Chapter IV

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THE ROLE OF AD HOC COMMITTEE

In Chapter II, the role of the OAS-sponsored Special Committee was examined at length. While the Special Committee was the most rudimentary of the steps that the OAS had initiated in an attempt to resolve the Dominican crisis, the reports of the Special Committee had shown how it could not bring about any resolution to the critical Dominican problems under the aegis of the OAS. Among other reasons, one basic factor that made the efforts of the Special Committee futile to bring any settlement to the Dominican civil strife was the total ineptitude of the Committee in understanding the very basis of the crisis. The Special Committee by and large, confining itself to a narrow and legalistic view of its role considered that its prime responsibility was one of effecting as expeditiously as possible the cessation of hostilities between the two contending groups -- the constitutionalists and the military junta. The Special Committee, however, was not equipped with a meditory military mission to police the International Safety Zone and thereby effect ceasefire.

With the Special Committee suspending its activities of mediating between the contending groups rather prematurely, the role of the OAS once again became, relatively speaking, narrow. For, the 22 May resolution of the Tenth Meeting provided for the creation of the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPP) and thereby left the Dominican crisis in the hands of the IAPP which by authority of the Tenth Meeting could at best only supervise and
police the International Safety Zone and largely concern itself with ceasefire and other related problems. In other words, the situation as of the later days of May was in a sense similar to that of the beginning of May in terms of the role of the OAS. Just as the Special Committee had a narrow mission and so could not accomplish much by way of resolving the outstanding political issues, the appointment of IAPF by the fourth week of May too had a narrow mission of supervising the ceasefire violations. It could not therefore accomplish much towards resolving the basic political issues.

Under these circumstances, the likelihood of a OAS-sponsored committee enlarging the task of the Special Committee of early May became inevitable. For after all, soon after the Special Committee hurriedly concluded its activities, the OAS role in the Dominican crisis was reduced to that of the Secretary-General's mediation in collaboration with Papal Nuncio. Further, the Secretary General had no clear mandate from the OAS as to what exactly he was expected to do as far as the resolution of the basic political problems was concerned. He in a sense, therefore, remained in Santo Domingo merely to inform the regional organization as well as the United Nations regarding the general day-to-day developments.

One of the actors, almost the prime actor in the Dominican drama, need only to say, was the United States. As has been noted earlier, especially after the landing of its marines, the United States was more anxious than before to have the regional security organization involved in the crisis. The United States had been quite successful in its objective of involving the OAS ever since the Special Committee was appointed. When the Special Committee gave up its mediation, the United States once again ingeniously worked towards the creation of the IAPF, which amongst other things let the United States legitimize its "military intervention". Once the United States accomplished its objective in respect of the creation of IAPF, the immediate task that required prompt attention was continuing the political negotiations in order to bring ultimately a permanent settlement acceptable to the United States.

Under such circumstances, an OAS-supported mediatory mission with the help of the IAPF to bring a political settlement undoubtedly became the primary concern of the United States. In doing so, however, the United States sought an OAS-sponsored mediatory mission, the composition of which should be such that it would assure the United States to emerge out of the crisis with a political solution that would meet its long term objectives as far as the Dominican Republic was concerned. It is necessary to recall at this stage that some of the diplomatic missions that

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2 See Jerome Slater, n. 1, p. 102.
were organised and launched by the policy-makers in Washington could not bring about a political settlement that would be acceptable at the same time to the United States, the constitutionalists and to the military junta.

Given that the United States private initiatives in respect of bringing about a political settlement favourable to the

3 Even if the United States were successful in reaching out a political settlement through its unilateral diplomatic mission, the Dominican crisis by mid-May had assumed some international if not, at least, regional dimension. For, the Dominican crisis assumed critical proportions, as has been noted earlier, following the landing of US marines at the regional organizational level. Again shortly thereafter, the Dominican crisis was, in a sense, internationalized by being brought up before the UN Security Council by a country of the Latin American continent, ostracised by the United States, only three years ago vis-à-vis Cuba. And the United Nations in turn had already initiated action by appointing Mayobro mission.

Parallel to the OAS efforts, the US administration, through its diplomatic missions, undertook independent initiatives to secure a solution favourable to the basic US objectives in the Dominican Republic. One such important initiative was assigned to former Ambassador, John Bartlow Martin. According to Ambassador Martin's own account, it appears that President Johnson gave him a clear mandate to "open up contacts with rebels, to help the OAS and Nuncio to get a ceasefire and stop the bloodshed and find out what the facts were and report to the President". The choice of Ambassador Martin was possibly for reasons that he had served the Kennedy administration as Ambassador in Dominican Republic and therefore, was generally acquainted with both the factions that were in conflict. While Martin was on his sojourn (30 April - 19 May) in Santo Domingo, McGeorge Bundy, Under Secretary of State and Special Assistant to the President on National Security Affairs, was despatched with what came to be known as "Guzman formula" according to which Antonio Guzman, who served as Juan Bosch's agricultural minister was to be named as the provisional president, in order to win the support of the constitutionalists. While Martin was making some breakthrough in terms of effecting a ceasefire, Bundy's mission with "Guzman formula" retarded whatever progress Martin could make. The Bundy's mission appears to be a high-powered body, for Bundy was accompanied on his mission by Deputy Secretary of Defense, Cyrus (footnote contd.)
basic objectives of the United States having failed, and given that the situation demanded an effort that should be initiated only within the framework of the OAS, the policy-makers in Washington had by the end of May strongly felt that a OAS-sponsored diplomatic initiative alone could bring some effective change in the crisis-ridden Dominican Republic. While the IAPF had by then been organised, manned predominantly with the US marines, the policy-makers in Washington presumably felt that concomitantly with the function of the IAPF, a OAS-sponsored committee very much along the lines of the Special Committee should go to Santo Domingo to iron out the differences between the political factions and make a breakthrough in the dead-locked situation.

The United States was more or less certain that in pursing its objective in respect of a OAS-sponsored committee it could well have the support, if not of all the members of the OAS, at least such of those who supported and voted for the IAPF. It is true that Latin American members such as Mexico, Chile, Uruguay...
and Venezuela had not, just as they had not supported the creation of IAPF, supported any OAS effort to organize a negotiating committee. In fact in the Fourteenth Plenary Session of the Tenth Meeting when the idea of a negotiating committee was mooted, whereas Argentina proposed a "general committee" to continue "the functions of the Special Committee", the Mexican reaction was negative. The Mexican delegate critically remarked "La había yo solicitado para la Comisión General no para esta sesión". On the other hand, countries like Guatemala lent its solid support to the resolution of 2 June 1965 calling for the establishment of Ad Hoc Committee. In fact, the Guatemalan representative strongly felt the need for such committee to give "necessary directives of political nature" and to guide the inter-American force.

Even countries such as Uruguay and Chile, toed the Mexican line. Be that as it may, the dye was already cast. Whatever may be the reaction of Mexico, Uruguay and Chile, the United States had its way on 2 June 1965 in getting the Tenth Committee vote in favour of what came to be known as the Ad Hoc Committee.

The Ad Hoc Committee and Its Ad Hoc Solutions

2 June was a day of diplomatic triumph for the United States in the OAS. For, on that day the OAS Council responding to US entreaties had given birth to the now Ad Hoc Committee with a "swearing mandate". The resolution adopted by the Tenth Meeting

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of Consultation providing for the Ad Hoc Committee urged the Ad Hoc Committee to "continue the tasks begun by the Special Committee and now being carried out by the Secretary-General of providing good offices to all the parties for the purpose of achieving the establishment of a climate of peace and reconciliation that will permit the functioning of democratic institutions in the Dominican Republic and its economic and social recovery". The resolution also stated that the proposed Ad Hoc Committee would act in conjunction with the IAPF.

Apart from the fact that the resolution provided the Ad Hoc Committee to continue along the lines of the Special Committee, though with an enlarged mandate, and in conjunction with the IAPF, what perhaps made the resolution meet the overall objective of the United States squarely was the recommendation of appointing "an Ad Hoc Committee consisting of Brazil, El Salvador and United States of America". The Ad Hoc Committee on the strength of the above-mentioned decision was composed of Ellsworth Bunker, US Ambassador to OAS, Ilmar Penna Marinho, Special Delegate of Brazil, and Ramon de Clairmont Duonas, Special Delegate of El Salvador to the OAS. The choice of countries such as Brazil and El Salvador in the Ad Hoc Committee was undoubtedly to the advantage of the United States. For, both countries were clearly pro-


6 According to corr., the El Salvadoran Special Delegate, Ramon Clairmont Duonas was chosen because he was considered as a very effective diplomat in winning over elements of (footnote contd.)
The opening paragraphs of the resolution of 2 June, giving the background to the creation of the Ad Hoc Committee, however, had something to say which strictly speaking, as developments unfolded themselves in the Dominican Republic, did not conform to what was stated in the resolution. For instance, while the second paragraph of the resolution amongst other things said that the Ad Hoc Committee would help the Dominican people to "freely decide their own destiny", in reality Dominicans however, had little choice to "freely decide their own destiny"! For, the Ad Hoc Committee ever since it began its negotiations was increasingly disposed and to some extent, "to determine" what it considered to be the destiny for the Dominicans.

The first report which the Ad Hoc Committee submitted to the Tenth Meeting on its activities stated that since its arrival on 3 June it had "undertaken extensive exploratory conversation with the contending sides and with a large number of individuals and groups from various sectors of the population and various sections of the country". It added that in its own judgement the Committee was "convinced that the best way" for resolving the

7 Final Act, n. 5, p. 16.
Dominican crisis was through "free and democratic elections". In view of the present fluid political situation often erupting into fierce battles between the contending groups, the Committee stated that the "restoration of climate of peace and tranquility necessary for carrying out electoral process" would be at least six months from the present date. While the Ad Hoc Committee recommended that the competent organs of the OAS should co-operate and provide assistance for holding the elections, it also suggested that during "the entire electoral process" the IAPF should be "reduced to numbers strictly necessary to carry out its mission".

That the Ad Hoc Committee had something more important under its sleeves than merely being concerned with the long term programmes of political rehabilitations is very well reflected in the Ad Hoc Committee's recommendation for a provisional government to be established "as soon as possible". In this connection, the Committee argued that "it is necessary to establish, as soon as possible, a provisional government ... until the elected government has been installed" so that the provisional government would assume immediate responsibility for the maintenance of law and order and ensure respect for human rights; to restore the normal functioning of public administration; institute urgent and necessary programmes for the rehabilitation and development of the economic and social life of the country; and represent the Dominican nation in the international community.

In order to help strengthen the provisional government's

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9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., p. 323.
credibility, the Committee recommended that the OAS "should grant it immediate recognition" and arrange for "extensive technical and economic assistance for the initiation of its national rehabilitational programmes". To facilitate the establishment of the provisional government the Ad Hoc Committee recommended an institutional act, "drawn from the relevant provisions of 1863 constitution" of the Dominican Republic. One aspect which in many respects suggests a different tone and tenor of the Ad Hoc Committee in relation to that of the predecessor Special Committee, was the Ad Hoc Committee's obsession with a solution, the basis of which is political negotiation and not a solution "imposed by force of arms, by hatred, by imprisonment, by persecution or by death". In sum, technically speaking, the task assigned by the Tenth Meeting to the Ad Hoc Committee on the basis of the 2 June resolution was one of essentially mediating between the two contending factions -- the constitutionalists and the military junta -- for the purpose

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11 Ibid., p. 323. It is said that an agreement was signed between the Secretary-General of the OAS and Agency for International Development (AID) of the US government to initially furnish aid to the Dominican Republic. Under the terms of this agreement, $17,000,000 was made available to the OAS to be used for emergency programmes and to effect economic and political recovery of the country. On the same day, a complementary agreement for the grant of another $15,000,000 was signed. Apart from this, independent organizations like CARITAS, CARE, International Red Cross and SSID (Social Services of Dominican Churches) provided relief operations and countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, Panama, United States and Venezuela sent medical teams and equipments to undertake relief measures. See for details Pan American Union, Report of the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States Regarding the Dominican Situation, OAS Official Records: OEA/38R.F/II,10 (Doc. 405) (Washington, D.C.), 1 November 1965, p. 22. Also see Lorman C. Wilson, n. 1, p. 53 and Pan American Union, n. 1, p. 3.
of achieving the establishment of a climate of peace and reconciliation". In other words, the Ad Hoc Committee as enjoined by the OAS was to perform merely the tasks of its predecessor vis-à-vis the Special Committee, advise and collaborate with IAPF in respect of ceasefire violations and acts of terrorism. While those being the expectations of the OAS in regard to the Ad Hoc Committee, the situation as of early June almost forced the Ad Hoc Committee to go beyond the strictly narrow mandate given to it by the 2 June resolution. As has been stated, the Ad Hoc Committee in its efforts, not only paved the way for the ultimate restoration of "climate of peace and reconciliation", in a sense also seemed to have transcended the 2 June resolution by attempting to establish a provisional government of its choice. While the Ad Hoc Committee justified its effort in this respect and genuinely searched out a compromise provisional president, the efforts of the Ad Hoc Committee in this direction however, in more than one sense not the implicit objectives of the United States.

Henry of the hot-war situation in the Dominican Republic, with its marines committed in Santo Domingo, a political resolution nowhere in sight, the diplomatic ventures failing and the tacitly blessed Infort junta turning increasingly hostile to the US interests, the policy-makers in Washington were eagerly looking forward to a resolution of the crisis which at worst, could be at least a face saving one for the United States. The constitutionalists on the other hand, not in a position to make a

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12 Pan American Union, *Final Act*, n. 5, p. 16.
breakthrough by way of a military solution were equally anxious
towards a political settlement that would relieve them of the
pressure under which they were operating.

It is against this context of a situation which between
the last week of April and early June, had become even more
complicated that one should review and assess the Ad Hoc Committee's
role. By and large, it is the weariness of the crisis providing
no scope for the United States to implement its objectives and
providing no hope for the constitutionalists to win a clear mili-
tary victory that led the Ad Hoc Committee literally dictate
whatever terms, even if it be, outside the frame of reference of
2 June resolution.

Following its extensive discussions with the parties to
the conflict as well as other Dominican groups, including busi-
nessmen, professionals, church leaders, trade union officials and
students, on 18 June, the Ad Hoc Committee made public its pro-
posed settlement to the Dominicans in what it called "Declaration
to the Dominican People".

In the Declaration, the Ad Hoc Committee asserted that it
has "not come to take sides in the struggle" and that its mission
"is not intervention, but rather reconciliation". In its appeal
to the people it made the following proposals: a general election
would be held under the supervision of the OAS within a period of
six to nine months; opportunities would be provided "for all
leaders of democratic parties abroad to return to the country
under safeguards of Organization of American States" in order to
facilitate their participation in the election; "immediate termi-
nation of the armed struggle" with the return of all members of
the regular armed forces to their respective barracks, and irregular forces to their homes, under supervision of the OAS; and surrendering to the OAS of all arms in the hands of the civilian population; the reopening of all commercial and industrial establishments throughout the country and the return of employees to their customary places of work; and the formation of a provisional government which will convocate general elections.

Alongside the "Declaration to the Dominican People" which was very widely circulated in the Republic and the text of which repeatedly broadcasted in Santo Domingo, the Ad Hoc Committee also submitted its draft proposals of the Institutional Act that it had prepared on the basis of its first general report to both the contending parties for their considerations. Following these efforts the Ad Hoc Committee along with the Secretary-General of the OAS and accompanied by Antonio Guzman met the constitutionalists to discuss its proposals as presented in the 18 June Institutional Act. The constitutionalists while endorsing the spirit of the Institutional Act, however, expressed certain reservations regarding some of the details of the Institutional Act. To them, had not the coup d'etat of 1933 interrupted with its "regrettable consequences", the peace [in the Dominican Republic] would have been an enduring reality. They also endorsed the Ad Hoc Committee's anxiety that "in the face of the superior armed forces of the interventionists", time has come when the constitutionalists also "must negotiate an agreement that will bring a solution to the Dominican people". Regarding the elections and the related

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electoral process envisaged by the Committee, the constitutionalists strongly felt that it should be "totally free and participated ... by all parties" and is "an undelayable event". While on the one hand they welcomed the implementation and the functioning of the Inter-American Humanitarian Commission, they nevertheless maintained that the IAPF has outlived its purpose and therefore must be forthwith withdrawn. In suggesting a formula for the withdrawal of the IAPF the constitutionalists stated that "evacuation ... and its IAPF departure should be in a period of time not greater than one month after the installation of the Provisional Government". Regarding the provisional government's army, the constitutionalists demanded that not only the "armed forces shall be subject to the authority of the Provisional Government" but also "the constitutionalists soldiers should maintain their respective ranks". In expressing their view regarding the form of the provisional government envisaged by the Ad Hoc Committee, they suggested that such a government "will not be a junta, nor council of state nor triumvirates or even collegiate bodies". The constitutionalists urged that the proposed provisional government should "Assume immediate responsibility for the maintenance of law and order" and should "immediately take up the task of national recovery with emphasis on ... the initiation and/or continuation of economic development programs".

The Ad Hoc Committee in its preliminary round of discussions with the military junta headed by Imbert held a day before
its meeting with the constitutionalists found that the response "in essence was favourable". However, on certain aspects of the Ad Hoc Committee's proposals the Imbert's side too had certain reservations and therefore offered only its qualified support to the Institutional Act. For instance, the Imbert government, just as the constitutionalists, said that the IAPF should withdraw from the Dominican soil. While however, demanding the withdrawal of the IAPF, unlike the constitutionalists, the Imbert forces stated that "once the plan to settle the crisis has been adopted, the Inter-American Peace Force should be withdrawn from the Dominican territory". In other words the Imbert forces were anxious to have the IAPF vacate Santo Domingo before long. Reasons for Imbert's anxiety to evacuate the IAPF were obvious. Imbert's expectations especially after he had been installed in the interregnum as the leader of what came to be known as the Government of National Reconstruction (GNR) was that, with the tacit support of the US administration, he would inevitably become the Ad Hoc Committee's choice for leading the provisional government. That however, did not materialise. In fact even the Mayobre mission had in its report to the UN Secretary-General, unequivocally condemned the Imbert's military misadventures which had very greatly embarrassed the US administration. In view of these developments, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunkor, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee had lost faith and confidence in Imbert being the possible future leader of the Dominican Republic. Having realised that the United States had no more faith in him it was natural

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that Inbort should demand the immediate evacuation of the IAPF which was nothing but the other name for the US Marines stationed in Santo Domingo. Moreover, Inbort also insisted on the question of amnesty that it should be selective and "only members of the armed forces who should be permitted to return to their quarters would be those who had committed no offence under the Code of Military Justice". His insistence on this aspect was primarily because of his desire to exclude the constitutionalists' armed forces from rejoining the Dominican military. Strangely enough Inbort also insisted that the constitutionalists should cease war and acts of terrorism and demanded that they deposit the arms and ammunitions back into the government arsenals.

Because of the different view points expressed regarding the Institutional Act by the constitutionalists and the Inbort forces, the Ad Hoc Committee felt the need for renegotiation and the differences thereby ironed out. In a number of aspects the Ad Hoc Committee had no great difficulty in thrashing the differences and working out a compromise which would at the same time satisfy both sides. In fact, regarding the nature and the set up of the provisional government, the Ad Hoc Committee itself felt that a collegiate type was impracticable and in fact it was of the view that the provisional government should be headed by one single


17 Pan American Union, n. 16, pp. 6-9.
loader acceptable as far as possible to both the sides. Regarding the withdrawal of the IAPF which both the constitutionalists and the Inbore forces had demanded the Ad Hoc Committee at all times maintained the view that the "withdrawal of the Inter-American Peace Force was a matter of the exclusive competence of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of the resolution of May 6, 1935, creating the Force".

In view of the incessant demand from both the sides for the withdrawal of the IAPF, the Ad Hoc Committee offered a compromise solution which suggested that the date and the manner of withdrawal of the IAPF could be determined in consultation with the provisional president after he was installed. On the issue relating to the formation of an indigenous Dominican army following peace settlement, both sides continued to maintain certain rigid postures. Whereas the Inbore government continued its efforts in excluding, by variety of means, the vestiges of the constitutionalist "rebol" army, the constitutionalists in turn demanded "the deportation of highest military officers" of the Inbore government and even sought that the military chief to be appointed for the new army should be drawn from the constitutionalists military. They continued demanding the 'reincorporation' of the constitutionalists military personnel in the Dominican armed forces "with the ranks" unchanged. Since the Ad Hoc Committee could not find a way out regarding the differences of opinion held

18 Ibid., p. 7.
by both the factions and in its anxiety to have the provisional government installed sooner than later, the Committee after several rounds of discussions recommended that matters relating to the Dominican army would be decided by the proposed provisional government which in turn would seek a suitable and satisfactory solution through an understanding between the interested parties.

Promptly on assessing the reaction of the contending parties, the Ad Hoc Committee, given its predisposition to work for a provisional government that has by now become acceptable to both the sides, decided to give priority to the establishment of such a government which in their certain judgment would pave the way for a permanent political settlement. In this direction the Ad Hoc Committee extended its efforts probing both the factions for an appropriate candidate for the provisional presidency. In addition, the Ad Hoc Committee also checked with representatives of leading Dominican groups necessarily not involved in either one of these factions to propose names for the provisional president.

According to some writers the candidate, Hector Garcia Godoy who was finally decided upon by the Ad Hoc Committee to be installed as the president of the provisional government was a decision which the US government had taken long before the Ad Hoc Committee had proposed. Whereas others contend that the name of Garcia

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21 The Ad Hoc Committee decided to give priority to the establishment of provisional government. The Committee appealed to both the contending factor to "submit lists" of names of persons for the selection of provisional presidency. "After carefully eliminating those who were clearly antagonistic to ... the United States" the Ad Hoc Committee began its procedural negotiations. Out of

(footnote contd.)
Godoj really emerged after considerable deliberations within the Ad Hoc Committee as well as after the Ad Hoc Committee had its series of discussions with the contending factions.

On the basis of available documents, even though it is difficult to verify the veracity of either one of these contentions, it is, however, possible to make the following surmise in regard to whether or not the US government thrust Garcia Godoy's candidature on the Ad Hoc Committee. As has been stated before the US policy-makers were, especially when the Special Committee returned without any concrete results, found themselves in a serious and complicated web of the internal political dynamics of the Dominican Republic, the resolution of which they realised required the majority support of the members of the OAS. The possibility of working out an amicable and immediate military solution to the Dominican crisis having been lost, the United States was more or less forced to accept whatever be the outcome of the OAS initiated efforts. It is no doubt true that the United

this process emerged Hector Garcia Godoy, "the man who impressed the Ad Hoc Committee on being most capable" and further "Ellsworth Bunker was greatly impressed by him" as the possible candidate to head the provisional Presidency.

While discussing this matter with Lowenthal, the writer gathered the impression that the US Government had already made up its mind clearly in favour of Garcia Godoy as the possible candidate for heading the provisional government long before the Ad Hoc Committee initiated its discussions. However, the Ad Hoc Committee's negotiations and discussions with the leading political factions enabled the United States not only to give legitimacy to its choice of Garcia Godoy, but also at the same time made it appear that the choice was on the basis of a democratic procedure. See Slater, n. 1, p. 119.

Ibid., pp. 119-23.
States even after resigning to the OAS, continued to the extent possible, its manoeuvres within the regional organization, with a view to get the best out of it in realising its ultimate objectives. Before long, however, the policy-makers in Washington realised that the increasing division within the OAS ranks, especially the dissenting views expressed by the influential members of the OAS such as Mexico, Chile, Uruguay and Venezuela, was making it difficult for the United States to have its own way. In fact the only achievement positively advantageous to the United States in submitting the Dominican crisis to the OAS purview was the indirect legitimacy that the OAS offered to its military intervention. Beyond that to push its way through the OAS in choosing a government, however provisional it could be, had become almost an impossibility. For one thing, the interim Government of National Reconstruction, under the leadership of General Imbert which the US government in the initial phase tacitly supported with the fond hope that it could possibly become the provisional government however, could not come by. More than that the constitutionalist by their sheer tenacity and conviction with the muted support of a large section of the civilian population had by then become a force credible enough to reckon. Under these circumstances the possibility of Washington making its own choice prior to the Ad Hoc Committee consulting with the contending factions, more importantly with that of the constitutionalists seemed somewhat remote.

At best the US policy-makers would have favoured a candidate

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23 For details, see Martin, n. 3, pp. 694-7.
for the provisional presidency who is neither the kind of an
Imbert with ambitions, political and otherwise that would prove
detrimental to US interests nor a person who would belong to the
extremists or terrorists groups with sympathies for the constitu-
tionalists cause. In fact the available evidence suggests that
the policy-makers in Washington themselves were increasingly dis-
posed towards a person who was a "liberal" and was acceptable to
the constitutionalists and who could to some extent be subjected
to friendly persuasions.

That Garcia Godoy could not have been the US administra-
tion's only choice can be further substantiated by the fact that
according to the report of the minutes of the meeting that the
constitutionalists held on 8 July there was considerable acrim-
emonious debate on the candidacy of Garcia Godoy himself. Within
constitutionalists group however, there was disagreement with
regard to the selection of Garcia Godoy's for the provisional
presidency. The radical left as represented by the 14th June
Movement and leaders like Hector Aristy and Jottin Curry along
with Social Christians considered Garcia Godoy as a reactionary
"who was being imposed on them by the Ad Hoc Committee", and

24 It is said that President Johnson on 20 May 1965 while
meeting with top Dominican strategists, seemed to have
remarked, "I am not going down in history as the man
responsible for putting another Trujillo in power in
Dominican Republic". See for further details Martin,
n. 3, p. 696. Also see Rowland Evans, n. 3, p. 525.

25 Slater, n. 1, pp. 119-20.

26 See for details Franklin J. Franco, Republica Dominicana:
Clase, Crisis y Commandos (Cuba, 1968).
therefore they should refuse to accept him even if it would pro-
voke the Ad Hoc Committee. They even maintained that the United
Nations could be approached as an alternative forum for achieving
their objectives in this regard.

The moderate faction of the constitutionalists as represen-
ted by the five-man group composed of the leaders of Dominican
Revolutionary Party which was set up by the constitutionalists
in early May to negotiate with the OAS, considered Garcia Godoy
as "a good man, and certainly the best they were likely to get". In
fact, they were more eager to seek reconciliation through the
OAS. They felt that if the OAS negotiations failed, the Imbert
forces might commit series of aggressions and in such a situation
even "the UN would be powerless to help the constitutionalists".
Further more the Ad Hoc Committee, convinced of its success in
installing Garcia Godoy's government conferred with the PRD
leaders in secret meetings and discussed the importance of having
a provisional government with a moderate like Garcia Godoy who
would be well disposed towards the constitutionalists. The PRD
leaders subsequently took efforts to convince other leaders of
the constitutionalists faction the advantages of having Garcia
27 Godoy as their provisional president.

It was even said that influential PRD activists like Jose
Pena Gomez through their eloquent speeches convinced the constitu-
tionalist leaders the need for accepting Garcia Godoy's candida-
ture. Though the minority of radical left like the 14th June
Movement and the Social Christians still maintained their

opposition to Garcia's candidature the PRD leaders succeeded in getting the support of the majority. Whatever might have been the differing points of view expressed by the moderates and the extremists within the constitutionalist camp, the upshot of these deliberations was decidedly in favour of Garcia Godoy. The basic factor which seemed to have influenced the constitutionalists in favour of Garcia Godoy's candidature was the unrelenting positive attitude of the Ad Hoc Committee. The final reply which the constitutionalist sent on 9 July to Ad Hoc Committee on the question provides ample testimony to the fact that despite the differences within the constitutionalist camp, it had in the end no other choice but to accept the Ad Hoc Committee's "insistence", to favour Garcia Godoy. Though the Ad Hoc Committee succeeded in its effort to convince the constitutionalists as to the need of having Garcia Godoy as their provisional president, it still had to get the support and concurrence of the Imbert junta. The Imbert junta though was quite reluctant initially to accept the candidature of Garcia Godoy, the Ad Hoc Committee through repeated negotiations almost pressurised the Imbert junta by suggesting that the US administration might withdraw its support if

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28 In a note addressed to the Ad Hoc Committee dated 9 July 1965, the constitutionalist stated: "In view of the Committee's insistence, the distress and anxiety prevailing in the country as a result of foreign intervention and occupation and need for the Republic to return to normalcy in all spheres, the constitutional government is compelled to redouble its efforts to secure solutions to the present crisis ... to the restoration of peace for which the country was longing, the constitutionalist government has decided not to object to Dr. Hector Garcia Godoy's becoming President of the provincial government...." UN Doc. S/6621, dated 12 July 1965, p. 47.
Inbort failed to endorse the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee.

With the selection of Héctor García Gómez to be the head of the provisional government, what remained to be accomplished by the Ad Hoc Committee was one of preparing a working document on the basis of which the Committee would install García Gómez as the leader of the new government. In pursuance of its limited objective the Ad Hoc Committee prepared a document entitled "Act of Dominican Reconciliation" and submitted it to the parties on 9 August. The document provided that both parties would recognize the provisional government presided over by Héctor García Gómez as the "sole and sovereign government" of the Dominican Republic and they would accept the Institutional Act as the basic constitutional instrument under which the provisional government would function. The draft document, amongst other things, included aspects such as general amnesty, incorporation of the zone held by the constitutionalists into security zone, recovery of arms from the civilian population, the reincorporation of the constitutionalists' military personnel into the Dominican army and finally, the procedure to be followed for the withdrawal of the IAPF.

In considering the draft document both sides expressed general satisfaction, however with certain qualification and

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amendments. Accordingly the Ad Hoc Committee made further revisions of such articles of the document over which some objections were raised by both the parties and on 23 August the Ad Hoc Committee once again presented the revised text of the document for the approval of the two parties. Finding that there are no more insuperable problems deadlocking the Ad Hoc Committee's initiatives, the document was presented for final signature of the constitutionalists and the GNR. On 31 August, with the GNR having already resigned in favour of the provisional government and the constitutionalist government already having agreed to resign, the document entitled "Act of Dominican Reconciliation" was signed on 30 and 31 August by both groups. Exactly three days later in a simple, brief ceremony in the National Palace, Hector Garcia Godoy, was installed as President of the Provisional Government.

To the Ad Hoc Committee, the day Garcia Godoy was installed as the Provisional President, was "a great day ... and the day

31 Some of the important provisions of the Act are as follows:

a) The "Government of National Reconstruction" and the "Constitutional Government" accept the Provisional Government presided over by Dr. Hector Garcia Godoy as the sole and sovereign government of the Dominican Republic. The members of the "Government of National Reconstruction" and of the "Constitutional Government" agreed to offer their fullest co-operation to the Provisional Government in the re-establishment and consolidation of political peace, as well as in the rehabilitation of the national economy;

b) The Provisional Government will, on the day it takes office, proclaim a general amnesty provided for in Article 11 of the Institutional Act and will take necessary measures to release all political prisoners; (c) The Provisional President will have the responsibility for assuring that public order will be maintained within the Security Zone". In discharging this responsibility, he may call on the "Inter-American Peace Force" for assistance.

(footnote contd.)
of the opportunity", which would "put an end to the conflict that has divided the Dominican people for four tragic months". The Ad Hoc Committee also stated with confidence that the Garcia Godoy's government "will guide the country along the path to recovery, and will establish in it the institutions of representative democracy".

From Provisional Government to the Election of June 1936

Admittedly the installation of the Provisional Government under the leadership of Hector Garcia Godoy was a great "opportunity" at least from the point of view of the Ad Hoc Committee. In the previous section, while discussing the role of the Ad Hoc Committee, ever since it commenced its mission in Santo Domingo on the strength of 2 Juno resolution of the Tenth Meeting to work for "the establishment of climate of peace and reconciliation", it was shown that the most immediate task it had undertaken was not as much a permanent settlement to the Dominican crisis as working out an interim solution. The interim or the ad hoc solution in the judgment of the Ad Hoc Committee was one of


33 Ibid.
establishing as quickly as possible a provisional government to
be headed by a person of a stature acceptable to the significant
segments of the Dominican population. Having achieved that objec-
tive no doubt the Ad Hoc Committee expressed its elation by des-
cribing the day when García Godoy was installed as President of
the Provisional Government as "a great ... and a day of the
opportunity".

That it felt extremely satisfied with the establishment
of Provisional Government was further reflected in the second
report the Ad Hoc Committee submitted to the Tenth Meeting of
Consultation of the OAS on 14 September. In the concluding part
of the report, the Committee stated: "With the installation of
Provisional Government and the initiation of the measures called
for in the Act of Dominican Reconciliation" it believed that it
has "fulfilled one of the fundamental tasks entrusted to it by
the Tenth Meeting of Consultation", in respect of "achieving the
establishment of a climate of peace and reconciliation" in the
Dominican Republic. While expressing confidence in the "new
government" which will enable the Dominican people "to return to
the peace and tranquility needed to seek its economic and social
recovery", the Ad Hoc Committee, however, strongly felt that "all
the technical assistance" the OAS could provide would ensure the
success and the effectiveness of the Provisional Government.

In respect of what the OAS should do so long the Provi-
sional Government was in power, the Ad Hoc Committee highlighted

34 Ibid.
35 Pan American Union, n. 16, p. 21.
the following activities. The role of the IAPF increasingly being questioned and its immediate and unconditional withdrawal demanded forthrightly by both the contending factions, the Ad Hoc Committee recommended: "Maintenance of at least elements of the Inter-American Peace Force in the Dominican Republic until the Tenth Meeting of the Consultation, in agreement with the Provisional Government, decided upon its withdrawal". Regarding other measures, the Ad Hoc Committee suggested the following: (1) the continued presence of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, at the request of the Provisional Government; (2) the designation of an OAS electoral committee, to advise the organization and holding of the election and (3) the establishment of a programme of technical and economic assistance to the Dominican people.

Against these suggestions, the Ad Hoc Committee specifically recommended: 1) the continuation of the Tenth Meeting's work until the installation of the constitutional government following the elections and 2) the continuation of the Ad Hoc Committee to "give advice and guidance" to the IAPF as well as "continue reporting" to the Tenth Meeting on the situation in that country. The other recommendations included the Tenth Meeting working towards increasing the disbursement of technical and economic assistance from the member states to the civil-war-devastated Dominican Republic as well as the designation of "an outstanding personality of one of the member states as Special

36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., pp. 21-22.
Representative of the OAS ... to supervise and coordinate all technical and economic assistance that the OAS may carry out in the Dominican Republic during the term of Provisional Government. 38

The recommendation of the Ad Hoc Committee regarding what the OAS should do following the installation of the Provisional Government were in fact specific. The situation in the Dominican Republic on the eve of Garcia Godoy assuming office as the Provisional President was such that it required the continued support and assistance from the OAS in respect of not only the technical and economic assistance to the war-ravaged republic, but also the moral support of the regional security organization. In that sense the day 3 September, for Garcia Godoy, was neither "a great day [nor] a day of opportunity". By no means, the resolution of the crisis, on the basis of the Act of Dominican Reconciliation offered a permanent solution to the problems confronted by the Dominican Republic.

The civil-war situation complicated further by the landing of the US marines remained unresolved. What is more, the diplomatic efforts and negotiations initiated by the OAS only gave "semblance of legality" to the naked military intervention of the United States. Further, the fact of the negotiating missions such as the Special Committee and the subsequent Ad Hoc Committee along with the creation of IAPF further aggravated the crisis situation in the civil-war-ridden island. As a climax, came a situation when the constitutionalists having the confidence of

38 Ibid., p. 22.
the majority of the civilian population were forced to accept a compromise in terms of a provisional government much against their wishes. With swords continued to be drawn between the constitutionalists and the military junta aided and abetted by a mighty military power such as the United States, the Provisional Government of Garcia Godoy could not work towards a permanent settlement. One of the basic pro-conditions for the permanent political settlement undoubtedly was the vacation of foreign troops, originally in the form of the US marines later converted into what came to be known as the IAPF. Despite the repeated demands, in fact from both the parties that the IAPF should be withdrawn, the Ad Hoc Committee for its own reasons took a narrowly legalistic view by suggesting that it is the Tenth Committee which had the authority to take a decision in that regard. Moreover, as stated above the Ad Hoc Committee in its recommendations to the Tenth Meeting made it abundantly clear that, if not the entire IAPF, at least elements of the Peace Force should continue to be maintained in the Dominican Republic.

No wonder therefore, the simmering conflict between the contending forces continued to erupt even after the Provisional Government came to power especially over issues relating to the organization of an indigenous military force and the manner in which the armies of the contending forces were to be reintegrated into the Dominican military under the Provisional Government. In

39 Ibid., p. 22.
the process, the Provisional Government could do little by way of bringing law and order in the Dominican Republic. And over the months, the Provisional Government had no other option except to resort to IAPF to police the Dominican Republic. In turn, the situation as it unfolded itself gave credibility to the continuing presence of both the IAPF and Ad Hoc Committee. The Ad Hoc Committee in fact continued its presence even after the Provisional Government had been installed contrary to its earlier stand that it is the Provisional Government and not the Ad Hoc Committee that would prepare the country for the elections and pave the way for the establishment of democratic institutions in the Dominican Republic. The Ad Hoc Committee continued to stay in Dominican Republic and began to work very closely with the Provisional Government till the elections were held in June 1935.

The record of the Ad Hoc Committee ever since the installation of the Provisional Government suggests that it was not the Provisional Government but the Ad Hoc Committee that was "indispensable to the solution of the Dominican crisis". In fact, in its report dated 1 October 1935 to the Tenth Meeting the Ad Hoc Committee said that "in view of certain rumours which were circulating concerning the difficulties that were said to be arising with respect to the implementation of the Act of Reconciliation ... the Committee decided to return again to this country [Dominican Republic] ... to study the situation". It added that the "object" of its returning back to Santo Domingo was one of "helping the government [ Provisional Government] to

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40 UN Doc. S/6621, 12 July 1935, pp. 46-47.
accelerate the implementation of Act of Reconciliation.\footnote{UN Doc. S/6741, 4 October 1935, p. 168.}

Even though, the Ad Hoc Committee on the basis of 2 June resolution, was expected to be the regional organization's negotiating mission, it however, generously agreed to "cooperate fully with the Provisional Government...\footnote{Ibid.} and accepted an invitation by the Provisional President to become a representative" of a Committee to serve as a member, the object of which was largely one of supervision. Invariably the representative to be chosen from the Ad Hoc Committee was the ubiquitous Ellsworth Bunker. Though, Ellsworth Bunker was the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, for routine tasks such as general supervision in respect of the recovery of arms from the civilian population and the integration of the constitutionalists military into the Dominican army it was not necessary that Ellsworth Bunker should have been chosen.

So that as it may, the Ad Hoc Committee continued to remain in Santo Domingo even after the establishment of the Provisional Government. Despite its repeated claims that "significant progress had been made in the effort to assure the full implementation of the Act of Reconciliation and towards the restoration of normal conditions in the Dominican Republic", the Committee agreed to extend its co-operation and support in whatever manner possible to Garcia Godoy's government.\footnote{UN Doc. S/6843/Corr.1, 29 October 1935, pp. 278-9.} The verification committee including the representatives of the Ad Hoc Committee

\footnote{UN Doc. S/6741, 4 October 1935, p. 148.}
\footnote{Ibid.}
\footnote{UN Doc. S/6843/Corr.1, 29 October 1935, pp. 278-9.}
began its task of verifying "the disarmament and the demilitarization aspects". One of the important recommendations made by the verification committee, presumably with the tacit support of the Ad Hoc Committee was one of transferring constitutionalists military personnel to a post outside the city where they could be integrated. It is not clear as to why the constitutionalist military personnel were transferred outside the city. The Ad Hoc Committee no doubt stated that such a step was of "urgent necessity" for "restoring normal conditions in the city". What is even more interesting was the Ad Hoc Committee's recommendation that the IAPF should implement the plan to that end. The Ad Hoc Committee in its several reports and messages conveyed to the Tenth Meeting often maintained that it was making such efforts as the reorganization of the Dominican army, location of different contingents in different parts of the city and the demilitarization at the request of the Provisional Government. In one of its reports, it even mentioned that the Provisional Government "drew up a plan whose execution has led in some instances to actual armed clashes, and requested, in agreement with Ad Hoc Committee, that the Inter-American Peace Force should enter the former constitutionalist zone in order to protect the inhabitants and restore law and order in the area".

Such references are replete in the reports prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee to the Tenth Meeting. Also replete are the references that the Ad Hoc Committee has been making regarding

44 Ibid., p. 230.
45 UN Doc. 3/4837, 29 October 1236, p. 236.
the normal law and order situation prevailing in the various parts of the city. If the situation as reported by the Ad Hoc Committee was normal or satisfactory in respect of the prevailing law and order situation in Santo Domingo, then neither the Ad Hoc Committee nor the IAPF was necessary, once the Provisional Government was installed. Undoubtedly, the continued presence of both the IAPF and the Ad Hoc Committee in Santo Domingo seemed to be for the purposes beyond what was claimed by the Ad Hoc Committee itself.

The situation subsequently seemed to have become even worse as claimed by the Ad Hoc Committee. By November 1965, the Committee claimed that there were attempts initiated by some groups essentially with a view to discredit, if not destabilize the Provisional Government. The subsequent reports claimed that the Ad Hoc Committee prevailed upon Garcia Godoy to continue to remain in power and that the Committee as well as the IAPF would make every effort to see that such disturbances aimed at destabilizing the Provisional Government were put down effectively by the IAPF. The Ad Hoc Committee at least implicitly claimed that but for its presence and the IAPF's vigilance, the Garcia Godoy's government would have been a victim of civil strife, if not, a coup d'etat.

Other than the Ad Hoc Committee's own reports, there is nothing by way of additional corroborative evidence that suggests that Garcia Godoy's government was effective because of the support and the timely assistance given by both the Ad Hoc Committee and IAPF. It is in fact very difficult to hypothesize on whether
the Garcia Godoy's government would have survived without the continuing presence of the Ad Hoc Committee. No doubt, there occurred armed clashes amounting to a limited civil-war in the country which would have had serious repercussions. However, once the Act of Reconciliation was agreed upon between the two contending forces and they themselves expressing faith in the Garcia Godoy's government, the possibility of the Provisional Government being overthrown was very remote. In any event, the US with its fond hope eventually to have an election decide the future of the Dominican Republic could ill-afford to let the Provisional Government go without the Ad Hoc Committee keeping a watch on the internal Dominican developments. It is even more imperative for the OAS to have taken the most appropriate and logical step of withdrawing both the Ad Hoc Committee as well as IAPF once power was transferred to the Provisional Government. In fact there were occasions when the Provisional Government had in unmistakable terms asked the Ad Hoc Committee not to exceed its limited jurisdiction. However, neither the Ad Hoc Committee nor the so-called "trouble shooter" diplomat Ellsworth Bunker restrained from offering generous counsel and requisitioning the IAPF to hold forth whether the situation warranted or not.

What is suggested is not that the Ad Hoc Committee with its supporting IAPF desired that it should run the Provisional Government. It is in fact very clear that even more than Garcia Godoy, it was the Ad Hoc Committee which was most anxious to have him at the helm of affairs and see to it that under no circumstances any danger -- external or internal -- threatened
his government. In a sense, it was the very objective of the US government at that juncture that Garcia Godoy's Provisional Government should survive without any interruption till such time the elections were held. Only the continued presence of both the Ad Hoc Committee and the IAPF that would have provided the necessary support to Garcia Godoy. And Garcia Godoy alone would have given a semblance of stability to the Provisional Government both of which were imperative for the United States.

46 See for details Jerome Slater, n. 1, p. 142. Also see Pan American Union, n. 16, p. 17.

During the crucial months of November-December 1935 when the plot to overthrow the Provisional Government was rumoured, the Ad Hoc Committee did a commendable job by co-operating with the Provisional President and assuring publicly of its support to the Provisional Government. See for details, UN Doc. S/6931, 13 November 1935, p. 363; S/6970, 23 November 1935, pp. 403-6; S/6975, 25 November 1935, p. 410; S/7034, 21 December 1935, p. 529.