can be regarded only as the efficient cause and not as the material cause, which is generally inanimate like the lump of clay in the case of a jar.

The Siddhāntin refuts this and asserts that the Brahman is both the efficient cause and the material cause

1. Atharvasīra Up. I.
of the universe, because the context states that, through the knowledge of the Brahman, the entire world, consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient, becomes known. This is possible only when the Brahman is regarded as the efficient cause and at the same time as the material cause. The sentence तदेवत कत्स्या प्राप्ययः तत्वात्मतः clearly states that the Brahman alone is the material cause.

In some texts, Rudra is mentioned as being higher than all, while others say that मयाः is the material cause, while still others say that the विरात्पुरुषा is the cause. So either मयाः or the विरात्पुरुषा must be understood as the material cause. This is the view of the Purvapaksin in the second interpretation of this section.

This view has been controverted by the Siddhántin by saying that Rudra or Siva alone is both the efficient and the material cause of the universe, as has been said in the scriptures. Moreover, the text तद्भवमार्क श्वयक्षुक्तं ।

confirms the same, namely that the Brahman, that is Śiva, is both the efficient and the material cause. The supreme Lord desired, and created, and separated the subtle sentient and non-sentient, forming his body, from his body, from himself. So there occurs the manifestation of all, the sentient and the non-sentient, the puruṣa and the prakṛti, from the supreme lord alone. Hence Śiva is both, the efficient and the material cause of the universe.

7. The last section of the fourth quarter of the first chapter sets aside as untenable doctrines of all other minor systems. 

The Sūrvapakṣin argues that the Smṛtis, the Purāṇas, etc., do not mention a single entity as the cause. Some of them declare Brahmā to be the supreme Brahman, some Viṣṇu, and some Rudra; still others speak of Śakti as the ultimate reality or of Agni or of Śūrya, or of Vāyu or of something else. All this results in confusion. At any rate, it cannot be said to be indicative of Śiva, the Brahman.

The Siddhāntin reiterates that Śiva is the reality. The Rgveda does designate the Brahman in the form
of the virat-puruṣa as the cause. In the Śatarudrīya, the supreme lord is directly said to be the lord of the world, the soul of the world with a blue neck and so on. Here the Purvapaksin raises an objection, namely, that if Śiva and Rudra are identical, how Rudra, who is endowed with the quality of manyu (amager), can be said to be identical with Śiva the ocean of auspicious attributes? The Siddhāntin sets aside this objection by saying that the form manyu denotes sacrifice. And even if it was taken to mean wrath, there would be nothing wrong, because, as the supreme lord Śiva may voluntarily assume such a form of anger for punishing the wicked.

It is also proper to hold that the Purāṇas too, with marks

1. Rgveda X.129
2. Śivārkamaniḍipīka, pp. 579-580.
3. Yajurveda:
that enable us to determine the real meaning, indicate none but Siva by such words as Brahma, Visnu, etc. So in all the authoritative texts, the Vedas and the rest Siva accompanied by Uma is referred to as the cause, and both cit and acit elements are said to constitute the body of Siva, the supreme Brahman. So there is no inconsistency anywhere. Everything is clear, and our view is well established. The repetition of the word Vyakhyatāṁ indicates the end of the chapter.
Appayya Dīkṣita wrote the Śivārkamanidīpika, only the first chapter of which it has been possible to consider in this thesis, with a definite intention of explaining the main doctrines of the Śivādvaita of Śrīkaṇṭha. This Śivādvaita has been set forth by Śrīkaṇṭha in his well-known commentary on the Vedānta Sūtras of Bādarāyana.

The opening verse of the Śivārkamanidīpika, namely, $\text{तथा हुन्निविन्दः परिपूर्णकल्पसे कितलिंधिनिविवर्धलोऽप्रजात्मप्}$ very clearly suggests the main tenet of the Śivādvaita, namely, the identification of Śiva, with Viṣṇu and Śakti. It is said that Appayya Dīkṣita wrote this work at the behest of Śiva, and of his patron, Cinna Bomma. In a sense, Appayya Dīkṣita had to perform a kind of tight-rope walk in this work, for, on the one hand, he had to expound the doctrines of Śrīkaṇṭha's Śivādvaita with a specially religious ardour, while, on the other hand, he could not alienate himself intellectually from

1. Śivārkamanidīpika, 1.
2. *Ibid.* 12: भावमैतदन्तः सीवीर्धिचितं स्वन्तारस्मरणोऽपने प्रमुः। कितलिंधिनिविवर्धलोऽप्रजात्मपः।
the absolute monism of Śaṅkara. He has tried to establish some kind of harmony between the Kevalādvaita of Śaṅkara and Viśiṣṭādvaita of Śrīkanṭha by stating that the apprehension of oneness, arises in the mind of a person only through the grace of Śiva, the highest Brahman.

The Śivādvaita of Śrīkanṭha, according to Appayya Dīksita, is nothing but a mere extension of the monistic idealistic philosophy of Śaṅkara. Even Śaṅkara has admitted that some of Śūtras of Bādarāyaṇa have a definitely saguna trend, and that the Sagunatva of the Brahman was intended by Bādarāyaṇa himself. With a view to expounding the sagunatva of Śiva, who is nothing but the Parabrahman and who is identical with Viṣṇu or Nārāyaṇa, Bādarāyaṇa has composed his other great works like the Mahābhārata the Harivamsa, etc. This point has been made more clearly by Appayya Dīksita in his works such as the Mahābhārataṭatātparyasamgraha, the Brahmatarkastava, the Ānandalahari, the Śivādvaita-nirnaya and the Śivakarnāṃrta. The main doctrines of the Śivādvaita may

1. Ibid. 7: त्याप्यानुप्रह्यायदेव तस्मैन्चुक्लिषितमयः ।
अवृत्तकालान्विति नान्यथा ॥
be briefly stated as follows:—

Śiva is the highest Brahman. The Nirguna aspect of this Brahman is called Paramāsiva, while the saguna aspect is known as Sāmba. Uma or Ambikā or Nārāyaṇī is the Śakti of Śiva. With the help of this Śakti, this world is created. This Śakti happens to be the part and parcel of the body of Śiva. It is both real and unreal. It is real in the sense that it is not different from Śiva, and it is unreal in the sense that it is the cause of the universe which is illusory. Nārāyaṇa or Visnu is the creative power of Śiva. This Nārāyaṇa also is not different from the body of Śiva. The three entities namely Śiva, cit-Śakti or Uma, and Nārāyaṇa are the real principles behind the creation. When a person is enlightened, he is separated from his worldly bondages (pāśa), and he attains salvation only through the grace of Śiva who is of a very compassionate nature. As every one born on the surface of this earth is bound by those bondages, he is called pasu, while Śiva, the Lord of universe, by whose grace those bondages are broken, is called Pasupati.

A closer study of this system will show that it is very closely related to the vedantic philosophy of
It might, indeed, not be wrong if it was claimed that this system was but an extension of Samkara's Kevaladvaita. This is exactly the point which Appayya Diksita has sought to establish in the Sivarkamani dipika.

Attention may, however, be drawn in this context to the discussion by Samkara, in his commentary on the Vedanta-sutras of Badarayana, of the Saivaite Pasupata system. While refuting that system, Samkara has emphasised some glaring defects in it. Among other things, he points out: In the Pasupata Saivaite system, Isvara is also regarded as being different from purusa. According to the Vedanta-texts, however, Isvara is both the nimitta and the upadana karana of the universe, so the Pasupata assumption that Isvara is only the nimitta karana is not correct. Similarly, as Isvara is omnipresent, he must be taken to be the adhisthana of purusa. So the difference between the purusa and Isvara cannot be thought of.

Srikantha meets these points of Samkara by saying that this particular portion of the Vedanta-sutras, the sutrakara does not at all intend refuting the Sivaadvaita.

What the sūtrakāra seeks to establish there is the untenability of the doctrine of the Śaiva tāntrikas, according to whom Śiva is only the nimitta kāraṇa (and not the upādāna kāraṇa). The Śivādvaīta, asserts Śrīkanṭha, accepts that Śiva is both the nimitta kāraṇa and the upādāna kāraṇa of the universe, and this is the view of the sūtrakāra also.

It is not only from the philosophical point of view, but also from the literary point of view, that the Śivārkamanicīpikā is significant. The style of the commentary is very simple yet effective, and a difficult philosophical subject has been treated with great lucidity. Appayya Dīkṣita seems to have been clearly influenced by Śaṅkara in the matter of the bhāṣya-style.

However, so far as Appayya Dīkṣita's original contribution to the system of Śivādvaīta is concerned, it must be conceded that it has not at all been much. Nor

1. Śrīkanṭha-bhāṣya on the Vedānta-sūtras II.2. 35-38:

2. Ibid.
can Appayya Dīkṣita be said to have succeeded in harmonising the Kevalādvaita of Śaṅkara with the Śivādvaita of Śrīkaṇṭha. It seems that there occurred a kind of struggle in Appayya Dīkṣita’s mind between intellectual inclination towards the Kevalādvaita and religious inclination towards the Saiva doctrine. He has tried to resolve this conflict by saying:

\[ \text{तथाप्यनुयस्य देव तस्मैन्-नुपपिलाम्} \]

\[ \text{अद्वैतानन्दा पुस्तामार्थिविविधति नान्यथा} \]

All that Appayya Dīkṣita had to say was that the tendency for non-dualism could not become manifest in one’s mind without the grace of Śiva. Appayya Dīkṣita was, indeed, expected to harmonise these two systems, namely, the Kevalādvaita and the Śivādvaita, on some more solid grounds. He has indicated that the Śivādvaita of Śrīkaṇṭha is some improvement on Śaṅkara’s Kevalādvaita. But Śrīkaṇṭha has already said and tried to substantiate this; Appayya Dīkṣita cannot be said to have made any further progress in this respect. Of course, Appayya Dīkṣita’s versatile genius and vast erudition become evident throughout the Śivārkaṇḍamadipikā. But they would have been more effective and impressive, if they had been accompanied by some originality of thought and presentation.

1. Śivārkaṇḍamadipikā, verse-7.
It is claimed that the Śivārkamanāḍīpikā was written by Appayya Dīkṣita at the behest of Śiva who actually helped him. This legend may or may not be true, but it certainly indicates the confidence of the author. After completion of this work, Cinna Bomma, the patron of Appayya Dīkṣita, was so greatly pleased with him that he is said to have showered gold upon the author. Appayya Dīkṣita also came to be known by another appellation, namely, the 'incarnation of Śiva'. The Śivārkamanāḍīpikā may be said to have taken Appayya Dīkṣita to the zenith of his fame, for, it was on account of this work, that the Śivādvaita came to enjoy a far wider currency among the people at large.