Chapter III

INTERNATIONAL PEACE FORCE
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INTER-AMERICAN PEACE FORCE:
ITS GENESIS AND GAINS

Nearly four hundred US marines were landed on 28 April following an announcement to that effect by President Johnson. Two days after, an additional contingent of more than one thousand two hundred marines reached the Dominican Republic along with two battalions of US air-bound troops of about two thousand five hundred men to San Isidro air base, the headquarters of the military junta. By yet another order issued on 2 May by President Johnson, a further contingent of four thousand five hundred US troops were landed in the Dominican soil. Thus between 27 April and 3 May nearly fourteen thousand US troops had landed in the Dominican Republic.

Whereas on 28 April US President's order stated that the US troops would remain in the Dominican Republic "as long as necessary" to protect the lives of US citizens stranded in the cross-fire of an impending civil-war, his announcement of 2 May however conveyed that the US had a larger objective in that the marines were landed in order to "prevent another communist state

1 President Lyndon B. Johnson in his press statement on 28 April said, "I have ordered ... necessary American troops in the Dominican Republic.... Pursuant to my instructions, 400 marines have already landed". On 30 April about 1,200 more US marines were landed in the Dominican Republic, bringing the total number of US marines to about 1,700. On the same day, another two battalions of US air borne troops of nearly 2,500 were landed at San Isidro Air Base — headquarters of General Wessin Y Wessin. On 1 May another contingent of 2,000 US marines was sent to Santo Domingo. Department of State Bulletin, 17 May 1965, pp. 738-9.

2 UN, SCOR, 1196th mtg., 3 May 1965.
in this hemisphere. The initial landing of US troops and its subsequent escalation to a figure totally unrelated to the initial objective whether justified or not is beyond the scope of this study. However, the landing of the US marines unmistakably suggested that the US perception in regard to the Dominican crisis had undergone a perceptive change between 28 April and the first week of May. What actually were the circumstances that led to the initial commitment of US troops in the Dominican soil and its subsequent expansion is not the focus of the present chapter.

What, however, is relevant that needs to be examined, is how the United States forged ahead in committing its troops in the Dominican Republic and how it legitimised its presence from then on.

As the decision itself was sudden, whatever may be the pressures that the Johnson Administration presumably faced in committing its troops, once the landing of the US marines took place, the policy-makers in Washington were confronted with a situation that made it imperative for them to look for alternate options and justifications for legitimizing their actions initiated earlier.

On 2 May 1965, once again President Johnson spoke about the landing of US marines in Santo Domingo. Said Johnson, "Earlier today, I ordered two additional battalions - 2,000 extra men - to proceed immediately to the Dominican Republic. In the meeting I have just concluded with the Congressional leaders - following that meeting - I directed the Secretary of Defence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to issue instructions to land an additional 4,500 men at the earliest possible moment...." See Department of State Bulletin, 17 May 1965, pp. 744-8. Pan American Union, Acta de la Session Plenaria de Apertura in Actas y Documentos, OAS Official Records, OEA/SER.F/TII.10 (Washington, D.C., 1968), vol. 2, Edicion B, p. 9.
One of the immediate policy initiatives that the US administration resorted was linking their decisions and initiatives with the regional security organization via the Organization of American States. The question whether or not the US administration was justified in taking the Dominican crisis to the OAS is beside the point, for after all it did, on its own initiative, bring the matter to the attention of the OAS. The previous chapter examined at length the initial efforts of the OAS much of which, if not at the behest of the United States, certainly had the tacit approval of the policy-makers in Washington.

In justifying the commitment of its troops, a decision that brought the memories of Theodore Roosevelt in terms of what was then known as "gunboat diplomacy", the US administration moved away from its initial claim that the troop landing was made in order to protect the lives of the US citizens and unabashedly stated subsequently that its decision was, in conformity with the spirit of Monroe Doctrine to prevent non-hemispheric intervention in Latin America.

In any event the landing of US troops added a critical dimension to the already complicated Dominican situation, demanding inevitably a serious consideration and attention by the Latin American members of the OAS. While the Latin American countries were somewhat muted in their expression of misgivings about United States perception of the Dominican crisis and its role

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and posture in the early days of April, once the United States landed its military, at least some of the Latin American countries became vocally critical and demanded a review of the US action more than that of the Dominican situation itself. The United States was thereby caught up in a problematic situation much of which admittedly, was its own creation or making. The resolution of the tangle in which US was caught demanded the support of the Latin American countries. Realizing that the landing of the US marines was, in a sense, an unprecedented event at least in the near past, the United States clearly visualised that such an action would have to be necessarily supported and under-written by the Organization of American States. In the absence of such a support, certainly it would have been rather difficult for the United States to maintain its role in the Dominican Republic as well as retain, if not salvage, its image in the Western Hemisphere.

**Genesis of the Inter-American Peace Force**

The Tenth Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs that met on 1 May to discuss specially the Dominican crisis finally decided in recommending a Special Committee to do an on-the-spot study. In the course of the debate, however, as has been stated in the last Chapter many of the Latin American countries were either explicitly or implicitly critical of US military intervention. In meeting their criticism, US Ambassador to the OAS, Ellsworth Bunker, made a passionate speech in which he highlighted that it was essentially the humanitarian
impulse that impelled the United States to commit its military to "avoid for greater casualties and greater bloodshed". In doing so he even added that the US action was not inconsistent with the inter-American obligations and that "there were many precedents of this kind". He even mildly criticised the regional security organization, by saying that the US government had to commit its troops because "regrettably", as Ambassador Bunker put it, "there was no inter-American force available to respond to the request of the authorities and needs of the people of Dominican Republic". He concluded his pororation by saying: "My government would welcome the constitution of such a force (inter-American force) as soon as possible". This was followed by the Ambassador’s introduction of a draft resolution that provided for requesting "governments of American States that are capable of doing so to make contingents of their military naval or air forces available ... to assist in carrying out the mission of the Committee".

That the US had by then decided that it should pursue the idea of organizing an inter-American force was very evident for, right at the time when Ambassador Bunker was proposing the establishment of an inter-American force under the aegis of the OAS, the policy-makers in Washington had already decided in sending feelers initially to countries of Latin America which were

5 Pan American Union, n. 3, pp. 8-10.

favourably disposed towards the US on this very idea. As Ambassador Bunker was speaking on the floor of the Tenth Meeting on his brilliant idea of an inter-American force, President Johnson had by his own admission stated that he had sent "special emissaries such as Ambassador [Theodore] Moscoso of Puerto Rico [and his ...] able Ambassador Averell Harriman" to Latin America, among other things "to warn them that joint action is necessary".

It appears as though that before the Latin American members of the OAS could agree on the idea of an inter-American force, the US administration even by then was fully determined to go ahead, outside the OAS in seeking support for its idea of an inter-American force that would sooner than later legitimize the presence of US marines in Santo Domingo by inviting few contingents of Latin American forces to enlist themselves in the inter-American force in order to provide an inter-American character to it.

Why then was the United States in such great haste in organizing an inter-American force and dispatching them speedily to Dominican Republic? Subsequent explanations offered by the US administration often suggested that the idea of organizing an inter-American

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7 [Theodore] Moscoso of Puerto Rico and Ambassador Averell Harriman were sent as early as 1 May 1965 to several Latin American countries not only to explain the US policy towards Dominican Republic but also to solicit support for the proposed inter-American force. Averell Harriman visited countries such as Colombia, Peru, Brazil and Argentina while Moscoso visited countries such as Mexico and Venezuela. See for the details of their visit, Brazilian Herald (Rio de Janeiro), 4 May 1965; Buenos Aires Herald (Buenos Aires), 6 May 1965.

force was very much in the agenda of US policy-makers even before. 
So that as it may, the circumstances leading to the administration's interests in evolving an inter-American force in the critical days of the end of April and beginning of May 1965, were such that without winning the support of at least a majority of Latin American countries, the United States would have found it extremely difficult to explain its military intervention in Santo Domingo. As London Times rightly observed the entire effort of the United States of selling the idea by Bunker in the OAS and vending it through its able salesmen such as Harriman and Moscoso to as many Latin American countries was "an attempt to placate the indignation which U.S. intervention has aroused."

The diplomatic efforts in winning support for an inter-American force did not prove effective. The only country which without any reservations agreed to offer and pledge its troops to Santo Domingo was Brazil. While the bilateral diplomatic efforts by Washington resulted in winning only Brazil to the administration's idea of an inter-American force, the fate of Bunker's efforts at the Tenth Meeting was even less rewarding for, the Bunker's resolution could not gain any support.

The attitude of most Latin American countries by then had become very critical of the United States and of its overbearing actions in the Dominican Republic. Led by Mexico and Chile, the position of most Latin American countries had become

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9 Times (London), 4 May 1965.
10 Brazilian Herald, 4 May 1965.
11 See for details, Laman C. Wilson, n. 6, pp. 40-41.
very hostile to the United States. Both those countries through
their respective resolutions demanded, on the basis of the prin-
ciple of non-intervention to which the OAS was wedded, the with-
drawal of the US troops before any further action on the crisis
was envisaged.

Undaunted by the initial unfavourable responses of the
Latin American countries to the idea of an inter-American force,
the US government untiringly persisted in its efforts by bringing
another draft resolution on 3 May to the Tenth Meeting. Whereas
the US resolution of 3 May could not be put to vote, the develop-
ments in Santo Domingo revived the hopes of the policy-makers in
Washington to press for an inter-American force. One of the most
significant developments was the cablegram from the Special Com-
mittee to the Tenth Meeting of Consultation on 4 May. In the
communication, Chairman of the Special Committee, Ambassador
Ricardo H. Colombo, drew importantly the attention of the Tenth
Meeting amongst other things, that in the considered view of the
Special Committee, "it would be useful, in order to aid in bring-
ing a return of the Dominican situation to normality, for the
member states that are in a position to do so to establish a
combined inter-American military force under the Organization of
American States". It is however, curious to note that the

12 Pan American Union, n. 3, pp. 5-7.

13 Pan American Union, First Report of the Special Committee
of the Tenth Meeting of the Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, OAS Official Records: OEA/SER.P/II.10,
The US representative, Adlai E. Stevenson while acknowledg-
ing the efforts of the Special Committee in evolving IAPF

(footnote contd.)
Special Committee which was entrusted primarily with the responsibility of investigating into the Dominican crisis to have come up suddenly with the idea of an inter-American force. As has been stated before it may be recalled that at no point of time, throughout its functioning, the Special Committee had anything to say on the US intervention or on its so-called "humanitarian" mission. Nevertheless, that the Special Committee should by 4 May come up with a recommendation for establishing "a combined inter-American military force under the Organization of American States" perhaps suggests that it was done so at the behest the United States.

Having regained what it lost in the first round of the discussions, the United States at the Third Plenary Session of the Tenth Meeting on 6 May, brought once again the question of creation of an inter-American force now being blessed and promoted by OAS-sponsored Special Committee. It must, however, be quickly added that from the point of view of United States it was an uphill task. For, as has been stated, countries such as Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela offered only qualified and conditional support to the creation of an inter-American force.

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rhetorically admitted in the UN Security Council that "we know of its Special Committee efforts to establish an inter-American armed force to take over supervision of public order in the Dominican Republic", UN, SCOR, 1208th mtg., 14 May 1965. Emphasis added.

Most of the above mentioned countries strongly felt and unhesitatingly argued that the US interest in creating inter-American force at this juncture to be despatched to Santo Domingo was nothing but a clandestine and clever move to legitimize its unilateral intervention.

These countries strongly felt that once an inter-American force is organized with the co-operation of all member countries including that of the United States, then the marines that the US had already committed in Santo Domingo, *in se factio* would be incorporated and integrated in the so-called inter-American force and thereby would remove the stigma of US intervention. Speaking at the Tenth Meeting, Venezuelan delegate, Enrique Tojora Paris vehemently criticized the United States' unilateral military intervention and said that voting in favour of establishing an inter-American force at this juncture would tend "to legitimize the US intervention".

Speaking on the resolution, Mexican delegate Rafael de la Colina categorically affirmed that his country would refuse to legitimize the unilateral intervention of the United States. "The negative vote of Mexico as already indicated *is in conformity* with our decision not to legalize or connect ourselves with the act of unilateral *intervention* *which tended* to break ... the constitution of this organization. *Moreover* by an agreement to form and integrate an inter-American armed force under the unified command of this Organization of American

16 Ibid., p. 46.
States would only complicate and bring about unforeseen problems and grave consequences”.

Uruguayan delegate, Emilio N. Oribé, opposed the resolution on grounds that the presence of the US marines was “illegal and contradictory to the established principles of Article 2, paras 1, 2 and 4 of the UN Charter and Articles 15, 16, 17 and 18 of the OAS Charter”. He added that the situation of “illegality” cannot be justified by virtue of creating a new international force. The only delegate who offered his unqualified support to the resolution was US Ambassador Bunker! He described the meeting as “an historic occasion” for the OAS for paving the way for the formation of an inter-American force.

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17 Ibid., p. 47.
18 Ibid., p. 49. The text of paras 1 and 2 of Article 2 of the UN Charter is as follows:

Para 1: The Organization is based on the Principles of sovereign equality of all its Members.

Para 2: All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith, the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.

The text of Article 18 of the OAS Charter is as follows:

"The American States bind themselves in their international relations not to have recourse to the use of force, except in case of self-defense in accordance with existing treaties or in fulfilment thereof".

For the text of Articles 15, 16 and 17, see Chapter I.

19 The Cuban representative to the United Nations, Alvaroz Tabo, while criticising the OAS resolution of 22 May 1935, stated that US has again succeeded in legitimizing its intervention in the internal affairs of the other nations. By converting the US force into one of multilateral force, he alleged, that Johnson Administration had succeeded in

(footnote contd.)
A revised resolution calling for the formation of an inter-American force was jointly drafted and presented by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica and Venezuela. The operative part of the resolution provided for the formation of an inter-American force, the sole objective of which was to restore normalcy in the Dominican Republic.

The resolution further provided, for the creation of an inter-American force with the participation of the member states "willing and capable" of making their contingents of land, naval, air or police forces to the OAS. The force would function under a "unified command" of the OAS and the individual national contingents over a period of time would be "progressively equalized". Since the inter-American force "will operate under the authority" of the Tenth Meeting, the question of "withdrawal of the inter-American force from the Dominican Republic shall also be determined by "the Tenth Meeting of Consultations". These elements incorporated in the 6 May resolution clearly met the very basic objectives that the United States had in creating an inter-American force.

changing "a poisonous gas into a harmless anaesthetic". He further questioned the wisdom of the OAS in legitimizing the unilateral intervention of the United States. According to the Cuban representative: "The setting up of an inter-American Peace Force not only derogates from the objectives of the Organization of American States in order to give legal authority to the imperialist policy of Washington Government, but is a flagrant violation" of both the UN and the OAS Charter principles. UN, SCOR, 1219th mtg., 20th year, 25 May 1955.

The responsibility of supervising and authorizing the tasks and functions of the inter-American force being reposed in the supreme organ namely the Tenth Meeting, the United States had thereby succeeded in multilateralising the role that it assigned to its marines. Even though the resolution was passed with a margin of 14-5 with one abstention that of Venezuela, the resolution despite being opposed by Mexico and Chile with their negative votes, enabled the United States to achieve its prime objective with the support of as many countries that voted in favour of the resolution. What is even more interesting is the fact that the preamble of the resolution painstakingly highlighted that the establishment of the inter-American force was very much within the purview of the Charter of the OAS. The resolution in its preamble said, that the circumstances leading to the creation of an inter-American force were clearly under the obligation "to provide reciprocal assistance" amongst members of the Organization,

21 Pan American Union, n. 3, p. 46.
The fourteenth vote necessary to obtain the required two-thirds majority within the Council was often provided by the Dominican delegate representing Imbert government bitterly hostile to the constitutionalist. When the Council's Credential Committee noting that there existed no legal government in the Dominican Republic but only two warring factions, declared therefore that the Dominican seat was vacant. The majority members of the Council including the United States, although argued that there was no legal government in the Dominican Republic however, refused to de-recognize the credentials of the Dominican representative. Moreover, when the crucial decision of establishing the IAPF was put to vote, the fourteenth vote cast by the Dominican representative turned the tide in favour of the US. See MFM Document 50, Minutes of the Fifth Plenary Session, 8 May 1965.

The Cuban representative, Alvarez Tabio referring to this issue in the UN Security Council on 7 May 1965 said that the decisions of the OAS are completely "null and void"

(footnote contd.)
and that the OAS was "competent to assist the means" for "the preservation of peace and re-establishment of normal democratic conditions". Above all, the greatest and singular victory for the United States in respect of 6 May resolution was to be seen in another passage of the preamble to the resolution. It said: "The formation of an inter-American force will signify in fact the transformation of the forces presently in Dominican territory into ... that of the Organization of American States". In this one line the US administration had won a major legal battle the implications of which were far reaching. Because the US administration was in a serious quandary, especially after its ominous decision to intervene militarily, the critical task confronting Washington's policy-makers was one of salvaging their claims and sustaining their reputation as champions of democracy. If the

since they did not get a clear majority from the members of the Council of OAS. UN, SCOR, 1203rd mtg., 20th year, 7 May 1935, pp. 13-14. According to Prof. C.G. Fenwick, no delegate of a country can exercise his vote unless he received de jure recognition from the Council of the OAS. "The Council upon receiving the notice that a change in the government has taken place in one of its member states would call a special meeting to discuss the situation" but until "a de jure recognition is given by the two-thirds majority of the members..." the vote of his country would not be counted either under Rio Treaty or under Article 39 of the OAS Charter. C.G. Fenwick, "The defacto Government", American Journal of International Law (Washington, D.C., 1934), vol. 58, pp. 102-13.

Paragraph 3 of the preamble of 6 May resolution adopted by the Third Plenary Session of the Tenth Meeting stated:

"The formation of an inter-American force will signify in fact the transformation of the force presently in Dominican territory into another force that would not be that of a State or a group of States but that of the Organization of American States, an international organisation, which organization is charged with the

(footnote contd.)
United States had not in the first instance involved the OAS in the Dominican crisis and if it had not succeeded in creating the inter-American force and thereby integrated its forces already landed in Santo Domingo without the concurrence of the OAS, the United States would have certainly lost not only its basic objectives, more than anything else, its reputation.

The Special Committee in its second report once again reiterated its earlier plea that an inter-American force be created to handle the Dominican crisis. It therefore, welcomed the 6 May resolution of Tenth Meeting for the establishment of such a force. While doing so, the Special Committee noting the message that the US had given to the OAS that it was willing "to make available to the OAS to become part of the Inter-American Force its military, naval and air forces presently in the Dominican Republic for the execution of the mission and purposes contemplated in the relevant resolutions of Tenth Meeting of Consultation", added that it is time that the Tenth Meeting considered the specific "objectives of the Inter-American Armed Force within the present circumstances of abnormality in the Dominican Republic" and "determine the size of that force required to fulfill its mission". In this connection the Special Committee also sought the advice of the Inter-American Defence Board and according to the Committee's report, it appears

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responsibility of interpreting the democratic will of its members". See for details, Final Act, n. 20, p. 11.

that the Inter-American Defence Board had sent a report for the organization of an inter-American armed force to the Special Committee. In pressing for the establishment of an inter-American force, the Committee felt that since the "armed force called upon to act on behalf of the system" was a new development and since "no standards have been established for giving orders" to the inter-American force, the OAS is likely to face "new problems". While the Committee went so far in alerting the OAS that the idea of an inter-American force was fraught with "new problems", it did not indicate in any detail what exactly were the nature of such problems. In other words, while it welcomed the 6 May resolution in respect of the creation of an inter-American force, it however, left it vague as to what could likely be the problems that such a force would create in the process.

With the Special Committee coming nowhere to grapple with the problem of resolving the Dominican crisis and expressing its own misgivings about its activities, it became now imperative for the United States to concentrate all its efforts in respect of the OAS on the inter-American force. In this connection, the recommendations of the Special Committee -- in its second report -- regarding the creation of inter-American force and subsequently the resolution passed at the Thirteenth plenary session on 22 May provided a breakthrough for the United States.

The anxiety of the US government in creating the inter-American force was very well reflected in the speed with which the United States extended its support in organizing such a force following the 6 May resolution. In fact by 19 May, not only the
United States had agreed by a letter that it was making "available to the OAS ... its military, naval and air force presently in the Dominican Republic" for the creation of such a force it also had brought countries such as Costa Rica, Honduras and Nicaragua to meet the call of the Tenth Meeting's 6 May resolution.

The 22nd May resolution of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation, however, agreed to "determine the mission and objectives" of the inter-American force and requested Brazil and the United States to designate the Commander and the Deputy Commander respectively of the newly constituted inter-American force. It also provided for an appointment of a committee composed of those members designated by the President of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation "to study the functioning and maintenance of the Inter-American Force, and to present a report to the present Meeting of Consultation". On 23 May 1965, the Act of establishing the Inter-American Force under a unified command was signed by the Secretary-General and the chiefs of national contingents who had agreed to make their forces available to the OAS. On the basis of 22 May resolution, Brazil's General Hugo Pansaco Alvim became the Commander and the United States Lt. General Bruce A. Palmer Jr., became the Deputy Commander of the Inter-American Force. The Brazilian Commander arrived in Santo Domingo and took command on 29 May of the Inter-American Force which by then consisted of military contingents drawn from countries such as Brazil, Costa

24 Resolution adopted at the Thirteenth Plenary Session, held on 22 May 1965, see for details, Final Act, n. 20, p. 15.
The Role of the Inter-American Peace Force

Whereas the resolutions of 6 and 22 May designated the OAS sponsored and supervised military force as the inter-American force, a resolution of the Tenth Meeting of 2 June renamed it as the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF).

The break up of the individual countries' contribution to the formation of the Inter-American Peace Force as of 3 July 1955 were as follows:

**Brazil:** 840 soldiers, 270 Marines, 1 Commandant, 3 General Staff Officers, and 1 Chaplain

Total: 1,115 men.

**Costa Rica:** 20 Policemen and 1 Commander
Total: 21 men.

**El Salvador:** 3 General Staff Officers
Total: 3 men.

**United States:** 10,900 Armed force members - this number was arrived at after the withdrawal of US troops in proportion to the number of men contributed by other members of the continent.

**Honduras:** 250 soldiers.

**Nicaragua:** 164 soldiers.

**Paraguay:** 183 soldiers.

However, Paraguayan contribution came as late as 2 July 1955. It is interesting to note that the countries which contributed to the force were those essentially under right using military dictatorship. In addition, major Latin American countries with exception of Brazil, countries such as -- Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Bolivia, Uruguay, Peru and Venezuela -- were conspicuously absent. Apart from that the Latin American contribution as a percentage of the total strength of the force was disproportionately small amounting to only 14 per cent. See for details, Pan American Union, Annual Report of the Secretary General of the Organization of American States, Fiscal Year 1954-1955, OAS Official Records: OEA/SER.B/111.16 (English) (Washington, D.C., 1956), p. 3.

The Tenth Meeting decided to have a Committee established for studying the function and the maintenance of Inter-American force in accordance with 22 May resolution. This Committee, at the request of Costa Rican delegate (footnote contd.)
Even before the Act of IAPF was signed by the countries participating in it, the constitutionalists in the Dominican Republic had expressed in unequivocal terms their doubts and misgivings about the creation of the IAPF. In fact, ever since the IAPF came into being and more or less undertook such responsibilities that the US marines had assigned themselves on 28 April, the constitutionalists often complained to the UN Secretary-General's representative, Jose A. Hayobro that by and large the IAPF was giving protection to the military junta as well as meeting the larger objectives of the United States.

In fact quite frequently Col. Caamano complained to the UN representative that the situation in the Dominican Republic cannot be resolved till such time the US had vacated its marines all the more because of the fact that the US has now "legalised" its intervention by organizing IAPF, largely drawn on the strength of its already stationed marines. The constitutionalists, however, continued to uphold the view that the regional security organization had failed in its duty in so far as it "had not condemned the action of the government of the United States of

introduced a resolution calling for a change in the name of Inter-American Force into that of Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF). Fifteen members voted in favour of the resolution, one against and four abstained. However, the reason is not very clear why the Committee recommended for such change. Probably the US as well as the OAS were eager to make it clear to the world body that the establishment of IAPF was not for implementing enforcement action but as US representative at the UN, Adlai Stevenson put it, it was for the creation of "an atmosphere of peace and reconciliation", which fell well within the jurisdiction of the regional organisation as envisaged under Article 62 of the UN Charter. UN, SCOR, 1222nd mtg., 20th year, 9 June 1955, p. 9.

America". It was of the view that the creation of the Inter-American Peace Force, has only exacerbated and legalized the intervention of the United States and the OAS has, "to a great extent, endorsed this serious violation of sovereignty of a free state".

Ever since the IAPF began its efforts on the strength of the 22 May resolution it was caught up in a cross-fire of allegations and counter-allegations made by the constitutionalists on the one hand, and the military junta on the other. That the task of the IAPF was going to be undoubtedly difficult as well as delicate was very well foreseen by the officials of the OAS. In a statement made after signing the Act of Inter-American Peace Force, Jose A. Norn, Secretary-General of the OAS after describing the broad objectives of the IAPF stated: "The establishment of the Force demonstrates ... the ability of the Organization of American States to adapt to new conditions and to solve new problems -- problems having features which may not have been foreseen when the Charter and the Treaty of Rio were signed". General Hugo Pansaco Alvim soon after assuming office as Commander of the IAPF also emphasized the huge responsibility that has been placed upon him and his command. Realising the great task confronting him, General Alvim said: "The moment has arrived for the Organization of American States ... to show the world that the American States should and can find the solution by themselves in moments of difficulty". He added: "counting upon the lofty spirits of

love of the country of all Dominicans and in the assurance ... we shall all assist in preserving inviolability of human rights". He concluded by assuring that he "will act with absolute impartiality within the line of conduct established by the Organization of American States".

The IAPF, on the basis of its reports sent periodically by the Secretary General of the OAS to the Tenth Meeting appeared to have started off well. In a report sent as early as 26 May, it was said that the IAPF was "carrying out patrols in the safety zone with the mixed units made up of personnel from various contingents". A report from Deputy Commander Bruce A. Palmer Jr. stated that the IAPF was patrolling "all of the international security zone as well as the northern parts of the city. The only area of the city that they do not patrol is that part ... held by the Caamaño group". He further added that plans are afoot to make a complete investigation of all coasofire violations, as well as to reduce the military junta's forces "to token guard" in order "to secure the palace grounds". Continuing, he reported "that the Inter-American Force ... was politely received" by Caamaño's forces and the most important "outcome of the meeting was Col. Caamaño Dano's statement that Inter-American Forces would have complete freedom of movement whenever their investigation tasks made it necessary".

30 Pan American Union, American (Washington, D.C.), vol. 17, no. 6, 1985, p. 44.

By 2 June, with the Tenth Meeting appointing an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate for "creating an atmosphere of peace and conciliation", the IAPF began to operate under the general supervision of the Ad Hoc Committee.

Despite its promising beginning by the first week of June, the IAPF was riddled with innumerable problems most of which related to the violation of the ceasefire alleged by both, the military junta and Caamano's constitutional group. While on one hand the constitutionalists complained to the United Nations representative, Jose A. Mayobre about the attacks with bullets and mortars from the zone occupied by the IAPF -- a zone which according to Caamano was constantly revised and expanded to include the area under the control of the constitutionalists, the IAPF on the other hand, claimed that it was attacked by troops from "Caamano's zone" and if ever the IAPF returned the fire, the IAPF claimed it was "in order to defend" themselves and "deny" the objective of Caamano's forces which "were trying to manoeuvre and capture positions in the security zone".

32 The establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee and the role it played in the Dominican Crisis at different points of time, are discussed in Chapter IV.

33 The Commander of IAPF, General Hugo Parsaco Alvim in his report to the Ad Hoc Committee dated 15 June 1965 stated:

a) At 8.10 A.M. on 15 June 1965, the IAPF was attacked by troops from the Caamano's zone.

b) The IAPF after the grace period of twenty-five minutes returned the fire "in order to defend themselves".

c) The Brigade Commander observing the Caamano troops reported that the attacking troops were trying to manoeuvre and capture positions in the security zone.

(footnote contd.)
The United Nations representative while receiving the different versions of the origin and the nature of the firing incidents admitted that it was very difficult for him to be "able to verify the versions given to him by the two parties". All that could be said, UN representative claimed, was that there had been exchanges of fire between the two sides and more often than not the IAPF reacted "to silence the opposition if required, would launch counter-attacks in order to destroy such opposition". He however, added that the "situation in the city" had become "extremely tense because troops under General Antonio Imbert were known to have massed in large numbers in the general area north of the corridor" and that Colonel Caamano's forces were apprehensive that "they [Imbert forces] might be permitted to break-through the corridor". On the same token he also added that on the Caamano's zone there were "some armed civilian groups ... not ... fully under Colonel Caamano's control and responsive to his command".

Going by the reports of United Nations representative on

d) The IAPF denied the constitutionalists of this objective.

c) All this occurred until 11.30 A.M. after which there was no incident. At 12.25 P.M. when "Inter-American troops located near the Hotel Jaragua were violently attacked and compelled to return fire". However, as regard to the casualties, he reported that three US soldiers and one Brazilian lieutenant were wounded in action; while a civilian woman was killed in the security zone.


Dominican Republic and his assessment of the critical events unfolding themselves in Santo Domingo, at least till mid June the constitutionalists seemed to have had faith in the operations of the IAPF. As has been stated before, the constitutionalists in fact had permitted the IAPF to move freely even in the area outside the jurisdiction of International Safety Zone. The incidents of exchange of fire between the constitutionalists and the IAPF were also far and few and in terms of casualties were rather insignificant. The situation however, seemed to have undergone some changes especially after General Imbert's military government was installed, presumably with the blessings and support of the United States. Even since that time the Imbert forces appeared to have threatened the constitutionalists by breaking into the area of control. Also the assessment of UN representative, Mayobre implicitly suggested that there were exchanges of fire by this time between the constitutionalists and the IAPF, more often than not initiated by the former. However, in explaining the alleged violations of the ceasefire committed by the constitutionalists, the UN reports showed that in the constitutionalists camp there were "armed civilian groups" not "responsive" to Caamaño's command. In the view of Mayobre, the IAPF's armed action were mostly reactive and rarely preemptive.

The IAPF's rather 'neutral role' in avoiding, to the extent possible, any exchange of fire between the constitutionalists and the Imbert forces began to undergo drastic changes especially after the fighting that began on 15 June. The 15 June

incident, by all counts was a serious one. Even though the casualties in the exchange of fire were not considerable, the IAPF as a consequence advanced deep into the constitutionalist zone and established "new positions along the general lines" of the International Safety Zone. Particularly, the United States troops of the IAPF, following the incident, by 18 June "remained in occupation of eight new blocks" which was within the constitutionalist zone. Even after the ceasefire was restored, the IAPF did not return to its former lines, despite the demand made by the constitutionalists to the Ad Hoc Committee that the IAPF should withdraw to its original positions on grounds that these new positions were unnecessary to preempt the constitutionalists from mounting future attacks.

While the UN representative reports attributed that the 15 June incident possibly could have been initiated by "armed civilians groups" not under the command of Col. Caamano, it is however, believed that the incident and the consequent penetration that the IAPF made, was necessarily to pressurize the constitutionalists to accept the Ad Hoc Committee's proposals of 18 June for a compromise settlement which amongst other things, included a new provisional government providing for guaranteed free elections. Ever since the Ad Hoc Committee initiated its 18 June compromise settlement, the IAPF role began to be increasingly questioned by both the warring groups.

Yet another incident of exchange of fire followed by accusations and counter-accusations by the constitutionalist,

the Imbert forces and the IAPF surfaced in the second week of July. It is interesting to note that just as around the time of mid-June when incidents of serious violations of the ceasefire were reported by both the constitutionalists and the IAPF followed by the Ad Hoc Committee making public its proposals for a permanent settlement, the second week of July incidents preceded closely the announcement of the appointment of Provisional President, Hector Garcia Godoy. Exactly like the June incidents, in the July incidents too, the United Nations representative suggested that while he found "evidence of indiscriminate firing", however added that the firing directly came from two "IAPF positions". It is possible to argue that there appears to be some connection between the IAPF's so-called preemptive firing and the role of Ad Hoc Committee. It is even argued that whenever the conflicting forces refused to compromise with the recommendations suggested by the Ad Hoc Committee then the possible recourse of action of the Committee had been to deploy IAPF in order to achieve its objectives. As Juan Bosch said: "Every time the government of Colonel Caamaño refused to accept a point in the negotiations with the United States ... the Dominican Capital was subjected to an attack ... the slightest resistance to accepting these terms cost Dominican lives". The IAPF


38 It is said that a US military official while outlining the activities of the IAPF in the Dominican Republic seemed to have remarked that the ostensible purpose of the IAPF is to fight against Communism. He said: "Those are Communists we are fighting in there, and the only way to deal with a Communist is to kill him. The sooner and
Commander himself admitted at one point of time that the IAPF denied "the objective" of the constitutionalists. Moreover, the US representative admitted on the floor of the UN Security Council on 20 May that the US forces in the Dominican Republic were engaged in cleansing the country of communist insurgents.

In accordance with the resolution adopted by the Fourteenth Plenary Session of the OAS on 2 June, the Ad Hoc Committee was recommended to "continue the task begun by the Special Committee for the purpose of achieving the establishment of a climate of peace and reconciliation ... and to effect its economic and social recovery". The resolution further stated that the Committee was "to provide Inter-American Forces ... the directives necessary for the effective accomplishment" of the spirit of democratic impartiality.

The Ad Hoc Committee accordingly submitted its recommendations on 18 June 1935 to both the parties. The Ad Hoc Committee in its recommendations said that there was "a general reaction against possible resumption of fighting and a deep yearning for the restoration of climate of peace and conciliation", and one of the major tasks undertaken by the Ad Hoc Committee was to

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40 UN, SCOR, 1213th mtg., 20th yrar, 20 May 1935, p. 3.
provide for a provisional government to the Dominican Republic which would pave the way for the establishment of democratic institutions. With this in view, the Ad Hoc Committee sent its suggestion to both the parties in conflict. On 23 June the Ad Hoc Committee along with Antonio Guzman visited the constitutionalists to receive its reply on the recommendations it offered. In its reply, the constitutionalists faction noted that if the coup d'etat of 1963 had not intervened then possibly "the peace would have been an enduring reality" in the Dominican Republic. The constitutionalist government agreed to the proposals of the Ad Hoc Committee since it offered "an effective form of achieving a stable democracy" in their country. Further the constitutionalists stated that the Dominican armed forces shall be subjected to "the exclusive authority of the Provisional Government, with the constitutionalists soldiers maintaining their respective ranks, including those that at the time of the outbreak of the Constitutionalists movements were sworn into the armed forces by a decree of the Constitutional Government". With regard to the IAPF, the constitutionalists government suggested that "it should withdraw from the country, by a formula of evacuation that will allow its departure in period of time not greater than one month after the installation of the Provisional Government". However, no specific reason was given why it wanted withdrawal of the IAPF. But viewing from the constitutionalist

43 Ibid., pp. 343-5.
side, one can safely assert that the constitutionalists identified the IAPF with the US forces. As we had noted earlier, constitutionalists were apprehensive of US marines for they thought that at the time "when democracy triumphed over the small sector that never wanted, that still does not want, to respect the will of the majority, the marines and paratroopers of the American Army, on orders of their Government, trampled upon the soil of our sovereign nation". They further asserted that "with the creation of an Inter-American Peace Force it [the OAS] has to a greater extent, endorsed this serious violation" which they felt was contrary to the spirit of the OAS Charter under Article 15. It also asserted that "the Inter-American Force may be called a "Peace Force" but the name does not change its illegality".

The constitutionalists also affirmed that "in the face of the superior armed forces of the interventionist, the constitutionalist government understand that it must negotiate an agreement that will bring a solution to the Dominican Republic". Faced with this reality, it is no wonder that the constitutionalists claimed for the speedy withdrawal of the IAPF. Col. Caamaño also complained to the UN representative about the support given by the US to the forces of Gen. Hossin Y Hossin and General Inbert "by the creation of the security zone and the corridor controlled by the United States". He also stated that the "United States was giving concrete military and logistical support to these forces".

44 Ibid., p. 343.
Similarly the Ad Hoc Committee also received a reply from the Imbert junta. The junta too wanted the withdrawal of the IAPF. It said that the Government of National Reconstruction "expresses its desire that, once the plan to settle the crisis had been adopted, the Inter-American Peace Force should be withdrawn from Dominican territory". But no reason whatsoever was given by the military junta why it wanted the withdrawal. Possibly, Imbert whose aspiration to become President had by then been failed, wanted the elimination of the IAPF. In other words, it appears that Imbert was perhaps interested in disarming the Provisional President of any enforcement machinery which strategy he thought that he could manœuvre his return to power.

Though neither the 18 June recommendation of the Ad Hoc Committee, nor "the Declaration to the Dominican People" voiced by it contained any reference to the IAPF, it was however, made clear by the US that it would prefer the IAPF to be retained until the elections took place. In fact, the Provisional President was given the authority for withdrawing the IAPF in consultation with the Tenth Meeting. However, the IAPF did not withdraw until the new government was installed.

Perhaps, the intensity of criticism of US action could have been minimised had the US or Chile convened the meeting under Articles 3 or 6 of the Rio Treaty which clearly provided an opportunity for collective enforcement action. Further

48 In a letter dated 29 April 1935 addressed to the Chairman of the Council of the Organization of American States the
Articles 3 and 6 of the Rio Treaty envisaged both direct and indirect threat arising out of aggression or armed attack or other forms of aggression which threatened the sovereignty or political independence of any American state. Moreover, the Latin American countries had often chosen to convene the Organ of Consultation under provisions of Article 6 and Article 8 of the Rio Treaty whenever there was a threat of aggression or breach of peace. On the contrary, the Tenth Meeting of Consultation was convened under the provisions of Articles 39 and 40 of the OAS Charter to consider the Dominican situation. The resolution calling for the convocation of the Meeting merely stated that it had been convened to consider the "serious situation created by the armed struggle in the Dominican republic". The equivocal statement made no mention of armed attack, aggression, extra-continental or intra-continental conflict, or threats to the peace of Americas, one which would require the application of the Rio Treaty. Having moved its marines as early as 27 April in Santo Domingo the US could have convened around the date a meeting under the Rio Treaty, which would have given it sufficient legal latitude for taking collective action. Having failed to do so, it made frantic attempts later to

Venezuelan representative, Raul Niss, urged the members to call for a Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in accordance "with Articles 39 of the Charter and 6 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, in order ... [to] apply the applicable measures that ... deems necessary". Pan American Union, Documents of the Council of the Organization Relating to the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, OAS Official Records: OEA/SER.II.10 (English) Document 79, Rev. (Washington, D.C., 1965), 27 July 1965, p. 15.
legitimize its unilateral intervention through the OAS. Though US succeeded to a large extent in legitimizing its intervention in the Dominican Republic it weakened in the process the position of the OAS in the eyes of the hemispheric nations and also brought in the jurisdictional conflict between the United Nations and the OAS. Whatever may have been the impact that the creation of IAPF had on the OAS and its Charter principles, it is however important to note that the US succeeded in its efforts to create the IAPF under the sponsorship of the OAS and thereby facilitated the continued presence of its marines till such time the elections were held in 1966.

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